查理·芒格

本，当我们在邮件里预告这期节目，提到我们刚发布的Jensen那集时，大家的猜测真是令人惊叹。

Ben, when we teased this episode in the email about the Jensen episode that we just released, the guesses that we were getting from folks were amazing.

我的意思是，人们都在猜是查理、沃伦，或者是泰勒·斯威夫特。而且很多人都猜对了。

I mean, people are like, it's Charlie, it's Warren, or it's Taylor Swift. And a lot of people were right.

嘿，泰勒。你知道在哪里能找到我们。Acquiredfm@gmail.com。

Hey, Taylor. You know where to find us. Acquiredfm@Gmail.com.

如果你想获得更多曝光，我们随时欢迎。

If you are looking to get more publicity, we're open.

让特拉维斯联系我们。

Have Travis get in touch.

好的。我们开始吧。

Alright. Let's do it.

是你吗？是你吗？是你吗？现在谁知道了真相？是你吗？

Is it you? Is it you? Is it you? Who got the truth now? Is it you?

是你吗？是你吗？让我坐下。直说吧。又一个故事即将上演。

Is it you? Is it you? Sit me down. Say it straight. Another story on the way.

谁掌握了真相？

Who got the truth?

欢迎收听本期《Acquired》，这是一档关于伟大科技公司及其背后故事与成功模式的播客。我是本·吉尔伯特。我是大卫·罗森塔尔。我们是您的主持人。对大卫和我来说，这期节目非常特别。

Welcome to this episode of Acquired, the podcast about great technology companies and the stories and playbooks behind them. I'm Ben Gilbert. I'm David Rosenthal. And we are your hosts. This episode is a very unique one for David and I.

节目的好朋友安德鲁·马克斯为我们组织了一场小型晚宴，在查理·芒格位于洛杉矶的家中与他和几位其他人共进晚餐。您可以听到安德鲁在背景中几次向查理提问。我们几乎可以肯定这是查理做过的唯一一次播客。查理除了作为有史以来最多产的投资人之一（与他的合伙人沃伦·巴菲特齐名）之外，今年已经99岁了。他将在1月1日迎来100岁生日。

Good friend of the show, Andrew Marks, organized a little dinner for us with Charlie Munger and a few other folks at Charlie's home in Los Angeles. You can hear Andrew a few times in the background asking Charlie questions. We are pretty sure that this is the only podcast that Charlie has ever done. Charlie, aside from being one of the most prolific investors of all time alongside his partner, Warren Buffett, is 99 years old. He will turn 100 on January 1.

当然，我们的对话很有趣，因为他可是查理·芒格本人，同时也因为能获得一位见证了过去九十九年人类历史的人的视角非常有意思。我们与查理当然谈到了好市多，以及他过去五十年投资零售商的经历。我们还听到了他关于建立伟大合作伙伴关系所需条件的看法、当今全球证券市场出了什么问题、投资与赌博的概念，以及当今世界哪些地方仍存在投资机会。

Of course, our conversation was interesting because he's freaking Charlie Munger, but also because it was interesting to get the perspective of someone who has seen the last ninety nine years of human history. We talked with Charlie, of course, about Costco, his history investing in retailers over the last fifty years. We also got to hear his views on what it takes to build a great partnership, what's gone wrong in the global securities markets these days, the concept of investing versus gambling, and where investment opportunities remain in the world today.

是啊。本，这对你和我，以及我们俩一起做这件事来说，都是一次如此特别的人生经历。而我们能够记录下来并与世界分享以供后人参考，更是锦上添花，整件事都令人难以置信。

Yeah. Ben, this was such a special life experience for you and me, and you and me together to do this. And the fact that we got to record it and now share it with the world for posterity, just icing on the cake, the whole thing was unbelievable.

是的。听众们，我们知道我们会共进晚餐。但我们不确定是否能够录制，而现在我们可以与大家分享了。说到这里，加入我们的Slack吧。在acquired.fm/slack上，每期节目和当日新闻都有精彩的讨论。

Yeah. Listeners, we knew we were gonna have dinner. We were not sure whether we were gonna be able to record it, and now we get to share it with all of you. With that, join the Slack. There is awesome discussion of every episode and the news of the day at acquired.fm/slack.

如果您注册Acquired的邮件，您将收到剧集更正、往期节目后续内容以及下一期节目的提示。网址是acquired.fm/email。本次访谈我们只有一位赞助商。

If you sign up for Acquired emails, you will get episode corrections and follow-up from previous episodes plus hints at what the next episode will be. That's acquired.fm/email. And we have only one sponsor for this interview.

是的。一场特别的对话值得特别的赞助，长期听众会知道在Acquired宇宙中只有一家公司真正合适，因为他们所做的一切都以查理和沃伦为榜样，那就是Tiny。

Yes. A special conversation deserves a special sponsorship, and longtime listeners will know there's only one company in the Acquired universe that is truly appropriate because everything they do is modeled after Charlie and Warren, and that's Tiny.

没错。Tiny就是互联网界的伯克希尔哈撒韦。毫不夸张地说，他们是如此忠实的粉丝，甚至创办了一家制作巴菲特和芒格本人青铜半身像的公司，不过这个我们稍后再详谈。

Yep. Tiny is the Berkshire Hathaway of the Internet. Literally, they are such huge fans that they started a company that makes bronze busts of Buffett and Munger themselves, but more on that in a minute.

是的。众所周知，伯克希尔最初是近两百年前马萨诸塞州的一家纺织厂。而大约二十年前，Tiny的创始人安德鲁·威尔金森和他的搭档克里斯以他们的互联网纺织厂版本——顶级设计机构MetaLab（曾为Slack、Uber、Tinder、Headspace、Coinbase等设计用户界面）为起点。他们自问：如果查理和沃伦处在我们的位置会怎么做？这让他们意识到，正如伯克希尔在实体世界中发现的那样，互联网同样存在拥有优质现金流的绝佳利基业务。

Yeah. So Berkshire, as we know, started as a textile mill in Massachusetts nearly two hundred years ago. And almost twenty years ago, tiny founders Andrew Wilkinson and his partner Chris took their version of an Internet textile mill, the premier design agency MetaLab, which designed the UIs for Slack, Uber, Tinder, Headspace, Coinbase, and others. And they asked themselves, what would Charlie and Warren do if they were us? And that led to the realization that just like Berkshire discovered in the physical world, the Internet also has wonderful niche businesses with great cash flows.

事实上，这些业务往往比昔日的See's Candies和蓝筹邮票更优越，因为它们需要零资本再投入，享有软件利润率，并且能比See's花费五十多年时间全球扩张的速度更快地建立全球品牌。

In fact, they tend to be even better than the old days of C's candies and blue chip stamps because they require zero capital reinvestment, have software margins, and can build global brands much faster than the, what, fifty some odd years it took C's to expand around the world.

没错。所以安德鲁和克里斯利用MetaLab及其他业务产生的额外现金流，创建了Tiny——全球首家也是最好的永久性控股公司，专门收购优秀的互联网企业。而且效果非常显著。

Yep. So Andrew and Chris took the extra cash flow from MetaLab and their other businesses and created Tiny, the world's first and best permanent holding company for wonderful Internet businesses. And boy, did it work.

是的。快进到今天，得益于Tiny的成功，这个机会已不再是秘密。许多人已经意识到这个模式确实可行。但正如伯克希尔本身一样，再没有人拥有安德鲁和克里斯在过去二十年中积累的经验、心态、资本渠道以及坦率地说——声誉的组合。我们自己也与比尔·阿克曼和霍华德·马克斯一起投资了Tiny。

Yeah. Fast forward to today, and thanks to Tiny's success, this opportunity is no longer a secret. Many people have caught on to the idea that this can really work. But just like Berkshire itself, no one else has the combination of experience, temperament, access to capital, and frankly reputation that Andrew and Chris have built over the past two decades. We're investors in Tiny ourselves alongside Bill Ackman and Howard Marks.

就像他们两位一样，Tiny确实是他们细分领域中的长期首选买家。任何为其盈利的互联网业务寻找永久归宿，或需要资本合作伙伴进行联合创始人或风险投资股权收购的人，能与Tiny合作都是幸运的。

And just like the two of them, Tiny is really the long term buyer of choice in their niche. Anyone who's looking for a permanent home for their profitable Internet business or who needs a capital partner for a cofounder or VC cap table buyout would be lucky to work with Tiny.

没错。例如，他们刚刚收购了影迷的首选社交网络Letterboxd，这是创始人十二年的心血，将在Tiny内部继续保持。这真正体现了Tiny的核心理念：只与最优秀的互联网企业合作，承诺简单的尽职调查、三十天完成交易，并让业务独立运营，无论是您继续管理还是引入新的长期导向管理层。由您决定。

Yep. For instance, they just bought the premier social network for film buffs, Letterboxd, which has been the founder's baby for twelve years and will stay so within Tiny. And this really reflects Tiny's whole ethos, work with only the best Internet businesses, commit to simple diligence, thirty day deals, and leave the business alone either for you to operate or bring in new long term oriented management. Up to you.

所以感谢Tiny。正如本所说，这是本期节目中您将听到的唯一赞助商。就像伯克希尔一样，它将永久存在。Tiny今年早些时候刚刚上市，现在可以处理从100万美元一直到2.5亿美元的交易。如果您想联系，只需给hi@tiny.com发封邮件，并告诉他们本和大卫推荐您的。

So thanks to Tiny. This is the only sponsor, as Ben said, that you'll hear on this episode. And just like Berkshire, it'll be here in perpetuity. Tiny just became a public company earlier this year, and they can now do deals ranging anywhere from 1,000,000 all the way up to 250,000,000. So if you wanna get in touch, just shoot them a note at hi@tiny.com, and just tell them that Ben and David sent you.

哦，还有一件事。查理铜像半身雕塑，是您工作空间中完美的日常提醒，问问自己查理会怎么做。只需前往berkshirenerds.store购买您自己的。他们还有不少某个叫沃伦的家伙的东西。好了。

Oh, and one more thing. The bronze Charlie busts, the perfect daily reminder in your workspace to ask what would Charlie do. Just head on over to berkshirenerds.store to buy your own. And they also have plenty of some guy named Warren too. Okay.

现在闲话少说，这不是投资建议。大卫和我可能在我们讨论的公司中有投资，本节目仅用于信息和娱乐目的。现在来谈谈查理·芒格。查理，我上周末看NFL比赛时，似乎现在的每个广告都是体育博彩广告。这对美国有好处吗？

Now without further ado, this is not investment advice. David and I may have investments in the companies we discuss, and this show is for informational and entertainment purposes only. And on to Charlie Munger. Charlie, I was watching the NFL games last weekend, and it seems like every advertisement now is a sports betting advertisement. Is this good for America?

不。当然没有。

No. Of course not.

美国的赛狗场、赛马场和赌场对美国有好处吗？当然没有。它们只是非常受欢迎。

Are the dog tracks and racetracks of America the casinos good for America? Of course not. They're just very popular.

不过沃伦就是这样起步的，对吧，在赛马场？

That's how Warren got his start, though, right, at the racetrack?

嗯，但沃伦作为顾客从未大额赌博。他想要胜算对自己有利，而不是对别人有利。

Well, but Warren never gambled heavily as a patron. Wanted the odds in his favor, not somebody else.

没错。

Right.

如果你是沃伦，这就很简单。你想做庄家？你必须成为庄家，而不是赌客。

It's just so simple if you're Warren. You want the house? You gotta be the house, not the punter.

听众们，接下来讨论的话题是零售股票交易，以及对于许多美国人来说，这类似于赌博的观点。

Listeners, the next topic that came up was retail stock trading and the idea that for many Americans, this is akin to gambling.

嗯，这就是它的组织方式。他们并不真正了解公司或其他任何东西。他们只是在赌价格涨跌。如果由我来掌管世界，我会对短期收益征税，且不允许任何损失抵扣。我会直接把这群人赶出这个行业。

Well, that's the way it's organized. They don't really know anything about the companies or anything. They just gamble on going up and down in price. If I were running the world, I would have a tax on short term gains with no offset for losses on anything. And I would just drive this whole crowd of people out of business.

你对那些算法怎么看，比如文艺复兴公司之类的？

What do you think about the algorithms, like Renaissance and stuff like that?

当然，文艺复兴是第一个算法。它非常简单。他们转移了过去的所有数据。然后他们发现了什么？连续两个收盘价上涨，以及连续下跌，比先跌后涨或先涨后跌更为常见。

Well, of course, Renaissance was the first algorithm. It was so simple. They shifted all this data from the past. And what did they decide? Up, up for two closing prices, and down, down were more common than down, up or up, down.

一旦他们意识到由于深植于人类心理的各种原因，人类天生就是趋势追随者。不断尝试短期投机。他们只是编程让计算机自动在第一个上涨日买入，并在第二天收盘前卖出。日复一日地执行。每天，中央清算机构都会告诉你：'今天的支票金额是850万美元'

Once they realized that's the way it was for various reasons deep in the psychology of man, is that man is a natural trend follower. Keeps figuring out gambling short term. And they just programmed the computers to automatically buy on one thing the first up day and sell before the end of the second day. And they just do it day after day after day. And every day the machine would the central clearing agent would say your check today is $8,500,000

太疯狂了。

That's crazy.

'明天的支票金额是940万美元'。实际上，最简单的交易就是抢先于平均线操作，抢先于指数基金必须买入的时机。而且你知道具体是什么。他们都清楚这一点。他们年复一年获得回报的方式，就是将日间杠杆越推越高。所以他们通过越来越大的成交量获得越来越小的利润，这带来了巨大的峰值杠杆风险，我自己绝不会这样操作。

Your check tomorrow is $9,400,000 Well, what happens is that the easiest trade is to front run what the average is, what the index funds have to buy. And you know what it is exactly. They all know that. And the way they get their returns year after year is taking the midday leverage up higher and higher and higher and higher. So they're making smaller and smaller profits up more and more volume, which gives them this big peak leverage risk, which I would not run myself.

他们获得这些巨大回报的唯一方式，就是使用这种会让你（如果已经富有）发疯的高杠杆。

And that's the only way they make these big returns is to have this huge leverage that would make you crazy if you were already rich.

我很幸运地与您熟知的理查德·加兰蒂在好市多交谈了几个小时。

I had the good fortune of speaking with someone you know well, Richard Gallanti, at Costco and spending a few hours.

他对此非常了解。他一生都在那里工作。

He knows a lot about it. He's been there all his life.

这太疯狂了。我的意思是，看起来好像整个

It's crazy. I mean, it seems like that's everyone on the

高管团队都是这样。

executive team.

我经历过。他们都是实验室的人。

Been there. They're all the labs.

我很好奇。你最初是怎么接触到好市多（Costco）或者当时的普莱斯俱乐部（Price Club）的？

I'm curious. How did you first come across Costco or or Price Club at the time?

罗德·希尔斯不知怎么地认识了普莱斯，并且知道他在做什么。他说，你必须去见他，他说。所以我开车去了，劳埃德带我参观了他的商店，并与索尔交谈。当然，索尔是一个非常聪明的人。索尔在39岁之前只是一名普通律师。

Rod Hills somehow knew saw Price and knew what he was doing. He said, you have to go down and meet him, he said. So I drove down, Lloyd went through his store and talked with Saul. And of course, Saul was a very intelligent man. Saul was an ordinary lawyer until he was 39 years of age.

然后他出去成立了政府雇员折扣公司之类的。

And he went out and formed government employees discount company or whatever.

是在Fedco时期吗？

In the Fedco days?

他已经不在Fedco工作了。而且他把Fedco卖给了德国人。

He was no longer with Fedco. And he sold Fedco to the Germans.

啊，Fedmark卖给，是的。

Ah, Fedmark to the Yeah.

Hugo Man。Hugo Man。是的。是的。

Hugo Man. Hugo Man. Yeah. Yeah.

那你在Price Club与Costco合并前投资了吗？

And did you get to invest in Price Club before it merged with Costco?

是的，我投了。但我只是在市场上买了股票。我没有得到任何特殊照顾。而且

Yes. I did. But I just bought my stock in the market. I wasn't I got any favor. And

那么你最终是怎么认识Jim Senegal的？

so how did you eventually meet Jim Senegal?

嗯，Senegal邀请沃伦担任Costco的董事。他当时在寻找有财务声誉的人。

Well, Senegal asked Warren to become a director of Costco. He was looking for somebody with a financial reputation.

作为独立董事？

As an independent?

是的。而且沃伦不愿意这么做。他说，她会找查理来做这件事。我想要更短的飞机航程去参加董事会会议等等。所以事情就这样发生了。

Yes. And Warren wouldn't do it. He said, well, she she would get Charlie to do it. I want shorter plane rides to directors meetings and so on. So that's how that happened.

伯克希尔有没有尝试过成为股东或收购好市多？

And did Berkshire ever try to become a shareholder or acquire Cosco?

我曾试图让沃伦在法国人退出时买下他们的股份，他们当时很在意。啊。但沃伦不愿意这么做。沃伦不喜欢零售业。

I tried to get Warren to buy out the French when they left, cared for. Ah. And Warren wouldn't do it. Warren doesn't like retailing.

仅仅是因为他不喜欢零售业，还是有什么大的反对理由？

Was it just that he doesn't like retail, or what was the big objection?

他害怕零售业。渐渐地，曾经在零售业中强大的一切都消失了。西尔斯百货消失了。大型百货商店也消失了。在他看来，这实在太难了。

He's afraid of retail. Gradually, everything that was once mighty in retail is gone. Sears Roebuck is gone. The big department stores are gone. It's just too damn difficult as far as he's concerned.

而且他在多元化零售方面有过不好的经历，对吧？

And he had a bad experience with Diversified retail, right?

不。我们在Diversified只赚钱。我们在零售业并不算真正成功，但我们确实赚了很多钱。

No. We made nothing but money at Diversified. We didn't exactly make it in retailing, but we made a lot of money.

哇。而且Diversified的大部分利润并非来自零售业务。你们通过

Wow. And with Diversified, most of the money was not on the retailing operation. You made a lot of that money through

事情很简单。我们在巴尔的摩收购了这家不起眼的百货连锁店。拿来比较是个大错误。当交易文件墨迹未干时，我们就意识到这将是个可怕的错误。于是我们决定直接撤销交易，宁可承受损失显得愚蠢，也不愿破产。

What happened was very simple. We bought this little pissant department store chain in Baltimore. Big mistake to compare it. As the ink dried on the closing papers, we realized it would be a terrible mistake. So we decided just to reverse it and take the hits to look foolish rather than go broke.

我们刚商量好如何脱身。那时我们已经通过无约束条款债务等方式融资了一半。他们还有大量额外现金。而我们自己的股票跌到极低价格——正值经济衰退期间，我们不断买入，买入，再买入。所有资金都投入了那些股票。

We just told us how to get us out of this. By that time, we'd already financed half of it on covenant free debt and so forth. And they had all this extra cash. And our own stocks got down to selling enormous we just in the middle of one of those recessions, we bought, bought, and bought, and bought. And all that money went right into those stocks.

当然，我们的资产翻了三倍，简直就像坐着收钱。

And, of course, we tripled and just was sitting on our ass.

这后来促成了蓝筹公司(Blue Chip)的成立？

And that led to Blue Chip?

是的。没错。这是蓝筹公司早期成功的一部分。

Yeah. Yeah. It was part of the early success of Blue Chip.

哇。

Wow.

所以你提到沃伦不喜欢卢西奥。

And so you mentioned Warren doesn't like Lucio.

还有件大家不知道的事。是的。我们花了大概2000万美元买下了一家小型Pizzant储蓄贷款公司。当我们退出时，已经从这2000万美元的小投资中提取了超过20亿美元的可流通证券，这些证券成为了内布拉斯加州保险公司基础资本的一部分。所以我们早期有过一些辉煌的岁月，这正是每个人都需要的东西——这些美好的早期成功。

Something else that people don't know about. Yeah. We bought a little Pizzant Savings and Loan company for maybe $20,000,000 And when we left that thing, we had taken out of our little $20,000,000 investment over $2,000,000,000 in marketable securities, which went into Nebraska insurance companies as part of their bedrock capital. So we we had some wonderful early years, and that's what everybody needs, these wonderful early years.

哇。在我们讨论好市多的那期节目中，我们从一个大约十年前伯克希尔股东大会上的笑话开始。沃伦讲了个笑话，说你在被劫持的飞机上，劫机者给你最后一个请求，你说你想做个关于美德优点的演讲。

Wow. So in our Costco episode, we started with the joke at one of the Berkshire beatings probably ten years ago. Warren told the joke about you were on a plane being hijacked, and the hijackers gave you one final request, and you said you'd like to give your speech on the virtues.

关于我有点提醒你想起我的事。

Of me kinda reminding you of me.

是的。是的。然后他说先毙了我吧。我们当时希望，您能给我们讲讲好市多的优点吗？

Yeah. Yeah. And he said shoot me first. We were hoping, could you give us your speech on the virtues of Costco?

不。沃伦是在开玩笑说我老是在这个话题上重复。但人的一生中没有多少次机会能确信自己是对的，并且知道这件事真的会非常成功。也许一生中只有五六次机会能做到。即使早期成功两三次，我也会破产，因为我觉得这太容易了。

No. Warren was kidding me for being so repetitive on the subject. But there aren't many times in a lifetime when you know you're right and you know you have one that's really going to work wonderfully. Maybe five, six times in a lifetime you get a chance to do it. Even do it two or three times early, I'll go broke because I think it's easy.

事实上，这非常困难且罕见。

In fact, it's very hard and rare.

好市多有什么特质让你意识到这是一生中少有的时刻？

What was it about Costco that made you realize this is one of those few moments in a lifetime?

嗯，他们确实比美国任何其他商家卖得更便宜。而且是在大型高效的商店里做到的。所有停车位都是10英尺宽，而不是通常的8英尺、9英尺之类的。他们很多事情都做对了。是的。

Well, they really did sell cheaper than anybody else in America. And they did it in big, efficient stores. And all the parking spaces were 10 feet wide instead of eight feet, nine, or whatever they normally are. They did a lot right. Yeah.

而且他们有很多停车位。他们还限制进店人数。你看，所有这些人都没有产生大额消费。他们通过奖励积分的方式给那些不来店里的人提供特殊福利。

And they had a lot of parking spaces. And they kept out of their stores. All these people didn't do big volumes, you see. And they gave special benefits to the people who didn't come to the stores in the way of reward points.

高级会员制？

The executive membership?

是的。这一切都奏效了。

Yeah. It all worked.

还有轻资本商业模式。我的意思是，当我们研究它时，区别在于...哦，是的。没错。

And the capital light business model. I mean, when we were studying it, the difference was Oh, yeah. Yeah.

没有投资在他们身上。他们让供应商等到他们收到付款后才安排支付，而且他们只安排在销售后才安排付款。

No investment in them. They make the suppliers wait until they've been paid, and then they're scheduled to pay only after they're scheduled to sell.

他们在全球有900个仓库，里面装满了高质量的商品，但没有任何一件商品在他们的账面上。

They've got 900 warehouses around the world full of high quality merchandise, none of which they have sitting on their books.

没错。

That's correct.

是的。据我们了解，Price Club在合并前最初就上市了。他们只是挂牌上市，没有筹集任何资金，也不需要任何资金。

Yeah. Our understanding is that Price Club went public initially before the merger. They just listed. They didn't raise any capital. They didn't need any capital.

谁知道呢？索尔有点像是个中间人。他喜欢交易，喜欢这些杂七杂八的房地产。就像，是的。

Who knows? Saul kind of like he was kind of a fence here. He liked deals. He liked this miscellaneous real estate. Like, yeah.

但这说不通。你不想让一个像好市多这么大的企业，去折腾你的停车场，让其他人永久堵塞你的停车场，而且那些东西不会给你带来太多收益。对吧。你不需要他们，这就是答案。

But it doesn't make sense. You don't want you got an enterprise as big as Costco. You don't have to screw around with your parking lot to get other people clog up your parking lot permanently and stuff that's not going pay you very much. Right. You don't want them is the answer.

你见过其他企业像好市多那样充分利用低SKU数量的优势吗？

Have you ever seen another business that takes advantage of the virtue of the low SKU count the way that Costco does?

嗯，如果你那里有很多这样的公司。洛杉矶这里的小型连锁杂货店格尔策兄弟公司，他们想要高周转率和低资本成本，但他们从未做出任何努力去赚钱或拥有任何东西——他们只想和别人共享停车场。

Well, if you there are lots of them. That little grocery store chain here in Los Angeles, Geltzer Brothers, they wanted high turnovers and low capital costs, and they never made the least effort to earn any money or have any they wanted to share their parking lot with anybody.

当你回顾这些一生中难得遇到的伟大公司时，对于像我和大卫这样寻找这类机会的年轻合伙人，你有什么建议？我们应该注意哪些方面？

As you reflect back on, you know, one of these few great companies in a lifetime that you should bet big on, what advice would you have for David and I as young partners looking for a few of these in our lifetime, things to look out for?

嗯，你可能在买入五年后才发现它。这些特质可能逐渐显现，或者你自己的理解可能会加深。但当你知道自己有优势时，就应该重仓下注。要确信自己是正确的。而大多数人，商学院里不教这个。

Well, you find well, you may find it five years after you bought it. These things may work into it or you may your own understanding may get better. But when you know you have an edge, you should bet heavily. Know you're right. And most people, they don't teach that in business school.

这太疯狂了。当然，你应该在自己的最佳选择上重仓下注。

It's insane. Of course, you got to bet heavily on your best bets.

你是如何培养那种程度的信念来确信

And how do you develop that level of conviction to know

你需要为此努力。通过大量反复阅读、思考和实地考察。保持好奇心。

You work at it. You redo a lot of reading and thinking and visiting. Curious.

我们想请教您。您与沃伦保持了半个世纪的美好合伙关系。而我们的合伙才刚进入第十个年头。

We wanted to ask you. You've had this beautiful partnership with Warren for half a century. But We're a decade in our partnership.

在我们运营初期有很多唾手可得的机会。现在你已经没有任何容易识别的低垂果实了。

There was a lot of low hanging fruit in the early days of our operation. You don't have any low hanging fruit that is easy to recognize.

你是指投资机会方面吗？

You mean in investment opportunities?

是的，没错。

Yeah, that's right.

但是你与沃伦的关系，怎么

But your relationship with Warren, how

你们 嗯，我们都有点相似。我们都想保障家人的安全，为投资者承担新的工作等等。我们的态度很相似。

have you Well, we were all kind of similar. We both wanted to keep our families safe and take a new job for our investors and so on. We had similar attitudes.

是的。这几十年间有变化吗？

Yeah. Did it change over the decades?

没有。沃伦仍然最关心的是他防盗庇护所的安全，胜过其他一切。如果我们全程多用一点杠杆，现在会有三倍的收益。而且风险也不会增加那么多。我们只是从来不想给他们任何搞砸我们基本股东地位的机会。

No. Warren still cares more about the safety of his burglar's shelters than he cares about anything else. If we used a little bit more leverage throughout, we'd have three times as much now. And it wouldn't have been that much more risk either. And we just never wanted to give them at least chance of screwing up our basic shareholder position.

如果你使用了更多杠杆，你认为有没有可能

If you had used more leverage, do you think there's some chance that

我们会做得更好一些。当然。

We would have done a little better. Sure.

你认为有没有可能它根本就不会存在，可能会让你失去整个特许经营权？

Do you think there's some chance that it wouldn't exist at all, that it would have cost you the franchise?

不，我认为它会运作得很好。

No, think it would have worked fine.

沃伦是这么认为的吗？

Does Warren think that?

这很简单。当时的情况很适合，如果你够聪明，就能慢慢从中获利。

It's very easy. The situation lend itself to if you were intelligent, just milking it out.

当你使用杠杆时，我很好奇在我们做了我们的之后

When you leverage I'm so curious on after we did our It's

自动实现了杠杆效应。你零资本开设新店，这当然是杠杆。谁不想要一个既有杠杆又无需库存的生意呢？

automatically leveraged. You open a new store with no capital, of course, it's leverage. Who wouldn't want a business with it and no inventories?

没错。说得好。本质上是你第一天就欠了一大群人这些商品的货款，

Right. That's a good point. By the virtue of you owe a whole bunch of people money on day one for these goods that

而这种周转速度极快。

Which is which turnovers so rapidly.

对。这很有趣。我的意思是，这就是杠杆。这不是债务杠杆。我是说，你怎么看待债务？

Right. It's interesting. I mean, that's leverage. It's not debt leverage. I mean, how do you think about debt?

就像，在我们做了伯克希尔系列之后

Like, after we did our Berkshire series

现在很多人都在这么做。很多生产非常强势产品的人现在都这样做，他们只是强迫供应商承担所有库存。并不只有我们这样做。

A lot of people do it now. A lot of people now do it who manufacture something that is terribly strong, and they're just forcing the suppliers to carry all the inventory. It isn't like we're the only ones that do it.

回到合伙关系这一点，大卫和我做这个播客即将满十年了，虽然不同于投资业务，但同样是一个具有复利效应的事业。在与沃伦长达五十年的合伙之后，对于如何维系一段持久的合伙关系，在人际层面您对我们有什么建议？嗯，

Back to the point on partnership, David and I are coming up on ten years as partners in this podcast we do together, different than the investing business, but a compounding one nonetheless. After a fifty year partnership with Warren, what advice would you have for us interpersonally to make for an enduring partnership? Well,

如果你们彼此喜欢并且享受一起工作，那会很有帮助。

it helps if you like one another and enjoy working together.

我们确实如此。是的。但是

We do. Yeah. But

我没有使用任何固定模式。很多长期运作良好的合作关系之所以成功，是因为一个人擅长某一方面，另一个人擅长另一方面。他们自然而然地分工，每个人都喜欢自己做的事情。在好市多的案例中，他们有杰夫·布劳特曼，他非常聪明但不是零售商，还有吉姆·辛内加尔。

I don't use any one formula. A lot of partnerships that worked well for a long time happen because one's good at one thing and one's good at another. And they just naturally divide it. And each one likes what he's doing. Now, in Costco's case, they had Jeff Broutman, who's very smart, but not a retailer, and Jim Senegal.

嗯，他们进行了分工。最初他们同意由布劳特曼担任董事长兼CEO，因为他是创始人，整个事情都是他创立的。但辛内加尔说，不，我必须当CEO。所以那是一次很不幸的董事会会议，每个人都陷入了各自的挣扎中。

Well, they divided it up. And they had originally agreed that Broutman would be the chairman and CEO, because he was his ID. He founded the whole thing. But Samuel said, no, I have to be the CEO. So it was a big unfortunate board meeting, everybody in her own struggle.

然后布劳特曼退让了。

And Bratman moved aside.

那是在你加入董事会之后吗？

Was that after you joined the board?

不。是在之前。你觉得

No. Before. Do you think

你和沃伦不住在同一个城市，这有助于你们的合作关系持续这么久吗？

you and Warren not living in the same city helped your partnership last so long?

嗯，这可能有所帮助。但沃伦与那些每周六在伯克希尔总部共进午餐的人都保持着非常密切的关系。他在那里有一小群人，可以说是从底层一起打拼上来的伙伴。

Well, it may have helped. But Warren has very close relations with all those people that have lunch every Saturday at Berkshire Headquarters. It isn't like he doesn't have a little quarter of people there who are kinda pals from the ground up.

你觉得当你们确实共度时光时，这段时光变得特别而非寻常，这是否有帮助？

Do you think it helps that when you do spend the time together, it's special rather than being common?

嗯，当然，我们年轻时经常在一起，因为那时没那么多事要做。现在我们有了更多事情要处理，但这就是生活的另一面。所以情况不同了。

Well, of course, we used to spend a lot of time together when we were young because we didn't have that much to do. Now we've got more to do, and then but then it's just the other initiative of life. So it's different.

是啊。有趣的是，我觉得我们现在有很多事要做。嗯，当然，

Yeah. It's funny. I feel like we have a lot to do now. Well, of course,

要很好地投资资金非常困难。我认为在风险投资领域，要一次又一次地成功几乎是不可能的。

it's very difficult to invest money well. And I think it's almost impossible to do time after time after time and venture capital.

是的。我们真的很想听听你对风险投资的看法。

Yeah. We really wanted to ask your thoughts on venture capital.

所有交易都变得如此火热，你必须迅速做出决定，你们基本上就是在赌博。

All the deals get so hot and you have to decide so quickly, you're all just sort of gambling.

你认为风险投资在社会中的角色是否得到了恰当的实现？

Do you think the role of venture capital is being properly accomplished in society?

不。我认为做得非常糟糕。

No. I think it's very poorly done.

查理详细阐述了这一点，其中有些内容我们无法播出，但话题确实转向了比特币。

Charlie elaborated on this point with a few things that we can't air, but the topic did turn to Bitcoin.

我听过您对比特币的许多评论。我好奇您是否从这个特定角度思考过：作为一种在国家间轻松转账的方式，特别是当那些国家内部缺乏稳定的价值储存手段时。拥有一种不与国家挂钩的独立价值储存方式是否有利

I've heard many comments you've made on Bitcoin. I'm curious if you have a thought on this particular angle. An easy way to transfer money in between countries, especially when those countries don't have a stable store of value within that country. Is it good to have an independent store of value that is not pegged

？对全世界而言，拥有某种货币的方式。这个问题长期以来的解决方案是，英镑曾是投资界的国际货币。后来转向了美元。现在仍然是美元。

the nation? To the world as a whole to have a way of having some currency. The way that was solved is for a long time, the British pound was the national currency of the investment world. And that shifted to the dollar. And it's still a dollar.

是的。像中国这样的国家拥有巨额美元储备。我们赚钱的方式——想想人们给我们的钱，我们总是只需印这些纸片。

Yep. And people like China have these enormous reserves at dollars. The money we make by think of the money people give us where we always just print up these pieces of paper.

是的。那么在一些不太幸运的国家里，那些无法获得美元的普通人怎么办？

Yep. And what about the common person in some of these less fortunate countries who don't have access to US dollars?

哦，如果他们已经有资金就能获得。美元流通性很强，你随时随地都能买到。

Oh, they do if they already get any money. The dollar is very fungible. You can always buy one anywhere.

我很好奇。回到风险投资在社会中扮演的角色这个话题，如果你能设计一个完美的体系来资助创新

I'm curious. Back to this point of the role of venture capital in a society, if you could design a perfect system to fund innovation

如果操作得当，这是非常正当的生意。如果你想赋予正确的人权力并培养他们、帮助他们，你深知游戏规则就能协助他们经营业务，同时又不过度干涉以致招人厌恶。总体而言，接触过许多获得风险投资的企业人士后，我认为普遍规律是：业内实干者往往讨厌风险投资家。他们不觉得对方是助力成功的伙伴，反而认为他们只顾自身利益等等。所以他们不喜欢这些人。

very legitimate business if you do it right. If you wanna give the right people the power and nurture them, help them, you know a lot about the tricks of the game so you can help them run their business yet not interfere with them so much they hate you. By and large, having bumped into a lot of people in the businesses with venture capital financing, I would say the ordinary rule is that people in the business doing the work, more often than not, they hate the venture capitalists. They don't feel they're their partner trying to help them become they're only taking care of themselves and so on and so on. And they don't like them.

怎样才能改变这种状况？

How could it work differently?

没错。但在伯克希尔情况不同。你看，RBOE知道我们不会把他们抛售给最高出价者。如果有混蛋投行出20倍市盈率收购某个烂业务，我们不会卖。如果是始终无法解决的问题业务，我们才会出售。

Yeah. Well, I but that's not true in Berkshire. You see, RBOE, they know we're not trying to discard them to the highest bid. See, if some asshole investment banker offers us 20 times earnings or some lousy business, we don't sell. If it's a problem business we've never been able to fix, we'll sell it.

但只要是还算不错的业务，我们从不出售任何资产。这为我们赢得了'长期坚守'的声誉，这对我们很有帮助。

But if it's a halfway decent business, we never sell anything. And that gives us this reputation of staying with things, which helps us.

你认为买入并持有，不仅是心态，更是实际行动，是让投资者与管理人保持一致的关键因素吗？

And do you think that buy and hold, not only mentality, but demonstration, is the key thing that aligns investors with managers?

嗯，这种情况很少见。其他人都有标准化的操作方式。律师们有他们的标准模板。每个人都使用同样的标准模板，最终在投资生活的起伏中获得同样的标准结果。

Well, it's rare, you see. Everybody else has a standard way of doing things. The lawyers have their standard forms. And everybody just has the same standard form. And they get the same standard results subject to the vicissitudes of investment life.

你不应该通过压榨投资者来赚钱。而这正是许多风险投资家所做的。世界上到处都是高盛合伙人成立的私募基金。他们管理着十亿美元左右的资金，收取2%的管理费外加利润分成。

You don't want to make money by screwing your investors. And that's what a lot of venture capitalists do. The world is full of Goldman Sachs partners that formed a private fund. They manage a billion dollars or something like that. And they charge two points off the top plus the split B.

这使得他们自己能获得非常可观的收入。但捐赠基金却没有获得良好的回报。

And that enables them to make very handsome loans themselves. But the endowments are not getting a good return.

你认为这特别与基金的费用结构有关吗

And do you think it's specifically the fee aspect of fund

？这是利益分割的本质。这就是运作方式。当然，除非你真的能取得非常不寻常的业绩，否则你实在不应该从事额外收费的业务。而且，假装能取得好业绩比实际取得好业绩要容易得多。

structures? It's the nature of the wedge. It's just the way it works. And of course, you really shouldn't be in the business of charging extra points unless you really are going to achieve very unusual results. And of course, it's more easy to pretend that you can get good results than it is to actually get them.

因此它吸引了错误的人。那些带着投资资本思维的人。在风险投资中赚最多钱的人，很多都像投资银行家一样，只是决定要进入哪个热门新领域。他们既不是伟大的投资者，在其他任何方面也不出色。

And so it attracts the wrong people. People with an investment capital turn of mine. And the people who made the most money out of venture capital are a lot like investment bankers deciding which hot new area they're gonna get in. They're not great investors or great at anything.

那么你认为捐赠基金和大规模资本应该怎么做呢？

What do you think endowments and large pools of capital should do then?

嗯，他们已经开始行动了。捐赠基金开始对这些收取3%管理费和30%绩效费或类似费用的基金经理们说：我们会支付你的3和30，但我们会投入双倍的资金。而在接下来的半年里，你将不会获得任何绩效提成。你只能靠着你的投资业绩来维持运营。

Well, they're starting to do it. The endowments have started to say to all these people that judge three and thirty or whatever they charge. They said, we'll pay your three and thirty, but we're going to put in twice as much money. And then in the next half, you'll get nothing on it. You're just going, ride Perry Passy Woods on your investments.

这样费用就降低了50%。这会大大减少其中的乐趣。费用降低50%。这种情况正在全美各地发生。他们感到被欺骗、被误导、被激怒。

So the fees go down by 50%. That'll take a lot of the fun out of it. Fees down 50%. And that's happening all over America. They feel had, misled, irritated.

他们在自己的受托人面前显得很愚蠢。

They've looked foolish to their own trustees.

我认为当前投资中的一个问题，你提到了风险投资，但我觉得这适用于所有领域。现在资本如此充裕，竞争如此激烈。我们早已远离了雪茄烟蒂时代。如今我们正处于雪茄烟蒂时代的反面。市场上还有机会吗？

One of the issues I think in investing right now, you mentioned about venture capital, but think it's true everywhere. It's like there's just so much capital and so much competition. We're so far removed from the cigar bud era. We're in the opposite of the cigar bud era these days. Are there opportunities out there?

会找到

Will find

一些机会。但变得越来越难。我认为最易成功的案例之一是当初家得宝周围的一小群人决定复制好市多模式到家居改善领域。这基本上是个好主意。想想他们通过这个赚了多少钱。

a few things. But it gets harder and harder. I would argue one of the easiest ones was when they decided a little group around Home Depot, they would copy the Costco model and home improvements. And that was basically a good idea. And think of the money they made doing it.

伯尼·马库斯。是的。它是

Bernie Marcus. Yeah. It was

对好市多的直接复制。

a direct copy of Costco.

你认为还有更多机会复制好市多吗？

Do you think there are more opportunities to copy Costco?

嗯，好市多还有另一个模仿者。Floor and Decor是当前的模仿者。他们只是在乙烯基、木质仿乙烯基地板领域运行好市多模式。而且他们还在不断添加各种杂项商品。

Well, there was another one at Costco. Floor and Decor is the current imitator. And it's just this in vinyl, wood imitating vinyl flooring that they're running a Costco model. And they keep adding miscellaneous stuff to it too.

不过最终会害死你的正是那些杂项商品。

It's the miscellaneous stuff that'll eventually kill you, though.

嗯，如果全是地板的话会更简单。

Well, it'll be simpler if it was all floor.

是的。这就像垂直的家得宝模式运作得很好，但我不确定这是否完全显而易见。就像，好市多的一部分吸引力在于它是横向的。它包罗万象。消费者可以前来购物。

Yeah. It's it's like the vertical Home Depot worked so well, but I don't know that it was totally obvious. Like, part of the appeal of Costco was it was horizontal. It was everything. Consumers could come.

他们可以安排一次行程，带上他们的大货车，带上他们的大卡车。

They could make a trip, bring their big wagon, bring their big truck.

家得宝也是一样的。他们复制了一切。

Home Depot is the same. They copied everything.

而且众所周知，伯尼·马库斯在之前曾出来拜访过索尔

And famously, Bernie Marcus came out to visit Saul before

他创业之前。是的。他们来过。他们复制了一切。

he started. Yeah. They came out. They copied everything.

索尔很乐意与所有人分享他的成功秘诀，对吧？吉姆

Saul was, like, happy to share the playbook with everybody. Right? How did Jim

和你对此感觉如何？索尔不是一个疯狂、专横的人等等，但他也非常聪明。但像家得宝和好市多这样的机会并不多。真的非常少。

and you feel about that? Saul was a not a crazy was domineering and so on, but he was also very intelligent. But there aren't many opportunities like Home Depot and Costco. There aren't very many.

你认为为什么沃尔玛在看到好市多后，在竞争中没有取得成功？

Why do you think Walmart hasn't been successful once they saw Costco in competing?

他们过于固守已有的观念。这是所有人的通病。他们就是无法接受新想法，因为思维空间已被旧观念占据。他们养成了即使毫无价值也要拿下房地产项目的习惯，因为他们进入的都是小城镇，那里没什么值钱的东西。所以他们的占用成本几乎总是零。

They were too wedded by the ideas they already had. That's everybody's trouble. They just can't accept a new idea because the place space is occupied by an old idea. They got in the habit of getting the real estate project even nothing because they went in little towns where nothing was valuable. So always their occupancy costs were like zero.

他们知道如何打造大型分区商店。那是他们的成功模式。所以让他们违背这个模式，去富裕郊区并为好地段支付高价，这让他们很不舒服。而好市多专门选择富人居住的优质地段。嗯，我就这样年复一年地任由他们发展。

And they knew how to make big division stores. That was their formula. So it offended them to go against the rich suburbs and have to pay up for the good locations. And Costco just specialized in the good locations where the rich people lived. And well, I just let them do it year after year.

这是

It was

一个可怕的错误。你认识山姆·沃尔顿吗？

a terrible mistake. Did you know Sam Walton?

不认识。从没见过他。我认识他儿子，其中一个儿子。他们很早就把产业分成了大约六份。

No. Never met him. I knew the son, one of the sons. And they divided it up, you know, at about six parts very early.

是的。沃尔顿企业。

Yeah. Walton Enterprises.

所以他们几乎没缴过什么赠与税之类的。

So they never paid much gift taxes or anything.

话题随后转向了汽车制造商和汽车行业的未来。

The topic then turned to the automakers and the future of the car industry.

看看进入汽车行业并取得巨大成功有多难。谁会赢？谁知道呢？所有这些电动汽车、巨额的新资本需求、不同的汽车销售方式，让整个行业变得完全不确定。而且，他们还有这些难缠的工会。

Look how hard it would be to go into the auto business and have some big killing. Who's going to win? Who knows? The whole thing has been thrown way up in the air by all these electric cars, all those big new capital requirements, different ways of selling cars. And plus, they got these tough unions.

你看，我甚至根本不看汽车行业。

See, I just don't even look at the auto industry.

你认为由于电动汽车的颠覆性创新，如今这个行业比五十年前更具投资价值吗？

Do you think it's more investable today than it was fifty years ago because of the disruptive innovation of electric?

嗯，也许对于一两家真正擅长此道的电动汽车公司来说是的。也许吧。但其他人肯定不行。

Well, maybe for one or two electric cars that are really good at it. Maybe. But certainly nobody else.

所以你认为

So you think

比亚迪。这太难了。比亚迪是个奇迹。但那家伙每周工作七十个小时，而且智商极高。他能做到你做不到的事情。他能看着别人的汽车零部件，然后想出怎么把这该死的东西造出来。

BYD It's too tough. BYD was a miracle. But that guy works seventy hours a week and has a very high IQ. He can do things you can't do. He can look at somebody else's auto part, and he can figure out how to make the goddamn thing.

你看，你不能那样做。

You can't do that, you see.

查理，你投资了现代汽车。

Charlie, you invested in a Hyundai.

是的。但他们也很聪明。

Yes. But they're they're clever too.

那笔投资对你来说怎么样？

How was that investment for you?

我亏了钱。亏得不多是因为我很固执。我一直持有直到它几乎涨回我的买入价，然后我才卖掉。

I lost money. Not much because I was stubborn. I held out until it got back to almost what I paid for it, and I sold it.

关于伯克希尔对日本贸易公司的投资，有很多讨论。

There's been a lot of discussion about Berkshire's investments in the Japanese trading houses.

嗯，但那是不用动脑子就能做的决定。像那样的机会，如果你像沃伦·巴菲特一样聪明，也许一个世纪里能遇到两三次。日本的利率十年间每年只有0.5%。而这些贸易公司都是根基深厚的老牌企业。他们拥有所有这些廉价的铜矿和橡胶种植园。

Well, but that is a no brainer. Something like that, if you're as smart as Warren Buffett, maybe two, three times a century, you get an idea like that. The interest rates in Japan were 05% per year for ten years. And these trading companies were really entrenched old companies. And they had all these cheap copper mines and rubber plantations.

所以你可以提前十年借入所有资金，然后购买股票。这些股票支付5%的股息。这是一个巨大的现金流，无需投资、无需思考、无需任何付出。这种情况能持续多久？一个世纪能遇到一两次就算幸运了。

And so you could borrow for ten years ahead all the money, and you could buy the stocks. The stocks paid 5% dividends. So it's a huge flow of cash with no investment, no thought, no anything. How long do you do that? You'll be lucky if you get one or two a century.

我们能做，别人做不了。价格看起来很有吸引力，比如半价之类的，但别人拿不到。但伯克希尔凭借其信用可以。唯一的办法就是非常有耐心，一点一点地慢慢积累。花了很长时间才投出去100亿美元。

We could do that nobody else could. It looked attractive at half or something, but couldn't get it. But Berkshire, with its credit, could. And the only way you could get it was to be very patient and just pick away at it little pieces at a time. It took forever to get $10,000,000,000 invested.

但这就像上帝打开宝箱，直接把钱倒进去一样。简直是太容易赚的钱了。

But it was like having God just opening a chest and just pouring money into it. Was awfully easy money.

有趣的是这很矛盾。你需要伯克希尔的信用，但在伯克希尔的规模下，实际上很难投入足够的资金来运作。

It's interesting that it's paradoxical. You need Berkshire's credit, but at Berkshire's scale, it's actually hard to put enough money to work.

确实如此。但赚钱为什么不应该困难呢？为什么应该容易呢？

That's true. But why shouldn't it be hard to make money? Why should it be easy?

日本贸易公司让我想起了。我们最近研究了另一家公司，耐克，它是

Japanese trading companies reminds me. We studied another company recently, Nike, that is

那是家非常不同的公司。

That's a very different company.

是的。你有没有看过

Yeah. Did you ever look

时尚公司。嗯，当然，我看过我看过它，但我不喜欢时尚公司。

at style company. Well, of course, I've looked I've looked at it, but I don't like style companies.

太追逐潮流了？嗯，

Too fad driven? Well,

我想如果是爱马仕和成就企业的话，我会买的。但除此之外，我会买这类公司。

I suppose if the RV Hermes and Achievement Enterprise, I'd buy it. But short of that, I'm gonna buy this type of company.

哦，这是个不错的选择。

Oh, that's a good pick.

说到时尚这一点，他们提到的另一家公司是LVMH。阿诺所做的非常了不起。你对那家公司怎么看？

To the style point, another one that they covered was LVMH. What Arnaud has done has been amazing. So what do you make of that company?

嗯，如果你像他们一样优秀，他们所做的，你需要一辈子来完成。实际上，每三四辈子才能完成一次。你可以再创造一个，但这并不容易。

Well, if you're as good as they are, what they've done, you have a lifetime to do it in. Every now lifetime, really, three or four lifetimes to do it in. You can create another, but it's not easy.

爱马仕现在应该是第八代了，我认为，目前还是家族在经营。

Hermes is on the eighth generation, I think, now, the family running it.

这绝非易事。他们每天开会制定政策决策，逐个选址，这确实是项工作。

It's not a bit easy. They have meetings every day where they make policy decisions, and they choose the locations one at a time, and it's work.

这绝对是项工作。你认为这些，如你所说，世界上最好的风格公司，比如爱马仕或LVMH，它们的持久价值是什么？是什么让它们经久不衰？

It's definitely work. What do you think the durable value is in these, as you say, style companies of the very best one in the world, the Hermes or the LVMH? What makes them enduring?

嗯，他们只是建立了一个人们信任的品牌，所以

Well, they just got a brand people trust so

非常信任。它

much. It

花了一个世纪才做到这一点。

took them a century to do it.

我们的对话随后转向将柯克兰签名(Kirkland Signature)作为一个品牌与爱马仕进行比较。

Our conversation then turned to comparing Kirkland Signature as a brand to Hermes.

柯克兰是一个品牌，就像汰渍是一个品牌，而爱马仕是另一种不同的品牌。

Kirkland is a brand the way Tide is a brand, and Hermes is a different kind of a brand.

没错。法拉利可不生产洗涤剂。

Yeah. Ferrari doesn't make detergent.

不。我们花了很多时间研究这些品牌。你如何看待一个品牌的价值？

No. We've spent a lot of time studying these brands. How do you look at the value of a brand?

嗯，我们很难不喜欢那些我们幸运地以2000万美元收购的Cees糖果品牌作为我们的第一次收购。我们很快发现，每年可以将价格提高10%，而没人会在意。我们没有增加销量或做类似的事情，只是让利润上升了。所以大约这四十年来，我们每年都将价格提高10%。这是一家非常令人满意的公司。

Well, it's hard for us not to love brands we were lucky enough to buy the Cees candy for $20,000,000 as our first acquisition. And we found out fairly quickly that we could raise the price every year by 10%, and nobody cared. We didn't make the volumes go up or anything like that, just made the profits go up. So we've been raising the price by 10% a year for all these forty years or so. And it's been a very satisfactory company.

它不需要任何新的资本。它有什么好处？几乎不需要新资本。我们收购它时有两个大厨房和一堆租赁店铺。现在它还是有两个大厨房和一堆租赁店铺。

It didn't require any new capital. What was so good about it? Very little new capital. We had two big kitchens and a bunch of rental stores when we bought it. And now it's got two big kitchens and a bunch of rental stores.

嗯，查理是个花花公子。他的哥哥经营公司，他的哥哥完全掌控着公司。但当他去世时，查理让他的哥哥担任遗嘱执行人。现在他需要很多钱来支付遗产税。他没有这笔钱。

Well, Charlie was a playboy. And his brother ran the company, his older brother, and dominated it completely. But when he died, Charlie made his brother his executor. And now he needs a lot of money to pay death taxes. He doesn't have it.

而且你知道，税款大概八个月左右就要到期了。所以他们真的很想卖掉公司来支付遗产税。看起来他收购时公司税前利润只有400万美元。

And it's due, you know, eight months or something later. So they really wanted to sell so they could pay the death taxes. And it seemed he was only making 4,000,000 pretax when he bought it.

所以这个买入机会的出现，仅仅是因为这个家族需要流动性来支付遗产税。

And so that buying opportunity only came about because the family needed liquidity to pay the death taxes.

没错。我们之所以能发现这个机会，是因为查理当时正和他一起乘船去夏威夷还是什么地方，这个人是某位投资顾问的客户，而那位顾问也为蓝筹邮票公司工作，正是这家公司买下了它。总之，我们就是这样得知的。我们还付给了那个人一笔中介费呢。我们以前可一分钱都没付过。

Right. We only found out about it because Charlie c was on his cruise to Hawaii or something with this guy who was a client of an investment counselor who also worked for Blue Chip Stamps, which was the company that bought it. Anyway, that's how we found out about it. We paid that guy a finder's fee even. We've never paid 1¢.

他总是说那

He always says that's

是值得的。

what it was worth it.

当然。但你并不想因为支付中介费而获得更好的名声。否则全世界的人都会整天来烦你。

Of course. But you don't want a better reputation for paying finder's fees. Everybody in the world will be bothering you all day long.

那么你认为，像C's或爱马仕这样的品类，品牌是否带来了定价权？

So what do you think so there are categories like C's or like Hermes where brands lead to pricing power.

我认为你买到其中任何一个的机会都微乎其微。我甚至不会去看。我根本不相信我会找到这样的机会。你不会有机会买到的

I think your chances of buying one of them is so low. I wouldn't even look. I don't even believe in looking at things that I might find. You're not gonna get a chance to buy

一辆车。毫无好奇心

a car. No curiosity with

你的时间。

your time.

是的。是的。那么你认为为什么在其他品类，比如包装食品之类的领域，会存在极其知名的品牌呢？

Yeah. Yeah. So why do you think there are extremely well known brands in other categories, maybe packaged food or something where?

嗯，有很多专业投资者会购买知名品牌的商品。他们通常从雀巢开始。它涵盖了一切。它们的表现比平均水平好两三个百分点，但这算不上暴利。

Well, there are a lot there are a lot of professional investors that buy Nellywood branded goods. And the one they usually start with is Nestle. And it is filled with everything. They've done two or three points better than average, but it's not a bonanza.

之后，我们的谈话转向了卡夫亨氏，以及为什么亨氏能够拥有定价权而卡夫却不能。

After that, our conversation turned to Kraft Heinz and why Heinz is able to have pricing power while Kraft is not.

这非常有趣。炸土豆上番茄酱的风味就是有种魔力。人们真的愿意为此更换品牌。他们买了亨氏。所以我们基本上可以提高亨氏的价格。

It was very interesting. There's something about the flavor of ketchup on a goddamn fried potato. People are really willing to change brands over. They bought Heinz. And so we could raise the price of Heinz pretty much.

但如果你试图提高卡夫奶酪的价格，一切都会陷入反抗，包括家庭主妇这样的最终客户。她们并不那么在乎奶酪是否是精制的。

But you try to raise the craft cheese, and everything goes into rebellion, including the final customer of the housewife. They don't care that much about whether the cheese is crafted or not.

你认为为什么会这样

Why do you think that is that some

嗯，酱料风味，这种情况在其他地方也发生过。在韩国，有个中国人控制了所有酱料。每一种主要酱料，他至少控制了95%的市场。

Well, the sauce flavor, it's happened elsewhere. In Korea, one guy, the Chinese guy, controls all the sauces. Every single major sauce, he controls at least 95% of.

是因为酱料的风味非常独特，没人能模仿其商业秘密吗？是的。这就赋予了定价权。

And it's because sauces have such a particular flavor that no one can imitate the trade secret? Yeah. And that gives pricing power.

人们已经习惯了，而且他们喜欢这种味道。

Used to it, and they like it.

可口可乐也是这种情况吗？

Is that Coca Cola as well?

是的，当然。

Yeah. Sure.

查理，我很好奇。在99岁高龄的今天，有什么是你现在相信但70岁的查理会不同意的事情？

Charlie, I'm curious. At age 99, what is something that you believe today that 70 year old Charlie would have disagreed with?

我想我在70岁的时候就知道这很难。但真的太难了。我现在才真正明白有多难。那些在20多岁、30多岁或任何年纪取得成功的人，他们都说得好像很容易似的，然后就开始相信自己的鬼话。当然，这一点都不容易。

I think I I knew when I was 70, it was probably hard. But it is just so hard. I know how hard it is now. And all these people who are getting this to 20 or three or 30 or whatever, they all talk as though it was easy, and they get to believe in their own bullshit. And of course, it's not a bit easy.

非常困难。

It's very hard.

如果你今天能回到30或40岁，你还会选择进入投资行业吗？

If you were back 30 or 40 years old again today, would you decide to go into the investment business again?

哦，可能会，因为这适合我的天性。但我并不真正喜欢那种三方业务。一旦我自己有足够的钱，我宁愿只用我自己的钱来操作。那样做要好得多。

Oh, probably because it suits my nature. But I didn't really enjoy the three and thirty business. Once I had enough money on my own, I'd rather just operate with my own money. That is a much better way of doing it.

因为被迫

Because of the forced

出售。被迫与投资银行家打交道。被迫与投资顾问打交道。被迫与风险资本打交道。那些认识我们的混蛋？

to sell. Being forced to deal with investment bankers. Being forced to deal with investment consultants. Being forced to deal with venture capital. The hell who knew us?

你不想需要别人。致富的意义就在于你不需要依赖他人，不需要与太多其他人打交道。

You don't want to need other people. The point of getting rich is so you don't have to need other you don't have to get a lot of other people.

查理，如果你和沃伦今天都是30岁开始起步，你认为你们能打造出接近如今伯克希尔规模的事业吗？

Charlie, if you started with Warren today and you're both 30 years old, do you think you guys would build anything close to what Berkshire is today?

答案是否定的，我们做不到。每个取得非凡成就的人几乎都具备三个特质：他们非常聪明，工作极其努力。

The answer to that is no, we would. We had everybody that has an unusually good result. Almost everything has three things. They're very intelligent. They worked very hard.

他们还非常幸运。要登上超级成功的榜单，这三者缺一不可。你如何能安排自己获得好运？答案是：尽早开始并长期坚持尝试，也许你能获得一两次好运。

They were very lucky. It takes all three to get them on this list if it's super successful. How can you arrange to have to have the answers of good luck? The answer is you can start early and keep trying a long time, and maybe you'll get one or two.

如果今天重新开始，你认为保险行业仍会是首选载体吗？

If you were starting again today, do you think insurance would still be the vehicle?

这取决于你的性格特质。保险业非常适合某种特定性格的人。需要极有耐心的人才能在保险行业致富——资金积累需要漫长的时间，市场竞争也需要漫长的时间才能淘汰对手。

It depends on your temperament. Insurance would be ideal for a certain kind of a temperament. And it takes a very patient person to get rich in insurance. It takes forever to get anything in. It takes forever to push anybody aside.

赚钱非常困难。

It's very hard to make money.

我听你说过，一旦财富足够自我承保，就应该这么做。是否有任何保险

I've heard you say, as soon as you're wealthy enough to self insure, you should. Is there any insurance

嗯，这差不多就是全部了。想想世界上那些喝得烂醉如泥、房子着火或出什么事时就向保险公司提交巨额索赔的废物们。你为什么要为他们的愚蠢行为分担费用呢？

Well, that's practically everything. Think of all the crumbums of the world that drink too much and file big claims with the insurance company when the place gets on fire or something. Why would you wanna pay your share of their stupidity?

更不用说运营成本了。当然，保险公司还需要支付所有员工的工资。

Not to mention the overhead. Of course, the insurance company needs to pay all the people that work there.

是啊。是啊。不。不。我...我觉得这太疯狂了。

Yeah. Yeah. No. No. I I it's crazy.

你现在有任何保险吗？

Is there any insurance that you carry today?

我没有任何地方的火险。

I carry no fire insurance anywhere.

你有汽车保险吗？

Do you carry auto insurance?

有，我必须得有。

Yeah. I have to.

嗯，从法律上来说是的。

Well, you're legally Yeah.

是的。是的。完全正确。

Yeah. Yeah. Exactly.

我不知道。查理可以

I don't know. Charlie could

不。我必须这么做，而且我也确实这么做了。

No. I have to, and I do.

我很好奇，既然这些人都非常关注科技领域，而我并非科技人士，我想知道您是如何看待苹果的投资的？是什么让您如此有信心进行如此大规模的投资？

I'm curious being that since these guys are very tech focused, I'm curious not being a tech person. How did you think about the Apple investment? And what gave you the conviction to be so big?

大家都学到的是，要想比其他人做得更好，就需要在这12家公司中有相当程度的参与。你至少需要其中两到三家。如果你有这种心态，苹果就是一个合乎逻辑的候选者，你会把它列入你要选择的公司名单中。而且想到它可能还不错，这个想法并不难得出。

What everybody has learned is that everybody needs some significant participation in the 12 companies to do better than everybody else. And you need two or three of them at least. And if you have that mindset, Apple was a logical candidate to be on the list for which you're gonna select your companies. And it's not very hard to come up with the idea that it may be okay.

列出名单听起来并不太难。事实上，有一些缩写词，比如FAANG或MAMA，你知道的，微软、苹果、谷歌、脸书。但选择其中一家并投入数千亿美元

Making the list doesn't sound too hard. In fact, there are these acronyms, FAANG or MAMA, you know, Microsoft, Apple, Google, Facebook. But selecting the one and putting hundreds of billions of dollars into it

我们没有投入数千亿。但我们确实投入了300亿美元。

We didn't put hundreds of billions. Put we put 30,000,000,000 into it.

要创造数千亿的价值，对我来说这听起来很难只选一个。你们是怎么挑选出那个项目的？

To create hundreds of billions of value, that to me sounds hard to pick the one. How did you guys pick the one?

我们买不到其他任何东西。

We couldn't buy anything else.

是因为估值吗？

Was it valuation?

或者说，是的。嗯，它变得便宜了。我们只花了大约10倍市盈率就买下了它。

Or Yeah. Well, it got cheap. We gotta pay about 10 times earnings and more than bought it.

我相信2015年是第一次。是的。这个概念让我着迷——如果你看困境债务，或者看看沃伦在最近一封伯克希尔信中指出，真正好的决策就那么几个；或者看看经典幂律分布的风险投资。所有这些资产类别归根结底都是在整个职业生涯中做出的少数几个高确信度的绝佳决策。

2015, I believe, was the first. Yeah. It's fascinating to me this concept of if you look at distressed debt or you look at I think Warren in the last Berkshire letter pointed out it's been a handful of really good decisions, or you look at venture capital that's classically power law distributed. Any of these asset classes comes down to a few really good decisions with high conviction over an entire career.

是的。这正是我——这正是它的运作方式。

Yeah. That's exactly what I that's exactly the way it works.

并不顺利。没有任何资产类别能让你反复地

It's not smooth. There's no asset class where you can repeatedly just do

不，不。对于傻瓜来说的低垂果实并没有消失，但它非常小。

No. No. There's the the low hanging fruit for the idiot is it's not gone, but it's very small.

你提到当我们谈论苹果时，有几家公司确实非常重要必须持有。你认为这些大型科技公司成为赢家，所有养老金、伯克希尔、大学捐赠基金和每个人的401k都集中投资这些公司，这是自然的结果吗？我们是否必然走向这个结局？

You mentioned this idea that when we're talking about Apple, there's a few companies that it's just really important to be in. Do you think these big tech companies being the winners where all of the pensions and Berkshire and university endowments and everyone's four zero one k is being concentrated in these companies, do you think that was the natural outcome? Did we have to end up this way?

是的。这是自然的。所以它发生了。就是这样。

Yeah. It was natural. That's why it happened. It was this one.

是什么导致了这种情况？

What causes that?

嗯，这就是人性和竞争，这就是它导致的结果。

Well, it's just it's just that's what human nature and competition, that's what it causes.

我们最终会只剩一家吗？

Will we eventually have one?

最终，风险投资领域的这种疯狂现象——当他们全都失去理智时——这是一个自然的结果。

Eventually, this craziness in venture capital when they're all all gone stupid, that's a natural outcome.

我们是否会出现一家市值20万亿美元的公司，然后第二大公司就变得...

Will we have one $20,000,000,000,000 companies, and then the next biggest company is all

这个世界会...我不知道我们会有朋友。我们确实有了。他们就是自然而然地出现的。

the world's gonna I didn't know we were gonna have friends. We did. They just happened.

你会继续在中国投资吗？你对此持什么立场？

Would you continue investing in China? What's your position with that?

嗯，我在中国的立场一直是：未来二十年，中国经济的增长前景几乎优于任何其他大型经济体。这是第一点。第二点，中国的龙头企业实际上比任何其他地方的龙头企业都更强大、更优秀。而且它们的价格要便宜得多。所以很自然，我愿意在芒格投资组合中承担一些中国风险。

Well, my position in China has been that the Chinese economy has better future prospects for the next twenty years than almost any other big economy. That's number one. Number two, the leading companies of China are stronger and better than practically any other leading companies anywhere. And they're available at a much cheaper price. So naturally, I'm willing to have some China risk in the Munger portfolio.

多少中国风险？嗯，这不是一个科学问题。但我不介意，不管是18%还是什么。只要芒格家族安排好的，我都接受。

How much China risk? Well, that's not a scientific subject. But I don't mind whatever it is, 18% or something. Whatever is worked out in the Munger family, it's Okay with me.

那其他地缘政治因素呢？你现在会持有台积电吗？

What about other geopolitical considerations? Would you hold TSMC at this point?

嗯，相比那些拥有真正消费者品牌的公司（比如苹果），我对这个的喜爱程度没那么高。

Well, I don't like that as well as I like something with a real consumer brand of its own, like Apple.

我很好奇，还有哪些未被提及的大公司，你认为人们应该好好研究它们的优点，就像研究好市多的优点那样？

I'm curious what major companies that haven't been mentioned do you think people would do well to study the virtues of, like studying the virtues of Costco?

嗯，我只研究两类公司。第一，我深受本·格雷厄姆的影响。如果某样东西真的很便宜，即使是一家糟糕的公司，我也愿意考虑买入并持有一段时间。我偶尔会这么做，而且有一两次取得了巨大成功。

Well, I only study two kinds of companies. One, I'm enough of a Ben Graham follower. If something is really cheap, even though it's a crappy company, I'm willing to consider buying it for a while anyway. And I do that occasionally. And I've done it with great success a time or two.

但我的重大成功，我这辈子也就做过一两次，获得了巨大收益，仅此而已。这不像是我能做到但没去做的事。我做过一百次。所以这一点都不容易。是的。

But my hard marks, I've done it once or twice in my lifetime for big gains, and that's it. It's not like I've had what was not going do. I've done it 100 times. So it isn't a bit easy. Yeah.

轻松赚一百次的钱几乎是不存在的。

100 times easy money is almost nonexistent.

一类公司是‘雪茄烟蒂’型。那另一类公司是什么？

One type of company is the cigar butt. What's the other type of company?

就是那些人们应该好好……嗯，研究其伟大优点的公司

The companies that people would do well to Well, study the great virtues

品牌公司当然很好。关键是要以合适的价格买入。整个诀窍就是在那些罕见的真正便宜的时候买入。但以现在的价格买入好市多，可能会不错，但这又变得困难了。

brand companies, of course, are good. Get them at the right price. The whole trick is to get them on the few rare occasions when they're really cheap. But buying Costco at its present price, It may work out all right, but that's again, it's getting hard.

是的。不考虑股票的前景，您认为未来十年这家业务会怎么样？

Yeah. Forgetting the prospects of the stock, how do you think about the next ten years for the business?

我认为它会做得相当不错。

I think it'll do pretty well.

在这个领域再问您一个问题。您最喜欢给年轻人什么建议？

One more question for you in this area. What is your favorite advice to give to young people?

嗯，我不会随便给任何年轻人建议。只给一些人。我会选择时机。我不想比我已经是的样子更像年轻人的导师。现在外面越来越难了，总有一些胡说八道和疯狂的事情。

Well, I don't give advice to just any young people. Give it to some. I pick my spots. I don't wanna be more of a guru to the young people I already am. It's getting hard out there, and there's always bullshit and craziness.

当然，这会很难。

Of course, it's gonna be hard.

现在有吸引力的机会都在哪里？听起来好像全世界的一切都被高估了。这可能吗？

Where do the attractive opportunities hang out anymore? It sounds like everything in the whole world is overpriced. Could that be possible?

差不多是这样。当然，这是有可能的。不仅可能，而且很可能已经实际发生了。

Damn near. Of course, it could be possible. It's not only possible. It's likely it's actually happened.

如果我们有这么多资本却只有这么少的机会，世界怎么会变得如此富有？

How did the world get so rich if we have all this capital for so few opportunities?

这就是事物的本质。你看，生物学通过残酷的竞争，经过数十万年的优胜劣汰，才造就了我们这样高度进化的生物，让我们能够坐在这里智慧地讨论这些话题。换句话说，自然界用来变得聪明的这个系统，对失败者来说其实挺残酷的。

It's the nature of things. Look, biology produces a very advanced creature like us. You can sit around and talk intelligently on all these subjects. But it does it by killing everybody off in brutal competition one way or the other for hundreds of thousands of years. In other words, the system that nature uses to get smart is kind of unpleasant to the people who are losing.

所以在过去一百年里，我们残酷地将所有价值从劳动力转移到了资本，而现在所有资本都在竞争进入一个非常有限的机会集合。

So over the last hundred years, we've brutally shifted all this value from labor to capital, and now capital is all competing to get into a very small set of opportunities.

嗯，资本从来就不是那么容易获得的。如果你回溯到很久以前，虽然相对容易一些，但也不是那么轻松。

Well, capital never cap you would it wasn't that it was all that easy if you go back a long time. It just was a lot easier.

如果这种情况继续变得更加困难，自然的结局就是你会面临

And if it continues to get harder, the natural end is that you have

是的。某种不愉快的爆发。天知道在我们现代民主制度下，这种不愉快的爆发之后会发生什么。可能会变得很像欧洲那样，功能相当失调。

Yes. An unpleasant blowup of some kind. And God knows what happens after an unpleasant blowup with our modern democracies. You would get to hear a lot like Europe, which is quite dysfunctional.

说世界似乎已经没有足够的好点子来匹配那些寻找好点子的资本量，这种观点是否过于悲观了？

Is it too pessimistic of a view to say that the world seems to be out of good ideas to match the amount of capital out there looking for good ideas?

这从来都不容易。我完全明白这从来都不容易，而现在更难了。这两点就是关键所在。你要注意处理好与你打交道的人。你希望最终留下的是好名声，而不是坏名声。

It was never easy. I thoroughly understood it was never easy, and it's harder now. Those are the two where it was. You pay attention that you're handling the people you deal with. You want a good reputation when you're all done, not a bad one.

我认为你并不是说完全没有机会。我觉得你是在说期望值较低。暴利机会更少了。

And I don't think you're saying there are no opportunities whatsoever. Think you're saying low expectations. Fewer bonanzas.

现在美妙之处在于你只需要富一次。你不需要四次攀登这座山。你只需要成功一次。

Now the beauty of it is you only have to get rich once. You do not have to climb this mountain four times. You just have to do it once.

嗯，这某种程度上是你们双方共同的哲学——你必须耐心等待绝佳机会。但当机会来临时，你必须能够识别它们并迅速抓住。

Well, that's sort of your philosophy on both sides is you gotta be patient for the great opportunities. But when they you gotta recognize them when they come and and pounce.