资本高效增长（与Zoom首席执行官袁征及Veeva首席执行官彼得·加斯纳对话）

我们当时紧张得要命。

And we were so nervous.

他为人特别直率。

He's very straightforward.

好消息是，他写了一篇非常棒的文章，登在《华尔街日报》上。

And the good news, he did write down a very nice article published in Wall Street Journal.

他还亲自录了一段视频。

And also, personally recorded a video.

一夜之间，我们收到了五万个访问量。

And over the night, we got 50,000.

五万个，没错。

50,000 Yeah.

都是从那篇文章来的用户。

Users from that article.

天哪。

Wow.

但大多数人过了几周就走了，你知道的。

But most of them, they left, you know, after several weeks.

不过那些留下来的，我想正是病毒式传播的起点——他们告诉朋友，朋友又告诉朋友，朋友再告诉朋友。

But those who stayed, I imagine that was the kernel of the virality of telling their friends who told their friends who told their friends.

还要和他们保持良好的个人关系，比如给VIP账户提供特别服务，或者送个小礼物。

And maintain a very good personal relationship with them, either VIP account or send them a small gift.

有个人取消了订阅。

Someone they canceled.

那时候才9.99美元，我亲自发邮件问他们：为什么取消我们的服务？

Back then only $9.99 I personally sent them an email, why you cancel our service?

我们该怎么改进？

What are we going do differently?

而且，直到今天，我们还和他们保持着联系。

And yeah, we still maintain a relationship even today.

有位首席执行官曾写信来，问我们该跟踪哪些不同的数据指标。

Had one of the CEOs wrote in and asked us about different metrics to track.

那在你有了这五万人之后，有没有一个明确的指标，让你意识到：我手里握着一把沙子，随时可能漏掉，但有没有什么可以衡量的东西，能看出这五万人能变成真正的规模？

Did you have a North Star after you had those 50,000 people where you realized, okay, I'm holding something in my hand and the sand could slip through my fingers, But is there something I can measure to see if this 50,000 can turn into something?

你当时最关注哪些数据？

What were you paying attention to?

我们盯的是那些最早、最忠诚的早期用户。

To those of very early, very loyal, early adopters.

哪怕只有一百个，也足够了。

Even 100 are good enough.

他们是最早、也是最忠实的用户，我们必须加倍努力，确保他们满意。

They are the early, I would say, most loyal users, double down to make sure they are happy.

如果他们特别满意，你觉得会怎样？

If they are very happy, guess what?

就会产生网络效应。

Network effects.

他们会主动带来一大批新用户。

They are going to bring a lot of new users.

所以即使有四万九千用户离开了，只要那一百个核心用户还在，我们就全力守住他们。

That's why even 49,000 users left, as long as 100 skill stayed, we doubled on that.

对，那时候我们就是这么做的。

So, yeah, that's a strategy back then.

对于彼得来说，在招聘、团队和组织建设方面，你的业务模式完全不同。

For Peter, on the hiring and people and organizational front, you had a very very different type of business.

你的客户不是用信用卡付款的。

Your customers don't buy with credit cards.

没错。

Right.

他们是用现金一次性支付数百万美元，买一年的合同。

They buy multi million dollar deals cash up front in a year for a year deal.

你需要一支销售团队来促成这些交易。

You need a sales force to Right.

而要维持这样的销售团队，通常意味着你得提供高额的现金薪酬。

To sell that, which usually means you need a lot of cash comp to compensate that sales force.

没错。

Right.

你在组建团队的时候，是怎么考虑该招什么样的人，以及怎么给他们报酬的？

How did you think about the right people to hire as you were building and and and how to compensate them?

是的。

Yeah.

我和埃里克有一个共同点，那就是在早期阶段，每个人都是关键，没有多余的人，因为多余的人只会白白烧钱，还会让决策变得迟缓和复杂。

I think one thing Eric and I have in common are, you know, in the early days, there's no wasted people, like no optional people, no wasted people because it just adds, a, it'll burn through your money and it'll just make your decision making smaller and sorry, complicated.

这就像是机器里的沙子。

It's like sand and machine.

所以我们需要人，尤其是因为销售周期很长。

So no wasted people and for us, yeah, we needed because a long sales cycle.

所以我们得立刻有销售团队，对吧？

So we need the sales right away, right?

所以，没错，我就是第一个销售。

So yeah, I was the first salesperson, right?

我在正式注册公司之前就开始卖东西了。

I I started selling before I signed the articles of incorporation.

我直接去找客户，说：你们要不要买点我马上要做的东西？

Show up at the customer, hey, think you should buy something for me, this thing that I'm gonna make.

那你们招人了吗？

Well, do you have you hired anybody?

还没。

No.

行吧。

Well, okay.

那你们能看看我做的演示吗？

Well, can you show us a demo you're gonna do?

不行。

No.

那做个PPT总可以吧？

How about a PowerPoint?

没有。

No.

好吧。

Okay.

一个月后再回来。

And then come back a month later.

我现在有PPT了。

I got a PowerPoint now.

你雇人了吗？

Have you hired anybody?

没有。

No.

还没。

Not yet.

继续卖就行了，这行靠的是关系。

You know, and then just keep selling because it's a relationship based business.

有个有趣的事，我们第一个客户其实是个小客户，但通过联合创始人的关系，我们认识了他，他可是个CEO。

Funny story, the first customer who bought, small customer, actually somehow through a relationship with my co founder, we got to this guy, he was the CEO.

他想给手下一个小部门买点软件，纯粹是因为对IT团队特别不满。

He wanted to buy some software for this small department just because he was really peeved with his IT team.

这人根本不知道我们卖的是什么。

So this guy had no idea what we're selling.

他说：我知道IT团队不欢迎你们，那我就干脆买一个，让他们知道谁才是说了算的。

He's like, I know that my IT team doesn't want you, so I'm gonna make a point and show them that I'm actually in charge here.

所以，我们就这样拿到了第一单。

So, that's how we got our first sale.

那时候，你几乎都登录不了系统。

And, you could barely log into the system at that time.

我不知道还有这回事。

Could you you I didn't know that.

但那时候你只能拼命干，对吧？

But then you gotta hustle, right?

然后就跟埃里克一样，对吧？

Then just like Eric, right?

接着你得拼命干啊，天哪，有客户想买东西，你就得使出浑身解数帮他们成功。

Then you gotta hustle, oh my god, this customer wants to buy something, and then you're working super hard to make them successful.

埃里克，我不确定有没有问过你，但我们在Veeva初期根本没做过客户满意度调查。

And Eric, I'm not sure I never asked you about this, but we never had customer satisfaction surveys for Veeva in the beginning.

我一直觉得，只要亲自跟那些早期用户聊聊，就能感受到他们的真实想法。

I always thought if I talk to those early adopter people, I will know, I will get the feeling.

要是搞什么调查表，反而可能抓不到那种感觉。

And if I have some survey, maybe I won't get the feeling.

完全没错。

Totally.

你说得对。

You are right.

我同意你的看法。

I agree with you.

你就这么着吧。

You just Yeah.

公司还小的时候，你有时能靠数据躲一阵子，但这种办法行不通。

You can hide behind When it's small, you can sort of hide behind metrics sometimes, and it doesn't work.

但只要你真正去和客户聊聊，弄清楚他们的真实想法，你就能明白问题出在哪。

But if you actually talk to the human and you figure it out, you'll know what's going on.

你能不能也跟我们讲讲，你是怎么拿下第一个大客户的？

How can you tell us also the story of landing your first big customer?

就是那个大客户。

The big customer.

我觉得，应该就是这笔单子真正让公司翻身了。

The which I I believe is probably the deal that really made the business.

是的。

Yeah.

当时确实有一套方法。

There was a set, right?

一开始是个对IT团队特别不满的人，后来一步步签下更大的单子，每一步都是跃升，对吧？

There was the first, like the guy who was just peeved at his IT team and then worked up to the next size deal and the next size deal and it was always a step function, right?

所以第一个数百万美元的年度合同是辉瑞，那真是硬碰硬的较量。

And so the first multi million dollar annual deals were a big customer, Pfizer and it was just hand to hand combat.

当时有个Salesforce的合伙人还说，你发个消息吧，说Veeva根本赢不了这个单子。

There was a partner at the time actually salesforce.com actually at the time said, oh, you know, send a note that Veeva will never win this deal.

我回了他们一句。

And I replied back.

我说，我们一定会拿下这个单子。

I said, we we will win this deal.

他们是在最终比拼期间把这话发给你的？

And I They sent it to you during the bake off?

是的。

Yeah.

因为他们压根不想来跟我们开会。

Because they didn't wanna even come into the meeting with us.

对吧？

Right?

他们说，我们打算选别的系统集成商之类的。

They were like, oh, we're gonna go with this other system integrator or something like that.

所以我回了封邮件，说我们一定会拿下这个单子。

So I sent an email back and said, we will win this deal.

为什么？

Why?

因为我们有更优秀的人，会更拼命，而对辉瑞来说，这是我们唯一的机会，我觉得他们真想追求卓越。

Because we have better people that'll work harder, and Pfizer's only shot at greatness, and I think they wanna shoot for greatness.

我记得那次和辉瑞开了个大会，对方有个负责人，我们这边也去了不少人，结果他站起来说：‘我们会议室里的人，比你们公司全公司的人还多。’

And and I remember there was this big meeting with Pfizer, there was a guy in there in charge of it, and we had a certain amount of people in the meeting, and the guy stood up for Pfizer, he said, We have more people in this meeting room than you have in your company.

你们凭什么让我们买你们的东西？

You know, why should we buy anything from you?

我就说了同样的话：你们唯一的希望就是我们。

And I just said the same thing, we're your only shot.

我们会做出点了不起的东西，而且我们有最棒的团队。

We're gonna make something great and we have the best people.

所以我觉得这事挺简单的，后来我们运气也不错。

So, it seemed simple to me and then we got lucky.

我们非常想要这个单子。

We want it.

赢下之后我突然想起来，天哪，接下来怎么办？

And then and then I remember after winning it thinking, oh my god.

现在该怎么做？

Now what?

接下来我们怎么才能让他们真正成功？

You know, now how are we gonna make them successful?

当那个客户正式上线并且满意的时候，整个公司都拿到了奖金，那并没有一个固定的衡量标准。

So we the whole company got a bonus when that customer was what we called live and happy, which didn't have a formulaic metric.

完全是靠访谈反馈来判断的。

It was based on interviews.

那你们是用那个客户的发票来资助产品开发的吗？

So did you use the invoice from that customer to then go fund product development?

是的。

Yeah.

我当时想，我们刚融了三百万元，却一点股权都没稀释。

I was I thought, oh, we've just raised a $3,000,000 round of capital here, and it didn't cost us any dilution.

对吧？

Right?

钱就直接到账了。

The check came in.

事情就是这么发生的。

So that's exactly what happened.

对。

Yeah.

你觉得

Do you think

那现在还能做到吗？

that's still doable today?

我想，外面肯定有很多人觉得，要是能把发票开给客户，把钱收进账户里，那就太好了。

Like, I imagine there's lots of folks out there that are like, well, I would love to go invoice a customer and get cash in the bank.

那么，到底在什么情况下，可以用客户的收入来给产品开发融资，什么情况下又不行呢？

And, you know, what what situations is it possible to fund your product with customer revenue versus not?

我觉得首先，你不能铺张浪费。

I think it's first of all, you can't be wasteful.

每个人都得被重视。

Every person has to matter.

我几乎会想，哦，我们要招这个人了。

I would almost think about, oh, we're hiring that person.

假设我们得每年付他十万美元。

Let's say we have to pay them $100,000 a year.

我父亲是做金属加工和机械的，我记得他。

I came from my father was in the business of metalworking and machinery, and he I remember him.

他就会想，哎，我得买那台车床。

He would like, oh, I gotta buy that lathe.

那台车床得花多少钱？

How much is that lathe gonna cost?

这钱花得值不值？

Is it working worth it?

所以我看待员工就像在买一台百万美元的机器，毕竟每年得付他们十万美金。

So I would think of people like, I'm buying a million dollar machine because I gotta pay them $100,000 a year.

这台百万美元的机器到底值不值？

Is that million dollar machine worth it or not?

要节俭，同时做出顶尖的产品，这才是降低销售成本最好的办法。

So frugal, and then make a really excellent product because that's the best way you can lower your cost of sales.

比如埃里克的产品，你们肯定都注意到，用起来特别顺手，因为他把整个产品设计得特别容易上手。

So like Eric's product, you probably all all notice it that it's easy to use, but he made it easy to consume the whole product.

他根本不需要去说服一堆人。

He didn't have to convince a bunch of people.

所以这就是关键所在。

So that's how to do it.

产品出色，定价合理，使用起来顺手。

Excellent product, get a good price, easy to consume.

你没必要在销售团队上花大钱，因为你的产品有独特优势。

You don't have to spend your money on salespeople because you have a differentiated product.

毕竟，销售团队才是最烧钱的地方。

Because salespeople, that's where it's really, really expensive.

没错。

Right.

你不用，但我读过那份报告。

You didn't have But I read sense

很多年前彼得的S1文件。

Peter's S1 document many years ago.

那时候我还记得，天啊，这个商业模式太棒了。

At that time, I still remember, wow, my God, this being model is so awesome.

但在我们的情况里，第一个付费客户、最大的付费客户，一年才两千块。

But in our case, our first paid customer, largest paid customer, only 2,000 a year.

所以我们没法靠这个来支持新产品的开发。

So we cannot use that to fund the new product development.

因为大多数用户每个月只付我们9.99美元。

Because most of users, they pay us only for $9.99 a month.

这真的挺难的。

So that's really hard.

但我确实觉得，对所有创业者来说，商业模式特别特别重要。

But I do think for all the founders, the business model very, very, very important.

如果你能找到像彼得和Veeva那样的模式，那就再好不过了。

If you can figure out a way to do something similar as what Peter and Veeva does, that's the best.

花时间琢磨这个吧，不只是产品，商业模式也一样——就像彼得说的，产品要出色，怎么卖、怎么撬动大企业客户，这些都很关键，才能打造一家持久的公司。

Do spend time on that, not only for product, but also the business model, as Peter mentioned, product excellence and how to sell the product and how to leverage big enterprise customer is very important, build a long term sustainable company.

在我们这儿，说实话，今天最大的挑战其实是我们的线上业务。

In our case, actually, I can tell you today the biggest challenge is our online business.

利润很高。

It's very profitable.

但很难预测。

However, it's very hard to predict.

他们今天还在，接下来两个月可能就走了。

They come today, next two months, they might leave.

直接取消服务。

They cancel the service.

这生意并不理想。

This is not a great business.

但企业客户这部分做得很好。

But enterprise portion is very good.

所以我从彼得身上学到了很多，比如怎么服务大企业客户。

You know, that's why I learned a lot from Peter, you know, how to manage a big enterprise customer.

我们很久以前在Emergence的一个活动上认识的，那会儿我第一次见到埃里克。

We met at an Emergence event way back when that's how we first met Eric and I.

是啊，话说回来。

Yeah, well.

那时候Emergence规模还小。

Emergence, it was smaller.

希望今天也能像那样多结识一些人脉。

Hopefully, there'll be some more connections like that today.

我想重点提一下合同和融资发展这个话题，因为这看起来完全违背直觉。

One one, thing I wanna highlight on on this topic of of contracts and funding development because I think it's really counterintuitive.

再说一遍，话题是资本高效增长。

Again, the topic is capital efficient growth.

你可能会觉得，比如像辉瑞那样的合作，或者你刚开始卖企业合同时，应该签多年长期合同。

You would think that what you would wanna do with, you know, that Pfizer deal for example or Eric when you started selling enterprise contracts is multi year deals.

把合同金额尽可能做大。

Let's get let's make this contract number as big as possible.

尽可能多收 upfront 的现金。

Let's get as much cash up front.

把客户锁定在两到四年。

Let's lock people in for two, three, four years.

你们完全不是这么做的。

That's not what you did at all.

对吧？

Right?

是的。

Yeah.

对。

Yeah.

我们没这么做，因为我一直着眼于长期价值，也就是每个客户的年度价值。

We didn't do that, because I I was always optimizing for the the long term value which is the annual value per customer.

所以，如果要给客户那种把他们绑死的条款，我觉得这反而是在缩小市场，因为他们被绑住后，付的钱会更少。

So if I had to give the customer terms that would lock them in, I thought that's actually shrinking my market because they'll pay less if they're locked in.

这是第一点。

That's one thing.

另外一点，我不希望我们变得懈怠。

Then the other one, I I didn't want us sort of getting lazy.

我希望每年都能重新赢得客户的信任。

I wanted us to earn the business every year.

所以当时就是这么想的。

So it was just sort of like that.

我们的核心目标其实是着眼于长期价值。

The driver was really optimizing to the long term value.

是的。

Yeah.

现在回头想想，这真的很合理——如果你当时给了客户30%的年折扣，或者锁定了价格，以后想提价就难了。

Which is, you know, makes so much sense now thinking about it that you would have had to have given a, I don't know, 30% annual discount or lock in the price, then raising prices is harder later.

而且这一点只有我们这么做。

And that's unique to us.

我觉得我们所处的垂直领域非常特定。

I think we're selling in a very confined vertical.

如果有两家公司，一家比另一家少付30%，结果对方知道了，心里肯定不舒服，这就不公平了。

So it's not really fair if there's two companies and one one's paying 30% less than the other, and they they end up knowing about it and feel bad feeling bad about it.

这在我们这种封闭的市场里是特别明显的。

So that's something specific to this confined market.

为了帮助不太了解Veeva业务的人理解一下，你们有几千个客户，其中大概一百个是真正的大客户。

And to put some shape around it for folks that don't know Veeva's business as well, you've couple thousand customers of which there's a 100 or so that are you know, like, really big customers.

是的。

Yeah.

除了你们，根本找不到其他可能的客户，除非你们去拓展整个市场。

And there's basically no one else out there who could be a customer without you expanding the market.

没错。

Right.

我们服务的客户群体是明确限定的。

We we have a we sell into a defined set of customers.

生命科学行业，前二十家是巨头，再往下还有上千家规模小一点的，我们只是逐步扩大了产品覆盖范围。

Life sciences industry, there's kind of top 20, and then there's another thousand or so that are doing smaller things, and we've just expanded our product footprint.

我们每卖给一个客户，通常能提供二十多种产品和服务。

So when we sell to a customer, we we might have 20 things that we can sell to them.

他们一开始可能只用其中某几项，后来再慢慢用上其他的。

They start in this area, they start in that area.

戈登管这叫一层层叠加。

So Gordon calls it layering the cake.

对吧？

Right?

我们针对同一个客户，有好多层不同的产品和服务在同时推进。

We have a lot of different layers to the cake that are all into the same customer.

我们靠的是关系网络。

We leverage relationships.

每年花十万美金维护这些关系，对我们来说完全值得。

We spend It's fine for us to spend a $100,000 a year maintaining free relationships.

重点是持续培养和深化这些关系。

Just putting into developing relationship.

这不算浪费。

That's not wasteful.

因为我们带着价值上亿美元的产品上门服务。

Because we have a lot of we're showing up the door with $100,000,000 worth of product.

只要你有关系，这笔投入就值了。

So if you have a relationship, it's it's worth it.

就像银行一样。

Like a bank.

投资银行就是这么干的，比这更值得。

A bank, investment banking, it's worth it than this.

这是一种完全不同的商业模式。

So it's a different type of business.

好了，各位听众。

Alright, listeners.

现在正是感谢我们非常喜爱的公司——Sentry的好时机。

This is a great time to thank one of our favorite companies, Sentry.

Sentry，就像一个站岗守卫的人。

That's s e n t r y, like someone standing guard.

一会儿我们会为Acquired的听众们送上一份特别福利。

And we have something special for the Acquired community to share here in a minute.

是的。

Yes.

Sentry 帮助开发者排查错误和延迟问题，几乎任何软件故障都能发现并提前修复，避免用户发火。

Sentry helps developers debug errors and latency issues, pretty much any software problem, and fix them before users get mad.

正如他们官网上说的，超过四百万名开发者都认为它‘不错’。

As their homepage puts it, they are considered, quote, unquote, not bad by over 4,000,000 software developers.

今天我们要聊的是 Sentry 如何与 Acquired 宇宙中的另一家公司 Anthropic 合作。

Today, we are talking about the way that Sentry works with another company in the acquired universe, Anthropic.

Anthropic 以前用过一些老式的基础设施监控工具，但鉴于他们规模庞大、系统复杂，最终改用 Sentry 来更快地解决问题。

Anthropic used to have some older infrastructure monitoring in place, but at their massive scale and complexity, they instead adopted Sentry to help them fix issues faster.

没错。

Yep.

在人工智能领域，崩溃可能是个大问题。

Crashes can be a massive problem in AI.

如果你正在运行一个大规模的计算任务，比如训练模型，一旦某个节点出错，可能会影响成百上千台服务器。

If you're running a huge compute job like training a model and one node fails, it can affect hundreds or thousands of servers.

Sentry 帮助他们及时发现硬件故障，从而在问题扩散前将其屏蔽掉。

Sentry helped them detect bad hardware so they could quickly reject it before causing a cascading problem.

Sentry 还让他们能把原本需要几天才能定位的大问题，缩短到几小时内解决，尽快恢复训练任务。

Sentry also enabled them to debug massive issues in hours instead of days so they could get back to their training runs.

如今，Anthropic 依赖 Sentry 实时追踪异常、分配错误并分析其研究团队主要使用的编程语言——包括 Python、Rust 和 C++——中的所有故障。

And today, Anthropic relies on Sentry to track exceptions, assign errors, and analyze failures in real time across all the primary languages used by Anthropic's research teams, including Python, Rust, and c plus plus.

据 Anthropic 团队说，Sentry 为开发人员提供了一个统一的平台，所有调试所需的信息都能在这里找到。

According to the Anthropic team, Sentry gives our developers one place that will have all the information they need to debug an issue.

说到人工智能，Sentry 现在推出了一款名为 SEER 的 AI 调试工具。

And speaking of AI, Sentry now has an AI debugger called SEER.

SEER 是一个 AI 代理，它结合 Sentry 的错误上下文和你的代码库，不只是猜测，而是直接定位那些棘手问题的根本原因，并为你量身提出可直接合并的修复方案。

SEER is an AI agent that taps into the issue context from Sentry and your code base to not just guess, but root cause gnarly issues and propose merger ready fixes specific to your application.

我们非常高兴能和Sentry合作。

We're pumped to be working with Sentry.

他们的客户名单非常亮眼，不仅有Anthropic，还有Cursor、Vercel、Linear等等。

They have an incredible customer list, including not only Anthropic, but Cursor, Vercel, Linear, and more.

如果你也想像超过二十万家使用Sentry的组织一样，快速修复代码问题——从独立爱好者到全球顶尖大公司——可以访问sentry.io/acquired了解详情。

And if you wanna fix broken code fast like over 200,000 other organizations that use Sentry from indie hobbyists to some of the biggest companies in the world, you can check out sentry.io/acquired.

最后一点，我们的朋友Sentry将在今年九月于旧金山举办官方的Acquired线下聚会。

And one last thing, our friends at Sentry are hosting the official Acquired Meetup in San Francisco this September.

想了解更多信息并获取活动通知，请访问sentry.io/acquired/meetup。

To learn more and get notified about dates, visit sentry.io/acquired/meetup.

我们真的特别兴奋。

We're so pumped.

非常期待在那里见到大家。

We can't wait to see so many of you there.

好了，我们继续回到节目。

And now back to the show.

埃里克，我很好奇，想听听你的看法。

Eric, for for you, I'm curious.

你能跟我们聊聊，从Zoom刚起步的时候，到现在这个阶段，你是怎么思考定价和客户策略的吗？

May maybe you can talk to us both in the beginning days and and then also now at Zoom.

你对定价和客户策略是怎么考虑的？

How do you think about pricing and account strategy?

是的，我们的具体情况有点不一样。

Yeah, so, you know, our case is a little bit different.

一般来说，做SaaS公司，最好是从某个垂直行业入手，或者专注某个部门。

You know, ideally, when you start a SaaS company, either focus on vertical market or focus on departments.

这可能是最稳妥的商业模式。

That's probably the best business model.

但不幸的是，我们一开始做的是一款跨部门的协作工具。

Unfortunately, you start from building up a horizontal collaboration solution.

这真的很难，因为那时候市场上已经有不少竞争对手了。

It's really hard, right, because a lot of other competitors are already there, right?

我们的策略是应对免费竞品。

Our strategy Free competitors.

没错。

Exactly.

还有大量免费方案存在。

And a lot of free solutions.

所以我们就像开一家新餐厅一样，打开局面，对吧？

So our strategy to, you know, more like, you know, open up a new restaurant business, right?

你的服务更好，价格更优，菜品也更出色。

So, and you have a better service, right, and a better price and a better food.

直到今天，情况也差不多是这样。

That's pretty much even today.

我们要确保产品比竞争对手更优秀。

We want to make sure our products are better than our competitors.

定价方面，也要更有优势。

Make sure when it comes to pricing, also better.

他们也确保我们提供最优质的服务。

And they also make sure we offer the best service.

无论什么时候看，我们的产品价格都全面优于任何竞争对手，每一件产品都是如此。

So you look at any time, our product always, always have better price across the board, any product, compared to any competitors.

生活就是各种权衡。

So life is about trade offs.

如果你告诉客户，我们更好、更快、更便宜，那哪里得做出让步？

And if you're telling a customer, Oh, we're better, faster, and cheaper, what has to give?

是组织结构上出了问题吗？

Is it something organizationally?

是效率方面吗？

Is there something Efficiency.

效率。

Efficiency.

对，没错。

Yeah, exactly.

比如客户，他们很可能在营销上花一大笔钱。

Say like a customer, they are probably going to spend a lot of money on marketing.

我们怎么利用网络效应呢？

What we can do to leverage the network effects, right?

他们雇了上百名销售代表。

They hire like 100 sales rep.

我们怎么能让五十名销售代表提供同样的价值呢？

What we can do to have 50 sales rep can deliver same value, right?

所以内部效率非常重要。

So that's why it is very important to have internal efficiency.

这真是挺讽刺的。

Which is so funny.

效率提升带来资本效率，进而提升利润率——不是毛利，是整体利润率，最终改善现金流。

That efficiency translates to capital efficiency, which translates to gross margin, well not gross, to margins, which translates to cash flow.

完全正确。

Totally.

这正是关键所在。

Which is the whole point.

这样能让你更有弹性，对吧？

Yeah, give you more flexibility, right?

没错。

Yeah.

对。

Yeah.

但我认为，关键还在于产品本身的质量，对吧？

But I would say the key also is just the product excellence, right?

这来自于你所招聘的核心工程师团队，我觉得。

And that comes from the core set of engineers you hired, I think.

而且你在早期特别专注于这一点，对吧？

And then also the, you were especially very focused in the early days, right?

完全正确。

Totally.

你那时候没想别的，对吧？

You were not thinking about something else, right?

你心里想的就是

You were thinking about

视频会议。

video conferencing.

所以我才认识了埃里克，说白了就是这么回事。

I would say, you know, that's why I got to know Eric.

我认识埃里克之后就觉得，这人真够专注的。

I got to know Eric, I thought, that's a pretty focused guy.

他的产品肯定不差。

Bet his product is good.

后来我试了试他的产品，真没想到这么棒。

And then I tried out his product and I, oh, this is really good.

我当时就决定要加入他的董事会。

I want to join his board.

我觉得，正是这种卓越让你变得更高效。

I think that so is the excellence can make you more efficient.

你的销售周期也更高效了。

Your sales cycle's more efficient.

方方面面都更好了。

Everything's better.

要是你的产品比WebEx强两倍，对吧？

If your was twice as good as WebEx, right?

如果你的产品只是

If your product was only

好上十倍。

10 times better.

好上十倍。

10 times better.

但我想说的是，就算你的产品只强了20%，也不够用。

But I guess my point is if your product was only 20% better, it wouldn't have been enough.

那也无济于事。

Wouldn't have mattered.

所以我总爱用餐厅来打比方，对吧？

That's why I always like this restaurant analogy, right?

你路过一家新开的餐厅，要是菜难吃得要命，就算免费请你吃，你也不会再来了，对吧？

You you stop by in a restaurant, a brand new restaurant, if food does not work, even for free, you do not want stop by anymore, right?

所以回到彼得的观点，这真的特别关键。

So again, I think back to Peter's point, it's extremely important.

一切都要从产品卓越开始，这才是根本。

Everything starts from one thing, the Product excellence, that's the foundation.

其他很多东西你都可以优化。

You can optimize a lot of things.

如果产品根本用不了，那就别谈别的了。

If a product does not work, forget it.

全都白搭。

Everything else.

就得加倍、三倍地投入产品。

Just double down, triple down on product.

这才是最重要的，彼得说得太对了。

That's the number one thing, you know, Peter right on.

这跟人息息相关，对吧，埃里克？

And that's a lot about people, right, Eric?

关键是你让哪些人来做产品。

About who, which people you put on the product.

没错。

Yes.

完全正确。

Totally.

埃里克对招揽顶尖人才特别讲究。

Eric was very particular about getting the best people.

是的。

Yeah.

是的。

Yeah.

我们先说说人的问题，这个回头再聊。

Let's so people, we can come back to that.

你还记得吗，几年前我们做那期关于Zoom上市的节目时，跟桑蒂聊过，你们在S-1文件里列出的高管，并不像大家想象中那种典型的高增长SaaS公司那样。

You know, remember when we talked about with Santi on the episode we did on Zoom's IPO years ago now, you know, your named executive officers in your s one were not like you think typical, oh, here's high flying SaaS company.

不会是 Salesforce 的销售副总裁。

There's gonna be a VP of sales from Salesforce.

也不会是 HubSpot 的首席营销官之类的，你知道的，这些公司和这些人本身都没问题，但我觉得在你们两家公司，招来的领导者都是有潜力的新人。

There's gonna be a chief marketing officer from HubSpot, you know, whatever like, and nothing wrong with those companies and those people, but I think at both of your companies, the people you brought in as leaders were up and comers.

他们不是那种早已成名的超级明星。

They weren't, you know, the established superstars.

是的。

Yeah.

我

I

我一直希望团队里有一些能伸能屈的人。

I think you I always wanted to have some people with some range.

他们既能深入一线干活，也能慢慢成长为管理者。

You know, they could get very hands on, but also grow into managing.

我总觉得，应该让人去尝试没做过的事，这样他们才有干劲，才有机会突破自己。

I guess I've always thought to try to get people to do something that they haven't done before, you know, so they would have a little bit more mojo, have a opportunity to do something that they haven't done before.

团队本身非常重要。

And the team is very important.

团队的默契，远比个人的能力更重要。

The chemistry of the team is much more important than the skills of the individual players.

这么说让我想到一个相似点：你们不签多年合同，是逼着产品自己去赢得客户；而你们提拔内部人，也是让员工保持紧迫感，逼着他们拼出最好的表现来争取职位。

In a lot of ways, that comment reminds me there's a parallel between you not signing multiyear deals where you're forcing the product to earn the customers and you promoting internally where you're keeping people hungry and forcing them to do their best work to earn that job?

对我来说，也对被提拔的人而言，能给他们一个从未有过的机会，这种感觉才更让人兴奋。

Well, it's more thrilling when you can give somebody a chance to do something that they haven't done before for for me and for them.

这种成就感，是无可替代的。

There's more fulfillment.

不然的话，你一遍又一遍做同样的事，到底有什么意思？

Otherwise, it's why you're doing the same thing you've done three times and what's the allure?

我可以赚大钱。

Well, I can get rich.

这可能只是多加了一点分数，但根本没法让你坚持下去。

It could just add some point that doesn't keep you going at the end of the day.

我猜这种策略背后也涉及薪酬问题，本质上是资本效率的考量。

Would also come I imagine there's an element of compensation to this strategy too which translates to capital efficiency.

不是。

No.

不太算。

Not really.

不是。

No.

我刚才在想股权和现金的区别，但是

I was thinking of equity versus cash but

我不这么认为。

I don't think so.

我从来不会凭这个来评判一个人。

I never really made any kind of decision on people based on that.

得先找到对的人，再给对的人配合适的报酬。

You gotta get the right the right person and then pay the right compensation for the right person.

但一定要先找到对的人，报酬的事后面再定。

But always the right person first and then figure out the compensation.

彼得，其实当时我们给一些高管发offer时，有人问过，为什么不直接从外面招个经验丰富、资历深的领导者呢？

Peter right now, actually back then when we try to make an offer, right, to some executives, right, at that time, the feedback, why not hire someone very experienced and seasoned leaders from our side?

这根本不是报酬的问题。

It's really not about a comp package.

因为我们在Zoom招人，特别看重那些有自驱力和自学能力的人，高管也不例外。

Because when it comes to hiring at Zoom, we really like to hire those people with a self motivation and a self learning mentality, right, including the senior executives.

他们能和公司一起成长。

And they can grow themselves along with their company growth.

而且，他们非常忠诚。

And plus, you know, they are very loyal.

我觉得这就是我们的理念。

I think that's our, that was our philosophy.

我一直认为这是最好的做法。

I thought that's the best philosophy.

疫情之后，我发现我错了。

After the COVID, I think I was wrong, actually.

这中间其实有个大问题。

There's a big flaw also.

因为当业务自动增长、团队随之扩张时，你猜怎么着？

Because when a business auto flows, auto grows your team, and guess what?

管理层和团队根本还没准备好。

The executives or team, they are not ready.

使用量一下子涨了十几倍、二十倍。

Usage, like 15 times, 20 times more.

收入涨了七倍。

The revenue, like seven times more.

我们的团队，别说我自己了，连提升一倍都算不上。

Our team, even not myself included, even not twice better.

这是我学到的一个教训。

This is one challenge I learned.

这是个错误。

That's a mistake.

另一个错误是，我们以为所有高管和核心成员都能跟上公司成长的步伐。

Another mistake is we think all those executives or key team members, they can learn along with their company growth.

但成长的速度不一样。

However, the pace is different.

有些人学得快，有些人却慢得多。

In some ways, they can learn quickly, some are very slow.

所以这也是另一个问题。

That's why also that's another flaw.

所以回过头来看，我觉得我们应该采用混合型的团队结构。

That's why looking back, I feel like, ah, we should have a mixed team structure.

一部分人要有潜力，

Someone, they have a potential.

能够自我成长。

They can grow themselves.

另一部分人，则必须聘请经验丰富的资深领导者。

Someone else, you have to hire some seasoned leaders.

谁说得准呢，对吧？

You never know, right?

万一你的业务突然起飞，那时候你的团队早就准备好了。

In case suddenly your business is going to take off, at that time your team know already.

这就是我们今天要面对的挑战。

That's a challenge we are facing today.

所以，你需要团队里有一些经历过比你们公司规模更大发展的人，同时也要培养其他成员。

So you need to have some members of the team who have experienced scale bigger than your company, but other people that you're developing.

没错。

Exactly.

这种搭配挺好的。

That's a healthy mix.

你知道吗，疫情之前，我那时候太固执了。

You know, back then, prior to pandemic, you know, I I think, too stubborn.

我本该多向彼得学习。

I should learn more from Peter.

想想看，每个人都有潜力。

Think, everyone, you have to have a potential.

不一定非得有很强的背景。

You do not need to have a greater background.

其实回头一看，那样想是不对的。

Actually, looking back, that's not right.

有意思。

Interesting.

也许混合一下会更好。

Maybe a mix would be better.

混合的方式好多了。

Mix is much better.

你觉得这个道理也适用于公司早期阶段吗？你当时是不是也该这么做？

Do you think that applies even do you think you should have done that even in the early stages of the company?

不是早期阶段，对吧？

Not early stage, right?

前四年其实没必要。

You know, for the first four years, no need.

但后来你已经能看出市场契合度和产品契合度了，对吧？

But down the road, you already see the market fit, right, the product fit.

当你想扩大业务时，

You want to scale your business.

那时候你就得转变思维了。

At that time, you have to change your philosophy.

我还一直注意到一个类似的点，Zoom 无疑是历史上最成功的以产品驱动增长的公司之一。

There's another I just keep these parallels keep popping up for me where Zoom is one of the greatest product led growth companies of all time.

但你刚才又在说，企业合同带来的稳定收入有多可贵。

And yet here you are talking about the beauty of predictable revenue that comes from enterprise contracts.

这其实是一回事。

And it's the same thing.

并不是说有经验的人更优秀，或者内部团队更强。

It's not that experienced people are better or that in house talent is better.

而是你需要两者结合。

It's that you need that mix.

完全同意。

Totally.

没错。

Yeah.

健康的组合非常重要。

A healthy mix is very important.

对。

Yeah.

所以，从运营角度来说，我想聊的最后一个软件公司的重要职能是营销——想和你们两位都聊聊，尤其是和埃里克一起，当时我们和萨提亚、彼得交流的时候。

So the last one of the last sort of disciplines within a software company that I wanna talk about operationally in this context is marketing, with with both of you but particularly with Eric when we were, chatting with Satya and with Peter.

你们知道，产品做出来之后，你们的增长效率高得惊人，资本用得特别省，但你们确实也在营销上花了钱。

You know, we sort of asked this question really, you scaled once you got the product developed, you scaled with such beautiful capital efficiency but you did spend money on marketing.

你们还开玩笑说那些广告牌，可现在确实到处都是Zoom的广告牌。

I mean, you joked about the billboards, but there are Zoom billboards now.

我问过他们，埃里克和Zoom当时是怎么考虑营销预算的？

I asked them, know, how did how did Eric and Zoom think about spending money on marketing?

我就不抢着说结论了，你们是怎么想的？

And, well, I'll let you tell the punchline, but how did you think about it?

对，直到今天，每个星期二我们都有三个小时的全员会议，对吧？

Yeah, that's a Yeah, even today, you know, every Tuesday, you know, we have a three hours staff meeting, right?

今天早上，第一个议题就是复盘我们的营销项目，到现在还是这样。

You know, this morning, the first topic read about reviewing our marketing, competent marketing programs, even today still.

我觉得这特别难把握。

I think it's very tricky.

原因在于，根本没有什么固定的公式可言。

The reason why is you do not have, I would say, sort of like a formula, right?

什么时候该多投，什么时候该少投，说不准。

When to spend more, when to spend less.

不是这么简单的事。

It's not like that.

作为创始人，你也得花时间关注营销。

As a founder, you have to spend time on marketing as well.

别光盯着产品和销售。

Do not always focus on product or the sales.

营销同样非常重要。

Marketing also is very important.

但到底什么时候该在营销上投入，真的很难判断。

However, when to invest in marketing is very tricky.

每个企业都不一样。

Every business is different.

在我们的情况里，我们特意做了个决定。

In our case, we specifically made a decision.

前好几年都没设市场团队，因为这东西不是新玩意儿。

No marketing team for the first several years because this is not something new.

这产品也好，市场也好，都早就成熟了。

This is a product or this is very, very mature market.

人人都懂视频会议。

Everyone understands video conferencing.

只要产品好，根本不需要专门的市场团队。

If your product works, you really don't need have a marketing team.

我们就是想证明这一点。

We try to prove that point.

后来，等我们有了不少付费客户，有个客户跟我们说，埃里克，我以前根本没听说过Zoom。

After that, after we have paid a customer, a lot of customers, a customer told us, Eric, I never heard about Zoom.

但我自己试过这个产品。

But I tried a product.

产品确实好用。

The product works.

这是为什么呢？

Why is that?

我们一直收到类似的反馈。

We received a very consistent feedback like that.

我知道这背后有信号。

I know that's a signal.

于是我们更加坚定了这条路。

Then we doubled down on that.

到了2015年，我们才成立了市场团队。

Then 2015, we created a marketing team.

而且即便之后，我们也把每一分市场预算都用得明明白白。

And also, even after that, we also married every marketing program spending.

刚开始的时候，我花了很多时间去搞清楚这件事。

Early on, I spent a lot of time trying to understand.

我举个例子，比如搜索引擎广告。

I'll give one example, like SEM.

每家公司都会在搜索引擎广告上花钱。

Every company, you spend money on SEM.

我第一次开支票的时候，天哪，这就是我付给谷歌的钱？

First time I send a check, oh my god, this is the price I paid to Google.

天哪，这可是我签过最大的一张支票了。

Oh my God, this the largest check I'm going to sign.

你

Do you

还记得那份合同的支票有多大吗？

remember how large that check was for a contract?

每个月超过二十万美元。

That's more than 200,000 a month.

一个月？

A month?

天哪。

Oh my goodness.

太疯狂了。

It's crazy.

所以我才想深入研究一下，弄明白是怎么回事。

That's why I wanted to deep dive to understand.

顺便说一句，市场团队的人都被谷歌培训得非常好，对吧？

But by the way, the marketing team is all very, very educated by Google, right?

他们更常谈投资回报率。

And more like they talk about ROI.

你给我一美元，我回你一点五美元。

You give me $1 I give $1.5 back.

咱们就这么干。

Let's do that.

效果还不错，对吧？

It's pretty good, right?

对。

Yeah.

但我跟他们说，不对，你应该回本3块。

But I tell them, no, you should've $3 back.

为什么不是45？

Why about 45?

嗯，

Well,

我特别想问问你关于Exactly的事。

I particularly want to ask you about Exactly.

你希望多长时间回本。

Time frame you want get money back.

怎么才能优化这一点。

How to optimize that.

对吧？

Right?

营销非常重要，但往往又特别有创意。

And again, marketing very important, but quite often very creative.

对吧？

Right?

如果你不知道怎么衡量效果，就别乱花钱。

If you do not know how to measure that, do not spend.

我们听到的故事是，大多数创始人、CEO和市场团队一谈到营销，就只看获客成本和客户生命周期价值，虽然实际情况更复杂，但他们的想法就是：花一美元，能收回一美元五，或者三美元。

That's The stories we heard were, you know, most founders, CEOs, marketing teams think about CAC to LTV with marketing, you know, and there's more complexity to it than that, but I'm gonna spend a dollar, I'll get a dollar 50 or I'll get $3 back.

如果一年内能回本，我就干。

If that pays back in within a year, I'm

我信这个。

believe that.

这正是所有SaaS公司的通病。

That's the mistake for all the SaaS companies.

不是1块5，也不是3块，应该是4块。

It's it's not a $1.50 back, not a $3, should be $4.

对吧？

Right?

这是为了优化。

It's to optimize.

刚刚涨上去

Just went up in

到了最后一刻。

the last minute.

对。

Yeah.

不过我觉得，大多数 SaaS 公司都会犯这个常见的错误。

But that's a common mistake, I think, for most of the SaaS companies.

还有，埃里克，回本周期应该多快才算合适？

And and, Eric, when how how fast should it pay back?

我说吧，越大越好。

As I would say it's as big as possible.

每个生意都不一样，但你每天都得优化，不断优化。

Every business is different, but you've got to optimize and keep optimize every day.

别觉得差不多了就停下。

Do not feel satisfied.

花一块钱赚一块五？不行。

Oh, give $1 get $1.5 back.

不行。

No.

得优化，争取回本两块、三块，必须持续优化。

Optimize, go to get $2 $3 You have to optimize.

这是每一块营销投入的参考例子。

This is one example for every marketing dollars.

不过，如果效果好，就得加大投入。

However, if it works, you have a double down.

我还记得第一次在101大楼看到我们广告牌的时候。

I remember first time I had the billboard in 101.

很多客户都给我们反馈，说特别好。

Many customers shared a very positive feedback with us.

他们说，很早以前我们就决定用Zoom了。

And they feel like, ah, early on, we decided to deploy Zoom.

我看到那个广告牌了。

I saw the billboard.

我觉得你们公司规模挺大的。

I feel like you guys are a bigger company.

我们做的是个正确的决定，对吧？虽然这并不能完全证明什么。

We made the right decision, right, to better Which is not validating Exactly.

这个决定。

The decision

而且员工们也都很开心，对吧？

And plus the employees, they feel very happy, right?

他们说：天哪，Zoom现在也有广告牌了。

They say, Oh my god, Zoom has a billboard now.

之后我就想，为什么不趁热打铁呢？

After that, I realized, why not double down that?

我问我们团队：沃尔玛里有多少块广告牌？

I told our team, how many billboards we have in Walmart?

只有一块。

There's one.

我说：不对，是三块。

I said, no, three.

这招很管用。

It works.

对。

Yeah.

所以你得懂得什么时候该加码，什么时候该收一收。

So that's why you have to know when to double down, when to take a step back.

你知道吗，如果你懂得怎么有效衡量这一点，那非常关键。

You know, if you know how to effectively measure that, that's very important.

今天我们大部分时间都在聊怎么打造一座城堡，怎么让这座城堡赚钱。

We spent most of today talking about how to build the castle and how to have a profitable castle.

我不确定这个思路能不能真正延续下去。

Not sure that really extends.

不过现在咱们来聊聊怎么守卫这座城堡。

But now let's talk about defending the castle.

我很好奇，要不先请埃里克说说，然后彼得接着讲，毕竟咱们刚才聊Zoom聊得挺顺的。

I'm curious, maybe let's start with Eric and then go to Peter since we've been on a good Zoom streak.

你觉得Zoom在未来三十年的竞争力到底来自哪里？

Where do you see the source of Zoom's defensibility as a business over the next thirty years?

对。

Yeah.

我觉得这更像一场体育比赛，对吧？

So, I think it's more like a sports, right?