红杉资本第二部分（与道格·利昂）

他们将实体文书工作转化为软件工作流，最初是为企业内部的IT部门服务。

They turned physical paperwork into software workflows, initially for the IT department within enterprises.

仅此而已。

That was it.

随着时间的推移，他们在这个平台上不断构建，承担更强大和复杂的任务。

And over time, they built on this platform going to more powerful and complex tasks.

他们从仅服务于IT部门扩展到人力资源、财务、客户服务、现场运营等其他部门。

They were expanding from serving just IT to other departments like HR, finance, customer service, field operations, and more.

在过去二十年的过程中，ServiceNow已经完成了连接企业各个角落并实现自动化所需的所有繁琐基础工作。

And in the process over the last two decades, ServiceNow has laid all the tedious groundwork necessary to connect every corner of the enterprise and enable automation to happen.

所以当人工智能出现时，从定义上来说，AI本质上就是高度复杂的任务自动化。

So when AI arrived, well, AI kinda just by definition is massively sophisticated task automation.

而谁已经构建了平台和企业间的连接组织来实现这种自动化？

And who had already built the platform and the connective tissue with enterprises to enable that automation?

ServiceNow。

ServiceNow.

那么回答这个问题：ServiceNow如今是做什么的？

So to answer the question, what does ServiceNow do today?

他们说连接并赋能每个部门时，是认真的。

We mean it when they say they connect and power every department.

IT和人力资源部门用它来管理全公司的人员、设备和软件许可证。

IT and HR use it to manage people, devices, software licenses across the company.

客户服务部门使用ServiceNow来处理诸如检测支付失败并在内部路由到正确的团队流程来解决问题。

Customer service uses ServiceNow for things like detecting payment failures and routing to the right team process internally to solve it.

供应链组织用它进行产能规划，整合其他部门的数据和计划，确保所有人步调一致。

Or the supply chain org uses it for capacity planning, integrating with data and plans from other departments to ensure that everybody's on the same page.

不再需要在不同应用程序间切换，反复在不同地方输入相同数据。

No more swivel chairing between apps to enter the same data multiple times in different places.

就在最近，ServiceNow推出了AI代理，让任何岗位的员工都能启动AI代理来处理繁琐事务，解放人力专注于大局工作。

And just recently, ServiceNow launched AI agents so that anyone working in any job can spin up an AI agent to handle the tedious stuff, freeing up humans for bigger picture work.

ServiceNow去年入选《财富》全球最受赞赏公司榜单和《快公司》最佳创新者工作场所，正是因为这一愿景。

ServiceNow was named to Fortune's world's most admired companies list last year and Fast Company's best workplace for innovators last year, and it's because of this vision.

如果你想在企业每个角落都利用ServiceNow的规模与速度，请访问servicenow.com/acquired，只需告诉他们本和大卫推荐你来的。

If you wanna take advantage of the scale and speed of ServiceNow in every corner of your business, go to servicenow.com/acquired and just tell them that Ben and David sent you.

感谢ServiceNow。

Thanks, ServiceNow.

于是我们红杉历史的第一部分在1996年结束，唐把你们和迈克尔叫进会议室，将公司交给了你们。

So we ended part one of our Sequoia history with Don in 1996 calling you and Michael into a conference room and passing the firm over to you.

那天对你来说是什么感觉？

What was that day like for you?

我猜这三家公司已经

I assume these three companies had

成为赢家，可以想象那次谈话让道格成为了合伙人。

become winners and could imagine the conversation to wish it made Doug a partner.

我相信那次谈话很轻松。

I'm sure it was an easy one.

一方面我有业绩记录，另一方面，记得那个让人难以忍受的部分。

In one case, I had a track record, in the other case, remember the insufferable part.

谈话肯定绕不开这个问题：如果他成为合伙人会是什么样子？

And the conversation must have gone around, what is he gonna be like if he's a partner?

他会变成怪物吗？

Is he gonna turn into a monster?

这类谈话，显然我没有参与。

Kind of conversation, which I didn't obviously.

实际情况并不像唐交接给迈克·莫里茨和我时那么非黑即白。

It's not as black and white as Don turned it over to Mike Moritz and me.

我其实回去查看了收益分配，不是想看自己分了多少。

I actually went back and looked at carry allocation, not because I wanted to see how much carry I got.

我只是想确认自己的记忆是否准确。

I wanted to see if my memory served me right.

结果发现迈克和我比其他人都更有影响力。

It turned out that Mike and I had more carry than the other folks.

这并不是非黑即白的问题。

It it wasn't the black and white.

这是你的。

It's yours.

你们来自合伙人 我们曾是

You're from associates We were

那些有业绩记录的人。

the ones with the track.

嗯，我被提升为普通合伙人。

Well, I got promoted to GP.

我只拥有十分之一的份额，就像红杉六号的唐·瓦伦丁那样。

I had one tenth of the carrier Don Valentine, the Sequoia six.

基金成立一年后，唐说：'我们应该改变所有份额，让大家平等。'

And a year into the fund, Don said, We ought to change all the carrier, make us all equal.

他明白需要确保年轻人不会表现得像普通员工，尽管他们已经是合伙人。

He understood that he needed to make sure that young people were not going to act like associates, even though they were partners.

于是他拉平了红杉六号的合伙人结构，现在变成了红杉七号。

And so he flattened the partnership in Sequoia six, and now it's Sequoia seven.

更多是迈克和我比较激进，我们有些业绩记录。

It was more Mike and I were the more aggressive ones, the ones that had a bit of a track record.

我记得唐和迈克与我坐在一起，他并没有说'你们是领导者'。

I remember Don sat with Mike and I, and he didn't say, You are the leaders.

他没有正式任命我们，但只和我们两人进行了谈话。

He did not anoint us, but he had a conversation just with two of us.

唐有一张绿色纸，上面列出了投资者要做的事情，并在愿意做的事情旁边打了勾。

And Don had a green sheet of paper with all the things an investor does and check marks next to what he's willing to do.

他像往常一样推过文件说道：你自己决定要不要我留下。

And he pushed the paper as he always would and said, You figure out if you want me around.

这就是我愿意做的事。

And this is what I'm willing to do.

他想要，或者说我们提议让卡莉负责那个基金。

He wanted or we offered Carrie in that fund.

我们让卡莉·唐负责了下一个基金，后来成为了谷歌基金。

We gave Carrie Don the next fund, which turned out to be the Google fund.

我们确实把唐照顾得很好。

We actually took good care of Don.

我们又给了几次分成权，不是GP分成，而是几个基金的分成。

We gave some carry, not GP carry, of a couple more funds.

从未强硬地要求过。

Never aggressively asked for it.

我记得后来我不得不走进唐的办公室，告诉他三个基金之后不再有分成了。

I remember when I had to walk into Don's office and tell him no more carry, three funds later.

他笑了，说：怎么拖到现在才说？

And he chuckled, he said, What took you so long?

但迈克和我算是，这么说吧，资历更深的两个人。

But Mike and I were the two, if you will, more senior.

我们轮流主持合伙人会议，决定由谁记录公司事务，谁担任会议负责人一两年，直到迈克站出来说这样行不通。

We rotated the partners meeting who would write down the company, who was the leader of the partners meeting for a year or two, until Mike stepped up and said, This is not going to work.

他主动提出由他来负责。

He offered to be the one doing it.

我们都同意了，他就接手了。

We all agreed, he did it.

所以后来就形成了迈克是头号人物，我是1A的局面——我不想改写历史。

And so it became that Mike was really one and I was 1A, just to, I don't want to rewrite history.

1A，我们的薪酬结构完全相同。

1A, we had exact comp.

可以说，迈克是CEO。

Mike was a CEO, if you will.

我是CEO，我们是合伙关系。

I was a CEO, we're a partnership.

这就是我们运营红杉资本的方式，直到2012年迈克因健康原因卸任。

And that's how we ran Sequoia until 2012, when Mike stepped down for health reasons.

道格，澄清一下，当你说红杉六号、红杉七号时，能否

And Doug, as a point of clarification, when you say Sequoia six, Sequoia seven, can

请你稍微解释一下？它们是...抱歉，它们是指连续发行的基金。

you explain a little bit They're, more about sorry, they're the funds, the successive funds.

红杉Sig是第六号基金。

Sequoia Sig was a six Fund.

明白了。

I see.

我成为普通合伙人时，是与唐最后一次真正的全职合伙关系。

Where I became a general partner was the last really true partnership with Don was full time.

红杉七号基金时期。

Sequoia is seven.

唐是普通合伙人。

Don was a general partner.

参与较少，合伙事务由其他五六位合伙人管理。

Had less, and the partnership was run by five or six other partners.

后来由迈克尔·莫里茨主导，我成为1A角色。

And then Mike Muritz took the lead and I became 1A.

给我们说说现在早期基金编号到多少了？

And give us a sense of what early stage fund number are we on now?

我们在17号。

We are in 17.

明白。

Got it.

好的。

Okay.

所以当这一切发生时，转向红杉七号基金，整个世界都在改变，对吧？

So right when this happens, transition to Sequoia Fund VII, the whole world is changing, right?

因为红杉最初和唐都来自半导体行业，然后是PC软件浪潮，但现在互联网来了。

Because Sequoia originally and Don came from the semiconductor industry and then there was the PC software wave, but now the internet is here.

是啊，不过还没完全到来。

Yeah, well, not yet.

其实有几个部分。

There's actually a few parts.

首先，红杉五号基金只有6700万美元，因为我们确实缺乏筹集更多资金的能力。

And part was, first of all, Sequoia five was 67,000,000 because of truly lack of ability to raise more money.

我们为成长基金筹集了1.65亿美元，却不知道该怎么用。

We had raised the growth fund for 165,000,000 that we didn't know what to do with.

实际上，我们用成长基金进行了投资，该基金的平均支票金额是200万美元，最终实现了4.5倍的净回报，表现非常出色，因为我们像风投基金那样投资。

In fact, we invested the growth fund and the average check size in that fund was $2,000,000 That turned out to be a 4.5 x net funds, which is a terrific performance because we invested like a venture fund.

当我们筹集红杉六号基金（后来成为雅虎基金）时，五号基金的回报还不明显。

When we raised Sequoia six, which turned out to be the Yahoo fund, the returns from five were not yet visible.

当我和迈克去筹集红杉七号基金时，有限合伙人说：'你们到底是谁？'

When Mike and I went out fundraising Sequoia seven, the limited partner said, Who the heck are you guys?

我们失去了一些大客户。

And we lost some big clients.

我们失去了一些大客户。

And we lost some big clients.

哇。

Wow.

结果红杉五号基金成了一支非常出色的基金。

And Sequoia five turned out to be a fabulous fund.

红杉六号基金，一支不可思议的基金。

Sequoia six, an incredible fun.

红杉七号基金是支非凡的基金。

Sequoia seven is spectacular fun.

红杉八号基金，谷歌基金，一支惊人的基金。

Sequoia eight, the Google fun, an amazing fun.

所以迈克、我以及其他合伙人获得了惊人的起步。

So Mike and I and the other partners got an incredible start.

然后1999年、2000年发生了。

And then nineteen ninety nine, two thousand happened.

我们当时根本不知道'回拨条款'这个词的含义。

We did not know the meaning of the word clawback.

为听众解释一下，'回拨条款'是指当基金表现极差时，你需要向有限合伙人退还大量资金。

For you listeners, what clawback means is when your funds are doing so poorly, then now you owe a lot of money back to your limited partners.

2000年我们在红杉开了作战室会议，当时我们欠的钱超过了我们的净资产。

And we had war room meetings here at Sequoia in 2000 where we owed more than our net worth.

我们该如何摆脱这种困境？

And how do we get ourselves out of that?

这是否涉及你们已经作为报酬收取的费用？

And is that of the fees that you've already taken as compensation?

包括管理费和附带权益，可能我们早期有盈利就提取了分成，但基金其他部分表现糟糕，我们不仅需要退还...

It's fees and carry, maybe we had an early win and we took carry and the rest of the fund is a turkey and we owe not only

因为你早期盈利时会默认整支基金都能获得分成，但如果...

Because you assume when you have early wins, you assume that the fund is gonna be in the carry, but if it's

不要让事情变得更困难。

And not let make things more difficult.

在那次早期胜利中，你获得了持有的股份，结果它们归零了。

In that early win, you're given shares that you hold and they go to zero.

所以你连那些都没有了。

So you don't even have that.

没错。

Right.

因为你账户里持有这些股票——毕竟那是1999年，那些都不是真正的公司，它们的股票会归零。

So you hold the shares in your account because it's 1999, those are not real companies, their shares go zero.

所以我们进行了热烈的讨论，需要做出一个选择。

So we had warm conversations and we had a choice to make.

要做的选择借用高尔夫术语来说（虽然我不打高尔夫）就是‘重打一杆’。

And the choice to make is to borrow a line from golf, and I don't play golf called Mulligan.

风投行业大多把那个时期的基金称为‘重打基金’。

Most of the venture industry considers the funds of that period called the Mulligan funds.

是的。

Yeah.

它们很糟糕。

They're crappy.

它们亏钱了，但你知道吗？

They lost money, but you know what?

这是重新来过的机会。

It's a do over.

我们采取了相反的做法。

We took the opposite approach.

在红杉资本，绝不会让任何人亏钱。

No one was going to lose money at Sequoia Capital.

所以我们拿到的资金是0.3倍，意思是如果原本是1亿美元，那笔资金就值3000万，或者像那个案例里，3亿或5亿的资金就值其中的30%。

So we took funds that were point three X, meaning if it was a $100,000,000, that fund was worth 30 or in that case it was 300 or 500 is worth 30% of that.

而我们通过放弃收费、不再收取费用并重新投资资金，将这些资金提升到了接近2倍。

And we brought them up to close to two X just by giving up fees, not collecting them and reinvesting money.

每次我们有一场游戏，我们都会重新投资。

Every time we had a game, we reinvested it.

我们重新投资是因为我们想保持永不亏损的骄傲。

We reinvested it because we wanted to have the pride of never losing money.

这对文化形成时期至关重要。

And so those formative time for the culture.

对你们来说本可以轻而易举。

And it would have been so easy for you guys.

大多数其他风投公司确实说过，'Mugen，我们这次要承担损失了'。

And most other venture firms did say, Mugen, we're gonna take the loss on this.

我们会成立一个新基金来收取管理费。

We'll start a new fund that we get fees on.

你说对了。

You got it.

是啊。

Yeah.

嗯，想想看。

Well, think about it.

红杉四号是思科基金，唐·瓦伦丁的。

Sequoia four is the Cisco fund, Don Valentine's.

红杉五号，年轻团队和老团队都有，是个很棒的基金。

Sequoia five, younger team, older team, terrific fund.

红杉六号，雅虎！

Sequoia six, Yahoo!

还有包括英伟达在内的许多其他公司。

And many others, Nvidia and many other.

红杉七期，投资了许多企业。

Sequoia seven, many companies.

红杉八期，谷歌。

Sequoia eight, Google.

对我们来说本可以轻而易举地接受援助，但我们选择拒绝。

It would have been so easy for us And to call we just refused to.

我们就是拒绝了。

We just refused to.

道格，这让我想起2008年福特拒绝接受联邦政府救助的故事，他们当时也说'是的，我们本可以轻松接受'。

Doug, it reminds me a lot of the 2008 story where Ford refused to take the federal government bailout and say, Yeah, yeah, would be easy for us to do this.

但从声誉角度，这对我们和未来几十年的所有客户都至关重要——我们绝不能这样做。

But reputationally, it's important to us and all of our customers or your clients for the decades to come that we don't do this.

完全正确。

Absolutely.

我告诉客户们，这些时刻不会成为红杉资本故事的第一章，但一定会有一章专门记载。

And while I tell clients, those times won't be chapter one in the Sequoia book, there'll be a chapter.

应该用整整一章来记录这段历史。

There should be a big chapter that's devoted.

这可能是红杉资本最引以为豪的时刻。

It is maybe our proudest moment at Sequoia Capital.

不是我们那些获得近20倍回报的基金。

It is not when we've had We have had funds close to 20x.

不是那些20倍回报的基金。

It is not those 20x fund.

最骄傲的时刻是我们决定'红杉资本绝不让任何人亏损'并付诸行动的时候。

The most proud time is when we decided no one's going to lose money at Sequoia Capital and we're going to go to work.

我们为此努力了十年

And we went to work for ten years to make

确实如此。

sure Yeah.

这些资金正在运作，另一方面，你知道，很少有听众认为这只是关于费用重新分配之类的事情。

Those funds are doing this The other aspect, you know, less listeners think this is just about reallocating fees or whatnot.

关键在于你与那些公司有大量工作要做，因为你仍持有那些投资。

It's that you had a lot of work to do with those companies because you still had those investments.

本可以轻松地说，这些都是零价值资产，我们就随便处理掉算了。

It would have been easy to say, yeah, these are zeros, we're just gonna, you know, do whatever.

但你却卷起袖子说，不，我们至少要将其转化为能返还资本的项目。

But you roll up your sleeves and say, no, we're gonna turn these into returning capital at a minimum.

迈克·莫里茨是英国人，行事缜密，言简意赅，能提前谋划十四步。

So Mike Moritz is a Brit, strategic, meant a few words, thinks 14 step ahead.

我是个热情奔放的意大利人。

I'm a gregarious Italian.

实话告诉你，这并不总是容易的。

And I'll tell you, it hasn't always been easy.

迈克也会这么说。

Mike would say the same thing.

但我们成功合作了二十年。

But we made it work for twenty years.

告诉你，在那段时期，我们的想法完全一致。

And I'll tell you, during those times, we thought exactly alike.

就算用香烟烫我们的手臂，我们也不会退缩。

You can burn us cigarettes in our arm and we're not going to flinch.

我们一定要让这些资金安全回笼。

We're going to bring these funds home.

令人惊叹的是，两只背景迥异、风格不同的猫能如此融洽相处，虽然也会激烈争论——正如你所想的那样，这简直太棒了，因为这意味着我们对问题持有两种不同视角。

And it was amazing how two different cats, with two different backgrounds, with two different styles, who got along a lot and really argued some, as you would imagine, which is terrific because that means we pour two different views on issues.

没错。

Right.

这是一种优势。

That is a strength.

在那些时刻，我们根本不需要讨论该做什么。

During those times, there was no question what we're gonna do.

是的。

Yeah.

我认为我们甚至从未进行过这样的对话。

I don't think we ever had the conversation.

我们连'该做这个吗？'这样的话都没说过。

I don't think we even said, should we do this?

我只是觉得我们必须这么做。

I just think we had to.

是啊。

Yeah.

能与另一个人达成如此默契的步调，是件特别的事。

That's a special thing to be able to to get in that lockstep with another person.

你是否觉得这种难得的际遇，一个人一生只会遇到一两次？

Do you feel like that sort of that rare thing that happens once or twice in a person's life?

你认为红杉资本的成功在多大程度上归功于你们二人这种默契配合？

And how do you attribute Sequoia's success to you two being in lockstep like that?

关于那个问题吗？

On that issue?

对。

Yeah.

看，这在运动队里很常见。

Look, it happens in sports teams.

人们在参战时也会经历这种情况。

It happens when people go to war.

他们再也感受不到那种情感，为什么人们还不断前往阿富汗？

They never again feel, why do people keep on going to Afghanistan?

他们这么做的原因是怀念那种战友情谊。

The reason they do that, they miss that sense of camaraderie.

我不知道你是否研究过这类情况。

I don't know if you study situations like that.

那是战争时期。

That was wartime.

别搞错了。

Make no mistake.

我们当时并不是...那不是我们的生活。

My we weren't it wasn't our lives.

我...我丝毫没有...

I I don't for a second.

我热爱并尊重那些为国效力的人们。

I love and respect the people that serve our country.

他们做的事比我和迈克所做的要重要得多，勇敢得多。

The things they do are far more important, far more courageous than what Mike and I did.

我想把这点说得明明白白。

I wanna make that crystal clear.

我们应该感激他们。

We should be grateful to them.

但那是一种相似的战友情谊。

But it was a similar sense of camaraderie.

那是你们的商业生涯。

It was your business lives.

不，与商业生涯毫无关系。

No, nothing to do with business lives.

而是我们体内每个细胞都无法做到的事。

It was the fact each one of our cells in our body could not do that.

无关紧要，我们要挽救事业和金钱，这些都不重要。

Nothing to do, we got to save our career, our money, none of that.

关键在于做个狠角色，做别人不敢做的事。

It had to do with being a bad ass and doing what nobody else would do.

这才是关键所在。

That's what it has to do with.

在对自己不便时仍坚持做正确的事。

Do the right thing when it's inconvenient to you.

是啊。

Yeah.

没错，正因为如此，当时那么多其他公司都选择了放弃，结果又重蹈覆辙。

Yeah, that's because it yeah, it would have been so many other firms did throw in the towel, get them all again.

他们的商业生涯都安然无恙。

Their business lives were fine.

我们讨论的是谷歌创立前后的那个时期，以及你的合伙人迈克尔。

We're talking about this era right around Google's founding, and we're talking about your partner Michael.

我记得你曾引用过一句话，大意是迈克尔在投资谷歌几个月后对你说：'我们从未花这么多钱买这么少的东西'。

There's a quote that I've heard you mention in the past where I it's something along the lines of Michael telling you a few months after making the Google investment, we've never paid so much for so little.

我认为这句话是约翰·杜尔告诉麦克·莫里茨的。

I think that quote is what John Doerr told Mike Moritz.

我们很长时间都不知道谷歌是做什么的。

We didn't know what Google did for a long time.

我们知道我们有聪明的创始人。

We knew we had smart founders.

我们知道我们瞄准的是互联网，也明白必须保持耐心。

We knew we were aimed at the internet and we just knew we had to be patient.

有时病人就在你手中。

Sometime patients sit in your hands.

你知道，我在Meraki有过类似但规模较小的经历。

You know, I had a similar, but a smaller story in Meraki.

聪明的创始人们当时也找不到方向。

Smart founders couldn't figure out which way to go.

如果你问他们，红杉资本做得最多的是什么？

And if you talk to them, what did, what did Sequoia do most?

他们放手让我们自己摸索。

They left us alone and let us figure it out.

我们在节目中听到很多与你们合作的创始人都说，最大的差异化因素就是让你们——要知道我们才是掌舵人。

We hear that from so many founders on this show that have partnered with you guys, that that's one of the biggest differentiating factors is let us, you know, we're in the driver's seat.

让我们自己

Let us figure

摸索。

it out.

如果是创造阶段，就该让创始人们去创造。

If it's creation time, the founders create.

当然也可能遇到执行不力的时候，这时你们就需要提供帮助。

Now there could be execution time where they don't execute as well, in which case you help them.

但我常告诉创始人们，你们应该去实现产品市场匹配。

But in a the thing I tell founders, you get to do product market, you should do product market fit.

这方面我们可以提供帮助。

We can help you there.

如果产品已契合市场需求，我们能协助解决其他所有问题。

If you got product market fit, we can help you with everything else.

因此当创始人在早期摸索前行，专注于未来可能见效的方向时，就放手让他们去创造。

And so when founders are meandering their way early on and focusing on something that's going to work later on, you just let them create.

他们才是创造者。

They're the creators.

好的，听众朋友们。

Alright, listeners.

此刻我们要特别感谢节目的老朋友Vanta——领先的主动信任平台，帮助您自动化合规管理并控制风险。

This is a great time to thank our longtime friend of the show, Vanta, the leading agentic trust platform that helps you automate compliance and manage risk.

大卫和我刚与克里斯蒂娜及Vanta团队交流过最新进展。

David, I, caught up with Christina and the Vanta team to get the latest.

哦，不错。

Oh, nice.

听众们可能知道Vanta最初专注于合规自动化领域。

So listeners probably know Vanta started by focusing on compliance automation.

就是帮助企业获得SOC2、ISO27001、GDPR和HIPAA等认证。

So helping companies to get their SOC two, ISO twenty seven zero zero one, GDPR, and HIPAA.

其核心洞见是建立能持续监控所有合规与风险的系统，而非仅为年度审计服务，让您能时刻对安全状况保持信心。

The big insight was to build a system that could monitor all of your compliance and risk continuously, not just once a year for your audit, so you could feel confident in your security posture all the time.

但现在他们意识到，真正的业务本质是让您更容易赢得客户信任。

But now they have realized that the business that they're really in is making it easier for you to earn the trust of your customers.

没错。

Yep.

有道理。

Makes sense.

当企业开始扩张时，会面临更多合规安全要求和工具，局面可能变得非常混乱。

So when you start scaling, you end up with more compliance and security requirements and more tools which can get very chaotic.

Vanta已成为随需应变的AI驱动安全专家，随企业规模同步扩展。

Vanta has become the always on AI powered security expert that scales with you.

正如Vanta所言，他们是你永远无需招聘的最佳安全人才。

And as Vanta puts it, they are the best security hire you'll never have to make.

当然，全球增长最快的公司如Cursor、Snowflake、Replit、Linear和Ramp都使用Vanta确保其安全方案始终领先一步，真正成为业务增长的驱动力。

And, of course, the fastest growing companies in the world like Cursor, Snowflake, Replit, Linear, and Ramp all use Vanta to make sure that their security programs are always a step ahead and function as a real driver of growth for the business.

完全合理。

Makes total sense.

挺有意思的。

It's funny.

大约五年前我们刚开始与Vanta合作时，我记得没错的话。

When we first started working with Vanta almost five years ago, I think it was Yep.

我们当时想，这又是一个优秀的生态产品，能让你专注于产品差异化，把其他环节外包出去。

We thought, oh, this is one of those great acquired universe products that lets you focus only on what differentiates your product and outsource the things that don't.

但过去几年他们的产品进步神速，已经不止于此。

But over the last couple years, their product has advanced so much that it's not just does that for you.

现在实际上是Vanta做得更好。

It's now actually Vanta does that better.

没有实时监控系统，你根本无法让供应商和客户建立这种级别的信心与信任。

Without a real time monitoring system, there's just no way that you could give your vendors and customers this level of confidence and trust.

没错。

Yep.

如果贵公司准备重新专注提升啤酒口感，把合规安全审查交给Vanta的AI自动化系统，欢迎加入他们全球12,000家客户的行列。

So if your company is ready to go back to making your beer taste better and leave the compliance and security reviews to Vanta's AI powered automation, join their now 12,000 customers around the globe.

只需访问vanta.com/acquired并告知是Ben和David推荐，即可获得1000美元赠金。

You can just head on over to vanta.com/acquired and tell them that Ben and David sent you, and you'll earn a thousand dollars of free credit.

网址是vanta.com/acquired。

That's vanta.com/acquired.

我想确保我们能深入探讨你和迈克尔在红杉任职期间共同创建的成果——我记得唐过去常说，红杉投资的企业都是‘骑自行车就能到达总部’的距离。

I wanna make sure we dive deep into what you and presumably you and Michael created here at Sequoia in your time and stewardship here, which is, you know, Sequoia was, I think the phrase, that Don at least used to use was you invested in companies that were a bicycle ride away from, headquarters here.

关于不仅在地域上扩张，还在投资产品种类上扩展的决定，这一举措是如何发生的？

The decision to expand, not just geographically, but also product wise in terms of investment products you offer, how that initiative happen?

首先，我不喜欢‘你和迈克尔’这种说法。

So the first thing, I don't like the notion of you and Michael.

我们都是站在彼此的肩膀上前行。

It is we're all standing on each other's shoulders.

迈克尔站在唐的肩膀上。

Michael stood on Don's shoulders.

我站在迈克的肩膀上，而吉姆又站在我和鲁洛夫的肩膀上。

I'm standing on Mike's shoulders and Jim gets his shoulder and Rulof's shoulders.

所以这其实是‘我们’。

So it is really we.

这确实是集体的努力。

It is really a we effort.

另外，当感到困惑时，我只会依据一条曲线来做决策。

And the other thing, when confused, there's only one curve I look at for the decisions I have to make.

那就是加速变革的指数曲线。

It's the exponential curve of accelerated change.

它不是线性的。

It's not linear.

随时间推移而增长——如果你相信这点，就会明白无所作为才是最糟糕的选择。

It increases through time, which means if you believe in that, which means that doing nothing is the worst thing you can do.

那才是你能冒的最大风险。

It's the riskiest thing you can do.

我们还知道，在曲线初期人们会过度预测，因为思维还停留在线性模式；而当曲线变得陡峭时，又会低估。我虽不算聪明，但明白这些简单原则。

And then we also know that in the early days of the curve, you over forecast because you're a linear thinker in the later days of the curve, when the curve So is steep, you under I'm not that smart a person, but I know these simple principles.

我知道行动、做事、抓住机会，然后我们会详细讨论这意味着什么。

I know that doing, do stuff, take the shot and we'll talk more about what that means.

但让我们把时间倒回2003、2004年，那时迈克和我都是移民。

But turn the clock back to 2003, 2004, Mike and I are both immigrants.

这里还有其他移民。

There's other immigrants here.

我们关注的创始人越来越多是移民。

Founders we look at are immigrants, more and more founders.

于是我开始思考：如果世界全球化，他们会回到自己的国家，那会发生什么？

And so I started wondering what happens if the world becomes globalized, they're going to go home.

我想起NEA办公室里贴着印度公司的海报，那些美印双籍的创始人来到这里，而我们却没有那些海报。

And I thought of NEA's offices with posters from India companies in India and The US India founder coming here and we don't have those posters.

我当时想：天啊，这是防御战。

I thought, Oh my God, defense.

但仅凭防御就足以促使你采取行动。

But defense alone should make you do things.

然后你想到那个更加全球化的世界，世界是平的，诸如此类的说法。

And then you think of the world that's more globalized, the world is flat, blah, blah, blah.

于是我想或许我们应该去那里。

And I thought maybe we should go there.

我了解到其他公司正在进行飞越计划，去那里不停地飞行考察。

I learned that other firms were doing flyover, going there and flying and flying and making Yeah.

或者进行双品牌投资。

Or making investment dual brand.

所以，我灵光一现：如果我们要做些什么，哪些是规模大且增长快的经济体？

And so, few brain cells said, if we're going to do something, where are the large and growing economies?

这让我们想到了印度——抱歉，是中国和印度。

That brought us to India, sorry, China and India.

正如我所说，它没有带我们去越南，虽然那里在增长，但规模太小。

It didn't, as I say, didn't bring us to Vietnam because it grows, but it's small.

它没有带我们去欧洲，因为那里虽然规模大，但增长停滞。

It didn't bring us to Europe because it's big, but not growing.

所以这就是两个地理区域的情况。

So those were the two geos.

于是我们开始频繁出差，尝试接触团队，想办法打入这些市场。

So we started making trips and trying to meet teams, trying to figure out how to get there.

是投资团队还是创始团队？

Investing teams or founding teams?

投资。

Investing.

组建投资团队。

Founding investing team.

我始终记得一部老情景喜剧里的某句台词。

And I'm very mindful of a line from an old sitcom, from a a scene.

那部剧叫《霍根英雄》。

The the sitcom is Hogan's Heroes.

哦，对。

Oh, yeah.

你知道《霍根英雄》吗？

You know Hogan's Heroes?

知道。

Yeah.

克林克上校是战俘营的指挥官。

So colonel Klink is the commander of a POW camp.

你知道的，他在剧里显然是个蠢货。

And, you know, he's a putz obviously in the show.

霍根上校是个非常聪明的美国人。

And colonel Hogan is the American who's very smart.

霍根和克林克有一个保险箱。

And Hogan and Klink have a safe.

如果你朝一个方向转动手柄，就能打开保险箱拿到钱。

And if you turn the handle one way, you open a safe and there's money.

如果朝另一个方向转动，它就会爆炸。

If you turn the handle the other way, it blows.

会炸毁。

It blows up.

霍根看着克林克说：克林克，该往哪边转？

And Hogan looks at Klink and says, Klink, which way?

克林克选了左边，霍根往右一拉，保险箱就开了。

And Klink goes left and Hogan pulls it right and it opens.

克林克问：你怎么知道的？

And Klink goes, how did you know?

霍根说：我不确定自己能不能转对，但我确定你肯定会转错。

And Hogan says, I wasn't sure whether I'd get it right, but I was sure that you would get it wrong.

信不信由你，正是这个场景让我确信：如果我和迈克·莫里茨在中国投资，我们肯定会搞砸。

And believe it or not, that scene is the scene that caused me to say, I know for sure Mike Moritz and I, if we make investments in China, we'll get it wrong.

没错。

Yeah.

是的。

Yeah.

我们不确定找到的团队能否成功，但认为这是风险最小的选择。

We didn't know if the team we found would get it right, but we thought that was the least riskiest thing to do.

所以我们开始物色团队。

And so we're shopping for teams.

嗯

Mhmm.

我们觉得这事挺有意思的

And we came across it's funny.

我去了中国20次，后来团队被引荐给了我们——引荐人是Billpoint的创始人，这个平台是PayPal的前身，后来卖给了eBay

I made 20 trips to China and then the team were introduced, what was introduced to us by a founder of Billpoint, which was a predecessor to PayPal, sold to eBay.

她给我们介绍了两位中国籍人士，他们在中国长大，曾在美国求学——这正是我们想要的——后来回到中国，还曾在同一家公司（分众传媒）担任董事

She introduced us to two Chinese nationals that have, grew up in China, had gone to school here, which is exactly what we wanna have, moved back to China, had served on the on the board of the same company, Focus Media.

其中一位是DFJ的投资人

One was an investor at DFJ.

另一位是公司创始人，携程网的联合创始人

One was a founder, a co founder of a company called Ctrip.

对

Yep.

没错

Yep.

我们在周二见了他

We met him on a Tuesday.

周四又见了一次

We met up again on a Thursday.

到了周五早上，在红杉资本的一个会议室里，我们握手达成了协议

And on a Friday morning in a conference in a Sequoia, we did a handshake deal.

没有合同，什么都没有

No contract, no anything.

他们原本下午要去另一家风险投资公司

They were going to another venture firm in the afternoon.

他们取消了那个会议

They canceled that meeting.

到了周一早上，迈克·莫里茨（愿上帝保佑他）准备了一份PPM（私募备忘录）给红杉中国一期基金，并带着取悦合作伙伴的初衷交给了他们。

By Monday morning, Mike Moritz, God bless him, had a PPM, private placement for Sequoia China one and gave it to them with a notion that you want to delight your partners.

当人们完成一笔交易后，事后总会发现它不如想象中那么好。

When people do a deal, after the deal's done, you always find out it wasn't as good as you thought.

我们偏爱反其道而行。

We love doing the opposite.

我们不想让人感到震惊。

We don't want people to be blown away.

天啊。

Holy cow.

红杉文化。

Sequoia culture.

当然，第二位到场的是沈南鹏。

And Of course, the second person there Neil Shen.

正是沈南鹏。

It was Neil Shen.

当时有两位创始人。

There were two founders.

其中一位就是沈南鹏。

One of them was Neil Shen.

于是我们开始了募资。

And so we went fundraising.

我们连正式合同都没签，就募集到了1.6亿美元的基金。

We'd still didn't have a signed contract and we raised $160,000,000 fund.

我们遭到了有限合伙人的嘲笑。

We were ridiculed by limited partners.

我们在北京一家新开的酒店召开年会，结果暖气坏了。

We held the annual meeting in Beijing in a brand new hotel where the heat broke.

大家都冻僵了。

Everybody's freezing.

我们受到了一点虐待。

We were slightly abused.

结果证明这是一场精彩纷呈的欢乐，剩下的就是历史了。

That has turned out to be a spectacular fun and the rest is history.

是啊。

Yeah.

红杉中国投资了哪些公司？

What are some of the companies that Sequoia China has invested in?

拼多多、阿里巴巴、美团、Bike Dance。

Pinduoduo, Alibaba, Meituan, Bike Dance.

Bike Dance。

Bike Dance.

对。

Yeah.

等等等等。

Dot, dot, dot.

我们已经有大约五六十家公司上市了。

We've had somewhere near fifty, sixty IPOs.

所以我当时在一页纸上有了这个想法，但如果我告诉你，会给你留下错误的印象。

And so I had the idea on a one page sheet, but if I tell you that that would leave you with a wrong impression.

在我们需要的关键时刻，这有点好笑——当我们需要运营动作时，是迈克洞察到我们需要采取这些行动。

At critical times where we needed, this is kind of funny when we needed operational's move, it was Mike that had the insight that we needed to make those move.

是迈克采取了行动。

It was Mike that made the move.

所以我...我从没告诉过迈克这件事。

So I I've never told Mike this.

我对...先生无比感激

I was incredibly grateful that Mr.

直觉如我所料，他在关键时刻发挥作用，说实话甚至比我做得更好

Intuitive, as I had him slotted in my brain, became operational at key times, even better than I was, if truth be told.

所以那不是我

And so it wasn't me.

也不是迈克

It wasn't Mike.

还包括科伊，因为当我们做这些时，美国有其他人承担着重任

It was also Coy because as we're doing this, other people were carrying the load in America.

明白吗？

Know?

我们身处其中，所以这是团队协作，真正意义上的团队努力

We were in the and so it was a team it it was truly a team effort.

所以当你们和迈克在倡导时，喊着

So while you were and you and Mike were sort of championing, hey.

嘿

Hey.

我们应该这样做，因为我们认为世界其他地区将达到这个转折点，至少这些地区会

We should be doing this because we think that the rest of the world's gonna hit this inflection point or at least these areas.

你们有没有这种——这算是较新的贝索斯式理念——对那些留守的人是否存在这种'不同意但执行'的心态？

Did you have this this is sort of a Bezosism that's more recent, but was there this sort of disagree and commit mentality for anybody who was here that knew that they had to hold down the fort?

即使他们没有像你们那样强烈主张，当时情况如何？

Even if they weren't pounding the table like you were, how did that go?

听着

Look.

多年来，部队里一直存在冷枪暗箭

For many years, there was sniping in the troops.

我们为什么要这么做？

Why are we doing this?

我们为什么要浪费时间？

Why are we wasting time?

因为要记住，这与金钱无关。

Because keep in mind that this is not about money.

没有人能因此赚更多钱，因为我们投入的金额相同。

No one's making any more money because we all contribute the same amount.

中国有贡献。

China contributes.

我们有贡献。

We contribute.

你知道，这并不是

You know, it is not

我们讨论的是2000年代中期，腾讯和阿里巴巴已经存在，但当时还不清楚它们会发展到今天中国的规模。

We're talking about the mid 2 thousands when, you know, Tencent and Alibaba exist, but like it's not clear that they're gonna be that China's gonna be what it is.

关键在于打造一个世界级的全球巨头，同时又能保持本土化运作，因为我们业务的根基是种子项目。

It's about building a dominant world class global powerhouse that at the same time can act very local because the foundation of our business is seeds.

如果失去种子和风投业务，就会变成我说的那种私募股权公司，因为后期只能靠价格竞争。

If you lose seed and venture, you become, as I say, private equity firm, because later on, all you have to compete is on price.

那么如何在全球化的同时，丝毫不削弱本土优势？

And so how do you at the same time go global while not losing an inch on the local side?

而一些最优质的种子项目正是在那个时期诞生的。

And some of the best seeds were made during those days.

于是我们设法实现了这个目标——嗯，其实最初是我负责全球化事务。

And so we somehow managed to pull that off Well, by thing, I initially became the global person.

其他人都不必操心这个。

Nobody else had to do that.

在某个时间点，我和迈克角色互换，他成了国际先生。

Somewhere along the line, Mike and I reverse roles where he was Mr.

国际。

International.

我更多时间待在美国。

I spent more time in The US.

2012年迈克因健康原因卸任时，我们考虑过是否该由我们三人共同管理，最终决定由我主理，但需要设立副手。

And in 2012, when Mike stepped down due to health reasons, we thought about should three of us run it, you know, and we made the decision that I should run it, but we should have second in command.

最合理的人选是来自美国的吉姆，当时还有沈南鹏。

And the logical one was someone from The U S Jim gets at that time and Neil Shen.

是的。

Yeah.

这构成了一个不可思议的故事。

That's makes the incredible story.

感谢分享这些经历。

Thank you for sharing all this.

在你们进行地域扩张的同时，也在每个地区扩充基金组合对吧？

At the same time that you're expanding geographically, you're also expanding the suite of funds in each geography, right?

比如增加了成长基金，最终还设立了全球成长基金。

In terms of adding the growth funds, then ultimately the global growth fund.

你们是如何考虑这个决策的？为何选择分设基金而非合并为一个？

How did you how did you think about that decision and doing that as separate funds versus one fund together?

显然，随着企业私有化周期延长等变化，公司需求也在演变。

And obviously, the company needs were evolving with stay private longer and everything.

所以最重要的是，正如

So the most important thing, as

我所说，要成为第一个出资10万美元支持创业者的人。

I said, is to be the first $100,000 to help that founder.

因此无论我们做什么，我们都明白这是公司的战略部分。

So whatever we did, we understood that is the strategic part of the house.

我们一直做种子轮投资，但考虑到思维清晰度和市场营销，我们认为应该设立C基金，因为我们开始有很多种子项目，比如侦察基金和其他许多我们不太公开讨论的项目。

We've always done seeds, but we thought both for clarity of thought, marketing, should do a C Fund because we're starting to have a lot of seed programs such as a scout fund and a whole bunch of others we don't really talk about.

然后世界继续变化。

Then the world continued to change.

虽然创业成本从未如此低廉——顺便说一句，我认为世界因网景公司而改变，至少发生了重大变革——这意味着我们从深度技术投资者（仅投资网景时代前的技术）转变为跨多个市场领域的应用层投资者，旅游、购物、iPhone和互联网都是原因之一。

And while it's never been cheaper to start a company, and by the way, I think the world changed with Netscape, at least it had a major change, which meant that we went from being deep technology investors where we really only invested in technology pre Netscape to being application layer investing across many market segments, travel, shopping, iPhone, internet being part of the reasons.

所以我认为这种转变已经开始发生。

So I think started to happen.

现在创业的成本从未如此低廉。

It's never been cheaper to start a company.

当你从事深度技术投资时做种子投资，其实并不需要种子轮。

I seed investing when you're doing deep tech investing, there's no need for seeds.

它只能帮你做出一点点产品雏形。

It takes you to your little bit of product.

Airbnb的种子轮是60万美元。

Airbnb seed was 600,000.

我记得Dropbox的种子轮是120万美元。

I think the Dropbox was 1,200,000.0.

但这是因为现在一个月就能开发出应用程序，不过与此同时，创业启动成本也从未如此高昂。

But that's because an app can be built in a month at the same time, though, it's never been more expensive to launch a company.

这就是为什么有些商业模式包含着你提到的经济因素，O2O线上线下结合、优步、DoorDash、Instacart等等。

Why you've got businesses that have the words you in that economics, O2O online to offline, Uber, DoorDash, Instacart, and so on.

如果你没有这些业务，把时钟拨回二十年前，我们通常在B2B领域启动美国市场就能实现盈利。

And then if you don't have those businesses, turn the clock back twenty years ago, we used to launch The U S let's say in B2B, we used to be profitable.

五年后，我们才会进军欧洲市场。

Five years later, we used to go to Europe.

你再也不能这样做了，因为你等待。

You can't do that anymore because you wait.

但你不能那样做。

But you can't do that.

六个月后你在美国推出，接着进军欧洲，因为如果等待，等你到达欧洲时，就会有20个竞争对手。

You launch The U S six months later, you launch Europe because if you wait, by the time you get to Europe, there'll be 20 competitors.

其中一半想来美国，所以你必须快速行动，这意味着要花很多钱，融资轮次会越来越大。

Half of which want to come to The U S so you've got to run fast, which means you have to spend a lot of money, which means it's bigger and bigger rounds.

所以当我们意识到公司需要更多资金时，我们参与了种子轮和风险轮。

So we were at Seed and Venture when we understood the companies needed more money.

记住，我们是提着行李箱的人。

And keep in mind, are the folks carrying the suitcases.

我们从第一天起就在那里，提着行李。

We're there from day one, we're carrying the luggage.

我们心想，是的，我们需要合作伙伴，但为什么要让别人进来对我们公司提条件？

And we thought to ourselves, yes, we want partners, but why are we letting other people come in and take terms to our companies?

我们当时脆弱且弱小。

We were vulnerable and weak.

于是我们更深入地涉足增长业务。

So we got deeper into the growth business.

我们进行了垂直整合。

We vertically integrated.

后来当融资轮变得更大，而我们今天拥有约五六百家公司的惊人投资组合时，我们启动了全球增长计划。

And then when rounds became even larger and we have this incredible portfolio today of maybe five, six, 700 companies, we launched a global growth.

全球增长是一个全球性工具，用于对红杉投资组合中最好的公司进行双倍和三倍加注。

The global growth is a global vehicle to double and triple down in the best company in the Sequoia portfolio.

是的，我们与其他机构合作等等，但我们能享受全程收益。

And yes, we partner with other firms and so on, but we're able to enjoy the full ride.

我认为那些更像是战术性产品，而C则更具战略性。

I view those as being more tactical product versus C being more strategic.

那是最重要的一个。

That's the most important one.

此外我们还设立了对冲基金，因为我们意识到，从零营收到1亿美元，或从零市值到50亿的难度，远比从5亿到25亿要大得多。

And then we also had a hedge fund because we realize that it's way tougher to go from 0 to 100,000,000 in revenues from from 0 to 5,000,000,000 in market cap than from 5 to 25.

关于这点，我们在红杉历史的第一部分已经讨论过很多。

And so we talked about this a lot in part one of, of this our Sequoia history.

绝大部分的收益回报规模都发生在

The vast majority of the magnitude of gains of returns happen

上市后。因此我们学会了谨慎地向客户分配股票，在IPO后一周或锁定期结束后一周进行。

post And so we learn to distribute shares to our clients carefully, the week after the IPO or the week after the lockup.

我们认识到，公开投资工具能在多方面帮助我们，包括如何回顾性分析这些公司。

We learned that a public investment vehicle would help us many ways, including how to look at these companies retrospectively.

如果你在对冲基金工作，你会回望初创阶段，并解释初创企业如何成长。

If you're in a hedge fund, you look back to youth and you explain how youth can grow up.

而我们大多数投资CNM风投的人会仰望未来。

Most of us that invest in CNM venture look up.

我们，你知道的，我们关注从零到有的过程。

We, you know, we look from zero to something.

对冲基金那帮人则关注从有到更多的过程。

The hedge fund guys look from a lot to something.

因此我们能够更深入地探讨公司现状及其发展潜力。

So we were able to have deeper conversations about companies and what companies could become.

敢于梦想企业可能达到的高度。

Dare to dream of what companies could become.

我们发现这种方式非常有用。

And so we found that to be quite useful.

然后我们推出了传承业务，旨在简化流程。

And then we launched the heritage business, which is to make it easy.

这是家族办公室式的捐赠模式。

It's a family office endowment style.

我们这样做的原因，是因为红杉的创始人和朋友们都取得了相当不错的成就。

And the reason for that, we have founders and friends at Sequoia who had done quite well.

这难道不是维持未来三十年关系的绝佳方式吗？

And wouldn't that be a terrific way to maintain a relationship for another thirty years?

所以这就是我们开展这项业务的原因。

And so that's why we did it.

这些努力都是为了打造一个全球性的强大平台——这正是我们想要的——让我们能够为创始人提供从创意到IPO乃至个人需求的全周期服务。

These were just to try to build a global powerhouse, which is what we want, where we can serve founders from idea to IPO and beyond, to personal needs.

当创始人产生个人需求时，我们的服务将延伸得更远，从而建立持续一生的长期关系。

It'll go so far beyond when they have the personal needs so we can have these relationships that would last a lifetime.

我们均分相同比例的利润。

We all take a equal percentage of our profits.

风投部门是核桃。

The venture group is walnuts.

中国业务是花生。

China is peanuts.

传承基金是腰果。

The heritage fund is cashews.

我们把它们混合后重新分配，这样大家都能得到混合坚果，但没有人能分到更多。

We blend them and then we redistribute them so that we all get a share of mixed nuts, but no one gets more nuts.

正是这些不同类型的坚果在财务上将我们紧密联系在一起。

It's just different kind of nuts that financially intertwine us.

我明白了。

I see.

但没有人赚得更多，我们只是都认同自己是这个全球团队的一员，在为创始人做正确之事的同时互相帮助。

But nobody makes more money, but we all have bought in that we're part of this team, this global team where we help one another while doing the very right things for the founders.

因为一切以创始人为核心。

Because it is all about the founders.

创始人永远优先，有限合伙人（我们的大多数是非营利机构）次之，而我们则排在第三位。

Founders come first by far, limited partners, most of ours are nonprofits come second and we come third.

这不是因为我们无私，而是因为若能实现这点，就是让企业延续百年的经营之道。

And it's not because we're altruistic because if we achieve that, then it's the way to run the business for the next a hundred years.

这里有个有趣的启示：随着上市或成为全球规模化公司的成本越来越高——因为你必须像你说的那样快速开拓新市场、加速增长以在赢家通吃的市场中领先竞争对手。

An interesting takeaway here is as it became more and more expensive to get to your IPO or to get to be a scale global company because you have to do things exactly like you're talking about, launch new geos faster, grow more quickly to get ahead of your competition in these winner take all markets.

要知道，一个重要趋势是许多公司选择了专业化路线，比如专攻A轮投资并保持小规模运作。

You know, a major takeaway is a lot of firms took the specialization route where they say, we're purely series a, and they stay smaller.

或者专注种子轮投资。

Or we're dedicated seed.

我们属于这种新型资产类别。

We're this new asset class.

我们专注前种子轮。

We're pre seed.

我们做成长期投资，或者那些大型公开股票机构转向私募并持续提供成长资本。

We're growth, or, you know, these these large public equity institutions come private and just stay growth capital.

但红杉资本的做法是：我们要伴随企业整个生命周期共同成长，采取与专业化完全不同的策略——就像你说的，全程跟进并为其各成长阶段提供适配产品。

But what Sequoia said was, look, we're just gonna grow with the company the entire life cycle and take a very different approach rather than specialization, exactly what you're saying, to follow them and have the right products for them along their entire growth curve.

这与多数人的做法截然不同。

It's just a very different approach than a lot of people took.

当然现在也有其他人在做类似尝试，但比起你们红杉的行动已经晚了五到十年。

And certainly there are other people doing something similar today, but it feels five, ten years later than when you did it at Sequoia.

我要说两点。

I'll make two points.

首先我要补充的是，我完全同意你所说的，并且要尽早达到目标

The first thing is I will add, I agree with everything you said and to get there as early as possible to

成为

be the

第一美元。

first dollar.

其次，如果我们自称只是A轮投资机构，当公司发展并非线性增长时会怎样？没有公司能保持直线上升。

Second, if we said we're only an A firm, what happens when And no company has a linear trajectory.

还记得你关于谷歌的问题吗？

Remember your Google question.

它们都会经历一些小波折。

They all have a little bump.

当那家公司遇到小挫折，而你又不得不投资那个存在疑问的轮次时怎么办？

What happens when that company has a little bump and you have to invest in that questionable round?

如果你只做A轮或只做C轮投资，却持有20%股份，你拿什么资本向新投资人证明你的信心？

If you're an only A firm or only C firm and you own 20%, where's your capital to show to the new investor that you believe?

正因发展从来不是线性的，也绝非从一开始就稳操胜券，只有持续参与，才能在公司经历阴云密布时给予支持，这有助于吸引其他投资者共赴晴空。

And so, because it's never linear, because it's never a slam dunk from day one, by being there, you can support the companies at times where there are darker clouds in the sky, which helps attracts other investors to then get to the sunny skies.

现在正是最佳时机——我知道时间所剩不多——让我们切换到《操作手册》环节。

This is the perfect time, since I know we're running out of time, to switch over to Playbook.

我认为在《操作手册》环节有两个问题特别想请教你，既为了听众也为了你，道格。

I think there are two questions I really want to ask you in Playbook, for listeners and for you, Doug.

《操作手册》环节我们会提炼本次对话中对创业者经营企业、以及我们考虑与企业合作时有借鉴意义的主题。

Playbook is we talk about, let's abstract out some of the themes from this conversation to what's applicable to entrepreneurs running their businesses, to us as we think about partnering with companies.

第一个问题是在整理红杉历史第一部分时给我们深刻印象的

The first one is it's just struck us in doing part one of the Sequoia history.

实际上，红杉成功的核心在于一些相当朴素的要素。

What actually, like, at the core makes Sequoia successful is some pretty simple things.

要聚焦市场，以创始人为先，倾听创业者心声，少说空话，做商业伙伴而非投资者。

It's focus on the market, founders come first, listen to what entrepreneurs tell you, you know, don't run your mouth, be a business partner, not an investor.

随着规模扩大，你们是如何保持对这些核心原则的坚守的？

How have you guys and you thought about staying disciplined on those core things as you've grown so much?

我想这需要大量的积极关注和努力。

I imagine it takes a lot of active focus and effort.

是的。

Yes.

答案有很多。

There are many answers.

我认为我们的小秘密就是我们的文化。

I think our little secret is our culture.

早年经商时，我常听CEO们谈论文化。

And when I was young in business, I used to hear CEOs talk about culture.

我曾以为这只是营销部门给CEO准备的谈资。

I used to thought it was a talking point handed to the CEO by marketing.

没有比这更错误的认知了。

Nothing could be more incorrect.

关于红杉的文化，请允许我用十秒钟说明。

And the culture at Sequoia, if I can spend ten seconds on it Please.

就是寻找那些经历系统冲击、渴望证明自己的怪才，用我的话来说，他们高中时不是橄榄球队的四分卫——你懂我的意思。

Is finding these quirky individuals who've had shock to their systems, who have something to prove, who, as I say, were not the quarterback or the football team in high school, and you know what I mean by that.

如果说有什么共同点，他们都是被主流排斥的人。

They were the shunned ones, if anything.

或许智商高出那么几点，某些方面更为突出。

Maybe a couple IQ points higher, something improved.

也可能是家庭环境造就的。

So maybe something happened in the family.

将他们置于团队合作与信任的环境中。

Put them in an environment of teamwork and trust.

红杉资本的组织结构相对扁平，所以我们把薪酬问题从讨论桌上拿掉了。

We're relatively flat at Sequoia, so we've taken comp off the table.