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今天的《Animal Spirits Talk Your Book》节目由摩根大通赞助播出。
Today's Animal Spirits Talk Your Book is brought to you by J.
摩根
P.
大通。
Morgan.
请访问jpmorganassetmanagement.com了解更多关于摩根大通战略收益机会基金的信息。
Go to jpmorganassetmanagement.com to learn more about the J.
摩根
P.
大通战略收益机会基金,代码JSOSX。
Morgan Strategic Income Opportunities Fund, j s o s x.
更多信息请访问jpmorganassetmanagement.com。
That's jpmorganassetmanagement.com to learn more.
欢迎收听《Animal Spirits》,这是一档关于市场、生活和投资的节目。
Welcome to Animal Spirits, a show about markets, life, and investing.
欢迎收听Michael Batnick和Ben Carlson的节目,他们会聊聊最近在读什么、写什么、看什么。
Join Michael Batnick and Ben Carlson as they talk about what they're reading, writing, and watching.
Michael和Ben的所有观点都仅代表他们个人,不代表Ritholtz财富管理的立场。
All opinions expressed by Michael and Ben are solely their own opinion and do not reflect the opinion of Ritholtz Wealth Management.
本播客仅供信息参考,不应作为任何投资决策的依据。
This podcast is for informational purposes only and should not be relied upon for any investment decisions.
Ritholtz财富管理的客户可能持有本播客中讨论的证券。
Clients of Ritholtz Wealth Management may maintain positions in the securities discussed in this podcast.
欢迎收听Michael和Ben的Animal Spirits节目。
Welcome to Animal Spirits with Michael and Ben.
Michael,AI交易的热点已经从最初的风险——股市——蔓延到了经济,再到债券市场,因为这些公司终于开始发债了。
Michael, the AI trade has now hopped from the risk was initially the stock market to the economy to the bond market because these companies are finally issuing debt.
我们是不是该担心这些科技公司,尤其是那些科技巨头,其实以前从来没真正处理过债务问题?
Should we be worried that tech companies, these tech companies, and these tech leaders have actually never really dealt with debt before?
这对他们来说完全是新事物。
This is a totally new thing for them.
马克·扎克伯格以前处理过公司发债的事吗?
Has Mark Zuckerberg ever dealt with issuing corporate debt before?
嗯,我觉得他不是亲自在做这件事。
Well, I don't think he's personally doing it.
我想他手下有人负责。
I think he's got some people there.
我们应该担心他们发债吗?
Should we be worried that they're issuing debt?
从历史经验来看,是的,我们应该担心。
The historical playbook would tell us, yes, we should be worried.
我们采访了比尔·艾根,他是摩根大通绝对回报和机会性固定收益团队的负责人。
So we talked to Bill Eigen, is the head of absolute return and opportunistic fixed income team at JPMorgan.
他是战略收益机会基金的投资组合经理,这是一只绝对回报基金,意思是我们不想亏钱。
He's the portfolio manager on the Strategic Income Opportunities Fund, which is an absolute return fund, meaning we don't wanna lose money.
这真的很有意思。
And it's really interesting.
在我们跟他聊之前,你发给我一张他们的收益图表,看起来非常……
Before we talked to him, you sent me a chart of their returns, and it's very...
非常……
It's a very...
一条几乎不动的线。
A line that doesn't move at all.
他们大量投资于现金。
They've been heavily invested in cash.
因为大部分都是现金。
Because a lot of it is in cash.
有意思的是,多年来一直有人说,一旦美联储降息,现金就会变得一文不值,但美联储并没有这么做。
And it's funny because it felt like for years, cash is gonna be trash again once the Fed lowers rates, but the Fed hasn't done that.
实际上,他们降了一点,但现在又加息了,现金仍然有不错的收益。
In fact, they lowered a little bit, but now they've raised them again, and cash is actually still yielding something.
还不错。
It's not bad.
你知道吗?
You know what?
投资者是不是总在抱怨?
Are investors always complaining?
当然。
Of course.
对。
Yes.
答案是肯定的。
The answer is yes.
他们确实如此。
They are.
利率在1%的时候不好,现在利率在5%也不满意,因为各种原因,我并不是忽视这些担忧。
Interest rates at at 1% were no good, and now interest rates at 5% are no good because x, y, and z, and I'm not sweeping those concerns under the rug.
我更愿意把这看作是一个乐观的故事。
I choose to see this as a glass half full story.
而且我明白,利率上升的部分原因是财政上的不负责任。
And I I understand that part of the reason that rates are rising is fiscal irresponsibility.
我明白这一点。
I understand that
通货膨胀来了。
inflation Come is on.
不是那个原因。
That's not it.
你是什么意思?
What do you
什么意思?
mean?
是通胀和增长的问题。
It's inflation and growth.
你怎么知道的?
How do you know?
因为九十年代我们有财政盈余,那时候利率是6%。
Because we had a fiscal surplus in the nineteen nineties and that interest rates were 6%.
但这并不能证明收益率上升不是因为人们担心赤字。
That doesn't disprove that yields are moving higher because people are worried about deficits.
不过你也证明不了这一点。
You also can't prove it, though.
我只是说说而已。
I'm just saying.
我觉得这更多跟经济有关。
I think it's more to do with economic
你说得对,先生。
on you, sir.
你看起来非常坚定。
You you seem to be pretty emphatic.
我觉得这更多是关于经济增长和通胀,而不是其他什么,投资者面对的就是这些。
I think it's more about economic growth and inflation than anything, and that's what investors are dealing with.
就是……
It's...
这确实是个很有意思的市场,因为随着收益率上升,大家特别担心通胀。
It really is an interesting market because as yields rise, people are so worried about inflation.
但如果收益率一直涨,最终反而会导致收益率下降。
But if yields keep rising, eventually, that's gonna cause yields to fall.
有点像“高价是解决高价的方案”。
It's kinda like higher prices are the solution to higher prices.
同样的道理。
Same thing.
高收益率是解决高收益率的方案。
Higher yields are the solution to higher yields.
十年期收益率不可能超过5.3%。
The ten year can't possibly go above 5.3%.
然后它就超过了,我也不知道了。
And then it does, and I I don't know.
想想这意味着什么,挺有意思的。
It's interesting to think about what that means.
比如说,如果美联储继续加息,他们加息后经济会放缓,然后利率就会下降,这对债券是有利的。
Like, if the Fed kept hiking, they'd hiked and they'd slow the economy down, and then rates would fall, and that's good for bonds.
而且这有点奇怪……
And it's it's a weird...
总之,我们和Bill Eigen聊了所有这些。
Anyway, we talked about all this with Bill Eigen.
我喜欢他对世界和固定收益的看法。
I like the way he thought about the world and fixed income.
很多固定收益经理天生就比较悲观。
Many fixed income managers are naturally pessimistic.
我觉得从营销的角度来看,就像对冲基金经理一样,几乎必须有点悲观。
I think from a from a marketing perspective, kinda like hedge fund managers, like, almost have to be a little bit of pessimistic.
每次固定收益经理上CNBC,他们都会对世界的整体状况相当悲观。
Every time a fixed income manager goes on CNBC, they're pretty bearish about the general state of the world.
因为你知道吗?
Because guess what?
看空意味着,嘿,快来拥抱债券吧。
Being bearish means, hey, come to the loving arms of bonds.
但比尔说,不,我必须为我的投资者赚钱。
But Bill said, no, I have to make money for my investors.
这,这……
It's it's...
我不受任何基准的束缚。
I'm not tied to some benchmark.
这是一种灵活的投资方式,提供收益,不亏钱,我觉得这种不考虑基准、管理这类委托的方式很有意思。
It's a go anywhere, provide us income, don't lose money, and I think that's an interesting way to think about, like, not having a benchmark and and a way to manage this kind of mandate.
总之,这是一次有趣的对话。
So anyway, fun conversation.
下面是我们与摩根大通的比尔·艾根的访谈。
Here's our talk with Bill Eigen from JPMorgan.
比尔,欢迎来到我们的节目。
Bill, welcome to the show.
谢谢你们邀请我。
Thanks for having me on.
很期待这次对话。
Looking forward to this.
好的。
All right.
对于债券投资者来说,现在确实是个令人兴奋的环境。
It has been an exciting environment for bond investors.
今天我们要聊的是摩根大通战略收益机会基金,我记得从2008年成立以来你一直在管理它,对吗?
Today, we're going to be talking about the JPMorgan Strategic Income Opportunities Fund, which I believe you've ran since inception in 2008?
是的。
Yes.
十八年了。
Eighteen years.
好的。
All right.
那在我们讨论今天市场机会之前,这个基金在投资者的投资组合里是起什么作用的?
So before we get into what today looks like in terms of the market opportunities, What is the purpose of this fund inside an investor's portfolio?
它的任务是什么?
What's the mandate here?
摩根大通战略收益机会基金从一开始就是被设计成所谓的绝对收益固定收益基金。
JPMorgan Strategic Income Opportunities Fund has always been and was designed as what's known as an absolute return fixed income fund.
这和传统的固定收益基金非常非常不同。
Very, very different from traditional fixed income funds.
你们知道,传统固定收益基金有一个基准,这个基准通常对利率和风险溢价这类东西很敏感。
As you guys know, traditional fixed income funds have a benchmark that's typically pretty sensitive to things like interest rates and risk premiums.
它们通常围绕那个基准进行配置。
You know, they typically allocate around that benchmark.
所以,市面上大多数固定收益基金,不管你喜欢不喜欢,都会随着利率上下波动,对吧?
As a result, the bulk of fixed income funds out there, like it or not like it, kind of move up and down with interest rates, right?
所以这就是为什么过去五年利率上升,很多这类基金回报为负,因为利率上升对持有传统基金的固定收益投资者来说非常不利,会侵蚀他们的投资价值。
So that's why over the last five years have interest rates have risen, a lot of these funds have negative returns because rising interest rates are terrible for fixed income investors who own traditional funds because it erodes the value of their investments.
而绝对收益投资则不同,它不仅仅是做多基金。
Absolute return investing on the other hand, it's not just a long only fund.
换句话说,我可以做多,可以做空,可以进行相对价值交易,可以使用传统证券,也可以使用信用违约互换等合成工具,还可以持有无限量的现金。
In other words, I can go long, I can go short, I can put on relative value trades, I can use traditional securities, I can use synthetics like credit default swaps, I can hold unlimited amounts of cash.
事实上,简单说一下,我一度持有该基金90%的现金,也曾经只持有10%,所以这完全取决于机会情况。
In fact, just to give you a brief overview, I've held as much as 90% of this fund in cash at one time and as little as 10%, so it really depends on what the opportunity set looks like.
绝对收益投资是对固定收益中的机会做出反应,而这又是由数学驱动的。
Absolute return investing involves reacting to the opportunity set in fixed income, which in turn is driven by mathematics.
换句话说,我永远无法准确告诉你股市何时会崩盘或何时会直线上升,对吧?
In other words, I can never tell you when equities are gonna crash exactly or when they're gonna go straight up, right?
但我可以相当确定地告诉你,当利率足够低或风险溢价足够紧时,固定收益中就没有多少赚钱空间了。
But what I can tell you with a pretty good degree of certainty is when interest rates are low enough or risk premiums are tight enough, you run out of room to make money in fixed income.
而这一点,人们很长时间以来都不愿意接受,因为我认为发生的情况是,你经历了一个四十年的周期。
And that's something that people have been unwilling to accept for for quite some time because I think what happened is you had a forty year cycle.
从七十年代末一直持续到2020年左右。
You're running from the late seventies until around 2020.
利率除了下降,什么都没做。
Interest rates did nothing but fall.
所以这让很多在那个时期进入固定收益领域的人成了英雄。
So it made heroes of a lot of people who got into fixed income during that period.
因为连续四十年,每年都在上涨。
Because it just goes up every year for forty straight years.
在那种环境下,很容易把牛市误认为是自己的本事,但过去五年才是真正的考验,利率基本上降到了零,对吧?
It gets very easy to confuse brains with a bull market in that environment, but the last five years have been the real test where rates went to zero, basically, right?
在那种情况下,你在固定收益上注定要亏钱,然而当利率为零时,固定收益却比以往任何时候都更受欢迎,因为人们总是看着过去的回报,以为这些回报还能重现。
At which point you're guaranteed to lose money in fixed income, and yet fixing was never more popular than it was when rates were at zero because people kept looking at trailing returns and thinking that they were repeatable.
但事实并非如此。
They're just not.
这和股票很不一样。
Very unlike equities.
有意思,关于现金这部分,因为如果你回头看,似乎对冲债券真的很容易。
It's interesting, the cash piece, because if you look back, it seems like it was really easy to hedge bonds.
就像,嗯,直接买短期国债就行了,因为没有利率风险。
It was like, well, just go to T Bills because you don't have the interest rate risk.
但当你需要对冲的时候,短期国债的收益率其实也不高。
But when you were supposed to hedge, though, T Bills still didn't yield much.
比如,美联储得……
Like, it took for the Fed...
美联储得多次大幅加息才能达到那个水平。
The Fed had to jack rates up a bunch of times to get there.
所以我很好奇那是什么感觉,因为你……
So I'm just curious how that felt because you...
当你对冲的时候,你几乎没有收益。
When you hedged, you had no yield.
这就是它的数学原理。
The mathematics of it.
现在有收益了。
Now there was yield.
我很好奇你是怎么度过2022年那段时期的,又是怎么避免总是被现金完全吸引,然后觉得,不,这太容易了。
I'm curious how you navigated that period of 2022 and then how you avoid being just totally seduced by cash all the time and being like, no, it's so easy.
没有波动。
There's no volatility.
我怎么……
How do I...
你怎么摆脱那种心态的?
How do you get out of that mindset?
当时,我不会说这很容易。
At the time, I'm not gonna say it was easy.
2021年的时候,我确实持有80%到90%的现金,我就说,听着,我不会把我的钱交给政府,以50个基点的利率借给他们十年。
I was literally in 2021, I was holding 80 to 90% cash just saying, listen, I'm not gonna give this government my money and lend it to them for ten years at 50 basis points.
只要利率升到1%,你就会面临巨大的损失。
All you need is for rates to go to one percent, you're sitting on a huge loss.
我宁愿一分钱不赚,就赚那么一点点利息,也不去买长期国债,就为了显得自己很专业、跟指数一样,明知道在那儿会亏钱。
I'd rather get nothing, like just a few basis points on my cash than to buy longer term treasuries just to be factionable and look like the index when I know I'm gonna lose money there.
我为什么要明知故犯,去买一个我几乎百分百确定会亏钱的东西?
Why would I knowingly buy something that I know with almost complete certainty is gonna lose money?
这就是固定收益的问题所在。
That's That's the problem with fixed income.
这就是主动管理和固定收益整体的问题。
That's the problem with active management and fixed income in general.
传统上,固定收益管理就是围绕一个基准,比如巴克莱综合指数,然后可能超配公司债,加点高收益债,超配机构债,反正就是找那些有利差的东西,对吧?
Traditionally revolves around getting along a benchmark like the Barclays aggregate index and maybe overweighting corporates, sprinkling in some high yield, overweighting agencies, anything with a spread, right?
但当利差收得很紧的时候,其实差别真的不大。
But when the spreads are really tight, doesn't it really make a difference.
就像现在,不管你是持有投资级公司债,还是持有同期限的国债,两边亏的钱都差不多,因为根本没有利差,对吧?
Like right now, whether you own investment grade corporates or whether you own treasuries of the same duration, you're gonna lose just about as much in either one because there's no spread, right?
利差已经接近历史最低水平了。
Spreads are near all time tights.
实际上,现在高收益投资级抵押贷款的利差比过去二十年里96%的时间都要窄。
In fact, spreads are tighter in high yield investment grade mortgages than they have been 96% of the time over the last two decades.
所以你承担这些风险根本得不到补偿,尤其是考虑到现在市场上存在的各种风险,其中一些最近已经开始被定价了。
So you're not getting compensated for taking the risk, particularly given all the risks that are in the market right now, some of which are starting to get priced very recently.
当市场变成这样的时候,我得说,嘿。
And when markets are like that, I gotta say, hey.
听着。
Listen.
无论如何我都得拿出正回报来。
I gotta put up a positive return no matter what.
我没有任何借口。
I don't have any excuses.
比如,2022年,你的债券基金跌了13%到14%,对吧?
Like for instance, in 2022, your bond fund was down 13, 14%, right?
因为利率大幅上升了。
Because rates fired higher.
那一年我们涨了不到1%,我还是觉得不太好,因为我们跑输了现金,但不知道为什么大家都看着我们,说你们是英雄。
We were up, know, a little less than 1% that year, and I still didn't think that was very good because we trailed cash, but for some reason, you know, everyone looks at us, oh, you guys are heroes.
市场大跌的时候你们还能有正收益,我就说,不,这是我们该做的,对吧?
You know, you had a positive return when the market really tanked, I'm like, no, that's what we're supposed to do, right?
我不能指着跌了13%的基准,而我跌了12%的固定收益基金,然后说干得好,对吧?
I mean, I can't point to a benchmark that's down 13% and I'm down 12 in a fixed income fund and say I did a good job, right?
那就像,这有问题,因为有人给你固定收益,它应该是无伤害的资产类别。
That's like, there's something wrong with that because someone gives you fixed when income, it's supposed to be a do no harm asset class.
然而,巴克莱综合指数的五年回报率,也就是债券的标普500,是负的。
And yet the five year return on the Barclays aggregate index, which is the S and P 500 of bonds, is negative.
我刚刚在看这个。
I was just looking at this.
这是综合指数有史以来最差的五年回报。
It's the worst five year return ever for the ag.
或者接近最差。
Or close to it.
不过这也难怪,因为是从零开始的。
And it's no surprise, though, because it came off zero.
那段时间作为基金经理,我挺郁闷的,2021年的时候大家一直在质疑我的持仓。
Frustrating for me as a manager during that time, people were questioning my position in 2021 constantly.
就是说,我们得赚钱啊。
Like, just, you know, we gotta make money.
现在情况不一样了。
Things are different now.
我喜欢你讲债券时用数学来解释的方式,因为我和迈克尔也是这么跟客户解释的。
And I like how you I like how you talk about bonds being about math because that's the way that Michael and I explain it too to our clients.
收益率更高了。
The yields are higher.
未来预期的回报也更高了。
The future forward expected returns are also higher.
对。
Yep.
那你现在对这个资产类别的热情,跟那时候比,高了多少?
How much more excited are you about the asset class now versus back then?
我现在对前端市场挺兴奋的。
I'm getting pretty excited about the front end now.
我觉得两年期国债收益率在5%左右,其实已经定价了过多的美联储紧缩,因为美联储能紧缩的空间有限,再紧下去就会把经济推入衰退。毕竟现在经济很大程度上是靠少数几个因素撑着的,比如超大规模数据中心、AI支出和资本开支。
Like, I think two year treasuries at at around five are pricing and too much Fed tightening now because the Fed can only tighten so far before they're gonna tip us into recession because so much of this economy right now is being supported by a very narrow set of factors like hyperscalers, AI spending CapEx.
这些因素开始逆转,我觉得会逆转,或者至少会放缓。
It starts to reverse, which I think it will, or slow down.
实际上,二阶导数已经在放缓了,这会把经济这个三条腿的凳子的一条腿给抽掉。
In fact, the second derivative is already slowing down, that's gonna pull a stool out from under the, you know, the three legged stool of the economy.
如果美联储在这种情况下还要紧缩,我觉得衰退会来得更快。
If the Fed wants to tighten into that, it's gonna bring that about quicker in my mind.
我觉得美联储现在做的,其实就是意识到当初通胀根本没接近目标的时候,就不该放松那么多。
I think all the Fed's doing right now is they realize they never should've eased as much as they did when inflation never even came close to hitting their target.
所以我觉得他们现在只是在收回一些之前的宽松措施,但我不认为他们能收得太狠,因为在我看来,这个经济其实挺脆弱的。
So I think they're just kinda taking some of that away, you know, of the easing that they did, but I don't think they can go too far with it just because I, in my personal view is this economy pretty fragile.
除了做资金管理,我还拥有几家小企业,每一家都在告诉我,我们现在处于一个相当脆弱的状态,尤其是考虑到AI资本支出占了上季度GDP增长近一半。
I mean, own a number of small businesses in addition to what I do on the money management front, and every single one of them is kinda telling me that we're in a kind of a fragile state here, especially when you consider like AI CapEx accounted for almost half the GDP growth last quarter.
如果这部分消失了,那就有大问题了。
That disappears, you have a real problem.
比尔,让我问你一个你现在每天肯定都会被问到的问题。
Bill, let me ask you the question that I'm sure you're getting asked every day at this point.
为什么利率涨得这么快,这意味着什么?
Why are rates going up so fast, and what does it mean?
一个是通胀。
One is inflation.
关于利率,你最不该问的人就是那种一直做多利率的人,比如典型的债券经理。
The last person you should ask for their opinion on interest rates is someone who's long interest rates all the time, like a typical bond manager.
我不是那种人。
I'm not.
我可能做多。
I could be long.
我也可能做空。
I could be short.
我可以随心所欲,所以我会客观地讲。
I could do whatever I want, so I'm gonna be objective here.
你们面临的最大问题就是通胀。
The single biggest problem you have is inflation.
第二个是财政问题。
The second is fiscal.
这两个我都会讲到。
I'll I'll I'll get into both.
通胀并没有在放缓。
Inflation is not slowing down.
实际上,它还在恶化。
In fact, it's getting worse.
不管你看制造业的投入成本,还是其他任何东西,比如铜、铝、钢筋,任何用来建房子的材料,都贵得离谱了。
Whether you look at inputs to manufacturing process, everything, you know you know, whether it's copper, aluminum, rebar, you know, anything to put up a building is getting ridiculously expensive.
我知道这个,因为我现在正在盖一栋楼。
I know that because I'm putting up a building right now.
现在食品价格贵得离谱,买吃的都得去申请房屋净值贷款了。
You know, food costs, I mean, you gotta take out a home equity loan these days.
从Costco出来,购物车都得装得满满的。
Have to come out of Costco with a cart full.
可惜就是没降下来。
It's just it's not slowing down, unfortunately.
反而越来越严重。
It's just getting worse.
美联储也意识到了这一点。
The Fed recognizes that.
他们就说,我们面临通胀问题。
And they're like, we have an inflation problem.
我们真不该说那句话。
We never should have said it.
我们以为通胀会直接降到2%的目标水平。
We think inflation is gonna go right down to our 2% target.
结果根本就没接近过。
It never even got close to that.
现在反而明显往反方向走了。
Now it's going decidedly the other way.
柴油一加仑要6.5美元。
I mean, diesel's $6.50 a gallon.
这影响可大了,不管是给施工设备加油,还是18轮大卡车,柴油渗透到所有东西里。
The implications of that is pretty big, whether it's, you know, filling up your construction equipment, whether it's, you know, 18 wheelers, you know, diesel goes into everything.
所以这问题会持续一段时间。
So that's gonna be a problem for some time.
还有一件事大家很少提,但对我来说特别重要。我最近一直在说,这个政府已经让我看到他们根本不关心长期国债收益率,那我干嘛还要关心呢?
And the other thing is that it doesn't get talked that often about, which is huge to me because, you know, the thing I've been saying lately is this government has shown me that they don't care about the long end of the yield curve, so why should I, right?
你看他们完全没有财政纪律,40万亿美元的债务,还有2万亿美元的赤字,而且越来越严重。
You look at the complete lack of fiscal discipline, you look at $40,000,000,000,000 in debt, you look at a $2,000,000,000,000 deficit that's just getting worse and worse.
你看,债务占GDP的比例已经达到125%,而十五年前这个数字还只有50左右。
You you look at 125% debt to GDP, which used to be like, you know, 50, you know, only fifteen years ago.
我们一直在不停地印钱、印钱、再印钱。
We just keep printing and printing and printing.
由于减税,收入端在下降。
We keep, you know, the revenue side's coming down because of tax cuts.
支出端在上升,因为福利支出不断增长。
The cost side's going up because entitlements keep going up.
国防开支高得离谱,最重要的是,美国债务的利息支出正在直线飙升。
Defense spending's through the roof, and most importantly, interest on The US debt is hockey sticking straight up.
所以支出端越来越糟,收入端在下降,赤字越来越大,我认为这也是为什么放眼全球,很多国家都在重新考虑他们对美国国债的敞口,对吧?
So the cost side's getting a lot worse, the revenue side's coming down, the deficit's getting bigger, and I think that's part of the reason why when you look around the world, a lot of countries are second guessing their treasury exposure, right?
你会看到一些国家在减持部分美国国债,无论是中国、日本还是欧洲,这显然对技术面资金流不利,所以即使三十年期收益率在5.5%,我也很难看好长期国债。
You're seeing some countries divest a portion of their treasuries, whether it's China, Japan, Europe, and that's not good for the technical flow, obviously, so I have a hard time liking the long end, even here at five and a half on thirties.
两年期收益率5%,我觉得值得投资。
5% on a two, I think that's worth doing.
我觉得风险不高,因为短期债券滚动得很快。
I don't think it's high risk because it rolls very quickly.
持有这些债券,你能获得比现金高得多的收益。
You're getting a pretty healthy premium over cash to own that.
我觉得美联储不会把利率加到5%。
I don't think the Fed's gonna get to 5%.
现在市场基本上是在按美联储利率5%来定价,但他们现在只有4%,而且我觉得他们再加不了多少了。
You're basically pricing at a 5% Fed there and they're only at four, and I don't think they can go a heck of a lot more.
我觉得他们会尝试加息。
Think they're gonna try.
他们会试着再加一两次,但我觉得到那时,不幸的是,唯一能在长期债券上赚钱的方式就是经历一场严重的经济衰退,那会把利率拉下来。
They'll try to go one, two more, but I think by that point, unfortunately to me, the only way you make money in the long end is via a nasty recession, which takes rates down with it.
这就是问题所在,作为绝对收益管理人,你永远不能排除任何一种情况。
That's the thing, as an absolute return manager, you can never exclude a scenario.
比如每次我在基金里做投资时,我都会想,好吧,如果我错了怎么办?
Like every time I put an investment in the fund, I'm like, okay, what if I'm wrong here?
就算我判断错了,基金本身还是能产生正回报。
Even if I'm wrong, the fund itself will still be able to produce a positive return.
这就是关键的区别。
That's the key difference.
我以前管理纯多头资金的时候,在富达做了很多年,我之所以离开,是因为我不喜欢被单一因素绑架,比如利率。
When I was running long only money, and I ran long only money for, a lot of years at Fidelity, the reason I got out of it was because I didn't like being held hostage to single factors like interest rates.
我实在受不了。
I just couldn't stand it.
作为绝对收益管理人,你必须能够控制结果。
An absolute return manager, you have to be able to control the outcome.
无论发生什么,你都必须能够交出正回报。
You have to be able to put up a positive return no matter what.
而且十八年来,我们一直做到了。
And for eighteen years, we always have.
2008年、2009年、2013年、2015年,都是正回报,对吧?
2008, 2009, 2013, 'fifteen, positive, right?
我们的基金从来没有在任何一个日历年度出现过负回报。
We've never had a negative return in the fund ever in a calendar year.
在每一个十二个月周期内,我记得有两次回撤,最严重的一次大约在非日历年度期间回撤了2%,但随后就迎来了两位数的回报。
Over every twelve month period, I think we've had two drawdowns, the worst of which was like around 2% over a non calendar year period, but that was subsequently followed by double digit return.
因为通常我们出现回撤的唯一情况是事情开始变得糟糕,大楼着火时,我会是冲进那栋着火大楼的人之一。
Because typically the only time we'll have a drawdown is when things start to go pear shaped and the building catches on fire, I'll be one of the guys running into that building that's on fire.
我不一定能够准时到达,但一旦风险溢价达到我代表投资者承担风险所应得的回报水平,我就会进去。
And I'm not necessarily gonna be right on time, but once risk premiums get to the point where I'm getting paid enough to take on that risk on behalf of my investors, I'll go in.
比尔,我同意你的看法,如果美联储继续施压,最终他们会把经济推向某种境地。
Bill, I agree with you that if the Fed keeps pushing, eventually what they're going to do is kind of tip the economy into something.
我不知道那是衰退还是放缓还是别的什么。
I don't know if that's a recession or a slowdown or whatever.
所以我觉得那些担忧有点过度了,但也有人认为,不,不,通胀会一直居高不下。
So I feel like those fears are, like, a bit overblown, but there are people who think, no, no, Inflation is just gonna stay sticky high.
我们会让经济过热运行。
We're gonna run the economy hot.
所以有些人可能会说,要不要考虑一下通胀保值债券?因为2020年和2021年的时候,通胀保值债券的收益率也低得吓人。
And so some people would say, you know, can interest you in tips potentially because tips yields were also horrible back in 2020 and 2021.
那时候名义收益率都是负的。
They were negative on a nominal basis.
你买那些也得付钱。
You're paying for those as well.
现在五年期通胀保值债券的收益率是2.7%,我们录节目的时候,今天几号来着?
Now we're looking at five year tips yields of 2.7%, and we're recording this, what's the date today?
28号?
Twenty eighth?
9月28号?
September 28?
十年期的,差不多3%。
Ten years, almost 3%.
二十年期的,3.3%。
Twenty years, 3.3%.
你现在是在……
Are you at...
那在什么情况下,你会开始对这些通胀保值债券的收益率感兴趣呢?现在它们的实际回报已经相当不错了。
What at what point do you become interested in these tips yields where you're getting, you know, pretty good real returns here in tips?
如果通胀保值债券所依据的CPI还是七八十年代用的那个公式,我会更喜欢它们,因为那样的话,CPI会是现在的两到三倍,这些债券在那个水平下会提供巨大的价值。
I'd like them a lot better if the CPI that tips reset off of was the same formula they used to use in the 70s and 80s because it would be literally two to three times the level it is now, and those would offer tremendous value at that pace.
但你要记住,通胀保值债券是根据未调整的CPI来调整的,而这个CPI现在确实在百分之三左右。
But you got to remember tips reset off the unadjusted CPI, which is, you know, yes, running in the threes.
就像你说的,2.7%加上3%,你可以得到大约百分之六的回报。
You know, like you said, a 2.7 plus three, you know, you can get you can get in the sixes.
你可以得到大约百分之六。
You can get, you know, around six.
现在三十年期的话,你可以得到百分之五点五五,如果你愿意承担风险,而不担心未调整的CPI会下降,从而拉低你的收益率。
You know, you get five fifty five on a thirty year right now if you want to go that without, you know, without the risk of inflation actually at CPI unadjusted coming down and then actually taking that, you know, taking your yield lower.
我想说的是,通胀保值债券和普通国债之间的利差,还不足以让我真正感兴趣。
I guess what I'm saying is the spread between tips and and nominals is not enough for me to really get interested yet.
如果那个利差再高很多的话,我可能会感兴趣。
If if that spread were much higher, I could be interested.
不过呢,我确实觉得TIPS会跑赢传统国债,但它们还是有久期风险的。
Now I do think tips will outperform traditional treasuries, but still they have duration.
这是大家要记住的一点。
That's the thing people have to remember.
TIPS有久期,如果利率涨得够多,你会在TIPS上吃亏,就像2022年那样,如果利率继续上涨的话。
Tips have duration and, you know, rates go up enough, you're gonna, you know, you're gonna get hit on tips much like you did in 2022 if rates keep going up.
但它们肯定会跑赢国债。
But they certainly will outperform treasuries.
但再说一次,如果我能拿着现金赚4%,而且毫无担忧,而且你知道,投资级的浮动利率债券,评级很高的那种,甚至能给你稍微多一点收益。
But again, if I can get if I can sit on cash at 4% right with with with no worries and I can actually you know investment grade floaters very highly rated investment grade floaters can get you even a little bit more than that.
说实话,我觉得没必要去碰十年到三十年的东西。
I don't feel the need to reach out ten to thirty years on anything, to be to be honest with you.
我就是不想在这里承担久期风险。
I just I just don't want duration risk here.
我就是不想……
I just don't...
过去五年我都不想要它。
I haven't wanted it for the last five years.
这个决定一直是对的。
That's been the right call.
你想想看,如果你什么都不做,看看晨星和其他机构列出的所有固定收益类别,你会惊讶地发现,过去五年里,现金的表现几乎超过了所有那些类别。
If you think about it, if you just did nothing, when you look at all the fixed income categories that Morningstar has and others have, you'd be shocked at how much, if you just look over the last five years, cash has pretty much outperformed every one of those categories.
就拿着现金,什么都不做,你的表现已经好过大多数主动管理的固定收益产品。
Just holding cash, doing nothing, you've done better than most forms of actively managed fixed income.
过去五年里,唯一比现金表现好一点的是高收益债,但那种风险更像股票,而不是固定收益,你们也知道,利差很容易突然扩大,眨眼间就把你的收益全吞掉。
The only one that outperformed cash by a little bit over the last five years is high yield, which is more akin to equity type risk, as you guys know, than fixed income risk, and spreads can easily jump out there and wipe out your returns in a heartbeat.
就算今天,高收益债也随着股市一起被打击了。
Even today, high yield has been getting hit a little with equities.
比尔,但即便如此,高收益债今年以来的表现还是超过了综合债券指数。
Bill, but even still, high yield has outperformed the ag year to date.
这显然是一个既有趣又令人兴奋,而且很不寻常的宏观环境。
It's an obviously interesting and exciting and unusual macro environment.
你提到的那些担忧,比如财政和通胀问题,不只是你一个人这么说。
A lot of the fears that you're talking about, fiscal and inflation, you're not the only person saying that.
有很多人都特别关注这些。
There's a lot of people that are hyper focused on it.
感觉我们每天都在讨论这些担忧。
It seems like every day we're talking about these worries.
不过,我知道这更偏向短期,但你看,VIX指数非常低,信用利差也收得很紧。
And yet, I know this is much shorter term, but, like, the VIX is super low and credit spreads are super tight.
最低等级的债券开始有点爆了。
The lowest rung is starting to blow out a little bit.
对。
Yes.
CCC级债券表现很糟糕。
CCCs are doing terrible.
顺便说一下,现在已经涨到1200了,这很糟糕。
They're up to 1,200, by the way, which is bad.
所以那里有很多变动。
So there's a lot of movement there.
随着私人信贷的介入,高收益债券指数的构成是否变得更高质量了?
Is there something in the composition of the high yield index getting maybe more higher quality as private credit has stepped in?
指数本身是否有什么问题,也许我们用的策略已经过时了?
Is there something in the index itself that is maybe we're using an outdated playbook?
是的。
Yes.
我们花点时间聊聊这个。
Let's get into that for a minute.
首先,私人信贷本身也有问题。
First of all, private credit has its own issues.
我已经说过很多次了。很多私人信贷都放在私募股权公司旗下的关联保险公司里,这些公司往往会把大量私人信贷塞进这些总账户中。
I've talking about this for two So much private credit sits in affiliated insurance companies that are owned by private equity firms, which tend to really overload these general accounts with private credit.
说实话,我一开始是在保险行业工作的。
I started in the insurance industry, believe it or not.
我毕业后的头两年,实际上是在一家很大的保险公司工作,帮忙管理一个总账户,这个账户里有年金、保证投资合同之类的产品。
My first two years out of school, I actually worked for a very large insurance company helping to manage a general account, which in turn had annuities and guaranteed investment contracts, etcetera.
所以我从一开始就学到,总账户是非常宝贵的。
So I grew up learning that general accounts are precious.
它们应该做到久期匹配。
They're supposed to be duration matched.
那些都应该是投资级资产,而且要保持流动性。
Those will be all IGs, to be liquid.
95支运动队。
95 sports teams.
对,比尔,你要是当时留在那儿,都能买下湖人队了。
Yeah, Bill, you could have bought the Lakers if you would have stayed there.
你跑得比我快多了。
You you got way ahead of me.
我只是……
I just...
你知道我要说什么。
You know where I'm going.
现在,一般的关联保险公司,差不多有超过40%的资产在私募信贷上。
Now your average affiliated insurer has something like 40 plus percent in private credit.
如果你从这些公司中的一家买了年金,你手上就会有大麻烦,对吧?
I mean, you have an annuity run from one of these companies, you're gonna have a big problem on your hands, right?
因为现在主导配置的是三级资产,而不是国债、投资级债券,甚至不是高收益债。
Because you can't level three assets dominate the allocations now, not treasuries, investment grade or even high yield.
与此同时,私募信贷现在也正面临自己的问题。
And at the same time, private credit's going through its own issues right now.
你们都知道BDC的表现,平均折价在25%到28%左右。
Mean, you guys know about BDC performance average discount up 20 five-twenty 8%.
但最重要的是,市场上以实物支付的坏账数量正在急剧上升,对吧?
But most importantly, the amount of bad payment in kind paper in the marketplace is hockey sticking higher, right?
赎回的速度依然非常快。
Redemptions continue at a very high pace.
现在私募信贷基金设置的赎回限制比疫情期间封控时还多,对吧?
You know, there's more gates up around private credit funds than during a COVID lockdown, right?
现在发生的事情简直太疯狂了。
I mean, it's just crazy what's happening right now.
所以大家都去把钱取出来,而且很多人当初买的时候以为这东西流动性不错,现在才发现根本不是那么回事。
So go and get their money out and and a lot of them were sold something that they thought was kind of liquid and now finding out that it's not at all.
而且你知道,现在你想走都走不了。
And you know, now you just can't leave.
你知道我要说什么,同时高收益债方面,你刚才说得很准确,利差收窄到了创纪录的水平,现在高收益债市场最让人不安的一点,我从2016年以来就没见过,这轮信贷周期已经持续了十一年,是历史上最长的一次。
You know where I'm going with this and high yield at the same time, you pointed out very accurately, record tight spreads, the most disturbing thing that's going on in high yield right now, which I have not seen since 2016, this has been an eleven year credit cycle we've had going on here, longest one in history.
信贷周期总是在阴影中结束,对吧?
Credit cycles always end in the shadows, right?
第一个警示信号就是私募信贷BDC的表现,对吧,现在依然很糟糕。
The first warning signal was kind of private credit BDC performance, right, which is still terrible.
下一步就是开始蔓延到公开市场。
The next step is it starts to carry over into the public markets.
现在,CCC级别的债券在向你发出警告,做高收益债要小心,因为最低级别的高收益债开始爆了,对吧?
Now right now, CCCs are screaming at you, be careful what you're doing in high yield, because the lowest run of high yield is starting to blow out, right?
利差从大约600个基点扩大到了1200个基点。
It's gone from like 600 over to 1,200 over.
今天可能又会扩大不少。
It's gonna be out again today pretty good amount.
抱歉打断一下,但600个基点是不是本来就不合理?
Sorry to interrupt, but wasn't the 600 stupid?
就是说,利差是不是太窄了?
Like, weren't spreads too tight?
考虑到当前的违约率,这难道不是更接近现实吗?
Doesn't reflect more of reality with the default rates what they are?
你知道最可怕的是什么吗?
You know what's terrifying though?
整体高收益债券的利差在指数层面仍然处于绝对低位,尽管CCC级债券正在大幅扩大。
The all in high yield spread at the index level is still at absolute tights despite triple Cs blowing out.
这是因为BB级和B级债券的利差进一步收窄,甚至超过了历史最低水平。
That's because double Bs and Bs have tightened even more further in to beyond record tights.
你现在持有BB级债券,大约能拿到150个基点的收益。
You're getting about 150 bips to own double B rated paper.
这难道不能说明现在系统里的流动性有多充裕吗?
Doesn't this tell you a lot about how much liquidity is in the system today?
确实能说明,但这种流动性可能转瞬即逝。
It does, but that liquidity can be fleeting.
我以前就经历过这种情况。
Like, I've been here before.
我经历过太多次这样的周期了。
I've been through so many of these cycles.
高收益债券五年赚的收益,可能在五个月内就全部回吐。
You can give back five years of gains in high yield in five months.
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完全同意,是的。
Totally, yeah.
就是这样。
Just like that.
而这就是人们不愿意面对的事实,在固定收益资产类别的某些子领域,这种情况确实可能发生。
And that's the thing people don't want to realize about, you know, subsets of the fixed income asset class, that that can happen.
而且还会再次发生。
And it will happen again.
我们早就该经历一个信贷周期了。
Are so overdue for a credit cycle.
现在市场上有太多投机性的债券。
I mean, there's so much speculative paper out there.
直到大约六个月前,承销标准确实大幅下滑,几乎任何人都能完成一笔债务交易。
Underwriting standards really went downhill, you know, right up until about six months ago, and pretty much anyone could a debt deal done.
而现在,只要你的名字里带点AI相关的东西,你仍然能完成一笔债务交易。
And now if you even have AI related in your name, can still get a debt deal done.
虽然价格不如三个月前那么好,但还是能搞定。
Not as good a price as you could three months ago, but you can still get it done.
这迟早会反噬的。
And that's gonna come back to hurt.
现在你看,AI相关的交易有2.3万亿美元的资产负债表外债务。
I mean, you know, right now you're looking at $2,300,000,000,000 in off balance sheet obligations for the AI related trade.
甲骨文、微软、亚马逊、Meta这些公司,欠着2万亿美元的RPO。
You're looking at $2.00 in RPOs owed to companies like Oracle, Microsoft, Amazon, Meta.
你觉得这会挤掉国债投资者,或者那些本来想投国债的人吗?
Do you think that this is crowding out treasury investors or otherwise would be treasury investors?
某种程度上确实会,因为超大规模云服务商发了大量长期债券。
To an extent it is because you've had just a ton of long term issuance from the hyperscalers.
这些公司以前几乎不借债。
These are guys who never really took on debt before.
现在不仅借债,而且一下子借了几百亿美元。
And now not only are they taking on debt, they're taking on tens of billions of dollars of debt all at once.
更别提资产负债表上的那些义务了,那又是另一回事。
Not to mention, again, the balance sheet obligations which is a whole another.
光这个我们就能做一整期播客。
We could do a whole podcast about that.
作为一个干了这行很久的人,我觉得挺吓人的。
It's scary to me as a guy who's been doing this a long time.
我从来没见过这种行为,连2015到2016年都没有。
Like I haven't seen this type of behavior, not even in twenty fifteen-sixteen.
那是上一次高收益债券市场利差扩大到一千个基点的时候,我记得大概发生过七次。
That was last time spreads in the high yield market blew out to a thousand, which they'd done like seven times I think.
这更像是2000年那种大规模科技投机和2008年融资问题的结合,因为我觉得数据中心建设在某种程度上和08年的房地产泡沫很像。
This is more kind of a combination of like the massive tech speculation you saw in 2000 coupled with financing issues that came from 2008 because, you know, I view data center construction is kind of similar in a way to the housing bubble of 'eight.
很多数据中心根本建不起来。
Like a lot of these data centers aren't gonna get built.
你看到上周甲骨文公司援引不可抗力条款,他们已经担心以后可能付不起这些账单了,而且在这上面已经写下了数万亿,不是数十亿,是数万亿美元的债务。
You saw what Oracle did last week with the force majeure, where they're already scared they might not be able to pay the bills down the road for some of this stuff, and it's, and there's just been so many trillions, not billions, trillions of dollars of obligations written on this stuff.
像我这种干了三十多年的人,看到这个,真的觉得,哇。
It's just a guy like me who's been doing this thirty plus years, I look at this, I'm like, wow.
就是,我还没……
Like, I haven't...
而且,我走进七十一便利店,柜台后面的小哥都能给我推荐半导体股票,这让我更不安了。
And and the fact that I can walk into seven Eleven and the guy behind the counter is giving me semiconductor stock tips is not very comforting to me either.
哪些股票?
Which stocks?
我想知道。
I want to know.
你说的这些其实都反映在你的投资组合里了。
All of what you're saying is actually reflected in your portfolio.
大约一半的资产,差不多,都是现金,稍微少一点。
About half of the assets, give or take, are in cash, a little bit less.
所以你可能,不是说你一定会这么做,但你可能正紧张地等着市场稍微走偏一点。
So you probably, not to put trades in your mouth, but you're probably very anxiously looking your lips for this to go a little bit sideways.
嗯,我很乐意在一个必须要有流动性的市场里提供流动性。
Well, I love providing liquidity into a marketplace that has to have it.
我不会像其他人那样,在飓风正在掀翻我家屋顶的时候才去买飓风保险。
I don't buy hurricane insurance when the hurricane's in the process of ripping my roof off like everyone else does.
我是在天气预报说永远不会有飓风的时候买飓风保险的,就像你永远不会遇到飓风一样。
I buy hurricane insurance when the weather forecasts are saying there's no chance of a hurricane forever, like you're never gonna have one.
而且信用保护保险的价格现在是有史以来最便宜的。
And insurance against credit protection is literally the cheapest it's ever been.
不过现在不是了,几周前我们一直在加仓的时候才是。
Not anymore, like a couple weeks ago it was when we kept adding.
所以我不仅持有大量现金,而且我每做多一美元,就大约做空0.33美元的投资级指数和高收益指数的信用违约互换组合,实际上还有一些……
So not only am I holding a lot of cash, I'm also for every dollar I'm long, I'm roughly, you know, zero three three short combination of credit default swaps on the investment grade indices, the high yield indices, and actually a couple of...
我还说了一些我认为现在非常脆弱的个别公司名字。
And I say some individual names as well that I think are very vulnerable here.
让我问你一个问题。
Let me ask you about this.
说到信用违约互换,我很好奇,你看那些超大规模企业的信用违约互换,显然甲骨文因为风险敞口太大,情况比较特殊。
So, speaking of credit default swaps, I'm curious if you look at some of the credit default swaps on hyperscalers, obviously Oracle is sort of in its own thing because it's so exposed.
人们买这些是因为真的认为Meta有百分之几的概率会债务违约吗?
Are people buying that because they really think that there's an X percent chance that Meta defaults on the debt?
还是说这只是表达一种交易观点,觉得自己能靠这个赚钱?
Or is this just a way to express a trade that you think that you're just going to make money on this?
这是多种因素的综合。
It's a combination of things.
比如看Meta,我真的觉得他们有很大可能还不起账吗?
When I look at like a Meta, do I really think there's a high likelihood that they're not going be able to pay their bills?
可能不会。
Probably not.
微软也一样,肯定不会。
And same with Microsoft, certainly not.
亚马逊,都是好公司。
Amazon, all good companies.
但这些公司所做的,就是承担了数百亿甚至上千亿美元的债务,还有表外负债,而它们的现金流,经营现金流,几乎都缩水到零了。
But what all these companies have done is they've taken on tens of billions of dollars, in some cases hundreds of billions of debt obligations, off balance sheet obligations, and their cash flows, you know, their operating cash flow numbers had just crumpled to nothing.
就拿甲骨文来说,很明显,他们的现金流是负的,而且把收入的百分之百都花在了资本支出上。
And in the case of Oracle, it's obviously you had negative cash flow numbers coming out of them and also spending 100% of the revenue on CapEx.
这根本不可持续。
That's just not sustainable.
这甚至是我在1999年到2000年都没见过的,那时候我以为自己什么都见过了。
This is something that I never even saw in 'ninety nine to 2000 when I thought I saw everything.
1999年我在富达投资的时候,坐在谈判桌对面,面对的是环球电讯、奎斯特通信、GDS、北电网络这些公司,他们都跟我说,对光纤网络设备的需求是无穷无尽的,永远不会消失,还说我质疑他们很傻。
I mean, I sat across the table back in 'ninety nine when I was at Fidelity from the Global Crossings of the world, the Quest Communications, the GDS UDiphases, Nortel Networks, all of them telling me there's this insatiable demand for fiber network equipment that's never gonna go away and silly you for even questioning us.
他们说我笨,说我目光短浅,说我不懂,说我不知道自己在说什么。
You're dumb, you're shortsighted, you know, you have no idea, you don't know what you're talking about.
现在当我提出数据中心这种疯狂可能不会有好结果时,我听到的也是同样的话。
That's the same thing I hear now when I bring up the fact that, you know, I think, you know, this data center craziness is not gonna end well.
没人想听这些。
You know, no one wants to hear it.
所以想想看,很多科技领袖显然以前从来没有处理过这么大规模的债务,这确实很有意思。
So it is interesting to think about the fact that many of these tech leaders have never really dealt with debt of this size before, obviously.
但如果你从基准的角度来看,你觉得他们有多大可能能够成功应对,从所有这些建设中获得惊人的投资回报,最后一切顺利呢?
But what would you put the probability of if you're looking at this in in terms of baselines, what is the probability that they do thread the needle here and they get some fantastic ROI on all this build out that they're getting, and it works out okay.
你觉得你判断错误的概率有多大,也就是说,这件事最终会以糟糕的结局收场?
What probability would you give that that you're wrong, this is gonna end badly?
在你看来,那会是什么样子?
What would that look like to you?
嗯,如果你六个月前问我这个问题,我的答案会不一样,根据我在这段时间里看到的……
Mean, you asked me that question six months ago, my answer would be different, what I've seen over the...
我会说,嗯,我真的不太确定。
I'd say, well, I don't really know.
现在,有太多的债务问题,太多的表外负债,太多的RPO。
Now, there's been so much debt issues, so many off balance sheet obligations, so many RPOs.
我看不出这些不盈利的AI实验室怎么能还清明年的RPO,除非他们能筹到一大笔钱。
I don't see how these AI labs who are unprofitable can even pay back next year's RPOs unless they raise an absolute ton of money.
以前,你不会买一个超大规模数据中心运营商,就为了看他们花几百亿甚至上千亿美元,背上巨额债务,赌这个AI热潮是对的,赌所有这些数据中心都能建起来并投入使用,赌所有买来的芯片——其中很多显然还没用上——最终都能派上用场,而且等这些数据中心建好的时候,原本要装进去的芯片还没过时。
In the past, you didn't buy a hyperscaler to watch them spend tens or hundreds of billions of dollars and take on a ton of debt in the hopes that, you know, this AI craze is correct and that all these data centers will get lit and approved and, you know, all the chips that have been bought, many of which, haven't been put to work yet, obviously, are actually going to get put to work and that by the time these data centers get built, that the chips that are supposed to go inside them aren't obsolete already.
这里的大问题是,我觉得我判断正确的概率很高,原因很简单,就是已经花了这么多钱,而这些数据中心未来要承担的投资回报率要求很高,我看不出,即使一个数据中心的毛利率能达到30%,那怎么够覆盖这些成本,对吧?
The big question here is I think I have a high probability of being right here simply because of the sheer amount of money that's been spent and the ROI that's gonna be demanded of these data centers, and I don't see how, even if a data center puts out a gross margin at 30%, how that's gonna cover, right?
而且我觉得,越来越多的人开始认同这个观点了。
And I think increasingly, more and more people are coming around to that.
对我来说,很明显这里会有赢家和输家。
To me, it's pretty obvious that there's gonna be winners and losers here.
现在,每个人都想把所有人都当成赢家,对吧?
Right now, everyone wants to treat everyone like a winner, right?
比如你看那些Neo Cloud公司,他们完全依赖AI实验室来给他们资金,对吧,来付他们的账单。
Like when you look at the Neo Clouds, mean, guys are completely reliant on the AI labs to fund them, right, and to pay their bills.
如果这种资金支持停了,会发生什么?
What happens when that stops?
这些问题我从来得不到答案。
I never get answers to this stuff.
我问专家数据中心能带来多少回报,
When I ask someone who's an expert, give me the ROI on a data center.
他们从来不给我一个明确的答案。
I don't get a straight answer.
所以比尔显然非常乐观。
So Bill is very bullish, obviously.
我只是比较现实。
I'm just realistic.
就是这样。
That's the thing.
我不是在预测股市走势。
I'm not making a call on equities here.
我在开玩笑呢。
I'm teasing.
那我们快进到一年后。
So let's fast forward a year.
我喜欢你之前说的,不排除任何可能性。
And I like what you said earlier, not taking any scenario off the table.
因为我觉得,如果你只看新闻标题和一些经济数据,特别是房地产市场的情况,你很可能不会——事实上我肯定不会,而且我敢肯定你也不会——预测标普指数会接近历史高点,只差2%。
Because I think if you were to be given the headlines, some of the economic data, certainly where the housing market is, you would probably not, in fact, I definitely would not, and I'm pretty sure you wouldn't either, predict that the S and P would be within 2% of its all time highs.
你也不会预测到利差会是这样。
You wouldn't predict where spreads would be.
你肯定会觉得情况要糟糕得多。
You would obviously think it's much worse.
那要发生什么才能让情况不变得糟糕呢?
What would have to happen for this to not go badly?
那得有大量的资金涌入这个市场,比如风险投资、二级市场、首次公开募股等等。
You'd have to have a hell of a lot more money pour into this market via VC investments, secondaries, IPOs, etcetera.
有意思的是,几个月前本该进行的最大的首次公开募股之一,一直在推迟,推迟,再推迟,对吧?
Think it's interesting that one of the biggest IPOs that was supposed to go months ago keeps putting it off, putting it off, putting it off, right?
现在都推到明年了,顺便说一句,这从来都不是个好兆头。
And now it's into next year and that's never a good sign by the way.
人们说历史不会重演,但人总是重蹈覆辙。
They say history doesn't repeat, but man does.
这让我想起了很多类似的场景,最近的就是2007年和1999年。
It reminds me very much of other scenarios I've seen like this, the most recent of which was 'seven and also 'ninety nine.
再说一遍,我不是说这次会完全一样,但历史确实很擅长押韵。
Again, I'm not saying this is gonna be exactly like that, but history can rhyme quite proficiently.
我担心的是现在有太多投机行为。
The thing I'm nervous about is just so much speculative behavior going on right now.
每次我看到这种情况,就像我说的,如果你去年问我,比如特朗普关税危机期间,你还记得2025年4月的关税风波吗?
Every time I've seen it get to this, like I said, if you asked me last year, like during the Trump tariff meltdown, you remember the tariff tantrum back in April 2025?
那时候我们实际上买了很多东西,因为当时经济还不错,通胀也在合理范围内,投机行为还没那么疯狂。
We actually went in and bought a lot of stuff during that because at that time, the economy was doing okay, inflation was actually in a nice range, The speculative behavior hadn't gone crazy yet.
我当时个人买了半导体,因为我觉得它们……
And I personally back then bought semiconductors because I thought they were...
顺便说一句,那已经是涨了400%之前的事了。
That was 400% ago, by the way.
那大概是2025年4月的时候。
It was like April 2025.
然后我们给基金增加了风险敞口。
And we added risk to the fund.
我们买了不少高收益债券。
We bought a bunch of high yield.
我们加了一些看涨的头寸,那一年余下的时间里效果不错,后来我们全部清掉了,因为一切又回到了紧张状态。
We added a number of bullish positions and that worked out for us, balance of the year and then took them all off because everything went right back to the tights again.
那是高收益债券最后一次哪怕稍微扩大利差。
That was the last time high yield even blew out even a little bit.
它涨到了大约500个基点,然后又回落了。
It went up to like 500 over and then came right back in again.
这次高收益债券再扩大利差,我觉得不会停在500个基点。
When high yield goes this time, I don't think it's gonna stop at 500.
我觉得它会突破,因为到那时违约周期真的要开始了。
Think it's gonna kick, because then the default cycle's really gonna start to kick in.
现在有很多公司都岌岌可危,不管是私募信贷还是公开信贷。
Got a lot of companies hanging by a thread right now, both in private and public credit.
而且,你也能从数据里看出来,不管是市场上用实物支付的比例,还是实际违约率开始上升,基本面、覆盖率这些指标都在恶化,等等。
And again, you could see it in the stats, whether it's percentage of market that's gone payment in kind, actual default rates starting to creep up, fundamentals, coverage ratios deteriorating, etcetera.
这些数字都摆在那里。
The numbers are there.
所以这次跟2025年不一样,我现在是我基金里自2007年以来最防守的仓位。
So that's why this time, unlike 2025, I'm like, I'm the most defensively I've been in position since o seven in my fund right now.
如果你们说的那种基准情况发生了,就是AI放缓,因为他们债务太多,现金流覆盖不了,或者就是投资回报率不行,那你觉得有没有可能我们至少不会出现一个轻微的经济放缓,然后演变成衰退?
If your baseline happens where we get this AI slowdown because they've taken on too much debt, the cash flows can't cover it, or they're just not getting the ROI, is there any scenario you see where we don't at least get a a minor economic slowdown that turns into a recession?
就像2000年那种……
Like a like a 2,000 to...
就像2001年的衰退,那次其实很……
Like the two thousand one recession, which was very...
我觉得大家可能没意识到那次衰退有多小。
I don't think people realize how small of a recession that was.
AI的规模够不够大,至少能引发像那样的小型衰退?
Is AI big enough to at least cause some sort of minor recession like that?
肯定得是吧?
It has to be, right?
是的,是的,百分之百。
Yes, yes, 100%.
再说,如果你去年这个时候问我这个问题,我会说不会。
And again, if you asked me that question last year this time, I would say no.
但现在我会说是的,就因为投入的钱太多了……
But now I say yes, just because of the sheer amount of money that's gone...
哦,过去这一年对我来说真是惊人。
Oh, the past year has been amazing to me.
我看到的资金投入、债务筹集、表外负债的产生,数量之大。
The amount of money I've seen spent, the amount of debt I've seen raised, the amount of off balance sheet obligations I've seen produced.
这是我从未见过的。
It's unlike anything I've ever seen.
所以,像我这样搞固定收益的人,必须保护资本,看到这种情况就会紧张,因为我知道这种行为的结局迟早会很糟糕。
And so by default, a fixed income guy like me who's got to protect capital, I get nervous when I see stuff like that because that's the behavior that I know is going end badly at some point.
这对我来说其实是个机会,因为我有一句话。
And that's actually a bonus to me because again, I have a saying.
我说过,Eigen银行永远开门。
I said, Bank of Eigen is always open.
你只是会讨厌那个价格,对吧?
You're just going to hate the price, right?
因为我会在市场恐慌、大家都急着要流动性的时候,才愿意放出我的流动性。
Because I'll give up my liquidity when I can see the whites of the market's eyes and guys are desperate to have it.
然后你猜怎么着?
Then guess what?
我会在03:59再压你两个点,然后想在04:00成交。
I'm gonna down bid you another two points at 03:59, and I wanna get filled at 04:00.
所以我特别期待那些日子,因为当飓风把屋顶掀翻的时候,我反而是最冷静的。
So I can't wait for those days because I'm actually the most calm when a hurricane is ripping off the roof of the house.
那种时候才是我们真正干活的时候。
Like that's when we really go to work.
所以你看这个基金的历史,每次它做到两位数或者接近两位数的回报,都是在市场动荡之后,我们进去,之前回报平平,大概3%到5%,然后突然来个10%或12%,接着又平淡了,因为我们抓住了那些下跌的机会。
That's why if you look at the history of this fund, every time it's done like a double digit return or a high single digit return, it's right after a tumultuous time in the markets where we went in, we had kind of boring returns like three to 5%, then all of sudden we've got a 10 or a 12 and then we go boring again because we take advantage of those fall situations.
就像你们很准确地指出的,现在疯狂的是市场表面之下有各种事情在发生,不管是私人信贷、CCC级债券,还是BDC,都在告诉你情况不对劲。
Like you guys pointed out very accurately, right now what's crazy is you've got all these things going on underneath the surface of the market, whether it's in private credit, whether it's in CCCs, whether it's in BDCs that are telling you things aren't right.
然而,当你只看一般的市场指标,比如VIX或者高收益债利差,它们会告诉你一切都很完美,对吧?
And yet, when you just look at generic market statistics like the VIX or high yield spreads, they would tell you everything's perfect, right?
一切都很完美。
Everything is just perfect.
我从来没见过一个周期结束的时候不是这样的,就是表面之下的事情看起来不太好,但表面上看起来还行。
I've never seen a cycle end where that wasn't the case, where things weren't going, things underneath the surface were very, you know, didn't look too good, but on the surface it looked fine.
但那时候你才会发现谁在裸泳。
But that's when you find out who's swimming naked.
比尔,这真是……
Bill, that's a very...
我们就在一个高点结束吧。
We're going go out on a high point.
对于那些想了解更多关于你管理的这只基金的人,它经历过平淡期,也经历过大的熊市,还有中间的各种情况,我们应该让他们去哪里了解呢?
For people that want to learn more about the fund that you've managed through dull times, through great bear markets and everything in between, where do we send them?
主要的代码是JSOSX。
So the main ticker for the symbol is JSOSX.
这是一只每日可赎回的共同基金。
It's a daily valid mutual fund.
这是它的一个优点。
And that's one nice thing.
流动性好。
It's liquid.
真是个好主意。
What a concept.
有意思。
It's funny.
我现在做这个是因为我喜欢。
I mean, I do this now because I love it.
因为我在长期做多投资很久之后,一砖一瓦地建起了这个基金。
Because I built this fund brick by brick after doing long only investing for a long time.
在变成共同基金之前,这是一个对冲基金。
This was a hedge fund prior to turning into a mutual fund.
我实际上在Hybrids管理过一个对冲基金,然后在2008年初把它转成了摩根大通的共同基金,之后就是历史了。
I actually ran a hedge fund at Hybrids and turned it into a mutual fund at JPMorgan since early two thousand and eight and the rest is history.
好的。
All right.
非常好。
Very good.
谢谢,比尔。
Thanks, Bill.
太棒了。
Awesome.
很高兴和你们聊天。
Great talking to you guys.
希望以后还能再聊。
Hope to talk to you again.
好的。
Okay.
感谢比尔。
Thank you to Bill.
记得去访问 jpmorganassetmanagement.com
Remember to check out jpmorganassetmanagement.com
了解更多
to learn
关于摩根大通战略收益机会基金的信息。
more about the JPMorgan Strategic Income Opportunities Fund.
代码是 JSOSX。
That's j s o s x.
给我们发邮件,地址是animalspirits@thecompoundnews.com,我们下次再见。
Email us, animalspirits@thecompoundnews.com, and we'll see you next time.
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