高度计（与布拉德·格斯特纳）

我们为这个业务筹集了大约五千万美元。

We raised, it must be $50,000,000 for that business.

我们收购了一家小公司，作为我们的核心基础。

We bought a little business to give us kind of the kernel.

我们在其上构建了一个数字层。

We built a digital layer on top of it.

当整个世界都在崩溃时，我们发现自己处于一个相当令人羡慕的位置。

And while the rest of the world was imploding, we found ourselves in a pretty enviable position.

我们把业务做到了超过十亿美元的总预订量。

We built the business to over 1,000,000,000 in gross bookings.

我认为在高峰期，员工人数超过了1000人。

I think it had over 1,000 employees at the peak.

这一切都是一年内完成的，对吧？

That was all within a year, right?

这不到十八个月就完成了，因为这确实行得通。

That was within eighteen months because, again, it worked.

人们真的在线购买这些东西。

Like, people were actually buying this stuff online.

对吧？

Right?

我们只是接入了现有的需求池。

And we were plugging into existing pools of demand.

我们不需要去创造需求。

We weren't going out and having to create demand.

所以当Expedia推出邮轮或度假套餐预订系统时，第二天就有很多人实际购买，而我们就像里面的Shopify。

So Expedia launches, you know, a cruise or a vacation package booking engine, and the next day, a lot of people are actually buying it and we're kind of the Shopify, if you will, inside.

于是，负责Expedia的里奇·巴顿说：‘我们想收购你们的业务。’

And so Rich Barton, who ran Expedia said, Hey, we want to buy the business.

然后我们遇到了达拉·卡什拉沙希，当时他正在为巴里·迪勒尔负责并购，他说：‘我想收购你们的业务。’

And then we ran into Dara Kashrashahi, who was running M and A for Barry Dillard at the time, and he said, you know, I wanna buy the business.

要明确的是，这发生在IAC收购Expedia之前。

And to be clear, this is pre IAC buying Expedia.

对。

Correct.

所以这是两个完全不同的实体在竞购你们公司。

So these are two completely different entities bidding against each other for your company.

对。

Correct.

我对达拉说，我们已经有一个正在洽谈的潜在买家。

And I said to Dara, well, we already have an interested party that we're talking to.

于是他说，那我去找巴里谈谈。

And so he goes, well, let me talk to Barry.

他去和巴里谈完后回来，说：那么，是谁呢？

And so he talks to him and they come back and he said, well, who is it?

我说，我不能告诉你，但这是其中一个大型在线旅游平台。

And I said, well, I can't tell you that, but it's one of the big online travel players.

他说，我觉得巴里也想收购他们。

And he goes, well, I think Barry wants to buy them too.

最终，在2000年10月到2001年5月期间，我们达成了一项交易，USA Networks更名为IAC，并收购了NLG和Expedia。

And that's ultimately what went down between October 2000, May 2001, we put together a deal where USA Networks would be renamed IAC, bought both NLG and Expedia.

哦，这些是同时进行的吗？

Oh, those were concurrent?

这些交易是同时宣布的。

Concurrent deals announced together.

我记得当时和里奇·巴顿一起坐在一辆豪华轿车的后座上，正前往巴里·迪拉德家的路上，我们对视一眼，心想：这世界真奇妙。

I remember being in the back of a limousine in Hollywood on my way to Barry Dillard's house with Rich Barton, we looked at each other and we're like, strange world.

我们是怎么走到这一步的？

How'd we end up here?

这

This

这标志着巴里从一个媒体人转变为媒体与科技领域的创业者，并打造了IAC。

was the beginning of Barry transforming from a media guy into a media and technology guy and and building IAC.

你知道吗？

You know?

是的

Yeah.

当时是USA Networks，后来变成了IAC。

It was USA Networks, and it became IAC.

嗯，我会

Well, I would

关于这一点，我想快速说两点。

say two things about that real quickly.

首先，巴里很早就意识到通过屏幕实现交易型商业的可能性。

First, Barry was early to understand transactional commerce through a screen.

因为有家庭购物网络。

Because of Home Shopping Network.

因为有家庭购物网络。

Because of Home Shopping Network.

他还收购了Ticketmaster，以及一个名为1800HOTEALS的资产，还收购了一些目录公司。

He also acquired Ticketmaster, and he also acquired an asset called one-eight 100 HOTEALS, and he also acquired some catalogs.

它们的共同点都是交易性质的。

What they all had in common was transactional.

它们都是基于电子商务的商业模式，并通过各种媒介实现。

They were all e commerce based business models, and they were through various mediums.

其中最大的是家购物网络，它是通过电视进行的。

The biggest being Home Shopping Network, which is through television.

因此，他稍微聚焦一下，就能看出所有这些交易将如何转移到互联网上，并不困难。

So for him to squint a little bit and to see how all these transactions were gonna move to the Internet was not that difficult.

对他来说，运行得最快的商业引擎是1800酒店，他后来将其更名为Hotels.com。

And the commerce engine, the commerce flywheel that was flying the fastest for him was one eight hundred hotels that he would rename hotels.com.

因此，他在旅行领域表现极为出色，明白这将成为在线商业的一个重要类别，我记得他非常明确地谈到过，通过所有屏幕进行商业交易。

So he was doing extraordinarily well in travel, understood that that would be a big category of online commerce, and I remember very distinctly him talking about, you know, commerce through all the screens.

那是在1999年、2000年，当时大多数人还没看到这一点。

And that was in, you know, 1999, 2000 before most people saw it.

我认为，认识到互联网泡沫时期这一点非常重要，因为每个人回顾时都会嘲笑它，但当时的消费者行为确实已经存在。

I think this is such an important thing to realize about the .com bubble because everyone looks back at it and makes jokes, but the consumer behavior was there.

这在所有这些不同的媒介中，客观上是更好的交易方式。

It was a objectively better way to transact in all these different mediums.

泡沫破裂是因为它是一个投机性资产泡沫，一旦你没有商业模式，资本就会撤离。

And the bubble burst because it was a speculative asset bubble, and capital went away if you didn't have a business model.

但对于那些拥有商业模式并能实现正自由现金流的人来说，所有的需求都朝这个方向汇聚，而且这种需求从未消失。

But for those who did and who could, you know, be free cash flow positive, this is where all the demand was going, and that never went away.

对吧？

Right?

你能感受到当时人们仍然想这么做，只要……

Could you feel that in the moment of, like, people still wanna do this as long as

我不能说我自己感受到了。

I can't say that I did.

你得记住，泡沫破裂时规模有多大，风险溢价的变化，还有9/11事件，这些都太集中了。

You I was really worried about you you gotta remember the size of the bubble bursting, the change in risk premiums, right, and then the events of 09/11/2001, they were all so compressed.

这就像战争中的迷雾。

It's the fog of war.

对吧？

Right?

我认为我们当时唯一确定的是，互联网不会消失。

I think about all we really knew for sure is this Internet thing wasn't going away.

围绕它会诞生真正的商业，但当时非常不清楚何时能获得建设这些业务所需的资金，以及资金从何而来。

There are gonna be real businesses built around it, but it was very unclear when you would have the capital required to build the businesses, where the capital was going to come from.

回头看，这似乎很简单，但我说2001年、2002年、2003年其实是一份礼物，不过在经历那段时期时，那真是一段艰难的历程。

You know, in hindsight, it seems pretty simple, but I would say 2001, 2002, 2003 turned out to be a gift, but that's a slog, right, when you're going through it.

是的。

Yep.

我看看今天那些单位经济为负、毛利率为负、却以超高估值融资的商业模式。

I look at business models today that have negative unit economics, negative gross margins, raising money at super high valuations.

那段经历让我留下了心理创伤。

I have post traumatic stress from that period.

因为如果你是一家高烧钱、单位经济为负的企业，一旦进入风险溢价发生变化的环境，不管你有多优秀，都会消失。

Because if you are a high burn business with negative unit economics and you fly into a world where risk premiums change, it doesn't matter how good you are, you cease to exist.

嗯嗯。

Mhmm.

对吧？

Right?

而且而且

And And

他们最终会改变的。

so they will change eventually.

我的意思是，这一点是

I mean, that's the thing that

看看过去八周发生了什么，对吧？

Just look at what's happened over the course of the last eight weeks, right?

增长倍数下降了50%。

Growth multiples are down 50%.

风险溢价已经发生了巨大变化。

Risk premiums have changed dramatically.

有很多企业属于我刚才描述的类别，它们将无法生存下去。

There are a lot of businesses that are in the category I just described that aren't gonna make it.

因此，在经历了这一切之后，最自然的决定就是你打算去做公开市场的投资者。

So the natural thing to decide after all this is that you're gonna go be a public markets investor.

对吧？

Right?

我只是知道，我们之所以想这么做，部分原因在于。

Like, I just know, part of why we wanted to hey.

这是一个很棒的故事。

It's a great story.

是的。

Yeah.

但同时，像Altimeter最终在这个领域会变成什么样，你们我认为可能是最纯粹的案例，绝对是最早之一，如果不是第一个的话，生命周期投资者。

But also, like, what Altimeter ultimately becomes in this, you know, you guys, I think, are maybe the purest play example, certainly one of the first, if not the first, life cycle investor.

你知道，当时根本没人会明显觉得你应该在这个时候去加入对冲基金。

You know, it was just not at all obvious that you should go join a hedge fund at this point.

对吧？

Right?

那这是怎么发生的呢？

Like, how did that happen?

是的。

Yeah.

我的意思是，中间还发生了一些别的事。

I mean, so there's a little bit more in between.

9月11日发生了，这是一个非常灾难性的事件，特别是对我们这家在线旅游公司而言。

So September 11 happens, which is a really catastrophic event, particularly for our company that was an online travel company.

于是我们和IAC协商达成了一个软着陆方案。

And so we negotiated kind of the soft landing with IAC.

我就不细说所有那些波折了，但这对泛大西洋资本来说是个不错的结果。

I won't take you through all the trials and tribulations, but it was a good outcome for General Catalyst.

我以为我会回去加入大卫和乔尔。

I thought I was gonna go back and join David and Joel.

我知道他们是两个极其特别的人，他们一定会打造一个伟大的事业，但我已经被创业的激情深深吸引。

I knew they were two extraordinarily special human beings, and they were gonna build something really big, But I had kind of been bitten by the startup bug.

一位名叫贝jos·苏马亚的朋友，现在在印度和东南亚经营LightSpeed，他有一个想法，本质上就是‘Yelp出现之前的Yelp’。

A friend named Bejos Sumaya, who now runs LightSpeed in India, in Southeast Asia, had an idea, and it effectively was, think of Yelp pre Yelp.

于是，贝吉和我一起创办了这家公司。

And so Beige and I started this business.

我们靠自有资金运营，虽然收到了多家风投的条款清单，但出于各种原因，我们没有接受。

We bootstrapped it, had a bunch of venture capital term sheets for a variety of reasons, didn't take them.

几年后，我们将这家公司卖给了西雅图一家上市公司。

And we sold that business a couple years later to a public company in Seattle.

而在第一次交易中，你知道，我在NLG付出了巨大努力，我认为自己作为CEO并协助完成交易后，拿到了一百万美元——对于一个来自印第安纳州的穷孩子来说，这简直是改变命运的数字。

And again, in the first transaction, you know, I had worked really hard at NLG, and I think I walked away after being the CEO and helping put the deal together with a million dollars, which for a poor kid from Indiana, that was game changing.

但以今天的硅谷标准来看，人们可能会说：‘你真是个门外汉？’

But by Silicon Valley standards today, people would be like, know, you clueless?

为此付出了大量的努力。

There was a lot of work that went into that.

我和Beige共同创办的第二家公司，出售时我拥有40%的股份，收益是之前的四到五倍。

The second business I started with beige, I think I owned 40% of the business when we sold it, That was four or five x the outcome.

然后当我思考自己想做什么时，我有两个相互竞争的想法。

And then when I thought about what I wanted to do, I had two competing ideas.

一个是另一个运营型业务。

One was another operating business.

就像你是个创业者，总会冒出各种点子。

Like, if you're an entrepreneur, you have these ideas.

你得把这些想法从心里排出去。

You have to get them out of your craw.

但我真正觉得更适合我的，是投资。

But what I really thought that I was better suited for was investing.

让我明白这一点的人是里奇·巴顿。

And a person who made this clear to me was Rich Barton.

里奇有一天把我叫到一边，对我说：我觉得你不是一个出色的创业者。

Rich one day sat me down and he said, I don't think you're a great entrepreneur.

我说：‘里奇，这太伤人了。’

And I said, Rich, that's so insulting.

为什么？

Why?

尤其是里奇，他总是说：‘好吧，’

Especially from Rich, like the constant Well,

他说话很实在。

he keeps it real.

显然。

Apparently.

他说：‘创业是一门化可能为现实的艺术。’

And he said, Being an entrepreneur is the art of the possible.

对吧？

Right?

你必须凭意志力让事情成真。

You have to will things into existence.

他说，要不断思考哪些事情可能会出错。

And he said, constantly think about what can go wrong.

当你是一名企业家时，通常需要暂时搁置怀疑，只去思考哪些事情可能会成功。

When you're an entrepreneur, oftentimes, have to suspend disbelief and just think about what can go right.

他说，但作为投资者，投资者考虑的是概率分布，而不是可能性。

And he said, but as an investor, investors think about distribution of probabilities, not possibilities.

他还说，我一直以来都在观察你，像你作为律师的训练方式，你作为投资者的思维方式，你会成为一个出色的投资者。

And he's like, I've always kind of observed you, like your training as a lawyer, how you think as an investor, like you're going make a great investor.

于是我心想，你知道吗？

And so I was like, you know what?

他说得对。

He's right.

最好的投资商业模式是这种风险投资对冲基金的模式。

And the best investment business model is kind of this venture capital hedge fund business model.

我以为这个商业模式会经历大量颠覆。

I thought there was going to be a lot of disruption occur in that business model.

另外，当

Also, when

你说这个商业模式，这个风险资本对冲基金商业模式时，在你和现在其他几个人做之前，这根本不是一个商业模式。

you say this business model, this venture capital hedge fund business model, until what you and now several others have done, that was not a business model.

那是两种完全不同的业务。

That was two completely different types of businesses.

对。

Correct.

我稍后会谈到这一点。

I'll hit that in just a second.

但我想要创办一家公司，我说过，我认为我可以打造一个更好的这种模式版本。

But I wanted to start a business and I said, I will start I think I can build a better version of this model.

当时，如果你真的回溯时间，沃伦·巴菲特，对吧？

At the time, if you really rewind the clock, Warren Buffett, right?

我不知道是哪一年，大概是1955年他创办了他的对冲基金。

I don't know what year it was, 1955 when he started his hedge fund.

他同时投资公开市场和私人市场。

He did both publics and privates.

对吧？

Right?

他并没有加以区分。

He didn't distinguish.

他只是寻找优秀的企业投资。

He just sought out great investments.

在布拉德·格斯特纳出现之前，创立Par Capital的保罗·里德就一直在做私人投资。

Paul Reeder, who started Par Capital, was doing private investments before Brad Gerstner showed up.

塞思·克拉曼在鲍波斯特也早在我们发明‘跨界投资’这个术语之前就从事私人投资了。

Seth Klarman at Bowpost was doing private investments, you know, before we coined the term crossover.

对吧？

Right?

波士顿的大卫·阿布拉姆斯。

David Abrams in Boston.

所以我有很多我敬仰的传奇投资者，他们从不把世界划分为交叉投资，而是认为世界根本不存在‘我只能投资于Pre-IPO或Post-IPO公司’这种人为的限制。

So I had a lot of legendary investors I looked up to that they never thought of the world in crossover, but they thought the world, you know, there wasn't this artificial constraint that I can only invest if you're pre IPO or you're post IPO.

对他们来说，私人投资意味着什么？

What did private investments mean to them?

是像我们现在理解的那样，还是别的意思？

Did it mean what we think of or did it mean something else?

我觉得对他们而言，私人投资可能是购买汽车经销商、报纸或纺织公司，或者其他任何类型的公司。

Well, I would say for them, private investing was maybe buying auto dealerships or newspapers or textile companies or whatever the case may be.

正如你所知，在那个几十年里盛行的价值投资中，我的做法是找到一家拥有大量自由现金流的公司。

And as you know, in value investing, which was really the rage of that couple decades, was I'm going to find a company with a bunch of free cash flow.

然后我会用这些自由现金流去投资那些回报率更高的项目。

I'm going to use that free cash flow to go invest in things that actually have higher returning characteristics.

保罗投资了那家叫NLG的公司。

Paul invested in that first company, NLG.

他还担任了董事会成员。

He was on the board.

我们彼此相当了解。

We got to know each other quite well.

他看到我进行Priceline等公司的日内交易，觉得这很有趣，竟然有一位CEO同时也是投资者。

He saw me day trading in companies like Priceline, and he thought, this is interesting, a CEO who actually is also an investor.

所以我记得他对我说：‘你哪天应该来跟我一起工作。’

So I remember him saying to me, you ought to come work with me someday.

所以在我们卖掉OpenList公司后，我去找他，说：‘嘿，我想来跟你一起工作。’

And so after we sold that company open list, I showed up and I said, hey, I want to come work with you.

我可以负责公司的技术部分。

I can run the technology part of the business.

你并没有技术业务。

You don't have a technology business.

我会建立一个技术业务，涵盖公开市场和风投，好吗？

I'll build a technology business, both public and VC, Okay?

这与你历史上所做的事是一致的。

Which is consistent with historically what you've done.

我说，如果我喜欢这个生意，我会自己开一个，所以你不用付我工资。

And I said, If I like the business, I'm going to start my own, so you don't have to pay me.

让我当学徒吧。

Make me an apprentice.

我只希望我们每天一起吃午饭，你教我对冲基金的业务。

All I ask is that we have lunch together every day, and you teach me the hedge fund business.

是的。

Yeah.

那时候你已经赚了几百万美元了。

You'd made a, you know, couple million dollars at this point.

对。

Right.

对。

Right.

所以我的意思是，我并没有很多钱，但again，像

So I mean, I didn't have a lot of money, but again, like

他带你参与了那个项目吗？

And did he take you on that deal?

他说，哦，太好了。

He said, oh, great.

你可以在这里名义上工作，但我不会付你钱。

You can you can quote unquote work here with and I won't pay

你？

you?

你知道吗，有趣的是他确实说过让我当学徒。

You know, the funny thing is he did say kinda come apprentice.

是的。

Yeah.

我想我干了两周后，他说这太荒谬了。

And I think I was two weeks in, and he said, this is ridiculous.

你知道吗？

You know?

他说，好吧。

He said, okay.

我会付你钱。

I'm gonna pay you.

你得做这件事。

You're gonna do this.

我会说，在接下来的两年半里，这是我们最非凡的一段师徒历程。

And I will say it was one of the most extraordinary mentormentee journeys over the course of the next two and a half years.

他是个传奇。

He's a legend.

他没有得到应得的认可。

He doesn't get the credit he deserves.

他给了我自主权，在公开层面，让我投资我整个书单里的公司，比如谷歌和Priceline，还有几家优秀的企业。

And he gave me the autonomy to, on the public side, go invest in my entire book in Google and Priceline and a couple of great companies.

然后去进行一些风险投资，比如领投Zillow的B轮融资。

And then to go make some venture capital investments like leading the series be in Zillow.

我记得当时觉得这太简单了。

I remember at the time thinking this is so easy.

我对谷歌有着深深的信念，因此不需要持有一个高度分散的投资组合。

I had such deep conviction in Google and I didn't have to have this highly diversified book.

如果股价下跌，保罗就会走进办公室问：你觉得呢？

If it went down, Paul would come into the office and say, do you think?

我会说：再买一些。

I'd say, Buy more.

我要去练瑜伽了。

I'm heading to yoga.

对吧？

Right?

当时就是这样，但我们确实一起度过了非常美好的时光。

It was just like and, and so but we had a we we had a really great run together.

我之前没意识到，你领投Zillow的B轮融资时，是和保罗一起的，因为从那时起，你就长期担任Zillow的董事会成员。

I didn't realize that you that was with Paul when you led the series b in Zillow, because you you were a Zillow board member from that point on for quite a long time.

你离开保罗的公司并创立Altimeter之后，还继续以独立身份留在Zillow的董事会吗？

Did you stay on the board of Zillow sort of as an independent even after leaving Paul's firm and starting Altimeter?

我离开了董事会。

I I I left the board.

我不确定是不是正好同时发生的，但大概是那个时候。

I don't know if it was exactly contemporaneous to that, but about that time.

到2000年底，我的意思是，我从保罗身上学到了很多。

By the end of two thousand I mean, listen, I learned so much from Paul.

说正经的，投资组合管理、风险管理——保罗没用‘极简主义’这个词，但他围绕自己最看好的想法构建简洁、集中的投资组合，这一点我完全认同。也许我天生就倾向这种理念，但我们在如何管理投资组合上确实高度契合。

And all kidding aside, the idea of portfolio management, risk management Paul didn't call it essentialism, but running a simplified, concentrated portfolio around your best ideas was something that I absolutely I may have been constitutionally predisposed to believe that anyway, but we were just very symbiotic in our thinking about how to manage portfolios.

他始终给予我极大的支持，因此我在与他共度的那些充满挑战的时期里学到了很多。

He couldn't have been more supportive, and so I learned through some pretty heady times with him.

到了2007年底，我跟他说：我觉得我想自己干一番事业。

And then at the end of 2007, I, you know, kinda said to him, I I think I wanna do my own thing.

你当时是以对冲基金的身份领投了Zillow的B轮融资。

You led the series b in Zillow as a crossover hedge fund.

交叉投资这个概念，正如你所说，不仅存在于科技和其他领域，也存在于科技领域，比如TCV和其他机构。

The idea of crossover, you know, existed as you said in in not necessarily in tech and other, you know, domains, but also in tech with TCV and and others.

他们并没有在那些公司中领投B轮融资，那些公司

They were not leading series b's in companies that that that

当时那个B轮融资是多少？

was series b at that point in time is what?

10.15亿美元？

$1,015,000,000 dollars?

我的意思是，这可不是五千万或一亿美元。

I mean, it's not a 50 or a 100.

是的。

Yeah.

没错。

That's right.

我想我在回忆当时的投资金额。

I think I'm trying to think the the check size.

如果我没记错的话，我们可能投了两千万到三千万美元，当时公司的估值是几亿美元。

We may have put in 20 to $30,000,000, if I recall, it was a couple $100,000,000 valuation.

听听他的背景，另一位元老级人物杰伊·霍格，他是TCV的创始人，在我加入Zillow之前就已经投资了Zillow。

Listen to his credit, and another OG, Jay Hoag, who started TCV, was already in Zillow by the time I came into Zillow.

对吧？

Right?

是跟Benchmark一起进入A轮的吗？

Came in in the A with Benchmark?

是的。

Yeah.

也许这是术语的问题。

Maybe it's the nomenclature.

我不确定是否一个是C轮、一个是A轮、一个是B轮，但这些确实是前三轮机构资本。

Don't know if one was a C and an A and a B, but those were the first three rounds of institutional capital.

杰伊和里奇在Expedia时期就认识。

And Jay had a relationship with Rich from his days at Expedia.

是的。

Yep.

我显然和里奇有关系。

I obviously had a relationship with Rich.

我们知道他是一位非凡的创业者。

We knew he was a special entrepreneur.

我也认识比尔。

I knew Bill as well.

所以，这是一个宏大的构想。

And so, it was a big idea.

这是由里奇和劳埃德领导的一群来自Expedia的杰出人才。

It was a special collection of people out of Expedia led by Rich and Lloyd.

但我记得当时曾和杰伊讨论过技术交叉投资。

But I remember at the time talking to Jay about technology crossover ventures.

他是做交叉投资的最佳人选。

Are the guy to do crossover.

我记得当时坐下来想，这就是成功的模式。

And I remember sitting down saying, that's the winning model.

这确实是成功的模式。

That's really the winning model.

当时我带着更清晰的想法来看待公共资本池和风险资本池。

Now, I was coming at it with a more, I think, clear idea of public pool of capital and venture pool of capital.

TCV 已经演变成一家更偏向后期阶段的风险投资公司，持有某些公开持股，但本身并不是对冲基金。

TCV had evolved into almost more of a later stage venture firm, right, that held some public positions but didn't have a hedge fund per se.

所以我认为我的观点略有不同，但该给的肯定还是要给，他们对世界走向的远见超前于时代。

So I think I had a slightly different view, but credit where credit is due, their vision for where the world was going was was ahead of their time.

好的。

Okay.

所以那是2008年。

So it's 2008.

2007年，2008年。

2007, 2008.

你告诉保罗你要离开。

You tell Paul you're gonna Yeah.

自立门户。

Go out on your own.

你一直在这个时间点上做得很好。

You just keep nailing this time.

是的。

Yeah.

你就只是说，真的吗？

You're just like, really?

你真的在想

You're really thinking

整个世界都在快速前进。

The whole world's going go go.

以防它突然崩塌

And just in case it I falls away

真希望我能做得这么好。

wish I was nailing it.

我在2007年底结的婚。

I got married at the end of 'seven.

我们于2008年6月3日迎来了第一个孩子。

We had our first child on 06/03/2008.

记得吗？2007年8月，世界的裂缝就已经显现了。

Remember, the world cracks were shown in August 2007.

每当你看这些股票图表时，它们看起来似乎很稳定，但天哪，那些失眠的夜晚实在太多了。

Whenever you look at these stock graphs, they look at it like they're generally stable, but man, the number of days of lost sleep.

但我记得我对米歇尔说：我们那时候没多少钱。

But I remember saying to Michelle, We didn't have that much money.

我们住在波士顿一个几千平方英尺的地下公寓里。

We were living in a few thousand square foot subterranean apartment in Boston.

我们正迎来第一个孩子，而到2008年，世界显然变得越来越艰难，我当时就说：我想自己创办一家公司。

We were having our first child, and it was clear the world was getting tougher by the 2008, I said, I think I'm going to start my own firm.

我要告诉保罗。

I'm going to tell Paul.

让我们说说看，2008年9月、10月你正在哺乳婴儿的时候，电视上播着CNBC，你只想找个垃圾桶吐出来，而我却在一分不名的情况下启动了事业。

And let's just say that when you're nursing a baby in September 2008, October 2008, I have CNBC on, it's like you just want to find the wastebasket to get sick in, and I'm launching with no money.

因为你当时有很多承诺，但都泡汤了。

Because you had a bunch of commitments and they dried up.

对。

Right.

所以到了2007年底，业绩记录一直不错。

So at the end of 'seven, the track record had been good.

于是我联系了一些大学捐赠基金和基金会。

So I talked to some university endowments, foundations.

但我对这个领域完全一无所知。

Now, I didn't know this world at all.

我对有限合伙人（LP）的世界也完全不了解。

I didn't know the world of LPs at all.

但我找了几个人，他们说，嘿。

But I talked to a few people, and they're like, hey.

我们会给你一些钱。

We'll give you some money.

所以我以为我起步时能有两亿美元。

And so I thought I was gonna launch with 100 to $200,000,000.

但到了2008年9月、10月，很明显，人们觉得金融世界可能就此终结了。

But it was clear by September, October 2008, people thought the financial world might be over forever.

现在很难了。

It's hard Now

这已经是一个不错的世纪了。

It's been a good century or two.

现在很难再设身处地地回想当时的情景了，但当你想到，人们当时觉得雷曼、摩根士丹利、高盛都会崩盘。

Hard it's hard now to, like, put ourselves back in those shoes, but when when you think, like, people thought Lehman, Morgan Stanley, Goldman Sachs were all going to collapse.

对吧？

Right?

而且没人知道这种危机的传染效应。

And nobody knew the contagion effects of that.

没人知道这对美元的影响。

Nobody knew the impact on the dollar.

没人知道这会造成什么后果。

Nobody knew the impact.

当时人们以为这将是一场极其严重的经济萧条。

The thought was it was going to be a very deep depression.

所以，试着站在创始人的角度去想，这很有趣。

And so it's interesting just to put in the mind of the founder.

人们对我说：‘你选了个绝佳的时机来创业。’

People say to me, oh, you picked a really great time to launch.

对吧？

Okay?

我可以向你保证

I can assure you

我当时说那话，是带着讽刺的。

I was saying it, no, sarcastically.

是的。

Yeah.

事实上，我的一位顾问就是管理着一家大型对冲基金的人。

Mean, it was, in fact, one of my advisors who runs a big hedge fund.

对你来说，什么是大型对冲基金？

What's a big hedge fund to you?

哦，他曾经管理着一家数十亿美元的对冲基金。我当时只是有一个非正式的顾问小组，他说：你犯了个大错。

Oh, he ran a multibillion dollar hedge fund at And the I just had an informal group of advisers, and he said, you've made a huge mistake.

回去找保罗，看看他会不会让你回去上班。

Go back to Paul and see if he'll give you your job back.

哇哦。

Woah.

别这么做。

And don't do this.

对吧？

Right?

因为我以一种非常谦逊的方式安排了我的生活，所以我并不需要钱。

And because I had organized my life in a really humble way, I didn't need money.

我还创办了几家其他公司，当我创办它们时，基本上都是从零开始。

And I had started a few other companies, and when I started them, I started them basically from scratch.

我知道那种感觉。

I knew what it felt like.

我知道那种感觉，那种创始人在第一天的感觉。

I knew that feeling, that founder feeling on day one.

那既令人兴奋又令人恐惧。

It was both exciting and terrifying.

我当时想，这事我拿得下。

And I was like, I got this.

马已经跑出马厩了。

The horse has left the barn.

我正在做这件事。

I'm doing this.

要说明的是，保罗也说：你行的。

And to Paul's credit, Paul was like, You got this.

他当初在1991年SNL危机期间，仅用不到300万美元起步；而我有明确的路线图，有信任我的导师，有清晰的目标，并且我知道我会长期坚持下去。

And he had started par with less than $3,000,000 in the SNL crisis in 1991, and I had a roadmap, and I had a mentor who believed, and I had a clear vision as to where I was going to go, and I knew I was going to do it for a really long time.

你当时也有大约300万美元，是吧。

And you also had about $3,000,000 if Yeah.

我们的研究是

Our research was

我在第一天就找到了投资者，虽然不想点名，但保罗就是其中之一。

I had I think on my day one investors, not to out them, but Paul was one of them.

我哥哥也是其中之一。

My brother was one of them.

现在，我大哥比我大十五岁左右。

Now, my brother my oldest brother is about fifteen years older than me.

顺便说一下，他是个建筑师。

The side note is he's an architect.

他一辈子省吃俭用，攒了一百万美元。

He had saved his entire life a million bucks.

不知道干了多少年，大概十五年吧，才攒到一百万美元左右。

Like, worked I don't know how many years, fifteen years to save a million bucks or something.

然后他把所有钱都投进了一个对冲基金。

And he invested it all in a hedge fund.

我不知道为什么我笑了。

I don't know why I laugh.

他把钱投到了洛杉矶的一个对冲基金，结果那家伙偷走了他所有的两亿美元。

Put it in a hedge fund in LA, and the guy stole all 200,000,000 of this money that he had.

所以我哥哥真的是辛辛苦苦干了十五年。

So my brother literally worked fifteen years.

天哪。

Oh, my god.

他一生的积蓄化为乌有。

His life savings went down the drain.

他东拼西凑又弄了五十万美元，说要把这些钱交给你去投资。

He scrambled together another half million bucks, and he said, I'm giving it to you to invest.

你当时是不是觉得

Were you like

别有这种想法。

don't have this.

所以你瞧，我不确定我能不能接下这个任务。

So you're I don't know if I can take this.

我记得我们当时在洛杉矶徒步，他说，我知道你一定能做好。

And I remember we were on a hike in LA, and he said, I know you're gonna do great with it.

我说，听好了，我向你保证。

And I said, Well, here's the thing I promise you.

我可能会把钱全亏掉，但我绝不会去偷。

I may lose it all naturally, but I won't steal it.

他说：‘我知道你住哪儿，你要是偷了，我找得到你。’

He's like, I know where you live if you steal it.

我很高兴地说，不到十年后，他退休了，一切对他来说都特别顺利。

And I can happily say less than a decade later, he was retired, and it had worked out fabulous for him.

你们家怎么这么爱冒险？

What is it with your family and risk?

对吧？

Right?

比如你，你知道的，几乎破产了，不是你，但你爸、你兄弟都经历过。

Like, you, like, gone you know, essentially gone bankrupt, you know, a couple not you, but, you know, your dad, your brother.

关键是

The thing with

我们家人之间关系非常亲密。

our family is we're incredibly close.

我们互相支持，包括我父亲在内。

We support each other, even including my father.

他很有名。

He was famous.

他愿意为你倾其所有。

He would have given you the shirt off his back.

而且知道你有这样的人，所以再次强调，我不想把这描绘得过于英雄化。

And to know that you have those folks And so again, I don't want to make it seem overly heroic.

我们起步时资金非常少。

We launched with very little money.

我做的第一笔交易是

The first trade I placed was

这是Altimeter

This is Altimeter

只是为了在家做一些测试。

just for some at home.

我们在2008年11月1日上线。

We launched on 11/01/2008.

我做的第一笔交易是以每股42美元买入Priceline。

The first trade I made was into Priceline at $42 a share.

这后来在收购了Booking之后变成了Booking，当然，它后来又收购了Booking。

Which, of course, became Booking after it later bought Booking and Booking

2004年、2005年的时候收购了Booking，但你知道，那个42美元……

bought Booking in 2004, 2005, but, you know, that 42

当时人们可能还没意识到这会成为一个如此庞大的企业。

People probably didn't recognize yet what a monster that was.

每股42美元。

$42 a share.

当股价涨到每股2000美元时，我仍然持有它。

I still owned it when it hit $2,000 a share.

我在哥伦比亚商学院教过一门课，讲的是格雷厄姆和多德的证券分析，探讨人们错过了什么，以及我们当时看到了什么。

And teach a class at Columbia Business School on it and, you know, securities analysis class on Graham and Dodd class kind of like, what did people miss and what, you know, what did we see?

但无论如何，你知道，那就是起点。

But at any rate, you know, that was the start.

我要说，当我们启动时，我想去硅谷，但我当时在波士顿，因为我没钱。

I will say that when we launched, I wanted to be in Silicon Valley, but I was in Boston because I had no dough.

当时，那些投资于集合基金的人——记得吧，到2007年底，人人都开始把私募投资放进公开基金里。

And at the time, people who had invested in commingled funds because remember, by the end of 'seven, everybody was starting to put privates in their public vehicles.

对吧？

Right?

我记得，比如，Legg Mason的比尔·米勒在2006年或2007年投资了Zillow，然后在2008年把所有股份又卖回给了公司，因为当时人人都在撤出私募头寸。

I remember, for example, that Bill Miller of Legg Mason famously invested in Zillow in 2006 or 2007, and then in 2008 sold all those shares back to the company because everybody was unwinding their private positions.

所以当有限合伙人发现他们在2008年流动性严重不足时，

So when LPs found themselves overly illiquid in 2008

我知道这是做跨市场投资的错误方式。

I know that is how not to do crossover.

到了2008年，他们就说：我们不想在公开基金里持有私募资产。

By 2008, they were like, we do not want privates in public funds.

对吧？

Right?

所以我有这个愿景，但当时并不清楚该如何执行，因为人们真的认为——交叉基金、合并基金、公私混合基金这些概念。

So I had the vision, but it wasn't clear how that was going to be executed because people really you know, crossover fund, commingled fund, public private fund.

在2008年，这些说法都是糟糕的，你知道的。

That was a bad you know, those were bad phrases in in the 2008.

为什么到2007年，人们开始把这些私营公司加入对冲基金的投资组合？

Why was it by 2007 that people had started adding these private companies to hedge fund portfolios?

我大概在2004年、2005年就有了这个观察，是的。

So the observation I had probably in 2004, 2005 Yeah.

我当时的想法是，我受过证券律师的训练。

Was and I was a securities lawyer by training.

我曾参与过许多首次公开募股的工作。

I had done a worked around a bunch of IPOs.

也许这有所帮助，但我意识到，私人市场正变得越来越深入、越来越有流动性。

Maybe that helped, but I was like, companies, the private markets are becoming way deeper, way more liquid.

公司会更快地扩张，因为互联网为它们提供了可扩展的网络基础；同时，它们会更长时间保持私有状态，因为私人资本的池子更深了，而且2000年之后，我们让它们上市变得更加困难。

Companies are going to scale faster because the internet provides a network upon which they can scale, and they're going to stay private longer because there are deeper pools of private capital, and we've made it more difficult for them to go public post 2000.

好的？

Okay?

而且2008年之后当然更是如此。

And then certainly post 2008.

没错。

Correct.

TCV当时就在那里。

TCV was there.

蔡斯已经创办了老虎基金。

Chase had started Tiger.

菲利普已经创办了CO2。

Philippe had started CO2.

所以我们开始看到一些对冲基金非常聪明地，我认为，开始涉足私人投资，我觉得我想在硅谷打造一个由创始人建立的全球顶尖的跨界基金。

So we started to see examples of hedge funds that were really smartly, I think, starting to do some private investing, and I thought, I want to build the best crossover fund in the world that's based in Silicon Valley, built by a founder.

我觉得这就是我的独特优势，对吧？

And I thought that was my differentiator, right?

我拥有硅谷的人脉网络。

That I had a network in Silicon Valley.

大多数其他对冲基金都在纽约或波士顿。

Most of the other hedge funds were in New York or Boston.

它们中的大多数是股票选股者，而不是创始人。

Most of them were stock pickers, not founders.

因此我认为，我可以以一种更具同理心、更贴近创始人的方式来做这件事，就像真正的风险投资那样，但又能一直扩展到公开市场。

And so I thought, I can do this in a way that's really more empathetic and more closely aligned with founders, like true venture, but they could scale all the way into the public markets.

2008年时项目被推迟了，因为当时没人想要集合基金。

So it was delayed in 2008 because nobody wanted commingled funds.

但到2010年，我们终于启动了，我们在2008、2009和2010年已经有了一个很好的开端。

But by 2010, we got off, we had a great start in 2008, 2009, 2010.

到2010年，人们开始说：好吧，现在我们可以让你去实现你的愿景了。

And by 2010, people were like, okay, now we'll let you start to undertake your vision.

因此在2011年，我们开始组建第一个专门的资本池。

And so 2011, we started putting together the first dedicated pool of capital.

2012年，我搬到了硅谷。

2012, I moved to Silicon Valley.

那个专门的资本池

And that first dedicated pool of capital

专门用于风险投资，而不是单一的

Dedicated for venture investing versus So the single

我们有一个公开的资本池，本质上是做科技股的多空策略。

we had a public pool of capital, which was long short technology effectively.

我们还因大量投资旅游相关领域而广为人知。

We also became pretty well known for doing a lot of travel related investments.

但在那个资本池中，我们也能进行一定量的私人投资。

But in that pool of capital, we could also do a certain amount of private investing.

但我们意识到，对于所看到的风险和成长型机会，我们需要一个期限更长的资本池。

But we realized that for venture and growth opportunities that we saw, we needed a longer duration pool of capital.

这个策略很有道理，历史也显然证明了这一点。

The strategy makes sense, and history has obviously shown that.

但是怎么才能做到呢，

But how do yeah.

你们是如何权衡的呢？

How do you trade off?

比如，如果你在管理一个公开投资组合，你可能希望基本保持满仓状态。

Like, if you're running a public book, you probably wanna be pretty close to fully invested.

而对于私募投资，你需要保留现金储备。

For privates, you need dry powder.

嗯，

Mhmm.

你们是怎么解决这个问题的？

How did you solve that?

是通过设立这些专项基金来实现的吗？

Is that by raising these dedicated pools?

就像任何创业者或创始人一样，你必须看到某些市场变化，从而为新进入者创造机会。

Like any entrepreneur founder, right, you have to see some market changes that give an opening for a new entrant.

因为现有企业拥有优势。

Because the incumbents have advantages.

我相信，我提到的那三件事——IPO变得更难、公司扩张更快、私人资本池更深——但我也相信，这将推动风险投资的工业化，对吧？

I believed that the very nature, the three things that I mentioned, IPO is harder to do, companies scaling faster, deeper private pools of capital, But I also believe that that was going to lead to the industrialization of venture, right?

赢家的形态将与上一代不同，而这个行业才刚刚发展了一两代而已。

That this thing the winners were gonna look different than the previous generation, and this was an industry that was only a generation or two old.

风险投资。

Venture capital.

风险投资。

Venture capital.

是的。

Yeah.

因此，我们需要一个长期限的资本池。

And so we needed a long duration pool of capital.

我们需要一款适合我们的公开市场投资者的产品，所以我们募集了第一笔资本。

We needed a product that suited our public market investors, so we raised that first pool of capital.

当我筹集资金时，自然会有一些怀疑。

Now, when I raised it, there was the requisite level of skepticism.

比如，你觉得自己怎么跟红杉竞争？

Like, how do you think you're going to compete with Sequoia?

你打算怎么跟克莱纳竞争？

How are you going to compete with Kleiner?

你打算怎么竞争？

How are you going to compete?

我们明确表示，我认为从第一次机构融资开始的创业历程，与我们原本的计划是不同的。

And we made very clear that I thought that the business building journey that started in that first institutional raise was different than what we intended to do.

对吧？

Right?

是的。

Yeah.

比如，我作为创始人，筹集了大量资金，涉及三家不同的公司。

Like, I raised a lot of money, three different companies, right, as a founder.

所以

So

如果每家公司要融资两到三次，甚至更多，而且你得接触大约30家风投机构才能拿到一份投资条款清单。

Which if if it's two or three raises per company or more and think 30 firms you talked to to to get one term sheet.

比如，你当时认识了数百家风投机构。

Like, you knew hundreds of venture firms at

到那时为止。

this point.

而且和那些曾经一起赚过钱的人建立了深厚的关系。

And and had deep relationships with people who we had made money together.

所以我猜，你当时回答‘你怎么跟红杉竞争’这个问题时，答案是：我们不竞争。

So I assume your answer to that question of how you're gonna compete with Sequoia at that moment in time was we're not.

我们不竞争。

We're not.

明白了。

Okay.

所以记住这些德高望重的早期阶段公司，比如迈克·斯派瑟、吉姆·怀特，还有萨特山公司的团队，以及我在Benchmark和Sequoia的朋友。

So remember just these venerable early stage firms, you know, Mike Spicer and and Jim White and the team over at Sutter Hill and my friends at Benchmark and friends at Sequoia.

有趣的是，我记得2009年3月，在亚利桑那州的艾伦公司会议上。

Interestingly enough, Andreessen, I remember March 2009, Allen and Company conference, Arizona.

他们正在为第一支基金做准备。

They're getting ready for fund one.

对吧？

Right?

所以市场不是在2008年触底，而是在2009年3月9日。

So the market bottomed, not in 2008, on 03/09/2009.

我们当时都在艾伦公司

And we were all at the Allen and

的会议上。

Company conference.

这是在他们投资Skype之前还是之后？

Was this before or after they did Skype?

这要早得多。

This was well before.

是的。

Yeah.

我记得当时坐在一张桌子旁，手里拿着我的小小融资演示文稿，抬头看到旁边桌坐的是马克和本，他们也拿着自己的演示文稿。

And I remember sitting at a table with my little pitch deck, and I looked at a table next to me, and it was Mark and Ben with their pitch deck.

可以说，他们的成长速度要快得多。

And let's just say they scaled much, much faster.

但没错，我们当时确实在同一个场合。

And but, yeah, we were both there at the same time.

你知道，他们有一个远见，那就是对风险投资行业工业化的一种卓越构想，他们如何改变风险投资，而他们确实做得极其出色。

You know, they had a vision, which was a brilliant vision for the industrialization of venture, for how they were going to change venture and they've done it extraordinarily well.

如果快进到今天，你们两家公司的规模大致相当。

When fast forward to today, your two firms are about roughly same, equal order of magnitude.

管理资产规模可能处于相似水平，但两家公司非常不同。

AUM may be in a similar territory, but the firms are very different.

我们稍后再谈这个。

We can get to that in a little bit.

但他们已经做到了

But they've done

短期。

short term.

见30个人。

See 30 people.

那是非常不同的

That that is a very different

是的。

Yeah.

30人对比350人。

30 versus 350.

今天是公司全员外勤活动。

And today's a full company off-site.

对吧？

Right?

所以

So

但我们是在2012年首次筹集了这一轮资金。

But we raised that first pool in 2012.

当时基本上就是大家凑钱。

It was basically passing the hat.

我们为我们的有限合伙人赚了不少钱。

We had made good money for our LPs.

在桌边轮流筹款。

Passed the hat around the table.

我是那支基金最大的有限合伙人，远超其他人，因为我希望把它做到一亿美元以上。

I was the biggest LP in that fund by a long shot because I wanted to get it, you know, upwards of a $100,000,000.

但第一支基金，我记得我做了六个投资。

But that first fund, I think I had six investments.

那个基金，我觉得我们不太可能获得回报。

And that fund, I I I don't think we will possibly have a return profile.

那个基金，它绝对是回报最好的基金之一。

I that fund, it definitely is is up there in terms of in terms of great returning funds.

当你领投Snowflake轮时，你还记得当时的股价是多少吗？

When you led the Snowflake round, do you remember what the share price was?

我不记得确切的股价了。

I don't remember what the exact share price was.

我觉得当时的企业估值大约在1.75亿美元左右。

I think the enterprise value at the time was somewhere around a $175,000,000.

好的。

Okay.

那是2012年。

So that was 2012.

基金是2000年设立的，但投资时间是2012年、2013年，我想。

Well, the fund was 2000 and vintage, 2012, 2013, I think.

我不确定Snowflake那轮投资是什么时候，是的。

I'm not sure when that first round of Snowflake Yeah.

可能是十三年或十四年。

There might have been thirteen, fourteen.

对。

Yeah.

但在那个时刻，你是否有一些别人没有的洞察，还是只是时机正好？

But that moment in time, did you have some insight that you felt nobody else had at that moment, or was it the right time?

比如，如何

Like, how

有几件事。

A few things.

第一，我对自己是个不错的投资者很有信心。

Number one, I did have confidence that I was a decent investor.

对吧？

Right?

所以我们付出了巨大的努力。

So we worked really hard.

我们是蓝领阶层。

We're blue collar.

实现战略的方式有很多种。

There are different ways to prosecute the strategy.

我认为有些人主要在社交酒会上活动，而我们则像人类学家一样，深入研究事物的发展趋势和哪些领域会崛起。

I think there are some people who work the cocktail circuit, and we really were students of we're anthropologists about where things were going and what was going to be big.

当时，人们对云计算普遍持悲观态度。

And at the time, there was a lot of pessimism, frankly, about cloud computing.

Salesforce 曾有几个季度的增长放缓超过了人们的预期，确实遇到了不少障碍。

Salesforce had some quarters where they saw more deceleration than people thought, and there were really kind of these obstacles.

其中一个障碍是云计算的计算成本与数据中心成本的对比。

One was the cost of compute in the cloud versus the cost in a data center.

但最大的障碍是这种观念：我永远不会把客户的数据放在云上。

But the big one was this perception that, like, I'll never put my customers' data in the cloud.

对吧？

Right?

这确实是个安全问题。

It was really a security issue.

那我们来回顾一下历史吧。

Which then, like, let's just review history.

那些认为自己不是科技公司、不需要维护本地数据中心的企业，很多都遭到了黑客攻击，客户数据被泄露。

Like, everyone that decided that was not a tech company that they needed to maintain an on prem data center got hacked and leaked customer data or lots of them.

而所有转向云端的人，你想想，我们真的能信任微软和亚马逊吗？

And everyone who shifted to the cloud, you know, oh, do we really trust Microsoft and Amazon?

他们在安全方面做得相当不错。

They're pretty good at that.

这是一个非常明智的决定。

That was a great decision.

有成千上万的人专注于安全，而你的数据中心可能只有两名顾问。

Thousands of people working on security versus your data center that had two consultants.

但那确实是索尼被黑的事件，你还记得吧。

And but it was really the Sony hack, you remember that.

哦，是的。

Oh, yeah.

哦，

Oh,

索尼董事会被黑的事件，我记得好像是科林·鲍威尔的邮箱被入侵了。

The the Sony board hack where I think it was Colin Powell, if memory serves me correct, his email was hacked.

在他的邮件里，有Salesforce并购活动的目标名单。

And in his email was the target list for Salesforce's M and A activity.

哇哦。

Woah.

泄露出来的内容太多了。

There was so much that came out

所以就像那样

that And so like that

所有关于Snapchat的事情。

All the Snapchat stuff.

所有的

All the

所有被泄露的内容。

all the stuff that got leaked.

所以，如果你是董事会成员或首席执行官，你会立刻想：如果我的邮箱被黑了怎么办？

And so if you were a board member or you were a CEO, you immediately said, what if my email was hacked?

那真是一个改变游戏规则的时刻。

And that was like a game changing moment.

但对我来说，我们所有云服务都如此。

But I would say for us, we had For all of cloud.

就像Excel一样。

To like Excel.

关于云服务。

For of cloud.