格雷厄姆·艾利森谈全球格局重组：伊朗、中国、以色列、格陵兰

欢迎来到另一期《All In》访谈节目。

Welcome to another episode of the All In interview.

我非常高兴再次邀请哈佛大学教授格雷厄姆·艾利森做客《All In》。

I'm really excited to be joined by back to All In, Harvard professor Graham Allison.

艾利森教授，欢迎再次回到《All In》。

Professor Allison, welcome back to All In.

谢谢你的邀请。

Thanks for having me.

我们上次是在洛杉矶的峰会上见到你，所以能进行这次对话真是太好了。

We last had you at the summit in Los Angeles, so it's great to have a conversation.

自从我们上次见面以来，发生了很多事情。

A lot's happened since we last got together.

对于观众来说，格雷厄姆·艾利森是哈佛肯尼迪学院的创始院长。

For the audience, Graham Allison's the founding dean of the Harvard Kennedy School.

自凯辛格以来，他一直为每一位国防部长提供咨询。

He's advised every secretary of defense since Kessinger.

他协助拆除了12000枚苏联核武器，其著作《注定一战》仍是理解中美关系的权威框架。

He's helped dismantle 12,000 Soviet nuclear weapons, and his book destined for war remains the definitive framework for understanding The US China relationship.

我认为有必要回顾一下自我们上次见面以来世界发生的诸多变化。

I think it's worth kind of bringing forward some of the things that have happened in the world since we last met.

我在这里全力以赴。

I'm going all here.

如果你今天从零开始构建一个全球金融系统，你不会依赖五十年前的老旧系统，而会打造Airwallex。

If you were building a global financial system from first principles today, you wouldn't build it on fifty year old legacy rails, you'd build Airwallex.

这是一个集全球账户、卡片和支付于一体的单一平台，将整个世界视为本地市场。

It's the single platform for global accounts, cards, and payments that treats the entire world like a local market.

停止为老旧系统支付额外成本，立即前往airwallex.com/allin，构建未来。

Stop paying the legacy tax and start building the future at airwallex.com slash all in.

Airwallex，构建未来。

Airwallex, build the future.

All in。

All in.

我们先从伊朗说起。

Let's start with Iran.

美国和以色列正在对伊朗发动攻击，最高领袖已死，但政权仍在维持权力。

The US and Israel are in the middle of an attack on Iran and the supreme leader is dead, but the regime is still holding on to power.

你认为这场冲突将把我们带向何方？我们是否在不知不觉中走向第三次世界大战？

Where do you think this conflict will take us, and are we sleepwalking into World War three?

再次感谢你邀请我回来。

Well, thank you again for having me back.

我会带来一档精彩的播客。

I will have a great podcast.

我享受了这次峰会，很遗憾我们没能亲自见面叙旧。

I enjoyed the summit, And I'm sorry we're not there in person to catch up.

但说到伊朗，该从何说起呢？

But I think about Iran, how much to say?

这可能会是一场漫长的演讲。

So this could be a long lecture.

让我先快速讲四五个要点。

Let me just do four or five quick points.

第一点，也是最重要的一点，就是问题远多于答案。

First point, most important point, is that there's more questions than answers.

目前，关于正在发生什么以及可能接下来会发生什么，存在着极大的不确定性。

So there's a huge level of uncertainty currently about what's happening and about what's likely to happen.

这其中一部分是克劳塞维茨所说的战争迷雾，但如今的迷雾因两个巨大的‘烟雾机’而加剧，一个是特朗普及其政府，另一个是BB。

Part of this is, Clausewitz's famous fog of war, but there's a fog of war that's actually increased because we got two big fog machines adding to the confusion, namely Trump and the administration on the one hand and BB on the other.

再加上周围一片喧嚣的议论。

And then we got all the chattering glass around this.

那么，为什么特朗普现在决定开战？

So I would say, why did Trump decide to go to war now?

他和政府给出了六个不同的理由，但每个理由都自相矛盾。

There's six different reasons he and the administration have given and each one they back around.

目标是什么？

What's the objective?

有五个不同的目标在反复变换。

There's five different objectives backing around.

这场战争什么时候会结束？

And when is this war gonna end?

你知道的吧？

You know?

一天？一周？一个月？

A day, a week, a month?

谁知道呢？

Who knows?

因此，承认事情有多么不确定，是非常令人不安的。

So it's very uncomfortable to recognize how uncertain things are.

而关于它的大多数讨论都试图让它显得更有把握。

And most of the conversation about it tries to make it more confident.

但我认为，我们应该从承认存在巨大不确定性开始。

But I think the place to start is there's a huge amount of uncertainty.

话虽如此，我还是要分享一下我对几个观点的偏见。

Having said that, I'll still give you my prejudices about a few of the points.

第二点，这是一次非凡的军事力量和情报力量的展示。

Point two, this has been an extraordinary demonstration of supreme military power and supreme intelligence power.

美国军方、情报机构以及以色列的对应部门的表现远远超出了正常水平。

US military and the intelligence community and the Israeli counterparts have been way way way off the charts.

我认为，这应该让所有美国人为自己过去十年乃至二十年的投资所取得的成就感到自豪，尤其是过去的十年。

And I think this should make all Americans proud of what's been built over this decade of two decades of investment, but especially the past decade.

第三点，对哈梅内伊和伊斯兰共和国政权，我们不必同情。

Third point, there's no tears to be shed for Khamenei and Islamic Republic regime.

这是一个邪恶的领导人，一个邪恶的政权。

It's an evil leader, an evil regime.

对他们而言，任何不幸的发生，我们都应该拍手称快。

There's no bad thing that could happen to them that we shouldn't be cheering out of that.

不过，下一个观点是，破坏总比建设容易得多。

Next point though, breaking something's a lot easier than building something.

摧毁目标是我们军队非常擅长的事情。

And destroying targets is something that our military knows very well how to do.

建立新政权、实现政权更迭，从历史上看，我们并不擅长这么做。

Building a new regime, regime change is something that we know historically doesn't work very well.

至少在伊拉克和阿富汗，我们曾说过所有现在正在说的这些话。

At least in Iraq and Afghanistan, We had every word said that's been said in this case.

随后我们全面介入，花费了超过10亿美元，牺牲了成千上万美国人的生命。

And we then went in all in and spent more than $1,000,000,000 of many, many thousands of American lives.

当我们进入阿富汗时，塔利班正在执政。

And when we went to Afghanistan, the Taliban were ruling.

当我们离开阿富汗时，塔利班依然在执政。

When we left Afghanistan, the Taliban were ruling.

因此，我会说，不幸的是，这一行动是在一个艰难的背景下进行的。

So I would say, unfortunately, it's against a backdrop that's hard.

下一个观点，稍微更具争议性，但我认为这是贝贝的战争。

The next point, slightly more controversial, but I think this is Bebe's war.

如果你的读者或听众忘记了《白鲸记》，他们应该再去读一读。

If your reader or your listeners don't remember Moby Dick, they should go look at it again.

亚哈对白鲸有着执念和痴迷，总是试图找到机会杀死白鲸。

Ahab had this fixation, obsession with the white whale and tried to find a way to kill the white whale whenever he could.

在过去二十年里，这一直是内塔尼亚胡的首要、第二和第三议程。

For the last two decades, that's been Bibi's number one, number two, number three agenda.

他一直试图向奥巴马、特朗普和拜登推销这场战争，而他成功地让特朗普着了迷——我以为我早就看透了他，结果我感到惊讶。

He's tried to sell that war to Obama, to Trump won, to Biden, and how he succeeded in mesmerizing Trump whom I thought had his number, I was surprised.

因此，在这个问题上，我支持以色列，但反对内塔尼亚胡。

So I'm pro Israel but anti Bibi in this respect.

我认为我理解他政治上非常聪明，但我并不认同那些论点，即特朗普重复过的说法——伊朗即将攻击我们。

And I think that I understand he's brilliant politically, but I don't think this The arguments that were made that Trump has actually repeated that Iran was about to attack us.

我看不到任何证据支持这一点。

I see no evidence for that.

伊朗即将获得核武器。

That Iran was about to get a nuclear weapon.

我看不到任何证据支持这一点。

I see no evidence for that.

伊朗正在研制一种将攻击美国的洲际弹道导弹。

That Iran was building an ICBM that was gonna attack The US.

我看不到任何证据支持这一点。

I see no evidence for that.

伊朗政权确实有很多恶劣之处，但大多数被提出的指控并不成立。

There's many many bad things about the Iranian regime, but not most of the claims that that were made.

所以我对此持观望态度，希望结果能好一些。

So I I look at this and I hope it turns out well.

但我记得，在战争中，往往很容易卷入，却很难脱身。

But I remember that in wars, very frequently it's easy to get in and it's quite difficult to get out.

让我再深入探讨一下这一点。

Let me double click on that point.

你提到，政府为此行动传达了多个理由，对成功有不同的定义，对结束时间也有不同的时间表，并且这是一场由内塔尼亚胡主导的战争。

You mentioned there's multiple reasons that the administration has messaged for doing this, multiple views on what success looks like, multiple timelines on ending it, and that this is BB's war.

你觉得特朗普为什么会被促使采取这一行动？

How do you think Trump was motivated to do this?

真正的动机是什么？

What is the real motivation?

我想结合下个月即将访华的庞大代表团这一背景来问这个问题。

And I will ask this in the context of the big delegation and visit to China coming up next month.

特朗普的根本动机是否是为了对中国施加压力，并将此事作为工具，以在对华谈判中最大化自己的议价能力？

Is Trump motivated fundamentally to create leverage with China and use this as a tool to try and maximize his negotiating leverage going into the Chinese negotiations?

这是个很好的问题。

That's a great question.

我真希望答案是这一切都属于一项宏大战略的一部分。

And I wish that the answer was this was all part of a grand strategy.

那样的话我会感觉好很多。

That would make me feel hugely better.

我尝试过进行归因分析，昨晚我和比尔·奥莱利共进晚餐，他是我以前的学生，我认为他是最擅长解读这类事件的分析者之一，我们对此进行了深入讨论。

But I tried to do tropology and I was actually having dinner last night with Bill O'Reilly, a former student who I think is one of the better topologists for trying to interpret and we were going back and forth through this.

很容易理解为什么选择这个时机进行攻击，因为当时伊朗最高领袖和另外40位领导人正在公开露面。

It's easy enough to see why the window, tactically, the window in which this attack occurred was chosen because here you got 40 You got the supreme leader and 40 of the other leaders of Iran out in public.

所以这是一个绝佳的攻击目标。

So that's an opportunity as a target.

这是迄今为止最好的机会。

And the the best opportunity that's come along.

问题是，为什么要攻击他们？

The question is why would you be attacking them?

尤其是特朗普，考虑到他的竞选承诺和以往主张，他反对重蹈那些将我们拖入无尽战争的覆辙。

And especially Trump, given his campaign and his previous views about not repeating the mistakes of the people that took us into endless, windless wars.

我觉得贝内特就像个魔术师。

And I think it's mean, think Bibi is a magician.

我觉得他的专注力令人印象深刻。

I think his single mindedness is impressive.

我觉得他构建论点和展开论证的灵活性非常出色。

I think his agility in making arguments and developing arguments is impressive.

他是怎么说服特朗普，认为这对美国现在是个好主意的，我实在想不明白。

How he managed to persuade Trump this was a good idea for The US now, I don't have a good idea.

我认为，如果听听他们身边最亲近的人，或者特朗普自己给出的理由，这些理由似乎都缺乏说服力。

And I think that I think if I listen to the reasons why even the people closest around them have given or that Trump have given, they don't seem persuasive.

部分原因是特朗普行事反复无常。

Now partly Trump is erratic.

部分原因是他常常凭直觉行事。

Partly, he sort of acts on the basis of instincts.

不知怎的，他突然觉得这件事是可以做的。

Somehow it came to him that this was something that could be done.

我认为，实际上，布里对这件事成功后的积极前景描绘得相当到位，我希望既然我们已经迈出了这一步，它能为中东的安全格局重新定义一代人的时间。

I think actually, Bree painted a pretty The upside of this picture, if it's successful, and I hope now that we've gone into it, it would be, would be redefining security in the Middle East for a generation.

正如本·内塔尼亚胡及其团队此前铲除了该政权的代理势力一样——自10月7日以来，他们的表现确实令人印象深刻——如果现在能推翻伊朗政权，或许可以说，一个全新的中东即将诞生。

So getting rid of the Iranian regime as the BB and company have gotten rid of the proxies of the regime earlier, which again, since October 7, been extremely impressive, could possibly, you could say, well, there's gonna be a whole new Middle East.

如果整个中东都像阿联酋那样，那简直太棒了。

And if The Middle East were all like The UAE, that would be fantastic.

这对生活在那里所有的人而言都太棒了。

Fantastic for all the human beings that live there.

所以我认为他可能被乐观前景激发了，却没有足够谨慎地考虑风险或负面后果。

So I think maybe he got excited by the upside, not quite careful enough about the risks or the downside.

因为这件事可能出错的方式太多了——如果我们明天或今天醒来，发现有几艘船被击沉，或者有几百名美国人丧生，那情况就会完全不一样。

Because the number of ways in which this could go wrong If we woke up tomorrow or today and a couple of ships have been sunk or a couple of 100 of Americans have been killed, this is gonna have a very different a different image.

你觉得这与对马杜罗的行动以及下个月前往中国进行重大谈判的大型代表团无关吗？

And you think that this is independent then of the action with Maduro and independent of the big delegation headed to China for big negotiation next month?

嗯，我不会说完全独立。

Well, I wouldn't say entirely independent.

我认为对于马杜罗，特朗普——这又是我的‘沙发特朗普学’。

I would think with Maduro so Trump I think this again, this is my, whatever, armchair Trumpology.

但我会说，最初他认为关税是万能钥匙。

But I would say initially he thought tariffs were a magic wand.

而每个领导人都觉得，如果你有一把万能钥匙，那简直太棒了。

And every leader thinks if you have a magic wand, that's fantastic.

他试过关税这个魔法棒，发现它在解放日并没有产生他想象中的所有效果。

He's tried the tariff magic wand and discovered it didn't quite have all the effects that he imagined on Liberation Day.

随后，他发现了美国军队，这确实是一个巨大的魔法棒。

He then discovered the American military, which genuinely is a huge wand.

而马德罗行动简直堪称完美。

And the Madero operation was just spectacular.

我的意思是，这又是一次军事和情报行动。

I mean, again, it's a military and intelligence operation.

太出色了。

Brilliant.

世界上没有其他国家能想象出这样的行动。

No other country in the world could even imagine doing something like that.

这实际上让我们所有人都挺直了腰板。

And that actually makes all of us stand taller.

但它也可能带来一点傲慢，或者历史上助长了一种幻想，认为这个魔法棒能在许多其他领域也奏效。

It can also provide a little Or historically encourages hubris and an imagination that this magic wand can work in many other arenas.

我完全不反对这样的观点：其他国家都应该认识到，美国拥有世界上最为卓越的军事和情报体系。

I don't mind at all the proposition that every other country should take account of the fact that The US has the most remarkable military and intelligence community in the world.

这对中国的行程来说，也是一个不错的背景。

And that's not a bad backdrop for China and for a China trip.

所以我同意，这些事情可能并非完全无关。

So I agree that things may not be completely disconnected.

但就时间点而言，我的意思是，现在战争什么时候才会结束？

But I think in terms of the timing, I mean, now, when is the war gonna be over?

如果你说三四周内，那我们到时候他已经会在3月29日抵达中国了。

If you talk about three or four weeks, we're we'll already He'll be in China March 29.

所以，我的倾向是——如果我们只是在做预测市场的话——他会想办法在那之前宣布战争结束，因为他需要一点时间来调整自己的心态。

So my inclination, again, if we were just doing prediction markets, is that he's gonna find a way to declare this over before then because he needs a little time to get his mind set on that.

但如果你去问国防部的人，或者问以色列方面的人，他们会认为这场战争还会再持续一个月甚至更久。

But if you ask the folks at the Defense Department or if you ask the people in Israel, they're thinking this is another month or beyond there's a war.

所以，再次强调，我觉得这些事情并没有完全同步。

So again, just things I don't think are quite, you know, in sync.

杰森加入了我们。

Jason's joined us.

欢迎艾莉森，有你真是太好了。

Fresher Allison, it's always a treat to have you

很高兴见到你。

Nice on to see you.

能有你在这里，为我们抽出时间，真是太棒了。

It's just amazing to have you on here and to give us this time.

如果情况极其顺利，伊朗从君主制演变为独裁政权，如今在当代又迈向民主，拥有九千三百万公民的中东民主国家，这会对该地区产生什么影响？

If things were to go extremely well and Iran went from a monarchy to a dictatorship and now in this third act here in in modern day to a democracy, and you actually had a democracy with 93,000,000 citizens in The Middle East, what impact would that have on the region?

我们已经看到海湾君主国在人权方面有所进步，但它们仍然是君主制国家。

We've seen the Gulf monarchies evolve human rights, but they're still monarchies.

该地区目前还有一个民主国家，那就是以色列，但如果伊朗成为民主国家，这将非同寻常。

You have one other, I I guess, democracy in the region in Israel, but this could be extraordinary if it was a democracy.

但这对全球棋局意味着什么？

But what would that mean to the to the global chessboard?

这是一个好问题。

Well, it's a good question.

我的意思是，如果这种情况真的发生，那将是非常壮观的。

I mean, if this could occur, it would be spectacular.

即使是我，也会说这太过于雄心勃勃了。

Even I think But I would say this is way way way too ambitious.

有上百种比当前可能情况更好的理想结果，即使达不到这个目标。

There's a 100 things that would be wonderful outcomes better than what's likely that would be short of that.

我记得在伊拉克，布什未能找到核武器之后——这原本是我所说的、有点搞砸了的入侵伊拉克理由——时任国务卿康多莉扎·赖斯发表了一次演讲，说当伊拉克成为一个民主国家和市场经济时，将会如何美妙地在整个中东地区辐射稳定。

I remember in Iraq, after Bush failed to find nuclear weapons, which was the initial, I would say, somewhat cucked up rationale for our going into Iraq, Condi Rice, who was the secretary, gave a speech about, well, how wonderful it'll be when Iraq is a democracy and market economy, quote, radiating stability through The Middle East.

所以我们在这种版本的‘我有一个梦想’上相当在行。

So we're pretty good at doing I Have a Dream in that version.

我认为这简直是太遥远了。

I think that's a way way way stretch.

我只希望那里的政权能简单地不再致力于研制核武器，不再制造威胁美国及我们在该地区朋友和盟友的导弹，也不再支持代理人。

I would be very happy with a regime there that simply was not about building nuclear weapons, was not about building missiles that threaten The US and our friends and allies in the region and not about supporting proxies.

如果这是一个相当残酷的政权，不幸的是，这对伊朗人民来说是不幸的。

And if it's a pretty cruel regime, unfortunately, that's unfortunate for the Iranian people.

波斯人民？嗯，我是个历史爱好者。

The Persian people, well, I'm a student of history.

我热爱波斯。

I love Persia.

我记得居鲁士，也记得伯罗奔尼撒战争。

Remember Cyrus and I remember the Peloponnesian War.

我记得这是一个在历史上极其辉煌的文化。

I remember this is a fantastic culture in history.

他们被一群极其糟糕的人劫持了。

They've been hijacked by a terrible terrible group of people.

如果这些人能以某种方式被推翻，这对伊朗人民和全世界都是好事；如果让我下注的话，我会再次说，回到第一点，这个问题充满不确定性，在噪音中寻找信号极其困难。

And if those people can be somehow ousted, wonderful for Iranian people and wonderful for the world, if I were betting it, again, I'd say go back to the first point, it questions uncertainty, finding signals in the noise extremely difficult.

但如果让我下注，最终结果很可能是那些握有枪杆子的人会在某种形式下成为下一代掌权者。

But if I were betting it, it'll end up that the guys with the guns will in some version be the next iteration.

如果他们更温和，且不太有决心威胁我们的利益，那这一切值得吗？

And if they're tamer and less determined to threaten our interest, Will this have been worth it?

好吧，同样地，我们需要从更长远的角度来看。

Well, again, we'll have to look at over the longer run.

我认为关于战争的另一点是，它们是不可预测的，并且会带来许多意想不到的后果。

I think the other thing that we know about wars is that they're unpredictable and that they have many unanticipated consequences.

现在，当我们观察当前发生的事情，并看到这对石油和天然气价格有何影响时，这是可以预见的。

Now I think as we watch what's happening now and see what impact does that have on oil and gas prices, predictable.

所以你可以看到，这种影响持续不断。

So you can see and going and going.

那么，这对其他国家有什么影响？

Well, what impact does that have on other countries?

影响巨大。

A huge.

因此，现在有大量国家的经济正受到这一影响的扰乱，因而将责任归咎于我们。

So the number of countries now whose economies are being disrupted by this impact and therefore blaming us for it.

昨天我接到台湾一个人的电话，他说：等等，有没有人想过这对我们意味着什么？因为他们大约一半的电力来自现在正在供应的天然气。

I had a call from someone in Taiwan yesterday saying, wait a minute, did anybody think what it's doing for us since they had about half of their electricity comes from their natural gas that is now coming.

如果你问这对中国意味着什么？

If you ask about what does this mean for Ukraine?

所有原本希望阻止俄罗斯或乌克兰导弹袭击的爱国者，现在都集中在中东。

All the patriots that were to hope to prevent missile strikes from Russia or Ukraine are now in The Middle East.

所以现在目标多了很多。

So that's There are many more target.

不幸的是，事态正以如此多的不同方向展开。

So there's just Unfortunately, it unfolds in so many so many different directions.

现在，我不希望显得过于悲观，因为再次强调，我很幸运地看到我们的军队和情报人员表现得非常专业，这让我们感到惊喜。

Now, I don't want to seem too pessimistic about it because again, I think we've been shocked fortunately on the upside by how professional our military has and intelligence folks have been.

而且伊朗方面表现得多么无能和空洞。

And also how pathetic or hollow the Iranians have been.

袭击的第一天，我在国防部时，给了他们一份清单，列出了如果我扮演伊朗角色，我会做和能够做的11件事。

First day of the attack, was at the defense department and I gave them a list of 11 things that I would do and be capable of doing if I were playing the Iranian hand.

他们看起来很强硬。

And they seem to be tough.

我的意思是，我几乎都不想说出口，他们就像纸老虎一样。

I mean, I hardly even wanna say out loud, they they act like a paper tiger.

你认为如果更成功的话，还能造成更多破坏吗？

Do you think there's there's more damage that can be done by being more successful?

你想一下伊朗，伊朗人口是我们的两倍，一亿对五千万，国土面积是四倍，军队装备也更好，而且可以说，军事体系已经渗透到工业的方方面面。

You know, if we think back to Iran, Iran is twice as many people, a 100,000,000 versus 50,000,000, four times the land area, a much better equipped military, and arguably, the military system, the regime, is embedded in every aspect of industry.

因此，如果美国更成功地瓦解了伊朗政权——正如康多莉扎·赖斯所建议的，她今天似乎刚去过白宫，向总统进言，并公开表示现在是彻底了结他们的时候了——但这难道不会留下一个没有基础设施、没有领导层、一亿民众流离失所的国家吗？而这正是极端组织趁虚而入、夺取权力的经典温床，而我们并没有资源再去陷入另一个长达数十年的阿富汗或伊拉克式困境。

So the more successful The United States is in dismantling the Iranian regime and as was advised by Condoleezza Rice who apparently was just in the White House today and advising the president and publicly stated it's time to finish them off, it's time to go all the way, etcetera, Does that not then leave a country with no infrastructure, no leadership, a 100,000,000 people in tatters, and that's the classic breeding ground for some of these extremist groups to seize control and seize power, and we don't have the resources to go in and have another multi decade Afghanistan Iraq problem.

我担心我同意你的看法。

I'm afraid I agree.

是的。

Yes.

我认为关于这一点的不确定性很多，我可以设想出四五种不同的可能结局。

I think the the uncertainties about that I mean, can do four or five different scenarios for how this might conceivably end.

伊朗可能陷入各民族群体之间的长期内战，甚至有些群体可能宣布独立。

It could end up being an extended civil war in Iran among the various national groups, even some of them possibly seceding.

所以，again，会相当混乱。

So again, fairly chaotic.

看起来像是叙利亚的加强版。

Look like Syria plus.

明白吗？

Okay?

它也可能演变成伊朗或阿富汗那样的局面。

It could look like Iran or Afghanistan.

抱歉，我们在那里待了十多年，资源几乎是无限的。

Well, excuse me, we were there for more than a decade with unlimited resources.

对人员数量几乎没有限制。

Hardly any constraints on the number of people.

但结果如何呢？

And how did that work out?

所以我认为自己是个小写的保守派，觉得历史虽然不是唯一的参考，但确实是个不错的起点。

So I I'd say that I'm a small c conservative and kinda think history is not always Certainly not the only guy, but is a good place to start.

哦，我觉得有点紧张，是的。

Oh, I'm I'm I would say nervous, yeah.

现在是不是太晚了，无法出现委内瑞拉那样的结果——我们除掉了蛇头，然后简单地换上了新的？

Is it too late to have a Venezuelan outcome where we've taken out the head of the snake and we've simply replaced it?

蛇即使没有了头，也可能继续运作和生存，不会造成太大的破坏性影响，但似乎我们在伊朗已经走得有点太远了，要彻底解决可能非常难以掌控。

The snake can continue operating and living without too much destructive damage and effect, but it seems like we may be a little too far gone now in Iran and that to take this all the way might be very difficult to manage.

好吧。

Alright.

现在是不是太晚了？

Is it too late?

如果我再来一次，我们所有人都处在黑暗和不确定性中，所以回到第一点。

If I were again, we're all in the dark and all the uncertainty, so back to point one.

在那之后，我认为特朗普行为反复无常、冲动，但他还是有一些基本准则的。

After that, I would say Trump is erratic, impulsive, but he has some coordinates.

其中之一是他的权力。

And one of them is his is his power.

11月3日对他来说是重要的一天。

November 3 is a big day for him.

他正专注于这一天。

He's focused on that.

经济是其中的关键因素。

The economy is a crucial element of that.

这构成了中美关系框架的一部分。

That's part of the framing of the of the China relationship.

这件事对经济的影响已经显现，而且可能会更加明显。

The impact of this on the economy is already evident, okay, and could become more evident.

公众舆论。

The public opinion.

再说一遍，我觉得今天我在报纸上看到，他已经派希格斯密去为这场战争做宣传。

Again, I think he I saw today in the journal that he's sent Higgsmith out to sell the war.

嗯嗯。

Mhmm.

祝你好运。

Good luck.

嗯嗯。

Mhmm.

我不确定他能不能说服别人。

I'm not sure he can sell.

所以公众对这件事的看法，大约是六比四的负面评价。

So public opinion of this, it's about six to four unfavorable.

嗯嗯。

Mhmm.

因为他们事先没有为这场战争做好论证。

Because they didn't make the case for the war in advance.

这对其他各方，包括我们关心的各方，产生了负面影响。

The impact of this on other parties, including parties that we care about, is negative.

所以我完全可以想象，在未来一周内，他就会宣布胜利——如果你看看他实际上为自己留下的余地，正如你所说，他斩首了敌方核心，摧毁了他们的核能力，以及他们投射力量的能力。

So I I could easily imagine in the next week even, him declare If you look at actually the way in which he's left himself room to declare victory at having, as you say, cut the head of the stake, destroy their nuclear capabilities, destroy their ability to project power.

或者在国防部，我们总是说‘摧毁’或‘削弱’。

Or in the Defense Department, we always say destroy or degrade.

‘削弱’包含很多层面，正如你所指出的那样。

Degrade has a lot of dimensions, as you would point out.

现在，轮到伊朗人民自己掌握政权，把握自己的命运了。

And now it's up to the Iranian people to seize their own government and take advantage of themselves.

这背后的困难在于，也许他想继续战斗，直到政权被彻底摧毁。

The difficulty with that will be, maybe he wants to fight on till the regime is destroyed.

这将是一场有趣的较量，我们拭目以待它将如何发展。

And that'll be an interesting struggle to see how that goes.

早前，特朗普曾表明，当他认为符合美国利益时，他愿意撤回B.B.的耻辱。

Earlier, Trump demonstrated that when he thought it was in American interest, he was prepared to pull BB's shame.

所以我们走着瞧吧。

So we'll see.

我认为在我们离开中东地区之前，有一个即将浮现的话题，那就是美国国内显然不支持这场战争。

Is I think before we move out of the MENA region, a topic that's coming up, there's obviously no support for this war in America.

如今，大多数美国人将外交事务视为他们关注的第1或第2位问题，经济和其他许多议题才更受重视。

Most Americans put foreign affairs today at one or 2% of their concern, economy, and many other issues are are high on their list.

他一直很明确地说：我们不会派地面部队。

And he's been pretty clear, hey, we're not gonna put boots on the ground.

此外，美国正在出现日益加剧的反犹太主义情绪。

And then there's this anti semitic underpinning that's happening in America that's become pretty acute.

你提到的卢比奥曾表示：我们这么做是因为以色列人本来就要行动，我们别无选择。

And you had Rubio, who we mentioned earlier, say, hey, we did this because the Israelis were going in anyway and we had no choice.

但随后他们又收回了这种说法。

And then they walked that back.

请向观众解释，我们该如何看待这一转折：在美国，有一群人，特别是MAGA阵营的支持者，认为特朗普背叛了他们，认为他被以色列政府操控，正在为他们做事。

Explain to the audience how we should look at that turn of events where there's a group of people in America, specifically people in the MAGA party who believe Trump has betrayed them and that he's captured by the Israeli government in some way, and he's doing their bidding.

我并不是说这是我的观点，但这种潜流确实存在。

I'm not saying that that's my perspective, but that is a an undertone that we're seeing.

这在我们这一代人中是前所未有的，我认为。

And that's something new in our lifetime, I think.

确实如此。

It certainly is.

这是一个大话题，但当我谈论它时，我会说，我支持以色列，但反对内塔尼亚胡。

So this is a big topic, but I'd say, when I talk about it, I I say, I'm pro Israeli and anti Bibi.

内塔尼亚胡不代表以色列。

So Bibi is not Israel.

我认识并最尊重的以色列人，大多是国家安全领域的高层人物。

The people whom I know mostly and respect mostly in Israel are the national security barons.

那些曾担任总参谋长、摩萨德局长、辛贝特局长，或在这些机构中工作的人。

The people who've been the chief of staff or the head of Mossad or the head of Shin Bet or the people that work in those structures.

他们认为，内塔尼亚胡实际上正在摧毁本-古里安所珍视的以色列民主。

And they believe that Bibi is actually destroying Ben Gurion's Israeli democracy that they cared about.

或者看看汤姆·弗里德曼，很难指责他反犹太。

Or take Tom Friedman, it's pretty hard to accuse him of being anti Semitic.

但我认为，他非常明确且勇敢地指出，内塔尼亚胡正在摧毁以色列的民主。

But he's been, I think, very clear and very courageous in pointing out that what Bibi's doing to Israel's democracy is really destroying it.

这对美国的犹太孩子产生了怎样的影响。

And the impact of that on Jewish kids in America.

我的意思是，我在校园里这么说，因为学生们希望为以色列感到自豪。

I mean, I say this on campus, where they wanna be proud of Israel.

他们理应为这个国家这些年来所取得的成就感到骄傲。

They they deserve to be proud of the country that has been built over these years.

但他们看到那些疯狂的右翼定居者在被占领的约旦河西岸的行为，或看到加沙地带的一些行动，或现在这种毫无节制、甚至不试图论证比例原则的战争时，就会说：等等。

But they look at the behavior of these crazy right wing settlers and their activities in the in the occupied West Bank, or they look at some of the activities in Gaza, or they look at now the kind of unlimited war without any even attempt to make arguments about proportionality and just say, wait a minute.

这并不是我想为之自豪的国家。

That's not the country I wanna be proud of.

我想为拉宾的以色列感到自豪。

I wanna be proud of Rabin's Israel.

我想为埃胡德·巴拉克的以色列感到自豪。

I wanna be proud of Ehud Barak's Israel.

我想为本-古里安的以色列感到自豪。

I wanna be proud of Ben Gurion's Israel.

我基本上持这种观点。

I'm I'm pretty much of that persuasion.

我认为，引用这些内容可能带来的风险，以及之前提到的干预美国政治，会引发反弹。

I think what what may be risks in this and risks to earlier with citing, I mean, interfering in American politics invites pushback.

所以我认为，这可能会对民主党与共和党都产生长期的负面影响，尤其是对年轻人。

So I think this could have a big long term negative effect both in the Democratic Party and the Republican Party, especially under younger people.

如果你看看三十岁以下人群对以色列的民调数据，简直令人震惊。

If you look at the polling for the under thirties on Israel, it's just like shocking.

是的。

Yeah.

我们能转到中国的话题吗？

Can we move to China?

因为我认为，这将在未来一个月成为重大新闻。

Because I think that, again, this is gonna be the big story over the next month.

你曾公开表示，推翻委内瑞拉的马杜罗可能会鼓舞中国加速对台湾的吞并。

You've said publicly that ousting Maduro from Venezuela could embolden China to accelerate a Taiwan takeover.

据报道，中央情报局已警告苹果公司的蒂姆·库克及其他科技公司，明年可能发生入侵。

The CIA, it has been reported in media, warned Tim Cook of Apple and other tech companies about a possible invasion as soon as next year.

你曾分别与中方官员公开会面。

You've separately met publicly with Chinese officials.

你如何看待中国试图吞并台湾的可能性和时间表？有哪些推动因素可能使这一行动提前发生？

What's your view on the likelihood and the timeline of a China attempted takeover of Taiwan, and what are these kind of motivating factors that might make that happen sooner?

让我澄清一下。

So let me clarify.

我不确定，或者我可能被误解了，但显然中国人在密切关注。

I I'm not sure or I may have been misinterpreted, but obviously the Chinese watch very carefully.

他们研究战争，并会从这里发生的事情中吸取教训。

They study wars and they will learn lessons from what's going on here.

但我不认为委内瑞拉的行动，除了让他们对我们的能力感到羡慕之外，会增加他们攻击台湾的可能性。

But I don't think that is I don't think the Venezuelan operation, other than making them feel envious about the capabilities, will impact their likelihood of attacking Taiwan.

所以，首先是台湾。

So Taiwan, number one.

我认为，今年、明年，甚至到2026年或2027年，除非台湾本身有重大挑衅行为或发生其他外部事件，否则中国大陆进攻台湾的可能性非常低。

I think the likelihood of an attack on Taiwan this year or next year or even into '28, but let me just do '26 and '27, absent some major provocation by Taiwan or some other third incident is very low.

我把这个概率估计在预测市场的水平，大约5%或者更低。

I put it at about where the where the prediction markets are, 5% or something low.

所以我并不指望会发生这种情况。

So I'm not counting on that.

扎克，为什么？

Zach, why

为什么这么低？

is that so low?

我只是很好奇。

I'm just curious.

为什么是5%？

Why 5%?

是的

Yeah.

好的

Okay.

因为首先，他们有一套他们称之为和平统一的理论。

Because first, they they have a theory of the case of what they call peaceful reunification.

他们认为局势正朝着这个方向发展。

And they think things are evolving in that direction.

这个理论认为，目前由民进党执政的政府在议会中受到反对党的阻碍。

The theory of the case is that the current government, which is a DPP government, currently is is stymied by its opposition in the parliament.

因此，他们甚至无法购买我们之前提供的军售装备。

So they can't even buy the arm sales that we previously gave them.

中国曾对价值110亿美元的军售表示不满，但台湾立法机构可能连其中一半都不会购买。

There's $11,000,000,000 arm sales that the Chinese have complained about, but Taiwan is The legislature probably won't buy half of that.

明白吗？

Okay?

所以现任总统正面临困境。

So the current president is struggling.

1月28日将举行选举，他们认为前政党国民党很可能获胜。

There's gonna be an election in January 28 and they think it's likely that the former party, the KMT, will be elected.

选出来的人会更同情中国，更愿意推动关系的演变。

Somebody that'll be much more sympathetic to China and to an evolving relationship.

所以这是第一点。

So that's number one.

第二点，中国一直在对其军队高层进行大规模清洗。

Number two, the Chinese have been engaged in a deep deep purge of all of their military leadership.

我的意思是，这很难让人相信，但你时不时会在报纸上看到，他解雇了这个人，又解雇了那个人。

I mean, it's hard to believe and you read about in the paper from time to time that he fired this guy, he fired this guy.

他解雇了相当于我们整个政治体系中所有四星上将、所有作战司令以及所有负责指挥对台军事行动的指挥官。

He's fired the equivalent of every four star in our whole political system and every combatant commander and every commander who would be commanding the forces over to deal with Taiwan.

所以，尽管他们一直在增强军事实力，但在我的看法中，要让这一切重新恢复正常需要很长时间。

So while they've been building up that military capability, takes a long time to get that back into order, in my view.

所以我会说，这部分让我觉得可能性更低了。

So I would say that part makes me feel less likely.

第三，我认为他明白，如果他这么做，虽然不是必然，但存在美国介入的风险。

Third, I think he understands that if he were to do this, there's a risk, not a certainty, but a risk that The US would become involved.

而这种介入对中国经济——他必须首先担心的方面——以及其发展态势的影响将是巨大的。

And that the impact of that either on China's economy, which he's gotta worry about first, and also on its evolution would be significant.

所以我在寻找……哦，抱歉。

So I'm I'm looking for And oh, sorry.

最后，在特朗普身上，中国可能会遇到对台湾最宽容的总统。

Finally, in Trump, he has the most accommodating president that China's likely to see with respect to Taiwan.

特朗普从不隐瞒自己的立场。

So Trump has made no secrets.

我的意思是，他公开谈论过自己对台湾的看法。

I mean, he talks publicly of his views about Taiwan.

而且我觉得在几本回忆录中，有这样一段讨论：他在椭圆形办公室里，有人问他关于台湾的问题。

And I think a couple of the memoirs, there's this discussion where he's in the Oval and he's talking about Taiwan and he picked Somebody asked him about Taiwan.

他拿起一支记号笔，在办公桌的一个地方画了起来。

He picks up one of those Sharpies and goes, you know, on a spot on the resolute desk.

他说，那是台湾。

And he says, that Taiwan.

然后他用手比划着整个桌面。

Then he draws his hand around the whole desk.

他说，那就是中国。

He said, that's China.

所以我认为，就目前的路径而言，我对台湾问题没那么担心。

So I would say, I'm less worried about Taiwan on the current path.

但从长远来看，中国方面非常明确，习近平和所有领导层都认为台湾是中国不可分割的一部分，而如何在确保台湾在经济和社会方面享有相当程度自由的前提下解决这一问题，是我们长期以来一直面临的挑战。

Now over the longer run, the Chinese are absolutely clear, Xi and all the leadership, that Taiwan is an inseparable part of China and how that could be satisfied in a way that allow the Taiwanese the degree or substantial degree of the freedom for both their economy and their society is the challenge that we've been struggling with for a long time.

但好消息是，我们已经这样处理了五十年，台湾从未经历过如此特殊的局面。

But the good news is we've been doing this for fifty years and Taiwan has never seen such a such such circumstances.

所以我对台湾的朋友说，基本上，别把这事搞砸了。

So I say to the Taiwanese friends, basically, don't don't screw it up.

你认为我们正在采取正确的行动吗？

Are we taking the right course of action, do you think?

我想对你来说，最大的问题是：对于美国而言，保持台湾不落入中国直接控制的战略必要性是什么？

I guess the big question for for you is what's the strategic imperative to keep Taiwan from falling under direct Chinese control for The United States?

我们是否正在采取正确的措施来对冲这一情况的发生？

And are we taking the right actions to hedge our bets, if you will, against that happening?

也就是说，半导体制造的本土化，但也可能涉及国防和战略部署方面。

Meaning, onshoring of semiconductor manufacturing, but also maybe from a defense perspective and positioning perspective.

你可以稍微分享一下，我们是否确信。

You can share a little bit about whether we're Sure.

这是一个非常重大的问题。

That's a big big question.

首先，财政部长斯科特·贝森特在被问到这个问题时说，他所见过的最大威胁是，96%的先进半导体都来自一个可能被切断的小岛。

So first, Scott Bissent, the secretary of the treasury, when he's asked about this, he says the biggest threat that he's ever seen is the fact that 96% of the advanced semiconductors come from one small island that could become cut off.

正如你们之前讨论过的，台积电生产了几乎所有主要客户的先进半导体，而我们正是其主要消费者。

So TSMC, as you all have discussed before, produces the advanced semiconductors for essentially everybody of whom we're the principal consumer.

我们阻止他们将这些产品运往中国。

And we prevent them shipping this to China.

这本身就是一个相当复杂的情况。

That's a pretty complicated situation to begin with.

其次，正如特朗普总统所说，台湾位于世界另一端，却距离中国海岸仅90英里。

Secondly, Taiwan is halfway around the world as President Trump says, and 90 miles off the shore of China.

我们相距遥远，还有许多其他事情需要关注。

And we're far away and we have a lot of other things to worry about.

所以这有点像古巴。

So it's a little bit like Cuba.

如果中国真的决心摧毁或占领台湾，那么它本质上是无法防守的。

So inherently indefensible if China were seriously determined to either destroy it or to take it.

然而，自中国开放和《上海公报》以来，各方一直维持着一种现状共识，其中美国的承诺被称为‘战略模糊’，即美国和中国都同意台湾的内部发展由其自行决定。

Now, on the other hand, since the opening to China and the Shanghai Communique, there's been an agreement of maintaining a status quo with The US commitment being what's called strategic ambiguity in which The US and China have been committed to Taiwan internal development is left to its own device.

而中国也不使用军事手段来阻止这一点。

And China doesn't use military force to prevent that.

但我们说，台湾属于一个中国，而中国的唯一首都是北京。

But we say, Taiwan is There's one China and the only China's capital is Beijing.

然后我们以一种略显模糊的方式谈论台湾与大陆的关系。

And then we have a little bit of ambiguous way to talk about the relationship between Taiwan and China.

但无论如何，让这种关系朝着双方都能接受的方向发展。

But certainly, letting it evolve in any way that the parties would be prepared to live with.

大多数人预期，随着时间推移，这种关系会自然找到出路。

Most people expecting that over time, this relationship will work its way out.

当我与中国方面交谈时，我会告诉他们：首先，你们从未见过海峡两岸这五十年来如此好的局面。

And when I talk to Chinese about it, I say to them, first, you've never seen fifty better years on either side of the straits.

因此，从双方关心的角度来看，这几十年对两个社会而言都极为成功。

So this has been fantastic for both societies in terms of what they care about.

其次，如果他们审视这一局势，假设中国的战略是正确的，即中国不可阻挡的崛起仍在继续。

And secondly, if they look at this situation, if China's core strategy is correct, which is the inexorable lies of China, And that continues.

再过十年或二十年，台湾将看起来像一支舰队。

In another decade or two, Taiwan will look like a fleet.

因此，这不会成为问题。

And therefore, not gonna be an issue.

如果中国的主叙事不奏效，台湾不会是他们最大的问题。

If China's main narrative doesn't work, Taiwan is not gonna be their biggest problem.

所以他们应该专注于其他问题。

So they should work on the other issues.

如果你考虑中国在全球范围内施加影响力，继续这样做对他们有多重要？

If you think about China projecting influence around the world, how important is it for them to continue to do that?

最近有一个目标，我认为是GDP增长在5%左右，介于4%到5%之间。

There was recently an objective, I think, of a GDP growth in the 5% range, four to 5%.

是这样吗，中国？

Is that right, China?

百分之四点五到五。

Four and a half to five.

是的。

Yep.