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好的,这一集肯定会很精彩。
All right, this is going to be a great episode.
这肯定会很棒,是的。
This is going to be awesome, yeah.
我觉得行政事务部分可能只需要请大家给个评价。
I think Administrivia might only be asking for reviews.
我们还要继续这样做吗?
Should we keep doing that?
这样会不会显得很急切?
Does it sound needy?
谁说的是真的?
Who got the truth?
是你吗?
Is it you?
是你吗?
Is it you?
是你吗?
Is it you?
现在谁知道了真相?
Who got the truth now?
是你吗?
Is it you?
是你吗?
Is it you?
是你吗?
Is it you?
让我坐下。
Sit me down.
直说吧。
Say it straight.
又一个故事要来了。
Another story on the way.
谁知道了真相?
Who got the truth?
欢迎收听《Acquired》第15期,这是一档讨论科技收购的播客。
Welcome to episode 15 of Acquired, the podcast where we talk about technology acquisitions.
我是本·吉尔伯特。
I'm Ben Gilbert.
我是大卫·罗森塔尔。
I'm David Rosenthal.
我们是你们的主持人。
And we are your hosts.
今天我们要聊的是2013年Salesforce收购ExactTarget的事情。
We'll be talking about the 2013 Salesforce acquisition of ExactTarget.
今天我们请到了斯科特·多尔西。
We have with us today Scott Dorsey.
斯科特是ExactTarget的创始人和CEO,而且我大学时其实在ExactTarget实习过一个夏天。
Scott was the founder and CEO of ExactTarget, and I actually interned at ExactTarget for a summer when I was in college.
可能值得一提,斯科特也是我的表哥。
And probably worth mentioning, Scott is also my cousin.
所以特别高兴能有家人上节目,欢迎你,斯科特。
So super excited to have family on the show, and welcome, Scott.
嘿,谢谢,本。
Hey, thanks, Ben.
真的很感谢,大卫,能上这个节目我很高兴,而且本,我很自豪看到你的事业发展得这么好。
Really appreciate it, and David, a delight to be on the show, and proud to watch how your career's developed, Ben.
也很高兴你曾在ExactTarget待过一段时间。
And glad that you had a little stint at ExactTarget along the way.
那挺不错的。
That's pretty neat.
特别有意思。
Super fun.
在那里认识了很多很棒的人。
Met a lot of great people there.
没有那段经历,你今天也不会坐在这里。
You wouldn't be here today without it.
对,确实是这样。
No, it's true.
我觉得我们平时聊的都是收购的历史和事实,大卫一般会回顾这些。
I think normally we talk about the acquisition history and facts, and David sort of reviews that.
但我觉得今天节目一个很酷的切入方式是让大卫简单回顾一下事实,然后跟斯科特做一场问答。
But I thought a really cool way of diving into the show today would be to have David do a little bit of review of facts, but go into a Q&A with Scott.
对,这就是计划,因为我们很幸运,能请到当事人坐在这里。
Yeah, that's the plan, since we're lucky enough to have the primary source here sitting with us.
所以,对于不了解的朋友来说,ExactTarget是由斯科特和你的联合创始人克里斯·巴戈特、彼得·麦考密克于2000年12月在印第安纳波利斯创立的。
So, for folks who don't know, ExactTarget was founded by Scott, and your co-founders, Chris Baggott and Peter McCormick, in Indianapolis in December of 2000.
那么斯科特,2000年12月,你们是怎么决定要创办一家科技公司的?
So Scott, December of 2000, how'd you guys decide to start a tech company?
那时候互联网泡沫刚刚破裂。
The bubble had just burst.
你当时不在硅谷。
You weren't in Silicon Valley.
你们当时在想什么?
What was going through your minds?
没错,大卫。
Exactly, David.
这是个好问题,我们就是那种典型的不知天高地厚、逆势而上的故事,因为我们在2000年12月最艰难的条件下创办了ExactTarget。
It's a great question, and we're a classic didn't know any better, against long odds story in that we started ExactTarget in December of 2000 under the toughest conditions.
互联网泡沫破裂了。
The internet bubble had burst.
风险投资几乎枯竭,我们是三个首次创业的软件创业者,在印第安纳波利斯创办一家科技公司,而且我们谁都没有技术背景。
VC funding had really dried up, and we were three first-time software entrepreneurs starting a tech company in Indianapolis, and actually none of us had a technical background.
所以我们确实面临很大的困难,但我们对自己想实现的目标有非常清晰的愿景。实际上,是我的联合创始人克里斯·巴戈特,既然我们在聊一些家庭故事,克里斯其实是我的姐夫。
So we were against long odds for sure, but we had a real clear vision around what we were trying to accomplish, and it was actually my co-founder, Chris Baggott, and while we're unpacking some family stories here, Chris is actually my brother-in-law.
所以我们俩都娶进了这个来自印第安纳波利斯的很棒的家庭。
So we both married into this great family from Indianapolis.
他来自匹兹堡,我来自芝加哥。
He's from Pittsburgh, and I'm from Chicago.
我刚在西北大学的凯洛格商学院读完MBA,主要研究创业和互联网商业模式,刚从我们的毕业设计课程回来,那个课程主要是研究硅谷的生态系统,并思考如何将其应用到芝加哥和中西部。
And I had just finished my MBA at Kellogg, over at Northwestern, and really studied entrepreneurship and internet business models and had just come back from our capstone course, which was studying really the Silicon Valley ecosystem and figuring out how to apply that to Chicago and how to apply that to the Midwest.
克里斯有一个关于数据库营销的大想法,以及如何将数据库营销的原则应用到互联网上。
And Chris had this big idea around database marketing and how to apply database marketing principles to the internet.
克里斯是那种非常出色的远见者和布道者,他后来多次成功,甚至在ExactTarget之后,创立了一家名为Compendium的公司,专注于博客软件领域,现在他深入食品科技和农业领域。
And Chris is one of these just incredible visionaries and evangelists, and he's now done it multiple times, even post ExactTarget, by founding a company called Compendium in the blogging software space, and now he's very deep into food tech and agriculture.
但克里斯敏锐地意识到,互联网将改变营销,特别是电子邮件营销,以及基于许可的电子邮件,将成为小企业更好地了解客户、建立个性化关系、传递相关内容并推动业务发展的强大工具。
But Chris had a real sense that the internet was going to transform marketing and that email marketing, in particular, and permission-based email, was going to be a very powerful way for small businesses to get to know their customers better and be able to build these kind of personalized relationships and be able to deliver relevant content that drove business.
他说得对。
And he was right.
他对此充满热情,以至于说服我辞掉了日常工作。
So he was so passionate about the idea that he really convinced me to quit my day job.
我当时在芝加哥一家名为Devine的互联网孵化器工作,我们卖掉了房子,带着两个小孩,全家开车去了印第安纳波利斯,说:“让我们试试吧。”
I was working for an internet incubator in Chicago called Devine, and we sold the house and had two little ones and put the family in the car and drove to Indianapolis and said, "Let's give this a shot."
哇。
Wow.
那真是太疯狂了。
That's pretty crazy.
你们当时有没有尝试从硅谷的风投那里融资?
Did you guys try and raise money from Silicon Valley VCs at that point?
我知道,你们从朋友、家人和一些本地个人那里筹了一些钱。
I know, so you raised some money from friends and family and a few local individuals.
鲍勃·康普顿,我记得是你们的领投人。
Bob Compton, I believe, was your lead investor.
但我猜在2000年12月,没有多少风投会投资,更不用说印第安纳波利斯的首次创业的技术创业者了。
But I got to imagine in December of 2000, not many VCs are making any investments, let alone first-time tech entrepreneurs in Indianapolis.
不,大卫,你说得完全对。
No, that's exactly right, David.
我们跟印第安纳波利斯、明尼阿波利斯的很多风投谈过,但都白费功夫。
We spun our wheels talking to a lot of different VCs in Indianapolis, Minneapolis.
我们其实没有真正大规模地回到硅谷,但我们确实和中西部的很多风投聊过,但一点运气都没有。
We really didn't head back to the Valley in a meaningful way, but we certainly talked to a lot of VCs in the Midwest, with absolutely no luck.
然后我们开始接触天使投资人,但他们动作也很慢。
And then started talking to angel investors who were also slow to move.
所以我们的第一轮融资就是典型的亲友轮。
So our first round of financing was just a classic friends and family round.
我们大约筹集了20万美元,来自那些爱我们、信任我们的人,早期投资者名单包括我的父母、我的兄弟、我的岳父,然后基本上就是克里斯的邻居们。
We raised about $200,000 from those that loved us and trusted us, and that early investor roster was my parents and my brother and my father-in-law, and then pretty much all of Chris's neighbors.
克里斯就是有那种感染力十足的 enthusiasm,毫不夸张地说,他拿着私募备忘录挨家挨户地在邻居里敲门,收集了5000美元的支票。
Chris has just this infectious enthusiasm, and it's not much of an exaggeration to say he went door to door with a PPM in his neighborhood and collected $5,000 checks.
我们非常小心,尤其是因为我和克里斯是家人,我们只想从家人那里筹集小额资金,这样如果事情不顺利,也不会伤感情,感恩节晚餐时也不会尴尬。
And we were so careful, especially with Chris and I being family, we only wanted to raise small amounts of money from family members, that if it didn't work out, there'd be no hard feelings, and we wouldn't have any discomfort around the Thanksgiving dinner table.
所以我们收了很多5000美元和10000美元的支票,凑齐了公司最初的两三十万美元。
So we scooped up a lot of $5,000 and $10,000 checks and cobbled together the first couple hundred thousand dollars in the business.
还有一个很酷的故事是,那些在种子轮投入5000美元并坚持到底的投资者,实际上有几个人做到了。
And a really cool story is that for those investors that put $5,000 into that seed round and went the distance, and actually a handful of them did.
他们一直持有股票,直到被Salesforce收购。
They held the stock all the way through the Salesforce acquisition.
那5000美元变成了——
That $5,000 became-
太厉害了。
Amazing
……远远超过一百万美元。
... well north of a million dollars.
哇。
Wow.
所以,克里斯家附近开始冒出好多游泳池和翻新工程。
So, lots of pools and home renovation projects started popping up in Chris's neighborhood.
我们很多家人都特别开心。
And we had a lot of happy family members.
所以那真的是我们的第一步。
So that was really our first move.
我们是一家白手起家的初创公司。
We were a bootstrapped startup.
我们三个人在公司成立的头六个月里没有拿工资,后来我们很幸运地遇到了鲍勃·康普顿。鲍勃本身是一位非常成功的风险投资家和科技企业家,他投资过一家叫Software Artistry的公司,那是印第安纳州第一家上市的软件公司,后来被IBM收购了。
The three of us worked without taking a salary for the first six months of the business, and then we were really fortunate to find Bob Compton, and Bob was a very accomplished venture capitalist and tech entrepreneur in his own right Bob had invested in a company called Software Artistry, which was the first really Indiana software company to go public, and then later was acquired by IBM.
后来他成为CID Equity的风险投资家,还亲自管理过他们投资的一家公司,叫Sophomore Danic,这家公司后来卖给了美敦力,那是一次很大的退出。
And then he was a venture capitalist at CID Equity, and then actually ran one of their investments, Sophomore Danic, and Sophomore Danic sold to Medtronic, and it was a big exit.
所以鲍勃是一位非常成功的投资人和科技企业家,他成了我们的领投天使投资人,也真的成了我的导师。
So Bob was a very accomplished investor and tech entrepreneur, and he became our lead angel investor, and really became my mentor.
在公司成立的头七八年里,他一直担任董事长。
He was chairman for the first seven or eight years of the business.
一旦鲍勃投了钱进来,融资就变得容易多了。
And once Bob put money into the business, then raising capital got a lot easier.
我们有了真正需要的信誉背书。
We had that stamp of credibility that we really needed.
哦。
Huh.
而且只筹到了20万,那还是在云计算出现之前。
And with only 200,000 raised, this was the era before cloud computing.
你是怎么用这笔钱来发展业务的?
How did you invest that to build the business?
问得好,Ben,情况真的很不一样。
It's a great question, Ben, and it's so different.
那时候还没有AWS,所以我们得自己买服务器、上机架、买网络设备。
AWS didn't exist, so we were buying servers, we were racking servers, we were buying networking equipment.
我们真的得自己搭建基础设施。
We really had to build the infrastructure.
有意思的是,我们第一笔1万美元花在了Lyris上,后来发现它竟然是做邮件营销的竞争对手,但当时Lyris提供的是基于服务器的批量邮件发送方案,那是我们早期购买的一个许可证。
And ironically, our first $10,000 went to Lyris, which later turned out to be an email marketing competitor, but Lyris had a server-based solution for sending email at volume, and that was one of our early licensing purchases.
所以大部分钱都花在了开发产品和搭建初期基础设施上。
So really most of the money went to building the product and building the early infrastructure.
还有一点很有意思,你总是要利用好时机和你独特的资源。
And then this was interesting, you always have to leverage your timing and your unique assets.
我们当时的一个独特优势,也是那个时代的一个特点,就是我们有很多很棒的朋友和同事在寻找下一步的机会,其中不少人在互联网泡沫破灭后失业了。
And one of our unique assets, and an element of the era, was that we had a lot of awesome friends and colleagues that were looking for what was next, and a good number of them were with dotcoms that didn't work out.
于是我们组建了第一支销售团队,他们算是独立承包商。我们会说服朋友,说我们有个大愿景,这是个不错的机会,然后他们就会帮我们卖东西。
And we ended up hiring our first sales team as kind of independent contractors, where we'd convince a friend that we had a big vision, this was a neat opportunity, and they would sell for us.
我们给他们公司股权,他们真的就像独立承包商一样为我们销售。
And we gave them equity in the company, and they would sell for us really as an independent contractor.
没有底薪,只有提成。
No salary, commission only.
而且他们得包办一切。
And they had to do it all.
他们得自己找线索,做演示文稿,谈成交易,收款,还要负责客户实施。如果他们能一路走到底,我们就付给他们佣金。
They had to find the lead, put the pitch deck together, sell the deal, collect the deal, implement the customer, and if they made it all the way through, we paid them a commission.
所以,我们早期就建立了一支经验丰富的销售团队,这全靠我们有很多好朋友,他们当时正好在寻找职业上的新方向。
So we actually built this really kind of seasoned sales team early, just on the back of the fact that we had a lot of really good friends that were kind of looking for something that was next in their career.
后来我们拿到融资后,他们就成了正式员工,我们也能提供福利等等这些好处了。
And then once we got funded, they became real employees, and we were able to provide benefits and all that good stuff.
但在我们真正有能力之前,我们就已经建立了一个非常可扩展的销售组织。
But we built a very scalable sales organization before we really could afford to.
你觉得那种最初完全基于纯佣金的销售模式,对早期那些销售人员,在多大程度上塑造了后来这个组织的构建方式?
How much do you think that sort of original DNA of totally giving pure commission-based sales to those early sales folks do you think kind of helped shape the way that that organization was built?
好问题,Ben。
Great question, Ben.
影响非常大。
A huge influence.
我们从第一天起就是一个以销售为导向、以客户为导向的组织,而且三位创始人都是销售和市场营销出身,有综合管理的背景。
We, from day one, were a very sales-driven, customer-driven organization, and just the nature of the three founders, all sales marketing leaders, kind of general management background.
每个人都参与销售,每个人都花时间跟客户在一起。
Everybody sold, everybody spent time with customers.
早期,我们常说自己是一群为营销人员打造软件的营销人员。
And early on, we would describe ourselves as marketers building software for marketers.
我们非常清楚自己在解决什么问题,希望产品长什么样,以及希望它如何运作。
We had a very keen sense for what problem we were solving, and what we wanted the product to look like, and how we wanted it to function.
所以产品管理的第一版,其实完全是由创始人推动的。
So that was product management V1, was really all driven by the founders.
但我们很早就建立了销售文化,我们三个人在销售和与客户合作方面都非常积极。
But we created a sales culture early on, where the three of us were very aggressive in selling and working with customers.
而且,这也许是我最喜欢软件即服务的一点:如果你善于倾听,并且与客户紧密合作,他们会为你揭示产品路线图。
And it's perhaps my very favorite element of software as a service is that if you are a good listener and you work closely with customers, they will reveal your product roadmap for you.
当然,你的工作确实是要带来你的愿景和观点,但你实际上是在提炼来自许多个人和组织的反馈,包括你的客户和市场上的潜在客户。
And it's really your job to certainly bring your vision and your point of view, but you're really distilling feedback from many individuals and organizations, your customers and your prospects in the marketplace.
如果你能正确提炼这些反馈并采取行动,你就能打造出客户真正想要的出色解决方案。
And if you can distill that feedback in the right way and take action upon it, you can build an amazing solution that clients really want.
所以我认为,我们的强项之一就是与客户保持紧密联系,善于倾听,真正帮助他们塑造我们的产品。
So that was, I think, one of our real strong suits was being very close to the customer and being great listeners and really helping them shape our product.
但我们非常以销售为导向,而且因为我们建立的独立销售代表网络,早期我们的销售比重非常大。
But we were incredibly sales-driven, and because of that kind of independent network of sales representatives that we built, we were very sales heavy early on.
实际上,我回想起来,几个月前我做过一次ExactTarget的历史回顾,我翻看了我们早期的一个演示文稿,连我自己都感到震惊,当时我们有44名员工,其中26人都在做销售。
I actually, I look back, I did a history of ExactTarget chat a few months ago, and I looked back at one of our early decks, and this was even staggering to me, but at the moment where we had 44 employees, we actually had 26 in sales.
哇。
Wow.
这确实挺重的。
That's heavy.
所以我们当时非常以销售为导向。
So we were very sales-driven.
而且我们比大多数软件公司更早地开拓了一个渠道。
And then we also unlocked a channel far earlier than most software companies.
我们意识到数字代理公司可以成为我们很好的合作伙伴。
We realized that digital agencies could be great partners of ours.
他们当时在建设网站,撰写文案和内容,但确实缺乏专门的电子邮件营销工具。
They were building websites, they were writing copy and content, but they really didn't have tools for email marketing specifically.
我们建立了一个大型的渠道计划,让这些代理公司能够利用我们的技术平台,在需要时进行品牌重塑或白标,并为他们建立有利的经常性收入流。
And we built a big channel program that allowed these agencies to leverage our tech platform, rebrand it or white label it where they needed to, and build these reoccurring revenue streams that were advantageous for them.
这让我们得以开始接触像通用磨坊和家得宝这样的大型财富500强公司,他们通过信任的代理公司成为了我们的客户,而那时我们还是一家小而灵活的公司。
And that allowed us to start reaching into big Fortune 500 companies like General Mills and Home Depot became clients of ours through their trusted agency at a time when we were still a small and scrappy company.
所以这让我们在早期就能以弱胜强,超水平发挥,这也是我们早期成功的一大推动力。
So it helped us kind of punch way above our weight class early on, and that was a big driver of early success.
说到这个,我们也想跟听众们说,这大概是我们第一次,或者说最早几次,真正聊到纯粹的企业级科技公司。
On that front, and we should say for our listeners, too, this is I think really our first or one of our first pure enterprise technology companies that we've covered.
哦,其实我挺想听听Scott对这话怎么看。
Ooh, actually, I'd be curious on Scott's take on saying that.
嗯,不过我想先回到那个话题,因为作为风投,我们在看企业级投资时,总有个老套路,就是企业软件公司要搞清楚目标客户是谁,卖给谁,这就像个测试。
Well, but I want to come back to that because, and I say that because as VCs, there's sort of this trope when you're looking at investments in the enterprise that there's this matrix of what your target customer is when you're an enterprise software company and who you sell to, and it's like a test.
你必须把这个搞清楚,比如你是做企业级、中型市场,还是中小企业?
You need to have that nailed, and it's like, are you enterprise, or are you mid-market, or are you SMB?
你是直接销售吗?
Do you sell direct?
还是通过渠道销售?
Do you sell via the channel?
通常,这些问题的答案必须非常明确。
And typically, you need to have very clear answers to those.
但听起来你们从一开始就对所有这些问题都回答“是”。
But it sounds like from the get-go, you guys were like, "Yes" to all of those.
这是有意为之的吗?
Was that deliberate?
你们是怎么考虑的?
How did you think about that?
不,好问题,大卫。
No, great question, David.
我们非常专注于小企业。
We were very small business focused.
非常专注于小企业。
Very small business focused.
事实上,我们的第一批客户就是餐馆、干洗店、披萨店。
In fact, our first wave of customers were literally restaurants, dry cleaners, pizza shops.
我们非常面向中小企业和零售业,最初想解决的问题是,零售商早上开门营业时,往往对谁走进店里、他们的客户是谁,以及如何建立更深的关系,几乎没有什么了解。
We are very SMB and very retail-oriented, and the original problem we were trying to solve was that when the retailer turns the lights on and opens their door in the morning, they often have little visibility into who's walking in the door and who their customers are, and how to build deeper relationships.
这也是Chris带到公司来的一部分背景。
And that was part of the background that Chris brought to the business.
所以早期,我们的订阅费是每年一千美元,非常专注于小企业。
So early on, we were a $1,000 a year subscription and very small business-focused.
实际上,早期那些风投拒绝我们的很多原因,就是他们无法想象这能发展成一家大公司。
And actually, a good number of the reasons why those early VCs said no is they just couldn't picture that this could become a large business.
后来,我觉得我们靠灵活、敏捷,以及非常注重销售和客户体验,开始意识到——其实我们第一波扩张,要想一次拿下大量小企业,就得开始向加盟连锁组织销售。
And then over time, through I think being crafty and agile and very sales and customer-oriented, we started to realize-- Actually, our first wave of expansion was to grab lots of small businesses at one time, you need to start selling to franchise organizations.
所以我们开始向加盟组织转型,加盟总部非常看重统一的品牌和内容,但他们希望把自主权和创作权下放给加盟商。
So we started evolving to franchise organizations where the franchisor cared a great deal about centralized branding and content, but they wanted to give autonomy and authorship down to the franchisee.
于是我们开始构建这种父子关系,以及一种企业级架构来服务加盟组织,这给了我们很大的推动力。
So we started to build this parent-child relationship and this kind of enterprise architecture to serve franchise orgs, and that gave us a big boost.
然后我们开始意识到,实际上世界上每个组织都需要用电子邮件和数字营销来与客户沟通,无论你是非营利组织还是像微软这样的企业,确实存在一套共同的需求。
Then we started realizing that really every organization in the world is going to need to use email and digital marketing to communicate with their customers, whether you are a nonprofit or Microsoft on the enterprise side, there really were a common set of needs.
我们只是不断构建更复杂的技术。
And we just built more and more sophisticated technology.
然后讽刺的是,我们从创业一开始就是Salesforce的客户。
And then ironically, we were a Salesforce customer from the inception of our business.
所以我们算是Salesforce的学生。
So we were students of Salesforce.
我们真的仔细观察了Salesforce是如何建立和扩展他们的业务的,我们很钦佩他们是一个多租户的SaaS平台,服务从小型企业一直到大型企业。
We really watched how Salesforce built and scaled their business, and we admired that they were a multi-tenant SaaS platform that served small businesses all the way up to large enterprises.
而且我深深爱上了这个想法:你可以基本上一次开发软件,然后反复销售和部署,而且你可以构建功能——我们开发的每一个功能都有一个控制面板。
And I just fell in love with the idea that you could essentially build software once and sell and deploy it over and over again, and that you could build features that could be-- Every feature we ever built had a switchboard.
我们有一个开关按钮,可以以非常灵活的方式部署和打包软件,对小型企业来说非常简单,或者我们可以为更复杂的企业开启所有高级功能。
We had an on/off button where we could deploy the software and package it in a really flexible way that was very simple for the small business, or we could turn on all the advanced capabilities for the more sophisticated enterprise.
而且基本上只有一个代码库,我们有年费1000美元的客户,也有许多七位数甚至八位数的客户,他们基本上都在使用同一个平台。
And to have essentially one code base where we have clients paying $1,000 a year, and clients-- We had a lot of seven-figure clients and even some eight-figure clients essentially using the same platform.
这真是了不起的规模和灵活性,而且围绕细分市场,组织内部也存在很多张力。
That's just a remarkable level of scale and flexibility, and there's a lot of tension that applies to the organization around segmentation.
你在为谁开发产品?
Who are you building products for?
你们是怎么搭建服务团队的?
How do you build your services org?
你们的支持模式是什么样的?
What are your support models?
但是——
But-
这些都是风投们担心的事情,对吧?
These are all the things VCs are afraid of, right?
哦,对,绝对是这样。
Oh, yeah, absolutely.
所以我们从小做起,然后通过逐步向高端市场迈进,真正颠覆了那些老牌企业,我觉得他们常常低估了我们。
So we started small, and then we really disrupted the incumbents by kind of inching our way upmarket, and I think they often underestimated us.
但正是这种灵活性让我们强大,而我也想成为软件民主化进程中的一员。
But it was that flexibility that was strong, and I wanted to be a part of that democratization of software.
我想以实惠的方式为小企业提供有吸引力的软件。
I wanted to deliver compelling software to small businesses in an affordable way.
而且我一直觉得,如果我们能继续服务从小企业到大型企业的客户,我们的市场机会会大得多。
And I always felt like our market opportunity would be a lot bigger if we could continue to serve SMB to enterprise.
然后最棒的是,小企业会变成大企业,营销人员从小公司跳槽到大公司,所以我们有很多客户是这么带过来的。
And then the really neat thing is small businesses become big businesses, and marketers leave small companies and go to big companies, so we had a lot of pull through.
实际上,我们最大的客户之一后来是Groupon,他们刚起步的时候,是通过我们的小企业内销团队进来的,之后几乎每一步都跟着我们一起成长。
Actually, one of our largest customers over time was Groupon, and Groupon came into our small business inside sales team when they were barely just getting started, and they were able to scale with us nearly every step of the way.
所以有很多这样成功的案例,从小企业到大型企业的这个跨度,确实是我们的一大优势。
So there are a lot of neat success stories where that SMB to enterprise range, yeah, was a big differentiator for us.
好了,听众朋友们。
All right, listeners.
现在是时候给大家介绍我们的老朋友,Vanta了。
Now is a great time to tell you about a longtime friend of the show, Vanta.
人工智能把整个安全格局都打乱了。
AI has scrambled the whole security picture.
以前,你只需要每年审计一次,或者提供一份静态的PDF,就能证明你是安全的,然后大家点点头,就完事了。
It used to be that you proved that you were secure once a year, on audit or a static PDF, then everyone would nod, and you're done.
但在AI优先的世界里,这已经行不通了。
But in an AI-first world, that doesn't hold up anymore.
对。
Yep.
现在你的风险面每周都在变。
Your risk surface changes every week now.
某个供应商启用了AI功能,或者有人没告诉IT部门就接入了新模型,你的安全态势就和上周不一样了,更别说和上次审计时相比了。
A vendor turns on an AI feature, or someone writes in a new model without telling IT, and your posture is different than it was last week, let alone at your last audit.
Vanta自己的研究发现,大约70%的公司都有这种“影子AI”在运行,完全没有经过安全审查。
Vanta's own research found that around 70% of companies have this "shadow AI" running with no security review at all.
这就是Vanta发挥作用的地方。
And that's where Vanta comes in.
他们是领先的代理式信任平台,也就是说,他们构建了弥补这一差距的东西。
They're the leading agentic trust platform, meaning they've built the thing that closes the gap.
他们弥补差距的方式就是Vanta Agent。
And the way that they close that gap is Vanta Agent.
你可以把它想象成一个GRC工程师。
Think of it as a GRC engineer.
就是治理、风险和合规,只不过它是软件,而且它不睡觉。
That's governance, risk, and compliance, except that it's software, and it doesn't sleep.
它能发现问题,起草修复方案,还能把你在供应商评估上花的时间减半。
It finds the issues, drafts the fixes, and cuts the time that you'd spend on vendor assessments in half.
减半。
In half.
这正是为什么现在有超过16000家公司在用Vanta。
Which is exactly why more than 16,000 companies today run on Vanta.
像Ramp、Cursor和Snowflake这样的公司,都能保持审计就绪,并捕捉到审计之间出现的风险,涵盖所有供应商、所有AI工具,整个环境。
Companies like Ramp, Cursor, and Snowflake all stay audit-ready and catch the risks that crop up between audits across every vendor, every AI tool, the whole environment.
这才是真正的价值所在。
And that's the real value.
现在信任必须是持续的,所以Vanta自动化了你的安全、合规,以及赢得和证明信任所需的工作。
Trust has to be continuous now, which is why Vanta automates your security, your compliance, and the work to earn and prove trust.
我们这边超级喜欢Vanta,而且这些年来,真的有几百位《Acquired》的听众在他们公司成了Vanta的客户。
We're huge fans of Vanta over here, and literally hundreds of "Acquired" listeners have become Vanta customers at their companies over the years.
所以你可以去vanta.com/acquired,享受1000美元的优惠。
So you can get $1,000 off Vanta at vanta.com/acquired.
网址是V-A-N-T-A.com/acquired,优惠1000美元,只要告诉他们Ben和David介绍的就行。
That's V-A-N-T-A .com/acquired for $1,000 off, and just tell them that Ben and David sent you.
我很好奇。
So I'm curious.
你们有几年是白手起家的。
So you have a few years of bootstrapping.
一开始规模很小,就像你说的,干洗店、披萨店,然后事情进展顺利。
You start really small, dry cleaners, pizza shops, as you say, and then things go well.
几年后,确切说是四年后,也就是2004年,你们最终从Insight那里融了1050万。
A couple of years, well, four years later, 2004, you end up raising 10 and a half million from Insight.
到2006年,你们又融了700万。
By 2006, you raise another $7 million.
那时候,你们的营收大概有四千万左右。
And at that point, you're doing sort of 40-ish million in revenue.
在这种阶梯式增长的过程中,从个体小商户到加盟商,再到我猜营收达到四千万左右的时候,你们可能已经进入企业级市场,或者刚开始接触企业级客户了。这个过程花了多长时间?
On that kind of stair-step up, how long did it take to get from the individual little guys to the franchisees to up to, I would assume by the time you're doing 40-ish million in revenue, you're probably already at the enterprise or starting to hit the enterprise at that point.
一路上有没有什么关键的转折点?
Were there specific breakpoints along the way?
我想微软可能是你们最大的客户之一。
I'm thinking perhaps Microsoft is one of your biggest customers.
那次合作是怎么开始的?
How did that conversation start?
他们是怎么成为你们的客户的?
How did they come into the fold?
是的,大卫,这个问题问得很好。
Yeah, that's a great question, David.
也许我先回到那个时间段来聊聊。
And maybe I'll first start with just kind of going back to that timeframe.
所以在07年12月,我们实际上提交了上市申请。
So in December of '07, we actually filed to go public.
我们当时有4800万美元的收入——
We were $48 million-
你们快到了。
You were getting there.
是的,我们当时有4800万美元的收入,而且盈利,刚开始进入企业市场,而且我们资金效率特别高。
... yeah, we were $48 million in revenue, we were profitable, and we were just starting to kind of reach the enterprise space, and we were extraordinarily capital efficient.
所以你提到的融资情况都是准确的,但实际上可能有点误导,因为每一轮融资都是初级和次级资本的混合。
So the fundraising that you referenced is all accurate, but actually can be a little deceiving because each of those rounds was a mix of primary and secondary capital.
所以我们经常在融资中包含次级部分,让创始人、员工和早期投资者有机会在过程中套现一些钱。
So we often had a secondary component to our fundraising to provide founders, employees, and early investors an opportunity to take a little bit of money off the table along the way.
我真的很感激我们这么做了,尤其是考虑到我们是如何白手起家的,以及我们三位联合创始人在很长一段时间里没有给自己发工资。
And I was so grateful we did that actually, especially because of how we bootstrapped the business and how our three co-founders worked for a very long period of time without paying ourselves.
有机会在过程中套现一些钱真的很重要,因为这让我们晚上能睡个好觉,知道我们为家庭有了一定的财务保障,能供孩子上大学,还有那些好的事情。
Having an opportunity to take a little bit of money off the table along the way was powerful because it just allowed us to sleep well at night knowing that we had some level of financial security for our family, and we'd be able to send our kids to college and all those good things.
但这反而让我们更有干劲,想要把公司做大做强,确保不会过早地把公司卖掉。
But then it just got us hungry to really want to take the business the distance and make sure we didn't prematurely sell the business.
有意思的是,我们在2007年12月提交上市申请时,只融了600万美元的本金,而账上的现金也差不多有这么多。
So what was interesting is when we filed in December of '07, we had only raised $6 million in primary capital, and we had nearly as much on the balance sheet.
所以在那之前,我们的资金使用效率一直非常高。
So we had been extraordinarily capital efficient up to that point.
于是我们在2007年12月提交了上市申请。
So we filed to go public in December of '07.
但2008年初,公开股票市场突然崩了,我们整个2008年都保持着申请状态,最终在2009年初决定撤回IPO,这又是另一个故事了,我很乐意聊聊。
The public equity market just fell apart in early '08, and we actually stayed on file all of '08 and ultimately decided to pull the IPO in early '09, and that's a whole nother story I'd be happy to jump into.
但我想说的是,正是在那段时间,我们开始向企业级市场拓展,业务性质也在发生变化。
But I would say it was that timeframe where we started reaching up into the enterprise and the nature of our business was shifting.
我们开始建立更多的专业服务能力,业务的基本面也开始转变。除了股票市场不景气之外,这其实对我们来说是个巨大的福音,因为它让我们有机会保持私有,引入更多资金,并重新调整方向,向企业级市场迈进,而作为一家私有公司,这样做要容易得多。
We started building more professional services capability and the fundamentals of the business started shifting, and in addition to the equity markets not being very favorable, it actually was a huge blessing for us because it gave us a chance to stay private, bring more capital in the business, and kind of recalibrate toward the enterprise, and it was much easier to do that as a private company.
这正是我接下来想聊的,就是——你在2007年12月提交了上市申请,那时候《就业法案》还没出台,现在很难想象——不过,因为我们都是亲身经历过的,所以也还好。
And that's where I wanted to go next here, kind of leading up to-- So you file to go public in December of 2007, and this was the days before the Jobs Act, which, hard to imagine now that-- Well, easy because we all lived through it.
但你的招股说明书从2007年12月起就公开了,到现在也还在,但直到2009年5月,你一直在备案中,所有竞争对手都能来看你的S1文件,看到你所有的财务数据。
But your prospectus was out there in the public domain from December of 2007, well, still to this day, but until May of 2009, you were on file and all your competitors could come read your S1 and see all your financials.
然后你最终没有在那时上市,我猜很大程度上是因为金融危机。
And then you ultimately didn't go public then, I assume because of the financial crisis in large part.
那时候根本没有IPO。
There were no IPOs happening then.
那是什么感觉?
What was that like?
那真是太难了。
It was so difficult.
那真是太难了。
It was so difficult.
你说得完全对,大卫。
You're exactly right, David.
所有媒体肯定都能看到关于你的一切,而你还是家私有公司,但你没有上市公司的好处,却要承受所有的坏处。
All the press, I'm sure, could read everything about you, and you're still a private company, but you have none of the benefits of being a public company, but all the downsides.
确实如此。
That's exactly right.
我常说,我们承担了上市公司的所有负担、成本和压力,却一点好处都没有,零好处。
I would commonly say we had all the burden and cost and pressure of being a public company with none of the benefits, zero.
因为你说得对,那时候《就业法案》还没出台,我们得像上市公司一样每个季度都要报告。
Because you're exactly right, this was pre Jobs Act, and we had to report every quarter just as if we were a public company.
所以好的一面是,我们有了一个很好的训练场,学会了如何设定季度预期,如何与华尔街打交道,如何与分析师合作。
So the silver lining is we had a great training ground of how to set quarterly expectations, how to work with The Street, how to work with analysts.
我们不得不与那些会报道我们股票的分析师进行季度财报电话会议。
We had to do quarterly earnings calls with the analysts that would be covering our stock.
但那真的非常艰难,能让我们团队保持专注、保持积极,这证明了我们团队的实力和公司文化,而08年由于经济危机,对经营企业来说本身就是艰难的一年。
But it was very, very difficult, and a testament to the strength of our team and our company culture that we kept everybody focused, we kept everybody very positive, and '08 was just a difficult year for running the business in general, given the economic crisis.
我们的客户流失率上升了,因为很多小企业客户都倒闭了。
Our churn numbers went up because a lot of our small business customers were going out of business.
续约变得更难,追加销售也变得更难。
Renewals got tougher, upsells got tougher.
新业务方面,价格压力很大。
New business, there was a lot of price pressure.
所以我们在08年表现不错,但这一年和之前几年相比,情况大不相同。
So we had a good year in '08, but it was a very different year from the prior years of our business.
但这对我们来说是一次很好的学习和成长机会。到了09年初,情况变得很明显,我们不会退出,而且我们当然也不想——我们并不需要那笔资金。
But it was a great learning and growth opportunity for us, and in early '09, it became evident we were not going to get out, and we certainly didn't want to-- We didn't need the capital.
除非我们非常有信心IPO会成功,否则我们不想上市。
We didn't want to go public unless we were very confident it was going to be a successful IPO.
然后回到我之前说的,业务真的开始更多地转向企业客户。
And then to my earlier comment, the business really started shifting more to the enterprise.
我还学到了一个宝贵的教训。
And I also learned a valuable lesson.
那时候我们是盈利的,而公开市场真的很希望看到利润率扩大。而且很明显,如果我们上市,就必须展示出利润率的扩大,无论是毛利率还是营业利润率,这会让我们很难对业务进行我们想要的那些战略性投资。
We were profitable at that time, and the public markets really want to see margin expansion, and it became really evident that if we were to go public, we were going to have to show margin expansion, both gross margin and in operating income, and it was going to make it very difficult for us to make the strategic investments in the business that we wanted.
我们非常热衷于超越电子邮件,进入一个纯数字营销平台。
We were very passionate about moving beyond email into a pure digital marketing platform.
我们当时已经准备好进行国际化扩张了。
We were ready for international expansion.
我们也准备启动几项收购计划,而作为一家私有公司,这一切都变得容易多了。
We were ready to start a couple of our acquisitions, and all of that became a lot easier as a private company.
所以我们在2009年初撤回了IPO计划,同时完成了一轮由Battery和Scale领投的大额融资,后来TCV也加入了投资行列,我们内部当时的口号是“比上市更好”。
So we pulled our IPO in early '09 in conjunction with a large round of capital led by Battery and Scale, and then later TCV came on board as well, and our internal tagline was "Better than an IPO."
我们确实向员工们明确阐述了——
And we really outlined for our employees-
你们那几轮融资,加上后来2011年那一轮,我猜你们在私募市场融到的钱,比最后IPO时拿到的还多。
Well, you guys raised-- Between that and then a later round you did in 2011, I think you raised more money then in the private markets than you ultimately did in your IPO.
对,我们在2009年融了1.45亿美元。那次融资里也有很大一部分是二级市场交易,但这笔钱让我们有了充足的弹药,可以大刀阔斧地扩张业务。
Yeah, we raised $145 million in 2009, and once again, there was a large secondary component, but it It gave us a war chest to really get aggressive in expanding the business.
我们制定了一个叫“加速2013”的愿景,非常具体地规划了公司在2013年应该呈现的样子。
And we created a vision we called Accelerate 2013, where we became very specific around the company, what we wanted to look like in 2013.
我们是从最终目标倒推回去的,这听起来有点反直觉。
We started with the end in mind and then worked our way back, and very counterintuitive.
那时候红杉资本发了一个他们特别有名的演示文稿,大概就是关于……
This was the time where Sequoia sent out their favorite kind of famous deck around kind of the-
好时光啊。
Good times.
……对,好时光结束了。
... Yes, good times are over.
差不多是强制要求所有投资的公司裁员20%。
Almost mandating 20% headcount reduction across all their portfolio companies.
当所有竞争对手都在收缩的时候,我们反而踩下了油门。
And as all of our competitors were pulling back, we hit the accelerator.
我们变得非常激进,大力投资研发,建立庞大的销售团队。
We got very aggressive, in investing in R&D development, building big sales capacity.
最终,我们建立的销售组织比最接近的竞争对手大三四倍。
Ultimately, we built a sales organization that was three or four times larger than our nearest competitor.
所以我们在09年和10年对业务进行了超常规投资,赌的就是经济复苏时,我们能占据最佳位置来抓住机会,结果确实如此。
So we kind of hyper-invested in the business in '09 and '10, counting on the fact that when the economy came roaring back, we were going to be in the best position to take advantage of it, and that happened.
然后我们实际上就顺势进入了IPO,那是2012年3月,势头非常强劲。
And then we actually rolled into our IPO, which was March of 2012, with just huge momentum.
我们的增长率一直在加速。
We had accelerating growth rates.
在2008年、2009年那段时间,我们增长了大约30%,然后升到了40%多,到2012年初进入公开市场时,我们达到了55%左右。
We had grown in that '08 timeframe, '08, '09, around 30%, and then we moved up to the 40s, and then we were mid-50s as we kind of rolled into the public markets in early '12.
所以那种过度投资和保持私有化的决定,给我们带来了巨大的回报。
So that hyper investment and that decision to stay private paid big dividends for us.
对,说到加速增长,我一直觉得ET特别独特的一点是,你们在拓展国际业务时非常谨慎,而且通过渠道合作伙伴来推动增长。
Yeah, and then talking about accelerating growth, one of the things that always struck me as really unique about ET was how deliberately you expanded the business internationally and using channel partners as the way to grow.
我觉得我们在节目里还没怎么聊过国际扩张的事,听听你是怎么考虑的会很有意思。
I think we haven't really talked about international expansion at all on the show, and it'd be really interesting to hear how you thought about that.
不,我很乐意分享。
No, I'd be happy to.
你说得完全对,Ben。
And you're exactly right, Ben.
这其实是我们渠道和代理计划的一个延伸。我们知道,通过渠道合作伙伴,我们能触达那些靠自己直接拓展很难覆盖的市场,在国际业务上我们也采取了同样的策略。
This was kind of a derivative of our channel and agency program, in that we knew we could get reach into markets that we likely wouldn't be able to address directly through channel partners, and we did the same thing internationally.
所以我们在英国找了一个合作伙伴,他们 basically 做起了 Exact Target 的转售业务,在澳大利亚我们也做了类似的操作。
So we found a partner in the UK, and they spun up essentially an Exact Target reseller, and we did the same in Australia.
这些优秀的团队后来也成了我们的朋友,他们依托 ExactTarget 平台把业务做起来并实现了规模化扩张。
And as those great teams and later became friends, they built their business and really scaled it around the ExactTarget platform.
当他们的客户和员工规模达到一定临界点后,我们就把这家业务收购了。
When they started to reach some critical mass of customers and employees, we then acquired the business.
所以这对我们来说,是一种低成本、低风险的国际扩张方式。作为一家资本效率较高的小公司,如果不走这条路,我们当时可能还做不到这一点。
So it was kind of a low-cost, low-risk way for us to expand internationally before we would've been able to do otherwise, as kind of a small capital-efficient company.
通过这些合作伙伴,我们确实验证了在美国以外的市场,我们的软件和服务是有需求的。
And we really validated with these partners that there was a market for our software and our services outside the United States.
后来我们开始与耐克、Expedia和微软这样的跨国公司合作。如果要深化这些合作关系,我们就必须建立国际业务布局,这变得势在必行。
And then we started working with multinationals like Nike and Expedia and Microsoft, and it became imperative if we're going to grow those relationships, that we had an international presence.
对,连续三年,每年八月都是这样。
So yeah, three years in a row, every August.
我们先收购了英国的经销商,并以此为跳板,向欧洲扩张。
First we acquired our reseller in the UK and used that as a beachhead to expand through Europe.
然后第二年八月,我们收购了澳大利亚的经销商,再下一年八月,又收购了巴西圣保罗的经销商,这让我们在那个市场有了很好的覆盖。
And then the next August, we acquired our reseller in Australia, and then the next August, we acquired a reseller in São Paulo, Brazil, and gave us a great reach into that marketplace.
所以在ExactTarget的历史上,我们总共做了六次收购,其中三次是产品扩展,三次是地域扩展。
So we did six acquisitions over the course of ExactTarget history, and three were product expansion, and three were geo expansion.
不错。
Cool.
对,所以你经历了从一次注定失败的IPO,到后来成功上市的过程。
Yeah, so you go through this period of from a dead IPO that wasn't going to happen.
你收缩业务,在没人能融到钱的时候融了一大笔钱。
You pull back, you raise a bunch of money at a time when nobody could raise money.
你加速发展,最终在2012年3月成功上市。
You accelerate the business, come out, and you go public in March of 2012.
而仅仅一年多之后,就被收购了。
And then it's just a little over a year later that the acquisition happens.
当然,这是我们节目的主题,我们一会儿会聊到类别、技术主题以及其他所有内容。
Obviously, the topic of our show, and we'll get to category and tech themes and everything else in a minute.
但是——
But-
……
...
我想花点时间聊聊,我们在节目开始前和斯科特聊过,我们在《Acquired》节目里最喜欢做的事情之一就是深入挖掘这些法庭案件、SEC文件以及各种资料,幸运的是,在ExactTarget的案例中,我觉得没有什么重大的法庭案件。
I want to spend a little bit of time, we were talking with Scott before the show, one of the things we love to do on "Acquired" is dig into these court cases and SEC documents and all sorts of stuff, and luckily in ExactTarget's case, I don't think there were any major court cases.
但有一件事是,当一家上市公司被收购时,你必须——这个很快也会发生在LinkedIn身上,我都等不及要深入研究了——
But one of the things that happens when a public company is acquired is you're required, and this will be coming out for LinkedIn soon, I can't wait to dive in.
你必须向SEC披露收购过程的具体细节,所以我们会把相关链接放在节目笔记里。
You're required to disclose to the SEC the play-by-play of exactly how the acquisition happened, and so we'll link to it in the show notes.
这是一份关于ExactTarget收购过程的惊人文件,我想请你谈谈这个过程是如何开始的,再说一遍,所有内容都是公开记录的,比如当时还有另外三个竞标者,我们不能透露他们的身份。
It's this amazing document about how the ExactTarget acquisition happened, and I'd love to just ask you to talk a little bit about that process of how it started and again, all of it's documented publicly, like there were three other bidders, that we can't talk about their identities.
在文件中,他们被称为A方、B方和C方。
They're referred to as party A, party B, and party C in the document.
但是有好几个报价来回拉锯。
But multiple offers going back and forth.
那段时间对你来说一定压力很大吧。
I mean, that must've been such a stressful time for you.
你是怎么应对过来的?
How did you navigate through it?
那真是难以置信。
It was incredible.
那是一次不可思议的学习经历,而且……对,既让人兴奋又让人紧张,确实如此。
It was an incredible learning experience and- ... yeah, exhilarating and nerve-wracking at the same time, for sure.
我们当时上市已经五个季度了,日子过得挺滋润的。
So we had been a public company for five quarters, and life was good.
我们过得非常开心。
We had a great time.
我们的IPO非常成功。
Our IPO was super successful.
我们在纽约证券交易所上市时,估值超过十亿美元,而且我们的首次公开募股被超额认购,感觉从第一天起就有所有合适的投资者支持我们。
We came out of the New York Stock Exchange at north of a billion-dollar valuation, and our IPO was heavily oversubscribed, and we felt like we had all the right investors supporting us from day one.
而且我们在2008年和2009年学到的那些经验,真的能够应用到S1文件、上市流程、选择正确的银行和分析师上。
And all that learning that happened in 2008 and 2009, we're able to really apply to the S1 and filing process and IPO and how to pick the right banks and the right analysts.
我们上市的过程非常愉快,真的很享受。
And we had an amazing time going public, and really loved it.
然后作为上市公司过了五个季度,情况也差不多。
And then five quarters as a public company, more of the same.
我们每个季度基本上都能达到或超过计划。
We kind of met and exceeded plan every quarter.
我们真的被华尔街接受了,而且有一个很棒的投资者基础。
We were really embraced by Wall Street and had a great investor base.
我们完成了两次收购,一次是预测分析领域的iGoDigital,另一次是B2B营销自动化领域的Pardot,生活非常美好。
We had completed two acquisitions, one called iGoDigital in the predictive analytics space, and a second, Pardot, in the B2B marketing automation, and life was great.
作为一家独立的上市公司,我们非常开心,而且年增长率超过40%。真正开始发生的是,在整个软件生态系统中,营销云解决方案开始受到更多关注,而且我觉得全球最大的五六家软件公司都在向云端转型,并公开表示要更深入地进军营销领域。
We were very happy as an independent public company, and we were growing north of 40% year over year What started to really happen across the software ecosystem is that marketing cloud solutions started really garnering more attention, and I would say really the largest probably five or six software companies in the world were really all shifting to the cloud and publicly stating an intent to go a lot deeper into marketing.
所以,这种情况开始大规模发生了。
So that started happening in a big way.
对我们ExactTarget来说,我们战略的一个重点就是打造一个非常开放的平台,提供强大的API,以及大量的集成合作伙伴。
And for us at ExactTarget, a big part of our strategy had been to build a very open platform, robust APIs, and lots of integrated partnerships.
我们的理念是,营销人员需要一个统一的地方来存储所有客户数据,然后利用这些数据来推动更加个性化和相关的沟通与关系。
So our premise was that marketers need one place to store all the data they have on their customers, and then to use that data to drive more personalized and relevant communications and relationships.
所以,甚至在应用商店出现之前,我们就已经集成了Salesforce和Microsoft Dynamics,并且与Adobe、Omniture以及业内其他许多公司建立了良好的合作关系。
So even literally before the app exchange even existed, we integrated into Salesforce, and we integrated into Microsoft Dynamics, and we had great relationships with Adobe and Omniture and kind of many others across the industry.
因此,我们参加各种展会和会议,与这些公司共同销售、共同营销,是非常自然的事情。
So it was very logical that we were attending shows and conferences, and co-selling and co-marketing with all these companies.
但Salesforce,我们一直有着非常深厚的合作关系,从作为客户,到成为集成合作伙伴,再到在市场上一起做很多事情。
But Salesforce, we've had this really rich relationship with, from being a customer to being an integrated partner, to doing lots of things together in the market.
我们认识了马克和他的团队,Salesforce通过收购Radian6和Buddy Media,在营销领域大举进军,并且确实采取了社交优先的战略。
And we got to know Mark and the team, and Salesforce had made a big push into marketing with the Radian6 and Buddy Media acquisitions and really had a social-first strategy.
随着时间的推移,很明显他们的客户想要更多,社交是一个重要渠道,但他们真正想要的是一个多渠道平台,他们想要更强大的数据能力,他们想要一个不仅面向B2B客户,也面向B2C客户的平台。
And over time, it just became apparent that their customers wanted more, that social was an important channel, but they really wanted a multi-channel platform, they wanted greater data capabilities, and they wanted a platform that was not only oriented for B2B customers, but also B2C.
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所以我们和Salesforce一直关系很紧密,经常分享产品路线图、愿景和方向,后来很明显他们打算在营销上加大投入,就主动找上门来说:‘嘿,我们想合作,认真考虑一下联手的事。’
So we always had a close relationship with Salesforce, and we would always share product roadmaps and vision and direction, and it just became apparent they were going to make a bigger investment in marketing, and knocked on our door and said, "Hey, we'd like to collaborate and take a closer look at kind of joining forces."
大卫,你说得完全对,作为一家上市公司,收到这种主动接洽时,治理和流程的级别完全不一样。
And you're absolutely right, David, when you're a public company and you get that kind of inbound inquiry, the level of governance and process is at a very different level.
我很好奇,也想告诉听众们,我们会把这份文件链接出来,你们真该读一读。
And I'm curious, and really for our listeners, we'll link to this document, you should read it.
那简直是用法律术语写的高潮迭起的莎士比亚戏剧。
It's like a legalese version of high drama, of Shakespearean drama.
但有没有人给你一本操作手册,告诉你‘这种情况下该这么做’,还是你们边做边摸索?
But did somebody hand you a playbook and be like, "Okay, here's what you do in this situation," or were you guys figuring it out as you went along?
对我来说这显然是头一回,但幸运的是,我们有一批非常优秀的顾问和董事会成员,他们在这方面经验丰富,确保我们走对了流程,最终做出了最符合股东利益的决定。
Clearly, it was a first-time experience for me, but fortunately, we had an excellent set of advisors and board members that had quite a bit of experience in this area to make sure that we really followed the right process and did what was ultimately in the best interest of our shareholders.
作为创始人和CEO,这个过程确实让人感慨,甚至有点苦乐参半。
And for me, as founder and CEO, it certainly can be kind of an emotional and even a bittersweet process.
我曾希望对方给出的溢价足够高,对股东和员工来说都是极好的结果,也真心希望最终找到的收购方很有战略眼光,会继续投资这项业务。
And I had hoped that the premium we were offered would be so substantial that it was really an excellent outcome for our shareholders and for our employees, and that I'd really hoped that we ended up with an acquirer that was very strategic and would continue to invest in the business.
Salesforce不仅做到了这一点,还做得更多。
And Salesforce became that and a whole lot more.
整个过程非常棒。
So the process was amazing.
速度很快,让人兴奋不已,当然也伴随着不少压力。
It was fast and exhilarating and certainly had a lot of pressure associated with it.
但我心里很踏实,确信这对我们的股东、员工以及所有相关方来说都是最好的决定。
But I was very comfortable that this was the best decision for our shareholders and for our employees and all of our constituents.
现在回头看过去这三年的情况,我百分之百确信这对Salesforce、ExactTarget以及所有参与其中的各方来说都是一次巨大的成功。
And now that we're able to see what's transpired over the last three years, I have 100% confidence that this was a huge win for Salesforce and for ExactTarget and everybody involved with the company along the way.
我特别好奇。
I'm really curious.
你们的出售价格比之前在公开市场上的交易价高出了大约50%。
You guys sold for about a 50% premium over what you had been trading at publicly.
肯定有不少投行或者甚至其他公司的CEO打来电话说:嘿,我觉得这事儿能成。
There's got to be a bunch of offers sort of coming in from investment bankers or perhaps even CEOs calling you and saying, "Hey, I think this might work out."
你从什么价位开始真正关注和倾听?
What number do you start actually paying attention and listening?
你是什么时候成立小组委员会的?
When do you form the subcommittee?
我们也应该提一下,收购发生在2013年6月,金额是25亿美元,每股33.75美元。
And we should say, too, so the acquisition happened in June of 2013, $2.5 billion, $33.75 a share.
而你们的IPO价格,我记得是一年多前的19美元,所以。
And your IPO price, I believe, was $19 just over a year before, so.
而且我觉得交易价格在22美元左右——
And I think trading at $22 or so-
……前一天。
... day before.
对,差不多是这样。
Yeah, that's about right.
我们的IPO价格是19美元,上市时是23.05美元,之后大部分时间在20多美元交易,当Salesforce第一次提出每股26美元的报价时,我们大概在22美元左右。
Our IPO price was $19, we came out at $23 and a nickel, and then largely traded in the $20s, and were kind of in the low $20s when Salesforce first put their first offer of $26 a share in front of us.
我跟你说,Ben,其实重点不在于要定一个多吸引人的价格。
And I'll tell you, Ben, it was less about even coming up with a number that was interesting.
我们真正关注的是,当收到第一波主动接洽时,要认真对待,把流程处理得无可挑剔,作为上市公司每一步都按规矩来,让流程自然推进,最后让特别委员会和董事会做出最佳决定。
We were really just focused on making sure that when you get that first level of inbound interest, that we take it seriously and really handle the process in a way that's above reproach and that we're kind of following every step you need to as a public company and let the process run, and then ultimately let the subcommittee and the board make the best decision at the end of the process.
而且我觉得,你们在谈判过程中,还发布了超预期的第一季度财报并上调了业绩指引,这也有帮助,这总是好事。
And it helps, too, I think you guys, during the negotiation process, released you beat Q1 earnings and upped guidance, and that's always a good thing to do.
就像你之前说的,第一次撤回IPO,然后融到资金,之后又加速增长,好的收购往往发生在公司被买的时候,而不是主动卖的时候。
As you were saying, too, about when you pulled the IPO the first time, and then raised all the money, then went out afterwards with the accelerating growth, great acquisitions happen when companies get bought, not sold.
哦,完全同意。
Oh, absolutely.
当你前景光明、一切顺利、不需要任何人的时候,那才是……
When you had a bright future ahead of you and things were going great and didn't need anybody, that's the-
对,就是这样。
No, that's exactly right.
没错,确实要最大化价值,就得在强势地位上操作,而且有多方真正感兴趣,无论是想做风险投资还是最终收购公司。
And you really maximize value, yeah, when you are operating from a position of strength, and you have multiple parties that are really interested in either making a venture investment or ultimately acquiring the company.
幸运的是,我们在这方面做得非常出色,而且我们和Salesforce的契合度简直完美。
And fortunately, we had that in a big way, and we just fit so beautifully into Salesforce.
他们对营销云有一个宏大的愿景。
They had a big vision around the marketing cloud.
我们和他们之前做的两笔收购形成了完美的互补,而且我们带来的数据架构非常以消费者为导向。
We were a perfect complement to the two acquisitions they had already made, and we really brought this data architecture that was very consumer oriented, uh To the table.
所以我们给Salesforce在B2C领域打开了一个很大的入口。
So we give Salesforce a big entree into the B2C side of the industry.
我们带来了这个多渠道营销平台,那时候我们已经从电子邮件扩展到了移动端、社交和网络分析。
We brought this multi-channel marketing platform, where by that time we had expanded beyond email into mobile and social and web analytics.
我们拥有一个非常广泛的数字多渠道平台。
We had a really broad digital multi-channel platform.
我们当时真的是全球最大、增长最快的营销软件公司,而且我们帮他们填补了一个很大的空白。
We were the largest and the fastest-growing marketing software company really in the world, and we were able to fill a big gap for them.
还有一个意外之喜是,我们最近收购了Pardot,这家位于亚特兰大的公司就像一颗宝石,我们大概花了1亿美元把它买下来。
And then a silver lining was that we had recently acquired Pardot, and Pardot was this gem of a company in Atlanta that we acquired for right around $100 million.
而且他们是B2B营销自动化领域的玩家,与Salesforce紧密集成。
And they were a B2B marketing automation player tightly integrated into Salesforce.
所以Salesforce不仅获得了ExactTarget带来的所有好处,而且Pardot是一个很好的补充,让Salesforce能够与Eloqua、Marketo以及该领域的其他竞争对手一较高下。
So Salesforce, not only was able to get all the benefits that ExactTarget brought to the table, but Pardot was a great snap-in that put Salesforce in a position where they could compete with Eloqua and Marketo and other players in that slice of the industry as well.
太好了。
Cool.
好了,听众朋友们。
All right, listeners.
现在是感谢我们节目的老朋友ServiceNow的好时机。
Now is a great time to thank our longtime friend of the show, ServiceNow.
如果你在运营一家大型企业,AI代理可能遍布每个团队,部署它们已经不再是难事了。
If you are running a large enterprise, AI agents are likely spread across every team, and deploying them is no longer the hard part.
难的是知道它们有哪些权限,员工在用它们做什么,或者AI在做哪些决策。
The hard part is knowing what permissions they have, what employees are using them for, or what decisions AI is making.
对于大规模企业来说,AI安全可不是小问题。
AI security for an enterprise at scale is not a small concern.
风险是真实存在的。
The risks are real.
没错。
Exactly.
而AI的挑战在于治理、安全、衡量,以及确保它真正带来价值。
And the challenge with AI is governing it, securing it, measuring it, and making sure that it actually delivers value.
这就是ServiceNow打造AI控制塔的原因。
That is why ServiceNow built the AI Control Tower.
对。
Yep.
AI控制塔为企业提供了一个统一的地方,可以查看、管理、治理和优化整个业务中的AI。
AI Control Tower gives enterprises a single place to see, manage, govern, and optimize AI across the entire business.
而且它支持任何AI,不仅仅是他们自己的。
And it works with any AI, not just theirs.
你网络上的每个设备,每个系统的每个权限,每个AI代理,都在一个地方可见且安全。
Every device on your network, every permission across every system, every AI agent, visible and secure in one place.
ServiceNow能做到这一点,是因为他们花了20多年时间打造企业的运营骨干,包括工作流程、治理、审批、安全控制以及制度知识,这些支撑着IT、人力资源、客户服务、财务和安全等各个领域实际工作的开展。
And ServiceNow can do this because they've spent more than 20 years building the operational backbone of the enterprise, the workflows, governance, approvals, security controls, and institutional knowledge that power how work actually gets done across IT, HR, customer service, finance, and security.
ServiceNow每年已经运行超过1000亿个工作流程,为财富500强中超过85%的企业处理数万亿笔交易。
ServiceNow already runs more than 100 billion workflows annually and trillions of transactions for more than 85% of the Fortune 500.
所以,当企业需要一个在企业规模上治理AI的地方时,他们是在一个已经处于业务运营核心的平台上进行构建。
So when companies need a place to govern AI at enterprise scale, they're building on a platform at the center of how their business already operates.
而且未来不会只有一个AI,而是会有成千上万个AI代理在公司各个职能部门中协同工作。
And in a future that isn't going to be one AI, it's going to be thousands of AI agents working across every function of the company.
但问题是,谁来管理它们呢?
But the question is, who's managing them all?
所以,如果你想把AI的雄心转化为实际的业务成果,并确保它安全、可靠、规模化地运作,就去看看servicenow.com/acquired,告诉他们是本和戴维推荐你来的。
So if you're trying to turn AI ambition into real business outcomes and make it work safely, securely, at scale, go check out servicenow.com/acquired and tell them that Ben and David sent you.
好了,我觉得是时候进入我们收购类别的下一个环节了,我和戴维会在人员、技术、产品、业务线或其他类别中做出选择。
Well, I think it's about time we move to our next section of acquisition category, and what we'll do is David and I will make our picks between people, technology, product, business line, or other.
然后,斯科特,我们很想听听你的看法。
And then, Scott, would love to get your take.
包罗万象的“其他”。
The all-encompassing other.
我们考虑过两次,但是——
We think it twice, but-
对,我们这么做的时候总是有点敷衍。
Yeah, it's always kind of cheap when we do.
好吧,对我来说,斯科特,显然你的话在这里最重要,但这对Salesforce来说显然是一次业务线收购,从……开始。
Well, I think for me, Scott, obviously your word is most important here, but clearly this is a business line acquisition for Salesforce, going from...
有趣的是,这马上会进入我的科技主题,但既然我们长期向销售组织推销,发展了这些大客户和大规模业务,Salesforce不得不收购ExactTarget,还有你提到的Pardot以及其他相关产品,现在他们能够向CMO和营销部门销售,这显然是一条业务线,而且对他们来说非常棒。
And it's interesting, this is going to go into my tech theme in a minute, but having been selling into the sales organization for so long and developed these huge accounts and big scale business that Salesforce had to pick up ExactTarget and, as you were mentioning, Pardot and everything else along with it, to now be able to sell into the CMO and the marketing side, was clearly a business line and a great one for them.
是的,我完全同意。
Yeah, I have nothing to disagree with there.
ExactTarget显然不仅仅是单一产品,而是一整套产品。
ExactTarget clearly had, it was not just a product, but a suite of products.
我记得在我任职快结束时,我们正在推出数字营销中心,包括短信营销、邮件营销和微网站。
I think when I was finishing up my tenure there, we were launching the digital marketing hub, and that included SMS and email marketing, microsites.
我们还有CoTweet的社交功能,而且很明显,ExactTarget自己有很多不同的客户渠道,Salesforce可以借此扩展,但更重要的是,ExactTarget有一整套产品可以补充到Salesforce的产品组合里。
We had social with CoTweet, and it became clear that there was their own... ExactTarget had channel to a lot of different customers that then Salesforce could expand into, but really a whole suite of products to add to Salesforce's repertoire, too.
而且如果更明确地说这是一条业务线的话,Salesforce实际上至今仍将其称为Salesforce营销云业务线,并在财报中单独列出。
And if it were more clear that this is a business line, Salesforce actually still calls this the Salesforce Marketing Cloud business line that they break out in the results.
斯科特,你到那里之后就是负责这个的吧?
And Scott, you ran it when you came there, right?
没错。
Correct.
我完全同意,各位。
I would absolutely agree, guys.
毫无疑问,我们给Salesforce带来了一大批优秀的人才、文化和很多独特且专有的技术。
There's no question that we brought a tremendous group of people and talent and culture to Salesforce, and a lot of really unique and proprietary technology.
但我也同意,如果要把这次收购归类的话,我会把它归为业务线,因为我们完美契合了他们的营销云战略,并且带来了相当可观的经常性收入。
But I would agree, if you had to classify the acquisition into a category, I would call it business line because we just fit so beautifully into their marketing cloud strategy and brought a sizable amount of recurring revenue.
我们的经常性收入从3亿美元增长到4亿美元,而对于Salesforce这样的规模和增长速度,就像你现在看到的DemandWare一样,他们需要做大规模且有意义的收购,这些收购要真正相关并能对营收增长做出贡献,而我们在这方面做得非常出色。
We were 300 million in recurring revenue moving to 400, and for Salesforce at their size and their growth velocity, and now you see it with DemandWare, they have to make large acquisitions that are meaningful, that actually are relevant and can contribute to that top-line growth, and we were able to do that in a big way.
而且让我特别自豪的是,马克在好几次上吉姆·克莱默的《疯狂金钱》节目以及其他场合都说,ExactTarget是Salesforce完成过的最成功的一次收购,我也确实这么认为。
And it's made me really proud that Mark, on a number of occasions with Jim Cramer on "Mad Money" and other places, has said that ExactTarget's been the most successful acquisition that Salesforce has ever completed, and I believe that to be true.
整个过程进展得非常顺利,我团队里的那些领导者现在在Salesforce和营销云里负责很大的业务板块,他们都很开心,取得了巨大的成功,真正把业务做大做强,而且扎根在印第安纳波利斯,这真的非常棒。
It's just gone remarkably well, and the leaders that were on my team that are now leading big functional areas within Salesforce and the marketing cloud, they're happy and having a tremendous amount of success and really growing the business in a big way and committing to Indianapolis, which is really, really cool.
Salesforce最近刚刚宣布,除了在印第安纳波利斯市中心已有的1400名员工之外,他们未来几年还要新增800个职位。
Salesforce just recently announced that in addition to the 1,400 employees they have in downtown Indy, they're going to add 800 new positions over the next few years.
哇。
Wow.
还有,本,我不知道你有没有听说过,印第安纳州最高的建筑是蔡斯大厦。
And then, I don't know if you've heard this, Ben, but the tallest building in Indiana is the Chase Tower.
Salesforce打算整合并让员工搬进那座大厦,而且它实际上会被改名为Salesforce大厦。
Salesforce is going to consolidate and move employees into that tower, and it's actually going to be renamed the Salesforce Tower.
所以能有这样的——
So to have the-
Salesforce对大厦也有执念啊。
Salesforce has a thing about towers, too.
哦,是的。
Oh, yes.
没错,绝对是这样。
No, absolutely.
马克——
Mark-
你说过你还在那儿的时候,
You said that when you were there
……马克喜欢他的高楼。
... Mark likes his towers.
马克和他的团队,他们特别喜欢高楼。
Mark and the team, they love their towers.
但这对我们的科技社区来说太棒了,因为这座城市和这个州最高的建筑竟然是一座科技大楼,这会对我们的科技社区起到很大的推动和加速作用,我对此非常高兴。
But it's going to be so fantastic for our tech community that the tallest building in the city and the state is actually a tech building, so it's going to be a big boost and accelerator to our tech community, which I'm very happy about.
嗯,而且我也一直记得,ExactTarget对这个地区来说有很多独特之处。
Well, and I always remember too, there were so many unique things about ExactTarget for the region.
我记得从一开始,大概是你第一个或第二个办公室的时候,就一直强调要做一家城市公司,而且人们需要……
There was this big drumbeat from I think maybe your first or second office that it was about being an urban company, and that people needed to...
我们当时在纪念碑环,那是市中心一个非常酷、非常有历史感的地方。
We were in Monument Circle, which was this incredibly cool, historic center of downtown.
有个大雕像。
Big statue.
ExactTarget 有一栋楼,楼顶有个很酷的露台,可以俯瞰整个广场。
ExactTarget had a building with this cool roof deck that looked out over it.
我记得当时就想:“我再也不想在园区办公楼里上班了。”
And I remember thinking, "Well, I never want to work in an office park again."
我觉得很多 ExactTarget 的员工在这方面都被宠坏了。
And I think that a lot of ExactTarget employees got super spoiled in that way.
没错,本,你说得太对了。
No, that's exactly right, Ben.
我们的房地产策略就是围绕城市核心区来建设,打造一个对千禧一代和年轻一代特别有吸引力的园区和工作环境,这真的很有意思。
Our real estate strategy was to really build around this urban core and build a campus and a work environment that was super appealing, really to the millennial, the younger generation, and it's been really fun.
在过去的十年里,印第安纳波利斯市中心经历了住房和美食的蓬勃发展,还有大量的艺术、文化和体育活动,ExactTarget一直是这个市中心的一部分。
Over the last decade, Downtown Indianapolis has had this huge resurgence of housing and amazing restaurants and a lot of arts and culture and sports and ExactTarget has been a part of that fabric of Downtown Indianapolis.
我确实觉得,要在像印第安纳波利斯这样的市场打造一家高增长、行业领先的公司,我们必须扎根于市中心,才能真正利用那里的活力、生机,以及从全国各地招募顶尖人才的能力。
And I really felt that to build a high growth category leading company in a market like Indianapolis, we had to be in the urban core to really take advantage of just the energy, the vitality, the ability to recruit top-notch people from all over the country.
而且,还要能吸引合作伙伴、风投和客户,他们可以飞抵印第安纳波利斯,然后坐15到20分钟的出租车到市中心,就能享受市中心带来的所有好处,这真的很棒。
And then even to bring in partners and VCs and customers that could fly into Indianapolis and take a 15, 20-minute cab ride to Downtown Indy, and then be able to just enjoy all the benefits that that downtown setting has, and that's been neat.
我跟你说,ExactTarget留下的一个很棒的遗产就是,多年来我们一直努力开通从印第安纳波利斯到旧金山的直飞航班,没有这个航班确实是个很大的障碍。
And I'll tell you, one of the neat legacy elements of ExactTarget is for years we've worked on getting a nonstop flight in place from Indianapolis to San Francisco, and not having it's been a real barrier.
我们西海岸的投资者要费很大周折才能来印第安纳波利斯参加董事会会议,这也让这里所有公司的融资变得更加困难。
Our West Coast investors have to jump through lots of hoops to make it into Indy for a board meeting and it makes just fundraising for all companies here in Indy more difficult.
就在收购前后,我们终于和联合航空搞定了这件事,开通了往返旧金山的直飞航班,这看起来可能微不足道,但实际上对我们的科技社区来说是个巨大的改变,Salesforce也很欣赏这一点。
And right around the time of the acquisition, we actually got it done with United Airlines and have had a nonstop flight back and forth to San Francisco, which might seem trivial, but it's actually been a game changer for our tech community and Salesforce has appreciated it as well.
不,我完全相信。
No, I totally believe it.
我觉得很多人把西雅图靠近旧金山看作是在融资和创业方面的一个竞争优势。
I think a lot of credence is paid to Seattle's proximity to San Francisco as a competitive advantage in fundraising and starting a company in general.
我觉得那种快速直达的航班确实起了很大的作用。
And I think the kind of quick direct flight has just a tremendous amount to do with that.
确实如此。
It's so true.
盐湖城也在发生同样的事情。
And the same is happening at Salt Lake City.
盐湖城是个很棒的科技生态圈,有Omnitrade和Adobe,现在差不多有十来个独角兽级别的估值了。
Salt Lake is this amazing tech ecosystem, with Omnitrade and Adobe and now you've got almost a dozen, I would say, unicorn level valuations.
这很大程度上是因为盐湖城和帕克城是个好地方,而且离硅谷很近,所以能轻松融到资,让投资者真正参与进来。
And so much of that is Salt Lake and Park City are a wonderful place to be, but it's such a short hop away from Silicon Valley that you're able to raise capital and get those investors really engaged in the business.
接下来进入下一个部分,这里有两个可能的未来,我想把这两个问题都抛给你。
Moving to the next section, what would've happened otherwise is sort of two alternate futures here, and I want to pose both questions to you.
第一个问题是,你觉得ExactTarget被其他公司收购会不会也合理?
One is, do you think ExactTarget would've made sense with any other acquirer?
第二个问题是,ExactTarget和Responsys以及其他很多从邮件营销起家的公司竞争了很长时间。
And then two, ExactTarget competed against Responsys and many other companies that started as email marketing solutions for a long time.
你觉得除了ExactTarget,还有哪家公司可能适合Salesforce?
Do you think there was anyone besides ExactTarget that could've made sense at Salesforce?
我觉得两个问题的答案都是肯定的。
I think yes to both questions.
我们当然可以和世界上其他几家大型软件公司很好地融合,这些公司一直专注于更深入地进入营销技术领域,并将其视为一个大的增长领域。
We certainly could have fit in well with a number of the other largest software companies in the world that have been focused on going a lot deeper into marketing tech and saw it as a big growth area.
而且毫无疑问,Salesforce在考虑潜在收购对象时,肯定考察了很多不同的公司。
And then there's no question, that Salesforce looked at lots of different players over the course of time to potentially acquire.
作为一家上市公司,在进行这种评估过程并真正为股东做出最佳决策时,一个有趣的方面是你必须进行大量的财务建模,并深入思考作为独立公司的发展前景。
And one element that's interesting when you go through that evaluation process as a public company and really try to make the best decision for your shareholders is you really have to do a lot of financial modeling and a lot of thinking about what does life as an independent company look like.
我们最终确实得出结论,成为Salesforce的一部分对员工和股东来说是一个更好的结果,成功概率更高。
And we ultimately did come to the conclusion that being a part of Salesforce was a better outcome, higher probability outcome for our employees, for our shareholders.
但我们的未来本可以有多种不同的发展方式。
But there are a number of different ways that our future could have played out.
不过,我对最终的结果非常非常满意。
But I was very, very happy the way it played out.
还有另一个有趣的维度,作为一家上市公司,我们会面临巨大的关于电子邮件的压力。
And I'll tell you the other interesting dimension, as a public company, we would get an enormous amount of pressure around email.
人们总是问,电子邮件什么时候会走到尽头?这些新渠道会不会蚕食电子邮件的市场?
The, when is the end of email coming and these new channels are going to cannibalize email.
天哪。
Oh my gosh.
要是每次回答这个问题都能赚点钱就好了。这确实是个沉重的话题,有时甚至像一团乌云笼罩着我们公司。大家始终把我们看作是一家以邮件为核心的公司。即便我们不断拓展全球业务,并进入你提到的那些相邻技术领域,Ben,外界依然认为我们只是做邮件的,往往忽略了我们在多通道、全渠道平台方面的实力。
It's like if I had a nickel for every time I answered that question, but it was just a heavy theme and even sometimes I'd say a cloud over our company where we were thought of as such an email centric company that even as we expanded around the world and expanded into all these other adjacent technologies that you referenced, Ben, we were still thought of as an email company, and I think often didn't get credit for being a broad multi-channel, omni-channel platform.
但邮件营销对 marketers 来说实在太强大了,所以这条业务线一直 booming,我们其他业务线也在增长,但根本没法跟邮件业务比,因为它是 marketers 手里最厉害的工具。
But email was such a powerhouse for marketers that that line of business just kept booming and our other lines were growing, but they could never even get close to the email side of the business because it's just the most powerful tool that a marketer has.
随着电商爆发式增长,邮件的重要性也进一步提升了。
And as e-commerce has exploded with growth, email's become even more relevant.
我挺好奇的,当你预测作为一家独立公司会怎样时,假设你能保持每年40%的增长率,至少能沿着S型曲线走到顶端,那会是什么样子?
I'm curious when you're forecasting what does life look like as an independent company, let's say you could continue to grow 40% year over year indefinitely, or at least to the top of some S-curve.
纸上谈兵容易,实际操作起来难啊。
Easy to say on paper, hard to do in practice.
没错。
That's right.
数字大了以后就更难了。
Gets tougher with a lot of big numbers.
那你是在什么时候,第一,把S曲线的顶点考虑进去,第二,你往前看多少年,你觉得这个溢价的回本周期是多久,比如说,“他们给了我们50%的溢价,但我们觉得20年都达不到那个市值,而我们只看10年的时间跨度,”或者类似这样的?
So at what point do you, one, factor in the top of the S-curve, and then two, how many years out, what do you look at as like the payback period of that premium and say, like, "Well, they're giving us 50% premium and we don't think that we will reach that market cap for 20 years and we're only looking at a 10-year time horizon," or something like that?
我跟你说,这真的是银行家、顾问和独立委员会发挥作用的地方,因为他们在构建财务模型和选择最合理的时间跨度方面很有经验,用来预测独立发展还是和别人合并。
I'll tell you, that's really where the bankers and advisors and kind of independent committee come in because they had a lot of expertise in how to build those financial models and what time horizon makes the most sense in order to predict your independent path versus joining forces with another.
所以我可能没法提供更多细节,但你说得完全对,Ben。
So I probably can't provide a lot more detail than that, but you're exactly right, Ben.
这正是你要经历的过程。
That's exactly the process that you go through.
没错。
That's right.
我很好奇,在我们继续之前,这也和我的科技主题有关。
I'm curious, before we move on from this, and this also bleeds into my tech theme.
你不需要说你们有没有考虑过,但你觉得回过头来看,那一代大多数大数据驱动的营销公司,ExactTarget 就算不是领头羊也是其中之一,都做得很大,增长很快,发展势头很好,但后来都被其他大型企业软件公司收购了,比如 Oracle 收购了 Eloqua,Salesforce 收购了 ExactTarget。
You don't have to say whether you considered it or not, but do you think looking back, most of the big data-driven marketing companies of that generation ExactTarget being one of, if not the leader, got really big, were growing really fast on a great trajectory, but then they all got swallowed up by other big enterprise companies, whether it's Oracle and Eloqua or ExactTarget and Salesforce.
你觉得有没有可能,如果这些公司之间进行整合,会不会出现一个巨大的……
Do you think there was any way that if maybe there had been consolidation among the companies into, could there have been a giant...
大型企业软件公司太少了。
There's so few giant enterprise software companies.
在营销领域能不能打造出这样一家公司呢?
Could one have been built in the marketing category?
是的,这是个好问题。
Yeah, that's a great question.
我觉得之所以没有发生,是因为功能重叠。
I think why it didn't happen is overlapping functionality.
当你仔细看的时候,确实一路上有很多讨论,能不能把一些大型营销科技公司整合起来,变成更大、更有意义的公司。
That when you take a look at, and there were certainly a lot of conversations that ensued along the way, could you stack together some of these kind of large marketing tech companies to become something bigger and something more meaningful?
但问题开始出现或者崩溃的地方在于,你只是有很多重复的功能。
And where it starts to run afoul or kind of collapse is that you just have a lot of duplication of functionality.
所以,当Omniture早期被Adobe收购时,电子邮件、数字营销渠道和分析之间本来是有可能结合的。
So, when Omniture got kind of pulled into Adobe early, there certainly could've been a fit between, let's say, email and digital marketing channels and analytics.
那本来是个合理的结合点,但他们很早就被Adobe拉过去了。
That would've been a logical connection point, but they kind of got pulled into Adobe early.
但你看我们和Responsys,还有一些B2B营销自动化公司,往往有很多功能重叠。
But when you looked at us and Responsys and some of the B2B marketing automation companies, you often had kind of a lot of redundant functionality.
但我们自己也在朝那个方向走,这也是为什么收购Pardot是有意义的,我们继续深入数据和数据分析,还有网络,努力打造一个强大的平台,让所有这些渠道协同工作。
But we were headed down that path ourselves, and that's really why the Pardot acquisition made sense, and we kind of kept moving deeper into data and analytics and the web and really trying to build out that robust platform to make all these channels work together.
真正有趣的是,我们构建的一个大产品,把所有东西整合在一起,叫做Journey Builder,Salesforce真的拥抱了这个Journey Builder平台,甚至在Salesforce内部的不同云中应用它,并且以许多独特的方式使用它。
And what's really interesting is the big product we built that stitched it all together is a product called Journey Builder, and Salesforce has really embraced that Journey Builder platform and is applying it even across different clouds within Salesforce and using it lots of unique ways.
好了,听众朋友们。
All right, listeners.
现在是谈论我们最喜欢的公司之一Legora的好时机,它是法律工作的代理操作系统。
Now is a great time to talk about one of our favorite companies, Legora, the agentic operating system for legal work.
是的。
Yes.
你们大多数人现在都已经把合同丢进聊天机器人里了,但作为一名律师,这真的能帮你走多远呢?
Most of you have dropped a contract into a chatbot by now, but as a lawyer, how far can that really take you?
它没见过你们律所的模板,不尊重保密性,而且你也没法查证它的答案是从哪来的。
It's never seen your firm's precedents, it doesn't respect confidentiality, and you can't check where its answer came from.
所以Legora的创始人像那些伟大的创始人一样,从根本入手。
So Legora's founders approached this the way that great founders do.
早期,团队搬进了斯德哥尔摩一家大型律师事务所的办公室,花了几个月时间学习实际工作是怎么完成的。
Early on, the team moved into the office of a big law firm in Stockholm and learned for months how the work actually gets done.
后来有了几千家企业客户和十万用户,他们依然保持这种工作方式。
A couple of thousands of enterprise customers and 100,000 users later, they still work that way.
他们雇了100名法律工程师。
They employ 100 legal engineers on staff.
这些律师驻扎在律所和法律部门内部,把Legora部署到实际场景中,比如这周要完成的交易,或者周五要交的政策审查。
These are lawyers sitting inside of firms and legal departments to deploy Legora onto live situations like the deal closing this week or the policy review due Friday.
这个产品在短时间内变得非常强大。
The product has gotten very powerful in a short period of time.
一年前,目标还是从聊天机器人那里得到个好答案。
A year ago, the goal was a good answer from a chatbot.
现在有了Legora智能体,你把工作交给它,它回来时带着一个计划。
With the Legora agent, you hand it the work, and it comes back with a plan.
像在数据室里做尽职调查,或者审阅新的供应商合同这样的任务,都能在你每天用的工具里完成,比如Microsoft Word,而且用的是你自己的先例和操作手册。
Tasks like running diligence on a data room or reviewing a new vendor contract get completed inside the tool you use every day, like Microsoft Word, and against your own precedents and playbooks.
每一条发现都有来源。
Every finding is sourced.
律师负责指导工作,在系统执行任何步骤之前,需要律师签字确认。
The lawyer directs the work and signs off before the system executes any steps.
每个法律团队都能用上同样的AI模型,所以模型本身并不会给你带来优势。
Every legal team can get access to the same AI models, so the models themselves do not give you an edge.
你能用自己的数据、人员和操作手册做什么,这才是关键。
What you can do with your own data, people, playbooks, that's the whole game.
如今,在50多个市场,超过1800家律师事务所和内部法律团队中,有超过10万名法律专业人士在使用Legora。
Today, over 100,000 legal professionals at more than 1,800 law firms and in-house legal teams in over 50 markets use Legora.
而且当Legora在试点中与它的头号竞争对手正面交锋时,它有70%的胜率。
And when Legora goes head-to-head with its top competitor in a pilot, it wins 70% of the time.
演示是一回事,但最重要的是,在凌晨两点交割期间,助理律师会不会主动去用它,或者总法律顾问在董事会会议前是否信任它说的话。
A demo is one thing, but what matters most is an associate who reaches for it at 2:00 in the morning during a closing, or whether a general counsel trusts what it says before the board meeting.
所以,如果你的法务团队想了解一下,不管你们是在律所还是企业内部,都可以去legora.com/acquired,记得告诉他们,是Ben和David推荐你们来的。
So if your legal team wants to check it out, whether you're at a firm or in-house, go to legora.com/acquired and be sure to tell them that Ben and David sent you.
David,在我们进入科技趋势环节之前,你有什么要说的吗?
David, do you have anything before we go into tech trends?
没有,我觉得没什么要说的。
No, I don't think so.
Scott,我唯一想补充的是,关于你刚才说的,很有意思的是,现在涌现出这么多新一代营销自动化初创公司,但它们都采用了你说的那种方式,就是把数据和分析结合起来。
The only comment just on, Scott, on what you were saying is it's interesting you're seeing so many startups now that are emerging that are next generation marketing automation, but they're all taking the approach that you said of marrying it up with data and analytics.
我想到的有Mixpanel,Segment也以不同的方式属于这个生态系统,还有好多,比如customer.io、Portland、Intercom。
I'm thinking anything from Mixpanel, and Segment is part of this ecosystem in a different way, but so many, customer.io and Portland, Intercom.
有趣的是,它们采取的方法和你说的完全一样,Scott。
It's funny they're taking exactly the approach that you're saying, Scott.
不会,看着它发展还挺有意思的。
No, it's fun to see it evolve.
还有一个话题你之前问过我,大卫,但我好像跳到了另一个类别里,不过这个故事挺有趣的,我很想跟你讲讲。
One other topic that you asked me about, David, but I think I jumped into another category, but it's kind of a fun story I'd love to tell you about.
这跟我们和微软的关系有关。
It's just the nature of our Microsoft relationship.
你介意我简单说一下吗?
Do you mind if I just touch on that real quick?
当然,我很乐意听。
Yeah, I would love that.
好,那真是个有趣的故事。
Yeah, so that was a really fun story.
我们真的成了微软技术上最大的云公司。
So we really became the largest cloud company running on Microsoft technology.
我们很早就开始用SQL和.NET,基本上所有东西都是基于微软框架构建的,而且我觉得我们把微软技术用到了极致,因为我们当时在打造一个交易量极高的多租户平台。
We were early users of SQL and .NET, and really everything we built was on the Microsoft framework, and we pushed Microsoft technology, I think, to the edge, as we were building a super transactionally intensive multi-tenant platform.
但通过这个过程,我们真的建立了很好的关系,然后我们开始整合到微软Dynamics中,在那里也有很好的合作,最终微软成为了我们的客户。
But through that, we really built this wonderful relationship, and then we started integrating into Microsoft Dynamics and had a really nice relationship there, and then ultimately Microsoft became a customer.
这真是个有趣的故事。
And it's a really fun story.
微软有一个内部平台,一个叫做Pens的内部邮件平台,主要是为微软的业务部门提供营销自动化和邮件营销服务,但内部解决方案在微软内部并不受欢迎。
Microsoft had an internal platform, an internal email platform called Pens that really kind of powered marketing automation and email marketing specifically for Microsoft business units, and the internal solution was not well-liked across Microsoft.
所以当我们有幸拿下微软,并真正推进采用时,我们制定了18到24个月的实施期,在这期间我们会把微软的不同业务部门引入ExactTarget,同时让他们从Pens内部系统迁移出来。
So when we were fortunate to land Microsoft and really go through our adoption, we built an 18- to 24-month implementation period where we would be onboarding different business units of Microsoft onto ExactTarget and off-boarding them on the internal system of Pens.
我们和——
And we set a joint goal with the-
这对我来说很难做到。
That's hard for me to do.
我知道。
I know.
那是个缩写,代表个性化邮件什么的。
It was an acronym for personalized email something something.
可能是通知系统吧。
Notification system, maybe.
如果你要跟Pens竞争,你得打败它。
You had to beat it if you're competing against Pens.
没错。
That's right.
对。
Exactly.
所以我们跟微软的实施团队定了个目标,他们真的很棒,等实施结束,我们真的能把Pens关掉,让这个企业内部不太受欢迎的系统退休,我们就庆祝一下。
So we actually set a goal with the Microsoft implementation team, and they were incredible to work with, that when we got to the end of the implementation, and we're literally able to turn the lights off on Pens, retire this internal system that was not well-liked across the enterprise, that we'd have a celebration.
开个派对。
We'd have a party.
我们做到了。
And we did.
我们真的在微软园区搭了个大帐篷,办了一场非常丰盛的宴会。
We actually, on the Microsoft campus, had a huge tent that was erected, an event that was just catered to the fullest.
美酒、啤酒、美食,应有尽有。
I mean, beautiful wine, beer, food.
微软团队还特意拿到了消防部门的批准,真的把运行Pens系统的服务器从微软的数据中心搬到了派对上,然后我们抡起大锤就砸。
And the Microsoft team, they had to get fire marshal approval, but they actually pulled the servers that were running Pens out of Microsoft data centers, seriously, brought them to the party, and we sledgehammered them.
大家都戴上护目镜,把这些服务器砸了个稀巴烂。
We all strapped on goggles and just beat the tar out of these servers.
那场面简直——
And it was-
就像《上班一条虫》里那样。
Like "Office Space."
真的就是那样。
It seriously was.
完全就是《上班一条虫》的翻版。
It was total "Office Space."
用这种方式告别他们的内部系统,真是太壮观了。
It was just like a spectacular way to retire their internal system.
那真是太爽了。
It was a blast.
哇,这简直是为你要讲的技术主题做了个完美的铺垫。
Wow, that couldn't be a better segue into what technology themes does this illustrate for you.
这正好非常直观地体现了我想要说的一个点,那就是企业用软件即服务来外包一切不是他们核心业务的东西。
And that's a very physical, visceral manifestation of the one that I want to touch on, and that's businesses using software as a service to outsource anything that's not their core competency.
这个主题在节目里反复出现,现在随着云计算的普及和创业成本的降低,企业运营时依赖其他几十家公司的基础设施和软件,通常甚至从免费层或某种免费增值定价模式开始。
This keeps coming up in episodes over and over again, where businesses now, with the advent of cloud computing and the general cost of starting a company going down, companies operate using tens of other companies' infrastructure and software, often even starting at a free tier or on some kind of freemium pricing structure.
而当他们真正从自建系统迁移出来时,情况就不同了。
And it's different at that sort of scale, where they're actually migrating from something they built in-house.
不过我更想听听你的看法,因为你在High Alpha做的就是创办这些新的软件即服务公司。
But I kind of wanted to open it up to you, since what you do at High Alpha is start these new software as a service companies.
你是怎么发现那些空白的?就是找到很多公司都在做的事情,然后把它做成一个平台,让他们都来付费使用我们的平台?
How do you identify where are the sort of holes where we can take something that a whole bunch of companies are doing and do it on one platform, and then they can all just pay us to use our platform?
不,这确实是High Alpha令人兴奋的地方。
No, it's an exciting part of High Alpha.
所以,High Alpha,我们是一个创业工作室。
So, High Alpha, we're a venture studio.
我们一年前成立,专注于创办新的云服务公司。
We started a year ago, and we're a venture studio focused on starting new cloud companies.
实际上,High Alpha有两个部分。
And we actually have two sides to High Alpha.
High Alpha Studio是我们的创业孵化器,我们已经计划在未来三到四年内创办八到十家新公司。
High Alpha Studio is our startup studio, and we've signed up to start eight to 10 new companies over the next three to four years.
而High Alpha Capital是我们的另一个分支,它是一个风险投资基金,用来资助我们自己的公司,当它们准备好扩大规模时,也用来资助全国其他优秀的SaaS创业者。
And then High Alpha Capital is our kind of second arm, and that's a venture fund that is utilized to fund our own companies when they're ready to reach scale, and then also fund other great SaaS entrepreneurs around the country.
你说得对,Ben。
So you're right, Ben.
我们花了很多时间在构思上,寻找企业云服务领域里未被满足的需求。
We spend a lot of time on just ideation, looking for unmet needs within the enterprise cloud space.
我们通过自己的创意来做这件事。
And we do that through our own ideas.
我们也会通过主动找上门的创业者来实现这一点。
We do that through entrepreneurs that approach us.
我们花很多时间与企业创新部门、大学以及那些对市场走向有敏锐洞察力的科技远见者打交道。
We spend a lot of time with corporate innovation groups and universities, and just tech visionaries that have a sense for where the market's going.
而且,每个雇主都是软件的买家,这种观念本身就是一种彻底的改变。
And this whole notion that every employer is a buyer of software is something radically different.
你可以回想一下云时代之前的客户端服务器时代,那时技术采购和支出都牢牢控制在首席信息官和IT部门手中。
You kind of think back to the client server days, pre-cloud, and tech spending and buying was tightly controlled by the CIO and the IT department.
然后,随着云的出现,情况开始放开,不同业务部门或业务线的负责人可以在一定框架内做决策。
And then, with the advent of cloud, it starts to kind of open up to different business unit or business line owners can make decisions within a framework.
现在我们进入了一个每个员工都是买家的时代。
And now we're in an era where every employee is a buyer.
有了免费增值模式和员工的信用卡,你可以快速创建Slack频道和许多其他解决方案,这带来了大量机会,但也引发了不少意想不到的后果。
With freemium and an employee credit card, you can spin up Slack channels and lots of other solutions, and it's creating lots of opportunity, but it's also creating quite a few unintended consequences.
所以,你听了这个肯定会觉得有意思。
So, you'll get a kick out of this.
我们其实已经启动了一个新业务,还没对外公布,本质上是一个管理SaaS的SaaS平台。
We actually have started a new business, we haven't announced it yet, that essentially is a SaaS platform for managing SaaS.
就是管理SaaS应用。
Managing SaaS applications.
确实如此,它针对的是那种混乱和有点拥挤的——
It really is, and it's targeted at the chaos and kind of the overcrowding-
严重的问题。
Serious problem
——SaaS支出方面。
... of SaaS spend.
这是个很大的问题。
It's a huge problem.
我们的MVP差不多准备好,要和第一批试点客户上线了。
And our MVP is about ready to go live with our first group of pilot customers.
但它把SaaS支出、SaaS使用情况,还有用户反馈和用户情绪都整合在一起。
But it brings together SaaS spend, SaaS utilization, and then user sentiment, user feedback.
所以它把这三个变量整合到一个平台上,这样组织至少能真正搞清楚自己到底在用哪些东西。
So it brings those three variables into one platform, so organizations can, at a minimum, actually understand what they're using.
他们付了钱的是哪些?
What have they paid for?
整个企业里实际在用的是什么?
What's being utilized across the enterprise?
有哪些是付了钱但根本没在用的?
What have maybe they paid for but isn't being utilized?
他们的产品和平台在哪些地方有重叠?
Where do they have overlapping products and platforms?
有哪些地方可能正在发生一些有趣的事情?
Where is there maybe something cool happening?
在一个团队或部门内部,有哪些创新举措值得在整个组织范围内推广和考虑?
Where's there innovation happening within one group or department that should be thought about across that organization?
所以这是一家很酷的公司,我们很兴奋能帮助他们理清业务是如何使用 SaaS 的,并找到最优化使用的方式。
So that's kind of a cool company that we're excited about to help organizations kind of get their arms around how their business is using SaaS and use it in the most optimized way.
所以我一直在提的那个科技主题,这也是个很好的引子,就是在企业领域,历史上一直有这种情况,不过我们在节目里确实聊得不多。
So the tech theme that I've been referencing a bunch, and this is another perfect lead in, is there's been this sort of historically in the enterprise space, which again, we haven't talked as much about on the show.
大概有四家巨头,对吧?
There kind of have been sort of four-ish giants, right?
有微软、SAP、甲骨文,还有Salesforce,它是最近才崛起成为巨头之一的。
There's Microsoft, there's SAP, there's Oracle, and then there's Salesforce, which has emerged as sort of the most recently as one of these giants.
这里有个概念叫客户掌控力,这个领域有很多初创公司,但最终,这四家公司是最大的,他们对CIO、越来越多的CMO、销售主管和CEO都有很强的掌控力,可以通过他们的渠道推销各种产品。
And there's this concept of account control, and there are lots of startups in the space, but ultimately, those four companies are by far the biggest, and they have the account control with the CIOs and increasingly CMOs and heads of sales and CEOs, where they can push all sorts of products through their channel.
ExactTarget,就像我们说的,作为一次业务线收购,非常适合Salesforce,是他们通过强大的渠道进军新产品领域的首批尝试之一。
And ExactTarget, as we talked about being a business line acquisition, was a perfect fit with Salesforce as one of their first forays into a new product sending through their gorilla channel, or gorilla sized channel.
你怎么看这个?
How do you react to that?
还有,我觉得SaaS企业投资者的一大论点就是,随着SaaS的发展,这种情况正在改变,对吧?
And/or one of the main theses I think of SaaS enterprise investors is that with SaaS, that's changing, right?
人们可以免费试用产品,比如个人员工,客户掌控力正在被削弱。
People can buy stuff freemium, like individual employees, and account control is being eroded.
我不知道,你怎么看这个问题?
I don't know, how do you think about that?
现在两边都经历过。
Being on both sides now.
我确实看到了两面的情况,你说得非常对,David。
I definitely see both sides of it, and you're totally spot on, David.
ExactTarget收购成功的一个大原因是Salesforce和全球最大的公司有着非常好的高管层关系,他们了解Salesforce。
One of the big reasons why the ExactTarget acquisition's been successful is that Salesforce just has these amazing executive-level relationships with the biggest companies around the world, and they know Salesforce.
他们信任Salesforce。
They trust them.
他们想买更多产品。
They want to buy more products.
他们想买紧密集成的产品。
They want to buy more products that are tightly integrated.
你看Salesforce营销云的数据,增长非常快,而且之所以增长这么快,就是因为他们和那些受信任的CEO、CIO建立了关系。
And when you look at the Salesforce marketing cloud numbers, they're booming, and they're really booming because they have all those trusted CEO and CIO relationships.
而且马克和团队,他们真的是了不起的创新者,在执行和扩展业务方面也做得非常出色。
And then Mark and the team, they're just incredible innovators and amazing at executing, scaling the business.
所以这是实实在在的。
So that's real.
这一点毫无疑问。
There's no question about that.
不过,仍然有很多机会留给新的创新和新进入者,这就是创新者的困境——那些提出新想法、新概念,以及更轻便、更灵活、更适合移动端、更贴近消费者体验的软件的公司。
However, there's still plenty of opportunity for new innovation and new entrants and the innovator's dilemma of companies coming up with new ideas and new concepts and software that's lighter and more flexible and more mobile-friendly and more consumer-like.
我觉得,创新的空间和新公司找到自己定位的机会是源源不断的。
There's no shortage of room, I think, for innovation and for new companies to find their groove.
而且你不需要得到首席信息官的批准就能购买。
And that you don't need your CIO to approve to buy it.
确实不需要。
You don't.
完全正确。
That's exactly right.
说实话,你刚才讲的这些关于创意、为新公司找点子、还有搞定第一个客户,这些对我来说特别有共鸣,毕竟我在Pioneer Square Labs就是干这个的。
Which honestly, you're talking about ideation and getting ideas for new companies and getting your first customer, obviously something near and dear to my heart at Pioneer Square Labs.
而且作为经常从客户开发阶段走出来、去争取第一个客户的人,你会把之前跟人聊的那些需求变成实际的东西,然后说:"好,我们把这个做出来了。"
And as someone that is often going out and transitioning from the customer development to getting your first customer and taking the people that you were talking to about what are your needs and saying, "Cool, we built this.
你愿意付钱吗?
Will you pay for it?"
现在要做到这一点真的特别容易,只要组织里有个支持你的人就行。因为你的产品定价不到一千美元,他们直接用信用卡就能买,根本不用经过CIO。
It's become extremely easy to do that when you have an advocate in the organization who for, you're going to charge less than $1,000 for your product, so they just can use their credit card, and you don't have to go through the CIO.
所以这给我们打开了一个全新的局面,让我们能更快地拿下第一个客户。
So it's opened this whole new wave for us of the ability to land your first customer in a much faster timeframe.
完全同意。
Absolutely.
对,就是这样。
No, that's exactly right.
而且现在有这么多优秀的云平台,你可以很快地搭建技术、做出MVP、推向市场,然后真正检验一下有没有产品市场契合度,看看这个东西到底能不能行得通。
And then all these great cloud platforms where you can really quickly build technology, build MVPs, get it to market, and really see if you've got product market fit, and you've got something that can be viable.
这就是我觉得特别有意思的地方,本,我们俩都在做新想法、创办新公司,从想法到MVP再到概念验证,真的可以非常快。
And that's what's so fun, I think, Ben, about what we're both doing in coming up with new ideas and launching new companies is you can go from idea to MVP and proof of concept really, really quickly.
好的。
All right.
我们要进入下一个环节了,这个环节以前是我们节目的最后一部分。
We're going to move on to what was formerly the last part of our show.
我觉得后面还有几个精彩的部分,但先来给这次收购打分。
I think we have a couple cool sections after, but grading the acquisition.
斯科特,你可以选择参与,也可以不参与。
And Scott, you can choose to participate in this or not.
我觉得你可能有点偏见,但是……这显然是一次非常成功的收购。
I feel like you might be a little bit biased, but- ... this is obviously an incredibly successful acquisition.
你听马克在最大的舞台上一次又一次地向全世界宣扬,这显然是个成功案例。
You hear Mark preach it to the world time and time again in some of the biggest stages he's ever on, obviously a success.
我们给那些倍数高得离谱的项目打过A。
We've given As to things that have ridiculous multiples.
你看看Instagram被Facebook收购的例子,或者皮克斯反向整合、反向收购迪士尼影业和迪士尼动画的例子。
You look at what Instagram did at Facebook, or you look at Pixar's sort of reverse integration or reverse acquisition of Disney Pictures, Disney Animation.
那些才是我们心目中的A。
Those are our As.
所以我觉得我给ExactTarget的评分是A-。
So I guess where I'm going to land on this is an A- for ExactTarget.
我的想法差不多。
I think I'm similar.
我们已经聊过为什么这是个很好的结果。
We've talked about all the reasons why this is a great outcome.
有意思的是,我们其实没怎么提数字,虽然这节目是关于收购的,但我们不太量化。
One thing that we actually didn't quote, it's funny, we're not super quantitative on this show, even though we're about- ... acquisitions.
所以,我们整集聊下来,一次都没提到你的营收。
So, we went through this whole episode, we didn't talk once about your revenue.
但我想抛出一些数字。
But some numbers I want to throw out.
2012年,ExactTarget作为独立公司的最后一个完整年度,我记得你们的营收大约是2.94亿美元。
When the ExactTarget in 2012, which was the final year, a full year of being a standalone company, I believe you had about 294 million in revenue.
而在Salesforce的2016财年,也就是截至2016年1月31日,基本上就是2015日历年,营销云部门的营收达到了6.54亿美元,不到三年就翻了一倍多。
And in Salesforce's fiscal 2016, which ended January 31st, 2016, so essentially the calendar year 2015, the marketing cloud division did 654 million in revenue, so over twice as much in less than three years.
所以我觉得这结果相当不错,也说明了这个收购的威力。
So that's a pretty great outcome, I think, and speaks to the power of this.
我相信Salesforce在收购后肯定做了很多产品上的整合,加了不少功能,但更重要的是他们拥有的那些企业客户关系的力量。
There are many product things that I'm sure that Salesforce has done with the acquisition and bolted on many things, but also just the power of these enterprise relationships that they have.
所以,我觉得这是一笔很棒的交易。
So, I think this was a great deal.
而且,当我想到Instagram时,它从10亿美元的收购价,三年内营收达到30亿美元,这也是我们的——我也给A-,但我有点犹豫。
And I'm also going to, when I think about Instagram it went from a $1 billion acquisition price to $3 billion in revenue in three years, and that's our-- I'm also A-, but I'm on the fence here.
斯科特,你有什么看法?
Scott, any comments?
你们打分可真严啊。
You guys are tough graders.
你就像那种特别严格、特别吝啬给A的教授,所以我……
You'd be like that professor that's really difficult and incredibly stingy about giving away an A, so my-
嗯,生活本来就不公平嘛。
Well, life is not fair, so.
不,我知道。
No, I know.
Instagram才是标杆。
Instagram is the bar.
那是个很高的标杆。
That's a high bar.
毫无疑问我有偏见,但我觉得我会给你一个很公平的评分,而且绝对给满分A,不加任何减号。
There's no question I'm biased, but I think I'd give you a really fair grade, and I'd definitely give a full A. No minus.
我会给满分A。我告诉你原因,因为这对ExactTarget来说是个非凡的成果。
I'd go with the full A. And I'll tell you the reason is that this was an extraordinary outcome for ExactTarget.
想想看,三个首次创业的软件创业者,在印第安纳波利斯创办了一家软件公司,起初的期望非常朴素。
You think about three first-time software entrepreneurs starting a software company in Indianapolis with very humble expectations.
没人想到会发生这种事。
Nobody thought this was going to happen.
简直难以置信。
Inconceivable.
你们就是典型的逆袭者。
You guys are the definition of underdogs.
难以置信我们最终能以25亿美元的价格卖掉公司。
Inconceivable that we would ultimately sell the business for $2.5 billion.
我特别感激的是,每个参与ExactTarget的员工都持有公司股权,这对我们的员工来说真的是一个非常有意义的成果。
And what I'm so grateful for is that every employee who was a part of ExactTarget had equity in the company, and this was really a meaningful outcome for our employees.
不仅仅是那种一生难得的经历,以及成为我们称之为“橙色”的强大文化的一部分,还有实实在在的经济回报。
Not only just the kind of experience of a lifetime and being a part of this powerful culture we called Orange, but there was a financial outcome that was meaningful.
而且最棒的是,以每股33.75美元的价格,每一个投资过ExactTarget的人,从亲朋好友到风险投资再到公开投资者,都赚到了钱。
And the neat thing is that at 33.75 a share Every person who ever invested in ExactTarget, from friends and family to venture rounds to public investors, made money.
所以一想到这对ExactTarget的每个人来说是多么不可思议的成果,我就笑得合不拢嘴。
So I smile from ear to ear just thinking about what an incredible outcome this was for everyone at ExactTarget.
然后有趣的是,大卫,我很高兴你提到了那些数字,整合其实非常困难。
And then the neat thing, David, I'm glad you referenced the numbers, is that integration is remarkably difficult.
收购公司并有效整合,这真的很难。
It is so difficult to acquire companies, integrate them effectively.
看看Salesforce,这是他们做过最大的一次收购,也是第一次收购上市公司,而且能看到这样的成果。
And when you look at Salesforce, this was the largest acquisition they had done, first time they had acquired a public company, and to see the kind of results that have been produced.
我知道马克和团队对业务的表现非常满意。
And I just know how delighted Mark and the team have been about the performance of the business.
两边我都给A,Salesforce这边和ExactTarget这边都是。
I give it an A on both sides, the Salesforce side and the ExactTarget side.
作为创业者,你必须热爱你的公司,对吧?
As an entrepreneur, you have to love your company, right?
如果你不爱,还有谁会爱呢?
If you don't, who else will?
哦,当然。
Oh, absolutely.
没错。
That's right.
好,那我们进入节目最后的小环节吧。
Well, let's move on to a little fun we have at the end of the episode.
这个环节叫“特别推荐”,我们会聊聊最近两周在流行文化或媒体里看到、读到、偶然发现的东西,或者我们喜欢的产品,反正就是让我们特别感兴趣的任何东西。
It's a section called The Carve Out, and this is where we talk about something that's in pop culture or media that we read or watched or stumbled upon, or a product that we love, really anything that really tickled our fancy in the last couple weeks.
我先来。
And I'll start with mine.
我是《The Talk Show》的忠实粉丝。
I'm a big fan of "The Talk Show."
这是John Gruber做的播客,他来自Daring Fireball,主要聊苹果,而且每年在苹果最大的开发者大会WWDC上,他都会做一场现场秀。
It is a podcast done by John Gruber of Daring Fireball that mostly covers Apple, and John does a live show every year at WWDC, the biggest Apple conference.
今年,他的嘉宾通常都是他的朋友,或者苹果新闻圈里的人。
And this year, his guests are normally friends of his or other people sort of in the Apple journalism space.
结果这次上台的是Craig Federighi和Phil Schiller,一个是市场部高级副总裁,一个是软件工程高级副总裁。
And out walks Craig Federighi and Phil Schiller, the senior VP of marketing and the senior VP of software, or just engineering all up.
总之,这是一场非常难得、坦诚的访谈,两位嘉宾在台上表现得特别有魅力。
Anyway, just an unbelievable, candid interview with two guys that have great personalities on stage.
平时我们看到的他们,大多是在那种排练得极其充分、节奏和细节都完美把控的苹果主题演讲里。
And you normally only see these people in the extremely rehearsed, very perfectly timed and executed Apple keynotes.
能听到他们即兴发挥的内容,真的很有趣,尤其是如果你是苹果的粉丝,或者只是对科技行业以及这些公司是如何运作的一般感兴趣的话,这种近距离了解他们的机会很难得。
And getting them off the cuff, it's just so fun if you're a fan of Apple or just a fan of technology and how these businesses run in general to get that sort of candid look at these guys.
我推荐一本好书,我快读完了,但一直觉得特别有意思。
Mine is a great book that I'm almost done reading, but have been enjoying immensely.
我是看到推荐才注意到它的。
I saw this as a recommendation.
我想大概是2012年或者2013年,我去参加了Y Combinator的创业学校,当时Jack Dorsey去演讲了,他推荐了这本书。
I went to Y Combinator Startup School in 2013, I believe, either 2012 or 2013, and Jack Dorsey spoke there, and he recommended it as a book.
从那以后它就一直在我的书单上,直到最近我才终于抽空把它读完。
And it's been on my list ever since, and I just finally got around to reading it.
这本书叫《分数自然会照顾自己》,作者是比尔·沃尔什。他是旧金山49人队传奇的主教练,可惜已经去世了。他在90年代带领球队建立了辉煌的王朝,我小时候就记得看乔·蒙塔纳、杰瑞·赖斯和史蒂夫·杨那会儿的比赛。
It's a book called "The Score Takes Care of Itself," and it's by Bill Walsh, who was the legendary, unfortunately late, coach of the 49ers during their amazing dynasty in the '90s, which I remember growing up and watching Joe Montana and Jerry Rice and Steve Young.
但这本书主要讲的是他的领导哲学和心得,他真是个了不起的人。
But the book is just about his kind of philosophy and lessons on leadership, and he's such an amazing guy.
你想想那个年代的橄榄球教练,通常都是非常严厉,大喊大叫的。
You think of a football coach in that era, and it's super hard and yelling and screaming.
但那完全不是他的风格。
That's not his style at all.
他追求的是卓越,这才是最重要的,其他都是表面功夫。
It's just this commitment to excellence, and that's all that matters, and all the other stuff is just show.
总之,这本书里有很多宝贵的见解。
But anyway, there's lots of good gems in the book.
我们会在节目笔记里放上链接。
We'll link to it in the show notes.
我得去看看。
I'll have to check it out.
那真有意思。
That's very fun.
我很喜欢这里的‘ carve out ’环节,各位。
I love The Carve Out feature here, guys.
这挺有意思的。
This is kind of fun.
谢谢。
Thanks.
还有大卫,我得澄清一下,杰克·多西跟咱们没什么关系。
And David, I should clarify, Jack Dorsey is no relation.
虽然这档节目里我跟家里人有不少交集,但我和杰克其实没有血缘关系,不过要是真有关系也挺有意思的。
Although I've got lots of family connections here on the show, Jack and I are not related to one another, although that'd be kind of fun.
所以我的截肢手术是一个月前做的。
So my carve out was a month ago.
当时我在换台找东西看,想找的应该是NBA季后赛,结果切到了ESPN,正好赶上斯克里普斯全国拼字大赛的尾声,那场面简直太震撼了。
I was flipping channels trying to find, I think, probably an NBA playoff game, and flipped over to ESPN and caught the end of the National Spelling Bee, the Scripps National Spelling Bee, and it was phenomenal.
两位决赛选手分别是11岁和13岁的孩子,他们不仅拼写那些超难单词的能力出众,而且显然在巨大的压力下表现得非常出色。
The two finalists were an 11-year-old and a 13-year-old who were just extraordinary at their ability, obviously, to spell very difficult words and handle a tremendous amount of pressure.
最后他们打了个平手。
And they ultimately tied in the end.
那个13岁的孩子有个哥哥或姐姐以前赢过,而那个11岁的孩子是五年级学生,是有史以来最年轻的决赛选手和冠军。
And the 13-year-old had had an older sibling that had won previously, and the 11-year-old was a fifth grader who was the youngest finalist and champion ever.
看着这两个孩子比赛,真的太了不起了。
And watching those two operate was incredible.
对我来说,我给你们讲两个小故事。
And to me, I'll tell you two little stories.
第一,我觉得现在的年轻人成长得太快了,这真的很特别。
One, it's just quite exceptional, I think, how young people are developing so quickly.
看看我们各个公司的实习生或者刚毕业的大学生能做出的贡献,他们现在能做的事情,在过去是根本不可能的。
And when we look across our businesses at interns or contributions new college graduates can make, they are able to contribute to businesses in a way today that never existed in the past.
看着这两个年轻学生比赛,真的非常震撼。
And watching these two young students compete was really incredible.
然后我最喜欢的部分之一是,每个决赛选手都要分享他们最喜欢的单词,那些单词我肯定拼不出来,甚至可能都读不出来。
And then one of my favorite parts is that each of the finalists had to share their favorite word, which I would definitely have a difficult time spelling any of them, probably even pronouncing one of them.
但其中一个让我印象深刻的词是‘不屈不挠’。
But one of them that stuck with me was indefatigable.
好词。
Great word.
好词,它的意思就是不知疲倦的坚持,做到不屈不挠。
Great word, which really means tireless persistence, to be indefatigable.
在我与这些早期创业公司合作的过程中,我觉得这是CEO或创始团队最重要的特质,就是他们要有这种不知疲倦的坚持,内心燃烧着成功的火焰,想要解决大问题,改变世界,你就知道他们一定会成功。
And as I'm working with all these early stage startups, to me, that's the number one characteristic for a CEO or a founding team is that they have this tireless persistence, and they have such a burning fire inside them to succeed and to solve a big problem and make a difference in the world that you just know they're going to be successful.
那太好了。
That's great.
完全同意。
Totally agree.
大卫,你想把后续问题留到下次再讨论吗?
David, do you want to table follow-ups until next time?
我们这里时间有点超了。
We're running a little long here.
好吧,那我快速说一个,因为我们在节目里提过好几次了。
Well, maybe I'll just do one real quick, because we've mentioned it a few times on this show.
好的。
Sure.
这周Instagram公布了最新的用户数据,或者说是Facebook公布了Instagram的最新用户数据。
Instagram reported latest user numbers this week, or Facebook reported Instagram's latest user numbers this week.
相当惊人。
Pretty incredible.
他们突破了5亿注册用户,3亿日活跃用户。
They passed 500 million registered users, 300 million daily active users.
想想这个比例。
Think about that ratio.
Instagram上每五个注册用户中就有三个每天使用它。
Three out of five registered users on Instagram use it every single day.
哇,这太厉害了。
Wow, that's impressive.
这就是用户粘性。
That's engagement.
Instagram 是我们最早做的节目之一,而且就像我说的,它是我们的经典案例。但尤其是现在有 Snapchat 和其他各种事情,大家都在问这些根本性的问题,而这项业务却依然表现得非常出色。
Instagram was one of our very first shows, and like I said, it's our canonical A. But especially with Snapchat and everything going on, there's all these existential questions, and that business just continues to perform at an amazing level.
确实。
Indeed.
谢谢你,Scott。
Thank you, Scott.
好了,听众朋友们。
All right, listeners.
现在是聊聊我们最喜欢的公司之一 Statsig 的好时机。
Now is a great time to talk about one of our favorite companies, Statsig.
对。
Yes.
最好的产品团队之所以依赖 Statsig,是有原因的,无论他们是在优化核心产品功能,还是大规模推出 AI 驱动的体验。
There is a reason why the best product teams rely on Statsig, whether they are iterating on their core product features or shipping AI-powered experiences at scale.
对。
Yep.
在如今这个疯狂的AI时代,快速发布已经只是基本要求了。
In the crazy speed of today's AI world, shipping fast is just table stakes now.
持续构建和部署你的应用基本上已经变得轻而易举。
It's basically trivial to build and deploy your app constantly.
真正的优势在于,你能多快了解到哪些改动真正为客户创造了价值,以及你能多快利用这些信号来指导下一步的发布。
The real advantage is how quickly you learn what changes actually created value for customers, and how fast you can use that signal to guide what you ship next.
这就是Statsig发挥作用的地方。
This is where Statsig comes in.
它将实验、功能开关和产品分析整合到一个统一的系统中,让团队能够安全发布、严格测试,并直接将他们的改动与用户的实际行为联系起来。
It brings experimentation, feature flags, and product analytics into one unified system so teams can ship safely, test rigorously, and directly link what they changed to how users actually behaved.
所以,如果你想让学习成为你的竞争优势,无论你是在构建新的AI体验,还是仅仅在优化现有的核心产品,都可以访问statsig.com/acquired开始使用。
So if you want to make learning your competitive advantage, whether you're building new AI experiences or just evolving your existing core product, go to statsig.com/acquired to get started.
嘿,差不多该结束这期节目了。
Hey, just to kind of close down the show.
各位听众,非常感谢。
Anyone listening out there, thanks so much.
告诉你的朋友,在iTunes上给我们写评论,在Twitter、Facebook上分享,随便你喜欢怎么做。
Tell your friends, review us on iTunes, share it on Twitter, Facebook, whatever you like to do.
如果你们喜欢,也可以发Snapchat提到我们。
Snap about us, if that's your thing.
Scott,我们的听众怎么找到你呢?
And Scott, how can our audience find you?
Twitter上是@scottdorsey,还有highalpha.com。
@scottdorsey on Twitter, and then highalpha.com.
你可以在那里了解更多我们在印第安纳波利斯正在打造的新项目。
You can learn more about the new venture that we're building here in Indianapolis.
太棒了。
Awesome.
好的,非常感谢。
Well, thank you so much.
是的,非常感谢大家。
Yeah, thanks so much, guys.
真的很享受这次交流。
Really enjoyed it.
谢谢,本。
Thanks, Ben.
谢谢,大卫。
Thanks, David.
谁掌握了真相?
Who got the truth?
是你吗?
Is it you?
是你吗?
Is it you?
是你吗?
Is it you?
现在谁掌握了真相?
Who got the truth now?
嗯。
Huh.
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