重温Instagram（与Emily White）

对吧？

Right?

如果你往一个业务投一块钱，你的主打产品，能拿回五块钱，而开发新产品时，投一块钱只能拿回七毛钱，或者投一块钱拿回一块二，对吧？

If you can put a dollar into one business, your main product, and get $5 out, when you're developing a new product, you're putting a dollar and you're getting 70¢ out or you're putting a dollar and you're getting 120¢ out, right?

我说的不只是钱，还有工程师、合适的人手，以及整个围绕业务发展的生态系统。

And I'm not just talking about dollars, I'm talking about engineers, I'm talking about right head count and the whole ecosystem that goes along with building a business.

所以一次又一次，当你从全局来看，你会说，我们为什么还要投资这个？因为我们的核心业务做得太好了。

And so time and time and time again, when you look at this from a high level, you say, why the hell are we investing in this other Because our core one is doing so well.

所以这让新业务变得极其困难。

So it's, it makes it incredibly hard.

对新业务的门槛高得不切实际。

So the bar is so unrealistically high for new businesses.

所以坦白说，这往往真的需要一次大规模的收购。

So it really does take often a dramatic acquisition, frankly.

很多时候，谷歌就是一个很好的例子。

Lot of times, Google is a good example of this.

他们通过收购来增长，因为很难获得早期的发展势头，来证明这里值得你继续投入资源。

They grow through acquisitions because it's too hard to get the early traction that you need to prove that this is a place you should continue to spend your resources.

对。

Yeah.

对。

Yeah.

所以这是个好观点。

So that's a good Yeah.

说到建立业务，大卫，你想带我们了解一下吗？

Was gonna say speaking of of building the business, David, you wanna take us into

投入和产出。

Dollars in and dollars out.

对。

Yeah.

我的意思是，目前还没有商业模式。

I mean, at this point, there's no business model.

没有收入模式。

There's no revenue model.

Instagram上没有广告。

There are no ads in Instagram.

品牌在Instagram上，但都是自然流量。

Brands are in on Instagram, but it's all organic.

对。

Right.

都是公司的品牌经理自己发帖，你知道的，自己发。

It's all brand managers at companies posting, you know, posts on on their own.

你是怎么和Kevin开始考虑在这里做什么的？

How did you even start with Kevin to think about what to do here?

我的意思是，我们现在是2019年，看起来你选的模式是对的，但当时并不明显。

I mean, because we're sitting here in 2019, it seems obvious that that the model you chose was right, but it wasn't obvious at the time.

比如，即使是Facebook的第一个广告模式，你知道的，著名的就是在网页侧边放展示广告，那很糟糕。

Like, even Facebook's first advertising model, you know, famously was just display ads on the side of the web page and that was terrible.

他们花了好几年才搞明白信息流这个东西。

It was years until they figured out the news feed.

你们当初是怎么开始考虑这个问题的？

You know, how did you guys start to approach the problem?

对。

Yeah.

嗯，第一个问题是，你们必须得赚钱吗？

Well, the first question is do you have to make money?

对吧？

Right?

这就是我们和自己以及公司里很多人争论的问题——真的需要赚钱吗？

And that's the question that we debated with ourselves and with a bunch of people at the company is like, do you really need to make money?

我喜欢赚钱。

I like making money.

在谷歌的AdWords上赚过钱。

Of on AdWords at Google.

我在这一行已经干了很多年了。

I've been in that business for a long time.

我懂这个。

I know it.

凯文和我后来达成了一致，我觉得我们都清楚我们想赚钱，因为如果你能赚钱，你就能自己定规矩。

Kevin and I sort of came to the place where I think we knew that we wanted to make money because if you make money, you can write your rules.

你可以

You can

自己定规矩。

write your own rules.

对吧？

Right?

这样更容易追踪。

It's easier to track.

也更容易争取人手。

It's easier to make the case for headcount.

在公司里也更容易有发言权。

It's easier to have a voice within the company.

而且当然，那时候我们是一家大公司里的小公司，或者说至少是一家中型公司，他们的人比我们多得多。

And of course, we were at this point now a very small company in a very large company, or at least a medium sized company that had a lot more people than we did.

我来了没多久，大概几个月吧，我们就达到了1亿用户。

And it was shortly after I arrived, I don't know, a handful of months that we hit the 100,000,000 user mark.

所以那时候，我们背靠一家有基础设施和人才的公司，能相对快速地实现商业化，比我们自己单干要快得多。

So at that point, we were sitting on top of a company that had the infrastructure and talent to help us monetize relatively quickly compared to how do we had to do this on our own.

我们有了足够的用户基础，可以真正做成一个可行的生意。

We had the user base that we needed in order to actually make a viable business.

而且我们知道，我们想要权力和控制力，以及自己书写未来的能力。

And we knew that we wanted sort of power and control and the ability to write our own future moving forward.

所以，从广告开始真的很有道理。

And so it really made sense that we were going to start with advertising.

我们也知道，在亚马逊、在Instagram上能行得通的模式

We also knew that the model that was gonna work on Amazon on Amazon, on Instagram

亚马逊也有广告业务。

Amazon also has advertising.

这也预示了Instagram未来的商业模式。

Also be foreshadowing of Instagram's future business model.

这让我们有机会在广告领域做一些非常不同的事情，特别是利用手机直接完成购买。

It gave us opportunity to do something pretty different in the ad space, namely around using mobile to actually complete a purchase.

而且人们来Instagram的心态不同，产品展示的方式也不同。

And the people were coming to Instagram with a different perspective, products were showing up in a different way.

即使在当时，我们也觉得让用户通过Instagram广告直接购买，将来可能会成为一种非常厉害的广告形式。

And it seemed to us, even at that time that giving users the ability to buy through Instagram ads could be a really killer ad format down the road.

但那时候的移动支付基础设施，说起来挺有意思的，支付功能。

But that mobile infrastructure, I mean, it's funny Payment.

当时根本不存在。

Doesn't exist then.

对吧？

Right?

移动网站当时做得还不错。

Mobile websites were good Did

那时候有Stripe吗？

Stripe even exist

没有。

at No.

这个嘛……

This

Apple Pay肯定还没有。

Apple Pay certainly didn't.

对。

Yeah.

对。

Yeah.

没有。

No.

所以我们知道，我们需要给这个行业一些时间来成熟。

So we knew that we needed to give the industry some time to mature.

所以，实际上从我们做的广告格式开始，作为旅程的第一步是非常有意义的。

And so actually starting with the ad formats that we did made a lot of sense as the very first step in a journey.

我们知道我们正沿着那条路走，而开始只是开始。

And we knew that we were heading down that path and that the beginning was just that, it was the beginning.

所以，你知道，有时候，我想说，在谷歌做AdWords，其实我们挺幸运的，早期就找到了那个广告格式，后来一直沿用到现在。

So, you know, sometimes, I mean, I would say at Google with AdWords, actually, got relatively lucky that early on, we sort of landed on the ad format that ended up being like the ad format that's still there today.

也许是有史以来最好的广告格式。

Maybe the best ad format of all time.

相当不错的广告格式。

Pretty good ad format.

它做得很好。

It's done well.

我的意思是，这很有趣。

I mean, this was fun.

对吧？

Right?

这真的很有意思。

This was really fun.

我们当时有视觉广告。

We had we had visual.

大概六个月后，我们又推出了视频广告。

We launched video another maybe six months after that.

所以，对于下一代广告格式和市场来说，那真是一个非常丰富的生态系统。

So it was a very rich ecosystem for really the next generation of ad formats and marketplaces.

Instagram 这个产品以简洁美观著称，而当时 Facebook 上的广告，至少从普遍情况来看，并不是这样的。

So Instagram as a product was known for being spartan and beautiful Ads focused on the on Facebook at the time were not that, at least if you generalize it.

你是怎么做，才能确保在把 Facebook 的商业模式引入 Instagram 时，不会破坏它原本的美感呢？

How did you go about making sure that you didn't ruin something beautiful on Instagram by starting to introduce the Facebook's business model to it?

是的。

Yep.

所以我们实际上把这一点当成了头等大事。

So we made that the number one priority, actually.

而且我们也知道，顺便说一句，看看之前服务条款那件事的教训，惹恼我们的用户绝对不是正确的做法。

We knew and we knew, by the way, just looking at what happened with the terms of service that pissing off our user base was not the way to go.

我们手里有非常珍贵的东西，我们会好好珍惜它。

And that we had something pretty precious, and we were going to treat it that way.

而且我们处于一个有利的位置，就像我之前说的，我们不需要靠它赚钱，也就是说我们不用靠它来付账单。

And we are in the advantageous position, as I mentioned earlier, of not having to make money, Meaning we didn't have to pay the bills.

所以我们可以慢慢来，从容不迫，深思熟虑。

So we could take our time and move slowly and be really thoughtful.

这正是Facebook的座右铭。

Which is Facebook's mantra.

对。

Right.

没错。

Exactly.

显然不是。

Obviously not.

这是我们拥有的一个非常奢侈的条件，大多数公司都没有。

It was an amazing luxury that we had and most companies don't have it.

所以我们花了很多时间观察平台上发布的内容、用户的感受、哪些品牌已经在平台上自然活跃，以及用户对这些品牌的反应。

And so we spent a lot of time looking at what content was going up, how users felt about it, what brands were already sort of natively acting on the platform and how users were reacting to them.

然后我们决定在信息流中投放广告，这你可以想象也是一个有争议的时刻，因为那是黄金位置，但当你做广告业务时，你需要分发渠道。

And decided that we were going to place ads in the feed, which was also, as you can imagine, sort of a controversial moment because it's prime real estate, but it's also when you're in an ad business, you need distribution.

而分发渠道就在那里。

And that's where distribution was gonna happen.

但我们会以这样的方式来做：选择那些已经在平台上表现得很优雅、与用户互动良好的品牌。

But we were gonna do so in a way with brands that were already really elegantly playing on the platform and had good user interactions.

而且我们还会以非常个案的方式来做，也就是说，每一条内容都要经过我们和凯文的批准。

And we were also gonna do it in a very sort of one off way, meaning every single piece of content that came in was approved by us and Kevin.

那真是……哇。

And that Oh, wow.

还有凯文。

And Kevin.

这种情况持续了很长时间。

And that went on for a long time.

我们就像手工挑选这些内容，并且非常仔细地关注。

We were, like, hand curating this stuff and paying it really close attention.

哇。

Wow.

对。

Yeah.

第一批品牌，嗯，迈克尔·科尔斯，我想，是Instagram上的第一个广告。

The first brands were, well, Michael Kors, I think, was the first ad on Instagram.

然后还有李维斯、W酒店、梅西百货、雷克萨斯、贝宝。

And then you had Levi's, W Hotels, Macy's, Lexus, PayPal.

通用电气也在里面。

General Electric was in there too.

哦，有意思。

Oh, interesting.

还有本和杰瑞。

And and Ben and Jerry's.

对。

Yeah.

我是说，那太合适了。

Mean, that's perfect.

我其实很好奇，关于PayPal，你还记得吗？那看起来不太明显。

I'm actually curious on on on PayPal if you remember, like, how that's not an obvious, like

你知道吗，我得告诉你，我对PayPal那个真的记得不太清楚。

You know, have to tell you, I don't remember the PayPal one, like, really specifically.

我希望我能说点什么。

I wish I could speak to it.

我

I

具体是什么我记不太清了，但可能是跟移动支付有关的。

can't remember exactly what it was, but it might have been for mobile payments.

算了。

Anyway.

再说，我们当时回去讨论，到底是谁真的在用这个？

Again, we went back and we said, who is really using this?

所以现在回头看，这似乎是营销人员参与这么早期项目的最好机会。

So I mean, it's looking back at it, it seems like the most amazing opportunity for a marketer to participate in something this early.

但别忘了当时是什么情况。

But remember what the time was.

就是说，我们当时想，我们不想当第一批广告主，万一他们不喜欢呢？

I mean, it was like, okay, we don't wanna be the first advertisers because what if they hate it?

万一有负面反应呢，对吧？

What if there's backlash, right?

我记得当时跟GE合作确实有挑战，因为他们在Instagram上做得特别漂亮。

I remember actually having a challenge with GE because they had gotten some, they had such a beautiful Instagram presence.

但等他们开始打广告的时候，用户们并不买账。

But when they started advertising, they The U the users didn't love it.

部分原因是我们是最早的广告之一，大家就觉得，等等。

It was in part because we were it was one of the first ads and it was like, wait a second.

现在你开始打广告了？对。

Now you're Right.

这是我用来存放所有参考资料的地方。

This is the place where I go and dump all the references.

广告下面有评论，对吧？

There are comments on ads, right?

对，而且有评论，我们基本上把它们当作带赞助标签的普通内容来对待，对吧？

Right, and there are comments on And we're basically treating them like organic content that with the sponsored tag, right?

所以，就是更多的分发。

So, and more distribution.

所以确实有一些阻力。

So there really is some headwind.

你得找到那些愿意跟你一起走这条路、愿意冒点险、并且足够相信你所做的事情，从而能跨过一些坎儿的营销人员。

You have to find marketers who are willing to go down this, go down the road with you and take some risk and believe in what you're doing well enough to sort of get over some bumps.

所以我们真的去看了谁在Instagram上已经做得很好。

And so we really looked at who is doing really well on Instagram already.

还有哪些团队正在积极投入这个方向，并且能成为我们一路上的好伙伴。

And who are the teams that were leaning into this and would be good partners for us along the road, along the way.

有意思的是，现在回想起来，这个商业模式就是——我们刚买下了增长最快的库存池。

It's interesting thinking about, also in retrospect, I mean, the business model of, okay, we just bought the fastest growing sort of inventory pool available.

我们有这么多广告商，他们想把越来越多的广告推给越来越多的广告位，或者说可用的库存。

We have all these advertisers that are trying to push more and more ads to, more and more slots or available inventory.

所以很自然地，只要让那个仪表盘也能推送到这个新的广告位池，就说得通了。

It makes so much sense to just enable that dashboard to also push to this new sort of slot pool

这太诱人了。

that is So tempting.

但我不会这么做的。

I'm not gonna do it.

我的意思是，这基本上就是现在的状况。

And I mean, that's effectively what it is today.

完全没有，我们在PSL经常买广告，就像你点一下另一个框。

There's zero I mean, we at PSL all the time, we're buying ads and, like, you click another box.

实际上，为了获取客户，我们做过一些广告。

In fact, for acquired, we've done some ads.

你再勾选一个框，然后，搞定。

You check another box and, boom.

同样的操作在Instagram和Facebook上，而且真的没有办法对其中一个或另一个进行质量控制。

The same thing goes on in Instagram and Facebook, and there's no real way of of sort of quality controlling one or the other.

你是怎么考虑的，比如广告仪表板的哪些功能，以及如何让使用广告仪表板工具的人真正把广告投放到Facebook，抱歉，是Instagram，而不是手动逐一策划每一个广告？

How did you think about, like, what features of the ad dashboard and in what way to actually let people who are using the ad dashboard tool put ads into Facebook beyond, like, I'm sorry, into Instagram beyond actually hand curating every single one?

这个问题有点棘手，是的。

So that's a tricky question Yeah.

因为我在2014年初或年末就离开了。

For this because I left in the beginning or the very end of 2014.

嗯。

Mhmm.

所以实际的仪表盘集成是在我离开之后才发生的。

So the actual dashboard integration happened after I left.

就是这样。

That's It

自助服务直到2020年才出现，之前完全没有。

wasn't until self serve at all didn't exist till '20 No.

花了挺长时间。

Took a while.

说得好。

That's a great point.

对。

Yeah.

确实花了很长时间。

It took a while.

所以我们当时真的是处于手工挑选、手工发布、手工汇报的阶段。

So we were really in the like hand curating, hand posting, hand reporting phase.

我觉得这里值得提的另一点是，当时Facebook和Instagram内部和文化上正在发生什么。

And I think the other point that's worth making here is sort of what was happening internally and culturally at Facebook and Instagram at that time.

就像我提到的，那是我们第一次为了人才和底层技术而收购一家公司。

So as I mentioned, it was the first time we had acquired a company for both the talent and the underlying technology.

而Facebook的社区，也就是在那里工作的人，其实并不真正理解这意味着什么。

And the Facebook community didn't really, the group of people who worked there didn't really understand what that meant.

具体来说，我给你们举几个例子。

Specifically, let me just give you some examples.

你知道，除了律师去修改服务条款之外。

You know, besides the lawyer going and and sort of, you know, changing the terms of service.

各个团队通常只想做他们为Facebook做的事情。

Teams generally just wanted to do exactly what they were doing for Facebook.

招聘团队也想做他们为Facebook做的事情。

The recruiting team wanted to do what they were doing for Facebook.

政策团队想直接套用Facebook的政策。

The policy team wanted to apply Facebook's policies.

对吧？

Right?

一切都像是，好吧，我们现在就把他们整合进来。

Everything was just like, okay, let's just integrate them right now.

所以在我上任的头一两周，我和Kevin把自己关在一个房间里。

And so really my first week or two on the job, Kevin and I had like locked ourselves in a room.

我们梳理了Instagram的使命、愿景和价值观。

And we mapped out Instagram's mission, vision, and values.

因为我们知道这件事很重要，它已经很大了，但将来会更大。

Specifically, because we knew that it was important that this thing was it was big already, but it was going to be much bigger.

保持我们自己的身份和对产品发展方向的掌控，这一点非常关键。

That it was really important that we maintained our own identity and control over how the product moved forward.

同时，我们也想从员工的角度明确一点：Instagram是什么，Facebook是什么，以及如何平衡这两个不同的世界。

And that we were also making it really clear from the employee's perspective, like what is Instagram and what is Facebook and how do you plan these two different worlds?

对吧？

Right?

我们想要大家的帮助，但不能让他们把Instagram给毁了。

We wanted people's help, but we couldn't let them smother it.

那是我们开始意识到，Instagram在Facebook内部应该保持自己的特色，而不是变成Facebook。

That was the beginning of realizing what Instagram was inside of Facebook instead of Instagram becoming Facebook.

对。

Yeah.

现在，当然，你读新闻的话，会发现Facebook内部确实有股势头，想把Facebook、Instagram和WhatsApp都整合成一体。

Now, of course, as you read the news, there is actually real momentum it looks like inside of Facebook to make Facebook and Instagram and WhatsApp all sort of one thing.

对。

Yeah.

但我觉得这只是个开始。

But I think it's beginning.

对。

Yeah.

我是说，有一种可能的历史是Instagram变成了Facebook的移动照片应用。

I mean, there's an alternative history where Instagram became Facebook mobile photos app.

对吧？

Right?

对。

Right.

是的。

Yeah.

不。

No.

那是有可能发生的。

It could have happened.

是的。

Yeah.

事实上，我做的第一件事之一就是，Facebook可能在那之前六到十二个月买了一个数据压缩应用。

In fact, one of the first things I did is Facebook had maybe six or twelve months before bought an app that was a data compression app.

所以世界各地的用户都在手机上下载这个应用。

So users all over the world were downloading this app on their phone.

它实际上是在降低他们的电话费。

And it was lowering their phone bill effectively.

作为交换，它获取了那些用户在用手机做什么的信息，对吧？

And in exchange, was giving information about what those, what users were doing on their mobile phones, right?

所以实际上我们是有权限访问这些数据的。

So I actually we had access to this.

我可以去看看，比如，在所有Facebook员工中，有多少人真的在用Instagram？

I could go see, okay, of all of the Facebook employees, how many are actually using Instagram?

结果发现，使用Instagram的Facebook员工比例，和使用Instagram的美国人口比例是一样的，具体数字我现在记不清了，但基本上就是一样的。

And it turned out that the same percentage of and I can't remember the exact percentages now, but basically the same percent of The United States that was using Instagram was the same percent that face of Facebook employees are actually using Instagram.

关键是，这个比例非常低。

The point here is that was very low.

大概只有百分之十几的样子，然后就像……

It was like in the, you know, low teens or something And like

这是在用户数突破一亿之后的事了。

this was after they'd hit the 100,000,000 user mark.

那是在那之前。

This was just before that.

好的。

Okay.

对。

Yeah.

所以Instagram当时已经被收购了。

So Instagram was, had been acquired.

团队也已经搬过去了，但大家还是特别专注于Facebook，你知道的，就是这样。

It had been, the team had moved down, but still people were so focused on Facebook, I mean, as you do.

没错。

Right.

所以，真的，你知道，从使命、愿景、价值观，到校园里的营销活动，我们开始在校区做Instagram步行参观，在全员大会上发言，还单独考虑产品发布，去董事会会议，就只是聊聊Instagram是什么，它的特别之处，以及它和Facebook有什么不同。

And so really, you know, between the mission vision values and then really like an on campus marketing campaign where we started doing insta walk tours around the campus and got up and started talking at all hands meetings and thinking about our product launch separately and going to the board meeting and sort of just talking about what Instagram was and what made it special and how it was different.

而且实际上，广告策略在一定程度上就是从那时候开始推行的，对吧？

And really the ad strategy in part rolled out out of that, right?

我们怎么才能打造一种真正符合这个平台调性的产品体验呢？

How do we create a product experience that feels really authentic to this platform?

同时，通过这个也表明我们的立场，就是我们有能力，也有必要为这个平台打造一些独特的东西，而不是简单地把Facebook的广告直接搬到用户体验里。我觉得那时候要是真那么做，效果肯定特别糟糕。

And through that also make a stance about our ability and requirement in some ways to build something that's unique for this platform and not just slap Facebook ads onto the user experience, which I think at that point would have been really rough.

对。

Yeah.

这就像从理念上讲，你怎么确保那些为这个平台设计体验的人，真的会去用这个平台呢？

It's like philosophically, how do you make sure that the people who are gonna be designing those experience for that platform actually use that platform?

对。

Yeah.

是的。

Yes.

这个观点很好。

That's a great point.

对。

Yeah.

好了，听众朋友们。

Alright, listeners.

现在是感谢我们节目的老朋友ServiceNow的好时机。

Now is a great time to thank our longtime friend of the show, ServiceNow.

如果你在运营一家大型企业，AI代理可能已经遍布每个团队，而部署它们已经不再是难事了。

If you are running a large enterprise, AI agents are likely spread across every team, and deploying them is, no longer the hard part.

对。

Yeah.

难的是了解它们有什么权限，员工在用它们做什么，或者AI在做什么决定。

The hard part is knowing what permissions they have, what employees are using them for, or what decisions AI is making.

对于大规模企业来说，AI安全可不是小问题。

AI security for an enterprise at scale is not a small concern.

比如，风险是真实存在的。

Like, the risks are real.

没错。

Exactly.

而AI的挑战在于治理、安全、衡量，以及确保它真正带来价值。

And the challenge with AI is governing it, securing it, measuring it, and making sure that it actually delivers value.

这就是ServiceNow构建AI控制塔的原因。

That is why ServiceNow built the AI control tower.

对。

Yep.

AI控制塔为企业提供了一个统一平台，可以查看、管理、治理和优化整个业务中的AI。

AI control tower gives enterprises a single place to see, manage, govern, and optimize AI across the entire business.

而且它支持任何AI，不仅仅是他们自己的。

And it works with any AI, not just theirs.

你网络上的每个设备、每个系统的每个权限、每个AI代理，都能在一个地方可见且安全。

Every device on your network, every permission across every system, every AI agent visible and secure in one place.

ServiceNow能做到这一点，是因为他们花了二十多年构建企业的运营骨干，包括工作流、治理、审批、安全控制以及机构知识，这些支撑着IT、人力资源、客户服务、财务和安全等领域的实际工作方式。

And ServiceNow can do this because they've spent more than twenty years building the operational backbone of the enterprise, the workflows, governance, approval, security controls, and institutional knowledge that power how work actually gets done across IT, HR, customer service, finance, and security.

ServiceNow每年已经运行超过一千亿个工作流，并为财富500强中超过85%的公司处理数万亿笔交易。

ServiceNow already runs more than 100,000,000,000 workflows annually and trillions of transactions for more than 85% of the Fortune 500.

所以当企业需要一个在规模化层面管理AI的地方时，他们是在一个已经处于其业务运营核心的平台上进行构建。

So when companies need a place to govern AI at enterprise scale, they're building on a platform at the center of how their business already operates.

而且未来的趋势不是只有一个AI，而是会有成千上万个AI代理在公司各个职能部门中协同工作。

And in a future that isn't going to be one AI, it's going to be thousands of AI agents working across every function of the company.

但问题是，谁来管理所有这些AI代理呢？

But the question is, who's managing them all?

所以，如果你想把AI的雄心转化为实际的业务成果，并确保它安全、可靠地大规模运行，就去servicenow.com/acquired看看吧，告诉他们说是Ben和David推荐你来的。

So if you're trying to turn AI ambition into real business outcomes and make it work safely, securely at scale, go check out servicenow.com/acquired and tell them that Ben and David sent you.

构建广告业务的组成部分是什么？

What are the components of building an ads business?

你显然在Instagram做过这个，但你在Google和Facebook也做过，你是世界上少数几个，甚至可能是唯一一个做过四次这件事的人。

You that obviously you did at Instagram, but but you saw at Google, you saw at Facebook, you know, one of the only people, if not the only person in the world who's done this four times.

那么，这个业务的核心支柱是什么？

Like, what are the what are the pillars of of this business?

对。

Yeah.

而且，这段时间里变化也很大。

Well, it also it's changed so much in that period of time.

对吧？

Right?

我的意思是，谷歌刚起步的时候，我记得他们其实真的不太在乎赚钱。

I mean, when Google started, I remember it actually really did not care about making money.

你们还记得那时候吗？

Do you guys remember those days?

就是招聪明人，搜索结果最快，其他什么都不重要。

It was like hire smart people, have the fastest search results and nothing else matters.

没错，基本就是这样。

Exactly, pretty much.

所以我是2001年初加入谷歌的，那时候AdWords还只有大概500个广告客户，测试版是按CPM排名的，放在右边，而且当时根本没有类似的东西，所以我有幸在一个没有先例的环境里成长。

So I joined Google at the very beginning of 2001 when AdWords was, you know, like 500 advertiser advertising beta was all, know, based on what was it, CPM ranked on the right side, and had the luxury of growing at a time when nothing like it existed.

当时有Overture在做一些算法方面的有趣尝试。

I mean, you had Overture at the time that was doing some interesting stuff on the algorithmic side.

但谷歌第一次真正把这种强大的网络影响力结合了起来，对吧？

But Google, for the first time really married this incredible web presence, right?

他们流量大得不得了，而且用户体验是基于用户意图的，人们会告诉你他们在找什么。

I mean, they just had traffic coming out of their ears with a very intent based user experience, People are telling you what they're looking for.

所以就有了提供内容的机会。

And so the opportunity to serve up content.

他们真的抓住了这个机会，说这不只是品牌营销人员才能做的。

And they really took advantage of that opportunity by saying, this is not just brand marketers who can do this.

任何人都可以。

This is anyone.

而且

And

他们一开始并没有意识到这一点。

they didn't get that initially.

他们最初其实把AdWords做成了按千次展示付费的产品，我之前提过。

They actually built AdWords originally, as I mentioned, as a CPM product.

所以每个出现在右上角的人都要付10美元。

So everyone who's showed up at the top right had to pay $10.

他们下面的人要付8美元10美分，不对。

Everyone underneath them had to pay $8 10 no.

是12.10美元，还有每千次展示8美元。

It was at $12.10, and 8 set per thousand views.

然后那个

And that

当时没有拍卖吗？

Was there no auction?

拍卖

The auction

早期并没有拍卖。

came no auction early on.

当时没有拍卖。

There's no auction.

我觉得大概过了一年、一年半左右，拍卖才出现。

And I would say like a year, year and a half in, the auction came about.

所以我们加入了实际点击率这个因素。

So we added we added in the component of actual click through rate.

也就是看这些广告表现怎么样。

So how well were these things performing?

然后我们引入了拍卖机制。

And then we added an auction in.

这样一来，各种利润空间的企业突然都能参与了。

So it allowed businesses with wide variety of margins to come and participate all of a sudden.

因为如果固定CPM，就会把90%的广告主排除在外。

Because when you have a set CPM, you're crowding out 90.

你只允许特定的一小部分广告主来竞价。

You're only letting, you know, very specific set of advertisers bid.

所以当时根本没人会去竞价那些乐谱纸或者波斯地毯之类的广告。

And so we didn't have anyone bidding for, you know, sheet paper music or Persian rugs.

对吧？

Right?

倒是有一大堆人抢着投间皮瘤广告之类的。

We had a ton bidding for like mesothelioma ads or whatever.

所以这真的是天才和运气同时撞在一起了。

So it really was, you know, sort of a stroke of genius and luck at the same time that those things came together.

等到后来到了Instagram的时候，做这件事的技术显然早就已经成熟了，这真是太好了。

By the time, fast forward to Instagram, the technology to do this obviously had sort of already existed, which was wonderful.

而且我们作为一个广告平台，也已经变得非常注重效果了。

But we had also moved as a marketplace to be so much more focused on effectiveness.

对吧？

Right?

其实AdWords就是开这个先河的，对吧？

Mean, AdWords started that, right?

你投一块钱进去，就能知道能拿回多少。

Could put a dollar in and you knew what you're going get out.

但真正过了十年、十二年后，它已经席卷全球了。

But really ten, twelve years later, had taken over the world.

所以他们建立了一个目标体系。

And so they've built a target.

对。

Yeah.

Facebook 投放转化像素，或者告诉广告主，嘿，你应该在网站的金矿尽头放上这些转化像素。

Facebook dropping, you know, conversion pixels or or telling advertisers, hey, you should be putting these conversion pixels at the end of the pot of gold on your website.

这样我们就能知道这些人是不是真的在买东西。

So we know when these people are actually buying the stuff.

你可以告诉我们花了多少钱。

You can tell us how much it was for.

我们可以帮你优化这个。

We can help you tune that.

没错。

Exactly.

所以这真的是非常严肃的效果营销。

So it's like really serious performance marketing.

当然，这种模式当时已经存在了。

And of course, that existed.

那是市场上的普遍预期，但我们当时刚推出Instagram这个全新平台，还不知道它会怎么发展。

That was the expectation in the marketplace, but we were coming out at Instagram with a brand new platform and we didn't know how it was gonna work.

我们

We

知道要发好看的照片。

knew Post pretty photos.

而且它们还得

And they had

是好看的照片，而且还得用一种非常独特的方式跟我们的用户群体对话。

to be pretty photos and they had to be they had to speak to our user base in a pretty unique way.

所以当你做这种事情的时候，你不想做出承诺。

And so when you're doing something like that, you don't wanna make promises.

我们知道我们打造的产品，至少在短期内，不会和Facebook的广告收入竞争。

We knew that we were not building a product that was going to, at least in the short term, compete with ad with Facebook ad dollars.

对吧？

Right?

我们不会成为那种效果营销的工具。

We weren't gonna be that performance marketing vehicle.

事实上，一开始我们跟营销人员谈的时候，更多是把它当作品牌宣传来谈，因为那时候没有行动号召按钮。

In fact, initially, we talked about it with marketers more as a brand play because there weren't calls calls to action.

那只是美丽的内容，讲述一个故事。

It was it was beautiful content telling a story.

哦，对。

Oh, yeah.

你能点击一下那个

Could you could you tap on the

广告，第一次没有。

ads the first No.

那时候还没有，没有，没有，没有。

Time they Not not not not that.

但那时候Instagram上甚至没有链接，对吧？

But there weren't even Nope.

Instagram上根本没有链接？

Links in Instagram at all?

没有。

Nope.

确实没有链接。

There were no links.

对。

Yeah.

没错。

Right.

当时确实没有链接。

There were no links.

所以他们真的必须适应那个情况。

So they really had to fit into that.

再说，从长远来看，我们是想要链接的。

Again, with the picture of longer term, we wanted links.

我们想要互动的能力。

We wanted the ability to interact.

我们想要购买的能力，并且推动购买行为。

We wanted the ability to purchase and drive purchase purchases.

对吧？

Right?

因为这是一个很棒的发现生态。

Because it's this beautiful ecosystem for discovery.

嗯。

Mhmm.

但再说一次，当时的基础设施还不存在。

But again, the infrastructure didn't exist then.

移动基础设施当时也不存在。

The mobile infrastructure didn't exist then.

所以我们做的是，非常系统地梳理了Facebook的所有部分，看哪些我们可以依赖，哪些需要自己搭建。

So what we did was we very systematically went through all of the pieces of Facebook that we could either lean on or build our own.

然后我们系统地决定，好的，这部分我们依赖Facebook，那部分我们自己建，对吧？

And we decided systematically, okay, we're going to lean on Facebook for this, we're going to build our own this, right?

我是说，应该这么说。

That I should say.

所以我们有Facebook的数据，对吧？

So we had the Facebook data, right?

我们知道我们的用户是谁。

We knew who our users were.

那真是一份大礼，因为当你推出一个新的广告产品时，能够说，实际上，你可以精准定位到你想要的目标人群，这真是一个巨大的胜利。

And that was a huge gift because when you're going out with a new ad product, to be able to say, actually, you can target exactly who you want to target was a big was a big win.

但我们也意识到，早期这会更像品牌广告。

But we also in the in the sort of the face of this is going to be feel a little bit more like brand advertising early on.

这不是一个关于微目标定位的世界。

This was not a world this was not about micro targeting.

这主要是为了广泛地触达你的受众。

This was about getting your audience in pretty broad swaths.

目标定位往往

Targeting tends to

在直接响应广告中非常重要，而在品牌广告中不那么重要，因为你追求的是更大、更广泛的受众基础。

be really important in direct response advertising and less important in brand advertising because you're going for the bigger, broader base.

我想，是的，你最初需要那些目标定位能力吗？

I guess, yeah, did you need all that targeting capability for those initial

我们需要基本的目标定位，因为我们的用户基数有一亿。

We needed basic targeting because our user base was a 100,000,000 users.

你需要非常大的预算才能覆盖全部一亿用户。

And you need really big budgets to target all 100,000,000

用户。

users.

对。

Right.

而且顺便说一句，这对他们来说其实并不相关。

And by the way, it's not gonna be relevant relevant for them.

所以你得考虑他们。

So you have to think about them

你不可能每天都买超级碗广告。

You can't be buying a Super Bowl ad every day.

那倒不会。

No.

而且那也不一定适合我们当时正在做的事情。

And nor would that necessarily play particularly well with what we were starting to do.

再说，一开始的重点是轻度干扰、平台一致、视觉叙事体验。

Again, remember the beginning was about little disruption, platform consistent, visual storytelling experience.

而且这也是我们的机会。

And it was also our chance.

这是我们的试验场。

It was our sandbox.

这是我们尝试不同东西的机会。

It was our chance to play and and sort of try different things.

所以

So

那你是不是需要——可能我有点超前了——但你是不是需要一支新的广告销售团队去卖这些广告，和这些品牌对接？

So did you need maybe I'm jumping ahead here, but did you need a new ad sales team to go sell these ads and interface with these brands?

我的意思是，这不是当时Facebook广告销售团队的核心能力。

I mean, that's not the core capability of what the Facebook ad sales team was doing at this time.

对吧？

Right?

对。

Yeah.

所以我们决定采取一种混合的方式。

So we decided to do a take a hybrid approach.

我们非常依赖销售团队，因为他们拥有我们不具备的那些关系。

We leaned on the sales teams really heavily because they had all these relationships that we didn't have

去

to go

重新建立。

recreate.

但实际上，我们在自己的团队里也成立了一个小的广告销售团队。

But we actually started a little ad sales team within our group.

我们重新调配了一些原本做业务拓展的人，让他们去进行那些对话。

And we sort of repurposed people who were doing more business development work and the the such to go and have those conversations.

所以当我们出现时，这可不是Facebook营销广告销售的会议。

So it when we showed up, this was not a Facebook marketing ad sales meeting.

这是Instagram的，对。

This was an Instagram Mhmm.

有意思。

Interesting.

会议。

Meeting.

因为你可能是在跟广告主那边不同的人见面。

Because you're probably meeting with different people within the advertisers.

对吧？

Right?

比如，这些大品牌是不是有不同的品牌方？

Like, do these big brands have different versus brand.

品牌方和效果方的人？

Brand versus performance people?

你知道，可能有些情况是这样，但说到底，当你做的是实验性、前沿的事情时，你通常还是要去找最高层的人。

You know, probably in some cases, but ultimately, when you're doing something that's experimental and cutting edge, you're typically running up to the people at the top anyway.

对。

Yeah.

而且我们倾向于和那些自己内部做这些事的品牌合作，而不是外包给代理公司。

And we tended to work with brands that were doing this in house and weren't out, like, outsourcing it to agencies.

所以对我们来说就简单多了。

So it was just easier for us.

摩擦更少。

It was lower friction for us.

我们不用经过十层审批。

We'd have to go through 10 layers of approval.

所以再说一次，我们当时的位置太好了。

So again, we were able we were in such a great position.

我们可以选择想合作的广告主。

We could go to the advertisers we wanted to go to.

这就像有史以来最棒的创业公司，你们既能做那些无法规模化的事情，又有可以手动操作的试验场，而且还能拿起电话让任何CEO说，当然，我们会承诺。没错。

It's like the greatest startup of all time where you you both get to do things that don't scale and have a playground to do it manually, but can pick up the phone and have any CEO say, sure, we'll commit Exactly.

对。

Yeah.

对。

Yeah.

当然，当我在Snapchat，也就是现在的Snap，再次做这件事时，我们没有人可以依靠。

And of course, when I did this again at Snapchat, now Snap, we didn't have anyone to lean on.

我们必须自己构建所有技术。

We had to build it all of our, we have to build the technology ourselves.

到那时，也就是2013年，嗯，我想是2014年、2015年，我们本可以去找谷歌或其他引擎，说，你们能把广告发给我们吗，这里是

Now by that point, which was, you know, 2013, '20, I guess it was 2014, 2015, we could have gone to a Google or, you know, one of the other engines and said, can you just send us your ads and here

资格要求

are the

他们必须满足的

qualifications And that they have to

在Snap，你和Viacom合作过，对吧，为了

and at Snap, you did a partnership with Viacom, right, for

那个销售？

that sales?

好的。

Okay.

不是。

No.

这有点混淆了问题，但我可以解释一下。

That's it's a little conflating issues, but I'll I can explain that.

但不是。

But no.

我们实际上决定不找合作伙伴，不让他们直接把广告流给我们，而是认为广告将成为我们未来发展和业务的重要组成部分。

We actually decided instead of going to a partner and just having them turn on their ad feed to us, that advertising was going to be an important part of our DNA and our business moving forward.

当它很重要时，你不想外包，你想自己掌控。

And when it's an important part, don't want to outsource it, you want to own it.

所以我们真的自己动手，建立了内部基础设施来投放广告和衡量广告效果。

And so we actually went ahead and built the infrastructure in house to serve the ads, to measure the ads.

这是在Snap的时候吗？

This is at Snap?

这是在Snap的时候。

This was at Snap.

对，Snapchat。

Yeah, Snapchat.

所以我们推出了，对，Snapchat，我们现在已经自己建好了那套基础设施。

So we launched the, yeah, Snapchat, We now built that infrastructure in house.

我们自己去拉来了所有广告商。

We went and got all the advertisers by ourselves.

所有的测量都是我们自己做的。

We did all the measurements.

我的意思是，再说一次，如果它很重要，你就得把它掌握在自己手里，自己控制。

I mean, again, if it's important, you've got to have it in your purview and your control.

你得去测量它，了解它，理解它。

You want to measure it, you want to know it, you want to understand it.

后来我们推出Discover的时候，就是那个平台，对吧，我们引入第三方内容，做成小块小块的片段，方便你轻松阅读，我们在里面也嵌入了广告。

We did down the road when we launched Discover, which is the platform, right, where we pull in third party content in sort of bite size snippet formats that you can sort of read really easily, we had ads, embedded ads within that.

所以我们的合作伙伴，他们实际上是在按照和我们商定的格式制作内容，他们为这些内容做了很多广告销售，但不是针对Snapchat核心内容的。

And so our partners who were actually producing the content to a format that they had agreed on with us were doing a bunch of the ad sales for that content, but not for the core Snapchat content.

因为其中很多内容，有些是重新利用的，但那是电视广告，对吧。

Because a lot of that was, some of it was repurposed, but it was TV commercials Right.

那些广告就是从那里来的。

That were coming out of that.

所以，是的。

So Yeah.

这就是为什么会有Viacom的合作。

That was why hence, the Viacom partnership.

总之，是的。

Anyway Yeah.

好。

Cool.

对。

Yeah.

我觉得这差不多就把Instagram的历史和事实讲完了。

I think that about takes us to the end of the road on on the history and facts of of the Instagram.

收购那部分。

Acquisition.

你知道，就像我们一开始说的，我们总是这样，最后就是80到90亿美元。

You know, the end, as we said in the beginning, as we always do, is, you know, 8 to $9,000,000,000.

嗯，简单的时间线。

Well, a brief timeline.

就像我们提到的，2015年自助广告上线了。

It was 2015, as we mentioned, when self serve ads launched.

对。

Mhmm.

2016年推出了故事功能。

2016 stories launched.

那时候Instagram上还没有故事功能，是的。

There were no stories on Instagram Yeah.

对。

Yeah.

2016年之前。

Before 2016.

但你可以感谢Snapchat

But you can thank Snapchat

因为这个。

for that.

Snapchat，各位。

Snapchat, everybody.

现在。

Now.

而且众所周知，直到2017年广告和故事功能才推出。

And famously and and it wasn't until 2017 that ads and stories launched.

我的意思是，那是两年前的事了。

I mean, that was two years ago.

嗯，不过我们之前几期节目也聊过，Stories这个广告媒介其实不如信息流效果好。

Well, there's I still mean, this is still we've talked about this on previous episodes, but Stories is not as good of a medium for advertising as the feed is.

所以随着越来越多的人把注意力转向Stories，Facebook和其他所有做Stories的平台在广告表现上都会面临一个清算。

And so Facebook and everyone else with Stories is going to have a reckoning as more and more attention shifts to Stories with their advertising performance.

我觉得这在Facebook的数据里已经有所体现，他们自己也提到这可能是增速放缓的原因之一。

And I think that shows up in Facebook's numbers a little bit and they've cited it a little bit as reasons that there might be a deceleration.

但当你刷Stories的时候，用户体验上很明显，你根本不会被像信息流那样吸引住。

But it's it's kind of obvious in the user experience when you're going through stories, you're just not grabbed in the same way that you're grabbed.

所以退一步想，我们说的其实就是，当你上下滑动的时候，广告形式反而更有吸引力，而左右点击的时候就不一样了。

It's so if you take a step back and think about what we're talking about here, I'm saying that when you are flicking vertically through something, ads are somehow more appealing of a format as when you are horizontally tapping through something.

然而，这两种用户体验差别很大，在Stories里你会觉得，哎呀，现在不想看，现在不想看。

And yet, it is a dramatically different user experience where in a story you're like, ah, not now, not now.

我现在在刷信息流。

I'm in the now.

我现在在刷Stories。

I'm in the story.

但当你滑动浏览时，你习惯花更长时间去研究某个内容，并且愿意让它稍微打断你的思绪。

But when you're scrolling, you're used to studying something for longer and it being something that you're willing to let interrupt your brain for a little bit.

没错。

Exactly.

所以关键就在于，是把广告融入故事里，还是放在信息流里。

So it's really about trying to infuse ads in a story versus in a feed.

这才是真正的区别。

That's the real difference.

实际上，在Snapchat，当我们推出实时故事时，我们在广告方面也采取了非常不同的做法，正是因为这一点。

We actually, at Snapchat, when we launched the live stories, we took a pretty different approach with advertising too because of that, actually.

我们决定把它更多地打造成品牌推广。

And we decided to make it much more of a brand play.

因为品牌通常已经是那种社交体验的一部分了。

Because brands were typically, they were already part of that social experience.

比如你要去听音乐会或者参加什么活动，周围通常本来就有相关的品牌。

Like if you're going to go to a concert or something or you're to go to an event, there's usually brands around you anyway that are associated with that.

所以我们的第一步就是把他们拉进来，让他们也成为这种线上体验的一部分，而不仅仅是体育场里或者演唱会现场的那种体验。

And so our first step was let's pull them in and make them part of this online experience too, not just the in stadium experience or the in, you know, in concert venue experience.

对。

Right.

所以我们预测Instagram今年2019年的收入会达到140亿美元，我记得那是在我们做第一期节目之前不久，第二期节目的时候。

So predicted Instagram to do 14,000,000,000 in revenue this year in 2019 when I believe it it was shortly before we did our first episode, episode two Mhmm.

关于Instagram。

On Instagram.

当时花旗集团刚发布了一份关于Facebook的研究报告，估计Instagram在Facebook内部的价值是350亿美元，那真是个惊人的数字。

Citigroup had just done a research report on Facebook and estimated the value of Instagram within Facebook at 35,000,000,000 at that point in time, which was a crazy number.

对吧？

Right?

我的意思是，我们一会儿会来评估这个预测，但不管怎么说，一个这么大的业务，每年增长50%，利润率又很高，广告收入业务，很可能至少能拿到10倍的收入倍数，这个倍数很高，但也是合理的。

I mean, we'll get to grading in a minute here but, know, by any measure, a business that big growing at 50% a year with a very high margin, you know, ad revenue business, probably gonna get at least a 10 x revenue multiple, which is very high, but, like, warranted.

你看看Square，它的交易倍数也是10倍收入，但利润率还更低。

You look at, Square's trading at a 10 x revenue multiple with worse margins.

所以你的意思是，Facebook的企业价值——抱歉，是Instagram的企业价值——大概在1500亿美元左右。

So you're saying the enterprise value Facebook I'm sorry, of Instagram is somewhere around a $150,000,000,000.

我就是这个意思。

That's what I'm saying.

至少。

At least.

对吧？

Right?

你懂的。

You know?

而Facebook现在的市值，我记得大概是4000亿美元。

And Facebook's market cap is, I believe, about 400,000,000,000 today.

具体数字可能不太准。

Didn't look right, exactly

有意思的是，这差不多是我们上次深入聊这个话题——2015年底——时的两倍。

Which is interestingly right about two x from the last time we we dove into this story at the end of twenty fifteen.

所以，就是这样。

So there you have it.

目前，我们先暂停一下关于Instagram历史的讨论。

For the moment, we're gonna pause our our history of facts on Instagram.

我有种预感，我们以后还会再聊到这个话题。

Something tells me we'll revisit this again in the future.

我在这里想提一个科技方面的话题，但退一步想想也挺有意思的，你想想看，Friendster和Myspace从来没有——我是说，想象一下，如果Myspace当初收购了Facebook，然后他们说，好吧，重点不是Myspace这个平台要成功，而是Myspace这家公司要成功。

I'm I'm pulling forward a tech theme here, but it is interesting to take a step back and just let it dawn on you that, you know, Friendster and Myspace never I mean, imagine if Myspace had bought Facebook and they said, okay, look, it's it's it's not about Myspace, the platform succeeding, it's Myspace, the company succeeding.

而Facebook在收购Instagram的时候就是这么做的。

And Facebook did that when they bought Instagram.

所以Facebook变得越来越不重要，而Instagram变得越来越重要，它是年轻人都在用的东西，而所有人的父母都上了Facebook。

And so Facebook is becoming less relevant, Instagram became way more relevant, it was the thing the kids were on, everyone's parents got on Facebook.

Snap开始抢回一些风头，然后Instagram，你知道，Facebook和Instagram明智地意识到，我们要利用我们仍然拥有的东西，那就是社交网络，我们只需要一个功能一个功能地复制，而且要以一种能很好地融入我们产品的方式来做。

Snap started to steal some of that back, and then Instagram, you know, Facebook, Instagram sort of wisely realized, we're gonna leverage what we still have and that's the network, and we're just gonna copy feature for feature in a way that blends really well into our product.

他们成功地把很多用户又抢了回来。

And they managed to sort of like steal a lot of that back.

而Instagram某种程度上避免了那种低端市场的冲击。

And Instagram remained sort of or avoided that sort of low end disruption.

我现在好奇的是，是不是父母都开始用Instagram了，然后Instagram就变得不那么酷了？

And the thing that I'm wondering now is sort of like, have the parents come to Instagram and has Instagram become uncool?

而且，当现有的社交网络开始有点……的时候，Facebook是不是很快又得去收购别的东西了？

And is there something else that Facebook's gonna need to go buy here shortly when the existing social networks are are sort of

那我们现在就是父母了。

Then then we are parents now.

对。

Yeah.

作为在座的父母，家长们确实都在用Instagram。

As as as the parent in the room, parents are on in on Instagram.

首先，我觉得这些平台其实挺有生命力的。

First of all, I think we're seeing that there's longevity to these things.

我是说，Instagram本身也已经存在好一阵子了。

I mean, has been around in and of itself for a while.

对吧？

Right?

而且它现在依然很成功，虽然感觉不像以前那样每天都离不开它了。

And it still is even though it doesn't always feel like it's as much of our day to day as it used to be, it's still incredibly successful.

Instagram到目前为止一直很好地保持了它最初的特点，是的。

Instagram has managed so far to stay really true to its initial character, I Yeah.

同时增加了一些很棒的附加功能，让它保持时尚，也确实帮助吸引了一些注意力，就像你提到的。

While adding on some really nice bells and whistles that keeps it current and has really helped, as you mentioned, to capture sort of some of the wandering eyes off.

所以我不知道，但我还是会赌Instagram会继续表现良好。

So I don't know, I would still, I would bet money on Instagram continuing to do well.

不过，当Facebook考虑把所有产品整合在一起时，我们得看看会发生什么，你知道，那是一个非常微妙的情况，他们真的不能搞砸。

Although we'll see what happens when, you know, as Facebook is thinking about bringing all these products together, you know, that's a very delicate situation that they can't really afford to mess up.

是的。

Yep.

对。

Yeah.

还有啊，说到这儿的历史和事实，我们得提一句，Facebook的创始人已经不在公司了，而且是在……

And it's it's it actually we shouldn't call the history and facts done without mentioning that the founders are no longer at Facebook and and left in

2018年底的时候。

the end of

2018年。

of twenty eighteen.

对。

Yeah.

还有在产品未来发展方向上的一些分歧。

And in sort of disagreements about the the future direction of the product.

所以

So

嗯

Well

我不是说

I'm I'm not saying