杰米·戴蒙专访

大卫，我们彻底搞砸了。我们进了杰米·戴蒙的办公室，进行了简短的会面寒暄。却完全没提那对双枪的事。

David, we completely blew it. We went into Jamie Dimon's office, had our little meet and greet. We did not ask about the dual pistols.

是啊。就是汉密尔顿和伯尔决斗时用的那对手枪，摩根大通收藏在总部的那对。我们搞砸了，连要求看一眼都没提。只能下次再找机会了。

Yeah. From the dual, Alexander Hamilton and Aaron Burr, which JPMorgan owns and keeps in their headquarters. And we blew it. We didn't ask to see them. We'll just have to come back.

等他们新大楼落成，肯定会在高管楼层展出。到时候我们就能去瞻仰这段美国历史文物了。

When they finish the new building, I'm sure they will be in the Executive Floor. We can go get a viewing of the, you know, piece of American history.

好。既然说到美国历史，咱们开始吧。

Alright. Speaking of American history, let's do it.

开始吧。欢迎收听2025夏季档《并购》——讲述伟大企业及其背后故事与商业策略的播客。我是本·吉尔伯特，我是大卫·罗森塔尔，我们将担任本期主持人。

Let's do it. Welcome to the summer twenty twenty five season of Acquired, the podcast about great companies and the stories and playbooks behind them. I'm Ben Gilbert. I'm David Rosenthal. And we are your hosts.

本期讲述的是：八十年代华尔街新星与导师携手通过并购问鼎九十年代金融界，却突遭导师解雇，在迷茫中于2000年接手经营不善的中西部银行，随后二十五年间缔造银行业乃至整个企业史上最辉煌的传奇——这就是杰米·戴蒙如何将风雨飘摇的美一银行、摩根大通、贝尔斯登、华盛顿互惠和第一共和银行整合成现代金融巨擘摩根大通的故事。作为华尔街大行中任期最长的CEO，尤其在2008金融危机期间，他被视为美国金融体系的定海神针。如今他执掌全美最大银行，市值超8000亿美元，是第二名市值的两倍多。

Today's episode is the story of a rising star on Wall Street in the nineteen eighties who worked with his mentor to merge and acquire their way to the top of the financial world in the nineties, who then got fired unexpectedly by that same mentor who cast about deciding what to do next, and then in 2000 accepted a job turning around a poorly run Midwestern bank. Then over the next twenty five years, he would orchestrate one of the most remarkable runs in banking history and really all of corporate history. This is the story of Jamie Dimon and how he created the modern financial behemoth JPMorgan Chase out of the beleaguered component parts of Bank One, JPMorgan Chase, Bear Stearns, Washington Mutual, and First Republic. Jamie is now the longest serving CEO of any major Wall Street bank and is viewed as kind of the great stabilizer of the American financial system, especially during the two thousand and eight financial crisis. He now sits atop the largest bank in The US with an over $800,000,000,000 market cap, which is more than twice their nearest competitor.

他们是唯一接近我们节目报道过的万亿级科技巨头体量的银行。更惊人的是，他们不仅是密西西比河以东全美市值最高的企业，更是该地区唯一突破5000亿美元市值的公司。那么问题来了：他是如何做到的？要知道银行倒闭是常态。

They are the only bank within spitting distance of these sort of big trillion dollar tech companies that we've covered here on acquired. And to really put a finer point on the dominance, they are the most valuable company East Of The Mississippi in The United States and the only company East Of The Mississippi worth more than half a trillion dollars. Incredible. So the question, of course, is how did he do it? I mean, banks fail.

金融机构常有惨烈爆雷，而大型组织——无论是否金融企业——往往因机构臃肿而效率低下。杰米·戴蒙究竟做对了什么？本期我们邀请到本人亲述。这期特别节目是在纽约无线电城音乐厅6000名《并购》听众前录制的，所以形式与往常不同。

Financial firms often have spectacular blowups, and large organizations, period, financial or not, can often get so bloated that they slow down to a crawl. So what did Jamie Dimon do differently? Well, today's episode, we have Jamie with us himself to tell the story. We recorded this live in front of 6,000 Acquired fans at Radio City Music Hall in New York City. So you'll notice it's a different format than our usual episode.

我们一直在探索适合现场观众的节目形式，这是最新尝试。当晚还有第二幕深夜脱口秀环节，与《纽约时报》CEO梅雷迪斯·科比特·莱维恩、IAC董事长巴里·迪勒对话，以及《并购》宇宙的惊喜客串，这些内容将在后续放出。若想及时获取更新，请订阅邮件acquired.fm/email，或加入Slack讨论组acquired.fm/slack。

We're always trying to figure out what version of Acquired works live with an audience, and this is our latest iteration. The Radio City show also had a second act, a late night talk show where we had conversations with the CEO of the New York Times, Meredith Kobit Levyan, and the chairman of IAC, Barry Diller, plus some cameos from around the Acquired Cinematic Universe, and we cannot wait to share all of that with you at a later date. Well, if you wanna know every time an episode drops, check out our email list, Acquired dot f m slash email. Come join the Slack and talk about this with us afterwards. Acquired.fm/slack.

如果想在月更节目间获取更多内容，欢迎收听ACQ2访谈节目，我们与各领域企业家畅谈商业故事。节目开始前，特别感谢首席合作伙伴摩根大通。

If you want more Acquired between each monthly episode, check out a c q two, our interview show where we talk with founders and CEOs, building businesses in areas we've covered on the show. And before we dive in, we wanna briefly thank our presenting partner, JP Morgan.

是的。就是那个摩根大通，说起来很有趣，因为当我们大约一年前开始共同策划这档节目时，本和我立刻意识到，在纽约能采访到的最佳人选恰好是他们的CEO。

Yes. The same JP Morgan, which is funny because when we started planning this show together, gosh, almost a year ago, it was immediately clear to Ben and me that the very best person who acquired could interview in New York also happened to be their CEO.

正如大家从过去几年的节目中所知，摩根大通一直是我们极好的合作伙伴，他们的支付团队在活动上展示了各种酷炫技术。衷心感谢摩根大通团队与我们共同呈现这场节目。若想了解更多，只需点击节目说明中的链接，并告诉他们是本和大卫推荐你的。请注意，本节目不构成投资建议，我和戴夫可能持有讨论公司的投资，节目内容仅供信息与娱乐用途。

And as you all know from the episodes over the last couple years, JPMorgan has been a fantastic partner of ours, and their payments team demoed all kinds of cool technology at the event. Our huge thanks to the JPMorgan team for putting on the show with us. And if you ever wanna learn more, just click the link in the show notes and tell them that Ben and David sent you. So with that, this show is not investment advice. Dave and I may have investments in companies we discuss, and this show is for informational and entertainment purposes only.

现在进入我们与杰米·戴蒙的对话。嗯，这感觉很合适。

Onto our conversation with Jamie Dimon. Well, this feels appropriate.

你们两位为我盛装打扮了。

You guys dressed up for me.

您也为我们精心着装了呢。去年在杰森的活动上，您通过视频连线时穿着非常夏日风，今晚看起来同样光彩照人。

You dressed up for us too. Thank you. Last year, we had you on the video board at at at Jason. You were looking very summery there. You look great tonight.

谢谢。我们知道您是历史爱好者，而我们自诩为历史研究者。所以今晚想与您回顾二十年历程——您如何将摩根大通从众多银行中脱颖而出，成为全球最具系统重要性的金融机构。您愿意吗？

Thank you. Yes. Well, we know you're a big history buff, and we consider ourselves historians above all else. So, what we'd like to do here tonight is walk through the twenty year story with you how you turned JPMorgan Chase from a bank among many to the most systemically important financial institution in the world. Are you game?

听起来不错吧？

Sound good?

非常棒，谢谢。

Sounds great. Thank you.

让我们从1998年开始。您和导师桑迪·威尔用十三年时间打造了现代金融集团 conglomerate，这实际上是摩根大通今日架构的雏形——只不过当时不是摩根大通，而是花旗集团。当时华尔街乃至全世界都预期您将很快被任命为花旗CEO。

We wanna start in 1998. You and your mentor, Sandy Weil, have just spent the past thirteen years building the modern financial institution conglomerate. Really, the the blueprint for what JPMorgan Chase is today, except it's not JPMorgan, it's Citigroup. And everybody on Wall Street in the entire world expects that you are gonna be named CEO of Citigroup in short order.

那是1998年。

This is 1998.

1998年。事情并非如此发展。相反，你被解雇了，不得不从头开始重启整个职业生涯，一切归零，人生彻底重来。

1998. This is not what happens. Instead, you get fired, and you have to restart your whole career, everything, your whole life from scratch.

抱歉从这里开始，

Sorry to start here, by

顺便说。但在我们讨论你接下来的行动之前，你和桑迪在花旗集团构建的模型究竟是什么？

the way. But but but before we get into what you do next, what was the model that you and Sandy built at Citigroup?

好的。首先我很激动能来到这里。我要祝贺这些家伙创建了'Acquired'。这是社会学习需求中一个极富智慧的补充。严格来说那不算一个模型，因为如果你看我们在Commercial Credit、Primerica（后更名为Travelers）以及合并期间的作为——

Okay. First of I am thrilled to be here. I wanna congratulate these guys for building the acquired. It's a it's a great intelligent addition to what we need to learn in society. And so I would say it wasn't quite the model because if you look at what we did at Commercial Credit, Primerica was then Travelers and Merge.

我们是个金融集团。收购了大量不同行业的公司，对它们进行整顿、扭亏为盈并实现盈利。

We were a financial conglomerate. We bought lots of companies and lots of different businesses. We fixed them up. We turned around. We made money.

然后我们与庞大的花旗银行合并。我的观点是应该精简机构，剥离对集团不重要的部分，保留战略上紧密关联的业务。这是我和桑迪关于公司未来的小分歧之一。不过当时规模很大，盈利可观。

And then we merged it with Citibank, which obviously was a huge bank. And, you know, my view is I was we should skinny it down and kind of shed the parts that aren't that important to the rest of the company and keep the things that strategically belong together together. It was one of my small disagreements with Sandy about the future of the company. And so but it was big. It was making a lot of money.

那时相当成功。然后我就被解雇了。

It was quite successful at the time. And then I got fired.

那那那你当时是什么感受？

So so so how are you feeling in that moment?

被解雇的时候？

When I got fired?

对，就是那一刻。

Yeah. That moment.

是这样的，当时我妻子在场，我在纽约的公寓里主持了一场百人招聘会，招募年轻人，就是我现在住的同一间公寓。他们打电话给我——想象一下那个周日下午四点。桑迪和约翰·里德来电说：‘能提前过来吗？有些事要谈。’

Well, you know, my wife is here, and I was hosting a 100 people, recruiter recruiting kids in my apartment in New York City, same apartment I have now. And they called me. We have them imagine me a Sunday at 4PM that night. And Sandy and John Reed called me up and said, can you come a little early? We got a bunch of stuff to talk about.

我当时是总裁兼首席运营官。我说开车去不了，他们坚持说事情非常重要。于是我赶过去，与桑迪和约翰会面时，他们说要做出几项调整，共有三点。

I was the president and chief operating officer. I drove I said, I can't. They said, well, it's really important. So I drove up there, and I sat down in the room with Sandy and John and they said, they wanna make a few changes. And there are three of them.

他们首先提出要让某人负责某项业务，我同意了，虽然觉得不合理。第二项是要任命别人接管我正执掌的全球投行业务，我认为这决定同样愚蠢。

And they said, one one, we wanna make this person in charge of that. I said, okay. Well, it didn't make sense to me. The second one, wanted to make someone in charge of the Global Investment Bank, which I was running. I thought it was another stupid decision.

最后他们说：‘第三，希望你辞职。’我直接答应了，因为那一刻我明白这是既定事实——董事会已投票通过，新闻稿都拟好了。

And the third is they said, and we want you to resign. And I said, okay. Because, you know, at that moment, I knew it was all arranged. The boards had voted. The press release was written.

管理层即将到任。我等到他们到场后，送上祝福：‘你们有机会打造一家伟大企业。’所有人都向我道谢。

The management team was coming up. So I waited, you know, for the management team to come up. I wished them the best. I said, you guys have a chance to build one of the great companies. They all thanked me.

桑迪问：‘要一起发声明吗？’我说好，但要在家里发布。回去见到孩子们——当时有个女儿也在场，她们大概12岁、14岁和10岁。

Sandy said, you want do the press with me? I said, yeah, but I'll do it from home. So I went home, went to see my kids. They were like one of my daughters here too. They were like 12 14, 12, and 10.

进门后我告诉孩子们：‘爸爸被开除了。’最小的立即问：‘我们要睡大街了吗？’我连忙说：‘不会的，我们很好。’

And I walk in the front door, and, I tell them, you know, I I was fired. And the youngest one says, daddy, do we have to sleep on the streets? I said, no. No. We're we're okay.

中间的孩子不知为何总惦记大学：‘我还能上大学吗？’得到肯定答复后，在场的大女儿突然说：‘太好了！那你手机不用了能给我吗？’

And the middle one was always obsessed with college for some reason. Can I still go to college? And he said, yeah. And the one who was here was the oldest one said, great. Since you don't need it, can I have your cell phone?

当晚约五十人涌到我家，全是刚见过的管理层，带着威士忌来开‘离职守灵酒会’。我有个高个子好友进门时，女儿抬头问：‘你是谁？’他说：‘我以前为你爸爸工作。’女儿秒回：‘现在不用了。’

And then that night, about 50 people came over. All the same people I just met, all the management team bringing whiskey, and it was like, have beer in your own wake. There's one really tall guy who came in, a very good friend of mine, and he looks and my my daughter looks up and says, who are you? He says, I used I work for your daddy. And she says, not anymore you don't.

就这样翻篇了。我后来常对人说：‘这关乎净资产，无关自我价值。’

And that was it. I was okay. You know, I was like, tell people, you're my net worth, not my self worth that was involved.

对于还不了解杰米故事的人来说，你曾是冉冉升起的新星。我是说，当时花旗是最大的银行，而你是公认的接班人。这简直难以置信，而你能如此优雅地面对，真的说明了很多。据我尽可能还原的情况，你大约有十八个月时间处于迷茫期。

And for anyone who doesn't sort of already know Jamie's story, you were the rising star. I mean, were Citi was the biggest bank. You were the heir apparent. I mean, is this was like unfathomable and for you to take it this gracefully, you know, it says a lot. So you're sort of wandering in the woods as I best I can kind of reconstruct it for about eighteen months.

是这样吗？在思考接下来要做什么？

Is that right? Figuring out what's next?

是的。要知道，我花了不少时间才完成离职手续、签署协议脱身。他们当时有点刻薄。但之后我走进办公室时已经很晚了。我们度了个长假，做了些类似的事情。

Yeah. I you know, it took me a while to exit and sign agreements and get out. They were kind of mean. But and then I stepped in office and it was late. I we went for a nice long vacation and stuff like that.

等到九月份回来时——那是六个月后——我开始去上班。虽然无事可做，但我坚持朝九晚五，开始联系人们并思考未来规划。当时在Siguirs大厦办公，所以我每天下楼吃午餐。

When I got back in September, so that was six months later, I went to my I started going to work. I had nothing to do, but I went from, you know, to nine to five and started calling people and thinking about what I'm going to do. It was in the Siguirs Building, so I go for lunch downstairs every day.

我...我在四季酒店。

I I At Four Seasons.

在四季酒店。我探索了所有可能性。考虑过成立自己的商业银行，也完全可以靠教书或投资退休——但我那时才42岁。

At the Four Seasons. And I explored everything. I saw my own merchant bank. I could have retired just teaching, just investing, but I was 42.

然后你...你接到过关于执掌亚马逊的电话对吧？

And you you took a call about running Amazon. Right?

再说一遍？

Say it again?

你接到过关于运营亚马逊的电话，不是吗？

You took a call about running Amazon, didn't you?

我去见了...我很喜欢...当时杰夫·贝索斯正在物色总裁人选。我们一见如故，从此成为好友。他是个非凡的人。但那对我来说像是步子迈得太大了。

I went to I loved I went to visit Jeff Bezos who was looking for a president at the time. He and I hit it off. We've been friends ever since. He's an exceptional human being. But it was like a bridge too far.

尽管那部《当哈利遇见莎莉》刚上映时，我还想着天啊，我再也不穿西装了。我要住在船屋里。对，对。那该多好啊。

Even though that movie just come out when Sally met Harry, I was thinking, my god, I'll never wear a suit again. I'm gonna live in a houseboat. Yeah. Yeah. This would be really great.

要是...要是我们当时住进去会怎样？

What if what if we'd be living in?

那就会是个平行宇宙了。不过我和杰夫至今仍是好友，至少这段经历给了我这点好处。后来我就认真起来了，你知道，有人邀请我去执掌其他大型全球投行。汉克·格林伯格执掌AIG时打电话给我说，你应该加入我们。我当时想，我要从桑迪·威尔跳槽到你这里？

It would have been an alternate universe. But I'm still good friends with Jeff, so I got at least one good thing out of it. And then I then I got serious, you know, and I was I was offered jobs to run, you know, big other big global investment banks. Hank Greenberger ran AIG called me up and said, you should come join us. I was thinking, I'm gonna go from Sandy Wilde to you?

我肯定是脑子进水才会做这种事。

I have to have my head examined to do something like that.

后来AIG的事我知道。

Then I know the AIG story.

是啊，那是好几年后的事了。后来我接到猎头电话说第一银行的事。你们很多人可能认识肯·兰贡、伯尼·马库斯和亚瑟·布兰克，他们经营家得宝。我和我妻子都很喜欢他们。

Yeah. Well, that happened years later too. And then I got a phone call from a headhunter about Bank One. And I was also you guys a lot of you probably know Ken Langone and Bernie Marcus Arthur Blank, ran Home Depot. My wife I loved them.

但第一次在亚特兰大和他们共进晚餐时，我坦白说：在你们联系我之前，我从没进过家得宝。

But at my first dinner with them, I went to see in Atlanta. I said, I have to make a confession. Until you guys called, I'd never been in a Home Depot. And

我们其实在猜。大卫和我还争论过。

We were actually wondering. David and I were debating.

我们当时...

We were

讨论过这事。我这辈子都是纽约客。朋友硬拉我去那里买工具和植物之类的东西。但我喜欢他们的企业文化和工作态度。他们当时想让我接手。

talking about it. My lifelong New Yorker. My friend made me go up there and get some equipment and plants and stuff like that. But I love their culture, their attitude. They wanted me to do it.

肯·兰霍恩说，我还是应该录用你的。我当时没打算给你足够高的薪酬。当然，这与那些因素完全无关。我当时在Bank One工作，但Bank One是我的舒适区。我习惯了金融公司，你知道的，就是那些服务、银行业务。

Ken Langhorne says, I still should have gotten you. I wasn't going pay you enough. Of course, had nothing to do with anything like that. And I had Bank One, but Bank One was my habitat. I was used to financial companies, you know, services, banking.

它并不完全是全球性的。当时算是有点国际化。而且，你知道，那是一家陷入困境的银行。后来我决定，生活是自己创造的。那段时期对我的家庭来说很艰难。

It wasn't quite global. Was a little global at the time. And, you know, it was a troubled bank. And, you know, I decided that, you know, life is what you make it. It was hard in my family.

我们经历了一次搬家，我觉得对于任何要带着孩子搬家的人来说...我记得他们当时是14岁、12岁和...

I had a we had a move, I think, for anyone who's gonna move kids that, you know, I think they were 14, 12, and

确实不容易。给不熟悉Bank One的听众补充些背景：它不在纽约。虽然是家大银行，但当时经营困难。是的。

kinda It's hard. Some context on bank one for for folks who are not familiar. It's not in New York. It's a large bank, but it's a troubled bank. Yeah.

总部在芝加哥。规模很大，大卫。那是家市值300亿美元的银行。而你之前所在的花旗集团是2000亿美元市值的银行。

It's based in Chicago. Large, David. It's a it's a $30,000,000,000 market cap bank. Citigroup where you just had been before was a $200,000,000,000 bank.

当时是210亿美元，因为...你数据是对的，但还是有差距。如果回溯的话，大概是2020亿美元左右。花旗是2000亿。但我并不担心这个。

It was 21,000,000,000 at the time because it had you you have the right numbers, but it's still a split. And so if you look back, was more $2,020,000,000,000 or something like that. Yeah. And Citi was 200. But, you know, I I didn't worry about that.

生活就是这样，你要自己创造价值。我不喜欢为打翻的牛奶哭泣。穿上裤子继续前进，看看能闯出什么名堂。

It was like, you know, in life, you make things what they are. I don't like complaining about overspilled milk. You know, you just put on your pants, you get going, you see what you can make out of it. And

但听起来你本有机会留在纽约执掌...

But you it sounds like you had opportunities to stay in New York to run

确实有。

I did.

更庞大、更光鲜的...

Bigger, more glamorous

当我准备接手这家公司时，其他选择本可以是些投资银行。但我对那些跟我谈这事的人并不完全信任。我还探索了一大堆其他可能性，接过不少电话，有来自小公司的，也有大企业的。

when I was gonna run the company. Other ones would have been some investment banks. I didn't really trust some of the people who were talking to me about that. And there's a whole bunch of other stuff that I explored. I took phone calls, some small companies, some big companies.

有几家次级抵押贷款公司联系过我，我当时的反应是：绝对不行。

There's a couple of subprime mortgage companies who called me, And I was like, absolutely not.

我们会谈到这个的，我们会...

We'll get to that. We'll get

谈到这个的，会谈到这个的。所以我觉得这是个机会，明白吗？而且如果家人愿意搬迁的话——我们花了些时间才安顿下来，之前租住了一段时间，但最终买下了栋漂亮的褐砂石住宅。

to that. We'll get to that. And so I just thought this was a chance, know. And, you know, if the family's willing to move, we got a nice took us a while. Had lived in a rental for a while, but got a nice brownstone.

结果我们爱上了芝加哥。从很多方面来说这都是座美妙的城市，就像我说的，生活取决于你如何经营。我当时把一半资金都投进了公司股票。

And, you know, we end up loving Chicago. Chicago is a wonderful city in a lot of different ways. And and, you know, like I said, it is what you make it. You know? And I went I I put half my money in the stock at the time.

没错，我把自己和公司绑定了——我要当这艘船的船长，就算沉船也要同进退。我向所有人明确表示会永久留在这里，成败在此一举。

Yeah. You I tied my I was gonna be the captain of the ship. I was gonna go down with the ship. You know? I made it clear to everyone I was here permanently, and it'll be what it is.

于是第二天我就立刻投入了工作。

And so I got to work, like, literally the next day.

我们算得对吗？就在你加入Bank One之前，你买了6000万美元的股票？

Did did we do the math right that right before you joined Bank One, you bought $60,000,000 of stock?

是的。

I did.

我是说，从没听说过有人接任CEO时说'我要把半数净资产投进这家公司'。

I mean, that's never heard of someone taking a CEO job and saying, I'm going to invest half my net worth in this company now.

是的。我当时认为它可能被高估了一点，因为有人认为它可能会被出售或类似的情况，但我不在乎这些。如果你在一家公司工作，新CEO来自外地，你将面对众多股东，而我认识其中很多人，也即将认识更多，我想确认自己是百分百投入的。毫无保留，毫无疑问，我绝不会抛售那些股票，我要与公司同舟共济。

Yeah. And I I thought it was I thought it might be overvalued a little bit because there was people thought it might be sold or something like that, but I didn't care about that. If you work at a company and the new CEO comes in, he's from out of town, and you're going have a lot of shareholders, and I knew a lot of the shareholders, I was going to know a lot the shareholders, I wanted to know I was in a 100%. Lock, stock, and barrel. There was no question I would never sell that stock, and I'm gonna go down with the ship or go up with the ship.

而且他们也在做我认为对公司长期健康发展有利的决策，而非短视之举。

And they also you as making decisions that I thought were right for long term health of the company, and not for a short term type of thing.

那么你到任后发现了什么？上任第一天开始调查时，情况比你预想的更好、更糟还是差不多？

So so what did you find when you got there? Day one on the job, you start investigating. Is it better or worse the same than

你知道吗，有位叫迈克·梅奥的分析师曾发布过一份报告。我记得报告里有句经典的话：即便是赫拉克勒斯也无力回天。这家银行是由Bank One、第一芝加哥银行和底特律国民银行合并而成的。

you thought? You know, there there had been an analyst called Mike Mayo who'd done a report. I remember one of the great lines of the report. Even Hercules couldn't fix it. It had been an amalgamation of Bank One, First Chicago, National Bank of Detroit.

这些公司从未真正整合过，所以它们有多套报表系统、处理系统、支付系统，比如SAP系统。品牌各异，服务每况愈下。我们正在流失客户，分支机构也在关闭。

They'd never put the companies together, So they had multiple statement systems, processing systems, payment systems, you know, SAP systems. They had different brands. You know, services coming down. We were losing accounts. They were closing branches.

简直一团糟。系统、人员、运营全都有问题。但当我见到管理团队时——这确实很棘手。

It was a mess. But, you know, it was all of it. Systems, people, ops. But again, I just, you know, I just I met the management team. I it's hard.

我上任后见了六位董事。当时共有21位董事，其中11位与另外10位势同水火。

You know, I walked in. I met six of the directors. I there were 21 directors. 11 hated the other 10.

等等，董事会居然有21名成员？

Yeah. Wait. Wait. Wait. There were 21 board members.

21名成员来自多次并购整合。他们形成了派系，最终互相敌视。我入职前就知道这点，因为我认识一些人，也做了大量调研。但人生就是这样，你接手的往往不是完美局面。

21 board members from the merge multiple acquisitions. They they were tribal. They ended up hating each other. I knew that when I went in because I knew one people and I spoke to a lot of people and did research in the bank. But again, in life you get handed these things and it's not perfect.

直到今天人们仍期望接手完美事物，但现实从不完美。所以我见了六位董事，上任第一天就与他们逐一握手。

Even today people want to be handed something perfect. It's not perfect. I was So I met six directors. I walked in. When I got off of the job, I shook all their hands.

我告诉他们我会全力以赴。我要向你们坦白一切，全部的真相，真相的终结，好的、坏的、丑陋的。我们不会胡扯。我们要努力打造一家伟大的公司。我需要你们的帮助。

I told them I'm going do the best I do. I'm going tell you the truth, the whole truth, the end of the truth, the good, the bad, the ugly. We're not going to bullshit. We're to try to build a great company. I'm going need your help.

然后他们说完就走了。所以现在我就在行政楼层。我甚至不知道该去哪儿。你知道吗？于是我随便敲了人力资源主管的门。

And, and then they they said, they left. So now I'm on the Executive Floor. I don't even know where to go. You know? And so I kinda knocked on someone's door, the head of HR.

我说，我确实需要一间办公室，而且真的需要一位助理。他们本来打算给我角落里的董事长办公室。我说不。不。我想坐在正中间，这样我能看到大家，随时探头交流。

Said, I do need an office, and I really need an assistant. And they were gonna give me the chairman's office in the corner. I said, no. No. I wanna be, like, right in the middle so I can see people and stick my head out.

接着我去见管理团队。他们把所有高管安排在这个铺着白色长绒地毯的会议室。我端着咖啡走进去，他们说'杰米，这里显然不能喝咖啡'。我看着他们，又看看咖啡。

And then I went to meet the management team. I went to this they put them all in this conference room with nice white plush carpets. I walked in with a cup of coffee, and they said, Jamie, we don't drink coffee in here for obvious reasons. So I looked at them. I looked at the coffee.

我盯着他们说'现在可以了'。然后就开始和他们逐一交谈。是的，系统很糟糕，公司正在亏损。

I looked at them. I said, you do now. And then I then I just started meeting with them all. And, yeah, the systems are terrible. The company's losing money.

我对所有业务并不完全了解，信用卡公司已经垮了——这大概是我最不熟悉的业务。但这对我无所谓，我就是要解决问题。它还有些优质资产之类的。

I didn't know all the businesses really well, so the credit card company had collapsed. That's probably the business I knew the least. But again, it didn't that didn't matter to me. I was going to try to fix it. It had some good assets and things like that.

于是我卷起袖子开始干

So I rolled up my sleeves and went to work and

几周前我们聊天准备这次活动时，曾问过你关于摩根大通的问题：在你心中，是什么关键因素造就了今天的摩根大通？你第一个提到的就是风险。是风险以及围绕风险形成的文化

One of them when we were chatting a couple weeks ago and preparing for this, we asked you in context of JPMorgan, like what are the critical things in your mind that has made JPMorgan what it is today? And the first thing you said was risk. And was risk and the culture around risk

以及通过风险管理来理解我们的运作方式

and Understanding the way we do by management of risk.

没错

Yeah.

当你加入BankOne时，我认为这是你首次开始实践关于风险的文化。BankOne的风险文化是怎样的？你又是如何改变它的？

When you got to BankOne, I think this is where you first started putting into practice the culture around risk. What was the risk culture at BankOne and how did you change it?

是的。我一直以来都非常注重风险。注重风险并不意味着消除风险，而是正确评估风险并理解潜在结果。所以当我到那里时，我开始接触员工并深入了解情况。

Yeah. I know, I've always been very risk conscious. And risk conscious does not mean getting rid of risk. It means properly pricing it and understanding the potential outcomes. And so when I got there, you know, I just started meeting people and going through.

我很快意识到，BankOne承担的美国企业信用风险比花旗银行还要多。而他们核算风险的方式极其激进。他们的资本金更少，准备金更少，各方面都更少。他们却称这些业务是盈利的，实际上是在亏损。

I quickly realized that Bank One had more US corporate credit risk than Citibank did. And they the way they accounted for it was unbelievably aggressive. And, you know, so they had less capital, less reserves, less this. They they were calling these things profitable. They were basically losing money.

要知道，在许多业务中，尤其是信贷业务，必须非常谨慎。当我发现这一点时，我有点慌了。我审查了账面上的每一笔贷款，全部做了减值处理，增加了准备金，向董事会汇报了情况，并希望每承担一美元风险能获得更多收益。例如，在中型企业业务中，每笔贷款的净利息收入大约是80美分，

And, you know, loans in a lot of business, have to be very careful about the credit business. And once I found out that, I kind of panicked a little bit. And I went through every single loan in the books. I marked them all down, put up more reserves, told the board about it, and then wanted to earn more revenues per dollar of risk. So, for example, in the middle market business, we had for every loan NII, we had like 80¢ and

净20美分的利息收入

Net 20¢ interest income for the

贷款的非净利息收入和其他如支付类业务的20美分收入。在我们与摩根大通合并时，贷款带来的净利息收入占比40%，而支付等其它业务的净利息收入占比60%。当你为风险获得报酬，而风险报酬又很低时。我总是进行压力测试，并向董事会展示：如果我们遭遇即将到来的经济衰退，我们在信贷上会损失多少。于是我聘请了琳达·巴曼女士，她说，好吧。

non Net interest income from the loan and 20¢ of other revenue like payments. By the time we merged with JPMorgan, we had 40 NII from the loan and 60% NIR from other type of things like payments. And when you're being paid for the risk, when you're being paid little for the risk. And I always stress tested, and I showed the board that if we have a recession and we're about to have one, how much money we'd lose in credit. So I hired a woman called Linda Baman who said, okay.

如果你们允许我负责信贷业务，允许我出售贷款。他们同意了。能让我对冲贷款风险吗？可以。我能操作100亿美元规模吗？

If you're gonna you're gonna let me do credit, you're gonna let me sell loans. They said, yes. Are you gonna let me hedge loans? Yes. Can I do 10,000,000,000?

我说，行。她回答，那好，我加入。我们可能因此缩减了500亿美元的资产负债表规模——后来确实发生了经济衰退，但那时我们已基本无碍。除了联合航空这个重大坏账案例，他们破产了，有段时间我们实质上接管了它。

I said, yes. She said, okay. I'll join. And we probably reduced the balance sheet by 50,000,000,000 because and then we did have a recession, but we were kinda okay by then. With one big bad one, which is United, went bankrupt, and we basically owned it for a small period of time.

这似乎体现了杰米·戴蒙的核心原则——绝不搞砸。虽然很多人擅长风险定价，但其他人似乎总比你更愿意逼近红线。你这种'绝对不搞砸'的理念是在哪里形成的？

There seems to be kind of a fundamental Jamie Dimonism, which is don't blow up. I mean, a lot of other people have gotten decent at pricing risk, but everyone else seems to be willing to get closer to the line than you. Where did you sort of develop this don't blow up at all

成本问题？是的。

costs? Yeah.

要知道，围绕风险总存在这样一个生态系统。你常听人说，大家都在这么做，大家都相安无事，这次肯定能成。

You know, around risk, there's always this ecosystem. You've always heard it. Everyone's doing it. Everyone's okay. This is going to work.

这次不一样。历史教会我们很多。我总说，要把它当作...我父亲是股票经纪人。所以我14岁就买了第一支股票。1972年，股市突破了一千点。

This time is different. And, you know, history teaches you a lot. And I always say, you treat it as an My dad was a stockbroker. And so I bought my first stock when I was 14. In 1972, the stock market hit a thousand.

1968年就曾触及千点。那时我已开始帮忙打下手。到了1974年，股市暴跌45%。华尔街的豪华轿车全消失了，餐馆纷纷倒闭。

It hit a thousand in 1968. I was already helping a little bit with stuff. By 1974, it was down 45%. All the limousines in Wall Street were gone. Restaurants were being closed.

市场剧烈震荡。后来我们算是有所复苏。1980年经历衰退，1982年又是衰退。82年时指数比1968年还低，跌到了800点。

Markets moved violently. And then, you know, we had kind of a recovery. In 1980, you had a recession. In '82, you had a recession. In '82, it was lower than it been in 1968, and it hit 800.

然后1987年，股市单日暴跌25%。1990年，摩根大通、花旗、大通、化学银行等全被房地产亏损拖垮，市值都只剩10亿美元左右。当时花旗市值30亿，其他银行约10亿。接着是97年房地产危机，2000年互联网泡沫，还有后来的次贷危机。

And then in '87, the market was down 25% in one day. In 1990, all these banks, JPMorgan, Citi, Chase, Chemical, were all taken to their knees by real estate losses, and they're all worth about a billion dollars. I think Citi was $3,000,000,000 at the time, and the other ones were about a billion dollars. Then you had the '97, also real estate related thing. You had the 2000 Internet bubble, you know, and then you had the great financial crisis.

翻看历史，这类事件数不胜数。安德鲁·罗斯·索尔金就在现场，我刚读完他写的1929年大萧条的书。他很好心寄给了我。历史确实总是押韵。

And I could if you go through history, there's tons of these things. Andrew R. Sorkin is in here, I just read his book. He's nice enough to send it to me on 1929. And, man, history does rhyme.

杠杆过高，风险过大。人人都觉得形势大好，没人相信会暴跌。但股市某年跌20%，次年30%，再下一年20%。最惨时跌幅达90%。

Too much leverage, too much risk. Everyone thinks it's gonna be great. No one thinks it can go down a lot. You know, and that stock market went down twenty percent one year, 30% next year, 20% next year. At one point, it was down 90%.

懂吧？意外总会发生。

You know? Shit happens.

看来你的哲学是做最坏打算。直接按最糟情况规划，而不是说'只要不发生那种疯狂的四西格玛事件就没事'。你认为那种极端情况不仅会发生，而且很频繁。

It seems like your philosophy is that the most the worst thing will happen. So just plan for it. Don't say, Oh, we're good as long as this crazy, insane, you know, Four Sigma event doesn't happen. You're like, No, that will happen. It happens often.

没错。所以我做高收益债压力测试时总会问——记得有次去摩根大通翻看他们的风险手册，他们的压力测试假设高收益债信用利差波动40%。当时利差是400基点左右，意味着可能扩大到560基点。明白吗？

Yeah. So when I look at it, I always ask, like, when I do stress testing at risk for high yield, the worst I remember getting to JPMorgan and going through the risk books, and their their stress test was that high yield would move 40%, the credit spread. That's and that time was at 400 or whatever it was. That means five five sixty. Okay?

我当时就说，不。我们的压力测试将是史上最严苛的。历史最差记录是17%。他们却说，那种情况绝不会重演。现在的市场更成熟了。

And I said, no. Our stress test is going be worst ever. Worst ever was 17%. And they said, that'll never happen again. The market's more sophisticated.

结果2008年2月，市场跌幅达20%，那时债券根本卖不出去。市场完全停滞。所以这类极端情况确实会发生。关键不在于预测它们，而在于确保你能应对，从而持续发展业务。

Well, in 02/08, it hit 20%, and you couldn't have sold a bond. There was no market. So, you know, those things do happen. And the point isn't that you're trying to guess them. The point is you you can handle them so you can continue building your business.

因此我始终关注所谓'肥尾风险'，确保我们能应对所有极端情况——不仅是美联储要求的压力测试情景，而是所有肥尾事件：市场腰斩、利率飙升至8%、信用利差突破历史最差值。当然业绩会受影响，但你能存活下来。金融服务业最致命的就是杠杆。

And so I always look what I call the fat tails and manage that we can handle all the all the fat tails. And not the stress test the Fed gives us, but all the fat tails. Markets down 50%, interest rates up to 8%, credit spreads back to worst ever. Of course, your results will be worse, but you're there. And and the thing about financial services, leverage kills you.

激进的会计处理同样致命——很多公司都这么做。作为金融机构，一旦亏损就会引发信任危机。我早就明白这个道理：媒体头条会大肆报道，而客户正把血汗钱托付给你...他们会对这种反差格外敏感。

Aggressive accounting can kill you, which a lot of companies do do. And, you know, the goal should be and also confidence. If you lose money as a financial company, I always knew this too, people the headlines are, you know, people read that and they're relying on putting their money with you Mhmm. They look at that difference. I

他们会失去信任。

They lose trust.

信任一旦丧失，就会引发银行挤兑——最近就有活生生的例子，人们会争相提取存款。

They lose trust. And that which cause you've seen runs on banks and you saw some recently, because people run take their money out.

您刚才提到'业绩可能更差但能存活'，这其实是一种权衡：短期利润较低，但至少能长久经营。回顾您执掌过的公司——比如摩根大通，在景气年份里，你们的盈利是否确实低于那些更激进的同行？

So so it's One there's a thing that you just said which is that you might do worse but you're there. There there's sort of this trade off that you make where you're less profitable in the short term but at least you stick around. If you look back at the companies that you've run, Biguan, JP Morgan Chase, is that true in the good years that you've actually been less profitable than those who are kind of risk on?

确实略低。要知道在2007年之前，很多银行股本回报率达30%——但它们后来都破产了。我们从未追求那么高的回报。

Yeah. A little bit. He's saying that, you know, if you look at the history of banks from up until 02/2007, a lot of banks were earning 30% equity. Most of them went bankrupt. We never did that much.

但2008-09年危机时我们安然无恙，它们却倒了。你要打造的是真正强大的企业：拥有扎实的利润基础、真实的客户群体、保守的会计政策，不依赖杠杆。任何行业都能通过加杠杆虚增回报——但在银行业这尤其危险。

Okay? But in o eight and o nine, we were fine and they weren't. And so, but you want to build a real strong company with real margins, real clients, conservative accounting, where you're not relying on leverage. And it's very easy to use leverage to, you know, to jack up returns in any business. You know?

银行业滥用杠杆的后果可能特别严重。

And but in in banking, it could be particularly dangerous.

所以，即便不是全部，这似乎也是你们运营战略的核心部分——堡垒式资产负债表。是的。你最初是什么时候听说堡垒式资产负债表的？

So it seems like a core part, if not the entirety of this distilled into your operating strategy is the fortress balance sheet. Yeah. When did you first hear about the fortress balance

我一直都在谈论这个，可以追溯到Primerica时期。我过去常提到这一点。你们要能够挺过

I've been talking I go way back to Primerica. I used to talk about that. You're gonna be able to survive the

艰难的九十年代？

tough nineties?

大概是在1990年代。就像我说的，我和父亲一起长大，经历了那些市场波动。我记得华尔街的人们那时有多艰难。但堡垒式资产负债表的关键在于，你经营一家服务客户的公司，要有良好的利润率、良好的流动性和充足的资本。

It was probably the nineteen nineties. And like I said, I grew up with my father and I went through those market things. I remember how hard it was on people in Wall Street. But but the fortress balance sheet is that you run a company serving clients well. You have good margins, good liquidity, good capital.

我是你能找到的最保守的会计师。如果可以分期确认利润，我不会提前确认。会计嘛，当然，会计师们讨厌我这么说——会计规则里漏洞百出。会计本身，你知道，有些东西被视为费用，但它们其实是好的，是对未来的投资，却被叫作费用。

I'm as conservative an accountant as you can find. I don't upfront profits when I can spread them over time. And accounting, of course, accountants hate it when I say this, you can drive a truck through accounting rules. And accounting itself, you know, that certain things are considered expenses, but they're good. They're an investment for the future, but they're called an expense.

还有收入，如果我放出不良贷款，那就是不良收入。它们会毁了你。但在一段时间内，它们看起来还不错。所以这些都是关键：利润率、客户。

And then revenues, if I make bad loans, they are bad revenues. They will kill you. But for a while, they look pretty good. So it's all those things. Margins, clients.

在银行业，你所服务的客户特质会反映在你的银行上。所以首要问题是：你在和谁做生意？怎么做生意？还要确保你的薪酬计划不会为愚蠢或不道德的行为买单。你必须不断审查这些事项，确保它们正确，因为它们总是在变化。

In the banking business, the character of the clients you have will reflect in your bank. So the first thing is who are doing business with? How are doing business? And also making sure your compensation plans aren't paying people for stuff which is stupid or unethical. And you always have to review these things to make sure you have them right because they they change all the time.

好了，听众朋友们。现在正是感谢我们最喜爱的公司之一Vercel的好时机。

Alright, listeners. Now is a great time to thank one of our favorite companies, Vercel.

没错。Vercel是一家了不起的公司。过去几年，他们已成为现代Web开发的基础设施支柱，如今又支撑起AI浪潮。如果你最近访问过一个快速、响应灵敏的现代网站，或使用过具有智能代理和超个性化界面的流畅AI原生应用，那很可能就是基于Vercel构建和部署的。

Yes. Vercel is an awesome company. Over the past few years, they've become the infrastructure backbone that powers modern web development, and now the AI wave. If you visited a fast, responsive, modern website lately or used a slick AI native app with agents and hyper personalized interfaces, there's a good chance it was built and deployed on Vercel.

过去十年间，他们一直致力于普及巨头公司（如谷歌、亚马逊和Meta）的经验。其理念是开发者不应花费数周时间和工程资源拼凑数十项服务，仅仅为了发布一个

So for the past decade, they've been on a mission to democratize the lessons of the giants, companies like Google and Amazon and Meta. And the idea is developers shouldn't have to spend weeks and engineering resources to stitch together dozens of services just to launch a

网页应用。Purcell让它变得简单。你编写代码，然后发布。快速、全球分布式，无需额外学习部署的复杂技巧。这就是他们框架定义基础设施的魔力，基本上让开发者和大型团队从想法到生产毫无阻碍。

web app. Purcell made it simple. You write code, you ship it. Fast, globally distributed, and without developing a second skill set in the nuances of deployment. That's the magic of their framework defined infrastructure, which basically lets developers and large teams go from idea to production without any friction.

如你所知，Vercel一直是前端开发的代名词，但现在他们也做后端和代理工作负载。Vercel称之为AI云，专为下一代应用而构建，已在Under Armour、PayPal、Notion等公司及Runway、Decagon、Browserbase等AI初创企业中投入生产。

So as you may know, Vercel has been synonymous with front end development, but now they do back end and agentic workloads as well. Vercel calls this the AI cloud, purpose built for the next era of apps and already in production across companies like Under Armour, PayPal, Notion, and AI startups like Runway, Decagon, and Browserbase.

没错。AI云将消除部署摩擦又推进了一步。在某些情况下，开发者甚至无需推送代码。代理可以持续发布功能，基础设施自动配置，界面适应你的工作方式。

Yep. The AI cloud takes removing deployment friction even one more step. In some cases, developers don't even need to push code anymore. Agents can release features continuously, infrastructure configures itself, and interfaces adapt to how you work.

如果你想构建软件的未来，请访问vercel.com/acquired。就是vercel.com/acquired，告诉他们Ben和David推荐了你。现在也是感谢我们另一家喜爱的公司Anthropic及其AI助手Claude的好时机。

If you wanna build the future of software, head to vercel.com/acquired. That's vercel.com/acquired, and just tell them that Ben and David sent you. Now is also a great time to thank another of our favorite companies, Anthropic, and their AI assistant, Claude.

Claude确实彻底改变了我们在Acquired的工作流程。准备采访Jamie Dimon显然需要深入研究。数十年的银行业历史、监管变化、三次金融危机、打造堡垒资产负债表。这正是Claude擅长的复杂分析类型。Ben和我过去从不借助外力，因为我们认为亲自研究很重要。

Claude has really transformed our workflow here at Acquired. Preparing to interview Jamie Dimon requires serious research, obviously. Decades of banking history, regulatory changes, three financial crises, building the fortress balance sheet. This is exactly the kind of complex analysis that Claude is excellent at. Ben and I have never had assistance here because we think it's important for us to do the research ourselves.

但Claude现在让我们鱼与熊掌兼得。它就像我们额外的一双手，我们对其行为和方式拥有完全的控制和可见性。

But Claude now gives us the best of both worlds. It's an extra set of hands that we have full control and visibility into what it's doing and how.

对我来说，Claude特别出色的是扩展思考模式。当我让它分析摩根大通在多次金融危机中的策略时，我可以一步步观察Claude在每个决策点的推理过程。

So where Claude is especially great for me is extended thinking mode. When I asked it to analyze JPMorgan's strategy through multiple financial crises, I could watch Claude's reasoning through each decision point step by step.

它通过所谓的MCP（模型上下文协议，你可能听说过）连接我们在Acquired的全部10个知识库，拥有完整上下文。它们与Gmail、Google Docs以及Jira、Asana、Linear、Square、PayPal等服务有预建集成，还能为任何内部工具定制集成。

And it has full context by connecting to our entire 10 base of knowledge here at Acquired through something called MCP, which you might have heard about, the model context protocol. They have prebuilt integrations with Gmail and Google Docs, and also services like Jira, Asana, Linear, Square, PayPal, as well as custom integrations for any internal tool that you have.

而且Claude由Anthropic打造，极度注重准确性和可信度，这正是我们需要的。

And Claude is built by Anthropic with a laser focus on accuracy and trustworthiness, which is exactly what we need.

没错。如果你想自己或为组织开始使用Claude，请访问claude.ai/acquired，他们为Acquired听众提供特别优惠：Claude Pro三个月半价，让你获得上述所有功能的使用权。

Yep. If you wanna start using Claude yourself or for your organization, go to claude.ai/acquired, and they've got a special offer for acquired listeners, half price Claude Pro for three months, which gets you access to all the features mentioned above.

因此，无论你是在为重要会议、面试或对话做准备，还是需要一个能信任的AI来处理严肃工作，Claude都与你共同思考，而非代替你思考。这就是claude.ai/的核心理念。好了，David，给我们讲讲合并的后续吧。

So whether you're preparing for your own high stakes meetings, interviews, or conversations, or you just need an AI you can trust with serious work, Claude thinks with you, not for you. That's claude.ai/ acquired. Alright. David, catch us up to the merger.

你在芝加哥执掌Bank One四年后，于2004年2月与摩根大通合并。当时被称为平等合并——我记得摩根大通是这么表述的——Bank One股东获得合并后公司42%的股份。说真的，现在很多人没意识到今天的摩根大通有多少是Bank One的底子。

So you run bank one for four years from Chicago. And then in 02/2004, you merge with JPMorgan Chase. In what is termed at the time a merger of equals, I think JPMorgan Chase referred to it as that Bank One shareholders get 42% of the combined company. I mean, I think people don't realize how much of JPMorgan Chase is Bank One today.

所以当他们说你一直掌管着摩根大通时，这有点让人恼火。实际上我始终只管理公司40%的业务。当我接手BankOne时——虽然我不是全天候工作——我就清楚与摩根大通的战略合并是合理选择。关键是我了解这些公司，这也是堡垒式资产负债表的优势：能经得起时间考验的战略布局。

That's why it's a little irritating when they say you've been running it since we said, was running JPMorgan. I was running 40% of the company for the whole time. And when I got to BankOne, and I'm not working around the clock, I I already knew that a logical strategic merger might be JPMorgan. Okay. I know all these companies, and that's the other thing about Fortress balance sheet is you also have real strategies that survive the test of time.

而且你知道，我们不会反复摇摆。当时我看着新闻快讯弹出'摩根大通即将合并'的消息，心想：我们市值约250亿，他们估值约800-900亿，那个美梦算是破灭了。

And, you know, you're not flipping and flopping. And then I'm sitting there, and of course, the tape comes JPMorgan Chase to Merge. So we're worth, like, 25,000,000,000. They're now worth, like, 80,000,000,000 or 90 or whatever the number was. I'm like, well, there goes that dream.

但四年后，我们的股价翻倍了，实际达到了目标区间。期间我经常与当时的摩根大通董事长比尔·哈里森会面，我们都清楚这笔交易在商业上的合理性。

But four years later, our stock was up to, you know, doubled or something like that. There's actually come in, and it was in the target range. And I had been meeting with Bill Harrison, the current chairman of of JPMorgan at the time. We were talking about it. We both knew it made business sense.

他们当时在物色CEO人选，所以我们其实已经持续洽谈了一年半左右。

They were kind of looking for a CEO. So we were we had been talking probably for a year and a half before that.

他们在找CEO？给BankOne股东42%股份就是因为这个原因吗？

They're looking for a CEO. Did they give BankOne shareholders 42% because they were looking for a CEO?

当时有两起诉讼。最终我们获得溢价，他们保留名称和总部。实际上我从第一天就掌握了控制权——根据合并协议中几乎史无前例的条款：除非75%董事会成员投票否决，否则我将在18个月后自动接任CEO。

There were two lawsuits. Okay? So we got the premium. They got the name and location. And I I effectively had kind of control from day one because inside the merger agreement, and this is almost unheard of when we get the premium, is that to not have me become CEO eighteen months later, 75% of the board would have to vote me out.

这个

The

没错。董事会的默认选项是

Right. Board The default was

你即将成为CEO。董事会由八名Bank One的人和八名摩根大通的人组成。我也认识很多摩根大通的董事，他们尊重我。比尔·哈里斯和我关系非常密切，但那是协议。他们因为支付过高收购我的费用而被起诉。

you were going to become CEO. And the board was eight Bank One people and eight JPMorgan people. And I knew a lot of the JPMorgan board members too who had who respected me. And Bill Harris and I were very close, but that was the agreement. They got sued for paying too much to buy me.

我则因为拿得太少被起诉。我是说，你知道，一旦被起诉，你就赢不了任何...

I got sued for not taking enough. I mean, I you know, if you get sued, you can't win any

我...我想每位股东可能都很满意

I I think every shareholder is probably happy

结果很顺利。

to do It worked out.

是的。好吧。

Yep. Alright.

2000年

2,000

在我们谈到2006年之前，当你经历那个过程时，甚至可能是在你和比尔开始商谈的前几年，你已经开始考虑摩根大通作为合作伙伴。我很好奇，品牌名称摩根大通是否对你的决策有任何影响？你视其为资产吗？

before we get to 2,006, when you're going through that process and even maybe the couple years before you and Bill were talking, you're starting to think about JPMorgan as a partner. I'm curious, did the brand did the name JPMorgan factor into your thinking at all? Did you view that as an asset?

我是说，摩根大通的品牌是如蒂芙尼般响亮的名字。我在交易中并未特别看重这点。我们当时...当我审视时，我给董事会的意见是——我认为首要任务是经营好你的公司。人们以为我会立即开始做交易，我说不。

I mean, JPMorgan brand is a Tiffany name. I didn't value it in the deal. And what we when I looked at, I had given my board I think it's I think the first thing is run your company well. And people thought I was going start doing deals immediately. I was like, no.

我们表现糟糕。我们还没资格接管别人的公司。等我们能经营好一家公司时，才能考虑合并。但我首先考虑的是商业逻辑——我们每项业务都...我们有消费金融业务，他们也有；我们有信用卡业务，双方都很糟糕。

We suck. We don't we haven't earned the right to run someone else's company yet. When we're running a good company, we can merge with somebody. And But the first thing I looked at was business logic. And that every business we had a consumer business, they had a consumer business, we had a credit card business, they were both terrible.

他们有信用卡业务。他们有个大型投行。我们有个需要部分投行服务的美国大型企业银行。双方都有财富管理业务。我知道我们能节省大量成本。

They had a credit card business. They had a big investment bank. We had a big US corporate bank that needed some of those investment banking services. We both had a wealth management business. I knew we could save a lot of cost saves.

所以商业逻辑本身是相当无懈可击的。接下来就是执行力的问题。比如，你们真的能落实到位吗？因为我们见过太多交易最终流产的例子。他们缺乏管理。

So the business logic was pretty impeccable. Then there's the ability to execute. Like, you actually get it done? Because we've all seen a lot of deals where they fall apart. They don't have management.

他们没有整合系统。内部存在争斗。花旗集团就发生过类似情况。结果自然无法实现预期效果。最后还有价格因素。

They don't consolidate the systems. They have infighting. It kind of happened at Citi. And so you don't effectuate. And then there's the price.

我知道我们拥有蒂芙尼这样的品牌，但这并不构成估值优势。因为如果其他环节都出问题，单凭这个品牌意义不大。

So I knew we had a Tiffany brand, but it didn't value because if everything else didn't work out, I don't think it would have mattered that much.

有意思。好的。那么我要快进到几年后。时间是2006年2月。你正式成为合并后的摩根大通董事长兼CEO。

Interesting. Alright. So So I'm gonna fast forward us a couple years. It's 02/2006. You're officially chairman and CEO of the combined JPMorgan Chase.

而且2006年的华尔街就像——

And and 2006 on Wall Street is like

说下去。

Go.

继续。

Go.

快说。快。加油伙计，简直像是八十年代重演。

Go. Go. Go, baby. It's like, you know, nineteen eighties all over again.

确实如此。我认为你和其他人有着相同的激励机制，但你的行为却大相径庭。我是不是漏掉了什么？你们当时的激励机制是一样的吗？

It was. I think you had the same incentives as everyone else, but you behaved very differently. Am I missing something? Did you have the same incentives?

还是说你在2006年2月就强力收缩了摩根大通的风险敞口？

Or did you pulled JPMorgan back hard on the risk side in 02/2006.

确实如此。2006年2月市场上已出现裂痕。你可能还记得量化基金。2006年底开始出现量化问题。我们明显看到次级贷款在恶化。

I did. So there there were cracks out there in 02/2006. You may remember the quants. There started to be a quant problem late in 02/2006. We definitely saw subprime getting bad.

因此我缩减了次级贷款业务。真希望当时能采取更多措施，因为回顾我的决策，你会说虽然保住了一半资金，但本可以挽救更多。

And that's I pulled back on subprime. I wish I had done more because if you look what I did, you say, okay, well, you saved half the money, but you would have saved more Yeah.

你们还是遭受了一些损失。

You still had some losses.

50亿。但我们的杠杆率只有大型投行的三分之一左右，流动性也更充足。2006年2月我就开始囤积流动性，当时我对局势非常担忧。由于巴塞尔协议I和III的会计规则，你可能不记得了，大型投行的杠杆率从12倍飙升至35倍，简直是疯狂扩张。

Five But billion we also had, I'm going say, less, maybe a third of the leverage of the big investment banks and a lot more liquidity. So in 02/2006, I started to stockpile liquidity and, you know, looking at the situation, I was quite worried. The leverage, if you you may not remember this, but the leverage, because of accounting rules in Basel III, Basel I, investment banks, particularly the banks, big investment banks, went from 12 times leverage to 35 times leverage. It was go go.

所以说

So for

每投入1美元

every $1 you're

进行

putting in

过桥贷款等业务。2007年华尔街的过桥贷款规模是4500亿美元，如今只剩40亿。现在摩根大通就能消化这40亿——虽然我们目前没做这40亿业务。而且当年的交易杠杆率高得多。

Bridge loans, the whole thing. Like, in 'seven, the bridge book of Wall Street was $450,000,000,000 Today, it's $40,000,000,000 J. P. Warren can handle the whole $40,000,000,000 today, though we're not the $40,000,000,000 today. And they were much more leveraged deals.

其中很多交易后来都崩盘了。这还发生在抵押贷款市场崩溃之前，那次危机真正击垮了许多银行。

And a lot of them fell apart, collapsed, then of course And that was before you had the collapse in the mortgage markets, which really took down a lot of these banks.

但你们当时面临同样的利益驱动，获取的信息渠道也和其他机构相同，却避免了爆雷。如何解释这点？毕竟行为通常受利益驱动。

But you did have the same incentives and you had the same access to information that a lot of these other folks did, but you didn't blow up. What explains this? Because usually behavior follows incentives.

是的。首先，如果你为我工作，我会告诉你，我不在乎激励是什么。不要做错事。也不要对客户做错事。如果你把自己当作客户，你希望被怎样对待？

Yeah. Well, first of if you work for me, I would tell you, I don't care what the incentive is. Don't do the wrong thing. And don't do the wrong thing to the client. If you treat yourself if you're the client, how would you want to be treated?

而且我已经清除了...我提到过那个风险点。类似的风险点有很多。他们当时是靠承担风险来获取报酬的。你卖出...

And I I had gotten rid of I mentioned that one risk thing. There were multiple risk things like that. They were being paid to take the risk. You sell

刚才在跟我们讲汽车贷款业务的事。

were telling us about the the auto loan business.

对。但他们本可以继续拿钱。可当我实施所有这些新的风险控制措施后，突然之间你们就无法通过加杠杆来赚钱了。因为我关注的是在情况恶化时实际能配置多少资本。所以我关注的是整个周期内的收益。

Yeah. But they'd be being paid. But the second I put in all these new risk controls, all of a sudden you weren't making money by taking that leverage. Because I was looking at how much capital can actually be deployed if things get bad. And so I was looking at earnings through the cycle.

但非常关键的是，所有这些投行都在做私下交易、三年期、五年期的私人协议。我几乎取消了...

And then but very importantly, all of these investment banks were doing side deals, private deals, three year deals, five year deals. I got rid of almost all of

这些交易。

them.

这是关于薪酬的。

This is for comp.

几乎所有的...

Almost all of

高级银行家。

senior bankers.

所以如今在摩根大通，没有...我们确实会做些业务（在座的有些合作伙伴也清楚），但都是公开透明的。没有暗箱操作，没有私下协议，几乎没有针对单项业务的奖励——因为单项奖励会诱使人做错事。

So today at JPMorgan Chase, there are no you know, we do do things, and I know some of my partners in the room here, but we all know about it. There are no winks. There are no nods. There are no side deals. There's almost no one paid on a particular thing because if you're paid on a particular thing, you can do the wrong thing.

与此同时，你并没有帮助公司管理风险或类似的事情。所以我们改变了激励计划。我对激励计划非常谨慎，确保它们不会引发不当行为。但同样重要的是，如果你在一家公司，发现激励计划存在问题，你应该告诉公司这个激励方案并未引导出对客户有利的正确行为。

And meanwhile, you're not helping the company, you know, manage its risk or something like that. So we changed the incentive programs. And I'm quite conscious about incentive programs that they don't create misbehavior. But it's also very important. If you're in a company and you say the incentive program is doing it, you should tell the company this incentive plan is not incenting the right behavior versus the the customer.

很大程度上这与杠杆有关。如果你观察某些证券化账簿和抵押贷款账簿的杠杆率，当你有30倍杠杆并获得20%的利润时，你会将杠杆提高到40倍。这直接会让你的奖金增加25%。因此我取消了20%的利润池和杠杆机制。期间也流失了一些员工。

And a lot of it was leverage. So if you look at the leverage in some of these securitization books and mortgage books, if you have 30 times leverage and you're getting 20% of the profits, you'll go to 40 times leverage. It's just going to it literally will add 25% to your bonus. And so I got rid of the profit pool of 20% and the leverage. And I lost some people too in the meantime.

有意思。确实，摩根大通作为系统的一部分曾采用相同的激励机制，但你们改变了激励方式

That's funny. Yeah. You know, JPMorgan as part of the system had the same incentives, but you changed the incentives

为了

for

是的。

Yeah.

差不多是这样。

Pretty much.

公司内部的团队。好的。我们得跳到2008年2月。三月。

Team within the company. Okay. Alright. We gotta go to 02/2008. March.

3月13日？

March 13?

2008年2月。

02/2008.

2008年2月周四晚上。对，是周四晚上。你接到贝尔斯登CEO的电话。当天股票收盘价为每股57美元。

Thursday 02/2008. Yeah. It's Thursday night. You get a call from Bear Stearns CEO. The stock closed that day at $57 a share.

几个月前还是150美元一股。三天后——天啊，我记忆犹新。当时我在华尔街公园大道工作。记得那晚，每股2美元。你们正在收购贝尔斯登。

It's like 150 a couple months before. Three days later God, I remember it like yesterday. Was working Park Avenue in Wall Street. Remember that night, $2 a share. You're buying Bear Stearns.

给我们讲讲这个故事吧。

Tell us the story.

当时我在第七大道40号的Avra餐厅，和我父母在他们最爱的餐厅。全家都在那儿。那天正好是我生日。我平时很少接到紧急电话的。

So I was at Avra on 40 Seventh Street with my parents and my parents' favorite restaurant. My whole family was there. It happened to be my birthday. I I I don't normally get emergency calls.

生日快乐。

Happy birthday.

是啊。当时CEO艾伦·施瓦茨看着公司股价下跌。我知道他们遇到了大麻烦，因为我们注意到他们的对冲基金和内部状况。他说：'杰米，我需要在亚洲开盘前拿到300亿美元。'我回答：'我不知道怎么一夜之间给你弄300亿。'

Yeah. And Alan Schwartz, who was the current CEO, we'd seen their stock go down. I knew they had some real problems because we saw their hedge funds and some of the things that were taking place there. And he said, Jamie, I need $30,000,000,000 tonight before Asia opens. So I said, I don't know how to get $30,000,000,000 for you.

我问：'你联系保尔森或蒂姆·盖特纳了吗？'于是我们全都打了电话。我召集管理团队，回去时可能只吃了口饭就告别家人，赶回办公室。

And have you called Paulson or you called Tim Geithner? So we all called. I called up the management team. I went back in. I probably had a bite and said goodbye and went back to the office.

那天晚上大概来了100号人。大家穿上正装赶回来加班。紧急状态——我们拉响了所有应急警报。

Probably had a 100 people come in that day, that night. They all got dressed. They went back to work. It's emergency. We now ring all, bells for emergency.

贝尔斯登要破产了。我们和美联储商量先撑到周末。只有一天时间，我们需要周六周日来设计这笔贷款。我们没法直接借出300亿，美联储技术上也不能直接借，但可以通过我们中转。

Bear Stearns went bankrupt. Spoke to the Fed about, let's just get them to the weekend. We had one day, and we needed a Saturday and Sunday, and we concocted this loan. So we couldn't lend the 30,000,000,000. And the Fed technically couldn't lend the 30,000,000,000, but the Fed can lend to us technically.

我可以用贝尔斯登的资产作抵押，这样我们拿到了字面意义上的一天贷款。第二天，我们召集数千人做尽职调查。用两三天时间审查每笔贷款、资产、资产负债表、衍生品、诉讼和人事政策——真正的深度尽调，最终以每股2美元收购。汉克·保尔森还问：'为什么要付钱买？'我说：'毕竟需要股东投票通过啊。'

And I can technically use the collateral of Bear Stearns so that, so we got the literally one day loan. And then the next day, I had we had thousands of people come in due diligence. And we went through every loan, every asset, every balance sheet, all the derivatives, all the lawsuits, all the HR policies, like real due diligence in a two or three day period, and bought the company at that night $2 a share. Hank Paulson was saying, why are you paying anything for it? I said, well, I do have to get shareholder votes.

后来这就成了...

And, which became Why

需要贝尔斯登的股东批准这笔交易吗？

do you need bear shareholders to approve the deal?

这是公开交易。最糟的是我将面临贝尔斯登持有人的诉讼。我早就知道会这样。

It was a public deal. And the worst part of it is I was gonna get the lawsuits from the bear holders. And I knew that That

你们支付得不够

you didn't pay enough

但我们不能让它破产。这不像工业公司通过破产重组。它会彻底消失，危机将全面爆发。

for that. But we couldn't let it go bankrupt. It wasn't like an industrial company combined in bankruptcy. It would have been gone. And the crisis would have just unfolded.

好的，两个问题。第一，如果它倒闭会怎样？第二，事后你认为危机结束了吗？

What okay. Two questions. One, what would have happened if it went down? Two, afterwards, did you think it was over?

没有。那时是三月份。雷曼的倒闭是失控的失败，资金到处被冻结，人们陷入恐慌。

No. So we already had so that was March. What happened with Lehman was an uncontrolled failure. There was money locked up everywhere. People panicked.

他们开始从所有领域撤资。贝尔斯登也会遭遇同样命运。我们的干预确实阻止了这点，我以为这能争取时间让其他机构整顿。六个月后，这些公司本应有更多流动性和资本来应对危机。但当时系统已承受巨大压力。

They started pulling money out of everything. That would have happened with Bayer. So, it did stop that, and I would have thought that it gave other people other time to clean up their act. So literally six months later, would have thought some of these other firms had more liquidity, more capital, and were a little bit more prepared for what might be happening. We already had the stress in the system.

危机迹象已经显现，只会愈演愈烈。巨额亏损即将到来。我们收购它确实有所帮助。

You saw it already. It was going to mount. It wasn't going to go away. There were tremendous losses coming. So we bought it and, you know, it probably did help.

事后看来，这并未阻止危机蔓延。收购一周后股价从1.2美元涨到10美元。这个拥有3000亿美元资产的公司，账面有形价值仅120亿。我们收购时核销了全部有形价值——必须清算贷款、对冲风险、支付遣散费和诉讼费，耗尽了这些资金。

In hindsight, didn't stop, you know, it didn't stop the crisis from unfolding. We bought it and then, like a week later, changed to $10 a share. It had been at $1.20. And the way to think of it is, it was $300,000,000,000 of assets and a $12,000,000,000 book tangible book value. We wrote off the whole tangible book value in the when we bought the company to pay we had to liquidate the loans, we had to hedge stuff, we had severance costs, lawsuit costs, and we basically used all that.

我们以10亿收购了近期市值200亿的公司。现在这栋大楼账面价值10亿却零成本入账。虽然获得了优秀人才和优质业务，但整个过程极其痛苦。

So, we paid a billion dollars for a company that had been worth $20,000,000,000 recently. The building we're in now was worth a billion dollars on the balance sheet for zero. And we got the the fact we got some very good people and we got some good businesses, but it was an extremely painful process.

我曾看过估算，在彻底处理完所有后续事宜后，总共花费了你们150到200亿美元。

I've seen estimates that in the fullness of time after really dealing with unwinding all the stuff there, it cost you 15 to $20,000,000,000.

所以无论如何还是花了200亿。

So it cost 20 anyway.

我们当时核销了120亿美元。那并没有实际消耗我们的资金。我们并未真正支付这笔钱。后来政府就抵押贷款问题起诉我们，这让我感到非常愤慨。真的非常不满。

Was the it was the 12,000,000,000 we wrote off. That didn't cost us. We didn't really pay for it. And then the government sued us on the mortgages, which I was quite offended by. I really was.

我认为这是政府接手问题后的做法。无论你与哪届政府达成协议，后续政府都可能不认账。尽管我们挽救了整个体系，救助了许多人，他们仍要求我们为巴里什·邓斯造成的不良抵押贷款支付50亿美元。正是这件事让我表态不会再重蹈覆辙。

I thought it was a take this problem and then This is the government. Whatever government you did a deal with, that's not the government down the road who decides, I don't care. We're going to come after you anyway. So while we kind of saved the system a lot, we bailed a lot of people out, they made us pay $5,000,000,000 on the bad mortgages that Barrish Duns had done. And that's what made me make the statement I wouldn't do it again.

我不会这样表述，也不知该如何表达——我不会再真正信任政府了。明白吗？

I wouldn't put it this way, and I don't know how to say this, I wouldn't really trust the government again. Okay? Would

我必须追问一下：这是制度性问题吗？是否与我们每四年更换一届政府的体制有关？

I gotta ask a follow-up question to that. Is that a structural thing? Just the way that we're set up with a new administration every four years?

是的。他们不觉得需要对前任政府的承诺负责。有些合约在这次事件中甚至被公然违反——具体细节我就不赘述了。按理说这已构成企业间的侵权干涉。但本质上，既然你在他们的法律框架下运营，他们就有能力整垮你。

Yeah. They don't feel obligated to what the prior administration did. You know, even some contracts were violated in this thing, which I won't go through. Literally, I mean, it would have been tortuous interference that had been company to company. But they basically you know, since you operate under their laws, you know, they can basically take you down.

所以我...我去见了埃里克·霍尔德试图解决抵押贷款问题（最终确实解决了）。他们带了我的首席董事来，对方以为我会气势汹汹。但我进去就说：埃里克，我是来投降的。我无法对抗联邦政府，也不可能获胜。

So you you know, I I went to see Eric Holder trying to settle this mortgage stuff, which we settled. They brought my lead director. He expected me to come and be pounding my chest. And I went in and said, Eric, I am here to surrender. I cannot fight, and I cannot win against the federal government.

你清楚一纸刑事起诉就能毁掉我的公司。我不会让公司和国家承受这种风险。我是来认输的。但在投降前，我希望你了解我们收购华盛顿互惠银行和贝尔斯登的背景——因为他们80%的索赔都针对这两家机构，而非摩根大通本身。我详细解释了整个过程。

You know that a criminal indictment can sink my company. I will not do that to my company or my country. I'm here to surrender. Before I surrender, I want you to know the circumstances by which we bought WAMU and Bear Stearns because 80% of what they were asking for related to Bear Stearns and WAMU, not Jake to Morgan Chase. And I went through the whole thing.

你知道，他当时说会考虑我的陈述。但他们始终没给我财务明细，所以我无从得知他们的处理方式。事实已成定局，虽然过程非常痛苦，但我们必须向前看。

You know, he said, thank you. I'll take in consideration. But they never gave me the accounting, so I don't know what they did. And so it is what it is. It was quite painful, but we've got to move on.

我们会翻过这一页的。

We'll move on from this.

我们会...我们会确保你...好吧，我们就不纠结具体细节了。

We'll we'll keep you Well, we'll move on from the specifics.

大卫的表现就像...

David's like

实际上，我确实有...

Actually, I do have

还有一点。无论你当时是否会再次选择这样做——从纸面上看，这对摩根大通并不是笔划算的买卖。但如今回顾，摩根大通的声誉价值在业内已无出其右。

one more thing. Whether you would have done it again wouldn't have, you know, very clear. It was not a great deal on paper for JPMorgan. But as we look at it now, the reputational value that j p the reputation of JPMorgan now is unlike any other in the industry.

你们市值能达到8000亿美元，部分原因就在于这份声誉。是的，而铸就这份声誉的...

Part of why you're worth $800,000,000,000 is that reputation. Yeah. A lot of what created that reputation

正是那个周末的事件。

Was was that weekend.

没错。我...我知道如果...是的。虽然我说过不信任政府，但如果他们再次来电求助...当然会帮，这是我的爱国本能。

Yeah. I I know if if you're yes. And I know I said I wouldn't trust the government. If the government called me up, they they didn't again. If they called me again and said, we need your help to save our well, of course, I'm gonna I'm a patriot that way.

我只是...会想办法规避下届总统的追责。总能想出对策的。

I just I would just try to come up with some ways to avoid the punishment by the next president. I would come up with something.

我说...知道吗？你们需要类似摩根大通那样的合并协议条款——除非75%国会议员投票反对，否则默认不被起诉。好了，就这样。

I You need you know what? You need, like, the version of the merger agreement with JPMorgan Chase where it's like a 75% of congress needs to vote not to sue you. Like, the default is you're not gonna get sued. Alright. Alright.

好的。那么

Alright. So

贝尔斯登事件发生了。六个月后，你又接到一个电话。华盛顿互惠银行要倒闭了。你们确实收购了华盛顿互惠银行。与我们讨论贝尔斯登的情况相反，华盛顿互惠银行实际上是一笔很棒的收购。

Bear Stearns happens. Six months later, you get another phone call. Wamu is going under. You do buy Wamu. Contrary to everything we're talking about with Bearer, Wamu was actually a great acquisition.

对吧？

Right?

是的。所以这是关于收购的一课。非常困难。记住，我们在雷曼兄弟破产一周后收购了华盛顿互惠银行。大多数董事会根本不会碰这个。

Yeah. So this is a lesson about acquisitions. It's very hard Remember, we bought WAMU a week after Lehman went bankrupt. Most boards wouldn't have touched that at all.

因为整个系统感觉像是

Because the whole system feels like The

整个系统都出了问题。但华盛顿互惠银行让我们进入了加利福尼亚州、内华达州的部分地区、亚利桑那州不是亚利桑那州、乔治亚州、佛罗里达州，这些我们之前没有涉足的地区。想想这些非常健康的州。他们有2,300家分行。他们有巨大的抵押贷款问题。

whole system is in trouble. But WAMU put us in California, parts of Nevada, Arizona not Arizona, Georgia, Florida, which we weren't in. So think of these really healthy states. And they had 2,300 branches. They had huge mortgage problems.

但我们反复研究了它。所以我们知道他们的抵押贷款账簿有问题。我们核销了我们以

But we had looked at it over and over and over. So we knew their mortgage books called. And we wrote off we bought it for

这一切都是

And this was all

在我们以300亿美元的折扣价收购它之前，相对于有形账面价值，因为他们有债务，我们把债务留在了后面。那300亿美元大约是抵押贷款损失的部分。所以我们收购这家公司时，可以认为我们买了一个干净的公司。我们核销了所有那些东西。账簿是干净的。

before We bought it for a $30,000,000,000 discount to tangible book value because they had debt, and we left the debt behind. And that 30,000,000,000 was approximately what the Moore's loss was going to be. So we bought the company think of it, we bought a company clean. We wrote off all that stuff. The books were clean.

然后我们还做了一件前所未闻的事情。第二天或两天后，我进入市场又筹集了110亿美元的股权，其实我并不需要。但再次，这是我的保守主义。我当时想，你知道吗？情况可能会变得更糟，我不想在资本流动性上捉襟见肘。

And then we did something unheard of too. The next day or two days later, I went in the market and raised another $11,000,000,000 of equity, which I didn't really need. But again, this is my conservatism. I was like, you know what? This could get even worse, and and I don't wanna be short capital liquidity.

所以我们，你知道，我们筹集资金是为了确保我们的资产负债表像收购华盛顿互惠银行后一样强健，甚至比之前更稳固。

So we, you know, we raised that to make sure our balance sheet was just as strong as it was after WAMU than it was before WAMU.

而且你们已经具备实现这一目标的信誉了，对吧？想象一下在金融危机最严重的月份，谁能出去筹集110亿美元的股权资金？

And you already had the reputation to pull this off. Right? I'm imagining in the worst month of the financial crisis, who can go out and raise $11,000,000,000 of equity?

是

Was

人们信任你们。

People people trust you.

是的。我们认识很多股东，要知道，股东的信任是长期积累的。我们向他们做了简短的演示，很多人积极响应说这很棒。他们也清楚我们有执行力——人们常忽略在贝尔斯登收购案后，第二天就有五万名员工开始整合五千个应用程序、分支机构、薪酬体系、结算系统和支付系统，工作量巨大。

Yeah. We knew a lot the shareholders, and, you know, you earn your trust over time with shareholders. And we explained We gave them a quick little presentation over the Yeah, and a lot of them stepped up and said, This is great. And they also know we can execute it because behind the bare sterns, people forget the work is the next day you've got 50,000 people consolidating 5,000 applications, branches, compensation programs, settlement programs, payment systems. It's a lot of work.

但我们显然具备这种能力，也具备整合华盛顿互惠银行的实力。我们九个月内就完成了所有整合工作，让他们全部接入同一套系统，这样就能开始提升客户服务等环节。

But we obviously have the capability to do that, and we have the capability to do WAMU. I think we finished the WAMU consolidations in nine months, all of them. So that within nine months, they were all in the same systems, which allows you to start doing a better job in customer service and things like that.

那么这种'堡垒式资产负债表'策略，筹集股权资本，保持额外安全边际和保守会计处理，现在回头看似乎是经营大型金融机构的明智之选。为什么其他机构没有效仿？现在大家是否都这样管理银行了？

So this fortress balance sheet strategy and raising this equity capital and, you know, having additional margin of safety and conservative accounting, in retrospect, it seems like the obvious right strategy for running a large financial institution. Why wasn't everyone else copying it? Have people changed, and does everyone else run their banks like this now?

我认为现在人们更保守了，监管也更严格。但有些人仍会采用激进的会计手段，没有真正压力测试自己的银行。你看有人承担了过高利率风险、信用敞口、期权风险，有时则是新产品的问题。

I think people the people are more conservative today. I think regulators are more conservative today. But again, I go back to people get involved in aggressive accounting. They don't look at stressing their own bank in real way. You know, you saw people take too much interest rate risk, too much credit exposure, too much optionality risk, and and or or sometimes it's new products.

纵观金融服务业，往往是新产品引发危机。这些产品需要时间检验——1929年的股票、后来的期权、

So if you look at the financial services, very often it's the new products that blow up. It takes a while. They haven't been through a cycle. And you had with equities way back in 1929. You had it with options.

股票衍生品、抵押贷款都出过问题。就连政府担保的吉利美（Ginnie Mae）也曾暴雷。

You had it with equity derivatives. You had it with mortgages. You had it with Ginnie even Ginnie Mae's at one point blew up, even though they're government guaranteed.

可以说，你在量化宽松和LTE时代已经经历过这种情况。

Arguably, you had it with quant and with LTE.

这在Quanta时期发生过。在杠杆贷款时期也发生过。然后人们会变得更理性，思考如何管理这些资产负债表以及如何评估风险。

It happened with Quanta. It happened with leveraged lending. It And then people then become more rational how they run these balance sheets and how they think through the risk.

所以我必须问你，这就是今天的私募信贷吗？

So so I have to ask you, is this private credit today?

再说一遍？

Say it again?

这就是今天的私募信贷吗？

Is this private credit today?

我其实不这么认为。我不认为它达到了2万亿美元。它增长迅速，这是个问题。但市场还有另一个特点，其中有一些非常优秀的参与者知道自己在做什么。

I I don't really think so. I I don't think it's $2,000,000,000,000. It's grown rapidly. That's an issue. But what happens the other thing about markets, there's some very good actors in it who know what they're doing.

客户喜欢这个产品。所以我总是说，客户喜欢它。但也有些人不知道自己在做什么，而且它增长迅速。所以其中可能有一天会出现问题。我不认为这是系统性的。

Customers like the product. So I always say, well, the customers like it. And but there are also people who don't know what they're doing, and it's grown rapidly. So there it may there may be something in there would become a problem one day. I don't think it's systemic.

那2万亿美元的抵押贷款市场，当它崩溃时，我要说是9万亿美元。损失了1万亿美元。你知道，而且那是

So that $2,000,000,000,000 the mortgage market, when the time it blew up was, I'm going say, 9,000,000,000,000. And a trillion dollars was lost. Is, you know, and it was

1万亿美元在当时也更多

A trillion dollars was also more

是的。许多这些私募信贷不像那时那样杠杆化。这并不意味着不会有问题，但情况略有不同。你看整个系统，还有其他杠杆化的东西可能会引发问题。当然，人们会以你看不见的方式秘密加杠杆。

than a trillion dollars back then. Yeah. Lot of these private credits are not leveraged like That doesn't mean there won't be problems, but it's slightly different. You look at the whole system, there are other things out there that are leveraged that can cause problems. Of course, people take secret levers in ways you don't necessarily see it.

在你看来，今天有哪些潜在的问题？

What are some of these in your mind that are potentially problematic today?

嗯，你看。当我观察资产价格时，它们处于高位。我不是说这不好，但如果今天的市盈率是15而不是23，我会说风险小得多。下跌空间小，还有上涨潜力。而在23倍的情况下，上涨空间不大，下跌空间却很大。

Well, look. I I look at when you look at asset price, they're high. Now I'm not saying it's bad, but if we if if today PEs were 15 as opposed to 23, I say that's a lot less risk. A lot less to fall and you have some upside. I would say at 23, there's not a lot of upside and there's a long way to fall.

信用利差也是如此。我们会对所有情况进行压力测试。每周要做大约100次压力测试，以确保我们能应对各种情况。另外，对我来说最大的风险是网络安全。我认为我们在网络安全方面做得很好。

And that's true with credit spreads. And look at we stress test everything. We do like 100 stress tests a week you know, and to make sure we can handle a wide variety of things. And then the other thing, and the biggest risk to me is cyber. I mean, I I think this cyber stuff is, you know, we we're very good at it.

我们与所有政府机构合作。他们会说链条是牢固的。我们每年在这方面投入约8亿美元。我们对此进行人员培训。但问题是，你谈论的是电网、通信公司、供水系统，甚至部分军事设施。

We work with all the government agencies. They would say the chain was up. We spend $800,000,000 a year or something on it. We educate people on it. We just do But it is you're talking about grids and communications companies and water, and even part of the military establishment.

如果我们卷入任何涉及网络战的冲突，现有的防护措施是不够的。中国在这方面非常擅长。俄罗斯也是，但俄罗斯主要是犯罪性质，这略有不同。

The protections are not what you need if we ever get in any kind of war where cyber is involved. And China is very good at it. And so is Russia, but Russia is mostly criminal, which is slightly different.

好的。什么？我要把话题拉回来。我们要快进到2023年。

Alright. What? I'm gonna pull us back to the story. We're gonna fast forward to 2023.

我们其实不太适合谈论俄罗斯。这不是我们收购后要做的事，但他们...

We're not really equipped to talk about, yeah, Russia. So it's not what we do when acquired, but but they

硅谷银行和第一共和银行都倒闭了。你又在那里。你预见到了吗？从2008年的经历中，你学到了哪些可以应用到2023年的教训？

Silicon Valley Bank Yeah. And First Republic both fail. You're there again. Did you see it coming? What lessons did you learn from how 2008 went that you could apply in 2023?

显然，你收购了第一共和银行。是的。

Obviously, you bought First Republic. Yeah.

那是硅谷银行。你知道，硅谷银行做过一些很好的事情。但它们都有一个我们当时不知道的独特问题。我称之为集中存款。不是因为未投保，而是因为人们误解了集中这个词。

It's a Silicon Valley bank. You know, they both Silicon Valley bank did some very good stuff. But they both had something unique that we didn't know at the time. I'm going call them concentrated deposits. Not uninsured because people misdating that concentrated.

因此有大量风险资本。硅谷银行和第一共和银行发生的情况是，一些大型风投公司——可能有数百甚至上千家——通知他们投资的客户，这些客户都在硅谷银行和第一共和银行开户，说这些银行不安全，建议撤资。于是客户们集体提取存款。硅谷银行我记得单日流失了2000亿或1000亿美元的存款。

And so a lot of venture capital. And what happened with Silicon Valley Bank and First Republic is some of these large venture capital companies, call them hundreds of them, maybe a thousand, told their constituent clients that they invested in, who all banked in Silicon Valley and First Republic, the banks aren't safe. Get out. And they all removed their deposits. And Silicon Valley Bank, I think they had 200,000,000,000 deposits or 200,000,000,000 100,000,000,000 in one day.

这引发了问题，但银行本身也有其他问题。它们流动性管理不当，没有向美联储足额抵押，还承担了过高利率风险。而会计处理掩盖了利率风险——采用'持有至到期'记账方式，连国债都不用作市价调整。

And that caused the problem, but they also had other problems. They didn't have proper liquidity. They didn't have their collateral posted to the Fed, and they had taken too much interest rate exposure. And the interest rate exposure was hidden by accounting. It was called held to maturity, where you don't have to mark even treasuries to market.

我一直反感'持有至到期'记账，虽然它能美化监管指标。但当采用这种方式时，假设某银行账面净值是100，如果对其中一项资产按市价计量，净值可能瞬间缩水到50——这时你就进入主观判断领域了。

And I always hated held to maturity because, but it gives you better regulatory returns and stuff like that. But when that held to maturity, the tan if you said, what's the tangible book value of one of these banks? You said it was a 100. Well, all of a sudden, was 50 if you just marked that one thing to market. And now you're into judgment land.

当你发现某银行仅因一项资产市价调整，就导致有形账面净值跌至面值的40%或30%时，你会恐慌吗？我会认为风险过高。监管机构当初也误导了我们，声称利率将长期保持低位。结果这些银行大举买入3%利率的抵押贷款，当利率升至5%时，这些资产价值就跌至面值的60%或50%。

At what point, if you saw a bank where just that one mark had the tangible book value dropped to 40 or 30¢ to the dollar, would you panic? I would have said, that's too much risk. And, you know, the regulators helped us because they said rates are going to stay low forever. So these banks bought a lot of 3% mortgages. And when, you know, 3% mortgage, when rates went up to 5%, you know, worth 60¢ to the dollar or 50¢.

这就是症结所在。两家银行都明知故犯地承担过高利率风险，监管机构也知情且本可纠正。我们对硅谷银行有所了解，当时正试图拓展该领域业务，事后深入研究如何更好服务风投生态系统。现在我们在帕洛阿尔托建立了完整园区。

And that was it. And so both those had they took too much interest rate exposure, known to management, and it was known to the regulators and, you know, and fixable. So, you know, we we knew about a little bit about Silicon Valley Bank. We were trying to compete in that area, so we learned a lot afterwards about how to do a better job for that ecosystem of venture capital. We have a whole campus in Palo Alto now.

我们已招聘500名创新银行家，覆盖风投公司。虽然目前不及他们专业，但凭借差异化组织架构终将赶超。我们对第一共和银行也很了解。

We've hired 500 innovation bankers. We cover, venture capital companies. We're not as good as they are yet. We're we're going get there because we're we're organized slightly differently. And we knew First Republic.

我们一直密切关注。我曾致电耶伦表示该公司及另外一两家机构陷入困境，若需要我们可以接手收购来化解危机。可惜他们行动稍迟。

We were watching it. I called Janet Yellen that I said, that that company's in trouble, and one or two others. If you want to, we'll take a look. We could probably buy it and eliminate the problem. They waited a little bit too long.

情况就像逐渐融化的冰块。但收购当天我们就完全控制了局面——几天内对冲所有风险敞口，完成全面整合并计提充分减值。

Was kind of a little melting ice cube. But you can imagine, the day we bought it, you never heard about it again. We hedged all their exposures in a couple of days. And, you know, we merged everything in. We wrote everything down.

我们确实从中获得了优质资源，包括优秀人才。通常并购中接收的团队表现糟糕需要裁撤，但我们研究了他们的客户服务模式——在座可能有他们的客户——他们在高净值客户服务方面很出色，提供单点联系和礼宾服务。

And we did get some good stuff from them. We actually got some good people. You know, the normal thing in acquisition is they're terrible, get rid of them, or they failed. But we also looked at what they did, how they dealt with clients. Some of may be clients here.

现在如果你走在麦迪逊大道，会看到'摩根大通财富中心'的招牌。

They did a great job with high net worth clients. Single point of contact, you know, concierge services. So now if you go down Madison Avenue, see things called JPMorgan Financial Center.

这是摩根大通首次推出面向消费者的品牌活动，对吧？

That's your first JPMorgan branded consumer effort. Right?

因为它某种程度上基于这个理念。当你走进来，我们了解你的小企业、你的房贷、你的个人银行业务。我们可以为你安排旅行，还能提供各种服务。这些都是非常高端的服务，目前我们已有20项此类服务。

Because it's kind of based on that. When you walk in there, we know your small business, we know your mortgage, we know your consumer banking. We can get you travel, we can do a whole bunch of different stuff. So very high level services. I think we have 20 of them now.

但我非常看好这个模式。如果顺利的话，二十年后我们可能会有300项服务。这些都是发展机遇，我希望它能成功。虽然无法百分百确定，但目前为止进展良好。

But I'd love it. And if it works, you know, in twenty years, we'll have 300. And so these things are opportunities, and I hope it works. You know, you don't always know they're gonna work for a fact, but but so far, so good.

好了听众朋友们，现在该聊聊我们最喜爱的公司之一——Statsig了。

Alright, listeners. Now it is time to talk about one of our favorite companies, Statsig.

Statsig是数百家优秀企业产品开发团队的首选工具，包括OpenAI、Notion、Rippling、Brex、Atlassian等。为什么这些高速增长的公司都在使用Statsig？

Statsig is the tool of choice for product development teams at hundreds of great companies, including OpenAI, Notion, Rippling, Brex, Atlassian, and more. So why are all of these hypergrowth companies using Statsig?

过去，每家大型科技公司都要耗费数年重建相同的数据工具，比如功能开关、产品A/B测试、日志服务、产品分析、仪表盘等等。但现在新一代的优秀公司都在直接使用Statsig。

Well, in the past, every major tech company spent years rebuilding the same internal data tools, like feature flags, product AB testing, logging services, product analytics, dashboards, you name it. But the latest generation of great companies are just using Statsig.

没错。Statsig将原本只有科技巨头才拥有的整套数据工具重建为独立产品，包括前沿的产品实验、安全部署的功能开关、会话回放、分析等功能，所有数据都基于统一的产品数据集。这是个构建更好产品的完整解决方案。

Yep. Statsig has rebuilt the entire suite of data tools that previously was only in use at the biggest tech giants as a standalone product. This includes cutting edge product experimentation, feature flags for safe deployments, session replays, analytics, and more, all backed by a single set of product data. It's a holistic suite to build better products.

Statsig还原生支持数据仓库，可以直接接入Snowflake、BigQuery等现有数据系统。这意味着更强的隐私性和安全性——对金融行业的听众特别友好，而且无需把数据发送到另一个工具。

Statsig is also warehouse native, so it can plug directly into your existing data in Snowflake, BigQuery, whatever you're using. That means way more privacy and security, great for any finance listeners out there, plus no sending your data to yet another tool.

如果你准备为产品和技术团队配备优质数据工具，请访问statsig.com/acquired开始使用。他们提供慷慨的免费套餐和5万美元的创业扶持计划。记得告诉他们是本和大卫推荐你们的。

So if you're ready to give your product and engineering teams access to great data tools, go to statsig.com/acquired to get started. That's statsig.com/acquired. They have a generous free tier and a $50,000 startup program. Just remember to tell them that Ben and David sent you.

好了，我们现在基本上讲到了现状。如果我们要...现在我们已经掌握了完整故事脉络，有了充分背景。显然我们没涉及每个细节，如果现在要探讨的是...这是种生活方式吗？

Alright. So we're we're effectively caught up to today. And if we're trying to and now we've got the whole story. We've got a lot of context. Obviously, let didn't go into every detail, if we're now trying to Is a lifestyle?

是的。如果我们现在要回答这个问题：你是如何从竞争中脱颖而出的？为什么你能变得与所有竞争对手截然不同？在你看来，是什么因素促成了这一成功？

Yes. If we're now trying to answer the question, how did you separate from the pack? Why did you become a completely different animal than your whole competitive set? What are the things in your mind that led to this success?

嗯，听着，我...我的意思是，我并不完全清楚。首先因为我们稍微跳过了战略部分。这是我们重要的驱动力——我们所做的与社区银行相同，除了投行业务，全球投行业务。明白吗？如果你走进一家小型社区银行，他们了解你的企业账户、个人账户，通常还设有信托公司。

Well, look, I I mean, I don't I don't know totally. First of all, because we skipped over strategy a little bit. And this is an important fuel that we we we have what we do is the same thing that a community bank does other than investment bank, global investment banking. Okay? So if you walk into a small community bank, they know your business account, they know your consumer account, they usually have a trust company.

他们过去常称之为信托业务。他们会管理你的私人事务，为你设立信托，处理这类事情。他们的客户关系管理就在这儿——不需要Salesforce系统，因为他们认识镇上的每个人。

They used to they used to call it trust. They'd manage your private affairs. They'd set up a trust for you, and they do it, stuff like that. And their CRM is up here. They don't need a Salesforce CRM because they know everyone in town.

但他们不做大型全球投行业务。而战略上，这些业务是相互契合的。它们彼此滋养，投行业务也是如此。我们许多中型市场客户使用投行产品，许多个人客户使用外汇服务。

And they didn't do big time global investment banking. But the strategy, those businesses fit together. They feed each other, and so does investment banking. A lot of our middle market clients use investment banking products. A lot of our consumer clients use some FX.

所以我们的所有业务都相互促进。没有冗余部分。我们剔除了所有不符合战略的内容。然后你开始构建客户业务和服务体系，打造堡垒般的资产负债表和会计体系等等。我一直强调...

So all of our businesses feed each other. There's no extraneous. We got rid of everything that didn't fit a strategy. And then you start building client businesses and client services, fortress balance sheet, fortress accounting, all those various things. And, you know, I I and I've always talked about

所以这是持有能相互促进的业务组合。

So it's it's it's holding a portfolio of things that actually feed each other.

它们确实契合。而花旗曾有的消费金融业务就不匹配，人寿保险业务也不协调。

They actually fit. Whereas, you know, Citi had consumer finance. That didn't fit. Life insurance. That didn't fit.

财产保险业务也不合适——他们最终剥离了所有这些。可当时还想扩张更多。比如收购了做卡车租赁的美国通用公司。一旦涉足这些领域，人们很难理解每项业务的风险。但我们的所有业务都紧密契合。

Property cals. That didn't they eventually got rid of them all. Just wanted to do more of them. You know, he bought American General, which did, truck leasing for god's sake. I mean and you once you get involved in these things, it's hard for people to understand the risk in each one of these businesses when but all of ours fit.

我不喜欢副业。我们确实犯过不少错误，因为必须尝试和测试。但你始终要为未来投资——这些投资永远是人、分支机构和科技。

I don't like hobbies. I don't like things. You know, we may and we've made plenty of mistakes because you you have to try and test things. And then you're always investing for the future. That investment is always people, branches, and technology.

无论是投行人才、零售银行人才，开设零售分行，还是像道格·佩诺和特洛伊·罗尔巴克（他们负责全球投行业务）在欧洲各地开设商业银行分行——据反馈进展顺利，并且反哺公司其他部门。所以关键在于专注本业、持续投资、不对市场过度反应。市场就像手风琴般起伏。

That's true whether investment banking people or consumer bank people or opening consumer branches or I think Doug Penno is here and Troy Rohrbach who run the Global Investment Bank, but they've opened commercial banking branches all over Europe. And I think you're telling me, it's going great. And it's feeding all other parts of the company. So just sticking to your knitting, constantly investing, not overreacting to the market. Markets are like accordions.