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好的，听众们。
Okay, listeners.
现在是一个绝佳的机会，向大家介绍我们非常期待的新合作伙伴——WorkOS。
Now is a great time to tell you about a new friend of the show we are very excited about, WorkOS.
是的。
Yes.
WorkOS 是一个面向企业的平台，已被 OpenAI、Cursor、Perplexity、Vercel、Plaid 以及数百家其他成功公司采用。
WorkOS is the enterprise ready platform used by OpenAI, Cursor, Perplexity, Vercel, Plaid, and literally hundreds of other winning companies.
那么，这些公司都在用 WorkOS 做什么？
So what are all these companies using WorkOS for?
想象一下，你是一家快速成长的初创公司。
Imagine you're a fast growing startup.
你已经找到了产品与市场的契合点，并且收到了许多大型企业客户的主动兴趣。
You've got product market fit, and you're getting inbound interest from big enterprise customers.
非常令人兴奋。
Very exciting.
但接着他们发给你一份安全问卷。
But then they send you their security questionnaire.
是的。
Yep.
而且问卷长达47页，里面的要求听起来像一堆字母缩写。
And it's, like, 47 pages long with requirements that kinda sound like alphabet soup.
你们支持SAML 2.0吗？
Do you support SAML two dot o?
你们能集成我们的Okta吗？
Can you integrate with our Okta?
你们有SCIM配置吗？SCIM？
Do you have SCIM provisioning, SCIM?
那RBAC呢？
What about RBAC?
R B A C。
R B A C.
你心里想，这些缩写到底是什么意思，更别提怎么实现了。
And you're thinking, I have no idea what these acronyms even mean, let alone how to implement them.
事情是这样的。
So here's the thing.
这些不是锦上添花的东西。
These are not nice to haves.
这些是交易的阻碍。
These are deal blockers.
如果没有单点登录，没有SCIM，没有RBAC，没有审计日志，你根本不可能签下企业客户，别无选择。
Without SSO, without SCIM, without RBAC, without audit logs, you simply cannot close enterprise deals, period.
但这些功能并没有让你们的核心产品变得更好。
But none of these features make your core product better.
它们不会让你们的啤酒更好喝，这是我们在这档《ACQUIRED》节目中最爱的比喻。
They don't make your beer taste better, to use our favorite analogy here on ACQUIRED.
所以，如果你在开发一款设计工具，花六个月时间实现SAML认证，并不会让你的设计工具更强大。
So if you're building like a design tool, spending six months building SAML authentication doesn't make your design tool more powerful.
这就是WorkOS的用武之地。
So this is where WorkOS comes in.
他们为企业的功能打造了Stripe一样的服务。
They've built Stripe for enterprise features.
WorkOS将企业认证需求转化为即插即用的API，最大限度地简化了不必要的复杂性。
WorkOS turns enterprise authentication requirements into drop in APIs, abstracting away as much unnecessary complexity as possible.
因此，你的团队不必花几个月时间研究SAML规范，几分钟内就能实现企业级SSO。
So instead of your team spending months reading SAML specs, you can implement enterprise SSO in minutes.
WorkOS负责用户配置、权限管理、审计日志——所有企业IT部门要求的必备功能。
WorkOS handles user provisioning, permissions, audit logs, all the checkbox items that enterprise IT requires.
无论你是刚刚起步、想拿下首个企业客户，还是已经规模庞大、正在全球扩张，WorkOS都是让你快速达到企业级标准的最快途径。
So whether you are a seed stage company trying to land your first enterprise customer or already big and expanding globally, WorkOS is the fastest path to becoming enterprise ready.
只需访问workos.com，或直接在他们的Slack支持渠道留言。
Just visit workos.com or just message their Slack support.
那里有真正的工程师，会快速回复你的问题。
They have real engineers in there who answer questions fast.
当你联系他们时，就说本和大卫介绍的。
And when you get in touch, just tell them Ben and David sent you.
欢迎来到《Acquired》第七期。
Welcome to episode seven of Acquired.
我是本·吉尔伯特。
I'm Ben Gilbert.
我是大卫·罗森塔尔。
I'm David Rosenthal.
我们是你们的主持人。
And we are your hosts.
今天，就在谷歌成为全球最有价值公司的公告前夕，我们来跟你们聊聊谷歌的
Today, sit here on the eve of the announcement that Google is the most valuable company in the world to tell you about Google's
他们宣布自己成了全球最有价值的公司？
announced that they were the most valuable company in the world?
什么？
What?
谷歌公布了财报，哦，对了。
Google announced earnings and Oh, yeah.
人们都在猜测，虽然我还没查股价，但谷歌的市值明天可能会超过苹果。
People are speculating that it might haven't checked the stock price, but that it Google's market cap might pass Apple's tomorrow.
明白了。
Gotcha.
让市场来告诉我们吧。
So Mister market will tell.
是的。
Yeah.
与我们这档节目通常的做法形成鲜明对比的是，这仅仅是推测和假设。
In in steep contrast to what we normally do on this show, that is just conjecture and and hypothesizing.
我们从不在这个节目中做推测。
We never conjecture on this show.
我们将要讨论的是一个较早的收购案例——谷歌收购YouTube。
We're gonna talk about, kind of an older acquisition when when you, look at the the companies that we've looked at so far, Google acquiring YouTube.
大卫，你来介绍一下这次收购的历史和相关事实吧？
David, why don't you, take it away with acquisition history and facts?
好的。
Will do.
所以YouTube，这是一次重大的收购。
So YouTube, this is a big one.
YouTube由两位前PayPal工程师和一位前设计师于2005年初创立。
Founded YouTube was founded early two thousand five by two former engineers and one former designer from PayPal.
他们属于备受瞩目的PayPal帮派成员。
They're part of the, the much Ballyhooed PayPal mafia.
有趣的是，我们稍后会深入探讨，YouTube是PayPal帮派另一位成员罗洛夫·博塔在红杉资本的首批投资之一。
And interestingly, we'll get more into this later, YouTube was one of the very first investments at Sequoia by another member of the PayPal mafia, Roloff Botha.
这真是家族内部的传承。
I just keep it in the family.
所以YouTube成立于2005年初，随后在2005年11月，红杉资本和罗洛夫共同领投了350万美元的A轮融资。
So it was founded in early two thousand five, and and then in November 2005, Sequoia and Roloff, come in and they lead a $3,500,000 series a.
就在几个月后，产品刚刚发布，还处于非常早期的增长阶段，Sequoia就领投了A轮融资。
And and then a few months later, it was very, very early growth days having just released the product, when Sequoia leads the series a.
几个月后的2005年12月，SNL节目——还记得 Lonely Island 在SNL的那段搞笑短剧《Lazy Sunday》吗？——上线了。
A few months later in December 2005, SNL, remember the Lonely Island days on SNL, the skit Lazy Sunday, was, comes out.
等等。
And Wait.
我们居然只用了七集就聊到了Andy Samberg，真是不容易。
It so it only took us seven episodes to talk about Andy Samberg here on ACQUIRED.
真讽刺。
Ironic.
我知道。
I know.
编辑备注：David长得像Andy Samberg。
Editor's note, David looks like Andy Samberg.
播客里不该有内部笑话。
There should be no inside jokes in podcasting.
《Lazy Sunday》播出后，很多人把电视上的画面录下来上传到YouTube。
Lazy Sunday comes out, and a whole bunch of people, like, video their TVs and post it to YouTube.
我不知道这是总播放量还是某个版本的《Lazy Sunday》片段在YouTube上获得了七百万次播放，这在当时是惊人的数字。
And, I don't know if this is an aggregate or just one of the versions of the clips of this clip of Lazy Sunday generates 7,000,000 views on YouTube, which was huge.
我的意思是，那时候网站上总共才不到十万人。
I mean, like, there were only a 100,000 people on the site before then.
是的。
Yeah.
我认为即使在被收购时，他们的用户群体已经达到七千二百一十万，但他们报告的月活跃用户只有一千九百一十万。
I think even at acquisition, they had an audience of 72,100,000, but they they were reporting 19.1, monthly active users.
所以，这么早就获得如此高的播放量，而且那甚至还是在一年前。
So, I mean, to get that kind of view count that early, and that was even, you know, a year
我敢肯定，当时像我这样的大学生一遍又一遍地反复观看。
I'm sure it was a lot of college kids like me watching it over and over and over again.
令人惊叹的是，想想当时人们用摄像机拍摄电视屏幕来看视频，这就像现在Vine视频的样子。
Well, the amazing thing is thinking about watching it on, you know, people filming their TVs like that, that's like what Vines look like now.
是的。
Yeah.
谈谈这种历史自我重塑的情况。
Talk about a a kind of the history rewriting itself.
在《懒惰星期日》以及其他病毒式热门视频的推动下，2006年4月，该公司从红杉资本和Artist Ventures筹集了800万美元的B轮融资，我认为后者领投了这轮投资。
So on the back of lazy Sunday, among other viral hits, April 2006, the company raises an $8,000,000 series b also from Sequoia with Artist Ventures, which I believe led the round.
到2006年7月，YouTube的日视频播放量已增长至约一亿次，这相当惊人。
And by the 2006, YouTube is, has grown in July to, about a 100,000,000 video views a day, which is pretty incredible.
随之而来的是许多问题，我们稍后会谈到。
And then, and a whole bunch of problems that arose with that, which we'll get into in a minute.
但在2006年10月9日之后不久，谷歌宣布将以16.5亿美元收购YouTube。
But, very shortly after 10/09/2006, Google announces that they are going to purchase YouTube for $1,650,000,000.
不可思议。
Incredible.
我的意思是，这距离公司成立还不到一年半，当时他们真的只是在车库里起步的。
I mean, this is just over a year and a half after the founding of the company, literally in a garage.
他们只筹集了1150万美元的风险投资。
They'd only raised 11 and a half million in venture capital.
所以，我的意思是，从1150万美元到16.5亿美元，这个倍数是多少？
So, I mean, the multiple 11 and a half million to 1,650,000,000.00.
这大概是100多倍吧？
That's, what, a 100 a 100 and 20 x ing?
真是不可思议。
Pretty incredible.
我的意思是，这种事发生在2006年。
I mean, this kind of stuff and this was 2006.
这种事在2006年根本不可能发生。
This stuff didn't happen in 2006.
我的意思是，在互联网泡沫之后，其遗留影响甚至在几年后仍在硅谷持续发酵，而一家公司竟然能在成立仅18个月后，就被谷歌这样的真正大公司收购，而不是靠泡沫资金上市，估值超过15亿美元。
I mean, after the, you know, the Internet bubble, the lingering after effects are still reverberating through the valley even a few years later, and the idea that a company would go from founding to actually being sold to a real company, Google, not just, you know, going public with funny money in, in eighteen months for over 1 and a half billion dollars.
这简直疯狂。
I mean, it was crazy.
就连Instagram，我们在第一集就讨论过，也以10亿美元的价格被收购了。
Even even Instagram was that we talked about on one of our first episode was such a splash of $1,000,000,000.
简直疯狂。
Insane.
所以谷歌在2006年12月完成了对它的收购。
So Google acquisition, closes by December 2006.
2007年3月，维亚康姆对YouTube提起10亿美元的诉讼，指控该公司及其董事——我不记得谷歌是否被列为被告——明知故犯、公然侵犯版权，上传如《周六夜现场》这样的内容；《周六夜现场》是NBC的财产，不是维亚康姆的，但像《懒惰星期天》这样的视频，YouTube明知没有版权，却任由其长期存在。
In March 2007, Viacom files a $1,000,000,000 lawsuit against YouTube accusing, the company, the directors, and I can't remember if Google was named in the suit or not, of knowingly and blatantly violating copyright laws and posting, material like, SNL is an NBC property, not a Viacom property, but like Lazy Sunday, knowingly, allowing it to persist on the site even though it didn't have YouTube didn't have the copyright.
这开启了关于内容版权和YouTube的漫长争端，直到七年后的2014年才最终解决。
So and that began this protracted battle over content rights and YouTube that really was only finally resolved in 2014, seven years later.
这是一连串的驳回、上诉和判决，最终维亚康姆与谷歌在2014年达成和解。
It was a whole series of dismissals and appeals and judgments and then finally the Viacom and Google settled in 2014.
很难相信。
It's hard to believe.
确实如此。
It is.
好的。
Okay.
所以这场诉讼发生了，当然我们稍后会单独讨论它，但这场诉讼带来了一个惊人的副产品——披露程序。
So this lawsuit happens, but which is, you know, we'll talk about in and of itself, but there's this amazing byproduct of the lawsuit which is the disclosure process.
我们得以看到所有关于YouTube、红杉对YouTube的投资以及收购的惊人材料和证词，这些都已公开在公共领域。
And we get to see like, it's just public in the public domain, all of this incredible material and testimony about YouTube, about Sequoia's investment in YouTube, about the acquisition.
所以，你可以在网上找到这些资料，我们会在节目笔记中提供链接。
So, you you can find this online and we'll link to it in the in the show notes.
作为发现程序的一部分，谷歌和罗洛夫——抱歉，是红杉和罗洛夫的A轮投资备忘录可供查阅，这是一份非常了不起的文件。
As part of the discovery process, Google and Rolloff's or sorry.
这份红杉和罗洛夫关于YouTube A轮融资的投资备忘录是公开的，内容极其出色。
Sequoia and Rolloff's investment memo for the series a of YouTube, is available, and it's really incredible document.
读起来非常有趣。
It is incredibly fun to read.
我的意思是，我为了准备这期节目刚翻看过，他们在这里列出的关键风险，坦诚得令人惊讶，也完全真实地反映了当时的担忧。
I mean, I I I was just looking over at preparing for this show, and the the key risks that they identify in here could not be more candid and could not be more real of concerns.
我的意思是，我们稍后会谈到这个收购案的评估，以及当今世界的情况等等，但关键风险之一是竞争与可防御性。
I mean, we're gonna talk about this later in evaluating the the acquisition and where the world is today and all that, but, you know, key risks, competition slash defensibility.
你看，距离收购已经过去十年了，而Facebook却在窃取视频份额。
Like, here we are, what, ten years after the acquisition, and Facebook is stealing video share
是的。
Yep.
收入。
Revenue.
我觉得特别有趣的是，我们会在节目全程中更多地讨论这一点，尤其是在主题部分。
Like What I thought was really interesting, and, we'll talk more about this throughout the show, and I think especially in the the themes.
但在备忘录中，罗洛夫和红杉资本在讨论竞争与可防御性时提到，团队必须始终保持对提升用户体验的极度专注，这与我们通常理解的‘可防御性’并不一致。
But, in the memo, Roloff and Sequoia, when addressing competition and defensibility, they say the team will need to remain laser focused on improving the user experience, which isn't what you would really expect when you think about defensibility.
这份备忘录里根本没提到网络效应。
Like in nowhere in this memo does it talk about network effects.
而YouTube表面上看，似乎应该依靠网络效应来构建防御壁垒——拥有所有内容，吸引所有观众，从而吸引更多内容。
And YouTube is, you know, on the surface, would think network effects defensibility through having all the content, which leads to all the viewers, which gets more content.
但他们实际上专注于改善用户体验。
But no, they're actually focused on improving the user experience.
我的意思是，这并不是我对如今YouTube的描述。
And I mean, that's not exactly how I would describe YouTube today.
当我想到让YouTube出色的原因时，几乎与YouTube的用户体验毫无关系。
Like, when I think about the things that make YouTube great, it has pretty much zero to do with the user experience of YouTube.
是的。
Yeah.
而且在很多方面，我认为YouTube实际上已经失败了。
And in a lot of ways, YouTube has actually, I think, really failed.
谁会直接去youtube.com并在那里发现或搜索内容呢？
Like, who goes to youtube.com and then discovers something or searches for something on YouTube?
不会。
No.
你通常是通过其他渠道进入，然后离开。
You come through other channels and then you leave.
是的。
Yeah.
我经常想，虽然我本想留到后面再说，但我觉得现在谈一谈也很重要。
I'm often well, I this isn't I wanna say this for later, but I think it's it's worth talking about now.
我对YouTube有点悲观，主要是因为它不是一个目标网站。
The I'm a little bit bearish on YouTube primarily because it's not a destination site.
它们依赖其他渠道的流量，而这些其他渠道——尤其是Facebook——人们首先在那里决定要看什么，它们都在打造自己的平台，没错。
They are reliant on traffic from other channels, and those other channels, namely Facebook, where people go first to decide what they're going to be looking at, are having their own platforms and Yep.
积极地把用户吸引到这些平台上。
Actively pulling people onto those platforms.
并引导流量。
And can drive traffic.
所以，YouTube本质上现在就是一个超级先进的内容分发网络。
So so YouTube is effectively, you know, a super fancy CDN at this point.
它们只是一个视频托管的地方，人们并不一定依赖YouTube来发现内容，YouTube。
They they're a a place where the videos get hosted, where people don't necessarily rely on going to YouTube for discovery That YouTube.
他们应该看什么，或者根本就没什么意思。
What they should watch, or it's it's just un uninteresting.
托管这些视频的费用由YouTube和谷歌承担。
Hosting that YouTube and Google pay for.
是的。
Yeah.
这是免费托管，你知道，如果有更好的平台，人们会很容易把视频上传到那个更好的地方。
It's it's it's free hosting, and I you know, if there was a better place, I think people would easily throw it up on that better place.
好了，各位听众。
Alright, listeners.
现在是感谢我们节目的新赞助商Intapp的好时机。
Now is a great time to thank new friend of the show, Intapp.
你们可能最熟悉他们的产品DealCloud。
You are probably most familiar with their product, DealCloud.
对。
Yeah.
DealCloud 是私募资本和投资银行业的领先交易管理与智能平台。
DealCloud is the premier deal management and intelligence platform for private capital and investment banking.
因此，如果你在一家私募股权公司，你的交易线索和客户关系管理系统很可能正在使用它。
So if you're at a PE firm, there's a pretty good chance your pipeline and CRM is running on it right now.
是的。
Yep.
但Intapp的实际范围要广泛得多。
But Intapp is actually much broader.
它本质上是专业机构——金融、法律、会计和咨询行业的操作系统。
It's essentially the operating system for professional firms, financial, legal, accounting, and consulting.
Intapp 支撑着这些机构的业务流程，包括业务开发、客户引入、合规管理和工时记录。
Intapp powers the workflows that run these firms, origination, business intake, compliance, and time capture.
上个月，他们发布了一款非常有趣的产品——Celeste，他们的智能AI平台。
And they just announced a product last month that's super interesting, Celeste, their agentic AI platform.
我们花了一些时间体验了这款产品，立刻就明白了它的价值。
We spent some time getting a tour of the product, and we instantly got it.
它不仅仅是一个个人生产力工具。
It's not just an individual productivity tool.
它是面向整个公司的AI，内置了工作流程、协作功能以及贵公司的历史信息。
It's firm wide AI for institutional knowledge with workflows, collaboration, and your firm's history just built right into it.
这大概就是为什么大卫，他们在Intapp那里称之为公司AI的原因吧。
Which, that's probably, David, why they call it firm AI over there at, Intapp.
是的。
Yes.
对。
Yes.
确实如此。
Indeed.
它不仅仅是一般用途的AI，那种会无差别吸收所有信息、对专业公司构成巨大风险的AI。
It isn't just general purpose AI that just ingests everything and can be a huge liability for professional firms.
你需要的是能够了解你的交易历史、保密要求，以及原生支持MNPI控制和利益冲突管理的AI。
You need AI that knows your deal history and your confidentiality requirements and things like MNPI controls or conflicts of interests and respects all of it natively.
关于塞莱斯特，有两件事让我印象深刻。
So two big things stuck with me about Celeste.
首先是上下文引擎，它是一个语义层，能够映射贵公司的专有知识，使智能代理能够据此采取行动。
First, the context engine, which is a semantic layer that maps your firm's proprietary knowledge so agents can act on it.
如果你因为行业集中度风险而放弃了一笔交易，塞莱斯特是知道的。
If you, say, passed on a deal for sector concentration risk, Celeste knows.
而且这个决策并不只是锁在高级合伙人的脑子里。
And that decision isn't just locked in a senior partner's head.
它被大规模部署，因此体现在全公司的决策中。
It's deployed at scale, so it's reflected in decisions that are made firm wide.
其次，是为交易筛选、利益冲突审查、交叉销售等任务预置的流程模板。
And second, prebuilt playbooks for things like deal screening, conflicts clearance, cross selling.
智能代理能够自主执行，同时内置了治理与合规机制。
Agents execute autonomously with governance and compliance built right in.
对于这些专业机构而言，竞争优势在于专有知识、人脉关系和交易历史，所有这些。
For these professional firms, the competitive advantage is proprietary knowledge, relationships, and deal history, all of that.
这就是他们的护城河，而Celeste让这种优势变得可扩展。
That is their moat, and Celeste makes that scalable.
它能连接Snowflake、Microsoft Copilot以及其他生态系统合作伙伴，他们今年二月还宣布与Anthropic和Harvey达成了合作关系。
It connects to Snowflake and Microsoft Copilot and other ecosystem partners, and they just announced partnerships in February with both Anthropic and Harvey.
所以，如果你在一家私募股权基金、律师事务所或任何专业服务公司，想要弄清楚AI如何为整个公司创造价值，而不仅仅是个人，不妨去查看intapp.com/celeste。
So if you're at a PE fund or a law firm or any professional services firm and you're trying to figure out how does AI create value for the whole firm, not just individuals, go check out intapp.com/celeste.
那是intapp.com/celeste，或者点击节目说明中的链接，并告诉他们这是Ben和David从Acquired推荐的。
That's intapp.com/celeste, or click the link in the show notes and just tell them that Ben and David from Acquired sent you.
关于这场诉讼，另一个非常有趣的地方是，我们看到了当时担任谷歌CEO的埃里克·施密特的大量证词，作为诉讼的一部分。
So another thing that's really interesting about this lawsuit is, we have there's a bunch of testimony from Eric Schmidt who was then the CEO of Google and, as part of the lawsuit.
这很有趣。
And he it's interesting.
他在收购前的几天以及交易进行过程中向谷歌董事会表示，他认为YouTube的价值大约在6亿到7亿美元之间。
He testified, that he told Google's board in the days leading up to the acquisition and as they were working on it that he thought YouTube was worth about 600 to 700,000,000.
随着交易推进，谷歌决定必须多付整整十亿美元，以防止竞争对手抢走YouTube。
And that as the deal progressed, Google decided that it had to pay more, literally a billion dollars more, to keep it from competitors.
而且YouTube曾向谷歌表示，据埃里克所说，他们曾表示‘我们会出售’，这非常有趣，因为当时围绕这家公司正流传着各种内容版权问题。
And that YouTube had indicated to Google, that quote, had indicated to us that they would be sold is what Eric says, which is super interesting because, you know, there's these content rights issues swirling around the company.
当时他们支付着巨额的托管费用，而且至今仍在继续支付。
There's the massive hosting fees that they were paying at the time and are still continuing to pay.
然而，它的增长却是爆炸性的。
And yet the the growth was explosive.
有趣的是，他们实际上把自己摆上了货架，而我们这里正好有这段证词，非常精彩。
And it's interesting that they essentially put themselves up for sale, and that we have this this testimony here, which is really cool.
那么，你觉得呢？我理解的一种方式是，‘我们会出售’意味着，如果我们没有人为这些诉讼提供资金，我们就只能关门大吉。
Well, do you think I mean, one way that I would interpret that is we are going to be sold is we are going to go out of business unless we have someone that is financing all these lawsuits.
比如，我们根本没有
Like, there we have no
选择，维亚康姆方面辩称。
options Well, Viacom argued.
是的。
Yeah.
但我们应该说，最终他们输了。
And ultimately lost, we should say.
但，是的，非常有趣。
But but yeah, super interesting.
你拥有这样一个产品，显然有着极佳的市场契合度，增长势头迅猛，简直难以置信。
You've got this property, this product that is clearly, know, incredible product market fit growing like, I don't know anything.
我认为，在那之前，互联网上从未出现过这样的东西。
I I think nothing that the Internet had ever seen, until that point.
我的意思是，也许那时Facebook已经存在了，所以它的增长速度可能也差不多。
I mean, maybe I guess Facebook existed then, so it was probably growing at a similar rate.
然而，尽管它价值巨大，却面临着巨大的生存危机，以至于在成立仅18个月时就积极寻求出售公司。
And yet had these massive existential questions that even though it was a a huge price, leads them to actively try and sell the company only eighteen months in.
是的。
Yeah.
关于这笔交易，有趣的是，它几乎完全是股票交易。
And the interesting thing about the sale too, it's almost entirely stock.
现金只有1500万美元，其余都是股票。
It was only 15,000,000 in cash and the rest in in stock.
大卫，如果你是谷歌，为什么要做如此依赖股票的交易呢？
David, if you're Google, why do you do, such a stock heavy transaction there?
嗯，我当时也不清楚。
Well, I don't know at the time.
我的意思是，我不知道谷歌当时手头有多少现金。
I mean, I don't know how much cash Google had on hand.
大概有很多吧，但那是十年前的事了。
Presumably a lot, but this was ten years ago.
是的。
Yeah.
而且他们是否能掌握，当时手头有多少现金，其中有多少是可用的，又有多少是在美国境内而非海外。
And whether they could, whether their treasury could know, how much cash they had on hand and how much cash of that was available and on US soil and not in Right.
确实如此。
That's true.
是的。
Yeah.
也许他们别无选择。
Maybe they had no choice.
对。
Yeah.
但在我看来，当时谷歌的股价只会上涨。
But to me, mean, like, looking at that, Google was only gonna go up.
现在回头看它那飞涨的走势，说这话很容易。
And it's easy to say that now looking at the skyrocketing that it's done.
但如果你是拉里·佩奇，难道你不该保持乐观，看到自己的公司价值不断攀升吗？
But if you're, you know, Larry Page, don't you gotta be optimistic there, and you gotta be able to see that your company is only getting get more valuable.
其实回过头去看看这些股票，算一算它们现在的价值，会很有趣。
It'd be interesting to go back actually and look at all these shares now and and do the math and see, what's the current value
那笔交易的价值。
of that.
同样有趣的是，我们在这档节目中多次提到红杉资本，无论是过去还是本集，尤其是因为这份投资备忘录——红杉资本是谷歌最大的股东之一。
It would also be interesting to look at, you know, we've mentioned Sequoia a lot in in this show, both in the past and this episode, but in particular because of this investment memo, you know, Sequoia is one of the largest shareholders in Google.
我不确定在那个时候他们是否仍然是股东，但他们有保留公开持股的历史，这非常有趣：YouTube的最大投资者，可能同时也是谷歌在此次收购时的最大或主要股东之一。
And I don't know if they were still shareholders at that time, but they have a history of keeping their public shareholdings, which would be very interesting that the largest investor in YouTube might also have been the largest or one of the largest shareholders in Google at the time of this acquisition.
很有趣。
Interesting
确实如此。
indeed.
好的。
Okay.
所以，简单总结一下。
So so so just to wrap
那么接下来发生了什么？
up, so what happened next?
2006年，《时代》周刊将‘你’评为年度人物，但封面是YouTube，主题是‘你’与用户生成内容。
2006, Time Magazine names, quote, you person of the year, but the cover is YouTube, and the theme of you and user generated content.
而且在产品方面，增长还在持续。
And and the growth just just continues on the product side.
我的意思是，到2010年5月，也就是不到四年之后，YouTube的月视频播放量从四年前的十亿增长到了一百四十亿。
I mean, by May 2010, so four years later, less than four years later, they're up to YouTube is up to 14,000,000,000 video views a month from a hundred million four years earlier.
到2013年，YouTube的月独立观众人数已达十亿，此后增长一直持续。
By 2013, YouTube has a 1,000,000,000 monthly unique, viewers, visitors, and and the growth has just continued since then.
好的。
Okay.
太棒了。
Cool.
所以我经常听你提到播放量和观众人数。
So I've heard you say a lot about views and viewers.
得养家糊口。
Gotta feed my family.
是的。
Yeah.
你对YouTube作为一项业务有什么看法？
How do you feel about YouTube as a business?
有趣的是，自那以后发生了很多变化，特别是我们已经做过关于Twitch的那期节目。
Well, here's what's really interesting and that's happened since then, especially, you know, we've done our episode on Twitch.
Netflix，你也知道，也在这段时间建立了起来。
Netflix, you know, has also been built.
Netflix作为一种数字流媒体服务，是在同一时期建立起来的。
Well, Netflix as a digital streaming service has been built, during the same time.
亚马逊在这段时间内从零开始搭建了业务。
Amazon stood up something from scratch in that time.
是的。
Yep.
你知道，YouTube几乎是目前少数几个，也许是唯一一个主要的视频平台，现在仍然依靠广告支持，当然还有Facebook。
You know and and YouTube is really one of the few if maybe only major video business, well, YouTube and Facebook, that are ad supported now.
我不禁想，这是否已经证明了直接付费模式才是互联网视频更好的商业模式。
And I wonder if it's kind of been proven that direct payments are a better model for video on the Internet.
现在，显然Twitch有广告，但正如我们之前讨论的，我认为通过Twitch流动的大部分资金其实是来自观众的订阅打赏。
Now now, obviously, Twitch has advertising, but, as we talked about, I think most of the most of the dollars flowing through Twitch are in this form of script subscriptions.
是的。
Yeah.
你刚才提到了两个非常有趣的观点。
So you touched on two really interesting things there.
一方面，关于YouTube作为一个盈利业务，我想去年并没有太多可靠的数据，但在2014年2月，他们的收入大约是40亿美元，但基本持平。
One, in thinking about YouTube as a a profitable business, I think, last year there's not a lot of good stats on this sense, but in February 2014, they were doing about 4,000,000,000 in revenue, but were, pretty flat.
我的意思是，他们差不多算是盈亏平衡的业务。
I mean, they they they, I guess, flat as much as they were breakeven business.
他们确实是。
They Yeah.
440亿美元的收入，增长迅速，但扣除给内容创作者的分成、托管成本、广告销售成本以及所有相关开支后，基本上是盈亏平衡，也就是零利润。
$44,000,000,000 in revenue, growing fast, but, after payments to content creators and hosting costs and ad sales costs and all associated stuff, about a breakeven business, you know, zero profit.
因此在过去一年里，有估算称他们的收入达到了50亿美元，但同样，仍未实现盈利。
And so in the last year, estimates that are that they are a $5,000,000,000 business, but, again, still not a profitable one.
值得思考的是，他们的单用户平均收入是多少？
The interesting thing to think about there is what is their average revenue per user?
关于这一点，相关信息非常有限，但我认为，最近关于Facebook和Twitter的数据大约在7到9美元之间，这些是依靠广告支持的社交平台。
And the information's pretty sparse on this, but I think, the latest numbers around kind of Facebook and Twitter are, like, somewhere in the 7 to $9 range for for those social services that are that are ad supported.
可能在7到8美元左右，甚至略低一些，因为广告单元的设置方式。
It's probably in that $78 range, maybe a little bit less because it's, you know, the the ad units.
可能更低，因为2013年他们有一亿独立访客，如果去年收入是50亿美元，可以想象自2013年以来，独立访客数量只增不减。
Probably less because if in 2013 they had a billion unique visitors, and if say they made 5,000,000,000 in revenue last year, imagine that number of uniques has only gone up since 2013.
所以，每个用户的收入不到5美元。
So you're talking about less than $5 per, per user.
是的。
Yeah.
对。
Yeah.
所以你能理解为什么YouTube Red会出现了。
So you can see why, YouTube Red is a thing.
所以YouTube Red是他们去年推出的一项服务，用户支付10美元就可以享受无广告的YouTube体验，这是他们应对YouTube上音乐内容的一种方式——当你不是在主动观看视频时，比如后台播放音乐，你不想被打断，这就是他们的解决方案。
So YouTube Red is a a service they announced last year that you can pay $10 and get ad free YouTube, and it's their sort of answer for how do you get, YouTube the the music that is on YouTube as sort of a streaming service for when you're not actively watching a video, you don't want the ad interruptions, all that.
这是一项每月10美元的服务。
So that's a $10 a month service.
一方面，我要说这有点短视，但另一方面，他们确实需要这么做才能让业务实现盈利。
On the one hand, and I am gonna call this shortsighted, but on the one hand, they need to do that to make it a profitable business.
我的意思是，自从被收购以来，这已经是一场长达十年的实验了，谷歌从拥有YouTube中获得了许多其他附加好处。
I mean, it's been a ten year experiment here since the acquisition, and there's a lot of other ancillary benefits that Google gets out of having YouTube.
但作为一项核心业务，YouTube的盈利能力并不高，甚至可以说几乎没有盈利。
But as a core business, not hugely profitable or profitable at all.
所以，也许转向这种新模式能为他们带来更稳定的现金流，从而实现真正的盈利。
So, you know, maybe moving to this other model gives them, you know, more cash flows where they're able to be a a profitable business.
但另一方面，这直接违背了YouTube作为广告平台的本质，没错。
On the other hand, it flies directly in the face of YouTube as an ad platform, And Yep.
他们正在让那些广告商最想触达的高价值用户，不再看到广告。
They're getting their highest value users, which are the people that the advertisers actually wanna reach, to not see the ads.
要做品牌广告，你需要巨大的规模。
And to do brand advertising, you need enormous scale.
我的意思是，Facebook 和 YouTube 是全球仅有的两个能够做到这一点的平台。
I mean, Facebook and YouTube are two of the the the only properties in the world that can do it.
如果 YouTube 开始减少那些尤其是最富裕人群的用户数量，而这些人正是广告商想要触达的对象，那么它作为广告平台的价值就会下降。
And if YouTube starts dwindling the population of people, particularly on the, you know, most affluent end that are actually seeing ads, they become a less valuable ad platform.
因此，我们看到，当谷歌试图通过 YouTube Red 让 YouTube 变得盈利时，这可能意味着 YouTube 作为一项业务的整体战略发生了巨大转变。
So what we're seeing here as Google transitions to trying to make YouTube a profitable business with YouTube Red is potentially a huge shift in the entire strategy of what YouTube as a business is.
是的。
Yeah.
我觉得你说得完全正确。
I think that's exactly right.
尽管视频内容极具吸引力，并且由于 YouTube 以及这些后续兴起的服务——比如 Facebook 视频、Twitch 等——在互联网上变得如此庞大，但从根本上说，它的成本结构与其他类型的互联网内容是不同的。
And, you know, video as incredibly compelling as it is and as large as it's become on the Internet, mostly thanks to YouTube and all of these services, you know, Facebook video and Twitch, and others that have sprung up in its wake, is fundamentally though does have a different cost structure than other types of of content on the Internet.
对。
Yeah.
我的意思是，如果你只拿这个和Instagram相比，它当初被收购时只花了十亿美元，而今年预计它能赚330亿美元。
I mean, if you just compare this to Instagram alone, you know, acquired for, a billion dollars, and then I think they projected it at, making $33,000,000,000 this year.
而且，成本结构在两个方面都不同。
Well, and the and the cost structure is different on on two fronts.
一方面，视频的托管和传输成本远高于文本或静态图片。
You know, one, there's the hosting and then the delivery of the video, which costs a lot more than text or or static photos.
另一方面是内容付费，YouTube在这方面的投入非常积极。
But two is is the content payments, you know, and YouTube has really been aggressively investing in this.
这不仅仅是支付给全球专业媒体机构的费用。
And it's not just payments to the professional media organizations of the world.
还包括支付给内容合作伙伴的费用，你知道，在Instagram上，那些人只是免费发布内容；在Snapchat上，他们也是免费发布。
It's payments out to content partners that are, you know, once you know, on Instagram, those people just post their post their content or Snapchat, you know, they're posting for free.
免费。
For free.
而YouTube却要付钱给他们。
And YouTube's them.
YouTube将广告收入的55%分给这些创作者。
The YouTube's splitting 55% of their ad revenue out and paying it out to those producers.
而且你知道，在Twitch上，很多最受欢迎的主播都提到过，YouTube曾主动接触他们，提供巨额报酬，让他们在YouTube上直播，而他们却在Twitch上免费直播。
And and, you know, we know, on on Twitch, you know, lots of the most popular streamers have talked about how YouTube has approached them and offered them large payments, very large payments, to stream on YouTube, and they're streaming for free on Twitch.
是的。
Yeah.
这很有趣。
That's interesting.
我的意思是，Twitch的直播本身就很有趣，但YouTube的存储型归档视频才是他们的核心业务。
I mean, the the the whole Twitch livestreaming thing is interesting in itself, but the even the, kind of stored, archive video that that, YouTube is is that's their bread bread and butter.
我的意思是，Facebook有一个产品正在大量吸引用户，因为那已经成为每个人的首选入口。
I mean, Facebook has a product that is pulling people away in huge numbers because, that's everyone's first step.
我最近看到的一个数据是，70%的Facebook视频都是原生上传的。
And I think that, the stat that I recently saw was 70% of Facebook videos are uploaded natively.
以前人们都是嵌入YouTube视频，但现在发生了巨大的转变。
That used to be people embedding YouTube videos, and it's just been this massive, massive shift.
是的。
Yeah.
非常惊人。
Pretty incredible.
嗯，我觉得我们应该转到收购这个话题了。
Well, I I feel like we should, we should move on to acquisition category.
但在那之前，我还想补充一点。
But before we do, one more quick aside, that I wanna throw in.
这期节目特别有趣，因为在我大学毕业后，刚在瑞银投资银行工作时，第一次面试就是在2007年1月，而当时这笔收购刚刚公布，我就把它作为面试中的案例分析来讨论。
This is a particularly fun episode because my very first, job interview or interview for my very first job, when I worked at at UBS in investment banking, after college, I was interviewing in January 2007, and this acquisition acquisition had just been announced, and and I did this as a case study in my interview.
我当时想，天啊，这简直是完美的工作。
I thought, man, this was gonna be, like, the best job ever.
我可以谈论互联网公司的战略和媒体，这太棒了。
I could talk about, like, Internet company strategy and media, and, like, this would be awesome.
但后来我才发现，投资银行的工作实际上完全不一样。
And then I learned investment banking was actually something very different.
但是
But
但现在你做了一个播客。
But now you get to do a podcast.
现在我可以做一期关于它的播客了。
Now I get to do a podcast about it.
我觉得在我们继续之前，我还没完全表达清楚，我想就刚才那个观点再补充一下。
I also think right before we move on, I I I didn't fully I guess I wanna come around on that last point.
称其为目光短浅，是假设他们只会坚持做广告平台，尤其是品牌广告平台。
Calling it shortsighted, that's assuming that they are straight sticking with being an ad platform and particularly a brand advertising platform.
如果他们有更宏大的计划，我觉得如果当前的商业模式就是这样，那确实是目光短浅。
If there is some grander plan, you know, I I think it's shortsighted if that's if that's the current business.
但如果他们有更宏大的计划，想转向类似Spotify的订阅制业务——我们拭目以待，看他们能否挺过向内容创作者支付高额分成所带来的惊人利润率压力——但关键是，如果他们仍固守原有的广告平台策略，那才是目光短浅。
If there is a grander plan to move to more of a Spotify type subscription business, which we'll see if they can, you know, weather that storm of the crazy margins that you have to pay out to content producers at that point, but, you know, it it's shortsighted in that they maintain that same advertising platform strategy.
好了，各位听众。
Alright, listeners.
这是感谢我们在Acquired节目中最爱的公司之一Sentry的好时机。
This is a great time to thank one of our favorite companies here at Acquired, Sentry.
S-E-N-T-R-Y，就像一个站岗的人。
That's s e n t r y like someone standing guard.
是的。
Yes.
Sentry 帮助开发者调试错误和延迟问题，几乎可以解决任何软件问题，并在用户发火之前修复它们。
Sentry helps developers debug errors and latency issues pretty much any software problem and fix them before users get mad.
正如它们官网所说，超过四百万名软件开发者都认为它不错。
As their homepage puts it, they are considered not bad by over 4,000,000 software developers.
今天，我们要讨论Sentry如何与Acquired宇宙中的另一家公司Anthropic合作。
Today, are talking about the way Sentry works with another company in the acquired universe, Anthropic.
Anthropic过去曾使用一些旧的基础设施监控工具，但在他们庞大的规模和复杂性下，他们转而采用Sentry来更快地解决问题。
Anthropic used to have some older infrastructure monitoring in place, but at their massive scale and complexity, they instead adopted Sentry to help them fix issues faster.
对。
Yep.
崩溃在人工智能领域可能是个严重的问题。
Crashes can be a massive problem in AI.
如果你正在运行一个大规模的计算任务，比如训练模型，一旦某个节点失败，就可能影响数百甚至数千台服务器。
If you're running a huge compute job like training a model and one node fails, it can affect hundreds or thousands of servers.
Sentry 帮助他们检测到有故障的硬件，从而能在引发连锁问题前迅速将其剔除。
Sentry helped them detect bad hardware so they could quickly reject it before causing a cascading problem.
Sentry 还让他们能够将排查大规模问题的时间从数天缩短到数小时，从而更快恢复训练任务。
Sentry also enabled them to debug massive issues in hours instead of days so they could get back to their training runs.
如今，Anthropic 依赖 Sentry 来实时追踪异常、分配错误并分析其研究团队所使用的主流编程语言（包括 Python、Rust 和 C++）中的故障。
And today, Anthropic relies on Sentry to track exceptions, assign errors, and analyze failures in real time across all of the primary languages used by Anthropic's research teams, including Python, Rust, and c plus plus.
根据 Anthropic 团队的说法，Sentry 为我们的开发者提供了一个集中平台，能获取调试问题所需的所有信息。
According to the Anthropic team, Sentry gives our developers one place that will have all the information they need to debug an issue.
说到人工智能，Sentry 现在推出了一款名为 Seer 的 AI 调试器。
And speaking of AI, Sentry now has an AI debugger called Seer.
Seer 是一个 AI 代理，它能整合 Sentry 和你的代码库中的所有问题上下文，不仅猜测，更能精准定位棘手问题的根本原因，并提出针对你应用的、可直接合并的修复方案。
Seer is an AI agent that taps into all the issue context from Sentry and your code base to not just guess, but root cause gnarly issues and propose merge ready fixes specific to your application.
我们非常兴奋能与Sentry合作。
We're pumped to be working with Sentry.
他们的客户名单非常出色，不仅包括Anthropic，还有Cursor、Vercel、Linear等公司。
They have an incredible customer list, including not only Anthropic, but Cursor, Vercel, Linear, and more.
如果你想快速修复有问题的代码，就像超过15万家使用Sentry的组织一样，从独立爱好者到全球最大的公司，你可以访问sentry.io/acquired。
If you wanna fix your broken code fast, like over a 150,000 other organizations that use Sentry from indie hobbyists to some of the biggest companies in the world, you can check out sentry.io/acquired.
访问sentry.io/acquired，并告诉他们是Ben和David推荐的。
That's sentry.io/acquired, and just tell them that Ben and David sent you.
是的。
Yes.
他们为所有Acquired的听众提供两个月的免费服务。
And they are offering two months free to all Acquired listeners.
对。
Yes.
谢谢Sentry。
Thank you, Sentry.
好的。
Okay.
收购类别。
Acquisition category.
大卫，你来吗？
David, you wanna take it?
是的。
Yeah.
所以，我认为这里最明显的是产品。
So, I think the obvious one here is product.
作为提醒，我们自我认定的主要类别是人员、技术、产品、业务线和其他。
As a reminder, our our self identified major categories are people, technology, product, business line, and other.
但我认为，实际上我会选‘其他’这一项。
But I think I, you know, I think I'm actually gonna go with other on this one.
我觉得这跟你刚才说的有点关系，本。
And I think it's a little bit what you were talking about just now, Ben.
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但我在提出这个观点时并不是独一无二的，我受到几篇在准备这期节目时阅读的文章的启发。
But there's I'm not unique in coming up with this, and I I was inspired by a few articles that I read in preparing for this show.
但多年来，人们一直在谈论YouTube作为谷歌的‘亏损引流产品’。
But people have been talking for years now about YouTube as Google's quote loss leader.
我认为这是一种有趣的视角，因为如果你把谷歌看作一台广告销售机器——它确实如此，其中大部分是自助服务，但也有大量广告销售团队——那么你可以把YouTube看作是谷歌广告销售团队所推销的整体产品组合中的一部分。
And I think that's an interesting, way to look at it because, if you think about Google as an ad sales machine, which it is, much of it self serve, but a lot of it, you know, they have a huge ad sales force, and you think of YouTube as a part of the the the overall portfolio of products that that Google's ad sales team is selling.
即使YouTube这个业务本身并不盈利，产品也存在严重问题，但它确实帮助谷歌实现了多种类型的广告产品。
Even if the business itself isn't profitable as a as a business, as a and the product has huge problems, but it's really enabled Google to have multiple types.
如果你想想他们核心的搜索广告和AdWords，然后是收购DoubleClick后建立的展示广告网络，以及现在的视频和YouTube。
You know, if you think about their their core search advertising and AdWords and then the display network that they built up following the DoubleClick acquisition and then now with video and YouTube.
我认为这是一个有趣的说法，就像我刚才说的，YouTube是谷歌的‘亏损引流产品’。
I think it's I think it's an interesting, you know, like I said, quote, loss leader product for Google.
是的。
Yeah.
我其实也会选择‘其他’，但理由完全不同。
I I actually was gonna go with other also for a totally different reason.
他们能够将人们上传和观看视频所产生数据整合到谷歌搜索算法中，应用于所有媒体类型。
The they're able to bring data that they're getting from the videos that people are uploading and watching into the Google search algorithm on all media types.
我认为，他们当然可以像现在对推特那样，将搜索结果嵌入并导向YouTube，返回前几个视频。
And I think that, sure, they could do what they're doing with Twitter now and embed kind of a passed along search to to YouTube and return the first couple videos.
但他们对YouTube内容以及用户观看视频的分析和数据进行的深度挖掘——理解每个视频中正在发生的主题趋势——远超任何将YouTube作为外部公司所能获得的信息。
But what they're doing with with the content on YouTube and the analytics and metrics of people watching these videos and understanding, you know, the topical things that are going on each of these videos is so much deeper than anything they'd be able to get with YouTube as an external company.
所以，再次强调，这可能主要是产品本身的原因，但我觉得是的。
So, you know, again, probably primarily the product, but I think Yeah.
基于上述两个原因，我倾向于另一个观点。
Other for for both of those two reasons.
这也引出了我想稍后讨论的一个话题，那就是嵌入式内容。
And that also gets to, something I wanna talk about in a minute, which is embeds.
是的。
Yeah.
但我们稍后再谈这个。
But we'll get there in a minute.
我想在这里提出一点。
One point I wanna make here.
所以谷歌在收购YouTube之前，已经研究了几年名为Google Video Search的产品，是的。
So Google was had been playing with a product for a few years called Google Video Search Yep.
在收购之前。
Before they acquired YouTube.
有趣的是，他们在收购后竟然还让这个产品以完全相同的形式继续运行了一两年，用户仍然可以上传视频到Google Video，并且维持了很长时间。
And interestingly enough, they actually left it running for, like, a year or two after the acquisition in its exact same form where you could actually upload videos to Google Video and then left it up for, you know, much, much longer.
这很有趣。
And it's interesting.
施密特在他的证词中确实提到过这一点，说他们之所以如此迫切地收购YouTube，是因为很明显，YouTube的增长速度更快，用户参与度也远高于Google Video。
Schmidt actually talks about this in his testimony, saying that one of the reasons that they were so compelled to pursue YouTube was that it was clear that YouTube was growing way faster and had way better engagement than Google Video.
是的。
Yeah.
那么，他们做错了什么？
So what were they doing wrong?
我的意思是，他们为什么需要YouTube？为什么不能直接用Google Video呢？
I mean, why did they need YouTube, and what why couldn't they do it with Google Video?
他们在哪儿失败了？
Where did they fail there?
我不知道。
I don't know.
这真是个有趣的问题。
This is a really interesting question.
有一部分我觉得这可能和The Lonely Island的《Lazy Sunday》有关，那种视频突然就病毒式传播开来，开始迅速走红。
Part of me wonders if it is like, you know, kinda related to the Lonely Island, Lazy Sunday, like, it kinda just got virality and it started taking off.
我的意思是，记得我当时还在上大学，2006年某一天，突然间校园里所有人都在看YouTube。
I mean, remember I was in college, you know, when this was happening, and one day in, you know, 2006, all of a sudden everybody on campus was watching YouTube.
所以你觉得，这挺有意思的，YouTube比Google Video做得好，是因为YouTube作为一个初创公司，本质上通过大量诉讼积累了债务——因为他们允许用户上传大量侵权视频，主要是因为当时技术上无法有效过滤，也根本没有手段去处理。
So do you think oh, that's kinda interesting to think about, that YouTube did better than Google Video because YouTube, by the nature of being a scrappy startup, was able to, like, basically acquire a bunch of debt in the form of lawsuits because they were doing things like, you know, letting people upload all these illegal videos, primarily because they didn't have great technology to filter it out and and really no means to.
但同时，这也正是推动他们增长飞轮的关键，一旦启动起来，他们之后就能用各种方式慢慢偿还这些债务。
But also, like, that was the thing that sorta got their flywheel going, and once it was in motion, they could do all sorts of things to sort of pay down that debt later on.
但从根本上说，他们拥有用户，并且内容源源不断涌入。
But fundamentally, they had the users and they had content flowing in.
我的意思是，说YouTube的战略之一是故意发布他们没有授权的内容，这不仅是错误的，而且至少是不清晰的。
I mean, I think it's it would be I I think it would be probably wrong and at least unclear to say that part of YouTube strategy was to to illegally post content that they didn't have access to.
我的意思是，整个诉讼就是围绕这一点展开的，而YouTube最终赢得了这场诉讼。
I mean, this is what the whole lawsuit was about and YouTube won the lawsuit.
所以，从法律上讲，我们确实应该承认这一点，是的。
So, you know, legally So we it a credit believe that that Yeah.
根据法院的判决。
According to the courts.
但你知道，我觉得这并不明确，而且，我们接触过很多初创公司，你知道，在早期阶段，你根本无法完全掌控发生了什么，人们会用你的平台做他们想做的事。
But, you know, I think it's unclear and, like, you know, we work with startups, you know, like things are you don't really have a good handle on what's going on in the early days and people use your platform for what they use it for.
但我认为这确实体现了YouTube的机智、令人难忘的特质，以及这种理念如何在你脑海中扎根——我的意思是，当我们谈到科技主题，比如流媒体时，我想讨论的很多东西都源于此。
But I think it does illustrate, you know, the scrappiness, the, you know, the memorableness of YouTube, you know, and the idea that that could, like, plant in your brain as a concept of you know, mean, so many of these things I wanna talk about when we get to tech themes, like streaming.
在YouTube出现之前，其实并不存在这样的概念。
That was not a concept that existed before YouTube, really.
是的。
Yeah.
去问问贾斯汀·科顿吧。
Just talk to Justin Cotton.
没人想看。
No one wanted to watch.
对。
Yeah.
我的意思是，我们现在想到的全部直播，甚至只是流媒体播放。
Well, I mean, with all the livestreaming that we think of now, but even just streaming media.
我的意思是，真正的网络平台当时确实存在，而且我们就在西雅图。
I mean, real networks was a thing obviously, and we're here in Seattle.
但在YouTube出现之前，大多数人知道，宽带普及率远没有现在这么高，几乎达到100%。
But, like, most, before YouTube, you know, and broadband penetration wasn't the, you know, basically a 100% that it is now.
那时候，人们会下载内容，在硬盘上存储视频观看，或者听音乐、播客。
Like, people downloaded content and watched videos that they had stored on their hard drives or listened to music or podcast.
你知道，播客最初是下载到 iTunes 里的。
You know, podcasts originally were downloaded into iTunes.
对吧？
Right?
你根本想不到会有人实时流媒体播放。
The idea that you would stream something live.
通过 USB 传到你的 iPod 上，然后听。
To put on your iPod with USB so you can listen to it.
是的。
Yeah.
没错。
Exactly.
对吧？
Right?
我敢肯定，当时所有人都在听这个？
I'm sure that's what all Why was listening to that?
十二年后，这种媒介才刚刚开始兴起，因为是的。
Twelve years later and the medium is just barely taking off because Yeah.
但是但是但是，你知道，想想看，YouTube 真正推动了这一点的普及。
But but but, you know, I mean, think about it, like, YouTube was really able to popularize this.
然后另一部分是嵌入功能，我想稍后谈一谈。
And then and then the other piece of it, think, is embeds, which I wanna talk about in a minute.
你知道吗？
You know?
我的意思是，YouTube 能够受益于这项惊人的服务，这项服务显然受到了数百万、现在是数十亿人的喜爱，那就是在互联网上观看托管视频。
I mean, YouTube could benefit from this amazing service that it offered that that clearly millions and millions and now billions of people love, which is watching hosted video on the Internet.
但你不需要去 youtube.com。
But you didn't have to go to youtube.com.
你得去 google.com/videos 才能发现和观看，是的。
You had to go to google.com/videos to discover and watch Yeah.
确实如此。
It's true.
那不是视频。
It wasn't videos.
我记得当时想，嗯，我会有什么视频值得上传到Google视频呢？这其实是个命名问题，天啊。
I remember thinking, like, well, what videos would I have that I even it's it's like a naming thing in the oh, man.
我会有什么视频想上传到Google视频呢？
What videos would I have that I wanna upload to Google video?
我不知道。
I don't know.
但这需要某种奇怪的创造力，而我并没有那种能力，或者
But it like requires some weird creativity that I don't I don't didn't or
但你有自己的个人博客。
But you have a personal blog.
哦，我知道这是什么了。
Oh, I know what this is.
就是一些我日常活动的视频。
Like, you know, it's videos of stuff that I do.
是的。
Yep.
或者你有自己的网站、个人博客之类的，你想在里面嵌入一个视频。
Or or or you have, you know, your own website about personal blog or or whatever, and, you wanna embed a video in there.
对。
Yeah.
你这么做了。
You do that.
然后，如果用户双击它，就会跳转到YouTube，从而了解YouTube。
And then, you know, if a user double clicks on it, they go to YouTube, and then they learn about YouTube.
他们可能会想，也许我想把我的视频托管在那里。
And they say, oh, you know, maybe I wanna host my videos there.
哇。
Or, wow.
看看那个慵懒的星期天素描。
Look at that lazy Sunday sketch.
是的。
Yeah.
我还有一个比喻想说。
I have one more allegory that I wanna make.
我在想，做那些不光彩的事情时，你会积累债务，因为后来这会变成一个无法停止的飞轮——你赚了太多钱，根本不在乎，也能应付得来。
I was thinking about, sort of the debt you acquire in doing things that are, like, shady, because later on, it's gonna be an untouchable flywheel that you're you know, you've got so much cash that doesn't matter, and you can deal with it.
突然有两件事浮现在我脑海里。
There's actually two things that just came to mind.
一个是领英刚刚输掉了一场诉讼，他们那种我们所有人都讨厌、被广泛诟病的行为——就是怎么也停不下来的邮件轰炸。
One is LinkedIn just lost that lawsuit, where the thing that they were doing that we all hate and everybody notoriously rips on them for is like, somehow they can never stop emailing me.
他们对用户的收件箱极其侵入，还擅自获取了我的所有联系人，并替我邀请他们加入领英，这既对用户不友好，也违法了。
And they've been incredibly invasive in the inbox, and they took all my contacts, they invited them all to LinkedIn for me, and that was user hostile and illegal.
而他们多年后，终于被处以罚款，具体金额我也不太清楚。
And they, years and years and years later, now finally got hit with the penalty that was like, I don't know.
大概在一亿美元左右。
It was in the neighborhood of like a $100,000,000.
但在早期，他们从这种行为中获得的价值以及所有的用户锁定效应要大得多。
And the value that they gained from that in the early days and all that lock in is way more.
但马已经跑出马厩了。
But, you know, the horse is way out of the barn.
比赛已经结束了。
Like, the race is over.
是的。
Yeah.
我的意思是，这真的很有趣。
I mean, it's really interesting.
我的意思是，我们俩都不是在说我们支持这种做法，或者我认为许多这些科技公司明确地以这种阴暗的方式思考问题。
I mean, I'm not I don't think either of us is saying we indoor either that we endorse this or that I think a lot of these tech companies, like, explicitly are thinking in this macabillion way.
但想想优步和爱彼迎吧。
But but think about, you know, think about Uber and Airbnb.
对吧？
Right?
比如Airbnb，他们早期通过在Craigslist上发布信息来帮助建立供应方网络。
Like Airbnb, one of they helped bootstrap their supply side network with posting to Craigslist.
这违反了Craigslist的服务条款，对吧？
Was that, you know, that was against Craigslist terms of service.
这算不算他们阴险又权谋的做法？
Was that, you know, evil and Machiavellian of them?
我不确定。
Like, I don't know.
他们可能根本没想这么多，他们只是想增长，别倒闭，别再卖麦片了。
They probably didn't think about it that They're probably just trying to grow and not die and stop selling cereal.
对吧？
Right?
比如
Like
是的。
Yeah.
我最近听说了一个极其出色的例子，虽然这个例子要早得多。
There's there's one more insanely good one that I heard recently that's it's, quite a bit older.
微软似乎有一种做法，他们会卖给你使用MS-DOS的授权，但不管你是否真的在那台电脑上安装了MS-DOS都没关系。
Microsoft apparently had this practice where they would sell you the rights to use MS DOS, but it didn't matter whether you actually put MS DOS on that computer or not.
你作为微软客户支付的费用是根据你出货的CPU数量计算的，不管这些电脑有没有装DOS都一样。
You were charged as a Microsoft customer for the number of CPUs that you shipped, period, no matter if they had DOS on them or not.
这带来了一个惊人的效果，因为公司们会想：反正不管装不装都得付费，那还不如装上。
And that did an incredible thing because that you know, the companies then are thinking like, well, it doesn't matter if we put this on or not, we're gonna get charged for it.
所以每台出厂的电脑都装上了MS-DOS。
So every PC leaving the door of the factory had MS DOS on it.
而一旦微软在整個競爭行業中建立了壟斷地位，司法部就回來說：這種銷售手段是非法的。
And then once Microsoft had an alleged monopoly on the entire competing industry, well oh, then then the Department of Justice comes back and says, well, that particular sales tactic is illegal.
但again，已經過了好幾年，好幾年了
But again, years, years, years
太晚了。
too late.
在初创公司里，当你试图生存和成长时，人们常说这一点，但现实中确实如此。
In startups, when you're you're trying to survive and grow, you know, people say this, but this is it in practice.
你知道，不公平的优势，如果你没有，别人就有。
You know, unfair advantages, if you don't have one, somebody else does.
YouTube 对 Google 视频拥有不公平的优势。
And, you know, YouTube had an unfair advantage over Google video.
是的。
Yep.
好吧。
Okay.
我想我们已经大致讲完了原本可能发生的情况。
I think we've kinda covered what would have happened otherwise.
当时 YouTube 面临着一个巨大的问题。
Like, there was a massive problem looming for YouTube.
否则会有人收购他们，或者他们会……
Someone else would have picked them up or they would have Or
他们就会破产。
they would have gone bankrupt.
所以，是的，科技趋势。
So, yeah, tech themes.
我们之前也讨论过很多这些，但我挑出了三个。
We've also covered a bunch of these, but but, you know, I I pulled I pulled three.
我还有其他几个，但我从红杉的备忘录中挑出了三个，我认为YouTube真正识别出了其中之一：用户生成内容。
I have a couple others, but, I pulled three out of the Sequoia memo that I thought were were that YouTube really illustrated that they identified, you know, one, user generated content.
你看到一波浪潮始于博客，比如Blogger在2000年代初出现，然后转向了照片。
You had this kinda wave that started with blogging, with blogger in the sorta early two thousands, and then it moved into, photos.
你有PhotoBucket、Shutterfly和Myspace，接着早期的Facebook出现，人们开始有了分享照片的概念。
You know, you had PhotoBucket, Shutterfly, and Myspace, and then and then early Facebook popping up of people starting to, you know, get this concept of sharing photos.
然后播客开始兴起，出现了音频内容。
And then you had podcasting taking off, and you had audio.
你知道，红杉喜欢这种浪潮类比，但你可以读一下那份备忘录，里面清清楚楚地写在那里。
And, you know, it was kinda you know, Sequoia loves these wave analogies, but then they you can read the memo, and it's just there in black and white.
你知道，视频是这一波浪潮中下一个、也是可能最大的部分。
You know, video is the next and potentially biggest, piece of this wave that's coming.
所以这是第一点。
So that's one.
第二点，宽带的持续普及。
Two, continued broadband adoption.
我的意思是，没有宽带，这一切都不可能发生。
I mean, this would not have been possible without broadband.
第三点，廉价视频捕捉设备的广泛普及。
And and then three, the the quote is wide proliferation of inexpensive video capture devices.
2005年、2006年发生的情况是，你有了像Flip这样的设备，是的。
What was happening in 2005, 2006 was you had like flip Yeah.
懂的，老兄。
Know, man.
这和思科的合作非常成功。
That went so well with Cisco.
你还有带视频模式的数码相机，这些是静态相机，但当时这还是新鲜事。
And you had digital cameras, still cameras, shipping with video modes, and this was new.
然后不久之后，手机出现了，智能手机也出现了。
And then and then shortly thereafter, cell phones happened smartphones happened.
是的。
Yeah.
我的意思是，想想这次收购发生的时候，是不是大约在2006年10月？
I mean, you think about when this acquisition happened, was it, like, October 2006.
是的。
Yeah.
我的意思是，就在iPhone发布前不到一年。
I mean, not even a year before the iPhone.
没错。
Yep.
所有这些因素共同作用，造就了YouTube崛起的契机。
All of these things that all combine to, you know, in this this, you know, inferno to to create the opportunity for YouTube.
是的。
Yeah.
这真的很有趣。
And and it's really interesting.
我的意思是，我一直在批评谷歌，而且还会继续下去。
I mean, I I've been kinda ripping Google the whole time here and, will continue to.
但他们大胆地赌了一把，认为人们会从看电视转向在线观看视频。
But the they made a big bet that people would move from watching their televisions to watching video online.
当时我们还没称之为‘剪掉电缆’，也不知道未来会有像Netflix这样的订阅服务，但他们确实坚信互联网视频是人们注意力的未来，而他们对此完全正确。
And we weren't calling it cord cutting then, and we didn't know that we'd have these Netflix like subscriptions and things like that, but they were definitely making the bet that that video on the Internet is the future of people's attention, and they were absolutely right about that.
对。
Yeah.
我的意思是，我没有有线电视。
I mean, I don't have cable.
你有有线电视吗？
Do you have cable?
没有。
Nope.
我成年后就没用过。
Not in my adult life.
有。
Yep.
我也没有。
Me neither.
我觉得，是时候做总结了。
I think, I think it's time for conclusion.
是的。
Yeah.
这很有趣。
It's interesting.
我想要思考的是，如果谷歌想要抓住我们刚才讨论的趋势，特别是我想说的——互联网视频将成为人们注意力的焦点，他们还能做些什么？
The the way that I sorta wanna think about this is what else could Google have done if they wanted to capitalize on the trends we've been talking about, particularly the the, the one that I was thinking of is is, video on the Internet is the place where people's attention will be.
作为一个从人们注意力的价值链中获取价值的公司，而人们的注意力和时间主要花在寻找信息上，谷歌所采取的是一种防御性举措：如果未来人们就是这样消磨时间的，那么我们就必须能够在那时将广告展示给他们，从而实现变现。
And as someone who, you know, as a company that captures value from being somewhere in the value chain of people's attention of people's attention and where they spend their time, primarily in the form of seeking out information, you know, Google was making a defensive move that in the if that's how people are spending time in the future, then we need to be able to put advertising in front of them on that during that time to monetize it.
那么，他们还能做些什么呢？
So what else could they have done?
那时的Netflix还远未形成如今这样的商业模式。
Netflix wasn't really a business yet that looked anything like this.
那会是一个相当愚蠢的收购。
That would have been sort of a silly acquisition.
他们曾尝试过Google Video，但显然无法在内部成功，而我认为，如果重新启动这样的努力，其成果未必会比这次收购来得丰厚。
They were trying with Google Video and clearly couldn't do it internally, and I I it feels like a rebooted effort there wouldn't have necessarily been as fruitful as this acquisition.
我不知道他们还有什么其他方式能抓住这股浪潮。
I don't know that they had a lot of other ways to capitalize on this wave.
是的。
Yeah.
我喜欢这个。
I like this.
想想当时和现在，有多少比例的谷歌搜索最终导向了YouTube？
And think about both then and today, what percentage of Google searches end in YouTube?
我猜这个比例相当高。
I I would imagine a pretty significant percentage.
是的。
Yeah.
这挺有意思的。
It's pretty interesting.
如果谷歌把，我不知道。
And if and if Google were sending I don't know.
我随便猜个数字吧，但我觉得10%到15%的谷歌搜索最终会跳转到YouTube链接，这听起来挺合理的。
I'm gonna pick a number out of thin air, but, 10%, 15% of Google searches, I I think that's seem feels reasonable to me, end up in a YouTube link.
如果谷歌把10%到15%的流量导向一个非谷歌的网站，我的意思是，它其实也确实会这样，比如对亚马逊。
And if they were if Google were sending 10 to 15% of its traffic to a non Google property, I mean, I guess it kinda does that with, like, Amazon.
是的。
Yeah.
是的。
Yeah.
这很有趣。
That's interesting.
如果有人变得足够大，以至于成为了一个直接访问其主页的终点网站，而不是通过Google搜索或通过Facebook上朋友分享的内容来发现它，这对Google的业务来说是坏事吗？因为这基本上是现在人们在互联网上发现内容的两种主要方式。
Is that bad for Google's business if they're I guess it's bad if someone gets big enough so that they actually become a destination site where you go right to that homepage instead of using Google to search for it or Facebook to discover it through what your friends and Facebook are surfacing to you, which are basically the two ways that people find things on the Internet right now.
没错。
Yep.
他们就像是
They're like
或者他们在Amazon上搜索。
Or they search on Amazon.
是的。
Yeah.
我的意思是，我甚至经常在Google上搜索那些我知道会优先显示Amazon结果的产品，而且我的书签栏里还特意放了一个Amazon Smile按钮，这样我就能确保去那里，让code.org获得收益。但我总是忘记点，因为最后我还是直接在Google里搜产品，反正我知道Amazon肯定会排第一。
Well, I mean, I even probably search products on Google that I know will come up on Amazon first, and I'm I freaking have an Amazon smile button in my bookmarks bar so that I always know to go there, so that code.org gets the the the money, but it I, like, always forget to do it because I end up just searching for the product in Google because I know Amazon's gonna be the first thing anyway.
所以当我清楚自己想要什么时，Google 是我的入口；而当我还不知道想要什么时，Facebook 是我的入口。
So Google is my front door when I know what I want, and Facebook is my front door when I don't know what
我想要的东西。
I want.
我对你太宽容了，真是个失败。
I'm so big hearted at you and such a fail.
我尽力了。
I try.
我刚才想说什么来着？
What was the point I was gonna make there?
没关系。
That is okay.
如果真的有一大块通过 Google 的流量都流向了单一网站，而不是分散到众多小网站，那会怎样？
If it actually let's go work off the hypothesis that a huge chunk of the traffic passing through Google goes to a single site instead of an aggregated bunch of little sites.
这应该是个问题，因为从波特五力模型的角度来看，那个网站就会对 Google 拥有话语权，然后人们开始直接访问那个网站，不再需要 Google 这样的中间商了。
That should be a problem because then in sort of a, like, Porter's five forces way, that business gets power over Google, and then people start going directly to that thing, and they don't need, like, the retailer of Google anymore.
他们可以直接从YouTube获取他们的内容。
And they can just get their their material directly from, directly from YouTube.
YouTube已经被谷歌拥有十年了，但他们仍然没能把youtube.com打造成一个独立的目的地网站。
YouTube has been owned by Google for ten years, and they still can't manage to make youtube.com slash a destination site.
我不确定这是否真的会对他们的业务构成威胁。
Like, I don't know that that actually would have been threatening to their business.
是的。
Yep.
另一方面，你可以说谷歌其实根本没有动力去投资这样做。
On the other hand, you could argue that Google really had no motivation to invest in doing so.
如果YouTube保持独立，正如我们某种程度上确认的那样。
And had YouTube remained independent, which as we kinda established Certainly.
那是不可能的。
Was impossible.
对。
Yeah.
但让我们假设他们本可以做到。
But let's imagine they could've.
你知道，如果是由产品导向的创始人来领导这家公司，会不会发展成类似Twitch的样子？未来十年Twitch又会怎样？
You know, would, product oriented founders have led that company to, you know, something that looks like Twitch, and what's gonna happen to Twitch in the next ten years.
是的。
Yeah.
这也很有趣。
That's super interesting too.
所以我要得出我的结论，是C。
So I'm gonna render my conclusion, it's a c.
哇。
Wow.
这是我们到目前为止最低的分数吗？
Is that our lowest grade yet?
肯定是我给的。
Certainly mine.
我们给Siri打了什么分数？
What did we give Siri?
我不记得了。
I don't remember.
是B-。
It's a b minus.
是的。
Yeah.
差不多就是这样。
Something like that.
好吧。
Okay.
所以对我来说，天啊。
So for me, gosh.
我有一部分真的很想把它分成两部分。
I kinda part of me really wants to split this into two pieces.
所以我认为我会这么做，分别为它们打分，但我们必须只有一个最终成绩，你知道的，因此我最终会给出一个总评成绩。
And so I think I'm gonna do that and give a grade for each, but but we have to have just one grade, you know, so I'm gonna ultimately render a final grade.
你的展示占50%，你说了算。
50% your show, you what you want.
是的。
Yeah.
对。
Right.
谢谢你，本。
Well, thanks Ben.
我非常感谢你对我的信任。
I really appreciate the trust here.
所以我认为，作为一个业务，YouTube，不幸的是，并不是一个特别赚钱的生意。
So I think as a I'm gonna take first as a business, YouTube, unfortunately, don't think has been a particularly good business.
正如我们之前所确认的，公司已经运营了十年以上，收入不错，但利润基本为零。
As we've established, you know, we're ten plus years into the company and revenues are great, but profits are basically zero.
也许有一些事情，他们可以投资去逐步改变这种情况，或者谷歌本可以做得不一样。
And maybe there are things that, you know, they can invest in to change that over time or Google could have done differently.
但一个年收入50亿美元、利润率为零的业务，绝不是一个好业务，
But, know, a $5,000,000,000 revenue business with a $0 margin is not a great business,
在我看来。
in my view.
好吧。
Fine.
你去创办一个吧。
You start one.
是的。
Yeah.
对。
Right.
嘿。
Hey.
我是一名风险投资人。
I'm a VC.
我的工作是评判别人的生意，而不是去真正地辛苦创业。
My job is to is to judge other people's businesses, not to, you know, do the hard work of actually building them.
这很棒。
It's great.
所以，在商业层面，我觉得这简直太糟糕了。
So, you know, on the business side, I think this is a gosh.
我不知道。
I don't know.
大概是个C-吧。
C minus maybe.
我的意思是，你说得对。
I mean, yeah, you're right.
像我这样的人，根本没法打造一家50亿美元的公司。
Like, I can't build a $5,000,000,000 business.
这真的太难了。
Like, it's it's freaking hard.
但那16.5亿美元只是开始。
And But that 1,650,000,000.00 is just the beginning.
我的意思是，想想这些年往这个业务里投入更多资金所带来的运营成本。
I mean, think about the operational cost of pouring more money into this business over the years.
还有人力和内容方面的投入等等。
And people and content investments and all that.
但我就是觉得，从优秀企业的标准来看，这并不是一个好生意。
But I just don't you know, it's not a great business by great business standards.
然后，我想从另一个角度——产品角度——来看待这个问题。
Then I think the other lens I wanna look at this through is the product lens.
这个角度特别有趣，因为YouTube本身也不是一个出色的产品。
And this one's super interesting because, like, YouTube is not a great product either.
就像我们之前讨论的，它在很多方面都很糟糕。
Like, it's really crappy in a lot of ways, like, as we've been discussing.
我的意思是，也许外面有人经常去，但本和我很少访问youtube.com。
I mean, maybe folks out there do, but, like, Ben and I don't go to youtube.com very often.
我偶尔可能会去，但只有在找非常具体的东西时才会。
And I probably do occasionally, but only if I'm looking for a very, very specific thing.
而且，那个网站还是有点难看，他们完全错过了聊天这样的创新功能。
And, you know, and it's still kinda ugly, the site, and they've totally missed out on innovations like chat.
而且
And
我觉得我从来没有直接打开过那个应用。
And I I don't think I've ever opened the app directly.
我每次都只是被跳转进去的。
I've only ever been kicked into it.
我们甚至聊到移动端，但天啊。
We even talk about mobile, but god.
对。
Right.
你知道吗，他们花了好久才搞明白这一点，现在总算差不多了。
You know, it took them forever to figure that out, and they're kinda like okay now.
但从纯粹的创新角度来看，我已经说过这一点了，那就是流媒体的概念。
But just on the like pure innovation side, I mean, and I've talked about this already, the concept of streaming media.
是的，在YouTube之前，RealNetworks和其他公司就已经有了流媒体。
And yes, it existed with RealNetworks and others before before YouTube.
但真正实现视频的流畅运行并支持大规模应用，这彻底改变了世界。
But really working and working with video and working at scale, it changed the world.
对吧？
Right?
第二个是嵌入功能。
And then the second one being embeds.
嵌入功能是一把双刃剑，因为我们刚才聊到，当你能把内容嵌入到别人网站上时，用户为什么还要去你的平台呢？
And embeds is a double edged sword because as we're talking you know, as we've talked about, like, when you can embed your content on somebody else's on other people's properties, like, why do they go to your property?
但作为一个概念，它确实非常了不起。
But, as a concept, like, it's pretty amazing.
太棒了。
It's awesome.
作为网站所有者，我不需要自己托管视频，也不用去研究编解码器和传输机制。
As, like, a site owner, I don't have to, like, host and and do figure out the codec and the delivery mechanism for all my own videos.
对。
Right.
而且你基本上是升级了互联网。
And you did I mean, basically, it it upgraded the Internet.
YouTube升级了互联网。
YouTube upgraded the Internet.
是的。
Yep.
而且我觉得这并不是夸张。
It's And I don't think that's an exaggeration.
对。
Yeah.
这是一个以前并不存在的基础设施层，而现在却可以直接拿来即用。
It's an infrastructure layer that that didn't previously exist and then was just totally off the shelf.
哦，是的。
Oh, yeah.
我只需要把我的YouTube视频嵌入到这篇博客文章里就行了。
I'll just I'll just put my YouTube video in that blog post.
是的。
Yeah.
所以，对于这些
So and, you know, for these
更不用说你提到的第一点了，它确实改变了世界，还催生了一整个群体的YouTube创作者，他们靠这个谋生，也造就了一整代人，把这些人当作自己的偶像。
Not to mention to your first point when it, like, it it changed the world and there's a whole category of people that are YouTubers that are making a living doing that, and a whole, you know, generation of people that know those people as their celebrities.
是的。
Yeah.
而且，比如PewDiePie。
And it, like, I this is PewDiePie.
虽然很俗气，但它彻底 democratized 了视频创作和成为明星的过程。
Cheesiest thing, but it totally totally democratized video creation and becoming a star.
是的。
Yeah.
因此，我认为这个产品的方面真的很难做。
And, you know, so and for that reason, I think this product side is like really hard.
他们的产品在好几个方面都令人失望，而且是巨大的失败。
Like, they it's been really disappointing and a big failure on several product fronts.
然而，在那些核心功能上，它简直表现得无可挑剔。
However, on, like, the core things that, like, it has just knocked it out of the park.
所以，我在产品方面给它打个A-。
So I give it an a minus on the product side.
总体而言，我会给谷歌打个B，因为我觉得，你知道，我可能错了，但如果你问拉里、谢尔盖和埃里克，如果他们能回到2006年，是否愿意花16.5亿美元收购YouTube，我想他们会天天都这么做。
Overall, I'm gonna mash this up into a b for Google, because I think, you know, I could be wrong, but I think if you asked Larry and Sergei and Eric if they could go back to 2006 and would they spend $1,650,000,000 for YouTube, I think they would do that all day every day.
是的。
Yeah.
我的意思是，还有他们的个性方面。
I mean, also, like, just on their personalities.
对吧？
Right?
我不打算称之为登月计划，但它确实属于那种‘如果每个人都能拍电影，全世界每个人都能观看’的思路，这种想法在2002年时远没有今天这么显而易见。
Like, it's I'm not gonna call it a moonshot, but it it sort of falls in the vein of, like, what if anybody could make movies and then anybody in the world could watch them and like, this idea was not as fathomable in 2002 and obvious as it is today.
对吧？
Right?
与YouTube出现前的几年相比，如今的世界确实看起来像一个疯狂的登月计划。
Like, the world a couple years before YouTube compared to the world now, it sorta does look like a crazy moonshot.
如果他们做到了这一点，而且运行成本至少不高，那就是件好事。
And if they can do that and it doesn't at least cost money to run, it's a good thing.
就是这样。
There we are.
太好了。
Cool.
感谢您的参与。
Thanks for joining us.
下次再见。
See you next time.
好了，各位听众。
Alright, listeners.
现在是时候感谢我们最喜爱的公司之一了，这家公司已经成为我们制作《Acquired》节目的关键伙伴——Anthropic，以及他们最新的旗舰模型Claude Opus 4.6。
Now is a great time to thank one of our favorite companies and one that has become essential to how we make Acquired, Anthropic, and their newest flagship model, Claude Opus 4.6.
我们在这里的Acquired总部一直在大量使用它。
Which we have been making heavy use of here at Acquired HQ.
我刚刚在西雅图为新的Acquired演播室租了一处场地。
I actually just, leased some space for the new Acquired studio here in Seattle.
哇哦。
Whoo.
当房东发来一份相当简单的租赁合同时，我想，哦，这完全是我自己就能审阅的内容。
And when the landlord sent over a a pretty simple lease, I thought, oh, this is totally something I can review myself.
我看了下，但后来我想，好吧，我需要一个旁观者的意见来确认一下。
I looked at it, but then I also thought, okay, I could use a sanity check.
所以我把它上传给了Claude，问有没有什么我应该注意的地方、不一致之处，或者需要反驳的内容。
So, I uploaded it to Claude and asked if there was anything that I should be mindful of or inconsistencies or or anything I should push back on.
Claude真的发现了三个我自己完全忽略的问题。
And Claude actually found three things that I totally missed on my own review.
太神奇了。
It's amazing.
你之前跟我提过这件事。
You told me about that.
我在这里也经常用它来写节目笔记。
I've actually been using it a lot here for writing show notes.
我写剧本时总是堆砌了太多细节，动辄五六十页甚至七十页，以至于我太贴近材料了，需要一双新的眼睛帮我梳理出每期节目的核心要点。
I end up with so much detail in my, like, fifty, sixty, 70 page script documents that I'm, like, way too close to the material, and I need a fresh set of eyes for what the big points are as I write up the show notes for each episode.
我也用它做过类似的事情。
And, I used it for something similar too.
当我们筹备超级碗创新峰会时，我让Claude回溯我们之前的NFL节目，并搜索自那以后哪些数据发生了变化，然后和我一起分析这些变化是否影响了我们之前的结论。
When we were preparing for our Super Bowl Innovation Summit, I had Claude go back through our old NFL episode and search the web for what numbers had actually changed since then, then go through it with me and figure out, if that changed any of our older conclusions.
是的。
Yep.
正如Anthropic所说，Claude是为那些不满足于现状的思维而设计的AI。
As Anthropic puts it, Claude is the AI for minds that don't stop at good enough.
它是一个真正理解你整个工作流程、并与你共同思考的合作伙伴。
It's the collaborator that actually understands your entire workflow and thinks with you.
无论你是半夜调试代码，还是在规划下一个商业决策，Claude都能延伸你的思维，帮你解决对你重要的问题。
Whether you're debugging code at midnight or strategizing your next business move, Claude extends your thinking to tackle the problems that matter to you.
所以，无论你是在推出下一个伟大的产品，还是在应对需要深度思考的问题，Claude Opus 4.6都会与你一同应对复杂性，而不是
So whether you are shipping the next great product or tackling problems that need deep thinking, Claude Opus four point six thinks through complexity with you, not
替你。
for you.
它是你智能的思考伙伴。
It's your intelligent thinking partner.
如果你准备好应对更大的挑战，现在就前往 claude.ai/acquired 开始使用 Claude，享受三个月半价 Pro 服务。
So if you're ready to tackle bigger problems, get started with Claude today at claude.ai/acquired to try Claude with 50% off pro for three months.
如果你想了解他们的企业级服务，只需告诉他们，是本和大卫推荐的。
And if you wanna explore their enterprise offerings, just tell them that Ben and David sent you.
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