LinkedIn

然后呢……

and so...

而且即使在微软内部也会是这样。

And even will be inside Microsoft.

没错。

Exactly.

对，他们在微软内部也会保持这种状态。

And they will remain so within Microsoft.

2011年1月，公司终于提交了IPO申请。

In January 2011, the company finally filed files for an IPO.

他们在2011年5月上市了。

They go public in May 2011.

他们把IPO定价为每股45美元。

They price, they price the IPO at $45 a share.

到第一个交易日结束时，股价涨到了94.25美元。

It trades up to $94.25 by the end of the first day of trading.

这就像是……

And this was like...

我记得这在当时是个转折点。

I remember this was like a watershed moment at the time.

他们是两千年代中期之后，第一批上市的、那种新一波的大型互联网公司。

They were the first, like, sorta new wave, you know, Internet company, big Internet company to go public, after the sort of mid two thousands.

不久之后，Facebook、Pandora、Twitter也都相继上市了。

And it was shortly thereafter that Facebook went public, that, Pandora went public, that Twitter went public.

所以这是一个重大时刻，大家都意识到这些社交网络，你知道，还在……

So this was a this was a big moment and that everybody kinda realized that these social networks that, you know, were still...

当时人们都在问，Facebook怎么赚钱？

You know, people were like, how does Facebook make money?

虽然Facebook的赚钱方式和LinkedIn很不一样。

You know, even though Facebook makes money in a very different fashion from LinkedIn.

但当他们……

But when they...

当LinkedIn提交IPO招股说明书时，大家都觉得，天哪，这家公司今年能赚5000万美元的EBITDA。

When LinkedIn, you know, filed their prospectus for the IPO, people were like, man, this business is gonna do like 50,000,000 in EBITDA this year.

所以那是个重要的时刻。

So it was it was a big moment.

然后呢……

And and so...

之后这只股票在上市后的五年左右时间里表现一直很好，涨到了……

And then the stock, continued to do really well for over the five ish years that it was public, up into...

涨到了200多美元，甚至更高。

Going up into the, you know, 2 hundreds and and above.

直到什么时候，二月……

Till what February...

今年二月吗？

February of this year?

直到2016年2月5日，就在几个月前，那是个星期五。

Until until 02/05/2016, just a few months ago, was, on a Friday.

LinkedIn和Tableau都公布了2015年第四季度的业绩，以及对华尔街的年度预期。

Both LinkedIn and Tableau announced, fourth quarter twenty fifteen, results and, and expectations for the year to to Wall Street.

那感觉就像软件公司的黑色星期五一样。

And it was like it was like Black Friday for software companies.

而且实际上……

And it actually...

这确实打击了私营公司的估值，也影响了其他SaaS公司的市值。

It it killed the, the private company valuation and some of the market cap of of other SaaS companies.

感觉市场反应过度了，而且并没有真正理解这件事。

And it it felt like it was super sensationalized and not well understood by the market.

因为LinkedIn……

Because LinkedIn

所以LinkedIn公布了财报。

So LinkedIn announced earnings.

他们实际上在2015年第四季度的盈利上超出了预期。

They actually beat expectations on earnings for the fourth quarter of two thousand fifteen.

但他们公布的预期低于华尔街……

But they announced lower than wall...

他们给出的2016年业绩指引低于华尔街预期，结果股价遭到重挫。

Than guidance that was lower than Wall Street expected for 2016, and the stock got hammered.

单日跌幅高达43.6%。

It was down 43.6% in a single day.

LinkedIn的市值瞬间蒸发了100亿美元。

$10,000,000,000 of market cap just wiped out of LinkedIn.

我觉得他们基本上是在暗示，我们已经达到了增长曲线的顶点，未来不能再指望这种持续增长了，而这一点之前已经反映在股价里了。

I mean, they basically were signaling that we are hitting the top of our s curve, and that you you can't count on this continued growth in the future, which had been priced into their stock.

对。

Yep.

对。

Yep.

所以我觉得，虽然核心业务依然强劲，但他们也在寻找次要的收入渠道，比如……

And so I think, you know, while that core business was still strong, they they were looking for secondary revenue channels with...

他们之前有个展示广告业务，但后来关掉了，或者至少是把资源转移走了。

They had a display ads business that they had shut down a little bit earlier or at least moved resources away from.

然后还有第二个产品。

And then there was a second product.

你还记得那个叫什么吗？

Do you remember what that was called?

那个是……

That that was...

那是一个……

It was a

销售导航器。

lead Sales Navigator.

嗯，销售导航器他们现在还有。

Well, Sales Navigator, they still have.

我正在做这个。

I'm working on.

但是增长……

But the growth...

Sales Navigator 预期中的大幅增长，实际上实现得比较慢。

The the expected huge growth in Sales Navigator, and it's been slower to materialize.

我们接下来会谈到这个。

We'll get into this.

但是，你知道，LinkedIn 的市值一度超过500亿美元。

But, but, you know, at at one point, LinkedIn had a had a market cap of over $50,000,000,000.

在那之后，紧接着就是……

And and between that and then and then following, was just a...

你知道，股价就像悬崖一样暴跌。

You know, fell off a cliff in terms of the stock price.

同一天，Tableau 也发生了类似的情况，那是西雅图一家很棒的软件公司。

On that same day, similar thing happened to Tableau, which is a great software company here in Seattle.

正因为这两家公司，这两家……

And because of those two, those two, the the the the...

这两家公司，你知道，公布的业绩不如预期，整个SaaS行业，上市的SaaS公司都遭受了重创。

Those two companies, you know, announcing weaker than expected earnings, the whole SaaS sector, public SaaS companies just took a big hit.

所以，就在那天……

So, like, on that...

就在那个周五，New Relic跌了23%，Zendesk跌了20%，HubSpot跌了20%，Workday跌了16%，NetSuite跌了15%，Click跌了14%，Demandware跌了13%，不过它后来被Salesforce收购了，就在上周或两周前。

On the same day on Friday, New Relic down 23, Zendesk down 20%, HubSpot down 20%, Workday down 16%, NetSuite 15, Click 14, Demandware which ends up getting acquired by Salesforce last week, two weeks ago, is down 13%.

Salesforce自己也跌了13%。

Salesforce itself was down 13%.

那真是惨不忍睹。

It was just carnage.

另外，研究做得不错。

Also, nice research.

谢谢，互联网。

Thank you, Internet.

然后呢，在过去的几个月里，LinkedIn的股价慢慢回升了，但远没有达到之前的高点。

And and and so then, for the last couple months, the the share price of of LinkedIn has crept back up, but nowhere near the highs where it once was.

然后两天前，也就是周一，这大概是史上最保密的大型并购案之一了，微软宣布以每股196美元的价格收购这家公司。

And then two days ago, Monday, in, like, what was gotta be one of the best kept secrets of major m and a of all time, Microsoft announces that they are acquiring the company for a $196 per share.

那总共是多少？

Which comes to?

总共是262亿美元，这确实是一大笔钱，但只有LinkedIn一年前市值的一半。

Which comes to $26,200,000,000 total, which is a lot of money, but but but half of what LinkedIn was worth, you know, a year ago.

我的意思是，二月份的时候我没想到的是……

I mean, the thing that I wasn't thinking about in February when...

就是得出这个结论其实有两部分。

It's like there's two parts to arriving at this conclusion.

我觉得在那第一周里，我大概明白了，哦，这些公司现在有点被低估了，因为它们遭受了这么大的打击，而且它们的核心业务依然强劲。

And I feel like within that first week, I I sort of understood, oh, these companies are sort of undervalued right now because they took this huge hit, and, you know, their their core business remained strong.

只是那个新业务，原本承诺……

It was just that a new business that proposed...

原本承诺会有巨大增长的业务，并没有真正实现。

That promised huge growth didn't quite materialize.

他们每年还是有30亿美元的收入，当时我没意识到的是，好吧。

Like, they're still doing 3,000,000,000 in revenue a year, and the thing that didn't occur to me at that time is, okay.

这些公司是在打折，但打折不只是说去买股票。

These guys are on sale, and that doesn't mean on sale just to go buy the stock.

而是说，它们被收购的价格非常低。

That means, like, they're massively at a discount for somebody to acquire them.

然后你得开始想，谁会是关键的收购方，能让LinkedIn成为巨大资产，并且能通过他们现有的核心业务放大价值？

And what you gotta start thinking then is, like, who are key acquirers where LinkedIn could be a massive asset and amplified by their existing core business?

所以我们今天的任务，就是来推测一下，想想这是不是……

So so our job today, is to speculate, and think about was was...

天哪，这到底好不好？

Man, was this good?

这对微软、对LinkedIn、对股东来说，是不是一个好决定？

Was this a good move for for Microsoft, for LinkedIn, for shareholders?

我们走着瞧吧。

We'll we'll find out.

但我觉得我们得先提一个非常重要的背景，不然没法直接深入这个话题。大概一年前，一年多前吧，市场上有很多传言说微软要……

But I I feel like we can't we can't dive into it just yet without mentioning a super important piece of context here, which is that, about a year ago, a little over a year ago, there were tons of rumors swirling in the market that Microsoft was...

已经向Salesforce提出了收购要约。

Had made an offer to acquire Salesforce.

我觉得这事儿基本上算是板上钉钉了，就是真的到了最后一刻，然后没谈成。

And I think I think it was all but confirmed, like, that that that was actually, you know, came to the eleventh hour and then fell through.

所以那些传言……

So the the the rumors...

这些只是传言，我们也不会知道真相。

And these are just rumors we won't know.

也许以后我们可以专门做一期节目聊聊这个，那会挺有意思的。

Maybe we could do a a show on this at some point, but, that would be fun.

传言说微软出价在500亿到550亿美元之间，想收购Salesforce。对。

The rumors were that Microsoft offered somewhere between 50 and $55,000,000,000 to acquire Salesforce Mhmm.

就在一年多前。

A little over a year ago.

Salesforce愿意谈，但他们想要700亿，微软就放弃了。

And Salesforce was willing to talk, but they wanted 70, and, and Microsoft walked away from that.

所以这一点非常重要。

So super important.

这件事在媒体上发酵了好几周，而且……

And and that played out in the press over weeks, and that...

这里有两件事。

Two things with this.

这两件事都完全保密了。

Both of this was completely kept quiet.

而且意向书，我想，是一个月前签的。

And the the the LOI, I think, was signed a month ago.

杰夫·韦纳在给领英员工的备忘录中提到，领英的高管团队已经“消化”这件事好几个月了，这挺惊人的。

And and, Jeff Weiner, in his memo to LinkedIn employees, mentions that, you know, the senior management team at LinkedIn has had, quote, months to digest this, which is pretty amazing.

而且显然，这一切都是从2月5日之后开始的。

And apparently, it all started after after February 5.

这让我觉得在微软内部，知道这件事的人并不多。

Which says to me at Microsoft that not a lot of people knew.

我的意思是，这件事只有董事会、萨蒂亚和少数高管知道。

I mean, that this was this was something that was board, Satya, key executives.

其实，我们节目的朋友库尔特·德尔贝尼，他在推动这两家公司如何整合方面参与得非常深。

Actually, friend of the show, Kurt DelBenny, is, very much involved in in, you know, orchestrating how these two companies will will come together.

库尔特，我们很幸运能请到他来录我们的Accompli和Wonderlist那期节目，他将负责微软这边的整合工作。

Kurt, who we were lucky enough to have on for our Accompli and Wonderlist episode, is, going to be leading the the, integration, for Microsoft.

而且，新闻稿里也提到他会和斯科特·格思里合作，斯科特负责企业业务，包括Azure和动态CRM产品，还有齐卢，齐的职责主要是生产力相关的，也就是整个Office套件和必应。

And actually, the press release talks about how he's gonna be doing that with Scott Guthrie, who leads enterprise, which includes both Azure and dynamic CRM product, and Chi Lu, which, Chi Chi's purview is, mostly kinda productivity, so the whole OfficeSuite and Bing.

所以我觉得这多少暗示了他们打算怎么用这个收购，可能主要是放在Office里，然后结合Azure和动态产品来推动。

And so I think there's a little bit of clue there as to what they're gonna do with it, probably in Office and then some combination of of Azure and fueling the Dynamics product.

好了，听众朋友们。

Alright, listeners.

现在是时候感谢我们的老朋友ServiceNow了。

Now is a great time to thank our longtime friend of the show, ServiceNow.

如果你在运营一家大型企业，AI代理可能遍布每个团队，而部署它们已经不再是难事了。

If you are running a large enterprise, AI agents are likely spread across every team, and deploying them is, no longer the hard part.

难的是知道它们有什么权限，员工在用它们做什么，或者AI在做什么决定。

The hard part is knowing what permissions they have, what employees are using them for, or what decisions AI is making.

对于大规模企业来说，AI安全可不是个小问题。

AI security for an enterprise at scale is not a small concern.

比如，风险是真实存在的。

Like, the risks are real.

对。

Exactly.

而AI的挑战在于治理、安全、衡量，以及确保它真正带来价值。

And the challenge with AI is governing it, securing it, measuring it, and making sure that it actually delivers value.

这就是ServiceNow构建AI控制塔的原因。

That is why ServiceNow built the AI control tower.

是的。

Yep.

AI控制塔让企业在一个地方就能看到、管理、治理和优化整个业务中的AI。

AI control tower gives enterprises a single place to see, manage, govern, and optimize AI across the entire business.

而且它适用于任何AI，不只是他们自己的。

And it works with any AI, not just theirs.

你网络上的每个设备、每个系统中的每个权限、每个AI代理，都在一个地方可见且安全。

Every device on your network, every permission across every system, every AI agent visible and secure in one place.

ServiceNow能做到这一点，是因为他们花了二十多年时间打造企业的运营骨干。

And ServiceNow can do this because they've spent more than twenty years building the operational backbone of the enterprise.

包括工作流程、治理、审批、安全控制，以及支撑IT、人力资源、客户服务、财务和安全领域实际工作的制度知识。

The workflows, governance, approval, security controls, and institutional knowledge that power how work actually gets done across IT, HR, customer service, finance, and security.

ServiceNow每年运行超过一千亿个工作流程，为超过85%的财富500强企业处理数万亿笔交易。

ServiceNow already runs more than a 100,000,000,000 workflows annually and trillions of transactions for more than 85% of the Fortune 500.

所以当企业需要在一个地方治理大规模AI时，他们是在一个已经处于业务运营核心的平台上进行建设。

So when companies need a place to govern AI at enterprise scale, they're building on a platform at the center of how their business already operates.

而未来不会只有一种AI，而是会有成千上万个AI代理在公司各个职能部门协同工作。

And in a future that isn't going to be one AI, it's it's going to be thousands of AI agents working across every function of the company.

但问题是，谁来管理它们呢？

But the question is, who's managing them all?

所以，如果你想把AI的雄心变成实际的业务成果，并且安全、大规模地运行，就去servicenow.com/acquired看看吧，告诉他们说是本和大卫推荐你来的。

So if you're trying to turn AI ambition into real business outcomes and make it work safely, securely at scale, go check out servicenow.com/acquired and tell them that Ben and David sent you.

好，那我们进入收购这个话题吧，我觉得这能帮我们理清一些东西。

Well, let's jump into, acquisition category because I feel like this will start to start to unpack this here.

你初步是怎么分类的？

What's your what's your early categorization here?

我觉得，从业务线来看，收购能带来现有的收入来源。

So, I mean, I think there's a business line from acquiring the the, you know, current revenue stream.

但在我看来，你买这个产品不只是为了现金流。

But in my mind, you know, you don't buy this product just to, cash flow it.

他们买那条业务线，不是因为很快就能回本，然后我们觉得拥有这个新收入来源挺好的。

Like, they're they're not buying that business line because it's it's gonna pay itself back in, you know, short order, and we feel good about owning this new revenue stream.

这是一次整合的布局。

It's an integration play.

所以我称这为产品收购，因为这是一个他们要通过自己的渠道和集成来放大现有销售的产品，然后让自己的产品变得更好，并定义身份识别的未来。

So I'm I'm calling this a product acquisition since it's a product that they're going to, amplify the current sales of with their their own kinda channel and and integrations, and then make their own products, better and kinda define the future of of identity.

所以我会说这是一个产品收购，要和他们现有的产品结合起来。

So I would say it's a a product acquisition to be combined with their existing products.

我，我会走类似的路，但我认为这真的很关键。

I, I'm gonna take a a similar route, but I think this is really key.

所以对我来说，我说，是的，产品收购。

So so for me, I said, yes, product acquisition.

但这是一个至少有可能，我认为，转变和发展微软整个业务线的产品收购。

But it's a product acquisition that at least has the potential, I think, to transform and evolve an entire business line for for Microsoft.

所以很明显，是……

So clearly, is...

我不确定，但我想这会在微软的业务流程、生产力和业务流程部门内，这是萨蒂亚接手后精简公司时设立的新部门之一。

I I don't know, but I would imagine this is gonna be within Microsoft's business process, productivity and business processes segment, which is one of the new segments that, Satya streamlined the company into when when he took over.

而且我认为，你知道，有很多方式和角度来思考领英，但其中一个你不得不想到微软的人正在考虑的是，它作为一个数据集和数据收购，以及运营领英的能力……

And and and I think, you know, there's so many ways, angles to think about LinkedIn, but one of them that you have to imagine people at Microsoft are thinking about is as a as a dataset and a data acquisition and the ability to both operate link...

继续把LinkedIn作为该业务板块下的产品组合来运营，但要把那些数据注入到Office、Active Directory、Dynamics，以及微软现在所处的这个移动优先、云优先的世界里。

Continue to operate LinkedIn as the set of products that it is within that segment, but then infuse that data into into Office, into Active Directory, into Dynamics, into all of the, you know, the sorta mobile first, cloud first, you know, world that Microsoft, you know, lives in now.

他们所有的商业工具，你都得想象这是他们正在考虑的事情。

All of the business, tools that they have, you you have to imagine is something they're thinking about.

完全同意。

Totally.

这个切入点非常好。

And that's a really good lead in.

我大概有四个方面的原因，觉得他们这次会下决心收购。

I I sort of have, like, four buckets of of why I think they they pulled the trigger on this one.

第一个方面，你刚才正好说中了，就是与Office 365的整合，把身份认证扩展到公司外部。

And that first one, you know, you just nailed is is integration with Office three sixty five to extend identity outside the company.

在微软的世界里，你的……

In the world of of Microsoft of your...

他们有Active Directory。

They, they have Active Directory.

我们可能得说，我有点担心这个，因为我敢打赌我们很多听众根本不知道Active Directory是什么。

We might wanna say I'm worried about that because I bet a lot of our listeners have no idea what Active Directory is.

说得好。

Great point.

所以，基本上，微软在企业市场的锁定优势来自于他们掌控了身份认证，以及由此衍生的一切。

So, basically, Microsoft's lock in in the enterprise comes from the fact that they own identity and everything that stems from that.

所以所有东西都能和他们……无缝配合。

So everything works seamlessly with with their...

你知道，或者说，从历史上看，所有产品都能无缝协作，因为一切都是……

You know, or historically, works seamlessly across all their products because everything is is...

你知道，都接入Exchange，用Active Directory来管理身份，它是你身份的可靠真相，公司里所有东西都能接入它。

You know, plugs into Exchange and uses active directory to manage identity, and it's it's, you know, the rock solid truth of who you are that everything in the company can plug into.

对。

Yep.

所以，当你作为一家使用微软生产力套件的公司的员工，你登录你的微软账户，然后你就能访问你的邮箱、Office 365，以及任何企业应用，甚至Windows。

So when you, as a employee at a company that uses the Microsoft productivity suite, you know, you sign in to your Microsoft account, and then that grants you access to your email to Office three sixty five, to whatever enterprise app if you In fact, even Windows.

你是说，对于

You're you're For

少数使用 Dynamics 的人来说，你知道，进入 Dynamics

the few people out there who use Dynamics, you know, into Dynamics

还有，甚至 Windows。

And, and and even Windows.

对。

Yep.

你可以把它想象成深度集成的单点登录。

You you can think of it as, like, deeply, deeply integrated single sign on.

而且公司的性质已经变了，我觉得这……

And the nature of companies has changed, and I think that that that...

我们一会儿会讨论趋势，但我认为一个大的技术趋势，或者说一个大的世界趋势，就是人们经常跳槽。

We'll we'll talk about trends in a little bit, but I think that a big tech trend or really a big, like, world trend that's happened is people move around a lot.

就是说，人们在一家公司待十八到三十个月，然后频繁跳槽，人们从他们待过的不同公司积累知识，也从那些公司建立声誉。

Mean, people stay at companies for eighteen to thirty months, and there's a lot of bouncing around, and people collect knowledge from all the different companies they were at, and build reputation from all the different companies that they were at.

一个完全围绕你在公司里的身份来运转的世界，确实有点过时了。

And a world that is entirely centered around, you know, who you are at this company is kinda antiquated.

这点说得太好了。

This is such a good point.

公司……

Company...

公司不再拥有你的身份了。

The company doesn't own your identity anymore.

你拥有自己的身份，你在公司期间，把你的技能和声誉借给公司。

You own your identity, and you lend your skills and reputation to the company while you're there.

有些人会这样做很长时间，但有些人不会。

And some people do that for a really long time, but some people don't.

你必须有一种方式，能够访问和利用所有这些其他数据。

And you have to have a way to be able to access and leverage all that other data.

对。

Yep.

而且，你知道，对于微软来说，之前它也在努力重塑自己的一切，就像库特几个月前跟我们聊的那样，在这个移动优先、云优先的世界里，现实是大多数员工，至少在科技或金融领域，已经不会在同一份工作上待很久了。

And, you know, for Microsoft previously, which is, again, trying to reinvent everything it's doing, as as Kurt talked to us about a few months ago, you know, in this, you know, mobile first, cloud first world, like, when the reality is that the majority of employees, at least in fields like tech or finance, you know, aren't staying in the same job for long periods of time anymore.

如果你作为微软，只看到人们对这些非常孤立的看法，而不是他们技能、职业历史和身份的整体视图，你知道，跨工作的，就这样。

If you, as Microsoft, only have these very siloed views into people and not their their holistic view of their skills and their career history and their identity, you know, across jobs, you know, there we go.

所以就有了领英。

Hence, LinkedIn.

而且，我觉得我应该提一个类似的情况……

And the the parallel, I think I should...

反正我记下来了，五年前、十年前，我们经历过一次IT大动荡，大家都在为BYOD，也就是自带设备，而抓狂。

That I wrote down anyways, you know, five years ago, ten years ago, we had this, like, IT shake up where they were freaking out about BYOD, bring your own device.

而现在，这就是BYOD在身份方面的体现。

And this is the realization of BYOD when it comes to identity.

BYOE，自带员工。

BYOE, bring your own employee.

BYOP，自带个人。

BYOP, your own person.

而且你提到了，我本来想讲第二点，因为我觉得这里有个很好的过渡。

And and and you mentioned, well, I was gonna go into the sort of second thing, because I think there's a good segue there.

第二点，我们刚才聊到了身份和Office 365。

The second reason, we kinda talked about, identity and Office 365 there.

我觉得当它扩展到动态CRM时，了解一个人的完整工作经历对销售来说非常有价值。

I think that as it extends to dynamic CRM, it's hugely valuable to know an entire person's work history when you are trying to sell something to them.

所以想象一下，微软以前的世界观就是，这是约翰·史密斯，他在A公司工作过。

So imagining, you know, that the problem with Microsoft's worldview before is this is John Smith, and he was at company a.

还有一个约翰·史密斯在B公司。

There is also a John Smith at company b.

我们不知道他们是不是同一个人。

We don't know if those are related.

而且，我知道肯定有尝试去确认他们是否相关，但LinkedIn做得最妙的地方在于，所有激励机制都让你愿意把自己的信息弄准确，这样他们就能从中赚钱。

And and, know, I'm sure there's, like, attempts to make sure they're related, but the magical thing that LinkedIn nailed is all the incentives are aligned for them to make money off of you wanting to make all of your information accurate.

所以如果你能对客户有一个全面的身份视角，那也是非常宝贵的。

And so if you can have this, like, holistic view of identity when it comes to customers, that's incredibly valuable also.

对。

Yep.

那个……

The...

同意。

Agree.

我想接着聊一下这次收购，我之前一直在想这个，而且我和Ben之前发短信聊过这个。

And I I wanna jump into with something that I've been thinking about is with regards to this acquisition, and Ben and I were texting about this earlier.

我对LinkedIn的看法是，它是网络效应力量的一个典型例子，也是他们建立的LinkedIn网络资产的价值所在。

The way I think about LinkedIn is, like, it's such a canonical example of, like, the power of a network effect and the value of the asset of LinkedIn's network that they've built.

我一会儿在科技主题里会详细讲这个。

And and I'll get into this in a in a little bit in in tech themes.

但如果你暂时接受这个观点，即网络效应和他们的防御性意味着他们建立的职业网络基本上可以，你知道，永远不会……

But if you take for a given for the moment that the, the network effect, and the the defensibility of that means that their professional network that they built basically can, you know, never...

几乎永远不会被颠覆，而且天知道多年来有多少人尝试过，尽管产品真的很糟糕，还有其他各种问题。

Almost never be disrupted, and lord knows many people have tried over the years despite the products being really crappy and all these other things.

你知道，在那上面能建什么？

You know, what can you build on top of that?

我们聊过，LinkedIn其实不怎么靠广告赚钱。

And we talked about how LinkedIn doesn't monetize via ads really.

你知道，他们有点像，先做了招聘。

You know, they're sorta like they they did recruiting first.

那是最明显的。

That was the most obvious.

他们做得很好。

They nailed it.

他们完全主导了那个行业。

Like, they own that industry.

但很明显，他们也应该做销售、商务拓展和合作这些，你知道，就像我用LinkedIn的方式，可能很多很多我们的听众也是。

But then it's also really obvious like they should do like sales and biz dev and partnerships and like, you know, like, what I use LinkedIn for, and probably many many of our of our listeners.

但他们在这方面真的搞砸了。

And they kinda really dropped the ball there.

然后你再想想，微软拿着LinkedIn这个网络资产，能不能真正在LinkedIn没做好的地方发力？

And then you think about, like, man, could Microsoft with the LinkedIn network asset on top of that, like, really execute where LinkedIn hasn't?

我觉得那里有很大的机会。

I think there's a big opportunity there.

而且，Ben Thompson也同意你的看法。

And, Ben Thompson agrees with you.

我找到了他的一段话。

I I pulled this quote.

它……

It...

现在的问题已经不是我们会不会提到Ben的频繁写作，而是会在节目里提多少次了。

It's getting to be not a question of if, but how many times we'll mention Ben's prolific writing on the show.

不过，他在Stratechery那篇文章里确实有句话。

But, he has a quote in the Stratechery article about this.

他说，我确实相信微软会大大放大这个上升空间。

He says, I do believe upside is magnified significantly by Microsoft.

比如说，LinkedIn的销售导航器如果能卖给微软Dynamics CRM的所有用户，那这笔交易的一大块成本就收回来了。

Should LinkedIn Sales Navigator, for example, sell into 100% of Microsoft Dynamics CRM user base, a good portion of this deal would be paid for.

想想这个确实挺有意思的，对。

And that's just really interesting to think about is Yeah.

你说得对。

You raise a good point.

整个事情的关键在于，微软能不能利用LinkedIn已经建立的那个网络资产，比他们自己做得更好。

The the crux of the whole thing is, can Microsoft leverage the network asset that link...

就是那个LinkedIn自己创建的网络，微软能不能比他们更擅长利用它。

That LinkedIn has created better than they themselves have

而且，关于销售导航器，也值得说几句。

And and and it's worth a word on, like, on Sales Navigator.

这是LinkedIn投入了大量精力的产品，他们想借此在网络上实现第二层价值，也就是销售和潜在客户开发。

So this is this product that LinkedIn has put a ton of effort into, and this is their attempt to execute and capture this sort of second pillar of value on top of the network with with sales, and and lead generation.

他们遇到的问题在于，销售工作都是围绕CRM系统展开的。

And the problem they've had is that, like, sales runs on the CRM.

这就是为什么Salesforce这么有价值。

This is why Salesforce is such a valuable company.

而且除非你直接和CRM对接，否则真的很难创造太多价值。

And unless you're directly plugged into the CRM, like, it's really hard to, you know, add a ton of value.

他们做了很多集成，Sales Navigator也和Salesforce以及其他CRM都有集成。

And and they've done a lot of integrations and, you know, Sales Navigator has had integration with Salesforce and with all the other CRMs out there.

但这件事真的很难做到。

But, like, it's really hard to do that.

对微软来说，他们可以直接把它整合进Dynamics，虽然Dynamics市场份额很小，但他们还有整个生产力套件的重量，包括邮件，这是销售和其他很多职业功能最重要的应用。

And and for Microsoft, like, a, they can plug it directly into Dynamics, which has very small market share, but they also have the weight and through all the rest of the productivity suite including email, the most important app for sales and many other, many other, you know, professional functions.

能把LinkedIn的所有网络资产整合进去，这是个巨大的机会。

And to be able to plug all of LinkedIn's network asset into that, like, huge opportunity.

对于所有收听节目的，或者在面向企业销售的公司工作的人来说，Salesforce已经成了B2B公司的操作系统。

And for everybody out there that listens to, or that works at a a company that sells to businesses, Salesforce has become kind of the operating system of the b to b company.

如果一个产品不能和Salesforce集成，你就不会用它，因为那是公司各部门沟通的核心数据库，也是唯一的事实来源。

And if a product doesn't plug into Salesforce, you're not using it, because that's the central repository for how all the different departments of your company, communicate with each other, and and it is the ground source of truth.

所以，我的意思是，那个……

So, I mean, that...

微软一直以来的定位就是，我们为生产力赋能，让企业能够通过技术实现最高效、最出色的运营。

Microsoft has always been the we power productivity, and we enable enterprises to be, the most productive and, efficient they can with the use of technology or through the use of technology.

这长期以来一直是他们的使命，至少是他们的使命之一。

And that's been their their mission for a long time, or at least one of their missions.

看到Salesforce真的在一点点蚕食这个领域，这……

And to see Salesforce really, like, etching away at that, it...

这几乎就像是为了守住地盘，他们不得不这么做。

It's almost like to defend that turf, they had to do this.

我想让Ben继续讲他的另外两点，但我想先快速补充一下。

I I wanna let Ben get to his, his other two points, but I I wanna add in really quickly.

对，是的。

Like Yeah.

我不得不想象……

I have to imagine...

这次收购还有一个特别酷的地方，就像我们节目一贯的主题一样，等SEC的文件公布、交易完成的时候，我们就能知道所有细节了。

So what's also really cool about this acquisition is, as is the theme on this show, we'll get to find out all the nitty gritty of how it happened when the SEC filings come out, when the when the deal closes.

他们说是在今年完成，这很可能意味着是12月底。

Which which they said is is this year, which likely means late December.

对。

Yep.

我真的很期待那一天的到来，因为我猜，如果有……

And I'm really looking forward to that because I have to imagine that if there there were...

肯定至少有一个其他竞标者，不然价格不会涨这么高，甚至可能不止一个，但我猜那个竞标者就是Salesforce。

There must have been at least one other bidder here or the price wouldn't have gone this high, if not multiple others, but I gotta imagine the other bidder was Salesforce.

肯定是。

Has to be.

这太棒了。

And this is this is awesome.

这正好引出了我要说的第三点。

This is leading right into point three for me.

本来会有别人要收购他们的。

Somebody else was going to buy them.

就是说，他们现在是在打折出售。

Like, they they are on sale.

LinkedIn只有一个。

There's only one LinkedIn.

网络效应的魔力就在于，你知道，他们是关于谁在哪工作、做过什么、擅长什么的权威信息来源。

Like, the magic of network effects makes it so that, you know, they were the source of truth for who...

尽管他们的技能和推荐功能有点像个笑话。

Where an employer has been and what they've done and what they're good at, even though their skills and endorsements thing is a little bit of a joke.

他们……

They...

只有一个，所以你不可能去买另一个LinkedIn，或者再造一个LinkedIn。

There was only one, so you couldn't go out and buy the other LinkedIn or build the other LinkedIn.

就好像只有一个超级有价值的资产，这其实是一个挺有意思的并购趋势……

It was like there was this one super valuable asset, and that's sort of an interesting m and a trend be...

因为你知道，现在的网络效应和科技。

Because of the, you know, network effects and technology today.

这让它们变得极其有价值，也造成了这些……这些……

It makes them immensely more valuable, and it creates these these abs...

这里肯定有一场竞价战。

There's certainly a bidding war here.

所以当你考虑这个价值，而你是微软，然后那个投资银行家来找你，他促成了这笔交易，跟你说，嘿。

So when you're considering the value of this and you're Microsoft and, you get approached by the investment banker that sort of put this together and said, hey.

你觉得

What do

这个怎么样？

think about this?

我觉得那个人是弗兰科·特龙。

Which I I believe was Franco Trone.

再说，我们……

Again, we get...

我们会核实一下这个。

We'll we'll fact check this.

但是，让我...

But Let...

我们来看看。

Let's see.

我知道领英的顾问是Catalyst。

I know LinkedIn was advised by Catalyst.

弗兰克·弗朗科·特隆。

Frank Franco Trone.

好的。

Cool.

微软的顾问是摩根士丹利。

And Microsoft by Morgan Stanley.

你不仅要考虑这26.25亿美元值不值，更要想想如果它落到别人手里，机会成本有多大，以及我们需要投入多少资金才能不被别人抢走饭碗。

You gotta be thinking with the hat not of, boy, is this worth, you know, $2,526,000,000 dollars, but more with the hat of what is the opportunity cost of it going to someone else, and what's the capital outlay that we need to make in order to not have our lunch eaten.

再退一步看，现在公司比以前任何时候都更需要把并购看作一种竞争威胁，并且要有能力，无论是借贷能力还是手头现金，来保卫自己的地盘，应对像这样的大规模格局变化。

And it it taking a step back from that, it's sort of interesting companies, more so these days than ever, have to look at m and a as a competitive threat and have the means, the borrowing means or the cash on hand means, to do what they need to to defend their turf against a a massive landscape shift like this.

比如说，我们就拿一个例子来看。

I mean, like, let's just take as an example.

如果当初是推特收购了Instagram呢？

What if Twitter had acquired Instagram?

我记得Instagram刚出来那会儿，我主要就是用它发照片到推特上。

I mean, I remember when, like, early days Instagram, like, my primary use case for it was posting pictures to Twitter.

所以当时完全能理解为什么会有这种收购的想法。

So like, totally could have seen the rationale for that to happen.

那对现在的Facebook来说，那得多糟糕啊？

Like, how awful would that be for Facebook right now?

那可不妙。

Not good.

确实不妙。

Not good.

另一个有趣的点，我稍微提到过，就是微软并不是用现金来支付这笔交易的，而且我们还没有……

The the other interesting thing that I I sort of danced into here a little bit is, Microsoft did not pay for this in cash, and and we haven't...

这种情况其实很常见。

This is often the case.

嗯，他们确实付了，但不是用那种方式。

Well, they they did, but they didn't do it.

所以……

So...

对，没错。

Well, right.

他们不是用资产负债表上的现金来支付的。

They did not pay for it in the cash that they carry on their balance sheet.

他们借了一大笔债，因为他们94%的资产都

They took out, you know, a large amount of debt because 94% of their assets are

在海外。

held overseas.

抱歉。

I'm sorry.

他们的现金存放在海外。

Their cash is held overseas.

而且，你知道，如果要把这些钱带回国内，要缴纳大约40%的税。

And, you know, with the 40 ish percent tax that they would have on on bringing that back home.

把现金汇回国内。

Repatriating the cash.

这对所有总部在美国的跨国公司来说都是个大问题，尤其是科技公司，在把现金汇回国内方面面临很大困难。

This is a huge problem for, all companies, that are multinationals and are headquartered in The US, but tech companies especially have a big problem with repatriating their cash.

所以他们做的是，这不是股票交易。

So what so what they did, this was not a stock deal.

LinkedIn的股东收到的是全现金对价，但微软是通过举债来为这笔交易融资的。

It was all cash, consideration that LinkedIn shareholders are receiving, but they, Microsoft took out debt to to finance the transaction.

我觉得不完全是。

And I think not entirely.

他们借了钱，虽然不是260亿美元的债务，但占了很大一部分。对。

They took out, like it's it's not, you know, $26,000,000,000 of debt, but it was a large part of the Yep.

为这笔交易融资。

Financing the transaction.

所以，是的，回到大卫的观点，这里有一个巨大的单一资产，具有网络效应。

So, yeah, you know, I think that that getting back to David's point, it's like there was one single huge asset with network effects here.

问题是，微软能否比领英自己榨取更多的收入？

And the question is, can Microsoft, you know, squeeze more revenue out of it than LinkedIn was doing themselves?

我的意思是，他们会不会，我们拭目以待。

I mean, will they is, we will see.

他们能吗？

Can they?

在我看来，答案是百分之百能。

Answer is, in my mind, a 100% yes.

然后进入我的第四点，这一点更广泛一些。

And then getting into my fourth point, this one's a little bit more broad.

但是，微软已经承认了那次胜利……

But, so Microsoft has, you know, admitted that that win...

Windows不是未来，他们未来不再是Windows公司了。

Windows is not the future, that they are not the Windows company going forward.

他们……

They...

当然，他们……

Of course, they...

你知道，很多人还在做Windows，收入也很大，但那是……

You know, large amount of people working on Windows, huge revenue stream, but it's it's...

操作系统不再是以前那样的摇钱树了。

Operating systems are not the solo cash cow that they once were.

我甚至不应该说操作系统。

And I shouldn't even say operating systems.

Windows不是。

Windows is not.

所以，在转向移动优先、云优先的公司，并专注于他们的云服务时，你从云服务栈的底层到顶层看，他们有Azure提供的基础设施即服务和平台即服务。

And so in moving to this mobile first, cloud first company and focusing on, you know, their their cloud offering, as you look up and down the cloud stack, they have infrastructure as a service and platform as a service with Azure.

他们还有Office 365提供的软件即服务，你可以这样看，没错。

They have software as a service with Office three sixty five, and you can look at this like, okay.

他们正在变成一家云服务公司。

They're becoming the cloud services company.

所以，为招聘人员以及更广泛的销售和营销提供的商业工具，也是他们可以添加到服务栈中的云服务。

So, business tools for recruiters and and more broadly for sales and marketing also is a cloud offering that they can add to that stack of services they provide.

所以我觉得，你戴上老微软的帽子，你会想，他们在干什么？

And so I I think, like, you put on your old Microsoft hat, you're like, what are they doing?

而且，他们通常会把大型并购搞砸，所以这太糟糕了。

And, like, they typically squander large m and a, so this is terrible.

这不会顺利的。

It's not gonna go well.

你跟一群现任和前任微软员工聊这个，这确实是最常见的反应，我觉得。

You put talk to a bunch of current and former Microsoft employees about this, and that that is the most common reaction, I I would say.

好了，听众朋友们。

Alright, listeners.

现在是时候聊聊我们最喜欢的公司之一——Legora，法律工作的智能体操作系统。

Now is a great time to talk about one of our favorite companies, Legora, the agentic operating system for legal work.

对。

Yes.

你们大多数人现在都已经把合同丢进聊天机器人里了。

Most of you have dropped a contract into a chatbot by now.

但作为一名律师，这真的能帮你走多远呢？

But as a lawyer, how far can that really take you?

它没见过你们律所的模板。

It's never seen your firm's precedents.

它不尊重保密性，而且你也没法查证它的答案来自哪里。

It doesn't respect confidentiality, and you can't check where its answer came from.

所以Legora的创始人们像那些伟大的创始人一样，着手解决这个问题。

So Legora's founders approached this the way that great founders do.

早期，团队搬进了斯德哥尔摩一家大型律师事务所的办公室，花了几个月时间学习实际工作是如何完成的。

Early on, the team moved into the office of a big law firm in Stockholm and learned for months how the work actually gets done.

后来，他们拥有了数千家企业客户和十万用户，但他们仍然保持着这种工作方式。

A couple of thousands of enterprise customers and a 100,000 users later, they still work that way.

他们内部雇佣了一百名法律工程师。

They employ a 100 legal engineers on staff.

这些律师驻扎在律师事务所和法律部门内部，将Legora部署到实际场景中，比如本周的交易交割或周五到期的政策审查。

These are lawyers sitting inside of firms and legal departments to deploy Legora onto live situations like the deal closing this week or the policy review due Friday.

这个产品在短时间内变得非常强大。

The product has gotten very powerful in a short period of time.

一年前，目标只是从聊天机器人那里得到一个好答案。

A year ago, the goal was a good answer from a chatbot.

现在有了Legora代理，你交给它工作，它会带着一个计划回来。

With the Legora agent, you hand it the work, and it comes back with a plan.

像数据室尽职调查或审查新供应商合同这样的任务，会在你每天使用的工具（如Microsoft Word）中完成，并且基于你自己的先例和操作手册。

Tasks like running diligence on a data room or reviewing a new vendor contract get completed inside the tool you use every day like Microsoft Word and against your own precedents and playbooks.

每一条发现都有出处。

Every finding is sourced.

律师负责指导工作，并在系统执行任何步骤之前进行审批。

The lawyer directs the work and signs off before the system executes any steps.

每个法律团队都能使用相同的AI模型，所以模型本身并不能给你带来优势。

Every legal team can get access to the same AI models, so the models themselves do not give you an edge.

你能用自己的数据、人员和流程手册做什么，这才是关键。

What you can do with your own data, people, playbooks, that's the whole game.

如今，超过1800家律师事务所和50多个市场的内部法律团队中，超过10万名法律专业人士使用Legora。

Today, over a 100,000 legal professionals at more than 1,800 law firms and in house legal teams in over 50 markets use Legora.

当Legora在试点中与最大的竞争对手正面交锋时，它70%的情况下都能获胜。

And when Legora goes head to head with its top competitor in a pilot, it wins 70% of the time.

演示是一回事，但最重要的是，在凌晨两点进行交易交割时，助理是否愿意使用它，或者总法律顾问在董事会会议前是否信任它所说的话。

A demo is one thing, but what matters most is an associate who reaches for it at two in the morning during a closing or whether a general counsel trusts what it says before the board meeting.

所以，如果你的法律团队想试试看，不管你在律所还是企业内部，都可以访问legora.com/acquired，并且一定要告诉他们，是本和戴维推荐你来的。

So if your legal team wants to check it out, whether you're at a firm or in house, go to legora.com/acquired, and be sure to tell them that Ben and David sent you.

我特别想聊科技主题。

So I'm dying to get to tech themes.

但在那之前，我觉得我们...

But but before we do, I think we...

我觉得值得花一分钟...

I think it's worth, a minute...

花一分钟聊聊，如果当初不是这样会怎样。

Spending a minute on, the what would have happened otherwise.

我们之前提到过，如果别人收购了LinkedIn会怎样。

We talked a little bit about somebody else buying LinkedIn.

我觉得那可能是最有可能的情况。

Think that's probably most likely.

显然，就像你说的，他们当时确实在出售，而且不止一种意义上。

Clearly, they were on sale, as you say, in more ways than one.

但我觉得，你知道，另一条路是，比如说，LinkedIn设法保持独立，你知道，他们会有...

But I think, you know, if the the other route is, let's say, LinkedIn and managed to stay independent, you know, they'd have a...

他们正在努力打造另一个收入支柱，在现有网络资产的基础上实现变现。

They're having executing on building another pillar, of monetization on top of their network asset.

但我想在这里插入一些媒体上的讨论，我觉得挺相关的，有人指出，我记得《纽约时报》有篇文章提到，领英的股票薪酬在过去几年里增长得非常快，实际上已经成了他们一个真正的问题。

But I I wanna throw in here some, a bit of discussion that's come out in the press that I think is relevant, that that somebody pointed out, and I believe there's a I believe there's a New York Times article about LinkedIn's stock based compensation has, grown hugely in the last few years, and it actually was becoming a real problem for them.

股票薪酬，可能我们很多读者都知道，这在初创公司里是个常见概念，但在上市公司里也一样，就是员工薪酬的一部分，除了工资，还有股票期权。

So stock based compensation, as probably many of our readers know, you know, is is a maiden concept in startups, but also in public companies where part of your equity package as an employee is you get a salary, but then you also get stock options Mhmm.

对。

In the company.

领英基本上在过去几年里，给员工发放了大量的股权，这稀释了现有股东的权益。

And and LinkedIn had basically, over the last couple of years, been giving away huge amounts of equity to employees, and that dilutes, the existing shareholders.

所以这是一种非现金支出。

So it's a non cash expense.

所以它不会体现在EBITDA之类的指标里。

So it doesn't show up in, like, EBITDA metrics and stuff like that.

但领英的股票薪酬从2012年每季度1300万美元，增长到了2016年第一季度每季度2.22亿美元。

But stock based comp at at LinkedIn went from 13,000,000 a quarter in 2012 to 222,000,000 per quarter, in the first quarter of twenty sixteen.

问题在于，如果你开始这样做并给员工补偿，显然，我非常相信员工股权，但是，你知道，这...

And the problem there is, like, if you start doing that and compensating your employees, obviously, I'm a huge believer in employee equity, but, you know, there's...

关于股权结构表，问题是，它只有超过100%。

The thing about cap tables is, like, there's only over a 100%.

就是说，你不能拥有公司超过100%的股权。

Like, you can't have more than a 100 of the equity in the company.

所以每次你给出更多，你就在稀释所有人。

So anytime you give more out, you're diluting everybody.

所以LinkedIn的股票就像变成了一个漏水的筛子，一直在发生这种情况。

And so it was like the the LinkedIn stock had become this sort of, like, leaky sieve, that was happening.

所以那本来是他们必须处理的一个大问题，但现在他们不用了。

So that was a major problem that they would've had to deal with, but then now they don't.

有意思。

Interesting.

我想如果事情不是这样发展的话，我...

I think what woulda happened otherwise, I I...

你知道，它本来会被卖给Salesforce的。

You know, it woulda gotten sold to Salesforce.

如果是那样的话，我在想，如果微软在Dynamics上失去这笔交易，未来会怎样，因为我觉得那对Salesforce来说是一记重击。

And in that case, I wonder for the future of what Microsoft is doing with Dynamics if they lose out on this deal, because I feel like that's a nail in the coffin for Salesforce.

你是说对Dynamics来说是一记重击？

You mean a nail in the coffin for Dynamics?

对Dynamics。

For Dynamics.

如果……

If...

好吧。

Alright.

我们进入……

Let's go into...

我们进入科技主题吧，因为，天哪，这些年来我跟很多人说过，作为一个投资者，我一直非常看好LinkedIn，现在依然如此。

Let's jump into tech themes because this is, man, I've I've said this to so many people over the years, you know, that, as a investor, I've been such a huge fan of LinkedIn, and continue to be.

大卫，你是什么时候买领英股票的？

David, when did you buy LinkedIn stock?

我是在IPO之后马上买的，然后在2月5号之后又加了不少。

I bought right after the IPO, and then I bought a bunch more after February 5.

原因就是我们一直在聊的那些，你知道，这家公司和业务面临很大的挑战。

And the reason for that is, you know, like we've been discussing, you know, there are major challenges for the business and the company.

但对我来说，科技领域真正有网络效应的公司太少了，而领英的网络效应非常强大。

But to me, there is so few, real true network effects that, exist in technology, and LinkedIn's is so powerful.

我不认为有人，也许永远都不会，但在可预见的未来，能撼动领英的地位。

I don't believe that anyone, perhaps, you know, ever ever is a long time, but anytime in the foreseeable future will be able to disrupt LinkedIn.

光有软件就只是软件。

Software alone is just software.

就像，它就是个普通商品。

Like, it's just commodity.

总会有人做出更好的东西。

Somebody will build something better.

它总会出现的。

It will come along.

但是……

But...

而LinkedIn就是最典型的例子。

And LinkedIn is such the classic example.

说实话，它看起来挺糟糕的。

Like, it looks like crap.

咱们都诚实点吧。

Like, let's all be honest.

说实话，这个产品现在真的很差。

Like, the product is really bad at this point.

还没有……

Hasn't

你加载一个页面都要十秒钟。

You have, like, ten second page load times.

真的，非常糟糕。

It's really, really bad.

但是，没人能打败它。

But, like, nobody will ever beat it.

比如说，我会一直用它。

Like, I will always use it.

我每天都会用，因为我需要联系的人都在上面。

I'll use it every day because everybody I need to interact with is on it.

如果我离开去别的地方，他们就不在上面了。

And if I leave and go somewhere else, they're not on it.

你明白吗？

You know?

所以，就像

So, like

而且唯一的事情……

And the only thing...

我能想象未来人们会在各个垂直领域逐步推进，然后这些领域会扩展，但我们离那一步还有一段距离。

Like, I can envision a future where people chip away in verticals, and then those verticals expand, but we're a ways out from that.

我想到的几件事是，比如招聘开发者时，通常都是从GitHub开始的。

And the couple things I'm thinking of are, you know, when recruiting developers, it's very common to start on GitHub.

没错。

Exactly.

然后突然之间，有大量数据其实不在LinkedIn上，但这些数据更有用，就像是，他们工作中留下的痕迹本身就构成了一个更丰富的个人资料。

And then all of a sudden, there's all this data that is not actually in LinkedIn that's so much more actionable, and it's like, oh, it's it's just the the mere, you know, breadcrumb trail that they've left from doing their work creates a much richer profile.

或者你可以想象在AngelList上也有类似的情况。

Or you can imagine sort of the same thing on AngelList.

比如，它从创始人和风投扩展到员工，然后人们实际上有动力去更新他们的AngelList资料。

Like, it it moves out from founders and VCs to employees, and then people are actually incentivized to keep their AngelList profile up to date.

这会扩散到其他行业。

That proliferates to other industries.

设计。

Design.

有一家叫Behance的公司，Adobe收购了它，当时就是在做这个。

There was a company called Behance that Adobe bought that was doing this.

完全同意。

Totally agree.

如果要攻击LinkedIn，这是唯一的方法，因为只有这样才能真正获得足够的临界规模。

If you were going to attack LinkedIn, this is the only way to do it because it's the only way where you can actually get enough critical mass.

网络在没有达到临界规模之前是零价值的，一旦达到，就变得完全有防御性价值。

Like, a network is is of zero value until it is of critical mass value, and then it is of, like, completely defensible value.

但是，但是……

But, but it's...

我真的觉得，现在想建立一个横向的、广泛的职业网络，那真是徒劳无功。

I really think it it would it would be a fool's errand to try and build a horizontal wide based, professional network at this point.

我的意思是，就像现在想建立一个横向的视频托管平台或者一个纯粹的横向社交网络一样，都是不明智的。

I mean, in the same way that it would be foolish to build a horizontal video hosting platform at this point or a horizontal, pure social network.

我觉得，横向平台的时代……

Like, I think the era of horizontal platform...

横向平台一旦形成了网络效应，你就不能通过再建一个横向平台来颠覆它们。

Horizontal platforms, once they have network effects applied, you don't disrupt them by building another horizontal platform.

我觉得，这在你考虑创办新公司的时候，是个值得注意的有趣点。

And I think that, you know, that's that's that's just an interesting thing to note when you're thinking about starting new startups.

因为我听过很多人说LinkedIn很烂。

Because I've heard so many people say LinkedIn sucks.

我要试着把它拉下马，颠覆LinkedIn。

I'm gonna try and unseat it and disrupt LinkedIn.

对，我们确实对产品有意见，但你不可能靠做一个更好的横向LinkedIn来做到这一点。

And, like, yeah, we have our product qualms, but you're not gonna do it by creating a better horizontal LinkedIn.

对。

Yep.

而且我觉得，这正好印证了我一直想提的一个关于收购的观点，LinkedIn那些人，他们很聪明。

And and I think this plays, for me, at one point I wanna bring up about the acquisition that, plays really strongly in here is LinkedIn, they're they're they're smart guys.

还有那些女士们，他们明白这一点。

Like, and and gals, like, they they get this.

那在LinkedIn的历史上，最让它害怕的是什么？

So what has LinkedIn been more terrified of than anything else in its history?

就是有人把网络关系从LinkedIn上挖走，偷出去，然后自己创业，跟它竞争。

It's people exfiltrating the network, right, off of LinkedIn and and stealing it out and bootstrapping and and competing with them.

LinkedIn是出了名的铁腕，尤其是在API限制或者你存储从LinkedIn获取的数据方面，管得非常严。

And LinkedIn is famously, like, just iron fisted in their, their terms about, you know, their API limits or your ability to, store data that you retrieve from LinkedIn.

他们那个所谓的开放API，其实是锁得最死的。

They they they have the most locked down, quote, unquote, open API.

那个API就是个笑话。

The API is a joke.

完全就是个笑话。

It is a utter joke.

所以，作为用户，作为产品使用者，也作为一个……你知道，作为一个对……

And so one of the things that gets me really excited about LinkedIn being part of Microsoft, as a, as a as a user, as a user of products, and as a, you know, as as as somebody who is...

有很高……

Has a high...

我对未来的创新有巨大的利益关系，天哪，这是否意味着真正的LinkedIn API的曙光？

Huge vested interest in innovation in the future is, man, could this mean the dawn of a real LinkedIn API?

因为微软的动机和LinkedIn非常不同。

Because Microsoft has a very different set of motivations than than LinkedIn.

只要他们保持网络效应的封锁。

So long as they keep the network effect blocked.

只要他们保持网络效应，但它也会嵌入到微软的所有产品中。

So long as they keep the network effect, but it'll also be embedded into all of Microsoft's products.

对，没错。

And Right.

微软也是一家面向开发者的公司。

Microsoft is is also a developer facing company.

所以，如果他们开放LinkedIn API给...

And so, like, if they open up the LinkedIn API to...

我的意思是，我甚至想到，比如，风险投资公司。

I mean, I think about, like, even, like, venture capital firms.

比如，很多公司都在内部开发数据工具，用来在创始人创业之前就识别出他们，或者找到那些可能对加入初创公司感兴趣的高素质人才。

Like, so many firms are building data, you know, tools, internally for themselves, to be able to identify people who might be founders, great founders before they start companies, or people who might be interested in joining startups before they do who are really talented.

而之前你完全被限制住了，因为LinkedIn的API不太好用。

And you've just been totally hamstrung because you can't really use the LinkedIn API very well.

但如果现在突然能用了，想想看，那会催生出多少酷炫的产品和服务啊。

But if now all of a sudden you can, like, man, think about all the cool products and services that are gonna be enabled enabled by that.

确实可以。

You can.

不过我得提醒一下，David，别忘了风险投资公司是个小众市场。

I'll just caveat this with, like, David, remember venture capitalists are a niche market.

没错。

Exactly.

没错。

Exactly.

而且，这样的例子还有很多。

But, there's so many more examples too.

说得好。

Good point.

我们要给它打分吗？

Should we grade it?

不。

No.

我觉得有一个。

I think there was one.

哦，我有个问题想问你。

Oh, I have a I have a question I wanna post to you.

好的。

Yep.

所以……

So there...

微软把LinkedIn整合到他们的所有产品中，对他们是有利的。

It is in Microsoft's interest to integrate LinkedIn with all of their products.

要记住，微软现在也拥有那个链接……

Keep in mind, Microsoft also owns now the link...

LinkedIn的产品，并且有动力让这个收入来源实现盈利。

LinkedIn product and has an incentive to make that revenue stream profitable.

所以他们呢

So do they

它就在……上面

Which it is on...

不考虑股权激励费用。

Without accounting for stock based compensation.

对。

Yep.

或者说，尽可能成功。

Or I I should say as successful as possible.

他们是不是也做了很多跟谷歌应用的集成？

Do they do a bunch of Google apps integrations also?

微软可能会遇到，或者潜在地会遇到这种情况。

Microsoft starts to encounter or potentially could encounter.

看看他们如何应对会很有趣，也就是平台和产品之间的张力。你知道的，他们以前 famously 不愿意在 iPad 上发布 Office，因为……

It'll be interesting to see how they navigate this, the platform versus product tensions where, you know, famously, they didn't wanna release Office for iPad because

正如你非常清楚的那样。

As you know all too well.

因为它会和 Surface 所具备的竞争优势产生冲突。

Because it competed with the competitive advantage that that, Surface had.

或者说，你知道的，在无数其他方面，比如 Office 和 Windows 之间一直存在的紧张关系。

Or, you know, in a in a million other ways, you know, Office and Windows always having tension.

你会遇到这种情况吗？

Do you run into a scenario here?

还是说有一个明确的、你知道的，从属产品和主导产品的关系，就是，不是的。

Or is there a clear, you know, subservient product and leader product where it's, nope.

我们并不专注于通过其他产品的集成来推动 LinkedIn 的增长，这对微软的其他产品来说，是唯一的价值来源。

We're not focused on growing LinkedIn through other people's integrations, and that is a sole, you know, source of value for other products in Microsoft.

我觉得，我猜啊。

I mean, I gotta imagine.

如果微软、萨提亚、库尔特他们还是用老一套微软的做法，我会非常失望的。

I'll be really disappointed in Microsoft and Satya and Kurt and everybody if if they take the the old school Microsoft approach.

我觉得他们不会那么做。

I can't see them doing that.

这话说得有点狠啊。

Shots fired.

但你知道，这就是萨提亚领导微软的关键所在，让这家公司重新变得重要，重新成为创新者。

But I mean, like, you know, this is this is the whole thing about, you know, Satya's leadership at Microsoft is, like, the way that this company becomes relevant again and and and an innovator again.

我是说，有些人可能会说，重新变得重要，对，确实。

I mean, I mean, some might argue relevant again, like Yeah.

科技发展太快了。

Technology moves fast.

就像《春天不是读书天》里说的，如果你不偶尔停下来看看周围，可能就会错过。

It's like Ferris Bueller, you know, you might miss it if you don't stop and look around every once in a while.

移动端。

Mobile.

移动端。

Mobile.

不过说真的，Office 在 iPad 上，就是想随时随地都能用。

But man, like, you know, office on iPad, like, wanna be everywhere where you are.

而且，如果 LinkedIn 想要创造的所有价值——比如把 LinkedIn 带到销售和其他领域——不在 Salesforce 上实现的话，那对他们来说就是个大失败。

And, like, so if if LinkedIn, all the value that they're gonna hopefully go try and create in in, you know, bringing LinkedIn to sales and other verticals isn't on Salesforce too, like, you know, that's a big fail for them.

对。

Yep.

好。

Okay.

结论。

Conclusion.

你有什么看法，Ben？

What do you got, Ben?