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当年我引发了我们与其他公司之间的诸多对立。
I caused a lot of antagonism between us and the other firms in those days.
你的筛选标准就像是，要么你拿下这笔交易，要么我拿下这笔交易。
Your filter is like, you're gonna get the deal or I'm gonna get the deal.
不是你死就是我亡。
You die or I die.
而且他们自己也不是什么省油的灯。
And they're not exactly shrinking violets themselves.
他们很讨厌那篇封面报道。
They hated that cover story.
比如，我登上了杂志封面。
Like, I'm on the cover of the magazine.
那本不该是他。
That's not supposed to be him.
那本该是那位企业家。
That's supposed to be the entrepreneur.
搞什么鬼？
What the hell?
我是说，他们就是
I mean, they just like
失去了
lost the
我们没有
We didn't
当时没有任何企业家
have any entrepreneurs for the time.
风险投资就像个大秘密
VC was like a big Secret.
而真正创建公司也是个天大的秘密
And then actually building companies was a big secret.
没错
Yes.
所以光是谈论这些就已经是个很大的差异化优势了。
And so just kind of talking about it was a big differentiator.
我们没有产品。
We don't have products.
是啊。
Yeah.
而且我们确实没有产品。
And we we don't have products.
我们有的是人才和创意。
We have people and ideas.
仅此而已。
That's it.
2009年，在金融危机最严峻的时期，两位创业者决定为一家风投公司募集3亿美元资金。
In 2009, at the bottom of the financial crisis, two entrepreneurs decided to raise $300,000,000 for a venture capital firm.
他们此前从未涉足风投行业，并计划以全新方式运作：积极营销、搭建平台、让自己登上杂志封面。
They had never been VCs before, and they planned to do everything differently: marketing aggressively, building a platform, putting themselves on magazine covers.
所有资深风投都告诉他们这是个糟糕的主意。
Every established VC told them it was a terrible idea.
十六年后，Andreessen Horowitz从根本上改变了风险投资的运作方式。
Sixteen years later, Andreessen Horowitz has fundamentally changed how venture capital works.
今天，Ben和Mark将与这场转型背后的策划者对话——Marcet Wenmockers，他在公司还窝在餐厅卡座里办公时就加入了，担任营销主管。
Today, Ben and Mark talk to the person who architected that transformation from behind the Marcet Wenmockers, who joined as head of marketing when the firm was literally operating out of a restaurant booth.
这是一场关于打破垄断的对话：关于为何保密不再奏效作为商业策略；关于Marc Andreessen如何在对记者随口一提后，一气呵成写下《软件正在吞噬世界》；也关于当下正在发生的深刻转变——那些缺乏真实有趣创始人掌舵的公司正开始败退。
This is a conversation about breaking cartels, about why secrecy stopped working as a business strategy, and the moment when Marc Andreessen wrote Software is eating the world in a single draft after an offhand comment to a reporter, and about a profound shift happening right now where companies without authentic, interesting founders at the helm are starting to lose.
当Ben Horowitz登上《财富》杂志封面时，其他风投惊慌失措地给LP打电话是有原因的。
There's a reason other VCs called their LPs in a panic when Ben Horowitz appeared on the cover of Fortune.
他们预见到了即将到来的变革。
They understood what was coming.
我们将剖析他们的成功之道、差异化策略，以及为何我们正在经历的这场转型远未结束。
We cover how they did it, what worked, what they do differently, and why the transition we're living through is far from over.
好的。
Alright.
欢迎来到a16c，我们这是第几期了？
Welcome to the a 16 c what are we on?
《马克与本秀》。
The Mark Ben Show.
欢迎来到《马克与本秀》。
Welcome to The Mark and Ben Show.
我们有幸邀请到玛格丽特·温梅克斯，过去十六年间A16z传奇的市场营销负责人。
We've got Margaret Weinmachers, the legendary head of marketing for A16z for the last sixteen years.
她将为我们讲述这一切的来龙去脉。
And she is going to tell us the story of all that.
你们这些年断断续续听我和马克提过，但今天我们要从当事人那里听到真实版本。
You've heard snippets of it from me and Mark over the years, but now we're gonna hear the real thing from the real person.
马克，欢迎你。
Mark, welcome.
非常感谢你们的邀请，各位。
Thank you so much for having me, guys.
很高兴来到这里。
I'm thrilled to be here.
但介于‘传奇’和15、16年这些词之间，我感觉自己有点老古董了。
But between the legendary and the 15 or 16, I feel kinda ancient.
睿智。
Wise.
睿智。
Wise.
睿智。
Wise.
睿智。
Wise.
睿智。
Wise.
睿智。
Wise.
是啊。
Yeah.
真的。
Real.
它把我们所有人都耍了。
It's kidding us all.
这非常艰难。
It's very rough.
我知道。
I know.
事情就是这么操蛋。
It's just a bitch that way.
也许我们可以从我们相遇的时候说起。
So maybe we could start with when we met.
我很想听听你的视角。
I'd love to hear it from your perspective.
我不知道。
I don't know.
当时是在
Where were
哪里来着？
we at?
霍比家还是
Hobie's or
我觉得
I think
是奶油坊。
it was the Creamery.
奶油坊。
The Creamery.
奶油坊。
The Creamery.
这正是我要请求的。
Which I would request.
你当时不在是吧。
Was your off Yeah.
我还没想起来。
I forgot yet.
公司是从奶油厂起步的。
The firm started at the Creamery.
没错。
That's right.
对。
Right.
正是。
Exactly.
所以某位不便透露姓名的人曾试图雇佣被放逐者。
So a certain someone who shall go nameless tried to hire outcast.
于是Facebook提出了利益冲突的问题。
And Facebook invoked a conflict of interest.
你很清楚那人是谁。
You know exactly who that is.
对吧？
Right?
然后那个某人就给马克打了电话，就是直接联系马克·扎克伯格，我觉得你有比帮马克·扎克伯格走关系更重要的事要做，比如，你干嘛不...随便啦。
And so that certain someone called Mark and said, just call Mark Zuckerberg, and I think you have better things to do than pull a favor for Mark Zuckerberg to go, like, why don't you, like, just whatever.
总之，我想你是问过我的邮箱地址。
Anyhow, but I think you asked for my email address.
我们就是这样认识的。
And so that's how we were introduced.
然后有人让我去乳品店找那里的服务生。
And then I was told to go to the creamery, the waiter at the creamery.
他说：去那儿等着。
He's like, go be it here.
他们正在和一些民主党官员之类的人会面
They're meeting with some democratic functionaries or something like that.
于是我就带着我有限的能力在那里等待，其实我多年前就见过你，但完全不记得了
So I wait there with my little capabilities And I had met you, like, years before, but no recollection.
我并没有见过你
I had not met you.
我只是听说过你的一些事情
I'd heard about you a little bit.
所以我带着我的能力展示去了那里
So I go there with my capabilities presentation.
我坐了下来
I sit down.
民主党人离开了包厢
The democrats left the booth.
我坐了下来
I sit down.
你基本上就是直直地看着前方。
You basically were just looking straight ahead.
你当时的样子就像——我不知道你在想什么，但肯定不是什么重要的事。
You were just like I don't know what you were thinking about, but it was not that much.
大概是在想怎么让公司摆脱那个困境吧。
Probably how how we get the firm off that.
我们筹集资金。
We raise the money.
然后马克拿走了那份通用的能力说明文件，我完全不知道它为什么会在那里。
And then Mark grabs the capabilities position, which was generic because I had no idea why it was there.
然后你就开始问：'你们如何选择客户？这些是你们的客户吗？为什么选那些客户而不是这些客户？团队情况如何？'诸如此类的详细问题。
And you go, Okay, so how do you pick the clients and here are the clients and why those clients and not these clients and teams, whatever, detailed questions.
所以，我有点招架不住了。
So, I got a little grueling.
然后你们俩说了声谢谢，我就离开了。
And then you both said thank you, and I left.
我推测可能是因为你当时在做天使投资，而且刚刚离开惠普。
And I concluded that it was probably because you were angel investing at the time and you had just left HP.
我当时想，他们可能只是想找个能推荐给他们天使投资组合的人，诸如此类。
I was like, they just wanna have somebody they can recommend to their angel portfolio, whatever.
对。
Right.
对。
Right.
然后几个月后，我们在瑰丽酒店见面了，我记得。
And then a few months later, we met at the Rosewood, I think.
不对。
No.
不是瑰丽酒店吗？
It was not the was it the Rosewood?
我们经常去那里。
We were there a lot.
然后你们就说，好吧。
And then you guys went, okay.
所以我们要创办这家公司，超级机密之类的。
So we're gonna start this firm and top secret blah blah blah.
我要创办这家公司，就我们两个人，三亿美元。
I'm gonna start this firm, and it's gonna be the two of us, 300,000,000.
那时候资金还挺紧张的。
And this was at a certain time where money was kinda tight.
是啊。
Yeah.
2009年。
2009.
对。
Yeah.
世界末日。
The end of the world.
没错。
Right.
当时完全没有流动性。
There was no liquidity.
上一次的世界末日。
The last end of the world.
是啊。
Yeah.
我看起来有点困惑，我说，你知道，现在时机不太好。
And I looked a little quizzical, and I said, you know, it's not a great time.
然后你说马克说过：我们假设会成功，好吗？
And you said Mark said, let's assume success, shall we?
当时你已经有了这个想法——我们想说点什么，但又不能接受媒体采访或上推特之类的去筹钱。
And then you had already had the idea of, well, we wanted to say something, but we couldn't be out talking to press or be on Twitter at the time or whatever else and raise money.
会被视为在公开募资。
Be viewed as So soliciting money.
马克随后去了。
Mark then went.
我记得他有个常驻邀请，在查理·罗斯的节目上。
He had a standing invitation, I think, on Charlie Rose.
你上了查理·罗斯的节目，聊得非常愉快。
And you went on Charlie Rose, and you had a very nice chat.
在最后，他说，顺便一提，我们要成立一家风投公司。
And at the very end, he was like, well, by the way, we're gonna start a VC firm.
然后我们都沉默了。
And then we all went quiet.
事情就是这样。
So that was that.
这是我的记忆。
That's my recollection.
我不知道你们你们怎么想的。
I don't know what you guys thought.
我记得当时在想，是啊，我完全被'我们怎么筹钱'这个问题分散了注意力。
I remember thinking, yeah, like, I was just so distracted with how do we raise money?
在那之前，我们甚至都没见过有限合伙人。
Like, we had never met LPs till then.
我们见过的每一个风投，同时我们也在接触大量风投试图了解这个行业，他们都说这个基金想法蠢透了。
And every VC that we had been meeting with, and at the same time we were meeting with lots and lots of VCs trying to understand the industry, and they all said, that's a dumbass idea for a fund.
你们绝对不该这么做。
You should definitely not do it.
我猜他们只是想给你们工作机会吧。
They just wanted to give you jobs, I'm assuming.
是啊。
Yeah.
其中有个风投说我们永远不可能从有限合伙人那里募到资，所以应该直接从风投那里筹钱，然后给投资的风投分一半收益。
Well, one of them said that we'd never raise it from the LPs, so we should just raise money from VCs and give the VCs who invested half the carry.
就是
That was
一个有趣的计划。
an interesting plan.
是一种策略。
Was one strategy.
然后整个平台的事情，那真的很蠢，因为之前有人尝试过并证明了，你知道，QED，它根本行不通。
And then the whole platform thing, that was really dumb because it had been tried before and proven, you know, QED, that it could never work.
实际上，谁真正尝试过这个？
Actually, who tried it for real?
我不知道。
I don't know.
所以我认为他们主要考虑的是孵化器。
So I think the main thing that they were thinking about was the incubators.
哦，是的。
Oh, yeah.
孵化器是
The incubator was
类似比尔·格罗斯的那种。
the Sort of the Bill Gross.
那是九十年代末。
It was the late nineties.
没错。
Exactly.
而且，你知道，其实回想起来，这确实非常非常像，有个叫比尔·格罗斯的创意实验室。
And, you know, actually in retrospect, like, it's actually very, very like, idea so there's this Bill Gross, Idealab.
对。
Yeah.
这个孵化器创造了，我想，很多公司。
This incubator created, I think, lot of companies.
我是说，你创建的公司最终成为了基本上创造了谷歌搜索模式的公司。
I mean, the companies you created turned out to be the company that created basically the Google search model.
这还是个小模型。
And this is small model.
就像，还有一堆其他非常有趣的公司。
Well as, like, a bunch of other, like, super interesting companies.
所以我认为那些优秀的公司表现比人们记忆中的要好。
So I think the good ones work better than people remember.
不过确实。
But yeah.
而且那时的孵化器要拿50%的股权分成，对吧？相比之下，Y Combinator著名的7%就很低了。
And the incubators in those days went for like a 50% equity split, right, as contrast to the Y Combinator, which is famously like 7%.
为了证明拿50%是合理的，他们提供了办公场地和
And so to justify the 50%, they provided your office space and
会计服务以及
your accounting services and
法律服务等等，没错，正是这样。
your legal services and so right, exactly.
我们当时已经是创业者了，所以对风投机构真正能提供什么有着截然不同的看法。
And we had been entrepreneurs, and so we just had a very different perspective on what we actually needed from our venture firms.
所以我们与孵化器的看法截然不同，而现有的风投机构由于种种原因，就是无法设身处地站在那个位置。
And so we just had a very different view than the incubators And then the existing VCs just, yeah, for whatever reason, couldn't put themselves in that hotel.
我想是因为他们自己没当过创业者。
I think because they hadn't been entrepreneurs.
他们从未成为风投产品的客户，所以不会透过那个视角来看问题。
They hadn't been customers of the VC product, so they weren't looking at it through that lens.
他们是从提供者的角度出发的。
They were looking at it from the provider.
顺便说一句，那些企业都是非常优秀的企业。
By the way, those businesses were all great businesses.
所以，在某种意义上，他们确实有傲慢的资本。
So, they sort of earned the right to be arrogant in that sense.
是啊。
Yeah.
我记得比尔·格罗斯在谈话时提到，我见到他时，他满脑子都是各种想法。
And I remember Bill Gross, when he was talking and I met him, it was all like, okay, I have all these ideas.
不，那也是
No, it was also And
是有那么回事。
there was that.
对吧？
Right?
更高级的胡桃夹子。
Higher nutcracker.
因为你们来自完全不同的视角，你们拥有这些想法并相信拉里·埃里森那些人拥有的是创意，而非金融机器。
Because you guys had come from a completely different lens, where you had the ideas and believed that Larry Ellison, those people had the ideas, not the financial machinery.
对吧？
Right?
是的。
Yeah.
而且显然，你们已经吸收了奥维德的剧本。
And then obviously, you had absorbed the Ovid's playbook.
对吧？
Right?
所以这与孵化器是截然不同的平台版本。
So it's a very different version of a platform from an incubator.
是的。
Yeah.
我的意思是，这基本上就是我们所做的。
I mean, that's basically what we did.
当我们为正在做的事情寻找历史模型时，结果发现是CAA，因为它更符合我们心中的构想，因为在硅谷还没有这样的先例。
When we had to find a historical model for what we're doing, it turned out to be CAA, because that just mapped much more to what we had in mind because there hadn't been a precedent like that applied in the valley.
是的。
Yeah.
而且那时候，Ovets的书还没出版。
And at that time, it was before Ovets' book came out.
所以整个策略基本上是个秘密。
So that whole strategy was basically a secret.
没人知道这件事。
Nobody knew it.
比如，你必须认识奥维茨才能了解它。
Like, you had to know Ovets to know it.
而且奥维茨非常神秘。
And Ovitz was very secretive.
我们进行了多次交谈才真正从他那里套出信息，尽管他已经离开CAA多年了。
We had several conversations before we could actually get it out of him, even though he was out of CAA for many years.
这就像是他想出的一个非常秘密的配方，而且非常了不起。
It was like a very secret formula he had come up with, and it was an amazing thing.
但最终让他加入董事会是个天才之举。
But it ended up being a genius thing to have him on your board.
从外部看这是个非常非传统的选择，但它带来了各种有用的人脉和有益的思考。
Like, was a very unorthodox pick looking in from the outside, and it led to all kinds of useful connections and useful thinking.
对吧？
Right?
是啊。
Yeah.
确实如此。
It's true.
没错。
Yeah.
当时这在我们的董事会内部都存在争议。
It was controversial at the time, even amongst our own board.
不说具体是谁，但让他们加入确实与众不同。
Won't say names, it was different to have them.
我们其实是通过罗恩·康威认识他们的，对吧？
We actually met them through Ron Conway, right?
是啊，很多年前了。
Yeah, years ago.
史上最强人脉枢纽。
The human router of all time.
人肉路由器，没错。
The human router, yeah.
Ron那次引荐真是棒极了。
That was a great intro from Ron.
这段友谊真是耐人寻味。
What an interesting friendship that's been.
接下来发生的事情是，我们准备融资，并决定接触媒体——这对风投机构来说，采取如此激进的策略在当时非常罕见。
So the next thing that happened, we're gonna raise the money and we decide that we're gonna talk to the press, which was very different for VCs to actually be aggressive about that.
通常，风投们会想和媒体交流，其中一些人在公司上市时曾是客户。
Usually, the VCs would wanna talk to the press, and some of them had been clients, at the IPO time.
所以他们基本上希望零风险。
So they wanted to basically have no risk.
但当公司上市时，他们就会说，嘿，那是我做的。
But then when the company goes public, it's like, hey, I did that.
所以可以说，我们反其道而行之。
So we did it backwards, if you will.
是的。
Yeah.
你说得对。
You're right.
我们当时两手空空，就直接上了。
With nothing in hand, we just went for it.
所以我们一募集到资金，没错，为了媒体宣传之旅我们必须先完成募资，因为涉及抢先交易的问题。
So as soon as we raised the fund, yeah, we must have had to raise the fund to do the press tour because of the gun jumping.
那么你是怎么考虑的？
So how did you think about it?
我想除了《连线》杂志当面拒绝我的时候，从我们的角度来看这还是挺神奇的。
I guess it was very kinda magical from our point of view other than when Wired slammed the door in my face.
不过
But
嗯，那是个毫无意义的信号。
Well, that was a useless signal.
我们意识到，哦，我们得稍微平衡一下这边的舆论场。
We realized, oh, we have to even the plague field over here a little bit.
是啊。
Yeah.
那确实有点问题。
That was a little bit of a problem.
那就跟我们说说这个吧。
So tell us about that.
嗯。
Yeah.
当一切进展如此神奇时，我过去常这样想：好吧。
Way I used to think about this when this was all working so magically is that okay.
如果你读任何文章，只需剖析标题、段落，看它是如何展开的。
So if you read any article and you just dissect the headline, the paragraphs, like how it unfolds.
然后你拿像你们这样的客户或产品公司为例，想想，我该怎么填充内容呢？
And then so you take a client like you guys or a product company, go, okay, how do I fill that?
我该如何从记者的视角来撰写这个故事？
How do I write that story from a reporter's point of view?
你们实际上拥有这个条件吗？
And do you actually have it?
对吧？
Right?
所以如果故事内容是'三亿美元和两个从未真正做过这事的人'，那可不算个好故事。
And so if the story is, oh, dollars 300,000,000 and two people who have never actually done this before, that's not a great story.
但我们确实有专栏内容需要填充，可以说，因为你们提出了这个平台构想。
But we did have the column interest to fill, if you will, because you had the idea for the platform.
对吧？
Right?
你们已经是经过验证的成功创业者。
You had been proven successful entrepreneurs.
你们在核心受众中拥有可信度。
You had credibility with the core audience.
对吧？
Right?
退一步说，我们共同决定的是要将所有沟通都针对创业者。
And taking a step back, the thing that we all decided is we're just going to aim all of our communications at the entrepreneurs.
针对创业者而非有限合伙人。
At the entrepreneurs versus the LPs.
因为我们有他们的联系方式，知道如何联系他们，而且你们获得了很好的人脉引荐。
Because we have their numbers, we know how to call them, and you guys got great introductions to people.
但所有内容都必须非常创业者友好。
But it all needs to be very entrepreneur friendly.
于是我们开始行动，就像我们拥有这个平台，一切都是为天才创业者服务，然后希望这个想法能成功，对吧？
And so we sort of set out, like, we have this platform, and it's all in service of the entrepreneur who is the genius, and then hopefully the idea works, right?
然后我们能否增加价值？
And then can we add value?
对我来说这很不同，毕竟我见过几乎所有其他风投人士。
And that was different enough to me, having met, like, most of all the other VCs.
然后，你知道的，那边那个高个子曾共同创造了浏览器。
And then, you know, the tall guy over here had co created the browser.
所以这算不上是风投的资历
So that was not a VC credential
是啊。
Yeah.
但这是非常了不起的创业者资历。
But it was an incredible entrepreneur credential.
对吧？
Right?
就像，确实。
Like, so Yeah.
没错。
Right.
你懂吧？
You know?
然后然后你完成了史上最伟大的逆转和拯救。
And then and then you the the turnaround, like, the save of all time.
我是说，我不太擅长体育类比，但这里面肯定有17个（类比）。
I mean, I I'm not so good with sports analogies, but there's there's gotta be 17 in there.
对吧？
Right?
就像，成功扭转局面后把它卖给了惠普，换来了真金白银。
Like, having turned that around and then sold it to HP and like, for, like, money money Yeah.
这简直太精彩了。
It was just spectacular.
所以我认为背后的两位主导者都非常支持创业者。
So I think the the two people who were behind it were very entrepreneur friendly.
他们在技术领域和品类开创方面都有过硬资历，更懂得如何运营这类公司。
They had really good credentials both on the tech side and a category creation side and on the sort of, like, how does one execute one of those companies?
然后你还有资金支持。
And then you had the money.
而且你们在那个时期拥有资金
And you had the money at a time
在那个时期
At time.
没错
Right.
当时市场上根本没有资金
When there was no money.
是啊
Yeah.
对吧？
Right?
那时候几乎没人真正在融资
Like, there was nobody really raising.
而其他人呢，他们可以坐着等待，直到市场好转，对吧
And, like, the other people, they could just sit and wait, right, until times got better.
是啊。
Yeah.
然后我记得没错的话，你三个月就搞定了，这在当时看来非常了不起，因为那时候根本没钱。
And then I think, if I remember correctly, you had done it in three months, which at the time seemed very spectacular because there was no money.
所以我后来可以这样推销：看，就是这两个人，他们三个月就做到了，你看新闻了吗？
So I could then pitch in, it's like, okay, like it's those two guys and it did in three months and have you read the news?
然后他们就有了各种想法。
And then they have all these ideas.
其实，我们融资时发生过一件特别逗的事，马克比我恼火多了，我只是觉得莫名其妙。
Well, actually, one of the funny things that happened while we were raising money that upset Mark much more than upset me because I just thought it was weird.
我们去见一个认识的LP，结果那位LP走进会议室时——
But we went to see an LP who we knew, and the LP walks into the meeting.
这个场景一下子让我们回想起整个融资过程，如果你想投资公司的话，经历这些其实挺好的，因为你需要知道那种感受。
And here we are, it really kind of brought us back to raising money in general, which is a good kind of thing to go through if you're gonna be investing in companies, because you need to know what that feels like.
我们当时正在排练路演，把所有要点都梳理好了。
So, we're practicing the pitch where you got it all lined up.
我们说，好吧，这是个重要会议。
We're like, Okay, this is a big meeting.
对方是位大LP。
It's a big LP.
我们进去后，那人进来就说，哦，对。
And we go in, and the guy comes in, and he goes, Oh, yeah.
听说你们在搞的事情。
Hear what you guys are doing.
我觉得，你们最快也要十八个月才能募到资，但会非常困难。
I think, you know, at best, you could raise it in eighteen months, but it'll be very hard.
但我得走了。
But I gotta go.
我要去见几个前NFL球员。
I'm gonna go talk to some ex NFL players.
原话。
Quote.
引用。
Quote.
我得去斯坦福一趟。
I have to go over to Stanford.
我要去给一屋子NFL球员讲解如何理财，现在他们的NFL职业生涯已经结束了。
I have to talk to a roomful of NFL players on how to manage their money, and then now that their now that their NFL careers are over.
是啊。
Yeah.
就像，那真是...哇。
Like, that that was the Wow.
那件事比跟我们谈话更重要，真是，嗯。
That was the thing that was more important than talking to us, which was a very, yeah.
那是一次定位认知的经历。
That was a level setting experience.
是啊。
Yeah.
我们当时就想
We were like
那简直太激励人心了
That was extremely motivating.
是啊
Yeah.
你也看得出来
As you can tell.
确实如此
It was.
马克当时气炸了
Mark was, like, super pissed.
我只记得当时心想，哇
And I just remember going, wow.
这也太不尊重人了
Like, that's so disrespectful.
这简直太疯狂了，他居然会那么做。
It's just, like, so crazy that that that he would do that.
我刚做了一笔小小的天使投资，这位创业者正在尝试融资。
I just made a little angel investment, and, like, this entrepreneur is trying to raise money.
而且，实际上，已经有投资人对她说过，
And, like, literally, she's been told by an investor,
然后，你知道的，我当时在场的是另一个家伙，一位风投人士，我记得他说，哦，是啊。
And and, you know, I'm and a different guy, one of the VCs at the time, I remember him saying, he's like, oh, yeah.
风投是个很棒的生意。
Venture's a great business.
风投就像是在经营一家回转寿司店。
Venture's like running it's like it's like going to a sushi sushi boat restaurant.
简直太棒了。
It's like it's fantastic.
你就像...你就像一块寿司
You just like you just a sushi
回转寿司餐厅简直太棒了。
boat restaurant restaurant is is like, like, it's it's fantastic.
太棒了。
Fantastic.
你可以就这样
You You could just
坐在吧台边，初创企业就像流水一样漂过，你只需说‘哦’。
sit at the counter and, like, the startups just, like, come drifting by, and you're just like, oh.
他说，
He's like,
每隔一段时间，你知道的，只要你想，就可以伸手摘取一片寿司。
every once in a while, you know, whenever you want, you just reach out and you just, like, pluck a piece of sushi.
记住耶稣。
Remember Jesus.
想着，你知道吗？
Thinking, you know what?
我不确定这会像我们想象的那么困难
I'm not sure that this is gonna be as hard as we thought it was
会
gonna be.
你是指竞争的部分吗？
You mean the competing part?
竞争的部分
Competing part.
没错
Exactly.
是的
Yeah.
这对我们思考竞争方式具有深远影响
It was very formative in how we thought about competing.
直到今天，当我们思考公司文化时，仍然会想：不要变成那样
And still to this day, when we think about the culture of the firm, it's like, don't be that.
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是的。
Yes.
是的。
Yes.
别当那个
Don't be Mr.
自以为是的家伙坐在沙丘路的办公室里等着寿司船
Smarty Pants sitting in your Sandhill Road office waiting for the sushi boat
路过。
to come by.
比如，你可以
Like, you can
那么做。
do that.
但我是说，看看。
And yet I mean, look.
是啊。
Yeah.
也许竞争没那么激烈，但当我身处局外时，在我看来顶尖的五家公司似乎从未变过。
Maybe the competition isn't that hard, but it felt like to me when I was at the out at on the outcast side, it felt like to me the top five firms never changed.
嗯。
Mhmm.
对。
Yeah.
就像，从来都没变过。
Like, never ever changed.
对吧？
Right?
没错。
Yep.
而你们并没有从风投公司独立出来，所以你们没有业绩记录。
And you guys didn't you guys hadn't peeled off from a VC firm, and therefore, you didn't have a track.
我是说，做过一些天使投资，但基本上没多少，无意冒犯。
I mean, had made some angel investments, but, like, basically, not so much, not to be insulting.
但我们并没有
But, like, we hadn't been
专业地参与其中。
there professionally.
是啊。
Yeah.
那天使基金的规模是多少，大概200万美元？
So The angel fund was, what, like, $2,000,000?
对。
Yeah.
我们确实没有。
We hadn't yeah.
而且我们当时没有团队。
And we we had no tram.
我们没有任何培训。
We had no training.
然后，你知道，虽然存在例外，但所有重要的公司基本上都是由顶尖的五家投资机构投资的。
We And and then, you know, the the all like, there are exceptions, but all the important companies, they're just like the top five firms invest.
所以，这个难题就在于，好吧，
So, like, the conundrum was like, okay.
没有实质内容的情况下，你如何跻身那个名单？
How did you break into that list without the substance?
对吧？
Right?
仅仅凭借想法。
Just just with the ideas.
再讲一个故事，关于那个的？
One more story one more story from that?
好的。
Yeah.
是啊。
Yeah.
没错。
Yeah.
这个故事我特别喜欢讲给有限合伙人听。
And this this is one I love to tell the LPs.
另一个人说，哦，他就像有限合伙人。
Another guy said, oh, he's like LPs.
他就像有限合伙人。
He's like LPs.
你们以后会讨厌和有限合伙人打交道的。
You guys are gonna you guys are gonna hate dealing with LPs.
他们简直是最难缠的。
They're just the worst.
这话告诉竞争对手倒是挺合适的。
It's a good thing to tell the competitor.
是啊。
Yeah.
是啊。
Yeah.
是啊。
Yeah.
他还说，他说关键在于——他说道，经过漫长的职业生涯后我意识到，关键在于你要把有限合伙人（LPs）当蘑菇一样对待。
And he's like he said and he said the key is I he said, I realized after a long career, I realized the key is you wanna treat the LPs like mushrooms.
对。
Yeah.
像蘑菇那样。
Like mushrooms.
像蘑菇一样。
Like mushrooms.
他们是指迷幻蘑菇吗？
And they were like magic mushrooms?
这是什么意思？
What does that mean?
你指的是什么？
Are you talking about?
不是。
No.
所以他们对待蘑菇的方式是把你放进一个纸板箱里。
So they treat mushrooms as you put you put them in a cardboard box.
你盖上纸板箱的盖子，然后把它放在床底下两年。
You put the lid of the cardboard box, and you put it under your bed for two years.
直到下次需要筹款时，你才会把箱子拿出来。
And then you don't take the box out until the next time you need to raise money.
哇。
Wow.
这真是太有趣了，因为我们一直觉得，哇，我们刚从一家上市公司出来。
It was so that It was so funny because the whole time we're thinking, wow, we're coming out of running a public company.
我们正在与做空我们股票的投资者会面。
We're meeting with investors who are shorting our stock.
这些家伙来自非常不错的大学。
These guys have very nice universities.
我们出去见面时，他们交谈起来非常愉快。
They were just super pleasant to talk to when we went out there.
他们有很多有趣的观点。
They had interesting things to say.
我当时就觉得，哇，你们生活在一个奇怪的认知世界里。
It was just so I was like, wow, you guys are living in a weird perceptive world.
让我惊讶的是，我从未见过有限合伙人，因为我不负责业务的那一部分。
One of the surprising things I to me had not ever met LPs because I wasn't on that side of the business.
但这个圈子真的很棒，他们中很多人都有着非常强烈的使命驱动。
But like, it's a really great community, and a lot of them are super, super mission driven.
比如你和Russ聊天时，会了解到他们是如何处理收益的。
Like, you talk to Russ, like, how how they what they do with their proceeds.
对吧？
Right?
他们不是金融家。
Like, they're they're not financiers.
他们只是非常酷的人。
They're they're just they're very cool people.
是啊。
Yeah.
没错。
Yeah.
他们的眼光非常长远。
They're very long time horizons.
是的。
Yes.
而且非常有耐心。
And Very patient.
他们对自己的机构非常忠诚，非常聪明。
Very devoted to their institutions, very smart.
我是说，他们把全部时间都花在思考这些话题上。
I mean, they spend all their time thinking about, right, all these topics.
我们进行了非常精彩的讨论。
We have incredible discussions.
都是很优秀的投资者。
Great investors.
而且非常有耐心，想要理解战略，关心战略，计划长期与我们合作，诸如此类。
And very patient and want to understand the strategy, care about the strategy, plan to be in it a long time with us, all that kind of thing.
不过确实，这非常有趣。
But yeah, it was just very interesting.
那就讲讲这些故事吧，因为它们很好地说明了这些问题。
Was Well, go through the stories because it is so indicative of so many of these things.
某些行业在某些时期就是会陷入困境。
Are certain industries at certain times where they just get wedged.
陷入固定模式。
Get locked into patterns.
嗯。
Mhmm.
而...而...而...你知道，世界上最令人不适的事情就是打破这种模式。
And and and, you know, the most uncomfortable thing in the world is to, like, break the pattern.
对。
Right.
对吧？
Right?
而且如果
And if
你不必，知道，如果你不必，你就不必。
you don't have to, know, if you don't have to, you don't.
如果你把它想象成寿司情境或蘑菇情境，不错。
And if you think of it as a sushi situation nor a mushroom situation Nice.
你为什么要做营销呢？
Why would you ever do marketing?
对。
Right.
没错。
Exactly.
他们是
They're
整个为什么
the Why whole
你会成为纸箱卡特尔。
would you ever box cartel.
某种神秘感。
Some mystique.
没错。
Right.
某种神秘的，是啊。
Some, like, mystical Yeah.
是啊。
Yeah.
精灵般的，对。
Fairy Yeah.
无论你说什么
Whatever you tell
确实要好得多，是啊。
is is way better Yeah.
那是
That's
没错。
right.
如果没有压力的话。
If there's no pressures on it.
对吧？
Right?
是的，不，这是个非常好的策略，所以我们才会推出市场营销。
Yeah, no, it was a very good strategy, which is why we went out with the marketing.
然后当然，我们进行了媒体巡回宣传，让马克登上了《财富》杂志封面，这对我来说太不可思议了，因为我们经营公司这么多年，我记得你说过，你想上《财富》、《福布斯》还是《商业周刊》的封面？
Then, of course, so we do the press tour and you get Mark on the cover of Fortune, which was, that was amazing to me because we had been running a company all these years, and I remember you saying, do you wanna be on the cover of Fortune, Forbes, or Businessweek?
我当时就想
And I was like
然后这就是...哦等等，你还有得选。
And this is what was oh, wait, you get a choice.
是啊。
Yeah.
这就像...嗯，在梵蒂冈博物馆还是什么地方。
This is like, yeah, in I don't know, Vatican Museum or something.
这简直是你所能想到的最重要的事情了。
It's just like the most important thing you can possibly Yeah.
有
Have
那时候，那些杂志的封面尤其重要，很难登上。
In those days, those magazines, particularly the covers, were incredibly important, tough to get.
真正让我震惊的是，我说了《财富》杂志，然后你就让马克登上了《财富》的封面。
And then the thing that really blew my mind was I said fortune, and then you got Mark on the cover of Fortune.
你是在撒谎还是怎么的？
Were you lying or something?
那时候我根本不可能登上任何杂志封面。
Was gonna put me on the cover of anything in those days.
不，但你出书的时候登上了《财富》杂志封面。
No, but you got to be on the cover of Fortune when you did your book.
是啊。
Yeah.
对。
Yeah.
是的。
Yeah.
是的。
Yeah.
不。
No.
我做到了。
I did.
我做到了。
I did.
我们得先让自己出名。
That we had to make being famous first.
是的。
Yeah.
看。
Look.
关键在于，你不开口就永远得不到想要的。
The thing is you never get what you don't ask for.
对吧？
Right?
而且当时那些出版物确实很重要，就像一种竞争。
And then it it's it's a comp like, at the time, the publications mattered, really.
现在重要的只是作家本人。
Now it's just the writer who matters.
而且现在他们处于整个互联网的下游。
And then also now they're downstream from the entire Internet.
对吧？
Right?
基本上，他们是在最后阶段才介入的。
Like, they come in at the end, basically.
是的。
Yeah.
但凯文·曼尼确实是个非常优秀的作家。
But Kevin Maney was a really good writer.
他有着非常出色的履历。
He had had a really strong track record.
就像，你知道的，长期关注他的人都知道，他总能写出实质性的、由好奇心驱动的故事。
Like, you, you know, followed him forever, and he he would write substantive curiosity driven stories.
对吧？
Right?
而且他真的很棒。
And he was great.
整件事最糟糕的部分就是那次该死的摄影拍摄。
The worst part about that whole thing was the damn photo shoot.
是啊。
Yeah.
是马克·黑格拍的。
It was Marc Hager.
而且
And
我...我记得你当时做那个手指动作时，我就想，就是你了。
and I I know I remember when you when you did that finger thing, I want you.
我当时就觉得，就是它了。
I was like, that's gonna be it.
这根本不用问，但那是最糟糕的部分。
Like, this is just not even a question, but that was the worst part about it.
是啊。
Yeah.
没错。
Yeah.
挺好的。
It was good.
那张照片很吓人。
It was a scary picture.
所以这挺好的。
So it was good.
还挺有趣的。
It was some fun.
但那件事确实让我们确立了立场。
But that kind of set off kind of really positioning us.
从那时起，我们就知道不会与行业保持友好关系了。
At that point, we knew we weren't going to be friendly with industry.
所以我们不仅不会加入那个联盟，还要反对他们，因为他们恨死了那篇封面报道。
So we were not only not gonna be in the cartel, we were gonna be against the cartel because they hated that cover story.
天啊。
Oh my god.
我是说，他们彻底疯了。
I mean, they went bananas.
他们给每个LP都打了电话。
They called every LP.
他们说，这些人，都是自大狂。
They're like, these guys, they're egomaniacs.
看看杂志封面上的他们。
Look at them on the cover of the magazine.
那不该是他。
That's not supposed to be him.
那应该是企业家才对。
That's supposed to be the entrepreneur.
搞什么鬼？
What the hell?
我是说，他们刚刚失去了We a
I mean, they just lost We a
当时我们没有任何企业家，
didn't have any entrepreneurs at the time,
老实说。
to be honest.
不。
No.
这太荒谬了。
That's bananas.
我认为这是因为他们觉得这类对外活动有失身份，有点不体面。
I think that comes from them viewing having to do any of those kinds of outbound activities as beneath them, kind of unseemly.
而我们当时却毫不羞于宣传自己和我们的产品，可以这么说。
And here we were like, unashamed about, like, advertising ourselves and our wares, if you will.
对吧？
Right?
所以我当时有点懵，什么情况？
So I was kinda like, what?
我们现在要做什么？
We're doing what now?
是啊。
And Yeah.
我觉得这招管用了。
It worked, I think.
我觉得某种程度上确实如此，但主要是通过写作让我们打入了创业者圈子。
And I think it got sort of I think that, but mostly I think the writing got us in with the entrepreneurs.
因为我记得，应该是你马克告诉过我，有位创业者说，我感觉已经有点了解你们了。
Because I remember, I think it was you, Mark, told me that an entrepreneur said, I kinda feel like I know you guys a little bit.
没错。
That's right.
对吧？
Right?
甚至还没见过面。
Having not even met you yet.
是啊。
Yeah.
他们还没来过我们办公室。
They hadn't been in our offices.
他们没见过任何人。
They hadn't met anybody.
但他们大致知道，这些人是谁？他们关心什么？
But they had some idea of, like, who are these people and what do they care about?
从那以后，每次有新合伙人加入，我们就会说，好吧。
And then from then on, every time a GP would come on board, we're like, okay.
你想投资什么领域？
What do you wanna invest in?
因此，我们会撰写关于这些主题的内容。
Therefore, we're going to write about these things.
因为这些内容会成为吸引该领域创业者（无论是互联网还是AI基础设施）的磁石。
Because that that is becomes the magnet for the entrepreneurs in that corner of the Internet or AI infrastructure, whatever it is.
对吧？
Right?
我认为这种做法非常有效，尤其对创业者群体而言。
And I think that was really powerful, particularly with the entrepreneurs.
是啊。
Yeah.
没错。
Yeah.
那时候有点像这样，风险投资就像个大秘密。
It was kind of one in those days, VC was like a big secret.
秘密。
Secret.
实际上创办公司也是个大秘密。
And then actually building companies was a big secret.
是的。
Yes.
所以光是谈论这些就已经是个很大的差异化优势了。
And so just kind of talking about it was a big differentiator.
你会学到什么对吧？因为当你听到那些创业者讲述时，会听到各种恐怖故事，比如与风投关系中出现的问题和所有麻烦。
What you would learn, right, when you because you'd hear those entrepreneurs, you'd hear all these horror stories, you know, from other entrepreneurs of like things that have gone wrong in the relationship with the VC and all the problems.
但你并不知道，当你走进门时，如果你不认识很多人，你该信任谁呢？
But you didn't know, like, if you didn't know who many people were when you walk in the door, like, who do you trust?
对吧。
Right.
他们在压力下会如何表现？
How are they gonna behave under pressure?
你知道他们会怎么做吗？
You know, what are they gonna do?
没错。
Right.
所以，我是说，如果能做到没人知道你是谁却仍能站在行业顶端，那当然很棒。
And so, I mean, yeah, I look, it's a great it's like if you can get away with having nobody know who you are and still, you know, be be on top of the industry, it's great.
但如果有人反其道而行，就会引发永久性的改变，我想这正是我们推动的。
But, like, if somebody actually does, you know, does it the other way, it's it causes a permanent change, which is I think what we catalyzed.
是啊。
Yeah.
确实如此。
It does.
对我来说，虽然我不了解最新数据，但你或其他合伙人写的那些博客文章是永恒的经典。
And to me, I don't know the latest numbers, the blog posts that you would write or the other GPs would write that are sort of timeless.
我记得《优秀产品经理与糟糕产品经理》那篇，是最成功的博文之一。
I remember the good product manager, bad product manager, that is one of the most successful blog posts.
你知道公司总共发布过多少篇博文吗？
You know how many blog posts the firm has put out?
多到数不清。
Like, a gajillion.
对吧？
Right?
是啊。
Yeah.
没错。
Yeah.
但是，那些有深度、创业者能从中汲取养分且具有永恒价值的内容，远比‘我们是否身处泡沫中’这样的讨论重要得多。
But, like, the ones that have depth that the entrepreneurs can, like, take something from and that is somewhat timeless, way more important than are we in a bubble or are we not in a bubble?
那种讨论虽然有趣，但更像是闲聊。
And that was kind of fun, that was like chatter.
真正有实质意义的是关于如何构建公司的内容。
But the substantive pieces on how do I construct a company?
以及如何管理人？
How do I manage a person?
我是如何看待晋升的？
How do I think about promotions?
所有这类事情。
All that kind of stuff.
我认为这对创业者们非常有价值。
I think that that was really valuable to the entrepreneurs.
而且我认为这也向我们的有限合伙人展示了，看，他们实际上对他们投资的每件事的细节都非常热情。
And I think it also showed our LPs, like, okay, they actually are very passionate about all the details of the stuff that they invest in.
有趣的是，有限合伙人(LPs)当时正在阅读所有
Well, that was one of the interesting things is the LPs were, like, reading all
内容。
the content.
我的意思是，这与公开市场投资者截然不同。
I mean, which is so different than public market investors, let's say.
他们不仅阅读内容，还有许多LP会主动联系Reddit，分享他们在管理小组织时遇到的问题等等。
Not only did they read the content, but we have many LPs that Reddit would call up, say, hey, in managing my little organization, this is what I'm running into and so forth.
因此，他们某种程度上是真正的合作伙伴，这可能是公司最棒的部分之一——能拥有这样的投资者。
So, they're real partners in a way that, yeah, that's been probably one of the best parts of the firm is to get to have investors like that.
是的。
Yeah.
我们确实写过一篇极具争议的博客文章。
We did one incredibly controversial blog, as it turns out.
几位LP非常讨厌那个标题。
A few LPs really hated the headline.
这是在BioHealth团队发布的，标题写着'去他妈的癌症'，我觉得这没什么争议性。
It was in the BioHealth team and it said fuck cancer, which I thought wasn't very controversial.
有限合伙人(LPs)人都很好。
LPs are so nice.
他们当时说：'有必要用这种表达方式吗？'
They were like, did you have to put it that way?
我是说，其实有更
I mean, there are better
得体的表达方式。
ways to put this.
我当时想：'好吧。'
I'm like, alright.
去他妈的。
Fuck.
该死的癌症。
Screw cancer.
对。
Right.
是的。
Yes.
郑重声明，我们坚决反对癌症。
For the record, we're very anticancer.
没错。
Yeah.
我们非常...是的。
We're very yeah.
是的。
Yes.
我们是。
We are.
而且我们愿意表态
And and we're willing to say
但他们对我们发布的每件事都非常关注，我觉得这挺让人受宠若惊的，尽管他们可能讨厌其中一些内容。
But they deeply care about everything that we put out, which I think is quite flattering, even though they may hate some of it.
所以其中一个
So one of
早期我想问你的一件事是，因为我们出现了，并且因为我们引起了其他风投的那种反应，我有点觉得我们可能——你知道，可能在风投竞争性和反风投的事情上做得有点过火了。
the things in the early days that I wanted to ask you about is because we came out and because we caused that reaction with the other VCs, I I kinda felt like we you know, maybe I took it too far in terms of just the VC competitiveness and the anti VC stuff.
比如，我们早期确实做得很激进。
Like, we really went hard in in the early days.
就像，既然你提到了这个，确实有点过线了。
Like, it was since you brought this up Over the line.
是的。
Yeah.
既然你提到了这个，你得——你得说说你和Sara Lacey那件事，对吧？
So since you brought this up, you have to you have to your your thing with, was it the Sara Lacey?
哦，对。
Oh, yeah.
这件事的巅峰就是你在Sara Lacey事件中的高光时刻。
The peak of this was your your peak moment of this was in the Sara Lacey thing.
好的。
Okay.
我得回忆一下——顺便说句，巅峰时期的Sarah Lacey是位非常出色的记者。
Have to refresh So remember Sarah Lacey at her peak by by the way, she was a great, great journalist.
后来她创办了Panda Daily，还举办过几场大型活动。
And then she had this thing, Panda Daily, that she started, and then she had these big events.
我在其中一场活动上演讲过。
And I spoke at the event.
她对我说了句话，那句话就这么脱口而出，她说'你好像和其他风投人士矛盾挺多的'。
And she said to me, and it just like popped out, she said, kind of like have a lot of conflict with the other VCs.
我回答说'是这样的，我来自企业软件领域'。
And I said, Well, I said, I come from enterprise software.
所以当我看到其他风投人士针对我时，就像我引用小韦恩那个比着和平手势的梗——我看到的只有扳机和竖中指。
And so like when I see another VC coming at me, and I quoted little Wayne with the peace sign, all I see is the trigger and the middle finger.
所以，答案本来会是那样的。
So, answer was going to be that.
你骨子里有个企业销售高手。
You have an inner enterprise sales dude in you.
哦，是啊。
Oh, yeah.
摆脱不了。
Can't get it out.
我觉得在与其他公司打交道时，这种想法很扯淡，因为我们实际上是共同投资而非竞争
I think when it comes to other firms, it's like which is horseshit because we co invest we don't actually compete
并没有那么多。
all that much.
不。
No.
不。
No.
我们应该合作。
We should be partnering.
但基本上，你的筛选标准就是：要么你拿下这笔交易，要么我拿下这笔交易。
But basically, your filter is like, you're gonna get the deal or I'm gonna get the deal.
不是你死就是我活。
You die or I die.
这就像是在任何竞争环境中都会发生在你身上的那种情况。
It's like that's that's sort of the the thing that happens to you in any sort of competitive situation.
是啊。
And Yeah.
如果你挡道了就得帮忙，我觉得我们做得有点过火了，因为就像我说的，你们已经加入了董事会席位。
You gotta help if you're in the way of think we overdid it because, like I said, like, you guys have joined board seats.
你懂吗？
You know?
你们会...我们会...我们的团队会打电话联系人，然后说：'嘿。'
You will we will our teams will call people and it's like, hey.
我们拥有这家公司。
We've got this company.
你想进行后续投资吗？
Would you like to do follow on or investment?
诸如此类的事情。
All that stuff.
你却在这里惹恼他们。
Here you are pissing them off.
那时我们——尤其是我——在我们与其他公司之间制造了很多对立情绪，不过现在我觉得关系已经更友好了。
And we caused a lot of I caused a lot of antagonism between us and the other firms in those days, which I think we've you know, at this point, like, we're Like, it's more friendly.
我认为更加友好了。
I think more friendlier.
他们自己也不是在缩减开支。
And they're not exactly shrinking ballots themselves.
是的。
Yeah.
你知道，是的。
You know, yes.
确实。
True.
场合的偏袒。
Favorism of the occasion.
是的。
Yes.
是的。
Yes.
是的。
Yes.
我想我们已经过了那个阶段了。
I think I think we're past that.
也许吧。
Maybe.
也许现在吧。
Maybe now.
是啊。
Yeah.
我...我认为我们现在确实对许多风投合作伙伴更加用户友好了。
I I think we're we're much more user friendly now for sure in terms of many VC partners that we have.
那么告诉我们，其中一个重大事件就是马克写了《软件正在吞噬世界》的时候。
So then tell us, one of the big pieces that came out was when Mark wrote Software is Eating the World.
这件事的起因非常有趣，因为那段时间我们非常忙碌。
And how that came about was very interesting because it was a really busy time for us.
大概是2011年？
Was like, what, 2011?
那时候...我想我们可能刚募集完第二期基金。
So it was very I think we had just raised a second fund maybe.
而且这件事的发生完全是个偶然，可以说。
And the way it came about was entirely random, if you will.
那时候，《经济学人》有位记者，你知道的，他们会派记者去新地区和新领域驻守大约25年，比如从香港调到硅谷之类的。
So at the time, there was a guy you know, The Economist has these reporters, and they send them to new regions and new beats, like, for twenty five years, and they go from Hong Kong to Silicon Valley, whatever.
当时有位叫马丁·贾尔斯的记者，她负责报道。
At the time, there was a guy called Martin Giles, and she was covering.
人非常好。
Very nice guy.
是的。
Yes.
人非常好。
Very nice guy.
很棒的人。
Great guy.
他负责报道硅谷新闻。
And he would cover Silicon Valley.
他是英国人。
He was British.
时不时地，我记不清具体周期，他们会做一份特别报告。
And every so often, I forget what the cadence is, they do a special report.
当时他们正在做一份关于技术现状及未来走向的特别报告。
And they were doing a special report on the state of tech and where it was going.
还记得我们当时坐在那里吗？我的第一个办公室就在那栋楼里。
And we were sitting remember my first office was at this office?
我想应该就在隔壁。
I think it was next door.
对。
Yeah.
没错。
Right.
当时我们三个人坐在那儿，马丁来拜访，他问了一堆问题。
It was like the three of us were sitting there, and Martin is visiting, and he's asking all these questions.
马可当时就说，这基本上就是软件正在吞噬世界，然后他解释了整个概念。
And Marco was like, well, it's basically like software's eating the world, and then he explains the whole thing.
我就说，是啊。
And I'm like Yeah.
这真的很有意思。
This is really interesting.
然后我说，我们应该把这个记下来。
And I was like, we should write this down.
马克就说，好啊。
And Mark's like, sure.
也许晚点吧。
Maybe later.
不。
No.
不。
No.
不。
No.
然后我把它交给了《华尔街日报》
And then I placed it with this guy, Ryan, I forget his last name, at The Wall Street Journal.
他说，如果我有这样一篇专栏文章，你们会刊登吗？
He's like, if I had an op ed like that, would you run it?
然后他说，会的。
And he's like, yeah.
当然。
Sure.
我会刊登的。
I would run it.
然后马克在可以安排这类事情的时候写了它。
And then Mark wrote it when when you could schedule things like that.
马克只写了一稿，至今仍是那同一稿。
And Mark wrote exactly one draft, and it's still that same draft.
我肯定你现在正折磨自己，因为你会想改这改那的。
I'm sure you're torturing yourself because you would change all kinds of things, this and that and the other.
然后为了好玩，给这个故事来个首尾呼应，你写的是《是时候建设了》吗？
And then just for kicks, to bookend that story, when you wrote was it It's Time to Build?
《是时候建设了》。
It's Time to Build.
对。
Yeah.
写了《是时候建设了》。
Wrote It's Time to Build.
就像，你动摇了一小会儿。
Like, you caved for a minute.
所以我就想，好吧。
So I'm like, alright.
我们会安排发表的。
We'll place it.
也许我们能安排发表。
Maybe we'll place it.
是的。
Yeah.
而且没人接受它。
And nobody took it.
没有人。
Nobody.
哦，是的。
Oh, yeah.
没错。
That's right.
那个人叫瑞恩，他后来去追求更远大的前程了。
That's called Ryan, who has since gone on to bigger and better things.
我就说，瑞恩，我问你个假设性问题，那件事？
I'm like, Ryan, I ask you hypothetical, that thing?
就像，如果我在想，你一直在杂志社工作，这很明显。
Like, if I like, you've been at the journal and it's like, of course.
就像，这是个玩笑。
Like, it's a joke.
那甚至不是个问题。
That's not even a question.
但时代变了，所以没人执行它。
But times have changed, so nobody ran it.
好吧，幸好我们掌握了大部分。
Well, good thing we big piece of it.
我们当时有很好的观众。
We had a good audience at the time.
不。
No.
而且我...我想我忘了。
And I I think forget.
我不想诋毁别人，但有人说可能是Feet那帮人。
I don't wanna malign people, but somebody said I think it was a it may have been the Feet.
有人说，这很让人生气。
Somebody said, it's angry.
我就说，要知道，我们正处于疫情期间。
And I'm like, you know, we're in a pandemic.
是啊。
Yeah.
是啊。
Yeah.
所以这就是...我们不是...我们戴着...对。
So this is And a we don't we're wearing Yeah.
那就是...对。
And that was the yeah.
整个重点就在于疫情期间真实发生的情况——连手术服都根本弄不到。确实如此。
The the whole point of it was just that what was actually happening in the pandemic with literally inability to get, like, surgical gowns Exactly.
对于急救人员来说，这正是整件事的导火索。
For first responders was, the the the catalyst for it.
是啊。
Yeah.
这很有趣。
It's interesting.
读起来很愤怒，
Read angry,
我当时
and I was
像是说，真的吗？
like, really?
对。
Yeah.
“软件正在吞噬世界”可能更为人熟知，但我要说“是时候建设了”更具影响力，因为人们读了“软件正在吞噬世界”后并没有采取行动。
Software is eating the world is probably more famous, but I'd say Time to Build is more influential in that people read Software is eating the world, and then they didn't do anything.
他们只是觉得，哇，这很有意思，然后就没有然后了。
They were like, wow, that's very interesting, and then that was it.
但在《建设时刻》中，华盛顿和创业社区等领域的许多人都在说，是的，我们正在采纳这个理念。
But with Time to Build, the number of people in Washington and entrepreneurial community and so forth that are like, yeah, we're taking this.
这就是蓝图。
This is the blueprint.
从某种意义上说，我们正在推动的整个民主党内的丰裕运动正是源于此，这实际上是一个伟大的
We're I moving on mean, in a way, the whole abundance movement on the Democratic Party came off Which is a great
发展。
development, actually.
伟大的发展。
The great development.
是的。
Yeah.
但我认为，我对此有个理论解释。
But I think the I have a theory on why that is.
‘软件吞噬世界’对我们圈内人来说就像是——看啊，这正在发生。
Software's eating the world's, like, to our people, our community, Hello, that's happening.
而他们都在逆势而为。
And they were all building against it.
他们根本不需要阅读那份文件。
They didn't need to read the thing.
而那些需要采取行动的人将被‘软件吞噬世界’的浪潮碾压。
And the people who needed to do something were going to get flattened by the software eating the world movement.
他们却不知所措。
And they didn't know what to do.
比如，你该如何转型？还记得所有来拜访我们的汽车公司吗？
Like, how do you retool into Remember all the car companies that came to visit us, right?
当你带他们了解自动驾驶技术时，品牌还重要吗？诸如此类的问题。
And you take them through autonomous, and does the brand even matter and whatever?
他们完全无法理解。
It just did not register.
他们没打算转型成软件公司。
They weren't going to become a software company.
因此，那些需要对此采取行动的人都没有采取行动。
Therefore, nobody who needed to do something with it did.
因为这确实相当困难。
Because it's just rather difficult.
是的，听起来我们公司学到的一个非常有趣的事情是，对于一家历史悠久且创始人已不在位的公司来说，要做出任何改变都是极其罕见的。
Yeah, it sounds like one of the very interesting things that we've learned as a firm is how unusual it is for a company that's been around a long time and where the founders are no longer there to change anything.
任何改变。
Anything.
是的。
Yeah.
甚至可以说，这对我们风险投资行业来说是一大幸事，因为许多在我们起步时极具影响力的公司从未改变过。
Even in like, I mean, this has been a huge blessing for us in venture capital in that many of the firms that were extremely powerful when we started just never changed.
它们和过去一模一样。
They're exactly as they were.
几乎就像被时间冻结了一样。
It's almost like frozen in time.
这让我想起，如果你去过古巴的哈瓦那，那里就像时间静止了一样。
It reminds me if you've ever been to Havana in Cuba, it's frozen in time.
完全是1959年的样子。
It's all 1959.
带着
With
和
and
所有的一切，所有的一切，就像被冻结了一样。
and everything, everything, it's it's It's like just frozen.
整个行业就这样冻结了。
Whole industries freeze like that.
汽车行业肯定就是这样。
The auto industry for sure did.
确实
Did
那你知道埃隆出现是为了什么吗？
And you see Elon came along for what?
他是什么时候创立特斯拉的？
How long when did he start Tesla?
两千年代初，然后一直发展壮大。
Early two thousands and had been going and going and going.
然后当这款车问世并表现出色时，所有人都愣在那里想：我们该怎么办？
And then when the car comes out and is awesome, everybody is just sitting there going, what do we do?
谁该怎么办？
Who do do?
我是说，你看。
I mean, look.
我刚刚在X上看到这个。
I just saw this on X, I think.
比如，德国汽车公司的裁员数字，那可是我的祖国。
Like, the layoff numbers from the German car companies, my home country.
比如，德国每六个工作岗位中就有一个与汽车行业相关。
Like, every sixth job in Germany is somehow related to the auto industry.
是啊。
Yeah.
这简直是一场灾难。
It's a disaster.
没错。
Yeah.
但那些天才软件工程师可不会愿意为埃隆·马斯克工作。
But they're not going like, the a genius software engineer is not going to they're gonna wanna work for Elon Musk.
关于埃隆·马斯克你可以随便怎么说都行。
Like, you can say about Elon Musk whatever you want.
但汽车行业那些油头粉面的高管，对软件工程师来说真的没什么吸引力。
But, like, a suave, well manicured executive from the car industry is not really a talent magnet for software engineers.
对吧？
Right?
而且
And
早期发生的一件事是，我收到了哈珀柯林斯的来信，说我没有时间写书。
then one of the things that happened early was I got a note from Harper Collins saying that I should And write did not have time to write a book.
你做到了。
You made it.
是的。
Yeah.
嗯，你觉得写书是个好主意。
Well, you thought it was a good idea to write the book.
你为什么觉得是个好主意？
Why did you think it was a guy?
我想，一方面是因为博客做得很好，这看起来有点疯狂。
I guess it seemed, one, it seemed crazy because the blog was doing so well.
所以书籍不是已经过时了吗？
So aren't books passe?
至少对我们来说是这样。
At least to us.
然后我就没时间了。
Then I didn't have time.
那么，你觉得这合理吗？
So, did you think that made sense?
风投通常也不会这么做，对吧？
It wasn't something that VCs did either, right?
就像风投们说的，
Like VCs Well,
我认为我们确实需要稍微平衡一下品牌形象，因为否则的话，任何有影响力的创业者都会想让他加入自己的董事会。
think never wrote do think we needed to even out the brand a little bit because like, otherwise, any entrepreneur with leverage was gonna go like, well, I want him to be on my board.
对吧？
Right?
而且这种情况会随着其他普通合伙人的加入而变得越来越糟。
And that was just going to get successively worse with every other GP.
所以当时的情况就是，我们需要为每个人制定一个计划。
So that was like, we needed a plan for everybody.
对吧？
Right?
而当时你就是另一个合伙人。
And then you were the other at at the time.
另一个。
The other.
我觉得这本书不错，因为安德森是另一个合伙人。
I thought the book was good because it Andreessen Other.
这正是你想这么称呼它的原因
There is exactly which is why you wanted to call it
霍洛维茨·安德森，我记得，这听起来确实很酷
Horowitz Andreessen, I remember, which It does sound Horowitz Andreessen is a cool
听起来很酷的名字。
sounding name.
不过听起来有点律师事务所的感觉。
It sounds a little law firm ish, though.
然后你永远无法像H16n那样，它根本比不上。
And then you could never a 16 z would like H16n is not nearly
现在这样已经很好了。
as good as It it is good the way it is.
我仍然认为，拥有一本关于某事的权威理论书籍是有价值的。
I do still think there is value in a book of like having a definitive theory on something.
考虑到所有的博客作者和各种博览会，我认为这很有价值。
I think with all the bloggers and all the expos and all that, I think there is value.
人们会读书。
People read books.
人们会消费书籍。
People consume books.
长篇播客某种程度上是相同风格的不同版本。
Long form podcasts is sort of a different version of the same flavor.
但更重要的是，我以为你有话要说。
But more importantly, I thought you had something to say.
关于如何创办公司以及各种意外状况的实际理论。
The actual theory of how one builds a company and all the stuff that goes sideways.
就像你常说的，大多数书籍，比如那些来自通用电气之类公司的某某人写的，基本上都是些光鲜的简历和成功学实验室产物。
And as you always said, most books, like whoever the guy was from this and that, GE, whatever, they were all kind of fancy resumes and victory labs.
它们并不能真正让你学到东西，特别是对我们这些观众来说——创业如此艰难，身处战壕，丢单子，融不到资，还有员工突然离职之类的破事。
They weren't really where you could learn something, particularly for our audience that like, it's so rough and tumble to be in a startup and to be in the trenches and to lose the deal and, like, not be able to raise the money, and you have this magical person walk out the door, all that kind of stuff.
所以我觉得能有一本坦诚的书——我原本期待你会写的那种——真的很有价值。
So having an honest book that I think I was expecting you to write, I thought was really valuable.
而我们取巧的地方在于你已经写好了所有博客文章。
And then the little hack that we had is you had written all the blog posts.
所以后来就
So then it was
我已经有了一些固定读者群。
I have a little built in audience.
然后它讲述了那段戏剧性的经历，包括费利西亚生病等所有事情。
And then it's telling the dramatic story of what went down, including with Felicia being sick and all of that.
那些内容最终成就了这本书。
That then made the book.
但你脑海中其实已经总结出了那些经验教训。
But you kind of had the lessons in your head.
其实我很喜欢这本书的标题。
And I actually think that book I like the title.
我一生都在践行《你的行为决定你是谁》这个理念。
I've been living by What You Do Is Who You Are forever.
虽然更喜欢那个标题，但我觉得这本书更重要，对人们也更具实用价值。
Like that title better, but I think this is a more important book, and it's way more usable for people.
它的受众面要广泛得多。
It's much more broad based.
我认为《你的行为决定你是谁》那本书其实对我个人更有帮助。
I think the What You Do Is Who You Are is It's actually more useful for me.
当我与泰德·萨兰多斯这类人交谈时，他们总是说'哦对，那本书我很喜欢'。
And when I talk to Ted Sarandos or somebody like that, they're like, Oh yeah, that's a book I like.
但你必须运营一个非常庞大的组织。
But you have to run a very large organization.
而且你必须已经克服了那些创业初期的艰难，开始思考如何为整个组织规划文化体系
And you have to have gotten beyond the things that are hard things to start to think about, okay, how do you program the culture of the whole organization and this
这类事情。
kind of thing.
但我记得海军
But I remember the Navy
太抽象了。
Too abstract.
想买《创业维艰》这本书。
Wanting to buy the book, The Hard Thing About Hard Things.
是啊。
Yeah.
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