第二十八集：与亚马逊董事会原始成员汤姆·阿尔伯格谈亚马逊IPO

你知道，当时很多人上市时估值高达300亿美元，但实际上并没有多少实质资产。

You know, people were going public and being worth $30,000,000,000 and really didn't have much.

亚马逊的情况并不完全如此，尽管当时确实有人感兴趣，而且我认为杰夫的一个动机是，我们希望能以不错的估值融资，然后用这些资金进一步扩张，这很有吸引力。

It didn't quite happen that way with Amazon because even though there was interest, and I think one Jeff's motivations, I think the idea that we could raise money at hopefully good valuations and then use that money to grow further was attractive.

他还觉得，由于亚马逊是一家相对默默无闻的小型零售公司，上市有助于提升品牌知名度。

He also felt that because it was kind of a small, relatively unknown retail company that it would help the brand to get better known.

我认为这对一些面向消费者的公司来说确实如此。

And I think that's true on some consumer oriented companies.

甚至对一些企业级初创公司来说，这也可能成立。

It actually can be true even on enterprise startups.

我们有一家叫Impinj的公司今年上市了，但当时大多数首席执行官并不了解他们。

We have one, Impinj that went public this year, and they were not widely known among CEOs.

所有首席信息官都知道他们，但一旦上市，你就会开始更多地出现在《华尔街日报》和《纽约时报》上。

Everybody at the CIO knew them, but once you get public, you know, you start to get picked up more on The Wall Street Journal and The New York Times.

亚马逊上市后确实发生了这种情况。

Certainly happened to Amazon after it went public.

好了，各位听众。

Alright, listeners.

现在是一个绝佳的机会，来感谢我们非常兴奋的新朋友——Sierra。

Now is a great time to thank a new friend of the show that we are very excited about, Sierra.

是的。

Yes.

我们非常高兴能与Brett、Clay以及他们那里的整个团队合作。

We are thrilled to be working with Brett, Clay, and the entire team over there.

那我们为什么对Sierra如此兴奋呢？

So why are we excited about Sierra?

嗯，多年来我们在制作《Acquired》的过程中学到的一点是，一家伟大的公司往往由其客户体验所定义。

Well, one of the things that we've learned from making Acquired over the years is that a great company is often defined by its customer experience.

没错。

Yep.

但要做到卓越很难。

But being great is hard.

与客户沟通成本很高。

Talking to customers is expensive.

虽然网站和应用程序很不错，但它们有点慢且笨重，还需要客户去学习使用。

And while websites and apps are great, they're also kinda slow and clunky, and your customers have to learn them.

是客户在适应你，而不是你在适应客户。

They don't learn you.

Sierra 改变了这一切。

Sierra changes all that.

他们构建了面向客户的AI代理，能够完成各种惊人的任务，比如找到完美的房子、挑选电视节目、办理抵押贷款、配送沙发、退鞋、为患者进行医疗认证、订购信用卡、阻止订阅者取消服务，等等。

They build customer facing AI agents that can do an insane range of things, like finding the perfect home or picking TV shows or originating mortgages, shipping a sofa, returning shoes, authenticating patients for health care, ordering credit cards, saving subscribers from canceling, and on and on.

自创立以来的短短两年内，他们已成为领先的对话式AI平台，众多杰出企业如ADT、Kleiner、Minted、Ramp、Redfin、Rocket Mortgage、Safelight、SiriusXM和Wayfair都信赖Sierra来提升客户体验。

In just two years since founding, they've become the leading conversational AI platform with hundreds of incredible companies like ADT, Kleiner, Minted, Ramp, Redfin, Rocket Mortgage, Safelight, SiriusXM, and Wayfair, all trusting Sierra for their customer experiences.

Sierra的设计足以满足财富500强企业的需求，包括医疗和金融服务等高度监管的行业，但它同样非常适合任何企业，包括你的企业。

Sierra was built to be powerful enough for Fortune 500 companies, including heavily regulated industries like health care and financial services, but it really works great for any business including yours.

借助Sierra，你只需构建一次AI代理，几周内即可在电话、聊天、短信、WhatsApp、邮件等多种渠道上部署，并支持30多种语言。

With Sierra, you can build your AI agent once and deploy it everywhere within weeks on the phone, in chat, SMS, WhatsApp, email, all in over 30 languages.

你甚至可以将其发布到ChatGPT上。

You can even publish it to ChatGPT.

而且，凭借他们独特且高度对齐成果的定价模式，你只需为Sierra带来的实际价值付费——包括提升的客户满意度和解决率、更低的成本以及更高的收入。

And with their unique and insanely aligned outcomes based pricing model, you only pay for the value that Sierra delivers, increased customer satisfaction and resolution rates, lower costs, and higher revenue.

Sierra让全球优秀的企业能够每天每时每刻都展现出最佳状态。

Sierra enables the great companies of the world to show up at their best consistently every minute of every day.

事实上，我们对Sierra的评价如此之高，以至于大卫和我都投资了这家公司。

And in fact, we think so highly of Sierra that David and I even invested in the company.

想了解如何利用AI打造更出色、更人性化的人机交互体验，请访问 sierra.ai/acquired，并告知他们是本和大卫推荐的。

To find out how you can build better, more human customer experiences with AI, visit sierra.ai/acquired and tell them that Ben and David sent you.

准备过程是怎样的？

What was the preparation process like?

特别是，我很好奇。

And then I'm in particular, I'm curious.

当时主导亚马逊IPO的投行是德意志银行，而不是高盛或摩根士丹利。

So the lead left, bank on the Amazon IPO was Deutsche Bank, not Goldman Sachs or Morgan Stanley.

我们几期前讨论过Facebook的IPO，谈到了这两家投行在争夺Facebook上市主承销商位置上的竞争。

We covered the Facebook IPO a few episodes ago and, talked about the the jockeying between the two of those firms for the Facebook IPO.

你知道，这些是华尔街顶级的金牌投行，每家公司都希望其中一家成为自己的主承销商。

You know, these are the the gold plated Wall Street firms that everybody wants one of them to be their, their lead book runner for for the IPO.

但亚马逊选择了德意志银行，特别是牵头银行家弗兰克·夸特龙和首席分析师比尔·古尔利，后者如今是Benchmark的合伙人。

But Amazon went with Deutsche Bank and in particular, the lead banker Frank Frank Quattrone and the lead analyst, Bill Gurley, who obviously is now partner at partner at Benchmark.

这种合作关系是怎么建立起来的？

How did how did that relationship come together?

如果你见过并了解夸特龙和古尔利，

If you've met and know Quattrone and Gurley, the

答案就是夸特龙和古尔利。

the answer is Quattrone and Gurley.

更广泛地说，我认为杰夫一直认为，大名头的公司并不总是最好的。

And, you know, a broader answer is, I think Jeff always had the view and we had the view that big name companies aren't always the best.

高盛和摩根士丹利长期以来一直是前两名，选择它们确实有很多优势，但这并不意味着其他机构就不够好，甚至可能更好，通常真正起决定作用的是直接负责交易的团队。

Goldman and Morgan Stanley have been the top two then and today, and there's a lot of merit in going with them, but it didn't mean that others weren't as good or potentially better, and often it is the people directly working the deal.

所以我认为他们留下了很好的印象，我们认为他们能胜任这份工作。

And so I think they made a good impression, and we thought they could do the job.

《一切皆可售》一书中讲了一个精彩的故事，说IPO之后，他们组织了一次夏威夷的静修活动。

There's a there's a great story told in The Everything Store that after the IPO, they organized a retreat in Hawaii.

对吧？

Right?

我想是墨西哥。

And and that Mexico, I think.

哦，墨西哥。

Oh, Mexico.

对，没错。

That's right.

我想是在卡波。

I think it was Cabo.

他们当时有一位参与该项目的助理，名叫杰夫·布莱克伯恩。

And and they had an associate working on the deal, who was Jeff Blackburn.

布莱克伯恩也参加了这次度假，我肯定他之前就与杰夫、亚马逊公司以及董事会有过互动，毕竟亚马逊有太多叫杰夫的人了。

And Blackburn came along on this, on this retreat and and I'm sure had interacted with, with Jeff, with there's so many Jeffs at Amazon, with Bezos and the company and and and the board beforehand.

但结果是，布莱克伯恩最终加入了亚马逊，至今仍在公司任职，是高层团队的一员。

But the net of that was that Blackburn ended up joining Amazon and is still at the company today and member of, member of the senior team there.

对。

Right.

一位顶级高管。

One of the top executives.

是的。

Yeah.

所以，如今研究亚马逊的人最关注、也广为人知的一点，就是他们推动飞轮的能力——在任何环节注入动力，就能以近乎永动的方式带动企业其他部分加速运转。

So one of the biggest the biggest things that that people who've studied Amazon look at now, and is is quite well known, is their ability to spin the flywheel, to add fuel at any given point, and and increase the momentum of of other parts of the businesses in a very, almost perpetual motion way.

因此，卓越的商品选择带来了更好的客户体验，进而吸引更多流量，吸引更多的卖家入驻平台，如此循环往复。

So that that superior selection drives a better customer experience, which increases more traffic, which brings more sellers to marketplace, and on and on and on.

而且这一切

And it's all

这降低了价格并增加了选择，是的。

Which lowers prices and increases selection, and Yeah.

这是一个递归循环。

It's a it's a recursive loop.

它

It

是的。

is.

在公司早期，在上市之前，这是否经常被提及？

Had this this early in the company, you know, before the IPO, was this something that was frequently talked about?

当投资者考虑投资IPO时，这是否是他们关注的问题？

Was this a a thing on investors' minds when they were thinking about investing in the IPO?

所以，是的，实际的飞轮概念是在2002年2月左右形成的。

So, yeah, the actual flywheel concept developed in like 02/2002.

它源于一次董事会会议以及与外部顾问的会面。

It rose out of a board meeting and meeting with an outside consultant.

但其中一些基础，我的意思是，杰夫从一开始就很注重客户体验。

But some of the basis of that, I mean, Jeff from the very beginning was very focused on customer experience.

他在和我开会时谈到，我们要打造世界上最好的客户体验。

And he talked in the meeting with me about we're gonna have the world's best customer experience.

在那些年做起来很难，因为当时的网页并不好。

And it was hard to do in those days because the web wasn't very good.

你知道，最终我们上线时，网站是黑白的。

You know, eventually when we launched, it was a black and white website.

是的。

Yeah.

那本书上没有出版日期，所以如果你想买一本旅行指南，我的意思是，我对此有过抱怨。

There was no publication date on the book, so if you wanted to buy a travel I mean, I complained about this.

如果你想买一本旅行书，你根本不知道它是二十年前出版的还是六个月前出版的，而对旅行书来说，这一点非常重要。

If you wanna buy a travel book, you didn't know if it was published twenty years ago or six months ago, and on a travel book, it's very important.

所以，你知道，但无论如何，客户体验是与生俱来的，那么你该如何实现呢？

So, you know, but nonetheless, it was like it was genetic, that customer experience, and then so how do you do that?

价格、价格和库存。

Well, prices, prices, inventory.

所以这些因素当然一直存在于背景中，并且被重点关注，你知道，就是这些要素。

And so it was in the background certainly and and focused, you know, some of those elements.

后来，飞轮这个比喻变得很有用，我认为。

The flywheel metaphor became useful later, I think.

听你这么说，我一直是——正如长期收听这个节目的听众所知道的——本·汤普森和他的聚合理论的忠实推崇者。

Hearing you talk about that, I've been one, as longtime listeners of this show know, we are great admirers of Ben Thompson and his aggregation theory.

但该理论的核心观点之一是，在客户群体无限、分发成本低廉的互联网世界里，卓越的客户体验才能胜出。

But, one of the core tenants of that is is that superior customer experiences win in a in a in a world where, your accessible customer base is infinite, and distribution costs are low, which is the Internet.

对。

Right.

对。

Right.

听到你这么说，真的很有趣，即使在互联网还被大多数人误解的早期，杰夫就已经深深认识到，提供卓越的客户体验将带来市场的胜利。

And really interesting to hear that that even in those early days when the Internet was so poorly understood by so many people, Jeff got that at his core that providing the superior customer experience would lead to winning the market.

是的。

Yeah.

不是所有公司都能明白这一点。

Not all companies get that.

我的意思是，部分原因是他们关注短期利益，部分原因是，我们怎么才能从客户身上再榨取两美分？

I mean, partly they're focused on short term, partly, yeah, how do we squeeze another 2¢ out of the customer?

天啊，我们砍掉了这个产品，省了钱。

Gee, we cut out this product and we save money.

所以这一切都发生了。

So all of this happens.

夸特龙。

Quattrone

昆特隆和格里利赢得了业务，主导了IPO。

and Gurley win the business, lead the IPO.

1997年5月15日，也就是公司成立不到三年、产品发布不到两年的时候，我们上周还在讨论，Snapchat敢于在成立四年后上市，真是勇气可嘉。

And on 05/15/1997, so less than three years after the company was founded and less than two years after the product launch, I mean, we were talking last week about how Snapchat is to be lauded for going public having the courage to go public, courage, four years after company founding.

这还不到三年。

This was less than three years.

亚马逊以每股18美元的价格进行IPO，筹集了5400万美元，初始市值为4.38亿美元，回过头来看，我们会在节目结束时讨论如今的市值是多少。

Amazon prices its IPO at $18 a share, raises $54,000,000 at an initial market cap of $438,000,000, which is thinking back today, we'll we'll, well, we'll wrap up at the end of the show with where the market cap is today.

但在第一天，股价就上涨了，收盘价为23.50美元。

But, it trades up on the first day, closes at $23.50.

但在接下来的几个月里，股价实际上下跌了。

But then for the first couple months, it actually trades down.

直到那年夏天晚些时候，公司公布了第二季度的营收数据，人们才重新关注——他们报告称1997年的营收达到了2800万美元，这远超第一季度，也远超1996年全年的业绩，此后股价才再次上涨。

And, it's not until the company reports its q two revenue numbers later that summer, that the shares, when they report that they did 28,000,000 in revenue in 1997, which was more than all of well, much more than q one and more than they did in all of 1996, then the shares rise again.

公司在上市后的头几个月里，股价下跌时，感觉怎么样？

What was it like in those those first couple months after the company went public and the stock traded down?

而且

And

是的

Yeah.

你说得对。

You're right.

它一开始并没有出现巨大的上涨。

It didn't have this enormous pop at the beginning.

而且，是的，正如你所知，我亲身经历过一些这些事，直到那些海洋发布出来之前，股价一直都很平稳。

And, yeah, I think by as you know, I physically remember some of this, that it was pretty flat for until those marine release came out.

甚至到第二季度末，也就是六月底，我想是这样。

And even by the end of the second quarter, so late June, I think it was.

所以，相当于今天的情况，因为已经经历了三到四次拆股，相当于12比1。

So the equivalent to to today, so if you, there's been three or four splits which are equivalent for 12 for one.

所以如果你除以12，就得到1.5美元。

So if you divide by 12, you get to a dollar 50.

是的。

Yep.

所以在六月底，股价大约在1.5美元左右交易。

And and so it was trading about a dollar 50 in late June.

然后还有几个关键点，因为这种分析你可以没完没了地做下去。

Then just a couple of other key points because you can do this, you know, endlessly.

但到年底时，股价大约是5美元，然后在接下来的三年左右，涨到了100美元，也就是今天的价位，然后……

But by the end the year, it was like $5, and then it went to 100 over three years or so in in those in today's And then

之后股票又多次拆分。

the stock split multiple times after that.

是的。

Yep.

但到了2001年，经历了经济衰退和市场崩盘后，股价又跌回了大约6美元。

But by 2001, when you had the recession and all the crashes, it was back down to like $6.

所以曾经有过一些时机，你可以以不错的价格买入，但每个人都知道，这在一定程度上说明市场在估值上并不完美。

So there were moments when you could have bought in at good prices and everybody, you know, it shows partly that the market is not perfect at valuation.

但另一方面，你知道，到2001年时，整个国家已经陷入衰退，

But on the other hand, you know, the country was in a recession by 2001 and

而亚马逊是一家零售商。

And Amazon is a retailer.

当时它亏损严重，许多人甚至那时就预测它会倒闭。

And it was losing a lot of money, and many people were predicting even then that it was gonna die.

但确实如此。

So but it yeah.

回过头来看这些数字，真是有点令人着迷。

It's kinda fascinating to go back over those numbers.

哦，是的。

Oh, yeah.

我猜也是。

I bet.

我们在这个节目中经常讨论的一件事是，试图评估一次收购或IPO是否是一个明智的决定，以及它有多成功。

One of the things we talk about a lot on this show is is we try to assess whether an acquisition or an IPO was was a good move, and and know, how successful was it?

对于IPO，我们衡量的一个标准是，上市为公司带来了哪些原本无法实现的机会。

And one of the measures that we we use for that with IPOs is what going public enabled that company to do that they would not otherwise been able have been able to do.

那么，在IPO后的短期内，也就是接下来的几年里，他们把这笔新涌入的资金用在了哪些方面？

So what in the kinda near term, those next few years after the IPO, did they, you know, plow that new influx of capital into?

嗯，我认为，

Well, I think,

你知道，亚马逊一直以不赚钱但愿意投资而闻名，只要金融市场允许的话。

you know, Amazon has been rightly known for not making any money and being willing to invest, and to the extent that the financial markets allow you to.

所以我认为，如果亚马逊被收购方掌控，你不会看到这种增长、创新和扩张。

And so I think if it had been in the hands of, let's say, an acquiring party, you wouldn't have not have seen this kind of growth and then innovation and expansion.

因此，杰夫拥有独特的长期思维能力，并明确传达出他着眼于长期，让投资者明白这是一笔长期投资，他常说：‘你得到的是你所吸引的投资者。’

So Jeff has had a unique ability to think long term and make it clear he's thinking long term so that the investors understand that this is a long term investment, and he likes to say that you get the investors you ask for.

意思是，如果你专注于每季度多赚两美分，那你吸引的投资者也会关注这一点。

Meaning that if you focus on you know, 2¢ more profit per quarter, then you get investors who focus on that.

而如果你花点时间，才能找到合适的投资者。

And if you, you know, it takes you a while, think, to get the right kind of investors.

但如果你说，长期现金流才是衡量业务的标准，很快你就会吸引到愿意基于这一点投资的投资者。

But if you say long term cash flow is how we measure the business, pretty soon you get investors who are willing to invest on that basis.

我的意思是，如果你不增长，他们可能不喜欢你的理念而抛售股票，但最终你会拥有更少的短期投资者和更多的长期投资者。

And I mean, it's possible if you don't grow, they weren't gonna like your message and sell, but but you end up with fewer short term investors and more long term.

我认为这极大地帮助了亚马逊。

I think that's helped Amazon a lot.

所以我对这一点非常好奇。

So I'm super curious on this.

我们在节目开始前聊过一点点，而这恰恰是故事中的完美时机。

We were we were chatting before a little bit before the show, but and this is the perfect place in the story too.

1997年，亚马逊全年营收达到1.48亿美元，比前一年的1600万美元大幅增长。

So at the 1997, Amazon wraps up the year with a 148,000,000 in revenue, up from 16 the year before.

惊人的增长。

Incredible growth.

但在我看来，1997年最了不起的事情是杰夫发表了他第一封致股东的年度信函。

But I think to my mind, the most incredible thing that happens at the 1997 is Jeff publishes his first annual letter to shareholders.

此时，公司上市已有七八个月了。

So the company's been public for seven or eight months at this point.

杰夫写了一封非常出色的信，被收录在年度报告中，并且从那以后每年都会附上他当年的信件。

And Jeff writes this this amazing letter that, is included in the annual report, and he's included every year since with his then current year letter as well.

这份文件是长期思维的杰作。

And the document is is a masterpiece of long term thinking.

这份文件是怎么写出来的？

How how did that document come together?

杰夫是不是有一天直接走进董事会，说：嘿。

Did did Jeff just walk into a board meeting one day and say, hey.

我想给我们的所有股东写一封信。

I think I'm gonna write a letter to all of our shareholders.

是的。

Yeah.

嗯，我并没有帮着他写这封信。

Well, I wasn't you know, I didn't help him write it.

可惜我不是合著者。

Unfortunately, I wish I was a coauthor.

但我认为，在那些早期日子里，关键人物之一是被聘为首席财务官的乔伊·科维。

But I think, you know, one of the key people in those early days was this Joy Covey who had been recruited as the CFO.

回想一下当时，当我们开始讨论上市时，约翰·多尔说：‘除非你们引进更多资深管理层，否则我投反对票。’

And thinking back a little bit on that, when we started talking about going public, John Doerr said, well, I'm gonna vote against going public unless you bring in some more senior management.

你不能只靠你和几个技术人员就去上市。

You can't go public with you and a couple technical people.

哦，天哪。

Oh, wow.

所以，这一直是我们的一项准则，虽然有时我们会打破，但我认为这是一条非常好的规则：私营阶段和上市是不同的。

And so, I mean, it's been a rule that sometimes we violate, but it's a very good, I think, rule that you you need being private is different than going public.

即使你增长得不错，也需要一位非常出色的首席财务官。

Even if you're growing pretty well, you need a really first class CFO.

你需要更强的市场推广能力。

You need some more marketing power.

当时，大卫·里彻从微软被招揽过来，他是那些年份里一位非常重要且强势的资深高管。

It's when David Richer was recruited from Microsoft, who was a very important strong senior executive in those days.

我们还引进并聘用了更多人，比如里克·达尔泽尔，等等。

We brought in, hired some more Rick Dahlzel, all that.

他当时在沃尔玛，杰夫早在1997年1月IPO之前就开始试图招募他，但直到IPO之后才成功。

He he was actually at Walmart, and Jeff started trying to recruit him in January '97 before the IPO, didn't get him until after the IPO.

但我觉得杰夫对此也不抗拒，实际上主要是约翰一再强调，你们必须有一个更强大、更庞大的团队才能上市，我认为这对很多人来说都是很好的教训。

But the but so and I think Jeff wasn't reluctant on that either, but it was really John in a lot of ways saying, you've gotta have a stronger, bigger team to go public, and I think it's a good good lesson for for lots of people.

所以乔伊确实很特别，她也非常不同寻常。

So Joy was and she also really Joy was unusual.

她非常聪明。

She was very smart.

她甚至没有高中毕业。

She hadn't graduated from high school.

但她最终从哈佛商学院毕业了。

She ended up graduating from Harvard Business School.

她在全美会计考试中排名第二。

She came in second in the nation on the national accounting exam.

显然她很聪明，而且

So clearly she was smart and

真是个了不起的女性。

somehow amazing woman.

是的。

Yeah.

对。

Yeah.

在某种程度上，她之前曾担任过一家位于东海岸的小型上市公司的首席财务官。

And she all she had done in some ways, she had taken she had been CFO of a small company in the East Coast that had gone public.

我相信她加入亚马逊时还不到三十岁。

I believe she was in her early thirties when she joined Amazon.

非常年轻。

Very young.

而且你知道，杰夫是个非常严格的面试官，他会面试很多人，直到找到他喜欢并认为能胜任这份工作的人。

But, you know and Jeff was interviewed Jeff's a very tough interviewer in the sense that, you know, he he will interview a whole bunch of people until he finds somebody that he likes and thinks can do the job.

他常说要设定很高的标准。

He talks about setting the bar very high.

他和她共进了一顿很棒的午餐，对她印象深刻，她非常聪明，富有进取心又亲和力强，因此在很大程度上推动了这次IPO。

And he had a great lunch with her, he was impressed with her, and she's very smart, nicely aggressive, personable, and so she really drove the IPO in a lot of ways.

我喜欢说，我们创造了从IPO启动到完成的最快纪录，但我想她也参与了那封信的撰写。

And I like to say, you know, we set a record for start of the IPO to the finish, but she was also involved in that letter, I think.

哇。

Wow.

说到从IPO启动到完成的过程，在公司当时进行了大量公关和营销、杰夫也频繁出席公开活动的背景下，度过这段静默期对这家公司来说很难吗？

Speaking of the the IPO start to finish, was that hard for the company in an era where it had been doing so much PR and so much marketing and Jeff had been doing all these public appearances to endure that quiet period?

是的。

Yeah.

我觉得是的。

I think yeah.

我的意思是，当时公司确实开始获得大量关注。

I mean, it was an era when, yes, the company was starting to get a lot of lot of attention.

我不觉得静默期带来了多大影响。

And I don't know that the quiet period made a lot of difference.

当时我们确实因此受到一些批评，甚至今天也有人质疑我们披露的信息超出了证券法和纽约证券交易所（纳斯达克）所要求披露的范围——你知道，你只需披露所有必须披露的内容，但总有一个模糊地带：客户的成本究竟是多少？

We did get some criticism then and even today on how much we disclose beyond what the securities laws and New York's, you know, the NASDAQ requires that, you know, you disclose everything you have to, but there's always this sort of area of, well, what's the cost of a customer?

嗯。

Mhmm.

你有多少客户？图书业务的增长速度与视频业务相比如何？

And how many customers do you have, or how fast is books growing versus video?

亚马逊一直认为这些是专有信息。

And Amazon's always felt that that's proprietary.

他们不希望客户了解这些。

They don't wanna let their customers know.

他们也不希望人们关注那些在某种程度上属于短期、琐碎的细节，因为从长远来看，这些问题最终会迎刃而解。

They also don't want people focusing on what are in some ways short term small things, and it'll work out in the long term.

或许传统实体零售商们会公布月度销售额之类的数字吗？

I maybe bricks and mortar retailers, do they release monthly sales numbers or something?

你至少会看到，是的，

You at least see Yeah,

同店月度数据，是的，不过呢，

same store, month Yeah, over Well,

你知道，这正是一个例子。

you know, that's an example then of something.

因此，分析师总是希望获得更多信息，并觉得，你知道，这只会帮到我们的竞争对手。

And so there's always been a little bit of tension with the analysts wanting more and feeling, well, you know, it's only gonna help our competitors.

所以我认为那时就已经存在这种状况了。

So I think that was going on even then.

当时的感觉就像是，你凭什么不告诉我们这些事？

It was sort of like, oh, who are you to not tell us these things?

在思考从最早期阶段创建公司时，这很有趣。

Well, it's it's interesting in thinking about company creation from the earliest stages.

你总是过于关注获客成本这个数字，是的。

You're you get so focused on that cost to acquire a customer number Yeah.

并致力于降低它，同时提高客户的终身价值。

And making that go down and increasing your lifetime customer value.

在亚马逊作为上市公司的整个生命周期中，他们对发布这些信息非常谨慎。

In in Amazon's life as a public company, they're they're so reserved about releasing that information.

你在其他私营公司中有没有遇到过这种情况：有人觉得这是专有信息，不会在他们的融资演示文稿或任何类似材料中透露？

Have you ever experienced in other private companies someone who felt that that was proprietary and that was not something they would they would divulge in their their pitch decks or anything like that?

是的。

Yeah.

我不太清楚这个具体方面。

I don't know about that specific piece.

我的意思是，有时候也会提到另一个指标，比如我们一些已上市公司的积压订单。

I mean, do think because sometimes it also comes up well, another one for, you know, some of our companies that have gone public has been backlog.

积压订单的情况因公司而异，有些公司有，有些没有，但亚马逊在这方面不是问题，因为他们的销售几乎是即时完成的。

And backlog often if some companies have backlog and some don't in different ways, but and that wasn't really an issue with Amazon because it was sort of instantaneous sales from any any any day.

但很多公司不愿意披露这一点，因为这可能会产生误导，有时还会向竞争对手透露信息。

But a lot of companies don't wanna disclose it because it's misleading sometimes, and maybe it tells things Competitors, to yeah.

所以我认为很多公司都拒绝披露，而分析师们却非常希望获得这些数据。

And so I think a lot of companies refuse to do that, and analysts would love to have it.

这也关系到预测下一季度或下一年的范围。

And it also relates to predicting, you know, a range for next quarter or next year.

我们的一些公司会给你一个明年的大致预期，而有些则不会。

Some some of our companies will give you next year's kind of general expectation, and some won't.

是的。

I yeah.

我觉得这方面存在很大差异。

I think there's a lot of variation in that.

还有一个问题，我们现在已上市，稍后我们会用一些有趣的统计数据来总结上市故事。

So one more, we're now post IPO, and and, we'll we'll wrap up the IPO story in a minute with some fun stats.

但我想问你一件事，汤姆，那是上市几年后发生的事：1999年，也就是上市两年后，亚马逊发行了可转换债券，在债务市场筹集了12.5亿美元。

But but one topic that happened a couple years later that I wanna ask you about, Tom, is in 1999, so two years after the IPO, Amazon did a convertible debt offering, and raised a billion and a quarter dollars in in the debt markets.

我很想知道，这笔资金后来成了互联网泡沫时期公司获得的最后一笔资金。

I'm curious that, and then that ended up being, I believe, the last money into the company through the Internet bubble.

在当时获得如此大规模的资本，是如何帮助公司度过随后的崩盘的？你是提到股价曾跌回5美元，公司又是如何从中恢复的？

How getting that large capitalization at that point, how did that did that help survive help the company survive the crash that came thereafter, and how did it dig itself out of you know, you mentioned the stock price went back down to $5 at that point.

是的。

Yeah.

所以当时资金是可用的。

So it was part of the, you know, money was available.

我们正在快速增长。

We're growing rapidly.

让我们利用当时存在的利率条件。

Let's take advantage of the fact that and the interest rates were there

我认为是5%。

I believe it was at 5%.

我觉得是4.75%，或者差不多。

I think it was four and three quarters, I believe, or right around

现在的利率大概就是这样的水平。

today is sort of where maybe interest rates are.

但在二十年的历史背景下，那些利率确实是极低的。

But in, you know, given the twenty year history, that was those were low low interest rates.

我想我们最终完成了两到三笔债务交易，总额大约有20亿美元。

And I think we ended up we did two or three debt deals totaling a couple, maybe $2,000,000,000.

所以一方面，这确实为我们提供了增长的资金。

So on the one hand, it did give us money to grow.

你知道，有时候公司资金过多会导致不良习惯。

You know, sometimes for companies having a lot of money lead to bad habits.

比如，你可能会收购一些原本不会收购的、边缘的公司，或者过度扩张等等。

And just, you know, you acquire maybe some companies you wouldn't have acquired, you know, that are marginal, or you overbuild and so forth.

当经济衰退来临时，亚马逊的亏损越来越多，我认为我们对经济衰退或市场峰值的预测并不比别人更准。

And so Amazon was increasingly losing money when that recession hit, and I don't think we were any better predicting recessions than anybody else and or the peak of the market.

但这是利用资金可用这一机会的一部分。

But so but it was part of taking to taking advantage of the fact that the that money was available.

当经济衰退到来，我们亏损严重时，我记得这些债务中有一些条款在前几年是免息的，然后才开始计息，是的。

And then when the recession hit, and we're losing a lot of money, and some of the as I remember, some of those some of the terms of some of these debts had no interest for several years And then it kicked interest in, yep.

开始计息后，我们就面临更多的利息支付了。

Kicked in, and so we were facing, you know, more interest payments.

债务持有人的债务价值下降了，他们施加了很大压力。

The debt holders, the value of the debt had gone down, there was a lot of pressure from the debt holders.

所以实际上在2001年左右，杰夫和董事会认为我们必须削减成本和开支。

So really in 2001 or so, the decision Jeff and the board felt we we need to cut costs and expenses.

因此，我想我们在某种程度上刚好赶上了时间。

And so, you know, we I think we barely did it in time in some ways.

我们拖延了很久，希望情况能自行好转，但最终还是意识到必须采取行动，当时有很多华尔街人士在关注亚马逊。

We waited quite a while and we're hoping, you know, we kinda grow out of it, and at some point said, no, we really need to and there were lots of Wall Street people calling it Amazon.

破产。

Toast.

是的。

Yeah.

这些著名的。

These famous Famously.

你知道，如果你打算倒闭的话。

You know, if you're gonna go out of business.

所以我们削减了成本，当时流行一句话叫‘别搞那些没用的’，比如他们曾经销售袋装狗粮就是一个很好的例子。

And so we cut costs and there was this famous saying, cut the crap, which meant, you know, they were shipping bags of dog food was a great example.

你知道，一袋20磅的狗粮，运费却收3美元，亏了很多钱。

Know, 20 pound dog of bag food and charging, you know, $3 for shipping and losing a lot of money on it.

那我们就别卖了

Well, let's stop selling

这很惊人，因为现在我的狗粮就是从亚马逊买的。

Which is amazing because I now get my dog food for my dog from Amazon.

我们

Well, we

把这项业务停了

cut it out

我想亚马逊现在一定已经找到了盈利的方法。

for I a I assume Amazon has figured out how to do it profitably now.

但再说一次，这并不是盲目地一味加速前进。

But, again, it was you know, so it isn't blind all speed ahead.

确实，当你需要的时候，你就得削减开支。

It is, you know, when you need to, you you cut back.

是的。

Yeah.

有趣的是，债务持有人施加的压力迫使公司削减成本，这比其他公司不得不立即进入紧急成本削减模式要早，而大多数公司都没能挺过来。

It's it's interesting to think about, the fact that the, pressure from that debt holders forced cost cutting, which was ahead of the rest of companies who had to go to immediate emergency cost cutting mode, and most of them didn't make it.

你认为还有哪些因素帮助亚马逊度过了难关？

What other factors do you think played into Amazon's Amazon making it through.

对。

Yeah.

在如此多公司倒闭的情况下，能够幸存下来。

Surviving the the burst when so many other companies didn't.

有时候，看着这些情况，很容易觉得他们只是在执行一些疯狂的策略。

Well, you know, it's easy sometimes to look at these and think, you know, boy, they're just following crazy strategies.

但我不这么认为，即使在当时，亚马逊也不是这样。

But I don't think that's true at was true even then at Amazon.

我的意思是，他们仍然专注于客户，虽然订单不多，但杠杆率确实是个问题。

I mean, they they were still focused on customers and they weren't getting a lot of orders, and the leverage was a concern or a problem.

但基本的经济状况并不糟糕。

But underlying economics were not bad.

是的。

Yep.

所以我认为这帮助很大。

So I think that helped a lot.

而且有优秀的管理层坚持下来，并能集中精力

And having good management that stuck it out and was able to focus down

控制成本。

on on cost controls.

《一切皆可购》这本书里有很多关于亚马逊那些年的精彩故事，以及它们对文化的影响。

And there there are great stories in the Everything Store about about those years at Amazon and, the impact it had on the culture.

我的意思是，那些年后，杰夫是不是因为收购了太多公司却效果不佳，而暂停了并购？

I mean, it and I I think there was, after those years, did Jeff put a moratorium on m and a for because they'd acquired so many companies and it wasn't working?

是的。

Yeah.

不。

No.

亚马逊并不以在……上过度花费而闻名

And Amazon's, you know, not famous for overspending on on

这么说也行。

That's one way to put it.

是的。

Yeah.

我们之前在

We've talked about that on

这个节目里聊过这个。

this show.

我们不会问你关于这个的事。

We won't ask you about it.

好的，听众朋友们。

Okay, listeners.

现在是一个绝佳的机会，向大家介绍我们非常兴奋的新赞助商——WorkOS。

Now is a great time to tell you about a new friend of the show we are very excited about, WorkOS.

是的。

Yes.

WorkOS 是一个面向企业的平台，已被 OpenAI、Cursor、Perplexity、Vercel、Plaid 以及数百家其他成功公司采用。

WorkOS is the enterprise ready platform used by OpenAI, Cursor, Perplexity, Vercel, Plaid, and literally hundreds of other winning companies.

那么，这些公司都在用 WorkOS 做什么？

So what are all these companies using WorkOS for?

想象一下，你是一家快速增长的初创公司。

Imagine you're a fast growing startup.

你已经找到了产品与市场的契合点，并且收到了许多大型企业客户的主动咨询。

You've got product market fit, and you're getting inbound interest from big enterprise customers.

这非常令人兴奋。

Very exciting.

但接着他们发给你一份安全问卷。

But then they send you their security questionnaire.

是的。

Yep.

问卷长达47页，里面的要求听起来像一堆字母缩写。

And it's like 47 pages long with requirements that kinda sound like alphabet soup.

你们支持SAML 2.0吗？

Do you support SAML two dot o?

你们能集成我们的Okta吗？

Can you integrate with our Okta?

你们有SCIM配置吗？S-C-I-M。

Do you have SCIM provisioning, s c I m?

那RBAC呢？R-B-A-C？

What about RBAC, r b a c?

你心里想：这些缩写到底是什么意思？更别提怎么实现了。

And you're thinking, I have no idea what these acronyms even mean, let alone how to implement them.

所以事情是这样的。

So here's the thing.

这些不是锦上添花的功能。

These are not nice to haves.

这些是交易的阻拦因素。

These are deal blockers.

如果没有单点登录，没有SCIM，没有RBAC，没有审计日志，你根本不可能签下企业级订单，别无选择。

Without SSO, without SCIM, without RBAC, without audit logs, you simply cannot close enterprise deals, period.

但这些功能并没有让你们的核心产品变得更好。

But none of these features make your core product better.

它们不会让你们的啤酒更好喝，用我们在Acquired节目中最爱的比喻来说。

They don't make your beer taste better, to use our favorite analogy here on Acquired.

所以如果你在开发一个设计工具，花六个月时间实现SAML认证，并不会让你的设计工具更强大。

So if you're building like a design tool, spending six months building SAML authentication doesn't make your design tool more powerful.

这就是WorkOS的用武之地。

So this is where WorkOS comes in.

他们为企业的功能打造了 Stripe。

They've built Stripe for enterprise features.

WorkOS 将企业认证需求转化为即插即用的 API，尽可能抽象掉不必要的复杂性。

WorkOS turns enterprise authentication requirements into drop in APIs, abstracting away as much unnecessary complexity as possible.

因此，你的团队不必花几个月时间研读 SAML 规范，几分钟内就能实现企业级单点登录。

So instead of your team spending months reading SAML specs, you can implement enterprise SSO in minutes.

WorkOS 负责用户配置、权限管理、审计日志，所有企业 IT 部门要求的必备功能都由它处理。

WorkOS handles user provisioning, permissions, audit logs, all the checkbox items that enterprise IT requires.

无论你是正在争取首个企业客户的种子阶段公司，还是已经规模庞大并正在全球扩张，WorkOS 都是让你快速达到企业级标准的最快路径。

So whether you are a seed stage company trying to land your first enterprise customer or already big and expanding globally, WorkOS is the fastest path to becoming enterprise ready.

只需访问 workos.com 或直接在他们的 Slack 支持中留言。

Just visit workos.com or just message their Slack support.

他们那里有真正的工程师，会迅速回复你的问题。

They have real engineers in there who answer questions fast.

当你联系他们时，记得说 Ben 和 David 推荐了你。

And when you get in touch, just tell them Ben and David sent you.

所以总结一下，这是一个非凡的故事，而有汤姆加入我们分享这段经历，更是特别。

So to wrap up, this has been an incredible story, and, having Tom join us for it, has been special.

所以今天，我们身处2016年12月。

So today, we're sitting here in December 2016.

截至今天早上，亚马逊的市值为3630亿美元，虽然尚未达到IPO时4.38亿美元市值的千倍，但回报依然非常可观。

As of this morning, Amazon's market capitalization was $363,000,000,000, up not quite a thousand x from the IPO when it was $438,000,000 market cap, but a a pretty healthy return.

让我想想。

I was in, let's see.

亚马逊上市的时候，我还在上中学。

I was in middle school when Amazon IPO ed.

我真的非常希望当时能把我的积蓄投到亚马逊身上。

So I really I really wish I'd put my, you know, bank account into Amazon at that point in time.

我当时一直在购买亚马逊的产品，但不管怎样，这真是一段非凡的旅程，能重温这一历史时刻真是太棒了。

I was buying Amazon products, but, anyway, an incredible journey and, super cool to relive this this moment in history.

接下来我们聊聊，如果当时情况不同会怎样。

Let's move to talking about, what would have happened otherwise.

我们之前稍微聊到过这个话题，但如果当时亚马逊没有上市的话，现在的情况会变成什么样呢？

We touched on this a little bit, but but, you know, had Amazon not gone public at that moment, where where would we be?

另外我尤其好奇，在创业初期，有没有人提出过要收购亚马逊呢？

Had and I guess, in particular, I'm curious, was a path of being acquired by somebody in those early days, did it ever come up?

当时有没有投资方是认真表达过收购意向的？

Were people seriously interested?

就算当时真有人提过收购，从我们之前的交流，以及大家都知道的贝佐斯的创业使命来看，他大概率也不会愿意把公司卖给别人的。

And and even if not, like, it it sounds like, you know, from our conversation so far and just knowing the lore of of Jeff's mission that very unlikely that that he wanted to sell to someone.

对。

Yeah.

当时有没有考虑过再多筹集一些私募资金，或是再撑更长一段时间呢？

Was it ever on the table to, you know, raise more private capital or wait it out longer?

是的。

Yeah.

我觉得，其实我们本可以这么做，但公司的增长速度会变慢——因为如果没有资金支持，很多事都承担不起。尤其是后来我们开始拓展产品品类的时候，刚起步那会儿，我们收到读者的购书订单后，会先联系分销商让他们把书寄给我们，我们再重新寄给读者。

I think, I mean, I think we could've, it would've been slower growth because you couldn't have afforded, if you didn't have access to capital, and particularly when, you know, we began to broaden the product mix, when we started, we would get an order for a book and then we would contact the distributor and have them ship us the book, and then we'd reship it.

所以我们当时根本没有库存。

So we didn't even really have inventory.

一旦你开始采购产品、建造仓库来存放它们，就需要资金了。

And so once you start buying product, building warehouses to put it in, you do need capital.

因此，以不同方式获得资金对亚马逊来说非常重要。

And so obtaining capital in different ways has been, yeah, very important for Amazon.

所以我认为这会限制增长。

And so I think it would have constrained growth.

我的意思是，现在有很多公司都想尽可能长时间保持私有，但这取决于它们的商业模式。

I mean, know a lot of companies these days, they wanna stay private as long as they can, and it does depend on their business model.

如果你的商业模式不需要太多资金，那确实可行，但亚马逊的商业模式，尤其是随着规模扩大，确实需要大量资金。

If you've got a business model that doesn't require a lot of capital, then that's that's a viable thing, but Amazon's business model, particularly as it grew, did require capital.

有道理。

Makes sense.

是的。

Yeah.

我觉得亚马逊把所有选项都用尽了。

I feel like Amazon exhausted all the options.

是的。

Yeah.

相反，他们想要的是支付服务。

Instead, they want payments.

对。

Yeah.

你知道，我们曾举办过两次与融资相关的活动。

You know, we did two two kind of events relating to that financing and so forth.

第一次是IPO前与巴诺书店的著名会面，里吉奥兄弟来到西雅图，希望与亚马逊达成某种合作。

One, we had that famous meeting with Barnes and Noble back in pre IPO, where the Rigio brothers came to Seattle and wanted to do some kind of a joint deal with Amazon.

他们实际上并没有提出收购，而是说：‘你们可以为我们的网站和你们自己的网站分别开发，也可以我们共同运营。’

They weren't actually offering to acquire, but they said, well, you can you can you can build our website and your own, and you can we can both have websites, or we could do it jointly.

我们可以共同拥有它。

We could jointly own it.

杰夫，我认为他明智地决定不这么做。

And Jeff, I think rightly, decided he didn't wanna do that.

然后，在上市前一天或前三天，他们提起诉讼，因为我们使用了‘世界上最大的’这个短语

And then they filed a lawsuit the day before, or three days before the IPO, because we were using the phrase the world's biggest The

世界上最大的书店

world's biggest bookstore,

是的。

yeah.

我的意思是，所有这些对任何想要上市的人都有教训：你的竞争对手有时确实会试图阻挠。

I mean, there are lessons in all that for anybody who wanted to go public that your competitors sometimes do try to take it take it.

但事实上，无论是他们还是其他人，都没有真正对我们发起过冲击，部分原因是我认为许多传统公司一直觉得我们估值过高，这反而成了我们的优势。

But really neither they nor nor anyone else really made a run at us, and partly because I think a lot of traditional companies always thought we were overvalued, and so that was actually a benefit.

现在，为什么在2001年我们只值5美元的时候，没人尝试呢？那时候他们本该出手的。

Now why nobody tried it when we were $5, you know, in 2001, that's when, you know, they should have tried.

我不确定他们能否成功，但当时每个人都在同一时间变得悲观。

I'm not sure they would have succeeded, but people you know, the whole everybody becomes pessimistic at the same time.

所有人都在同一时间变得乐观

Everybody becomes optimistic at the same

有趣的是，你知道，亚马逊，如果今天有人想收购亚马逊，那简直令人震惊。

interesting that, you know, Amazon, obviously, it would be a shocker if anybody would buy Amazon today.

我严重怀疑这是否可能。

I I seriously doubt that's even possible.

但作为收购方，亚马逊似乎已经内化了这些教训。

But Amazon as an acquirer, it feels like has kinda internalized those lessons.

我想起2009年2月对Zappos的收购，或者对Quiddzi的收购，这两起案例在《一切皆可购》一书中都有详尽描述，几乎让人感觉杰夫和公司真正吸取了教训：当有优质企业瞄准大市场，却因某种原因不受青睐或处于经济衰退期时，正是出手收购的好时机。

And I think about the the Zappos acquisition during the February, 02/2009, or the or the Quiddzi acquisition, which both of which are written about extensively in The Everything Store, it it almost feels like Jeff and and the company taking that lesson to heart that when there are good businesses targeting large markets and for whatever reason are out of favor or in the midst of a recession, that's the time to to go shopping.

你并不总是有这种优势，但是

You don't always have that luxury, but

是的

Yeah.

如果能有这样的机会就好了。

It would be nice if you could.

我们继续谈一下科技主题吗？

Should we move on to tech themes?

好的。

Let's do it.

本，你来开头吧？

Ben, you wanna kick it off?

当然。

Sure.

在这个环节，我们会分析我们正在讨论的IPO或收购案，从真正的技术角度或投资技术角度，提炼出哪些科技趋势。

So, in this this part of the show is where we, we analyze, you know, specifically looking at the IPO or acquisition that we're talking about, what tech themes can we extrapolate either from a true technology perspective or sort of from an investment technology perspective.

这里有几个。

And there there's a few here.

我认为我们已经提到过的最重要的一点是飞轮效应。

I mean, think the biggest one that we've already touched on is the the flywheel.

当我想到亚马逊时，它简直就是构建全球最佳飞轮商业模式的典型例子，其中众多因素相互促进，共同推动业务发展。

When I think about Amazon, it's just like the the canonical colloquial example of how to build the world's best flywheel business, where so many things feed into so many other things and fuel the business.

但你知道，这并不是上市时的一部分。

But, you know, that wasn't really part of the IPO.

正如汤姆早前告诉我们的，那直到2001年才真正被正式确立。

As Tom told us earlier, that that didn't really get formalized until 2001.

所以，当我们思考从上市中学到的教训时，关键在于正确把握时机，在新一波浪潮兴起时创建公司。

So, you know, as we we think about lessons learned from the IPO, it's a lot about, you know, timing your timing company creation correctly around new waves.

是的。

Yeah.

我的意思是，互联网时代，你必须相信某件事将成为一股浪潮，并比其他人更具逆向思维。

I mean, Internet was you have to believe that something is gonna be a wave and be a little more contrarian than other people.

我认为，这一点从那些在最早阶段放弃投资的投资者身上得到了印证，他们觉得风险太高了。

I think that, you know, that's evidenced by the investors that passed in the the earliest stages, thinking that it was it was too risky.

但对我来说，最重要的是，你必须全心全意地相信自己正站在一场浪潮的边缘，如果不身处浪潮之中，就不可能打造出一家世界前十的企业。

But the the big thing for me is is, yeah, you you have to believe wholeheartedly that you're on the precipice of a wave, and it's not possible to create, you know, a a top 10 in the world biz business without being on

不可能不顺应浪潮。

Without being a wave.

对我来说，与此相反的一面在阅读亚马逊当时的历史时尤为突出，那就是杰夫以及公司和董事会即使在早期就具备的长远眼光。如果你相信自己发现了这样的浪潮，而它真如你所想的那样会变得如此庞大，那么这需要很长的时间，几十年。

And I think for me, the the flip side of that coin that that I think really shines through in in reading about and and reading this history of Amazon at that time is the the long term thinking that Jeff and and the company and the board had even in those early days, you know, you have to, if you believe you've identified a wave like that, if it truly will become as big as you think it will, it's going to take a long time, you know, decades.

你知道，杰夫很有名，我不确定是不是在那个时候他首次提出了这个说法，但在1997年的股东信中，他说互联网和亚马逊都还处于‘第一天’。

You know, Jeff is fam you know, in in I don't know if this was when he introduced the phrase, but in that shareholder letter in 1997 said, you know, it's day one for the Internet and for Amazon.

这种视角对很多人来说很罕见——很多人声称自己有这种眼光，但真正能这样行动并据此做出投资，确实令人印象深刻。

And that that perspective is is really rare to lots of people say they have it, but to actually behave that way and make investments accordingly is is quite impressive.

这种理念即使在今天，当你谈论亚马逊或其他公司的新项目或新举措时，也同样适用。

It also, you know, applies even today when when you talk about new projects or initiatives at Amazon or other companies.

我知道杰夫经常说，通常需要十年时间才能证明一件事。

And I know Jeff likes to say, it often takes ten years to prove it.

因此，在公司上市后，你必须继续创新，这一点同样重要。

And so you've got to make after you go public, it's equally important to one, continue to innovate.

不要因为觉得自己已经站在了山顶就停止创新。

Don't stop innovating just because you feel like you're at the top of the mountain.

如果你不持续创新，就无法生存；同时，还要保持长远的眼光。

You're not gonna survive if you don't keep innovating, and the other is maintain that long term thinking.

上市为你提供了这样做的机会，因为你那时有了资金来做这件事。

An IPO gives you the opportunity to do that because you then have the money to do it.

不过，你必须一定程度上忽略市场的动向。

You have to somewhat ignore what the market is doing, though.

我认为，上市后这一点同样重要。

That's another important part after you go public, I think.

是的。

Yeah.

你提到今天的亚马逊，作为外部观察者，这很有趣。

It's it's interesting you bring up Amazon today as a just an observation from the outside.

我认为我们可以从亚马逊观察到的一个趋势是，它在企业创新方面做得很好。

One trend that I think we can observe from Amazon is actually doing corporate innovation well.

我一直相信，每一家真正伟大的公司都蕴含着一项价值数十亿美元的创新，而这通常是它们的创始洞察。

I I've, like, long held this belief that every company has every, like, really great company has one multibillion dollar innovation in them, and it's usually their founding insight.

它们围绕这一核心建立业务，并竭尽全力发展其他附属业务，有些规模更大，有些则较小。

And they build that business, and they try desperately to to build other ancillary businesses around it, and some are bigger and some are smaller.

有时候你会遇到像微软这样拥有Office和Windows的公司。

Sometimes you you get a Microsoft that has an Office and a Windows in them.

但通常情况下是谷歌。

But usually Google.

对吧？

Right?

当然，谷歌内部也有不少出色的业务，但核心是搜索。

And, you know, not that there aren't great businesses within Google, but it's search.

你知道的。

You know?

是的。

Yeah.

我的意思是，谷歌90%的收入都来自展示广告。

Mean, it's it's 90% on Google display ads.

或者说是搜索广告。

That's the or or search ads.

这是大部分的收入。

That's most of the revenue.

因此，亚马逊令人惊叹的一点是其强大的实验文化、小团队运作和精益方式。

So the the thing that's amazing to observe in Amazon is an incredible DNA for experimentation and small teams and doing things in a lean way.

正如我们所观察到的，已经出现了一个业务，其规模与亚马逊最初的零售业务相当，那就是AWS。

And as we've observed, there's already been one business that's on the scale of Amazon's original retail business with AWS.

而且可能更大。

And it Or bigger perhaps.

是的。

Yeah.

是的。

Yeah.

继续观察这家公司，看看它还会带来什么，将会非常有趣。

And it it'll be fascinating to to continue to watch the company and see see what else.

我想快速问一下。

I wanted to ask quickly.

这显然发生在IPO故事之后很久，但关于AWS，我们的听众中可能也有一些人听本·汤普森和詹姆斯·奥利弗的播客《Exponent》。

It's it's, obviously, this happened much later than the IPO story, but, about AWS, the listeners, to our show might also listen to Ben Thompson and and, James Oliver's podcast exponent.

在他们最近的一期节目中，他们讨论了平台思维以及这种思维在亚马逊的重要性，以及微软在AWS作为真正平台的构想方面对亚马逊产生了多少影响。

And on one of their recent shows, they were talking about, platform mentality and the importance of that at Amazon and and, perhaps how much DNA came from Microsoft into Amazon in terms of thinking about AWS as as a true platform.

本和詹姆斯提出了一段比尔·盖茨的精彩言论：当一个平台上的其他参与者占据了行业绝大部分的经济价值，而你只获取一小部分时，这就是平台。

And and Ben and and and they showed you, they they posit that, this great Bill Gates quote, that a platform is when, other participants on top of you realize the vast majority of the economics in the industry, and you only collect a certain, you know, a small percentage.

你知道的？

You know?

这并不是像谷歌那样的高利润率业务。

It's not a it's not like a a high margin, you know, Google like business.

在亚马逊创建过程中，有多少这样的高层级思考发生过？

How much, you know, thinking, on that level happened at Amazon and during that creation?

嗯，我认为我们并没有刻意去模仿微软的模式。

Well, I don't I don't think we thought we were, yeah, kind of following an a Microsoft model.

不过，从一开始，亚马逊的每个人都意识到微软在云领域有可能成为最重要的竞争对手，而他们确实成为了。

Although, I think from the beginning, everybody in Amazon recognized that Microsoft had the potential on the cloud to be the most important competitor in that as they have become.

但某种程度上，平台过去被认为是静态的，你构建一个平台后，每隔几年才更新一次，或者发布新软件或设备，而互联网却是持续不断的迭代。

But the difference in a way was platforms were somewhat considered static in the sense that you built a platform, and then every couple years you revised it or you sent out new software or machines, and Internet was so much constant iteration.

所以我认为——虽然我从未从杰夫或其他人那里听过这种说法——但在我看来，AWS之所以能成功并取得领先地位并保持下去，部分原因在于它率先行动，而其他人却犹豫不前。

And so I think that I mean, I'm you know, I have never heard this from Jeff or others, but seems to me with AWS, the difference in a lot of ways, why it succeeded and been able to take this lead and keep it partly was being first when others held back.

但AWS的持续迭代，就像不断修改你的网站一样。

But the constant iteration of AWS, I mean, it's like it's like revising your Internet site.

你知道的，他们今年就推出了600个新功能之类的。

You know, they had 600 new features this year or something.

是的。

Well Yep.

在过去，平台并不会这样做。

In the old days, platforms didn't do that.

你推出Windows 8或10时，需要两三年的大量编码工作。

They you know, you came out with Windows eight or 10, but it was two or three years of massive coding.

所以我认为，就连这一点，世界也已经发生了巨大变化。

So I think the world even on that has changed a lot.

对。

Right.

这是个很好的观点。

That's a great point.

在我们转向趋势和主题之前，还有一个问题：在最近几年，当你观察那些向Madrona寻求投资的公司时，从亚马逊的巨大成功中，你学到了哪些模式，从而在其他公司中寻找类似的特征？

One other question before we move out of, trends and themes is, as you're looking at at companies that are pitching Madrona for investment in in recent history, what are things that you learned from Amazon being so successful that you sort of look for in other companies as a pattern matching based on Amazon?

你知道，不是每家公司都会上市，也不是每家公司都着眼于长期发展，但我确实更青睐那些拥有长期愿景、至少在初期就表示愿意坚持下去的创始人。

Well, you know, every company isn't gonna go public, and every company isn't in it probably for long term, but I really do prefer founders who have a long term vision and at least in the beginning, say they're gonna stick with it.

但我觉得这几乎是与生俱来的，只有在事情发生后才能看出来。有很多理由可以出售公司，比如市场没有如你预期那样发展，但你能获得一个不错的价格。

And I think it's almost genetic though, and you don't know it until it happens, and there are lots of reasons to sell your company, and your market didn't turn out quite what you thought, but you're gonna get a good price.

但我真正希望的是，如果一位创始人正乘着浪潮，或者有其他原因，他不要在本可以长期坚持的时候就选择套现退出。

But what I really, you know, hope is that a founder, if he's riding the wave, as you say, or has other reasons, doesn't sell out when he could be in it for the long term.

这在某种程度上是性格使然，我很幸运，杰夫一直着眼于长期发展，即使在那些他本可以出售公司的时候，他也没有兴趣。

And again, it's somewhat personality, and I think, you know, I was very fortunate that Jeff was in this for long term, and so even at moments when he could have gone out and sold the company, he wasn't interested.

他想打造一个长期的事业，当你思考许多伟大的公司时，它们的创始人都真正希望实现一些超越盈利的目标。

He wanted to build something for the long term, and when you think about a lot of the great companies, they've had founders who really wanted to accomplish something kind of beyond making the the profit.

我们要改变人们对于软件的看法。

We're gonna change how people think about software.

我们要改变人们的搜索方式。

We're gonna change how people do search.

所以我认为，这并不能保证公司成功，但如果他们能着眼于长远，持续思考并努力实现，那就更好了。

So I think, you know, that doesn't guarantee a successful company, but if only they can do Longer term, they're thinking about it and hopefully going to seek it.

不错。

Cool.

谢谢。

Thanks.

我们结束吧？

Should we wrap up?

是的。

Yeah.

你想打个分吗？

You wanna grade it?

是的。

Yeah.

我的意思是，从某种角度来看，这确实很艰难。

I mean, this is, in some ways, this is tough.

我在想《一切商店》的结尾部分，关于乔·科维和她写给布拉德的那封信——她写给布拉德·斯通的邮件，她是这本书的关键信源之一。

I'm I'm I'm thinking of the end the coda to The Everything Store, which is Joy Covey and the letter that she wrote to to Brad an email that she wrote to Brad Stone, and she was one of the key sources for the book.

在完成所有访谈之后，她回望自己在亚马逊的时光，以及讲述这个故事的经历。

After having done all the all the interviews and just reflecting back on her time at Amazon and then the experience of talking about the story.

她说，你知道，杰夫和公司从一开始就很清楚自己要去哪里。

And she said, you know, Jeff and the company kinda like he knew in the very beginning exactly where he was going.

而正如我们在节目中多次提到的，许多创业故事、IPO故事和并购故事都充满曲折与惊险，但如今听来，这家公司选择在那时上市似乎顺理成章。

And, you know, so many as we talk about on the show, so many startup stories and IPO stories and M and A stories are twists and turns and wild rides, and it feels inevitable that the company would have went public when it did, especially, you know, just hearing the story now.

这完全是理性的。

It was completely rational.

这很合理，因为它给了公司成长所需的规模、资本和知名度，使其能够超越竞争对手。

It made sense that it gave the company the scale and the capital and the visibility that it needed to grow, and outpace competitors.

所以某种程度上，我想我给它打个A。

So in some ways, I mean, I guess, I think I give it an a.

我确实给它打个A，但对我来说，这可能是我们这档节目迄今为止最不具争议、最缺乏启发性的决定。

I do give it an a, but, it's this might be, like, the least controversial or or thought provoking decision that we've had so far on this show for me.

是的。

Yeah.

这很有趣。

It's funny.

我刚刚也在想，这其实是一回事。

I was just thinking that's the same thing.

实际上，这里不需要太多分析。

There's there's actually not a lot of analysis that needs to go into it.

我的意思是，看看亚马逊今天的规模，甚至是IPO后不久的规模，他们要想取得这样的成就，唯一的方式就是上市。

I mean, you look at the the scale of Amazon today and even the scale in the years, shortly after the IPO, the only way that they could have achieved the outcome that they did was by going public.

我认为，我们在前面那段讨论‘否则会怎样’时遇到困难，原因之一就是，似乎根本没什么选择余地。

And I I think that, one reason why we had so much trouble in that earlier section of what would have happened otherwise is it just it just doesn't seem like there was a lot of choice.

很难想象这里会存在另一种历史。

It feels like unnatural to think about an alternative history here.

对。

Right.

作为一名从事早期初创公司工作的人，很多时候，我们都会面临一些非常模糊的问题，比如：

And I you know, as, as someone who works on early stage startups, a lot of the time, there there's all these, like, really vague questions around, okay.

我们认为自己在这个领域有了一个想法，边做边学，但到底应该做一个平台提供商，还是做一个建立在平台之上的业务呢？

We think we we have an idea in the space, and we're learning as we're going, and, you know, oh, should we be a platform provider, or should we be the, you know, business that sits on top of it?

还是应该把一切都整合在一起？

Or should should it all be combined?

或者我们应该在这个领域做横向业务还是纵向业务？

Or should, we be a horizontal or a vertical business in in this space?

即使在公司成立很久之后，你还是会反复权衡这两种路径。

And you even go back and forth long after you started the business, kinda playing both sides there.

但亚马逊似乎从一开始就没有对公司的长期愿景——至少是电商业务——产生过任何疑虑。

And it just doesn't seem like Amazon had any ambiguity over what the long term vision of of the company was, at least at least the retail business.

所以，汤姆，听了这些，你同意吗？还是你在笑我们，觉得从现在的视角来看，这话当然说得容易？

So so, Tom, you know, hearing that, do you agree, or are you laughing at us saying, like, oh, easy easy to say from this vantage point?

一方面，我认为我们当中没有人真正预见到亚马逊会变成什么样。

Well, on the one hand, I I don't think any of us really did understand what would Amazon could become.

但我觉得，杰夫和我们中的一些人当时都认为互联网将会变得非常重要，潜力巨大，没人知道这会把我们带向何方。

But I think the fact that Jeff and and several of us thought the Internet was gonna be a very big deal, and there was lots of potential, and who knew where this could take you?

我认为这在技术领域经常发生：你意识到某样东西将会变得非常庞大，但具体细节——比如今天AWS会从那时的发展中诞生——在当时是完全无法预测或想象的。

And I think that often happens with technology where you realize that something is gonna be very big, but you knowing the details, you know, that today AWS would have come out of that, there was no way to predict that or think about that in those days.

但当你回过头来看亚马逊拥有的资源和技术发展时，你会发现这一切非常契合。

But again, you know, it fits very well when you look back and say what the assets of Amazon were, but also what the technology development.

所以我认为乔伊说得对，从某种意义上说，这确实是不可避免的。

So I think Joy is right in the sense that it was in some ways inevitable.

我只是不确定我们当时是否意识到这种不可避免性有多强。

I'm just not sure we knew how inevitable it was.

但这需要非凡的创新投入，以及真正地招聘优秀的人才。

But it took, you know, fabulous commitment to innovation and really, you know, hiring good people.

所以，你不应忽视这种必然性。

So you should not neglect that for inevitability.

对。

Right.

是的。

Yeah.

好的。

Okay.

接下来，谈谈剥离业务。

With that, carve outs.

值得思考的是，我们有多少剥离业务会被亚马逊提供或以某种方式服务？

And it will be interesting to think, how many of our carve outs will be available on or in some way served to you by Amazon?

哦，我肯定。

Oh, I'm I'm sure.

亚马逊在物流领域 somewhere。

Amazon's in delivery there somewhere.

要么

Either

无论你的预留部分是什么，亚马逊都参与其中。

No matter what your carve out is, Amazon is involved in it.

回顾我们之前的预留部分，看看是否有任何部分既不是通过AWS提供，也无法配送给你，或者我们得选择一个根本不是实物的商品，这会很有趣。

That would be interesting to look back at our previous carve outs and figure out are there any that are not served to you either on AWS or be able to ship be shipped to you or we'd have to pick something that's basically not a physical good.

一种实物商品，来自某个非常顽固的零售商，他们只在自己的网站上销售。

A physical good that's on some very, very, stubborn retailer that that retails only on their own sites.

所以我不确定。

So I don't know.

我的意思是

I mean

一个不是托管在AWS上的网站？

Site that is not hosted on AWS?

是的。

Yeah.

或者网站使用了并非由其托管的技术，这几乎是不可能的。

Or uses technologies as part of the site that are not hosted by it would practically be impossible.

所以。

So

是的。

Yeah.

是的。

Yeah.

我想这就是为什么亚马逊正如我们几分钟前提到的那样值得称赞。

I I guess that's why Amazon deserves that a that we mentioned a few minutes ago.

所以，我的例外情况是一个叫《The Album Leaf》的乐队。

So, my carve out is a band called The Album Leaf.

我昨晚在西雅图actually去看了他们的演出。

I actually went to their show last night here in Seattle.

我一直是这个乐队的忠实粉丝。

I've been a long time fan of the band.