聊聊你的书：为什么IPO这么少？

今天的《Animal Spirits Talk Your Book》由VanEck赞助播出。

Today's Animal Spirits Talk Your Book is brought to you by VanEck.

访问vaneck.com，了解他们如何帮助你进入私募市场。

Go to vaneck.com to learn more about how they can help you access private markets.

网址是vaneck.com。

That's vaneck.com.

欢迎收听《Animal Spirits》，一档关于市场、生活和投资的节目。

Welcome to Animal Spirits, a show about markets, life, and investing.

迈克尔·巴特尼克和本·卡尔森将在这里聊聊他们正在读、正在写和正在看的内容。

Join Michael Batnick and Ben Carlson as they talk about what they're reading, writing, and watching.

迈克尔和本的所有观点仅代表他们个人，不代表Ritholtz财富管理公司的立场。

All opinions expressed by Michael and Ben are solely their own opinion and do not reflect the opinion of Ritholtz Wealth Management.

本播客仅供一般参考，不应作为任何投资决策的依据。

This podcast is for purposes only and should not be relied upon for any investment decisions.

Ritholtz财富管理公司的客户可能持有本播客中讨论的证券。

Clients of Ritholtz Wealth Management may maintain positions in the securities discussed in this podcast.

欢迎收听Michael和Ben的Animal Spirits节目。

Welcome to Animal Spirits with Michael and Ben.

Michael，我喜欢直来直去的人。

Michael, I love a good straight shooter.

今天的节目里就有一位。

On today's show, we have one.

我们采访了Christian Munafo。

We talked to Christian Munafo.

他是VanEck私人增长策略部门的负责人，今天他给我们分享了一些我们之前不了解的信息，因为关于私人市场的公开数据确实不多，远不如公开市场的数据丰富，这是显而易见的。

He's the head of private growth strategies at VanEck, and he enlightened us with some information today that was new to us because there's not a lot of data as far as private markets go, not nearly as much as public markets, obviously.

我觉得可以说，2021年到2022年这段时间，可能是晚期成长型公司有史以来最疯狂的时期之一。

And I think it's fair to say now that the twenty twenty one, twenty twenty two period is maybe one of the crazier periods ever for late stage growth companies.

对。

Yes.

从定价的角度来看。

In terms of pricing.

事情变得完全失控了。

Things gotten just absolutely insane.

对吧？

Right?

就像宿醉后的第二天早上，大家走过酒店房间，到处都是啤酒瓶，浴室里还有只老虎，每个人都醒过来，一脸懵地说，发生了什么？

Like, it's like the hangover scene the next day where everyone's walking through the hotel room, and there's beer bottles everywhere, there's a tiger in the bathroom, and everyone kinda wakes up and goes, what happened?

我是在跟谁来着？

Who was I talking to about this?

可能是乔什。

Probably Josh.

我记不清当时聊天的具体内容了，但我们错过了——哦，其实是在TKEV上。

I can't remember the the context of the conversation, but we miss oh oh, it was actually on TKEV.

当时有人对估值发表了评论。

A comment was made about valuations back then.

然后我说，听我说。

And I said, listen.

我明白。

I I get it.

不是说所有人都没责任。

Not to absolve everybody.

哦，也许是你和我，作为投资者，都有点失职，但说实话，我们当时都有点醉醺醺的。

Oh, maybe it was you and I of of their duties as an investor, but, like, we were all a little bit a little bit drunk.

对。

Yes.

那是个令人兴奋的时期。

It was an exciting time.

是的，你说得对。

And yeah, you're right.

当时有大量新事物，而且显然没人预料到AI会来，这算是接下来的大事。

There was tons of new and obviously no one saw AI coming, which was kind of the next thing.

所以你说得对。

So you're right.

不是每个人都能被原谅，但那时候钱太多了，对吧？

Not everyone is absolved there, but there's just so much money sloshing around, right?

那确实是个不同的时期，也许我们再也不会见到了。

And that was yeah, it was a different period and maybe one that we'll never see again.

但克里斯蒂安让我们清醒了一下，告诉我们为什么——我是说，如果你账上有私人投资，而且很久没有一轮定价了，看不到透明度，那你可能应该给它打个折。

But Christian kind of set us straight and told us like why there's a I mean, I guess if you have a private investment your books and you don't have good see through that there hasn't been a round in a while with the pricing, you should probably give it a haircut.

不是本·卡尔森那种理发，是迈克尔·巴特尼克那种。

Not a Ben Carlson haircut, a Michael Batnick haircut.

这就对了。

There we go.

直接剃到头皮。

All all the way to the skin.

但想想2020年、2021年。

But think about 2020, 2021.

那时候每个人整天都待在家里。

Everybody was at home all day every day.

打开Zoom视频。

Hop on a Zoom.

打开Zoom视频。

Hop on a Zoom.

打开Zoom视频。

Hop on a Zoom.

而且想想那时候创业公司的增长，人们的想法，那真是个激动人心的时代。

Well, and think about the the growth in business startups then to people like, the ideas and it was an it was an exciting time.

融资成功。

Funded.

融资成功。

Funded.

融资成功。

Funded.

是的。

Yes.

你和我跟很多人聊过，他们就是说，我有个想法。

You and I had a lot of conversations with people who was just like, I have an idea.

我没有商业模式，我只有一个想法。

I don't have a business model, I have an idea.

人们都在往我身上扔钱。

People are throwing money at me.

你不能怪那些人拿钱，确实，那时候钱多得泛滥。

You can't blame people for taking that money and yeah, there was a lot of money sloshing around.

所以我们跟克里斯蒂安聊了聊私募市场的现状，包括IPO、AI公司，这对私募市场意味着什么，以及为什么IPO数量这么少。

So we kind of did a state of the private markets with Christian in terms of IPOs and AI companies and what it means for private markets and why there haven't been more IPOs.

所以这真是一场非常精彩的对话。

So this was a really fascinating conversation.

所以对我来说，他说有一千家，这是本期节目最亮眼的数据。

So as I'm concerned, the fact that he said there's a thousand this is the stat of the show.

大约一千家独角兽公司，但过去十二个月里，只有六家经历了估值下调，对吧？

A thousand unicorns essentially, and just six of them have had a down round in the last, what do you say, twelve months or something?

所以这些公司拿到了太多钱，根本不需要重新定价，但你可以推测，它们的估值大多都高得离谱。

So these things are just not these things got so these companies got so much money, and they don't have to reprice, but you can you can make the assumption most of their valuations are way way too high.

挺有意思的。

Interesting stuff.

但这不会是一场车祸。

But it's not gonna be a car crash.

那会是什么呢？

It's gonna be what?

就像轮胎漏气，开出去五英里才慢慢瘪下来？

A flat tire that catches up to you five miles down the road?

抱歉。

Sorry.

我是不是比喻得太远了？

Am I reaching out into my analogy there?

好了，这就是我们和VanEck的Christian的对话。

Anyway, here's our talk with Christian from VanEck.

Christian，欢迎回来。

Christian, welcome back.

很高兴能和你们在一起。

It's great to be with you guys.

上周我和Josh聊了Airbnb，这只股票表现相当不错。

Last week, I was talking with Josh about Airbnb, and, the stock is doing quite well.

它现在差不多是上市以来的最高水平。

It's at about the highest level it's been at since it came public.

我们当时讨论了这家公司、它的基本面以及发生了什么变化。

And we were talking about the the business and the underlying fundamentals and what's changed.

而在我看来，关于Airbnb的一个大故事，或者说主要故事，就是它最初的估值。

And one of the big stories or the the primary story as far as I'm concerned, high level with Airbnb, is the starting valuation.

它在2021年上市，当时环境完全不同，交易价格大概是销售额的70倍。

It came public in 2021 during a very different environment, trading at whatever, 70 times sales.

我甚至不知道具体是多少。

Don't even know what it was.

公司当时不盈利，市值也完全不合理。

Company was unprofitable, and the market cap just didn't make any sense.

切斯基和团队一直在努力经营，你知道，这需要时间。

And Chesky and team have been operating, and it just you know, it took time.

花了五六年时间才让估值跟上。

It took five or six years to grow into that valuation.

2026年的市场和2021年大不相同，但我们仍在处理当年那些糟糕的决策，那些草率的、行业性的行为决策。

The market in 2026 looks a lot different than 2021, but we are still dealing with some of the bad decisions, some of the sloppy, industrial behavioral decisions that were made back then.

你觉得现在的成长股投资环境怎么样？

Where do you see the growth equity environment today?

对，这个问题问得很到位，我们经常讨论。

Yeah, I mean, a spot on question we talk about a lot here.

我觉得，就像你说的，2021年那会儿，估值涨得离谱，但很多时候根本没有相应的运营数据支撑。

I think, you know, as you said back in 'twenty one, had just these absolutely incredible valuation runs without, in many cases, the underlying operating metrics to support them.

现在的情况是，以前公司可能要花八到十年才能达到一亿美元的收入。

I think now you have this environment where you have companies that used to take maybe eight to ten years to hit $100,000,000 in revenue.

他们十二到十八个月就能达到这个目标，对吧？

They're hitting it in twelve to eighteen months, right?

有些公司甚至几年内就能做到十亿美元的收入，这真是太不可思议了。

In some cases, you have companies hitting a billion revenue inside of a couple years, which is just incredible.

所以我觉得你说得对，当私募市场里这些估值都在飙升的时候，确实会出现一种情况，就是有些公司上市后需要更长时间才能撑起这个估值，对吧？

So I think to your point, there's definitely a dynamic when you have all these valuations running in private markets where some companies are going to take longer to grow into them, right, once they go public.

而且我觉得在我们这个市场里，现在的情况是价值更集中，资本也更集中，都集中在越来越少数的公司上。

And I think in our market, have a situation where there's more concentration of value, more concentration of capital, concentrating in fewer and fewer numbers.

对吧？

Right?

所以，就像在2021年那样，我觉得当时是各种创新主题全面上涨，到处都是机会。

So, like, back in '21, I think you had this, like, ubiquitous run up just across all these innovation themes.

我觉得现在在我们私募市场的世界里，也能看到一些这样的情况，但越来越多的增长是由越来越少数的公司推动的。

I think now you're seeing some of that in our world in private markets, but more and more of it is being driven by fewer and fewer companies.

所以我觉得这就是我们现在看到的情况。

So I think that's what we're seeing now.

而且有些情况下，坦白说，估值已经超前了。

And in some cases, think, frankly, the valuations have gotten ahead of themselves.

但在其他情况下，这其实是合理的。

And in other cases, it's actually warranted.

在这种环境下保持纪律是不是更难了？因为现在私募市场里的钱太多了，就像，嘿。

Is it harder to stay disciplined in this environment because there's there's just so much more money in private markets now where it's like, hey.

你提到的那些集中交易。

You you talk about these concentrated deals.

就像，要么接受，要么放弃。

It's like, take it or leave it.

你懂吧？

You know?

其他人都想往这里投钱。

Everyone else wants to throw their money in here too.

所以在这样的市场里，保持纪律有多难？

So how how hard is it to be disciplined in a market like this?

因为看起来21年和22年就是那样，钱太多了，到处流动。

Because that it seems like that was kinda what was going on in '21 and '22 is that there was so much money sloshing around.

人们拿到那么高的估值，就是因为大家都在往里面砸钱。

People were given these really high valuations just because people were throwing money at them.

我觉得这次不一样，钱更多了，但投的公司更少了。

I think this time around, there's more money but going to fewer companies.

所以如果我们只看那些拿到钱的公司，你说得对。

And so if we focus on the fewer companies that are getting the money, you're right.

有些估值真的很难接受。

Some of these valuations are like really hard to swallow.

比如我们现在面临的最大问题之一，你退一步看主要趋势，对吧，我们考虑的那些主要趋势。

Like one of the biggest things we're facing right now, you know, if you step back and look at the major themes, right, major themes that we think about them.

一方面，AI渗透到所有领域，对吧，软件、硬件、实体。

On one side you have AI touching everything, right, like software, hardware, physical.

另一方面，整个经济的再工业化，对吧，无论是太空、国防、先进制造，还是能源。

On the other side, you have the whole reindustrialization, right, of the economy, whether it be space, defense, advanced manufacturing, right, energy.

我们现在看到的最大问题之一就是，有些公司还没证明自己有能力大规模生产产品，就已经拿到了很高的估值。

One of the biggest things that we're seeing is companies being awarded valuations without actually having demonstrated the ability that they can produce products at scale.

对吧？

Right?

比如说在国防领域，有些公司正在开发各种能力，比如自主系统，但它们的估值却已经相当于它们成功推出了多条产品线。

So you have companies in, like, the defense space, for instance, in certain areas that are generating, you know, all sorts of capabilities, autonomous systems, and are getting valuations that essentially give them credit for executing on a rollout of multiple product lines.

我觉得对我们来说，这正是我们最担心的地方，也是我们暂停投资的原因。

I think for us, like, that's the biggest thing that we're getting concerned about and why we're pausing.

但其他投资者并没有这么做。

Other investors are not.

而且我觉得在一定程度上，市场规模太大了，所以你会给他们信任，可能是因为他们是经验丰富的运营者，你会想，嘿，他们以前做到过。

And I think to some extent, the TAM is so large that you're giving them credit because maybe they're good seasoned operators and you say, hey, they did this before.

他们还会再做到的。

They're gonna do it again.

所以你能理解为什么人们会这么做。

So you can kinda get behind why people are doing it.

说实话，我们就是在尽量避免这种情况。

Frankly, we're trying to avoid that.

然后呢，你可以用不同的策略，比如通过二级市场，也许能以更好的价格来抵消一部分估值泡沫。

Then And there's different tactics you can use, like, by secondaries, maybe at, like, better pricing to offset some of that valuation froth.

你说得完全对。

But you're absolutely right.

保持纪律确实很难。

It is hard to be disciplined.

我觉得从2000年开始，也就是金融危机之后到疫情之前，对私募市场来说是一段非常平稳的上升期。

2000, I guess, post GFC through pre COVID was a really nice glide path for private markets.

那时候有大量的资金在支持很多非常有趣的公司，这些公司最终改变了世界，并且在每个阶段都给投资者带来了丰厚的回报。

There was a lot of there's a lot of money subsidizing a lot of really interesting companies that ultimately transformed the world and returned a great amount of money to the investors at at every stage.

但现在那个环境已经结束了。

And and that environment is now over.

我们现在处在一个很奇怪的位置，你提到公司比以往任何时候都更快达到十亿美元的估值。

We're in this weird place where you mentioned companies are getting to a billion dollars faster than ever.

有这样的增长率显然非常令人兴奋，但这又带来了另一个问题。

And it's obviously very exciting to have growth rates like this, which poses another problem.

在颠覆性时代和颠覆性技术中进行投资，谁知道未来会怎样呢？

Investing during disruptive times and disruptive technologies, who the hell knows where this is going?

那些能在一夜之间或看似一夜之间达到十亿美元的公司，它们是否面临被颠覆的风险？因为天哪，看看它们做了什么，现在又冒出了一百万个模仿者。

And companies that can get to a billion dollars overnight or seemingly overnight, are they at risk of disruption because holy cow, look what they did, and now there's a million other copycats?

是的，迈克尔。

Yeah, Michael.

所以我们有句话，如果它像火箭一样升空，也可能像炸弹一样坠落，对吧？

So we have a saying, if it goes up like a rocket, it could fall like a bomb, right?

所以很多这样的公司，它们的持久性和寿命都值得怀疑。

So a lot of these companies, it's questionable what the durability and shelf life is of these businesses.

对吧？

Right?

很多情况下根本没有护城河。

There's no moat in many situations.

在某些情况下，尤其是硬件领域，资本几乎就成了护城河。

In instances, in hardware in particular, like capital almost becomes the moat.

所以，在某些情况下，你比竞争对手更能融资，这本身就成了一种护城河。

So your ability to out raise the cohort that you're competing against in some instances becomes a bit of a moat.

但我想稍微退一步说，你说得对，零利率持续了十年，在某些情况下看起来是好事。

But if I could just step back a little bit, because you're right, like 0% interest rates, right, for ten years in some instances seems like it was great.

但现实是，正如你指出的，一方面，这导致所有项目都能拿到融资，不管好坏。

The reality is, as you point out, on one hand, that led to everything getting funded, good and bad ideas.

说实话，过去几年我们也看到了这种情况，虽然现在开始有点收紧了。

Frankly, we've been seeing that in the past several years as well, although it's starting to tighten up a little bit.

但如果你看数据，那些零利率时期投入的资本，还有大量未实现的收益被锁在里面，投资者还没拿到回报，对吧？

But if you actually look at the data, there's still a tremendous amount of unrealized value locked up from those ZERP oriented capital deployment vintages that investors have not received, right?

过去五六年、七八年，我们看到的分配周期是历史上最低的之一。

There is one of the lowest kind of distribution cycles over the past kind of five, six, seven years that we've seen in a very long time.

而且，就算SpaceX上市了，或者Anthropic、OpenAI也上市了，也不会一夜之间改变这个局面。

And just because, you know, SpaceX goes public and maybe an Anthropic or an OpenAI goes public, it's not going to change that overnight.

对吧？

Right?

你读到的退出价值越来越多地集中在少数几家公司身上。

More and more of the exit value that you're, you know, reading about is in fewer and fewer names.

没人讲的故事是，还有大量未释放的价值一直搁在那里。

The story that's not being told is there is a tremendous amount of unlocked value that's continuing to sit out there.

说实话，这也不是要唱衰。

And frankly, and, you know, this isn't, you know, meant to be Mr.

但那个时代确实会带来很多资本毁灭，那些被淘汰的公司，坦白说，转型不够，也没能力再融资来维持自己。

Doom, but there's going to be a lot of capital destruction from that era, from companies that have been rendered obsolete and that, frankly, have not pivoted enough and don't have an ability to raise more capital to sustain themselves.

所以你说得完全对。

So you're absolutely right.

低利率周期确实带来了一些好结果。

You know, the low interest rate cycle definitely led to some good outcomes.

但故事的结局还没写出来呢。

The ending of the story is not yet written.

我觉得我对市场大部分走向还是有点数的，而且这挺让人担心的。

I have a fairly good sense, I think, of where it's going for a lot of the market and it's concerning.

克里斯蒂安，你提到这个真有意思。

Christian, it's funny you mentioned this.

我今天早上正好在看PitchBook的一份报告。

I was looking at a report from PitchBook this morning.

私募股权僵尸企业问题。

Private equity zombie problem.

报告说，目前美国赞助的投资组合里有13,509家私募股权支持的公司，其中33.8%的公司持有时间超过五年，而在这13,509家中，有2,536家已经超过了传统的退出窗口期。

And they say, of the 13,509 PE backed companies currently in US sponsored portfolios, 33.8% of the total universe have been held for more than five years, and 2,536 of, again, that 13,509 have exceeded the traditional exit window.

所以，普通合伙人手里攥着超过8600亿美元的收购净资产，这些资金分布在超过七年历史的基金里。

So GPs are sitting on more than $860,000,000,000 in buyout NAV across funds that are more than seven years old.

而且，就像我们之前讨论的，不出所料，这个问题在2018到2022年的基金中最为严重。

And the problem, as we discussed earlier, not surprisingly, the problem is most acute among the 2018, 2022 vintages.

那么，这个僵尸问题会怎么影响整个投资领域呢？

So what does the zombie problem how does this ripple across the rest of the pond, the investable landscape?

迈克尔，在收购这一块，另一个问题是，这些公司全都加了杠杆。

The other aspect of that on the buyout side, Michael, is those companies are all levered.

对吧？

Right?

所以，除了股权投资者面临的期限问题，还有一个杠杆问题。

So you've got a leverage problem on top of the duration issue for the equity investors.

杠杆问题出现在

You have a leverage problem when

你面对的是利率问题。

you're An interest looking rate problem.

利率问题，对吧？

An interest rate problem, right?

当你审视收购资产的时候。

When you're looking at the buyout assets.

我的意思是，我们关注的世界，基本上是后期风投和成长型公司，这些公司通常没有杠杆。

I mean, the world we focus on kind of the later stage venture growth, these companies typically don't have leverage.

它们不值得。

They don't deserve it.

它们通常不像是在印钞票或分红。

They're not often like printing cash or dividends.

对吧？

Right?

它们只是在投资增长。

They're just investing into growth.

我再给你一个类似的数据，这个也来自最近的PitchBook。

And I'll give you one other stat that's kind of similar to that, which also comes from PitchBook recently.

我们内部在讨论这个问题。

We're having a debate internally here.

也许我可以把这个当作一个趣味问题来问你们。

Maybe this is I'll ask this as like a trivia question for you guys.

在风险增长领域，大约有一千个所谓的独角兽公司，大概一千个。

So there's roughly like a thousand reported of these unicorns in like the venture growth landscape, a thousand of them.

有些其他出版物说比这个数字还多。

Some some other, you know, publications say there's more than that.

我们就按一千来算吧。

Let's just say it's a thousand.

对吧？

Okay?

你觉得在过去十二个月里，有多少家报告了估值下调的融资轮？

How many of those do you think have reported down rounds in the past twelve months?

因为我们经常听到估值上调的消息。

Because we hear a lot about up rounds.

在这1000家里，你们觉得有多少家实际上报告了估值下调？

How many of them have actually reported down rounds, would you guys say, of the thousand?

那会是个很小的数字。

That'll be a small number.

我猜是个很小的数字。

I would I would guess a small number.

没有。

No.

我本来猜是30%，也就是300家。

I was gonna guess 30%, 300.

六家公司。

Six companies.

因为他们还不想这么做。

Because they don't want to yet.

对吧？

Right?

我也是这么想的，就是那六家。

It's that's what I was thinking that people that Six.

那些降价融资，就是你想说的重点，对吧？我大概一个月前跟迈克尔说过这个。

Those down rounds are com that's that's kind of where you're going here, right, is that I told this to Michael about a month ago.

我说，感觉这些公司不上市的原因，就是不想承认自己被高估了，对吧？

I said like, it just seems like the reason these companies aren't going public is because they don't want to admit that they're overvalued, right?

我的意思是，这就是你想表达的意思，对吧？

I mean, that's kind of what you're getting at, right?

这是个很大的问题，对吧？

It's a huge issue, right?

所以这些公司会尽可能延长资金消耗的时间，直到不得不重新估值。

So these companies are going to make the runway last as long as they possibly can until they have to reprice themselves.

一方面，你可以说有些公司可能已经盈利了。

Now, you can, on one hand, say some of them may be profitable.

那很好。

Okay, great.

如果你盈利了，就不需要融资了。

If you're profitable, you don't need to raise money.

那真是太好了。

God bless you.

但现实是，大多数这些公司，出乎意料的是，还没有盈利。

The reality is most of these companies, shocker, are not yet profitable.

所以他们就在尽量延长资金消耗的时间，直到不得不重新定价，或者被低价收购，再或者直接倒闭。

So they're using the runway and extending it as long as they can until they have to reprice, until they get bought on the cheap, or until they go away.

这算是个附加的趣味问题。

And this is a follow on trivia question.

那么，这一千家公司里，你觉得有多少比例的公司，在过去两三年里没有进行过新一轮融资定价？

So how many of these companies, the thousand companies, right, what percentage of those would you say have not priced a new round in the last two to three years?

哇，这问题真够劲。

Oh, wow.

我都不敢回答了。

I'm afraid to answer.

80%？

80%?

80。

80.

听起来差不多。

Sounds good.

大概一半吧。

About half.

哇。

Wow.

所以你说的那些公司里，大概一半，市值可能有好几万亿，但那个市值其实已经过时了。

So about half of those companies you're talking about probably low trillions in market cap of arguably stale market cap value.

再问一个问题。

Again question.

这些公司以前是每六个月就融资一次。

These are the companies that we're raising every six months.

以前是。

They were.

现在不是了。

They're not now.

对吧？

Right?

但说到你的观点，他们确实筹到了足够的钱，所以有足够的资金储备。

But but to your point, they had they they they raised enough money where they have this runway.

而且回应迈克尔之前的问题，很多这样的公司可能已经在很多方面被颠覆了。

And to Michael's earlier question, a lot of these companies have probably been disrupted in many ways.

一千，其中有多少是软件公司？

A thousand How many of them are software?

让我问你这个问题，克里斯蒂安。

Let me ask you that, Christian.

其中有多少是软件公司？

Percent of them are software?

很多。

Lot.

我可以回头给你具体数据。

I can come back to you with the stat.

答案是很多。

The answer is a lot.

我这不是在扮演什么末日预言家。

This is not me being like Doctor.

不是那种悲观论调。

Doom.

我只是说，你看着这些数字，对吧？

This is just saying that you're looking at these numbers, right?

我在这个行业里已经待了二十五年了。

I've lived in this world the past twenty five years.

现实是，并不是一切都那么美好。

The reality is it's not all sunshine and rainbows.

对吧？

Right?

不是所有公司都像SpaceX或Anthropic那样成功。

Everything's not SpaceX or Anthropic.

所以，我们得退一步看，肯定会有一些了不起的胜利。

So, like, we have to step back and say there's going to be some incredible wins.

对吧？

Right?

肯定会有一些非常成功的案例。

There's going to be some incredible success stories.

有些公司在十二到十八个月里连续融资三四轮，每一轮都比上一轮规模更大。

You have companies raising three, four rounds in a twelve to eighteen month period, each one successively larger than the next one.

但这种情况在整个投资组合里出现的频率更低，所以价值更集中，更多的资本流向更少的基金管理人和更少的资产。

But the frequency of that across the book is smaller, so there's more concentration of value and more capital flowing to fewer managers and to fewer assets.

那问题就是，剩下的那些公司会怎么样呢？

So the question is, what happens to the rest of them?

那我问你一个问题。

Well, let me ask you this.

你知道这个模式好在哪吗？

You know what's great about this model?

我觉得投资者心里都明白，2021年的那批投资表现很糟糕。

I think investors mentally understand that the 2021 vintages are terrible.

也许他们把AI看作是一张免死金牌，觉得24、25、26年的投资会更好。

And maybe they see AI as their get out of jail free card, and they think that the '24, '25, '26 vintages will be better.

等到这些数字真正变成现金回报，或者没有回报给投资者的时候，好吧。

And by the time these numbers really show up as actual cash returned or lack of cash returned to investors, all right.

我的意思是，那已经是九年前的事了。

Mean, it's nine years ago.

对吧？

Right?

所以这些数字真正显现出来，实际上要到2029年才会按市值计价。

So these numbers will show themselves actually will mark to market in 2029.

谁在乎呢？

Who cares?

那太久了。

It's so old.

你怎么看？

What do you think about that?

所以第一点，你说得对。

So one, you're right.

不过，如果你考虑到过去十年的退出活动一直很低，就会出现一种情况：投资者已经持有大量非流动性资产。

However, if you factor in that the exit activity for the past ten years has been pretty low, you have a situation where you have investors that are already quite overweight illiquid assets.

而且除非你能看到通过增加并购或IPO的频率来变现这些资产的路径，否则很多机构投资者已经资金枯竭了。

And unless you can see a path to liquefying that through increased frequency of M and A or IPOs, a lot of these institutional investors are tapped out.

那为什么大家都在关注RIA和财富管理渠道呢？

Now, why is everyone spending time focusing on the RIA and wealth channel?

因为有一个新的资本渠道可以获取，它没有很多这些遗留的负担，在某些情况下，比如僵尸资本。

Because there's a new channel of capital to access that doesn't have a lot of that legacy overhang of these, in some situations, right, like zombie capital.

所以我认为这是一件好事，因为生态系统可以继续获得资本。

And so I think that's one a good thing because the ecosystem can continue to access capital.

我们得小心，原因就是我们正在讨论的这些。

We have to be careful for all the reasons that we're talking about.

但和过去不同，我觉得不能简单地说我们会继续募资，等这个问题显现出来时，我们已经到了两三个基金之后了。

But unlike the past, I would say it's not as easy as to say we're going to kind of keep raising, and by the time this catches up, we're on two, three funds from now.

我觉得这里有个问题。

I think there's a problem.

有一个尚未解决的问题，越来越需要解决，尤其是对于更机构化的投资者来说。

There's an unrealized problem that increasingly needs to be solved, especially for your more institutional grade investor.

所以，他们以后募资会难得多，因为你说得对。

So there's it so they're gonna have a much harder time fundraising because you're right.

嘿。

Hey.

我们几年前做了第三期基金。

We did fund three a couple years ago.

现在该做第四期了。

It's time for fund four.

要么出钱，要么以后就不带你玩了。

Either pony up or you're not gonna be included anymore.

但很多出资方可能会说，不。

But a lot of allocators are probably saying, no.

我们会等的。

We're gonna wait.

我们还没怎么动用资本呢。

We're still you're you still haven't called much capital.

那这意味着以后交易会变少，还是说结果会怎样？

So what does that just mean that fewer deals going forward, or what's the what's the outcome here?

就一个词，二级市场。

So one word, secondaries.

我从2000年代初就开始做二级市场了，那时候年交易量大概有560亿美元，大家都在玩音乐椅游戏，买卖LP份额。

So I've been in secondary since early 2000s, and back then there was probably like $56,000,000,000 of annual deal volume, and everything was just playing musical chairs with LP stakes.

对吧？

Right?

比如某个基金会需要卖掉它的LP份额，不管什么原因。

Like an endowment needs to sell their LP stake for this whatever.

那时候市场非常单一，主要就是围绕LP权益。

It was just this very kind of uniform market focused on LP interests.

过去二十年，你看到了这种演变，现在每年的交易量今年至少会达到2500亿，而且至少有一半会涉及除了LP份额以外的所有东西。

And the last twenty years, you've seen this evolution where now annual deal volume this year will probably be a 250,000,000,000 at least, and at least half of that is gonna involve everything but LP stakes.

所以基本上，你听说的那些GP主导的交易，我们二十年前就在做了，那时候还没有这些名字。

So basically, these GP leads you hear about, we were working on them twenty years ago before we had names for them.

比如基金资本重组、基金清盘、为了在退出前给GP制造流动性而进行的份额转让交易，这样他们就能把资本还给LP以便再投资。

So like fund recapitalizations, winding down funds, strip transactions to manufacture liquidity for the GP ahead of exits so they can get capital back to the LPs to recycle.

你这里考虑的是什么样的折扣？

What kind of discounts are you thinking here?

这取决于，第一，资产类别，第二，底层基金和管理人，说实话。

It depends depends on, one, the asset class and, two, the underlying fund and manager, frankly.

比如，更好的管理人总是会带来更高的回报。

Like, the better managers are always going to warrant a higher return.

而在风险投资领域，历史上你会看到更大的折扣。

And then in venture, historically, you'll see bigger discounts.

通常，在正常环境下，你会看到，比如，风险投资有10%到30%的折扣，并购可能是个位数到15%，实物资产可能也差不多。

Usually, like in a normal environment, you'll see, I like, don't know, 10 to 30% discounts in venture, maybe, like, single digits to 15% in buyout and probably similar with, like, with with real assets.

在市场动荡的时候，比如22年到24年、25年，连续11次加息对私募市场造成了很大的冲击，那些折扣幅度至少会翻倍。

In periods of disruption, right, so think of, like, '22 to '24, '25 when you've got 11 consecutive interest rates just knocking, right, a big kind of hit to the private markets, those discount ranges at least double.

但那些更高质量的经理和资产，即使在那种市场周期里，也能更好地守住价格。

But the higher quality managers and the higher quality assets, even in those market cycles, can actually defend better pricing.

这就是我一直说的。

And this is what I keep saying.

更多的资金流向那些被认为的赢家，不管你是基金经理还是运营公司。

There's more capital flowing to the perceived winners, whether you're a fund manager or whether you're an under law operating company.

但二手市场总体来说，不管是基金层面的解决方案还是资产层面的解决方案，比如要约收购，帮助员工获得流动性，让早期投资者也能套现。

But secondaries in general, whether it's fund level solutions or asset level solutions, right, tender offers, right, helping employees achieve liquidity, getting early investors liquidity.

二手市场将会成为释放这些未实现净资产价值的重要出口，这些价值现在正在造成问题。

Secondaries is gonna be a major release valve for all of this unlocked unrealized NAV that's creating problems.

我觉得私募股权的一级市场募资在财富管理渠道上会遇到问题。

I think private equity primary fundraising will have a problem with the wealth channel.

我觉得二手市场和私募信贷都很有意义。

I think secondaries and private credit make a lot of sense.

二手市场是个很容易理解的故事。

Secondaries is a very easy story to understand.

私募信贷呢，就是浮动利率收入，没有久期风险。

Private credit is, all right, income floating rate, no duration.

大家喜欢这个。

People like that.

但私募股权呢，我得把钱锁个八到十年。

But private equity, all right, I'm going to lock my money up for eight to ten years.

也许能比标普多赚个2%到3%，如果表现特别好，可能再多一点。

Maybe I'll beat the S and P by 2% to 3% maybe if they're really good a little bit more.

这我就不确定了。

I don't know.

对我来说，这听起来没那么有吸引力，尤其是当顾问和客户都在回顾过去的时候。

That doesn't sound that attractive to me, especially when advisors are looking and clients are looking in the rearview mirror.

不是说这样想就对。

Not saying that that's right.

但现实是，过去十年我们做到了14%。

But the reality is we've gotten 14 for the last decade.

相当不错了。

Pretty damn good.

再说一遍，大家别误会我的意思。

Again, I don't think anybody don't mishear me.

我不是说未来大家还期待这个数字。

I'm not saying anybody expects that going forward.

但这确实是人们做决定时经常参考的。

But that is how people make decisions often.

我们来拆解一下，去掉杠杆后的回报，因为那可能用了些创造性的金融手段。

And let's strip that back for the unlevered returns because that's probably using creative financial engineering.

所以实际上去杠杆后的回报可能在8%到10%，或者8%到12%之间，但无所谓了。

So your actual unlevered returns may be more like 8% to 10% or eight to 12%, but whatever.

所以，对吧？

So yes, right?

我觉得你说得完全对。

Like, I think you're absolutely right.

问题是，这些策略是通过什么样的包装提供给财富渠道的？

The question is, what is the wrapper that these strategies are being offered to wealth channels through?

对吧？

Right?

这就像1940年法案下的封闭式基金，带有结构化流动性，比如间隔基金或要约收购基金。

This is like a 1940 Act closed end fund that has structured liquidity, like an interval fund or a tender offer fund.

这些基金的投资者在赎回期内可以选择部分赎回流动性，对吧。

Investors in those will have an option to take partial liquidity out, right, during the redemption periods.

所以，迈克尔，你说得对，如果你通过这些包装进入，你不一定非得锁定八到十年。

So you don't have to technically lock yourself up to your point, Michael, I think for eight to ten years if you're coming in through those wrappers.

如果你是合格购买者，进入传统的私募股权式分期缴款基金，那么，是的，那些基金的期限是十年。

If you're a qualified purchaser and you're going into, like, a traditional private equity style drawdown fund, then, yeah, those are, like, ten year lives.

但让人意外的是，它们实际上从来不是十年，尤其是在风险投资领域。

Shocker, they're never actually ten years, especially if you're in venture.

其实更像是十五到二十年。

It's more like fifteen to twenty years.

但我觉得基金经理带给财富管理渠道的那些产品结构，灵活性更高，所以中途可能会有一些流动性。

But the wrappers that I think managers are bringing to the wealth channels give more flexibility so there could be some liquidity along the way.

所以，Christian，我很感谢你愿意用这些清晰的数据来看这个问题，因为很多时候，私募基金经理会设定一些不切实际的预期。

So, Christian, I appreciate your willingness to, like, look at this using just the clear data because a lot of times there's there's unrealistic expectations being set by private managers.

所以我就很好奇，在你给我们描绘的这个听起来相对负面的背景下，你现在在VanEck具体在做什么？

So I'm just curious, like, what are you doing at VanEck now then with this backdrop that you've laid out for us that sounds relatively negative?

你现在在这个市场里看到了什么？

Like, what are you are you seeing in this market now?

我们现在是精准打击的策略。

So we're it's a rifle shot approach.

第一，主题投资。

So one, like, thematics.

比如，你知道VanEck的。

Like, one, you know VanEck.

我们非常专注于主题投资。

We're very thematic focused.

对，无论是再工业化、电气化，还是去美元化。

Right, whether it's to reindustrialization, electrification, right, de dollarization.

所以，那些驱动我们大型主题ETF的主题，在私募领域也同样适用。

So one, those same themes that drive our large thematic ETFs, they live in our world in the private side as well.

所以，我们首先会拆解哪些领域正在发生最大的创新和颠覆。

So one, it's like deconstructing where we're seeing the biggest innovation and disruption happening.

然后，我们会跟随最聪明的资金流向。

Then it's following where we see the smartest money going.

在我们这边，我们专注于后期阶段的公司。

And on our side, we focus on later stage companies.

所以，我们不会投资于那种在帕洛阿尔托车库里两个人画着白板构思下一个伟大创意的公司。

So like we're not investing at, like, you know, two guys in a garage in, you know, Palo Alto whiteboarding the next great idea.

我常说，那也是一个非常适合停放资本的地方。

As I always say, that's a perfectly fine area to park capital.