第三十四集：丹·莱维坦谈星巴克IPO

没错。

Exactly.

对。

Yep.

好了，各位听众。

Alright, listeners.

现在是一个绝佳的机会，来感谢我们节目的新朋友——Intapp。

Now is a great time to thank new friend of the show, Intapp.

你们可能最熟悉他们的产品DealCloud。

You are probably most familiar with their product, DealCloud.

是的。

Yeah.

DealCloud是私募资本和投资银行领域领先的交易管理与智能平台。

DealCloud is the premier deal management and intelligence platform for private capital and investment banking.

因此，如果你在一家私募股权公司，你的交易管道和客户关系管理系统很可能正在使用它。

So if you're at a PE firm, there's a pretty good chance your pipeline and CRM is running on it right now.

是的

Yep.

但Intapp的实际应用范围要广泛得多。

But Intapp is actually much broader.

它本质上是专业机构的运营系统，涵盖金融、法律、会计和咨询领域。

It's essentially the operating system for professional firms, financial, legal, accounting, and consulting.

Intapp支撑着这些机构的各项工作流程，包括业务开发、客户接待、合规管理和工时记录。

Intapp powers the workflows that run these firms, origination, business intake, compliance, and time capture.

他们上个月刚刚发布了一款非常有趣的产品，名为Celeste，这是他们的智能代理AI平台。

And they just announced a product last month that's super interesting, Celeste, their agentic AI platform.

我们花了一些时间体验了这款产品，立刻就明白了它的价值。

We spent some time getting a tour of the product, and we instantly got it.

它不仅仅是一个个人生产力工具。

It's not just an individual productivity tool.

它是面向全公司的AI系统，内置了工作流程、协作功能以及机构的知识历史。

It's firm wide AI for institutional knowledge with workflows, collaboration, and your firm's history just built right into it.

这大概就是为什么他们在Intapp那里称之为Firm AI的原因吧，大卫。

Which, that's probably, David, why they call it Firm AI over there at, Intapp.

是的。

Yes.

对。

Yes.

确实如此。

Indeed.

它不仅仅是一般用途的AI，那种会无差别吸收所有信息、对专业机构来说可能带来巨大风险的AI。

It isn't just general purpose AI that just ingests everything and can be a huge liability for professional firms.

你需要的是了解你的交易历史、保密要求，以及能原生尊重MNPI控制和利益冲突等事项的AI。

You need AI that knows your deal history and your confidentiality requirements and things like MNPI controls or conflicts of interest and respects all of it natively.

关于Celeste，有两点让我印象特别深刻。

So two big things stuck with me about Celeste.

第一，它的上下文引擎，这是一个语义层，能够映射贵机构专有的知识，使智能代理能够基于这些知识开展工作。

First, the context engine, which is a semantic layer that maps your firm's proprietary knowledge so agents can act on it.

如果你因为行业集中度风险而放弃了一笔交易，Celeste 是知道的。

If you, say, passed on a deal for sector concentration risk, Celeste knows.

而且这个决策并不只是锁在资深合伙人的脑子里。

And that decision isn't just locked in a senior partner's head.

它被大规模部署，因此体现在全公司的决策中。

It's deployed at scale, so it's reflected in decisions that are made firm wide.

第二，预置的流程模板，用于交易筛选、利益冲突审查、交叉销售等。

And second, prebuilt playbooks for things like deal screening, conflicts clearance, cross selling.

智能代理在内置治理与合规机制的前提下自主执行。

Agents execute autonomously with governance and compliance built right in.

对于这些专业机构而言，竞争优势在于其专有知识、人脉关系和交易历史，所有这些。

For these professional firms, the competitive advantage is proprietary knowledge, relationships and deal history, all of that.

这就是他们的护城河，而 Celeste 使其具备了可扩展性。

That is their moat, and Celeste makes that scalable.

它能连接 Snowflake、Microsoft Copilot 及其他生态系统合作伙伴，他们今年二月还宣布与 Anthropic 和 Harvey 达成合作。

It connects to Snowflake and Microsoft Copilot and other ecosystem partners, and they just announced partnerships in February with both Anthropic and Harvey.

所以，如果你在一家私募股权基金、律师事务所或任何专业服务公司，想要了解人工智能如何为整个公司创造价值，而不仅仅是个人，那就去查看 intapp.com/celeste。

So if you're at a PE fund or a law firm or any professional services firm and you're trying to figure out how does AI create value for the whole firm, not just individuals, go check out intapp.com/celeste.

那就是 intapp.com/celeste。

That's intapp.com/celeste.

或者点击节目说明中的链接，并告诉他们这是来自 Acquired 的本和大卫推荐的。

Or click the link in the show notes and just tell them that Ben and David from Acquired sent you.

今天很难想象，但正如我们在介绍历史和背景时提到的，如今星巴克已经成了一个动词。

It's hard to imagine today, but, know, as we talked about in sort of the intro to the history and facts, Starbucks today is a verb.

它也是一个名词。

It's a noun.

它遍布全球每个城市的每个角落。

It's on every corner in every city in the entire world.

但那时，就高盛而言，这还只是小打小闹。

But back then, this was small fry as far as Goldman was concerned.

对吧？

Right?

我的意思是，就连我们稍后会谈到的IPO，定价也是

I mean, even the IPO, which we'll get into in a sec, prices

IPO于1992年6月26日定价。

The IPO priced on 06/26/1992.

约为2.25亿美元的

At a roughly $225,000,000

市值，这比今天还要高，但当时公司还处于非常非常早期的阶段。

market cap, which was more than than it is today, but these were still very, very early days for the company.

哦，百分之百。

Oh, a 100%.

我的意思是，当时可能只有80家门店，但那时候企业的知名度要低得多。

I mean, there might have been 80 stores, but the visibility of companies was a lot less back then.

嗯。

Mhmm.

对。

Yep.

再说，那时候还没有互联网。

Again, you don't have the Internet.

你也没有专门报道商业的新闻来源。

You don't have dedicated news sources about business.

所以要发现这些公司更困难。

So it was harder to discover these companies.

比如像 retailroadshow.com 这样的网站，你可以去查看每一个视角、每一个 IPO 的视频——但那时候根本不存在这样的网站。

You know, something like retailroadshow.com where you can go and see every perspectives, every video of every IPO that didn't exist.

所以，星巴克的承销商，主要承销商是我们公司和亚历克斯·布朗公司。

So, you know, the underwriters on Starbucks, the lead underwriters were our firm and Alex Brown.

除非你在这些公司有账户，否则很难拿到招股说明书。

And unless you had accounts there, it was hard to get a prospectus.

因此，信息的获取渠道和今天完全不能比。

And so the access to information wasn't what it is today.

而这家公司上市的部分原因，坦白说，是为了登上一个更大的平台以提升知名度。

And part of the reason why the company went public, frankly, was the visibility of going to a bigger platform.

事实上，在IPO后的几个月里，如果我们不急于下结论的话，同店销售额显著增长，因为他们意识到一次成功的IPO会引发顾客的好奇心。

And in fact, in the months following the IPO, without getting ahead of ourselves, the comp store growth significantly increased because they realized a successful IPO would equate to curiosity amongst customers.

是的。

Yeah.

当然，上市的原因之一，虽然不总是最主要原因，是为了获得由此带来的知名度。

And, of course, one of the reasons to IPO, not always the greatest reason, but for the visibility hit that you get from it.

你知道，除了筹集资金和为股东提供流动性之外，你确实会在IPO前后几周或一个月内获得大量关注，就像我们现在看到的Snap那样。

You know, along with raising the capital and getting liquidity for your shareholders, you certainly get that buzz for, you know, a few weeks or a month around the IPO like we're seeing with Snap now.

丹，你认为星巴克的竞争护城河是什么？

Dan, what do you think the competitive moat around Starbucks is?

也就是说，它的防御优势在哪里？

Like, what is the defensibility?

为什么任何一家夫妻店都无法将他们击垮？

Why can't any mom and pop shop knock them out of business?

我认为自星巴克创立之初，就存在两个竞争护城河。

I think there are probably two competitive moats that have been around Starbucks since the beginning.

第一个是霍华德。

The first is Howard.

我会说杰夫·贝佐斯是一个竞争壁垒。

I would say Jeff Bezos is a competitive moat.

我会说史蒂夫·乔布斯是一个竞争壁垒。

I would say Steve Jobs is a competitive moat.

这些公司之所以能在起伏中生存下来，是因为这些创始人所展现出的韧性、毅力、决心和能力。

These companies are willed into existence through ups and downs because of the resilience, the grit, the determination, and the ability of these founders.

我认为这非常重要。

I think that's super important.

至于星巴克，我经常谈到星巴克与其员工之间的心理契约，以及这种心理契约如何体现在员工与顾客之间的心理契约中。

And then in terms of Starbucks specifically, I frequently talk about the psychological contract that Starbucks has with its employees and how the strength of that psychological contract manifests itself in the psychological contract between the employees and the customers.

因此，星巴克是一家极具零售和消费者导向的业务，拥有26,000个销售点。

And so Starbucks is an incredibly retail facing, consumer facing business with 26,000 points of distribution.

哇。

Wow.

即使你使用手机下单支付，你到场时依然能亲眼见到咖啡师。

And even if you're doing the mobile order and pay, you show up and physically see the barista.

我认为霍华德当然觉得产品更好，但如果你问一百个人，有些人可能会说好，有些人可能会说不好。

I think that certainly Howard thinks the product is much better, but I think if you talk to a 100 people, some might say yes, some might say no.

他们能够抵御竞争的真实差异，在于员工的投入，这使得星巴克在顾客心中超越了仅仅购买一杯咖啡的意义。

The real differentiation in how they have withstood the competition is because of the commitment of the people, which then made Starbucks become in customers' mind something bigger than just buying a cup of coffee.

本周的年度会议上，他们稍微谈到了如何利用他们的平台和规模做有益的事。

And in the annual meeting this week, they talked a little about using their platform and their scale for good.

他们实际上谈了很多这方面的事情。

They talked a lot about that actually.

这一直是霍华德长期坚持的一个主题。

And that's just been a theme that Howard has used for a long time.

稍后，我们将简要总结星巴克的历史与事实，特别是IPO，然后谈谈星巴克在此之后的发展。

In just a sec, we'll wrap up the history and facts with the IPO itself and then talk a little bit about Starbucks evolution after that.

但我觉得，回顾并阅读S-1文件时，这一点非常清晰，而且这也很有趣，因为这份文件是在互联网出现之前发布的。

But I think this is something that's super clear in going back and reading the S-one which also was super fun because it came out before the internet.

所以你得在网上好好搜一搜才能找到它。

So you have to do some rooting around online to find it.

我们会在节目笔记里附上链接。

We'll link to it in the show notes.

但丹，你提到霍华德、杰夫·贝佐斯和史蒂夫·乔布斯都是护城河。

But Dan you mentioned Howard, Jeff Bezos, Steve Jobs being Moats.

我认为他们共同的一点，从阅读S-1文件中特别明显，就是霍华德和公司对客户忠诚度的深刻理解。

I think something that's common to all of them and really comes out reading the S-one is how deeply Howard understood and the company understood customer loyalty.

你知道，这一点看似显而易见，但回想起星巴克刚起步时，或者霍华德刚开始经营Il Giornale的时候，人们去城市里买咖啡，无论是外带还是在店里喝，这想法以前根本没人想过。

You know, especially it seems obvious but for, you know, thinking back to when they started Starbucks or when Howard started Il Giornale, the idea that you would go and buy your coffee either to take away or drink at a store in a city, that was just something nobody had ever thought of.

那时候，咖啡都是在家自己煮的。

It was just you made it at home.

但创造这样一个地方和一种体验，让人们愿意一次又一次地回来，这才是业务能够运转的关键，也让他们有底气投入资金开店、投入营销，因为一旦你赢得了这个客户，他们就会一生反复光顾。

But creating this place and this experience where people are gonna come back again and again, that's what enables the business to work, enables them to invest money in opening the store, invest money in marketing because when you acquire that customer, they're gonna be coming back again and again and again for their lifetime.

是的。

Yep.

我记得在IPO时的研究显示，活跃的星巴克顾客平均每月光顾18次。

And I remember the research at the time of the IPO was that the average engaged Starbucks customer came 18 times a month.

对我来说确实如此。

It's accurate for me.

是的。

Yeah.

这相比今天的应用，比如Facebook，表现相当出色。

I mean, compares favorably with apps today with like Facebook.

没错。

Exactly.

但我想说的是，如果你有18次机会去超越顾客期望或搞砸，那么每一件事都至关重要。

But I think the other thing I would say is if you know you have 18 opportunities to exceed your customers' expectations or flub it, everything matters.

因此，你对细节的关注和每天都要赢得信任的态度就显得尤为重要。

And so your attention to detail and your earn it every day attitude becomes present.

在我们离开IPO话题之前，我想再讲一个趣闻。

I'd like to go back before we leave the IPO, just one anecdote.

在IPO的流程里，公司的管理层会走遍全国——如果IPO规模足够大，甚至会走遍全球——去向投资者做推介，这个流程放到今天都没怎么变过。

So in an IPO, and it's still remarkably similar today, the management of the company goes around the country and depending upon the size of the IPO, perhaps the world, and pitches to investors.

而这类推介会分两种形式。

And they do it in two formats.

一种是集体的早午餐会，另一种则是一对一会面。

One is group breakfasts and lunches, and the other is one on ones.

一对一会面都是面向那些顶尖的大投资机构，比如富达投资还有T...

And the one on ones are for the biggest investors, Fidelity, T.

普信集团、资本研究集团。

Rowe Price, Capital Research.

所以在星巴克的IPO阶段，短短两周内我们要完成61场固定认购路演。

And so in the Starbucks IPO, there were 61 on one schedules over a two week period.

其中在美国要进行八九天的路演，另外还要在伦敦、巴黎和日内瓦各花几天路演。

And it was eight or nine days in The United States and a few days in London, Paris and Geneva.

短时间内要开这么多会，这也太多了。

That is a lot of meetings in a short period

的时间。

of time.

61场一对一会议。

61 on ones.

所以，在我们刚开始时，霍华德就对我说过：你觉得这60场会议里，我能拿到多少订单？

And so Howard said to me before, right as we were starting, he said, how many of the 60 do you think I'm gonna get?

我说：你什么意思？

And I said, what do you mean?

他说：我们即将进行的60场一对一会议中，你认为有多少能转化为订单？

And he said, well, of the 60 meetings that we're gonna have one on one, how many do you think will convert to orders?

那时我大概已经参与过10次IPO了。

And at that time I had probably done 10 IPOs.

我说了大概80%到90%，他说：我会拿到全部60单。

And you know, I said 80 or 90% and he said, I'm gonna get 60.

我说

And I said

霍华德不是60%，而是100%，全部60个都会成交。

Howard Not 60%, 100% get all 60.

没错。

Exactly.

我说，霍华德，人们不投资的原因有很多，比如这次IPO太受欢迎，他们可能分不到足够多的股票来产生实质性影响。

And I said, you know, Howard, there's lots of reasons why people don't invest including the fact that the IPO is so popular that they might not get enough stock to be meaningful to them.

所以别把自己逼到必须100%成交的地步。

So don't hold yourself accountable to a 100% hit ratio.

他说，我就是要拿到100%。

And he said, I'm gonna get a 100%.

而且这次只募集2500万美元。

And this is only raising $25,000,000.

对吧？

Right?

不对。

No.

他们筹集了四千多万美元。

They raised 40 something million.

这次发行的一部分是secondary（二手股份）。

Part of the offering was a secondary.

我明白了。

I see.

这不是一次成功的发售。

Not a good sale.

不是。

No.

不是

Not a

一大笔钱。

good amount of money.

对吧？

Right?

就只是

There's just

流通的股份没那么多。

not that many shares go around.

确实如此，但那时候所有东西都更小。

Definitely true, but everything was smaller back then.

所以1992年时，4000万并不是一个特别小的IPO。

So 40 was not a necessarily small IPO in 1992.

我明白了。

I see.

但结果发现，他拿到了59个Oh。

But as it turns out, he got 59 of Oh.

我敢肯定，直到今天这件事仍让他痛心。

I'm sure it kills him to this day.

嗯，不，故事还有更精彩的。

Well, no, the story gets better.

有个叫米奇·施特劳斯的人，他在一家叫威斯·佩克·格里尔的公司工作。

There was a guy named Mickey Strauss and Mickey Strauss was at a firm called Weiss Peck and Greer.

一位了不起的人，愿他安息。

Wonderful man, may he rest in peace.

米奇决定不在威斯·佩克·格里尔公司购买股票。

And Mickey decided not to buy it at Weiss Peck and Greer.

在上市后的九个月内，星巴克的最大股东是谁？

Within nine months after the IPO, who was the largest shareholder of Starbucks?

威斯·佩克·格里尔公司。

Weiss Peck and Greer.

所以对在座的创业者来说，这个教训是：风水轮流转。

And the lesson for your entrepreneurs out there is what goes around can come around.

霍华德对米奇·施特劳斯在上市时没有买入感到非常沮丧，但后来米奇却成了公开市场上最大的买家。

And Howard was so frustrated that Mickey Strauss didn't buy on the IPO, but he then became in the public markets, the biggest buyer.

所以对风险投资家来说，教训是：如果你真的想投资一家公司，第一次应该拒绝他们，这样创业者反而会更想在第二次找你合作。

So the lesson for the venture capitalists is if you really wanna invest in a company, you should turn them down the first time because then the entrepreneur is gonna want to get you the second time.

没错。

That's right.

在A轮中赢得这个权利。

Earn that right in the a round.

是的。

Yeah.

这个故事太棒了。

That's such a great story.

所以我们走遍全球，终于到了定价的时候。

So we go around the world and it's finally time to price.

我记得这次发行被超额认购了八到十倍。

And the offering was oversubscribed eight or 10 times as I remember.

我们申报的股价区间是每股14到16美元。

And we had filed at 14 to $16 a share.

实际上，对这次IPO的兴趣是可用份额的十倍多？

There's literally like 10 times more interest in the IPO than there was room?

没错。

Correct.

哇。

Wow.

正常是多少？

What's normal?

嗯，在Snap和其他一些公司，情况要多得多。

Well, in Snap and some of these others, it's a lot more.

好的。

Okay.

你知道，在Zulily，我觉得我们有20倍的认购需求。

You know, at Zulily, I think we had 20 times interest.

因为最终的情况是，如果这些股票变得热门，每个人都会假装非常想要，但也许他们并不真正长期看好。

Because what ends up happening is if these things get hot, then everyone acts like they really want it, but maybe they don't really want it for the long term.

他们只是想快速套现。

They want it just for the flip.

因此，很难区分真实需求和炒作者的需求。

And so it's very hard to gauge real demand versus flipper demand.

但在定价方面，如果在我们提交文件到公司定价之间存在可比公司，那么这些可比公司的估值下降了30%。

But what ended up happening at the pricing was the comps went down 30% if there were comps between the time we filed and the time that the company priced.

顺便说一下，这和你不能保密提交文件的情况截然不同。

And by the way, that was so different than you couldn't file confidentially.

当我们提交文件时，所有人都看到了我们的申报材料。

When we filed, everyone saw our filing.

这情况非常糟糕，因为如果你无法完成IPO，大家就会知道你曾经提交过申请但最终失败了。

And it was super bad because if you couldn't complete an IPO, then everyone knew that you had filed and you couldn't get it done.

这造成了相当大的负面影响。

And that was quite a taint.

是的。

Yeah.

但在定价方面，这笔交易远远超额认购，资本市场团队建议我们将发行价定在区间高位，即每股16美元。

But in terms of the pricing, the deal is way oversubscribed, and the capital markets guys recommended that we price the deal at $16 a share, high end of the range.

霍华德说不行。

And Howard said, no.

我们必须定价在17美元。

We have to price it at 17.

两家公司的资本市场团队都建议我们定价在16美元。

And the capital markets guys from both firms recommend we price it at 16.

于是我们打了一通非常尴尬的电话，那些所谓的专家根本说不清为什么非得是16，但他们就是觉得应该是16。

And so we had this very awkward phone call where these wise guys who somehow couldn't really tell you why it was 16, but they felt that it was 16.

他们一直说必须是16，而霍华德一直坚持必须是17。

They kept saying it had to be 16 and Howard kept saying it had to be 17.

这对我来说是个艰难的处境，作为负责企业融资并代表客户的投资银行家，我某种程度上倾向于霍华德，但我自己公司的同事们却一直说16、16、16。

And it was a difficult spot for me because as the investment banker who's in corporate finance and kind of representing the client, I was kind of pulled toward Howard, yet the colleagues in my firm were saying sixteen, sixteen, 16.

霍华德始终坚持，最终我们把定价定在了17美元。

Howard relentlessly prevailed, and we priced the deal at 17.

最终，当天股价涨到了20.21美元，剩下的就是历史了。

And ultimately, the stock traded to $20.21 that day, and kind of the rest is history.

它上涨了183倍

It's gone up a 183 times

从那以后。

since then.

所以你们以17美元定价，当时的市值大约为2.25亿美元。

So you priced it at 17, which was roughly a $225,000,000 market cap.

而今天，星巴克的市值已达830亿美元。

And then today, Starbucks has a $83,000,000,000 market cap.

因此，自那以来，回报率约为18000%。

So that's about a 18000% return since then.

所以，IPO中的出售股东本应继续持有这些股票。

So the selling shareholders in the IPO probably should have held on to those shares.

是的。

Yeah.

但就像其他每一家早期公司一样，他们在上市时可能已经获得了五倍或十倍的回报。

But like every other early company, they might have had a five or a 10 x at the offering.

对于苹果、亚马逊、星巴克这些公司来说，卖出它们的股票最终证明是极其糟糕的决定。

And so for the apples, the Amazons, the Starbucks, those turn out to be incredibly bad sales.

但你必须有耐心和毅力，不能把自己当成交易员。

But you have to have patience and tenacity, and you can't be thinking of yourself as a trader.

是的。

Yeah.

丹，在我们继续之前，以16美元还是17美元定价对这家公司、购买这些股票的人以及投资银行分别意味着什么？

And, Dan, before we move on from this, what are the implications of pricing at 16 versus 17 both for the company, for the people buying those shares, for the investment bank?

为什么这是一个有争议的问题？

Why was that a contentious issue?

因为IPO的定价非常复杂，涉及多个利益相关方。

Well, the pricing of an IPO is a very complicated thing because you have multiple constituencies.

对公司来说，显然在17美元时他们筹集到了更多资金。

For the company, clearly, they did get more money at seventeen.

理论上，对于短期套利者来说，定价越高，他们赚得越少。

And in theory for the flippers, they would get less money the higher you price.

所以我认为，从一开始，投资银行家们就在寻找一个适度的涨幅，而不是一个极其巨大的涨幅。

And so I think from the very beginning, the investment bankers are trying to find what a nice bump is, but not an incredibly overwhelming bump.

因为这会让人感觉你把太多钱留在了桌上。

Because it feels like you've left too much money on the table.

然而，如果跌破发行价，就会变成一个负面新闻。

Yet, if it breaks the IPO price, then it becomes a negative story.

没错。

Right.

这就成了滞销品。

It's damaged goods.

Exactly.

Exactly.

我过去常劝诫上市公司首席执行官们：不要让自己或你的团队被股票当天的涨跌所评判。

And one of the things that I always used to counsel public company CEOs is don't let yourself or your people be judged by whether or not the stock today goes up or down.

你在打造一家公司，从长远来看，股价最终会与公司价值相匹配。

It's you're building a company, and in the long term, they will correlate.

但在短期内，它们常常会大幅偏离。

But in the short term, they can frequently widely diverge.

是的。

Yeah.

好了，各位听众。

Alright, listeners.

现在正是感谢我们在Acquired节目中的最爱公司之一——Sentry的好时机。

This is a great time to thank one of our favorite companies here at Acquired, Sentry.

拼写是 s-e-n-t-r-y，就像一个站岗的人。

That's s e n t r y, like someone standing guard.

对。

Yes.

Sentry 帮助开发者调试错误和延迟问题，几乎能解决任何软件问题，并在用户发火前修复它们。

Sentry helps developers debug errors and latency issues pretty much any software problem and fix them before users get mad.

正如它们官网所说，超过四百万名软件开发者都认为它不错。

As their homepage puts it, they are considered not bad by over 4,000,000 software developers.

今天，我们要聊聊Sentry如何与收购宇宙中的另一家公司Anthropic合作。

Today, are talking about the way Sentry works with another company in the acquired universe, Anthropic.

Anthropic过去曾使用一些较旧的基础设施监控工具，但在他们庞大的规模和复杂性下，他们转而采用Sentry来更快地解决问题。

Anthropic used to have some older infrastructure monitoring in place, But at their massive scale and complexity, they instead adopted Sentry to help them fix issues faster.

是的。

Yep.

在人工智能领域，崩溃可能是一个严重的问题。

Crashes can be a massive problem in AI.

如果你正在运行一个庞大的计算任务，比如训练模型，一旦某个节点失效，就可能影响成百上千台服务器。

If you're running a huge compute job like training a model and one node fails, it can affect hundreds or thousands of servers.

Sentry帮助他们检测到有故障的硬件，从而能在引发连锁问题前迅速将其剔除。

Sentry helped them detect bad hardware so they could quickly reject it before causing a cascading problem.

Sentry还让他们能够将排查大规模问题的时间从几天缩短到几小时，从而更快恢复训练任务。

Sentry also enabled them to debug massive issues in hours instead of days so they could get back to their training runs.

如今，Anthropic依赖Sentry来实时追踪异常、分配错误并分析其研究团队所使用的主要编程语言（包括Python、Rust和C++）中的故障。

And today, Anthropic relies on Sentry to track exceptions, assign errors, and analyze failures in real time across all of the primary languages used by Anthropic's research teams, including Python, Rust, and c plus plus.

根据Anthropic团队的说法，Sentry为我们的开发人员提供了一个统一的平台，其中包含解决任何问题所需的所有信息。

According to the Anthropic team, Sentry gives our developers one place that will have all the information they need to debug an issue.

说到AI，Sentry现在推出了一款名为SEER的AI调试器。

And speaking of AI, Sentry now has an AI debugger called SEER.

SEER是一个AI代理，能够整合Sentry和你的代码库中的所有问题上下文，不仅猜测问题，还能深入定位棘手问题的根本原因，并为你量身提供可直接合并的修复方案。

SEER is an AI agent that taps into all the issue context from Sentry and your code base to not just guess, but root cause gnarly issues and propose merge ready fixes specific to your application.

我们非常兴奋能与Sentry合作。

We're pumped to be working with Sentry.

他们拥有令人惊叹的客户名单，不仅包括Anthropic，还有Cursor、Vercel、Linear等公司。

They have an incredible customer list, including not only Anthropic, but Cursor, Vercel, Linear, and more.

如果你想快速修复代码问题，就像超过15万家使用Sentry的组织一样——从独立爱好者到全球最大的公司——你可以访问sentry.io/acquired了解详情。

If you wanna fix your broken code fast, like over a 150,000 other organizations that use Sentry from indie hobbyists to some of the biggest companies in the world, you can check out sentry.io/acquired.

网址是sentry.io/acquired，记得告诉他们是Ben和David推荐的。

That's sentry.io/acquired, and just tell them that Ben and David sent you.

好的。

Yes.

他们为所有《Acquired》的听众提供两个月的免费服务。

And they're offering two months free to all Acquired listeners.

是的。

Yes.

谢谢，Sentry。

Thank you, Sentry.

我想如果你们愿意尝试的话，来做一个单独的环节。

I wanna get into maybe a one off section if you guys are willing to experiment here.

我们在Snap的IPO中引入了一个新环节——叙事。

We introduced on the Snap IPO a new section narratives.

但我认为有一个环节不太合理，而且由于星巴克IPO发生得太久远，做相关研究会非常困难。

But one I think that doesn't make total sense and would be really hard to do the research given how long ago the Starbucks IPO happened.

我们今后要做的叙事环节，是探讨公司在IPO过程中试图传达的叙事，以及媒体和市场围绕它的叙事。

The narrative section that we're gonna do going forward is what the company's narrative is that they're trying to tell during the IPO process and what the narrative is in the press and the market around it.

但我认为对本节目听众来说特别有趣的是，过去十到十五年间，围绕星巴克已经形成了一种叙事。

But what I think is really interesting especially for listeners of this show is that there has been a narrative that's emerged over the last ten to fifteen years around Starbucks.

它是一家咖啡公司，一家零售公司，一家房地产公司，但也是一家科技公司。

And that's it's a coffee company, it's a retail company, it's a real estate company but it's also a technology company.

我认为，特别是对你来说，丹，作为一名科技风险投资家，而且只专注于消费科技领域的风险投资家，和霍华德共同创立了Maveron，霍华德的思维和公司的思维是如何从那个没有互联网的时代演变至今的呢？

And I think that's especially for you Dan being a technology venture capitalist and a consumer only technology venture capitalist and founding Maveron with Howard, how has Howard's thinking and the company's thinking evolved from those days when it was, there was no internet?

那时，你只能在街角看到星巴克；而今天，你可以通过手机或Alexa下单你常点的饮品，然后在大楼大堂取走，或者直接送到你手上。

You could only find out about Starbucks if you saw them on the street corner to the days today when, you know, you can request your usual mobile order, you know, on your phone or from Alexa and then pick it up in the building of your lobby or have it delivered to you.

是的。

Yeah.

变化真的很大。

It's changed a lot.

1998年我们创立Maveron时，我们完全没想到，科技正以前所未有的方式融入消费者的日常生活。

In 1998 when we started Maveron, whole thought was holy cow, technology is integrating into consumers' lives in unprecedented ways.

那么，它将如何改变这些公司的商业模式呢？

So how will it change the business models of these companies?

我认为在1998年，甚至在2008年，大多数零售企业都认为IT只是用来管理业务的工具，而不是吸引顾客的手段。

And I think in 1998, a company like Starbucks, or even in 2008, most companies in the retail business thought of themselves as using IT as a way to manage their business, but not really as a way to attract customers.

我认为在过去十年里，随着互联网和社交媒体的兴起，人们才意识到社交媒体能够为实体店带来大量客流。

And I would say in the last ten years, with the advent of the web and the power of social media, you saw the eye opening opportunity that social media can drive traffic into stores.

这是一些公司首次意识到的机遇。

And that was the first that a lot of companies had.

星巴克可能更先进一些，因为马弗伦和霍华德曾是eBay的董事会成员。

And Starbucks maybe was a little more advanced because with Maveron and Howard was on the board of eBay.

所以我认为，他虽然来自传统零售业，但比其他传统零售公司更早有意识地接触了科技。

So I think he came from that regular retail world, but he was exposed to, consciously exposed to technology perhaps before other traditional retail companies.

现在我觉得有点好笑，人们竟然把星巴克称为一家科技公司。

And I think now I find it kind of somewhat humorous that people refer to Starbucks as a technology company.

我认为它是一家极其强大的消费公司，正在利用科技融入顾客的日常生活。

I would say it's a incredibly powerful consumer company that's utilizing technology to integrate into customers' lives.

想想看

Well, think

不过很有趣，你说得对，它确实是一家消费公司。

it's interesting though, you're right, it is a consumer company.

但你知道，你提到了JCPenney，提到了西尔斯。

But you know, you mentioned JCPenney, you mentioned Sears.

这些长期以来都是它的同行，但都没有进化。

These were its peers for a long time that haven't evolved.

显然，你和他共同创立了Maveron，还担任eBay的董事会成员。

Obviously, cofounding Maveron with you, being on the eBay board.

霍华德曾一度担任Square的董事会成员。

Howard was for a while on the Square board.

我想问题是，在这个过程中，你认为有哪些关键时刻让星巴克逐步建立起这种能力，完成了向科技公司的转型，而一些同行却没有？

I guess the question is, what along the way do you think were some of those key moments when Starbucks built that capability and that part of that transformation into being a technology company when some

它的同行没有做到？

of its peers didn't?

当时有个人叫克里斯·布里佐，是星巴克第一位负责社交媒体的人。

Well, there was a guy named Chris Brizzo who was the first social media person at Starbucks.

他现在在艺电负责市场营销。

And he's now in marketing at EA.

但无论如何，克里斯在星巴克的时候有点超前了，他一直坚持认为社交媒体可以成为提升品牌认知和吸引客流的工具。

But anyhow, Chris was kind of before his time at Starbucks and just kept pounding on the opportunity that social media had to be an awareness vehicle and a traffic driver.

他没有多少预算，但却坚持不懈地推进这件事。

He didn't have much budget, but he kind of relentlessly kept on it.

我认为霍华德逐渐意识到，通过社交媒体，他们真的能把顾客引到门店里来。

And I think Howard started seeing that through social media, they could literally send people into the stores.

如果你想想零售业，每个投资者都非常关注的一个关键指标就是同店销售额。

And if you think about retail, one of the key metrics that every investor looks at is same store sales.

事实上，我很幸运认识一位名叫杰里·加拉格尔的人，愿他安息，他就是同店销售额概念的发明者。

And in fact, I was privileged enough to know a guy named Jerry Gallagher, may he rest in peace, who was the inventor of same store sales.

我曾邀请他加入我所在的Potbelly董事会，他答应了。

I asked him to join the Potbelly board with me, which he did.

但无论如何，同店销售额这个概念后来成为了这些零售公司估值的重要驱动因素。

But anyhow, the concept of same store sales became a valuation driver for these retail companies.

所以最初，如果技术和社交媒体能够带动客流和额外客流进店，那就值得投资。

So at the beginning, the first was if technology and social media could drive traffic and incremental traffic into the stores, then that was worth investing in.

但就在五年前，许多传统食品和其他零售商在投资技术方面仍面临巨大困难，因为他们看不到明确的回报。

But as recently as five years ago, many traditional food and other retailers really had a hard time investing in technology because they couldn't really see the return.

他们觉得上社交媒体很酷，但不愿意花钱。

They felt it was cool to be on social media, but they didn't wanna spend the money.

是的。

Yeah.

我认为这里可以延伸出一个很好的科技趋势：技术从IT支出中的成本中心，转变为收入驱动因素，成为产品组织的核心部分以及公司创新的推动力。

I think that's a good tech trend to extrapolate here is the shift from technology as a cost center in the IT spend to a revenue driver and, core part of the product organization and the driver of part of the innovation of the company.

我们来看看星巴克发生的一些事情。

And, I mean, we look at some of the things that have happened with Starbucks.

他们与多家科技公司合作进行了许多实验，引入了一些并非规模巨大的功能。

They've had a lot of experiments with other technology company partnerships and bringing things in that weren't huge.

比如2012年与Square的合作。

I mean, there was, like, that twenty twelve Square deal.

他们在2000年代中期就与苹果和iTunes有过早期合作，并共同进行广告推广。

They had that early partnership in the mid two thousands with Apple and iTunes and co advertising there.

而且他们至今仍然保留着‘每周歌曲’和‘每周应用’，并在店内提供免费下载卡。

And then they still have, I think, the song of the week and the app of the week with the free download card in the stores.

真正让我印象深刻的是，他们通过应用程序建立了极强的用户忠诚度。

And the thing that ended up really, like, working in my mind is they have incredible loyalty due to their app or manifested in their app.

他们是最早将礼品卡整合进应用程序的公司之一。

They were one of the first to pioneer putting those gift cards in the app.

现在，我几乎没在星巴克用过现金或信用卡购买任何东西，除了给我的卡片充值以赚取星星积分。

And now, I don't think I've actually used cash or a credit card at a Starbucks to buy anything other than reloading my cards so I can get my stars.

他们一直是在忠诚度计划方面以及利用技术强化忠诚度计划的先驱。

They've always been pioneers in loyalty and then using technology as a lever to strengthen the loyalty program.

在我看来，他们是在运用技术方面表现最出色的零售商，堪称全球之最。

In my mind, least, that's the thing that they've really exemplified the best in using technology of any retailer on Earth.

是的。

Yeah.

有趣的是，十二年前，Madron 和我们投资了一家做‘提前下单’的公司，但那家公司失败了。

It's funny that you say that because twelve years ago, Madron and us invested in a company that had order ahead and it went flop.

那是哪家公司？

What company was that?

我已经忘记它的名字了。

I've forgotten the name of it.

但我们确实因为投资一家允许通过手机下单的公司而亏损了1000万美元。

But we literally lost $10,000,000 investing in a business that had order off your cell phone.

当时，我们正在五到六家星巴克进行测试，但他们觉得这并不相关。

And at the time, we had a test going with five or six Starbucks and they didn't think it was relevant.

但理解这件事的复杂性在于，他们觉得这不相关，部分是因为智能手机的普及程度当时远不如现在，这很明显。

But the complication of understanding this stuff is they didn't think it was relevant partly because the smartphone proliferation wasn't as wide as it is now, obviously.

而且当时的功能也不够吸引人。

And the feature set wasn't as compelling as it was.

所以我认为，预存价值功能加上提前下单，形成了一套颇具吸引力的功能组合。

So I think the stored value component coupled with the order ahead became kind of a compelling feature set.

而现在，我认为星巴克在移动下单和支付方面提供的整套产品，正被各种其他餐饮和零售公司争相效仿。

And now I would argue that the suite of products that Starbucks has in mobile order and pay is being clamored for by all sorts of other restaurant and retail companies.

也许我们可以从这一点开始，正式将节目转向科技主题。

Maybe we can mark the official transition into tech themes on the show at this point.

我们某种程度上已经置身其中了，但我们在节目中多次讨论过，而我本人极度相信的是，技术必须服务于更卓越的客户体验。

We're sort of in it, but something that we've talked about a lot on this show and I'm just such a huge believer in in technology is it has to be in service of a superior customer experience.

仅仅为了技术而做技术，或者仅仅为了技术本身而做移动点单，是不会成功的。

And just doing tech or just doing mobile ordering for the technology aspects isn't gonna work.

我认为星巴克在过去几年中做得特别出色的一点，就是通过应用实现提前点单并绑定我的储值账户。

And this is what I think Starbucks has executed so well on in the last few years is doing order ahead in the app with my stored value.

这让体验变得更好，因为我能更快拿到咖啡。

It makes the experience better because I get my coffee faster.

但我仍然会和店员互动，我的名字依然写在咖啡杯上，这感觉很棒。

But I still interact with the people there and my name is still written on the coffee and it's wonderful.

我只是不用再排队了。

It's just I don't have to wait in line.

所以，这种做法更好，而不是为了做技术而强迫用户去应付一堆繁琐的技术流程。

And so it's better as opposed to forcing you to jump through technology hoops just for the sake of jumping through technology hoops.

是的

Yeah.

我在与科技公司合作时最有成效的经验，是那些拥有出色且引人入胜的产品，但又能站在零售商或消费公司立场、真正理解客户体验的公司，而不是仅仅以技术参数来推销产品，是的。

And where I've had the most luck working with technology companies is companies that have a great compelling product but can put themselves in the shoes of the retailer or the consumer company and try to understand what that customer experience is as opposed to just kind of selling it based upon Feeds and speeds, yeah.

没错。

Exactly.

我们毫无进展的情况，是科技公司认为这些零售商根本不懂行。

Where we've had no luck is where tech companies think that, well, you know, these retailers just don't get it.

他们不理解这个大方向。

They don't understand the big idea.

关键在于，要打造前沿技术，同时让这些技术能够被负责维系客户关系的公司所接受、适用并真正拥抱。

And it's that alchemy of building cutting edge technology that then can be adopted, relevant and embraced by these companies who are responsible for nurturing the relationships with their customers.

说得好。

Great point.

在我们全面深入探讨科技主题之前，值得暂停一下，想想如果没有这些会怎样。

Well, before we go whole hog into tech themes here, it's worth stopping for a moment in our what would have happened otherwise section.

我们之前讨论过，在首次公开募股之前的二级市场阶段，他们筹集了2500万美元。

And we've talked about in at least before the secondary in that initial IPO, they raised $25,000,000.

星巴克有没有考虑过像如今很多公司那样，在私募市场上融资呢？

Did Starbucks ever consider doing that on the private markets like we see a lot of today?

我的意思是，显然他们需要资金注入，才能持续以那样的速度开设新店。

I mean, obviously, they needed a capital infusion to continue opening the stores at the rate that they were doing that.

但我想有两种可能性：如果他们增长得更慢一些呢？

But I guess the two possibilities are, what if they grew more slowly?

星巴克今天还会是现在的样子吗？

Would Starbucks be the way it is today?

其次，他们有没有可能用其他方式筹集到这笔资金？

And then two, could they have raised that money in a different way?

如果他们增长得更慢一些呢？

What if they had grown more slowly?

他们可能就不会拥有如今这样的市场主导地位了。

They probably wouldn't have the domination that they have.

与亚马逊不同，星巴克是一城一城地赢得市场。

Unlike a Amazon, Starbucks kind of won market by market.

因此，在他们看来，快速进入市场并最终建立起足以掌控一个市场的资源至关重要。

And so it was super important for them in their mind to get to markets quickly and eventually build the resources where they could go into a market and kind of own it.

他们通过多种不同的方式实现了这一点。

And they did that in a number of different ways.

我记得自己有幸与星巴克合作时，收购了波士顿一家名为The Coffee Connection的公司。

I remember when I was privileged enough to work with Starbucks and buying a company called The Coffee Connection in Boston.

那是一家由乔治·霍威尔资助的风险企业。

And it was a venture funded company by a guy named George Howell.

我当时得到了一群风投的支持。

I was funded by a bunch of VCs.

我们明确告诉他们：我们要进军波士顿了。

We basically told them, you know, we're coming to Boston.

我们要么彻底碾压你们，要么你们就卖给我们——结果他们选择了后者。

We're gonna either steamroll you down or you could sell to us and they did.

在伦敦，Mod Pizza的斯科特·斯文森将他称为‘西雅图咖啡公司’的业务出售给了星巴克，这为星巴克在这些门店的布局奠定了基础。

And same thing in London where Scott Svensson from Mod Pizza sold what he called the Seattle Coffee Company to Starbucks which served as the footprint for Starbucks in those stores.

所以，追求增长、增长、再增长已经融入了霍华德的基因。

So it's in Howard's DNA that growth, growth, growth.

我认为这部分原因是为了回馈员工，创造更多机会。

And I think part of that is to give back to the partners and create opportunities.

所以我认为在早期，他几乎没有放缓的可能。

So I don't think in the early days, there was much of a chance that he was gonna slow down.

但你刚才提的是个两部分的问题。

But you had asked it as a two part question.

抱歉。

I'm sorry.

我忘了第二部分是什么。

I lost the second part.

另一部分是关于在私募市场融资。

The other part being raised in the private markets.

我觉得你们的听众里，很少有人能真正理解过去25年间资本市场发生的巨变和出现的种种变迁有多么深远。

I don't think many of your listeners can comprehend the vastness of what's happened and the changes in the capital markets over the past twenty five years.

对。

Yeah.

那时候根本没有——别说晚期投资了，甚至所谓的，呃，哪怕是对冲基金本身可能都没多少，更别提会有对冲基金去投资私营企业了，完全没有这种情况。

There were no, not even late stage, quote unquote, but there were especially no well, there probably weren't even very many hedge funds, period, but there certainly weren't any of them that were investing in private companies.

没错。

Right.

当时确实有几只跨界基金，但从事这类投资的资金规模很小。

There were a few crossover funds, but the amount of capital doing that was small.

所以星巴克在1991年12月完成了2000万美元的融资，那在当时已经是一笔大额融资了。

And so Starbucks did a $20,000,000 raise in December '91, and that was a big raise.

他们还聘请了帝杰证券（DLJ）作为这笔融资的承销商。

And they used DLJ as an agent for it.

如今你能看到有至少180家市值超千亿美元的私营企业，这个数字比1992年的时候多了足足178家。

So the fact that you have a 180 multi billion dollar or more private companies today, that's probably 178 more than there were in 1992.

所以，那时的私营公司根本无法像今天这样获得资本，就是这样。

So they didn't have access to the capital that private companies have today, period.

就此打住。

Full stop.

说得好。

There you go.

这正好引出了我们深入探讨科技主题的话题。

Well, that's a great lead into going hard in tech themes here.

很难想象，在那个年代，无论是公司、投资银行家还是风险投资人，都面临着信息匮乏和选择极其有限的状况。

It's shocking to think that the lack of information and the significantly fewer options available to anyone, to companies, to investment bankers, to venture capitalists in those days.

由于互联网的发展，我们看到了截然不同的公司形态和市场动态。

And we see very different companies and very different market dynamics falling out because of, well, the Internet.

是的。

Yep.

你知道吗，我觉得在咖啡行业里，有个叫‘浪潮’的概念特别有意思。

You know, I think it's so cool that in the coffee industry, there's this concept of waves.

对吧？

Right?

人人都在谈论第三波咖啡。

Everybody talks about third wave coffee.

对于那些不太了解咖啡文化的听众来说，第一波咖啡就是我们开头提到的福格斯和麦斯威尔咖啡，也就是在家自己冲泡的那种。

And for listeners that aren't steeped quote unquote in coffee culture, the first wave of coffee was the Folgers and the Maxwell House that we talked about in the beginning of the show, the making your coffee at home, you know.

我可能和我们许多听众不一样，我年纪够大了，或许有点自曝年龄了。

I perhaps unlike many of our listeners, I'm old enough perhaps dating myself a little bit.

我记得小时候，我父母早上会开着电视，听着广告歌，比如‘福格斯让你的早晨最美好’和‘麦斯威尔，滴滴香浓，意犹未尽’。

And I, you know, remember growing up my parents having the TV on in the morning and hearing the jingles, like the best part of waking up as folders in your cup and good to the last drop Maxwell House.

那从来都不是真的。

It was never true.

那从来都不是真的。

It was never true.

但后来星巴克出现了，这就是第二波，这是咖啡行业首次出现一种非传统的商业模式，即把咖啡当作一种体验，而不仅仅是一种饮品。

But then Starbucks, that was the second wave and that was the first time that this sort of orthogonal business model had emerged in coffee which was this idea of coffee as an experience not just as a beverage.

星巴克显然抓住了这股巨大浪潮，规模远远超过了福格斯和麦克斯韦豪斯。

And Starbucks obviously rode that huge wave into becoming orders of magnitude bigger than Folders and Maxwell House ever were.

而今天，你看到的是第三波咖啡浪潮，即去中心化的、手工冲泡、小批量烘焙和本地咖啡店的兴起。

And then today you have the third wave coffee which is the sort of disaggregated, you know, the artisanal brew, small batch roasting and brewing local coffee shops.

但我认为，这一切与科技行业和互联网有着绝佳的类比。

But I think there's this great analogy between all of that to the tech industry and the Internet.

第一波是美国在线（AOL）。

The first wave being AOL.

对吧？

Right?

每个人都记得那个广告曲。

Everybody remembers the jingle.

它远没有宣传得那么好。

It wasn't nearly as good as it was supposed to be.

第二波则是真正令人信服的AOL版本，即Facebook和社交媒体。

And the second wave being the truly compelling version of AOL, Facebook and social.

我们之前也谈到了社交媒体。

And then we talked about social media earlier.

我觉得星巴克是社交场所，Facebook也是社交场所，关键在于，一旦你将人际互动引入市场，就能彻底改变它。

And I think of Starbucks being the social place, Facebook being the social place, the insight being that once you bring human interaction into a market, you can completely transform it.

而今天第三波趋势是Facebook上所有事物的进一步细分，当然Facebook在其中扮演了重要角色，比如Messenger、WhatsApp、Snapchat和Instagram（用于拍照），但本质上是通过技术、数据，同时也通过人类，将每个最佳元素匹配起来，为你个性化定制符合你行为的内容。

And then you have the third wave today of the further disaggregation of everything happening on Facebook that, of course, Facebook is a big part of with the messengers and WhatsApp and Snapchat and Instagram taking the photos, but basically creating through tech, through data, but also through humans, you know, matching the best of each individual element for you personalizing it to what you're doing.

所以你会不会把第一波总结为‘一刀切’但质量差？

So would you summarize that as first wave being one size fits all but bad?

对。

Yep.

第二波是‘一刀切’但质量好。

Second wave is being one size fits all but good.

和你的朋友一起。

With your friends.

和你的朋友一起。

With your friends.

是的

Yeah.

而第三波则是不再是一刀切。

And then the third wave being not one size fits all.

真正地分解为小群体、小批量、高度精准、高度个性化的体验。

Truly this broken up small group, small batch, highly targeted, highly personalized experiences.

这简直就是我咖啡因上瘾后的梦境总结。

That would be a summary of my coffee drug induced fever dream.

我想我要说的是，我们一直在Maveron花很多时间思考语音以及语音如何促进冲动消费。

Well, I guess where I would go is we've been spending a lot of time at Maveron thinking about voice and how voice facilitates impulse.

如果你退一步看，第一代是1995年、1996年的亚马逊，那时你必须主动去操作，而且很麻烦。

And I think if you step back, version one was Amazon in 'ninety five, 'ninety six, where you had to intentionally go and it was hard.

在很多方面，数字订购体验已经变得更好了。

And in many ways, the digital ordering experience has gotten better.

它变得更加移动化。

It's become more mobile.

但移动设备只是迈向冲动消费的一步。

But mobile is only one step toward impulse.

我们很幸运从Zulily的早期阶段就参与其中，它是一种另类的冲动消费体验，某种程度上是QVC与传统电子商务的交汇点。

And we were fortunate enough to be involved from the very beginning at Zulily, which was another kind of impulse experience, somewhat of an intersection between QVC and traditional e commerce.

以及互联网。

And the internet.

我认为语音是下一个前沿。

I think voice is the next frontier.

其中一部分显然是人工智能。

Part of that is obviously artificial intelligence.

但本周在星巴克的年会上，他们预览了这样一个场景：你进入你的福特汽车，从车内下单点一杯拿铁，然后在上班途中取走。

But at the Starbucks annual meeting this week, they previewed you get into your Ford car and you order your latte from there and you pick it up on the way to work.

哦，太棒了。

Oh, awesome.

因此，我认为你会看到语音入口在电子商务场景中被广泛应用，这将改变我们的购物方式和购物体验。

And so I think you're gonna see voice on ramps adopted within e commerce situations that are gonna change the way and how we buy.

这似乎是一个令人兴奋的时机去做这件事，但你必须以一种强化品牌和购物体验的方式来做。

And seems like such an exciting time to do that, but you have to do it in a way that reinforces kind of the brand and the buying experience.

丹，我觉得这非常有洞察力。

Dan, I think that's super insightful.

我觉得完全正确。

I think that's totally right.

而且我觉得，你知道，我手机上安装了星巴克应用。

And I think that, you know, I have the Starbucks app on my phone.

我走到收银台时就会打开它。

I pull it out when I get to the register.

但在西雅图这种寒冷的天气里，当我的手冻得发冷时，我常常觉得不值得掏出手机来输入订单。

I often don't think it's worth it to pull my phone out when my hands are cold in this Seattle weather and punch in

下单。

the order.

但

But

如果能实现的话，我知道这问题是苹果那边的，不是星巴克的问题。

if there were and I know this is a problem on Apple's side, not Starbucks side.

但假如我能掏出Siri，说一句：‘三分钟，杏仁奶拿铁，麦迪逊街第三家星巴克。’

But if I could pull out Siri and say, three minutes almond milk latte, Starbucks third in Madison.

然后它就直接准备好了。

And it was just there.

我认为，这才是你突破诡异谷效应、真正无缝融入日常生活的方式。

I think that's when you break out of that uncanny valley and it actually slots right into your life in a convenient way.

是的。

Yeah.

所有功能都必须服务于创造卓越的客户体验。

Everything has to be in service of creating a superior customer experience.

而卓越客户体验的一部分，就是在天冷的时候，不必掏出手机、冻着手去点击按钮。

And part of a superior customer experience is not taking your phone out and your hand and pushing the button when it's gold out.

好的。

Alright.

接下来评价一下IPO。

On to grading the IPO.

我们这样做的方式是，正如我们一开始评估收购时那样，我们会根据收购方收购被收购方是否是一个好主意来打分。

So the way that we do this, and Dan's smiling, guests can participate or not, but would love to get your commentary, is as we started with acquisitions, we would grade based on was that a good idea for the acquirer to acquire the acquiree.

这对他们来说是一个巨大的资金黑洞，还是他们真的实现了1+1=3的效果？

Was that a gigantic money pit for them, or did they actually manage to turn that into a one plus one equals three?

当我们转向IPO时，我们的思考方式是：这一事件让该公司在之前提到的三个支柱上实现了什么——即提升公司的知名度和品牌、为早期投资者提供流动性，以及最重要的是，他们如何利用这笔资本注入？

And then as we shifted over to IPOs, the way that we think about it is, what did that event enable that company to do on all three of the pillars that I mentioned earlier of notoriety and brand for the company, giving liquidity to those early investors, and primarily, what did they do with that capital infusion?

在深入讨论之前，值得稍微回顾一下，丹，你之前提出了一个很好的观点，那就是这家公司的DNA以及霍华德的基因都是增长。

And before diving into it, it's worth recapping a little bit though, you know, Dan, you made that great point that the DNA of the company and of Howard was growth.

他们需要开设更多的门店。

And they needed to open more stores.

他们需要进入更多的市场。

They needed to go into more markets.

而一直萦绕在我脑海中的问题是：他们当时所处的环境是否竞争激烈？

And the question that's been hanging in the back of my head is, were they in a highly competitive landscape?

比如，他们是否需要匆忙进入市场，赶在其他模仿者之前抢占先机？因为当时正有其他公司开始兴起咖啡连锁店，并且已经积累了一定的品牌忠诚度。

Like, did they need to rush into markets and beat out competitors because there were other copycats coming in and starting these coffee chains that were getting brand loyal?

还是说，他们其实可以更从容一些，慢慢来，把利润再投资回去？

Or could they have afforded to buy their time a little bit more and just reinvest their profits?

星巴克上市时，即使在当时，一旦某个行业有了成功的IPO，就会吸引大量模仿者。

The Starbucks IPO, even back then, when you had a successful IPO in a particular sector, it drew a lot of copycatters.

他们在1992年6月上市。

So they went public in June '92.

到了2002年，已经有几家公司开始整合现有的咖啡连锁品牌，比如Gloria Jeans，还有其他一些我记不清的名字了，但其中很多后来都消失了。

By the '2, there was a couple of companies that were rolling up different existing coffee chains, Gloria, Jeans, and I forget the other ones, but many of them have gone by the wayside.

但他们当时只是在试图拼凑一些东西。

But they were trying to put masks together.

他们没意识到的是，他们根本没专注于执行。

And what they didn't realize is that they really weren't focused on execution.

他们关注的是如何打造一个能上市的项目，而不是每天超越顾客的期望。

They were focused on creating something that was IPO able but not exceeding customers' expectations every day.

但我觉得星巴克今天能有这个地位，部分原因在于霍华德缺乏耐心，总是渴望扩张。

But I would think that part of the reason Starbucks is where it is today is that Howard was impatient and always wanted to grow.

因此，他比原本可能的速度更快地进入了市场。

And as a result of that, he got to markets quicker than he might otherwise.

你提到了Pete's。

And you talked about Pete's.

我没看过星巴克在旧金山的数据。

I haven't seen the numbers for Starbucks San Francisco.

但我会说，无论是Blue Bottle还是Pete's

But I would say that whether or not it's Blue Bottle or Pete's

或者是Phil's。

Or Phil's.

或者是Phil's。

Or Phil's.

正因为它们没有像在西雅图或洛杉矶那样占据主导地位，才让这些小型竞争者得以兴起。

The fact that they didn't have the dominant position the way they have it in Seattle or LA enabled these smaller competitors to pop up.

你知道吗，我记得我第一次投资星巴克是在1991年12月的那一轮。

You know, I remember making my first investment in Starbucks was in that December 1991 round.

你看到消费者在每个市场都表现出极大的热情。

And you saw this cauldron of consumer passion in a market by market basis.

你真的会问自己，东海岸有什么不同吗？

And you really asked yourself, is the East Coast any different?

亚特兰大有什么不同吗？

Is Atlanta any different?

是的。

Yep.

如果你得出结论，没有不同，那就没问题。

And if you came to the conclusion, no, then it's okay.

那么你多快能到达那里？

So how quickly can you get there?

你提到，以前一家公司上市时，会引来模仿者，这让我想起布拉德·斯通在我们关于优步和滴滴合并的那期节目中说过的话：特别是在中国，但全世界各地都有人一直在阅读TechCrunch。

You mentioned when a company would IPO back in those days, you know, it would attract copycats, and it reminded me of something Brad Stone said on our episode about the Uber and Didi merger that there are folks in China especially, but all over the world that are just reading TechCrunch.

当公司进行首轮风险融资时，它们其实是在复制自己。

And as companies raise their first round of venture funding, they're copying themselves.

真有趣，这种加速竟然如此迅速。

So funny how the acceleration has happened.

你知道，我认为IPO以及星巴克和霍华德的经验中一个主导主题就是，正如你刚才说的，丹，要在每一个机会中超越客户的期望。

You know, I think one of the dominant themes of the IPO and lessons from it and from Starbucks and Howard is that focus like you just said, Dan, on exceeding your customers' expectations at every opportunity.

你知道，我只是看看如今哪些公司做得好，哪些做得不好。

You know, and I just look at companies today that are doing that well versus ones who aren't.

再想想优步与滴滴的那期节目，甚至自那期节目以来，这家公司暴露出的种种问题。

And again, thinking back to the Uber Diddy episode and even since that episode, all the challenges that have come out about that company.

我不是想落井下石，优步确实做了许多了不起的事情。

And not to pile on, Uber has done many many amazing things.

但很明显，它的企业文化已经暴露出来——那里并不以取悦客户、超越客户期望为核心。

But man, it just has really come out in the culture that, like, the culture there is not about delighting your customer and exceeding their expectations.

我只是想到我们在那期节目中看到的中国市场的激烈竞争，以及这种竞争如今正在全球上演，而星巴克却能避免陷入这种厮杀，即使模仿者层出不穷，它依然快速扩张，同时始终坚持一个核心使命：始终超越客户的期望。

And I just think about the competitive bloodbath that we saw in that episode in China and that is playing out all over the world and how Starbucks was able to avoid that even as the copycats popped up by a growing fast but also b just keeping that core mission of always exceeding the customer's expectations.

是的

Yeah.

我认为，这始于一个根本信念：在这些26,000个销售点，每一件事都很重要。

Well, I think it starts by just a fundamental belief that at these 26,000 points of distribution, everything matters.

你必须提供培训，并投资于你的员工，让他们对自己感到自豪，从而也对品牌产生认同感。

And you've got to provide training and you've got to invest in your people such that they feel good about themselves and therefore they feel good about the brand.

他们是品牌代言人。

I mean, they're the brand ambassadors.

在很多方面，我认为星巴克的日常执行是极其困难的。

And in many ways, I would argue that Starbucks is one of the most difficult daily execution.

你知道，他们每周有九千万顾客光顾他们的门店。

You know, they have 90,000,000 customers coming through their stores every week.

每周都是如此。

Every week.

真了不起。

Wow.

而且他们如此显眼，每一个出错的机会都会成为社交媒体放大这一信息的机会。

And they're so visible that every opportunity to screw it up is an opportunity for social media to amplify that message.

我经常跟我们的Maveron公司谈到，相对而言，他们超越客户期望的任务是多么简单。

And I frequently talk to our Maveron companies about, relatively speaking, how easy their task is to exceed customer expectations.

因为如果你拥有自己的分销渠道，那么你只需要一个能够理解你所追求的目标、品牌主张并为之代言的客户服务体系。

Because if you have your own distribution, then you just really need a customer service infrastructure that gets what you're trying to do and what the brand says and speaks for.

这要简单得多。

It's just much easier.

我认为这就是星巴克的卓越之处。

And I think that's one of the masteries of Starbucks.

但我以苹果为例，看看苹果商店，我不知道你们怎么想，但十五年前，当我70岁的岳母告诉我她如何预约苹果商店，她有多喜欢那里、学到了多少东西时，我就知道苹果做对了什么。

But I look at Apple as an example, and I look at the Apple stores, and I don't know how you guys feel, but, you know, I knew fifteen years ago that Apple was onto something when my 70 year old mother-in-law at the time told me how she's making reservations at the Apple Store, and she just loves it, and she's learning.

所以，看到亚马逊先从书店开始，最终走向其他领域，并不令人意外。

So I think it's not a surprise to see Amazon first with the bookstore and then eventually go.

因为让我们回到原点。

Because again, let's take it full circle.

技术本身并不是问题。

Technology for itself is not the issue.

用于满足客户需求的技术，在我看来，会变得极其强大、持久且难以替代。

Technology for serving customer needs, to me, becomes incredibly powerful and sticky and enduring.

是的。

Yep.

说得很好。

Well said.

完全同意。

Completely agreed.

我不再绕弯子了，确实，说得非常好。

I will stop dancing around it and say that, yes, very much well said.

显然，我有偏见。

Obviously, I'm biased.

我坐在这里和丹一起，但我们已经全面分析过这个问题了，我会给它打个A。

I'm sitting in the room here with Dan, but we've gone over this full analysis, and I'm gonna give this an a.

你知道吗，我认为出于品牌活动的原因，这让他们得以进入新市场，并且取得了成功。

You know, I think for the branding event reason, that enabled them to go into markets, and that worked.

当他们扩展到这些新市场时，突然间成了全国新闻。

When they spread to these new markets, they were suddenly national news.

人们意识到，这不仅仅是一个位于西雅图和西海岸的小咖啡连锁店。

And people understood this wasn't this little coffee chain in Seattle and on the West Coast.

这是一个广为人知的IPO，拥有良好的声誉，因此他们能够凭借这一点进入这些新市场。

It was an IPO that people knew about, and they had a pedigree, and they could move to these new markets with that.

然后我把他们对资本的运用分成了理念和执行两个方面。

And then I'm splitting what they did with the capital into idea and execution.

如何利用这笔资金，在新市场中以正确的方式持续开设新店并扩张，这个理念本身是正确的，执行得也非常出色。

The idea of what to do with it to continue this frenzy of opening new stores the right way in new markets and moving in was both the right thing to do with that capital and really well executed.

我的意思是，丹，当你回顾你的故事时，60家中有59家都同意了，定价定在17而不是16，仍然获得了那一点涨幅。

I mean, when you look at your stories, Dan, of 59 out of 60 said yes, and pricing it at 17, not 16, and still getting that little pop.

不是夸张的涨幅，但已经很不错了。

Not a ridiculous one, but a good one.

而且，我刚刚查了下股价的历史记录。

And, you know, I was just pulling up the history of the stock price.

我正在看前几年的数据，因为我觉得这部分很相关。

I'm just looking at these first few years because I think that's relevant part.

根本没有那种‘天啊，糟了’的时刻。

There was no, like, oh, crap moment.

股价并没有出现崩盘的情况。

The bottom didn't seem to have fallen out.

它以与公司价值相符的价格进入公开市场，并随着公司价值的增长持续上涨。

It was like, it went to the public markets with a true to the company value and continued to grow from there as the company's value grew.

由投资银行家们完美执行。

Masterfully executed by the investment bankers.

我对这次IPO的分析完全同意。

I agree a 100% on the IPO analysis.

但当你说到没有‘天啊，糟了’的时刻时，其实这些企业的历史中，有很多次都出现过‘天啊，糟了’的时刻。

But when you say there was no, oh, crap moment, there's plenty of times in the history of all these businesses where there are, oh, crap moments.