比尔·阿克曼：投资策略、市场忽略的要点、人工智能如何颠覆企业

这个国家最具争议也最有趣的投资者之一。

One of the most provocative and interesting investors in the country.

一位传奇的积极派投资者。

A legendary activist investor.

Pershing Square的首席执行官兼创始人，阿克曼。

Pershing Square CEO and founder, Ackman.

做空并公开宣布，这可不是小事。

Taking a short position and going public with it is a pretty serious business.

有意思的是，世界上一些最优秀的企业，现在的估值倍数却低得惊人。

Interestingly, some of the best businesses in the world are trading at the lowest multiples.

我们某种程度上重新点燃了封闭式投资基金的活力。

We're kind of the rebirth of the closed end investment company universe.

你对OpenAI的首席执行官莎拉怎么看？

What did you think of Sarah, the CEO of Open AI?

抱歉，我说的是首席财务官。

I'm sorry, CFO.

她确实有CEO的气场。

Felt like the CEO.

是的。

Yeah.

我当时在想，

I I was

别再说那些了。

Stop with that stuff.

其实我特别佩服她。

Actually, I was super impressed.

这让我对OpenAI更加看好。

Made me a lot more bullish on Open AI.

你觉得对吧？

And I thought Right?

我觉得她才应该是OpenAI的CEO。

I thought she should be CEO of Open AI.

我也是这么想的。

That's what I thought.

我觉得萨姆

I think Sam

应该当董事长。

should be chair.

我本来想问她一个问题，但没来得及问，就是和萨姆一起工作是什么感觉？

Think there was a question I wanted to ask her that we didn't get time, which was what's it like working with Sam?

我的意思是，那可能真的特别

I mean, that could have been like Probably super

我想先开场。

I wanted to kick this off.

非常感谢你今天能来。

So thank you so much for being here.

我们之前几次都想邀请你参加《All-In》，现在终于把你请来了，太好了。

We've tried a number of times to get you to All-In and it's great to to finally have you.

你显然是个传奇人物，根本不需要我多介绍。

You obviously are a legend that doesn't need much of an introduction.

最近这几年、几个月、几个季度，不管你怎么说，感觉你的投资理念好像有了变化——以前你总是积极介入，买入又卖出，但最近你经常提到更偏向于长期持有的策略。

Lately, in the last number of, call it years or months or quarters or what have you, it seems like your investment philosophy may be changing, your model, where you've been activist and you've entered positions and exited positions, and lately you've talked a lot about more kind of permanent long term holdings.

我很想听听，这确实是个转变吗？你的投资思路这些年是怎么一步步演变的？

Would love to hear a little bit about if that is actually a change and how your evolution and your investment model has kind of changed over over time.

当然。

Sure.

我觉得最大的变化，就是我越来越意识到‘企业质量’的重要性。

So I would say the biggest change over time is an appreciation for the importance of what we call business quality.

那种长期稳定、有护城河、不容易被颠覆的增长。

Long term, durable, protected, non disruptable growth.

早年的时候，你资金规模小，流动性强，

I would say early days, you're smaller, more liquid investor.

没必要想得太长远。

You don't have to think as long term.

当你成长为一个更集中、规模更大的投资者时，随着时间推移，你会越来越意识到持久增长的重要性。

As you become a bigger concentrated investor, and over time you learn the importance of durable kind of growth.

这才是最关键的因素。

That's the most important factor.

我觉得我跟以前一样积极，只不过现在更多是在推特上发声，而不是在公司内部推动。

I would say I'm as activist as I've ever been, but more of it's on Twitter than than I would say in the corporate context.

原因是我刚在对冲基金Pershing Square起步的时候，根本没人认识我们。

And the reason for that is when I started in at Pershing Square, no one sort of knew who we were.

我们最早的一笔投资之一就是温迪汉堡。

And so I actually one of our first investments was Wendy's International.

那时候温迪还拥有加拿大咖啡和甜甜圈连锁店蒂姆霍顿斯。

Wendy's own Tim Hortons, the Canadian coffee and doughnut chain.

蒂姆霍顿斯的价值，甚至超过了温迪整个公司的市值。

And the value of Tim Hortons was more than the entire value of Wendy's.

所以我们当时有个很简单的想法：买下温迪，把蒂姆霍顿斯分拆出去，就能让我们的投资翻倍。

So we had this very simple idea, buy Wendy's, spin off Tim Hortons, double our money.

我们买了公司10%的股份，然后给首席执行官打电话，他根本没回我。

And we bought 10% of the company, and I called the CEO and he didn't return my call.

我又打了一次，他还是没回。

And I called him again, he didn't return my call.

我 literally 就是连个回电都得不到。

I literally couldn't get a return phone call.

这事儿就这么开始了。

That was the beginning.

于是我们找了个在黑石工作的朋友，史蒂夫·施瓦茨曼同意帮我们出一份报告，评估如果把蒂姆霍顿斯分拆出去，温迪斯值多少钱。

So we actually called a friend who worked at Blackstone, and Steve Schwartzman agreed to write a fairness opinion on what Wendy's would be worth if we spun off to Hortons.

我们把报告发出去，公开提交了，六周后他们就把蒂姆霍顿斯分拆了。

We kind of mailed it in and filed it publicly, and six weeks later they spun off

天哪。

Wow.

分拆出了蒂姆霍顿斯。

To Hortons.

后来，那位首席执行官终于回了我电话，还向我道谢。

And then the CEO finally called me back and he thanked me.

他当时已经被解雇了，但他还是感谢我，因为他拿到了一大笔离职补偿，特别满意。

And he had gotten fired and and but he thanked me because he had a huge exit package and was very happy.

一开始我们连个回电都打不通，那时候我们还很小。

But So in the beginning, we couldn't get a return phone call, so we had to and we were small.

所以我们得去参加展会，做演讲，还得上CNBC接受采访。

So we had to go to a conference, and we had to, you know, do presentations and go on CNBC.

时间久了，你就开始进入董事会，慢慢被人认作是投资者。

What happens over time is you join boards of directors, become known as an investor.

我们算是那种有建设性的股东。

You know, we're kind of a constructive shareholder.

标普500强的CEO，我基本都认识，要么直接认识，要么就隔一个人。

I know pretty much every CEO in S and P 500 either directly or one person removed.

我年纪是大了点，但你慢慢会建立起声誉，现在我们投资一家公司，就是这么回事。

And, you know, maybe I age I've aged a bit, but you build kind of a reputation and today we buy a stake in a company.

有时候他们会发推文说，欢迎珀钦广场成为股东，但实际上，是他们自己打开了门。

Sometimes they'll put out a tweet saying, we welcome Perching Square as a shareholder, but they opened the door for us.

刚开始的时候，我们得砸门进去，现在如果需要的话，我们会深度参与公司事务。

In the beginning, had to bang down the door and today So we get very deeply involved in our companies if it's needed.

至于其他我们投资的公司，根本不需要我们做什么，就坐在那儿鼓掌就行了。

Other companies we own, there's no nothing for us to do, just be to, you know, just clap.

所以，你现在被认为是一个能带来价值的投资者了？

So, you are considered a value add investor at this point?

是的。

Yeah.

但我们只希望真正带来价值。

But we only wanna add value.

昨晚的谈话还挺有意思的。

The conversation last night was kind of an interesting one.

你知道吗，最好的投资是那种根本不需要你进董事会、也不用做任何事的。

You know, the best investments are one where you don't need to join the board and do anything.

这在初创公司里或许成立，但在成熟企业就不一定了。

Well, that may be in a startup, but in a mature business it may be

不对。

No.

我觉得在上市公司这个背景下，我们能提供的一大价值就是应对当今市场和分析师普遍过于短视的问题。

I think in in the public company context, one of the valuable things we can do, problem of being a public company today is kind of the very short term nature of markets, analysts, etcetera.

要经营好一家企业，真正的好企业是面向长远的。

And obviously to run a business, a business is a good one, is a forever thing.

你得从几十年，至少三五年的时间维度来做决策。

And you wanna make decisions in the context of decades sometimes or certainly three, five years.

可如果别人总在问你第二季度的税率，你怎么做这种决策？

And how can you do that when someone's asking about the tax rate in the second quarter?

如果有大股东在董事会里，你可以在公开之前先跟他们探讨想法，他们能说‘我支持这个举措，哪怕它会拖累未来几个季度的利润’，这非常有帮助。

And having a big shareholder on the board where you can kind of test ideas out with the big shareholder before you expose them to the public, where the big shareholder can say, I'm supportive of this initiative even though it's gonna hurt earnings in the next few quarters is a helpful thing.

我想把刚才和萨拉的对话跟这一点联系起来。

I just wanna connect this last conversation with Sarah to this.

你投资人工智能领域吗？

Are you an investor in the AI complex?

从外部来看，你怎么评估整个领域里企业的商业模式质量？

And how do you underwrite business model quality from what you see on the outside in in the entire complex?

嗯，说白了，我们确实是个投资者。

I mean, yes, effectively, we're an investor.

我们现在持有了微软、Meta 和亚马逊的股票。

We're actually today we own Microsoft, we own Meta, we own Amazon.

其实不管你愿不愿意，你都直接或间接地投资了人工智能。

Actually, think you're either directly or indirectly, you're invested in AI.

没错。

Yeah.

不然它就是一种威胁。

Or it's a threat.

所以你必须得理解它。

So you have to you have to understand it.

从商业模式的角度来看，我该怎么理解人工智能？

How do I think about AI in a business model context?

没错。

Yeah.

商业模式的质量。

Business model quality.

对。

Yeah.

你看，作为一个集中型投资者，或者任何长期投资者，最重要也最难的是判断颠覆性风险。

Look, when you're a concentrated investor or investor generally and you're long term investor, the most important and most challenging thing to do is determine what's the risk of disruption.

比如，有没有可能两个来自斯坦福的学生，在车库里搞出点什么新东西。

What's the risk of two guys, two women from Stanford in a garage, you know, coming up with something.

我觉得这种风险已经大大增加了。

That risk I think has gone up dramatically.

这绝对是历史上最适合创业的时代。

This is the greatest era in history just to build a business.

对吧？

Right?

现在计算资源唾手可得，尤其是对初创公司来说，资本也几乎取之不尽，再加上大量顶尖人才，这意味着你被颠覆的可能性已经大大增加。

There's unlimited access to compute, you know, certainly for a startup, unlimited access to capital, and a lot of incredible talent, which means that the probability of your being disrupted has gone up enormously.

所以作为投资者，最难的事就是真正理解这一点，而这正是我们最花时间去琢磨的——我们的风险到底在哪。

So the hardest thing you have to do as an investor is understand, you know, and and that's really where we spend most of What's our

在这种情况下，你的倾向是什么？

your tendency in a moment like this then?

你是倾向于拥抱不确定性，还是转向那些更持久、更抗AI颠覆的领域，也就是那些不容易被撼动的业务？

Do you swing towards the chaos or do you reposition to things that are maybe more durable and defensible from AI where the disruptability is less?

市场有趣的地方在于，人们总是盯着最新的东西。

What's interesting about markets is people always bring their eye to the new new thing.

而最新的热点，无非就是芯片、半导体和能源。

And the new new thing is sort of chips and semiconductors and energy.

短期资本确实都往这些地方涌。

And that's where, you know, the shorter term capital is going.

往往那些质量特别高的东西会被忽略。

What tends to happen is really high quality things get left behind.

2000年那波泡沫里，也发生过类似的情况。

And the same thing really happened I there in 2000 in that sort of bubble.

但这次不一样。

This is different.

我不是说完全一样，但确实有些相似之处。

I'm not saying this is But there's some analogies.

当时人们狂热追捧互联网股票，而伯克希尔·哈撒韦的估值跌到了历史最低点，因为大家都觉得，那些都是老掉牙的东西了。

And the analogies are people got excited about Internet stocks and Berkshire Hathaway traded at the lowest valuation I think it ever traded out of its history as people said, okay, that's all old stuff.

今天我觉得也在重演同样的故事，只不过主角换成了亚马逊、Meta和微软。

I think a similar thing is happening today sense in to Amazon and Meta, Microsoft.

就是那些公司。

Those are the ones that

在大家眼里，这些都算是过时的公司了，哦，对。

These are these are old fashioned companies in kind of this Oh, yeah.

你知道，OpenAI 这类公司，

You know, the open AI So,

你觉得它们被低估了？

you're undervalued in your mind?

对，确实被低估了。

Yes.

还有哪些被低估了？

What else is undervalued?

那 SaaS 行业呢？

What about the SaaSpocalypse?

现在是不是已经跌过头了？

So, is it oversold at this point?

我觉得这需要仔细分析。

Again, I think it's a careful analysis.

我更担心的是 Salesforce，而不是你那种情况，你得自己做足功课。

I worry more about a Salesforce than I do about your kind of I think you gotta do the work.

我觉得得一家公司一家公司来看。

I think it's one company at a time.

但如果你现在是一家软件公司，那就得尽可能把AI能力整合进去。

But I think if, you know, if you're a software company today, you have to be as AI enabled as you can.

以前有些公司靠卖 niche 的软件产品，动不动就收客户三万美元一年，这种垄断式的赚钱方式，现在我觉得行不通了。

You can I I think there have been sort of monopolistic type profit taking off of customers when someone had a kind of a niche software product, they're charging, you know, 30,000 a year or something like this?

这些公司现在其实挺危险的。

I think those companies are really at risk.

微软的客户平均一年才花五十美元左右，这种平台的价值反而更高，而且这种模式的利润空间反而更小。

Microsoft, when the average customer is paying, I don't know, $50 a seat or some small number, that platform is worth a lot more and I there's less of

咱们能不能回过头说说疫情那会儿？你当时在CNBC上拍着桌子说，事情会怎么发展。

wanna go back to COVID because you had an incredibly viral moment where you were on CNBC at that moment and you pounded the table and you said, this is what's gonna happen.

结果市场真的就立刻崩了，你一开始判断的是下跌。

And literally the market just ripped and you you were well, first it went traded massively down.

你对了，看准了下跌，后来市场反弹的时候，你又站对了方向。

You were right on that side of the trade, and then you were on the right side of the trade when it ripped back up.

然后我觉得大概一个月前，你公开拍着桌子说，这市场还要涨得更高。

And then I think it was maybe a month or two ago, I think publicly you basically pounded the table and said, this market's going way higher.

你能跟我们说说，你心里是怎么想的吗？你这么积极表态，其实风险很大，一旦错了就容易出丑，可一旦对了，又让比尔·阿克曼的名声更响了，而你本来就有很多这种故事。

Can you just put us in your head, like, where does that desire to be so active and you know, it it gives you so much room to be wrong, but then when you're right, it does add to the lore of Bill Ackman, of which you have a lot.

那你是怎么平衡这个的？

So how do you balance that?

这种冲动到底从哪儿来的？

Where does it come from?

为什么每次到了这种关键时刻，你就是那么确信，非得说出来不可，还说得这么高调？

Like, why in these moments do you just get so convicted that the conviction just has to spill out and then you're just so out there?

我一直都是这样，高中毕业册上给我的评语就是‘最爱说话的人’。

So I've always been like my high school yearbook epithet was most verbose.

我也是。

Me too.

其实我有个朋友就住在这附近。

And actually, my my friend actually lives around here.

他在我年鉴里我名字旁边写的那句话是：闭嘴不会招来麻烦。

He his quote that he put next to my name in my yearbook, It says, a closed mouth gathers no foot.

那是他写的。

That was his.

我一直都信奉这句话。

And so that's kind of what I've lived by.

我总是有一种冲动，想把事情的真相说出来。

I've always had this sort of desire to speak the truth about things.

我刚才其实跟杰克聊了，今天早上我们一起吃的早餐。

And, you know, I was just talking with Jake actually, we had breakfast this morning.

我们在聊我发的那条关于罗达的帖子。

And we're talking about my Rhonda post.

是的。

Yeah.

你还记得那条吗？

Remember that one?

有些事情就是得说出来，得讨论一下。

So, like, you know, there's just certain things that need to be shared and discussed.

说到市场，实际情况是我很担心这个国家，我觉得我们至少得暂停两周。

But with respect to markets, I actually what happened was I was concerned about the country because I felt we needed to have basically a two week pause.

那会儿是二月还是三月。

This is March of or February.

应该是2020年3月。

I guess it was March 2020.

我当时以为就是短暂关停一下，让病毒缓一缓，医院也别被压垮了。

And I assumed we were gonna just do a short term shutdown, let the virus cool down as hospitals were kinda getting overwhelmed.

可那时候总统还没采取行动。

And the president hadn't done that yet.

我其实挺意外的。

I was kind of surprised by this.

所以我才上电视，想直接跟特朗普总统说：你们得把全国停摆两周。

And so that that was what inspired me to go on TV as a way to reach president Trump and say, look, we need to shut down the country just for two weeks.

我和迈克说，你得这么办。

You know, Mike And I said, look, you do this.

明白吗？

Okay?

病毒很快就会过去的。

The virus will blow over.

股市现在的估值低得惊人。

Stocks are at an incredibly cheap valuation.

只要我们处理得当，你就能赚大钱，我们正在买入。

If we handle this correctly, you're gonna make a ton of money and we're buying.

估值就像是拴住市场的绳子。

You know, valuation is like a tether on the market.

对吧？

Right?

一旦估值太高，就像橡皮筋被拉得太紧，迟早会弹回来。

When it gets too high, it's like this rubber band that's stretching and inevitably it bounces back.

但反过来也是一样的。

But it works the other way as well.

当股价变得太低时，这种橡皮筋反而会把估值往上拉。

When stocks get too cheap, there's this the rubber bands actually pulling valuations up.

对。

Right.

所以总有一些特定时刻，市场会达到那种状态。

And and so there there are certain moments where it gets to that place.

有时候，只要你点出来，就会让人心态上重新调整一下。

And sometimes actually, if you call that out, it causes people to have kind of a psychological reset.

最近发生了什么，让你注意到这种情况？

What happened recently that caused you to call that out?

Sucks的股价突然跌得离谱。

Sucks just got crazy cheap.

真正高质量的公司，价格低得不可思议。

Just incredibly cheap of really high quality companies.

对。

Right.

我不清楚。

I don't know.

我也说不准为什么。

I don't know why.

从基本面来看，价格低得离谱。

Find extremely cheap in fundamentals.

基本面呢，简单说就是一项金融资产的价值，取决于它一生中能产生的现金流的现值。

Fundamentals based on, you know, what's the value of a financial asset, the present value of the cash it generates over his life.

按这个标准，那些高质量的股票现在真的便宜得不行。

On that basis, stocks are really high quality companies are really cheap.

有没有办法去评估呢？我并不是想针对具体公司，但我们现在有三家公司要上市，还有像Palantir这样的公司。

Is there any way to underwrite, and I don't want to pick on specific companies, but we have the three that are going public and then you have like a Palantir, let's say.

这些公司现在在流行文化里特别火，Reddit上到处是讨论，公众关注度很高，高净值人群争相投资那些双层结构的SPV，结果最后被清空了股权结构。

And these things have become very popular in pop culture, in retargeting on subreddits, on the public's consciousness, high net worth individuals wanting to buy into SPVs that are double loaded and then getting wiped off the cap tables.

这些公司市值达到收入的100倍、50倍、150倍，真的能合理估值吗？

Is there any way to underwrite a 100 times revenue, 50 times revenue, a 150 times revenue in these companies?

还是说，只是因为需求太旺，才被严重高估了？

Or are these just tremendously overvalued because of the demand side?

我觉得，对SpaceX这样的公司，应该像投资风投项目一样来评估。

I think you underwrite a SpaceX the way you underwrite a venture capital investment.

有意思。

Interesting.

能详细说说吗？

Explain that.

展开讲讲。

Unpack it.

这里所有人都在做风险投资，对吧？

So everyone here invests in venture.

对吧？

Right?

你押的是谁在掌舵。

You you bet on, you know, who's running it.

对吧？

Right?

人才真的太强了。

The talent is enormous.

他们教过我，商学院一位教授说过，投资要看人、机会、环境和交易。

It's people They taught me I had a professor at business school, he said people, opportunity, context, deal.

说到人，SpaceX 的团队就是其中之一。

So on people, SpaceX One of Yeah.

机会嘛，也是顶尖的。

Opportunity, one of one.

环境方面，简直无可挑剔，说实话，我挺同情蓝色起源的，但对 SpaceX 没啥影响。

Context, you know, incredible and actually, you know, feel bad for Blue Origin, but not harmful to SpaceX.

关键是，他们并没有落后太多。

The fact that, you know, they're they're not way behind.

然后就轮到执行了。

Then you get to deal.

明白吗？

Okay?

这对SpaceX来说是个更复杂的问题。

That's the more complicated question for SpaceX.

我们也不知道估值最终会是多少，但如果是十亿、万亿，或者七千五百亿美元，那你就明白了。

Again, we don't know what the valuation is gonna be, but if it's a billion a trillion $750,000,000,000, then you say, okay.

我们不妨想想五年后的情况。

Well, let's think five years out.

那时候这家公司会是什么样子？

What does this company look like?

Starlink到底是什么？

You know, what is Starlink?

Starlink的发展趋势会怎样？

What's the trajectory of Starlink?

你知道吗，SpaceX在低成本太空发射这块几乎处于垄断地位。

You know, SpaceX is near monopoly in terms of low cost space launch.

这一点会变得越来越重要。

That's gonna become increasingly important.

就连亚马逊也不得不成为更大的客户，毕竟他们不是Blue Origin的，而且在AI时代，时间变得越来越宝贵。

And even Amazon is gonna have to become an even bigger customer because they're not Blue Origin's, you know and and time, I would say, has become increasingly valuable in the AI era.

对吧？

Right?

你要是推迟一个模型的上线，

You you delay a model.

我和大卫之前聊过，说到政府那边介入，故意拖延签署那项行政命令，就是想拖慢我们的进度。

We were talking David and I were talking about administration and and his kind of stepping in for the president not to sign that executive order just kind of slow us down.

据说如此。

Allegedly.

耽误一个月、两个月，现在可真不是小事。

You lose a month, you lose a couple of months today and it means a lot.

所以我觉得我唯一的问题是，我没算过这笔账，但说实话，我确实投资了X。

So I think the only question I have and I haven't done the math, I, you know, I I actually invested in X.

我投资了X AI。

I invested in x AI.

我通过一个SPV持有的股份。

I'm in an SPV.

罗恩·巴伦跟我说，比尔，你得投SpaceX。

Ron Baron said, Bill, you gotta invest in SpaceX.

所以我现在也投了，显然，我盼着能有个好结果。

So I So I'm I'm I'm in So now I have So obviously, I'm rooting for kind of a good outcome.

我只是还没算清楚

I just I haven't done the

你得想想，那Anthropic、OpenAI和Palantir呢？

You have to What about

Anthropic、OpenAI和Palantir呢？

Anthropic Open AI and Palantir?

好的。

Okay.

不好意思。

I'm sorry.

Anthropic、OpenAI 和 Palantir 也属于这一类。

Anthropic Open AI Palantir also fall into this category.

你们也会把这些当作风投项目来评估吗？

Do you underwrite those as venture investments as well?

你们对这些公司做过调研吗？

And have you done the work on those?

这些确实是风投项目，不过有意思的是，它们不是种子轮或 A 轮。

They're venture investments that do What's helpful is they're not seed or series a.

对吧？

Right?

它们一般是 D 轮或者 E 轮。

They're, you know, d or e.

但它们本质上还是风险投资。

But they're still like venture investments.

这些公司已经证明自己能产生大量收入。

These companies have proven they can generate a lot of revenues.

刚才我说到莎拉的时候，觉得她对资本投入的思考非常深入。

And actually, what I was just saying on Sarah, I thought she had a very, very thoughtful explanation on how they think about committing capital.

对吧？

Right?

但我没听到OpenAI这么说过，所以如果我是OpenAI，我一定会主动传达这个信息。

And and that's the thing I haven't heard from an OpenAI, which is why if I were OpenAI, I would be getting that message out.

因为从外面看，这个商业模式确实挺有意思的。

Because, you know, from the outside, you're like, it's a pretty interesting business model.

有一家公司花的钱远远超过它的收入，这怎么做到的？

You got a company that's spending making capital commitments that are massively in excess of revenues.

这种操作的难度，我觉得是相当高的。

And how do you do that and get you know, it's it's degree of difficulty I would say is hard.

你在这些传统财富500强企业的董事会任职，和那些首席执行官们交流时，他们是怎么看待人工智能的？

Your perch on the boards of, let's call it, these more traditional Fortune 500 type businesses in your conversations with those CEOs, how are they thinking about AI?

他们是先拿一些试点项目来试探吗？

Is it something that they're tipping into with pilots?

还是在推动全面的转型计划？

Are they doing transformation initiatives?

或者觉得这跟自己公司没关系，先放一放再说？

Do they think this doesn't really apply to us, we'll deal with it later?

你感觉他们对人工智能的接受程度到底怎么样？

What what's your sense of how they're adopting or embracing AI?

我觉得现在全美国的首席执行官都在想：我该怎么用人工智能？

Would say every CEO in America today is like, how do I use AI?

它对我的业务能有什么帮助？

How how does it apply to my business?

它会不会构成威胁？

How is it a threat?

他们得找个内部推动者。

They gotta find an internal champion.

可能还得从外面招个人进来。

They maybe have to recruit someone from the outside.

在我看来，他们最关心的，就是AI既是机遇也是威胁，排在第一位。

I would say on the hierarchy of things they worry about is probably number one, as both an opportunity and a threat.

如果你不重视，董事会每次开会第一个问题肯定就是：你们怎么应对AI的威胁？怎么抓住AI的机会？

So if you're not paying attention to it, you'll I mean, your board is gonna be asking you the first question every meeting about what how we dealing with the AI threat, how we dealing with the AI opportunity.

所以这绝对是他们最挂心的事。

So it's absolutely top of mind.

你看到早期的成功案例了吗？

Are you seeing much early success?

我是说，基于你对这些公司的了解。

I mean, are through your, you know, again, your visibility into these companies.

我们其实听到不少矛盾的消息，比如麦肯锡做过一项研究，说企业级AI项目有95%都失败了。

I mean, there's a lot of mixed signals that we get like McKinsey did a study and said that 95% of enterprise initiatives actually fail.

查马斯，你之前提到过，很多企业其实根本不知道该怎么应用人工智能。

Chamath, you've made this point around '89 that a lot of these enterprises don't really know how to deploy AI.

如今硅谷最时髦的头衔是‘前线工程师’，其实就是能弥合人工智能潜力与实际投资回报之间差距的IT顾问。

The fanciest title in Silicon Valley these days is a forward deployed engineer, which is basically like an IT consultant who can close the gap between the promise of AI and the ROI of it.

我觉得大家都还在摸索，到底该怎么用这个东西呢？

And I think people are just trying to figure out how do we how do we use this thing?

我的意思是，你看到过多少真正的成功案例吗？

I mean, have you seen much actual success?

现在大家最关心的，是不是就是这个问题？

Is this the is this the question right now?

关键是怎么填补这个差距？

Is this how do we bridge this gap?

说实话，我见过的成功案例不多，不过我可以跟你讲讲Pershing Square的故事。

So I haven't seen much success other than I I'll give you the Pershing Square story.

我们是个小公司，现在是怎么用人工智能的呢？

We're a tiny little company, how are we using AI today?

第一个应用场景主要在法律方面。

The first use case is really on the legal side.

我们差不多把它叫做合规类的后台支持功能。

And, know, kind of almost almost we call it compliance back office type functionality.

我觉得大公司真正有效使用AI，现在还处于非常非常早期的阶段。

I I think we're still super, super early in terms of big companies using AI effectively.

我能跟你验证一个观点吗？

Can I ask or test a thesis with you?

风险投资的评估模式，其实是评估创始人本人，看他们有没有能力在变化的环境中带领团队、调整方向——不管是技术、市场还是其他方面。

The venture underwriting model where you think about people, you're underwriting a founder and their capacity to lead and redirect the organization in a changing environment, in technology environment, market environment and whatnot.

我们反复看到，只要公司还是创始人主导的，创始人觉得自己有权力做出所有必要的激进决策，确保公司在变化中生存和调整，这样的公司就更容易规模化成功。

And we have seen repeatedly similar success at scale if the company is still founder led, where the founder feels like they have the authority to make all the radical decisions needed to make sure that that company persists and changes as needed in a changing environment.

你有没有研究过创始人主导的公司和非创始人主导的公司？创始人是不是在应对变化、长期创造超额回报方面，天然更有优势？

Have you looked at founder led companies versus non founder led companies where perhaps the founders really do have an inherent advantage in being able to navigate the changing environment and actually generate outsized returns over time?

我特别想问这个问题，是因为现在所谓的‘SaaS寒冬’——你看看今天哪些公司是创始人主导的，哪些不是。如果不是创始人主导，管理层的动机往往是避免犯错、别被炒鱿鱼。

And I asked this particularly as it relates to the SaaSpocalypse and if you take a look at the companies that are founder led today versus not, if you're not founder led you have an incentive to not make a mistake and get fired.

如果是创始人领导，你根本不在乎别人怎么想，你的任务就是确保公司活下去。

You're If founder led you don't give a shit, your job is to make sure the company Yeah.

我觉得你说得一点都没错。

I think the answer is exactly what you said.

我觉得问题在于，标普500公司的CEO平均任期大概只有三年半左右吧。

I think the problem is that the average life of an S and P five hundred CEO is probably, I don't know, four years or three year, three and a half years or something like this.

你关注的都是短期的薪酬回报。

And you're focused on, you know, kind of shorter term compensation.

你通常在公司里也没有太大的经济利益。

You don't generally don't have a big economic stake in the business.

但你是创始人。

You're a founder.

这可是你的一切。

This is your entire life.

这关系到你整个人的声誉。

It's your entire reputation.

你又不可能再去找别的工作。

It's not like you're gonna go get another job.

你只能想办法把这事做成。

You you gotta kinda make it work.

而且你在董事会里，要么是拥有重大投票权的人，要么就是公司里持股最多的股东之一。

And also when you're in the boardroom, you have the authority of either being a major voting voice or or a you've got a huge economic stake in the company.

我们加入董事会时，通常都是最大的股东，或者至少是最大的非指数基金类股东。

And when we join a board of a company, we're often the largest or the largest non index fund type shareholder.

这就让我们在董事会里拥有超出比例的发言权。

Kind That of gives us a little bit of a disproportionate voice in the boardroom.

你想想，如果你既是这样的股东，又是公司的CEO呢？

Imagine if you have that and you're CEO of the company.

对吧？

Right?

所以我觉得，这确实让你更有话语权。而且，如果你能一路成长为成功的创始人，那肯定做过不少艰难的决定，而且都做对了，不然你根本走不到今天。

So I think that does give you And and also if you've gotten to be a successful founder over time, guaranteed that you've made a number of very challenging calls over time that turned out to be right, otherwise you wouldn't be there.

你看马克·扎克伯格收购Instagram的时候，大家都震惊于他出的价，还有WhatsApp，也是这样。

And so you look at Mark Zuckerberg, right, when he bought, I don't know, Instagram, everyone was like shocked at the price paid or WhatsApp.

那时候，人家觉得这公司就十几号人，他居然花了一二十亿美元。

You know, they seemed like, you know, sort of outside the know, the company only had whatever 19 employees or something when he paid a billion something.

但只要你做对足够多这样的决定，那些更艰难的决策也能跟着赢回来。

But you make enough of those calls and you can make the other challenging

决策。

calls.

这跟本·格雷厄姆的投资理念不是背道而驰吗？

Is this antithetical to a Ben Graham investing model?

作为投资者，你要有一套完全不同的能力，才能识别出这种人才，而不是……

Like, you have to have a different set of skills as an investor to to identify this talent versus

本·格雷厄姆对投资者来说是个非常重要的声音，他说：你得把企业当回事。

Ben Graham is a really important voice for investors in that he said, look, you gotta think about a business.

股票不是一张纸，它是你对一家公司的所有权。

A stock certificate is an interest in a business as opposed to just this piece of paper.

这可能是他最重要的格言之一。

That's probably one of his most important kind of aphorisms.

但他大部分投资都是针对公司清算的。

But he was investing for the most part in liquidations.

在本·格雷厄姆那个年代，还没有EDGAR系统，想拿一份10-K报告，得亲自跑到公司总部去。

He was invest know, in the in the days of Ben Graham, where there weren't there's no EDGAR system and in order to get a 10 k filing, had to go to the headquarter of the company.

当时有很多股票，交易价格几乎就等于账上的现金。

There were a lot of stocks trading at, basically the cash on the balance sheet.

他的策略就是以极低的价格买下这些公司，然后等它们价值回归。不过本·格雷厄姆赚大钱，其实是因为投了GEICO这类公司。

And his business model was buying these things at stupidly cheap prices and eventually But Ben Graham made most of his money investing in, I don't know, GEICO or something.

别光说，要做。

Know, not Tell

能跟我们聊聊吗？有一种积极股东，像霍华德·休斯那样的，你之前也提到过伯克希尔哈撒韦2.0，还有查马斯，你很久以前就受他启发。

us a little bit about you know, there's this sort of activist and significant shareholder, but then there's Howard Hughes and you've talked a little bit about Berkshire Hathaway two point o or just being inspired by that Chamath, you were inspired by it for a long time.

哦，比尔刚把Pershing Square上市了。

Oh, Bill Bill just took Pershing Square public.

是的。

Yeah.

但关于休斯公司，你具体说说这个运作吧，毕竟你是在经营这家公司。

But with with the Howard Hughes Corporation specifically, tell tell us about that effort because you're operating that business.

有本书。

There's a book.

我记得叫《伯克希尔·哈撒韦的金融史》。

I think it's called the Financial History of Berkshire Hathaway.

那是给极客看的。

That's for geeks.

这人回去把每一份10-Q报告都翻了一遍。

Basically, this guy went back and read every 10 q whatever.

他真的逐份审阅了所有文件，把巴菲特做过的每一笔交易都梳理了一遍，追踪了他六十年来的整个投资历程。

Actually went through the filings, looked at every deal that Buffett ever did, and you follow him over a sixty year period of time.

而他在伯克希尔创造的绝大部分价值，其实都来自保险业务的持股。

And the vast majority of the value he created at Berkshire was through it, actually the ownership of insurance operation.

保险业有意思的地方在于，经营一家保险公司其实有两件事要做。

And what's interesting about insurance is that, you know, running an insurance company you have two jobs.

一是承保业务，

One is you, you know, write business.

对吧？

Right?

你承担风险，

You take risk.

收保费，作为交换，承诺未来赔付理赔。

You collect premiums in exchange for the obligation to pay future claims.

钱一到手，你的责任就是把这些钱拿去投资。

And then you get that, you get money upfront and responsibility is to invest that money.

大多数保险公司只关注资产负债表的负债端，

The vast majority of insurance companies focus only on the liability side of the balance sheet.

而巴菲特是第一个真正把重点放在资产端、而不是负债端的人。

Buffett was really the first to do focus on actually more on the asset side of the balance sheet than on the liability side.

随着时间推移，在负债端呢。

And over time, on that liability side.

如果你能把资产和负债都管理得很好，久而久之，就能打造出一个利润惊人、税负又低的复利机器。

If you if you manage the assets of an insurance company well and the liabilities well, you can build this enormously profitable compounding tax efficient machine over time.

那问题来了，为什么别人没这么做呢？

And the question is why haven't other people done this?

答案是，如果你真擅长投资，你会去对冲基金、富达或者威灵顿工作，而不是去保险公司。

And the answer is if you're really good at investing, you go work for a hedge fund, you go work for Fidelity, you go work for Wellington, but you don't go work for an insurance company.

所以保险公司在吸引投资人才方面，能力非常有限。

So the insurance company's ability to recruit investment talent is very limited.

巴菲特拥有公司一半的股份。

Buck Buffett owned half the company.

他投资本事特别强，这才是关键所在。

He was really good at investing, which is why it worked.

我们现在的做法，其实是效仿巴菲特——他当初接手的，不过是一家烂纺织厂。

So what we're doing is we're you know, Buffett started with a crappy textile company.

他逐步把这家公司清盘，把资金转投到保险业务，再把资产管得非常好。

He effectively liquidated it over time, reinvested in insurance, and then invested the assets well.

霍华德·休斯其实是个很有趣的企业，只是华尔街好多年都不太关心它。

Howard Hughes is actually a really interesting company, but it's a business that Wall Street has not cared about for a long period of time.

我们是从通用增长公司破产后重组出来的。

We created it out of the bankruptcy of of general growth.

它是从其他资产里剥离出来的，专门拥有这些小型城市。

It was a spin off of all the other assets, and it's a company that owns these small cities.

我猜在座不少人听说过萨默林，因为很多科技圈的人从加州搬到了拉斯维加斯。

So I bet a lot of people here have heard of Summerlin because a lot of the tech community has moved from California to Las Vegas.

但我们拥有这片占地两万六千英亩的完整城市。

But we own this small city, 26,000 acres of land.

我们掌控所有商业用地和住宅用地，卖给开发商大量地块，还自己建了市中心和各种楼宇。

We own all the commercial land, we own all the residential land, we sell lots of home builders, we build a downtown, we build buildings.

这有点像欧文公司。

It's a bit like the Irvine company.