人工智能会取代财务顾问吗？（第455期）

因为我们深入得更多。

Because we go deeper.

对吧？

Right?

每个客户的平均收入上升了。

Average average revenue per client went up.

我们提供的价值主张比以往更深入，因为技术让我们能够更深入、做更多事情，为客户提供更出色的服务。

We offer a deeper value proposition than what we did because the technology lets us go deeper and do more and be more awesome for clients.

但对我来说，当你观察整个行业格局时，这真是最引人注目的变化。

But to me, I mean, it's just it's the striking thing when you look at the landscape.

在三十年的技术演进中，我们行业唯一真正发生变化的是客户数量，而不是费率、利润率或运营成本，客户数量多年来一直稳定且持续下降，贯穿了所有基准数据的时间段。

The the only material thing that's changed in our industry in thirty years of technology evolution, it's not fees, it's not margins, it's not overhead costs, it's client loads, and they went down very steadily in a straight line for, like, all the years of the benchmarking data.

它们并没有增加，因为当我们有时间时，对于大多数顾问来说，早期任何客户或收入都是好的，因为你只是在努力生存。

They didn't they didn't go up because when we get the time I mean, for most advisers, early on, any any clients or revenue you can get is good because you're, like, just trying to make it survive.

然后最终，你会渡过生存阶段。

And then eventually, you get, like, you get past survival stage.

你超越了马斯洛需求层次中的安全与生存需求。

You get past, like, Maslow's hierarchy of, like, you know, security survival needs.

然后其他优先事项就开始浮现。

And some other priorities start kicking in.

我现在赚得不错了。

You say, like, I I make pretty good money now.

那接下来呢，好吧。

What do I you know, okay.

我有了些技术工具。

I got some tech.

它帮我节省了一点时间。

It saved me a little bit more time.

我到底想做什么？

What do I wanna do?

比如，A，再去开发一个客户；B，去参加孩子的足球比赛。

Like, a, go get another client, b, go to my kid's soccer game.

B。

B.

对吧？

Right?

一直都是B。

It's always b.

是的。

Yeah.

对。

Yeah.

那么，当技术开始提升时，会发生什么？

So what happens even as technology starts to lift up?

一旦顾问的收入达到让他们感到舒适和安全的关键水平，工作时间就会略微减少。

Working hours go down slightly once advisers are at a crucial crucial level of income that they feel comfortable and safe.

或者如果你觉得：不。

Or if you're like, no.

实际上，我是想工作一定的时间的。

Actually, like, I do wanna work a certain number of hours.

我很享受我现在做的工作。

I'm enjoying the work that I'm doing.

我不再去开发新客户。

I don't go get another client.

我会更深入地服务我现有的客户。

I go deeper with the client I've got.

比如，总有一些客户，我很想更主动地跟进一些顶级客户。

Like, there is always some clients, like, I would love to be more proactive with some of my top clients.

我知道我应该多给他们打电话，多为他们做点事，但我因为其他事情时间很紧张。

I know I should be calling them more and doing more things for them, and I'm kind of time constrained because of all the other stuff.

所以，如果我真的腾出了一点时间，我该怎么做？

So what do I do if I do actually manage to free up a new moment?

当我达到一个舒适的水平后，我就不会再去找新客户了。

I don't go get a client once I'm at a comfortable level.

我会与现有的客户深入合作。

I go deeper with the clients that I've got.

好的。

Alright.

所以最后一个问题。

So last question.

我们剩下两分钟来讨论这个。

We've got two minutes for this.

麦肯锡最近做了一项关于人工智能、顾问及其工作未来的研究。

McKinsey did a study recently about the future of AI and the advisers and the work, etcetera.

是的。

Yeah.

他们列出的一点我其实觉得报告还不错，就是顾问将更多地扮演人生教练的角色，提供各种相关的服务。

And one of the things that they listed I actually thought it was a decent report, was that advisers are going to become more life coaches, offers all sorts of other adjacent things.

这一点是我表示怀疑的，我不确定是否认同。

That was the one thing that I said, I don't know that I believe that part of it.

你对这个有什么看法？

What was your thought on that?

如果报告里还有其他你想批评的地方，尽管说。

And if there's anything else in the report that you wanted to rip apart, feel free.

我认为大方向上，这可能是对的。

I do think directionally, it's probably right.

我的意思是，'生活教练'这个说法本身就带有一定负担。

I mean, just life coach is kind of a loaded term.

这里面有很多内容。

There's a lot there's a lot to that.

但总体趋势显然是提供更多服务。

But the I mean, the general arc is clearly more services.

我们已经看到了这种趋势。

I mean, we're already seeing it.

对吧？

Right?

根据我们对孩子研究的数据，每六家咨询公司中就有一家已经将税务申报业务内部化，至少为部分客户提供了这项服务。

The by our kids' research data, like, one in six advisory firms has brought tax prep in house for at least some subset of their clients.

十年前，除非你原本来自会计师事务所，否则根本没人这么做。

Like, that was no one ten years ago unless you actually came from a CPA firm.

你早就为你的客户做过这些了。

You just already did that for your clients.

我们在税务方面正深入更多。

We're going deeper on tax.

我们在遗产规划方面也在深入更多。

We're going deeper on estate.

你知道，CFP认证过去是一个独特的差异化优势，但现在对今天入行的年轻人来说，这几乎成了基本要求，所以它正成为新的底线，而你还得在此基础上继续深入。

You know, CFP marks used to be, like, a special differentiating factor, and now that's basically, like, a mandatory expectation for young people coming in today, so that's becoming a new floor, and then you're supposed to go and get deeper beyond that.

因此，我认为服务深度和服务范围的扩展是真实存在的。

So the increasing depth and the increasing service expansion, I think, is real.

如果你想从更宏观的角度来看，当我们离开时，当AI让世界变得更好、更富裕，我们过上了财务充裕的生活，而我们只是在思考：当我不再需要像以前那样工作，金钱也变得充裕时，我们到底该在地球上做什么，寻找什么人生意义？

If you want to get kind of, you know, a little bit meta to it all, okay, when we leave, like, wives of one when we lead lives of wonderful financial abundance because AI is making the world better and more rich, and then we're just trying to figure out what the hell do we do with our lives and purpose on Earth when I don't necessarily need jobs in the same way and money is abundant.

我该做什么？

What do I do?

我觉得，到现在为止，我有很多关于人生教练的问题，比如我在地球上的目标到底是什么。

I'm like, I guess I have, like, a lot of life po life coaching questions at this point about what the heck is my purpose on Earth.

更广泛地说，我认为我们很多人都有过这样的经历：至少对一部分客户来说，当他们还处于资产积累阶段时，会努力达到某个积累目标；但一旦他们感到自己财务安全且足够了，就会开始产生其他问题，比如我究竟在做什么？我想把时间花在哪里？这就是为什么退休人士常常会陷入目的和意义的危机。

More more generally, I mean, I think a lot of us have had experiences that there comes a point, at least for a subset of clients, where if they're still in accumulation mode, they're trying to get to a certain accumulation, and if they get to a point where they feel like they're financially safe and sufficient, other other questions start cropping up about what am I doing, where do I wanna spend my time, it's why retirees often have crises of purpose and meaning.

如果我不再依附于曾经对我有意义的工作，我该怎么办？

What do I do if I'm no longer attached to the work that was meaningful for me?

所以这种动态仍然存在，我认为还会持续下去。

So that that dynamic still exists and I think continues.

如果我们让其他事情变得更简单、更容易，我认为从趋势上看，我们可能会花更多时间在这些方面，但我不确定这是否意味着我们要完全成为人生教练。

And if we make the other stuff simpler and easier, I do think directionally, we probably spend more more time there, but I don't know if that means, like, full on life coach.

我的意思是，这确实有一些其他的

I mean, that that's that's that has some other

好的。

Alright.

这太棒了。

This was awesome.

谢谢你做这件事。

Thank you for doing this.

你今天上午在舞台上的报告非常出色。

Your your report that you did on the stage this morning was fantastic.

对于那些没有到场、正在收听的听众们。

For people that are listening who didn't who weren't able to be here.

哦。

Oh.

这个有公开吗？

Is that available?

是的。

Yeah.

是的。

Yeah.

它在网上。

It's it's it's online.

所以如果你给advisertech发短信，全部连在一起，发送到33777，你应该就能收到。

So if you text adviser tech, all one word, like adviser tech to, what's 33777, you should get it.

如果短信无法发送，可以访问kids.com/well-being，好的。

If for some reason the text doesn't work, kids.com/well-being Okay.

那份完整版的打印件。

Has the the printout of the full

所以是advisertech发送到33777。

So adviser tech to 337733777.

好的。

Okay.

明白。

Okay.

好的，迈克尔。

Alright, Michael.

谢谢。

Thank you.

太棒了。

Awesome.

不客气。

My pleasure.

谢谢。

Thank you.

非常感谢。

Appreciate it.

是的。

Yeah.

你感觉好点了吗？

Do you feel better?

妮可。

Nicole.

尼科尔。

Nicole.

尼科尔。

Nicole.

我感觉好点了吗？

Do I feel better?

我感觉很棒。

I feel great.

我的意思是，我们在迈阿密。

I mean, we're in Miami.

哦，那个AI的事情。

Oh, the AI stuff.

不是。

Not.

你今天怎么样？

How are you doing today?

你对顾问领域的感觉好些了吗？

Do you feel better about the advisor space?

因为现在有很多被AI洗脑的人，我就不点名了，比如克里斯，他们认为这真的会改变世界，会让每个人更高效，我们不再需要顾问了。

Because there are a lot of AI pilled people, I'm not gonna mention any names, Chris, who think that, no, this really is gonna change the world, and it's gonna make everyone more efficient, we're not gonna need advisors.

你知道吗，迈克尔今天早上提到，当顾问服务的客户达到一定规模，比如80户家庭，很多重复性工作都被剔除后，他们就有了大量空闲时间，反而不想再接50个新客户了。

You know, I think Michael's point this morning about when advisers get to a critical mass and they're serving 80 households and a lot of their redundancies are stripped away and now now they have all this time, they don't want 50 more clients.

没人想要七场会议。

Like, that nobody wants seven meetings.

就像迈克尔说的，这真的让人筋疲力尽。

It's as Michael said, it is exhausting.

这非常消耗精力。

It is draining.

你重新获得了时间，会用它来做其他事情。

You have the time back, and you're gonna do other things with it.

所以我对我们的领域感觉非常好。

So I I feel great about our space.

我认为这是一个很棒的行业，一份很棒的职业。

I think this is a wonderful industry, a wonderful career.

客户需要我们。

The the clients need us.

他们重视我们。

They value us.

我不认为他们想取代我们。

I don't think that they're looking to replace us.

如果他们真想取代，那也没关系。

And if they are, then fine.

他们本来就不是你的客户，或者你没有满足他们的需求。

They're not your client anyway, or you're not doing what they need.

对。

Right.

这对每个人都有好处。

That expands for everyone.

我认为那些不使用顾问的人会有更好的体验。

And I think the people who don't use an adviser, they're gonna have a better experience.

我也这么认为。

I think so too.

好的。

Alright.

稍后，我们要互相调侃一下。

So in a little bit, we're going to we're gonna we're gonna roast each other.

但那是什么？

But what's it?

哦。

Oh.

是的。

Yeah.

这是菲尔·休伯的音乐。

It's Phil Huber's music.

没有摔跤迷吗？

No wrestling fans?

别这样。

Come on.

是的？

Yes?

休伯先生的。

Mister Huber's.

好的。

Okay.

所以我们今天要谈谈私人信贷。

So we're gonna talk about private credit today.

最近这方面的新闻很多。

It's been in the news a lot.

我想我们就从这里开始吧。

And I guess let's just start here.

菲尔。

Phil.

等等。

Wait.

我们得从这个事实说起：一个中年男子竟然伴随着摔角音乐出场。

We gotta start with the fact that we a middle aged man came out to wrestling music.

是的。

Yeah.

确实如此。

Did.

菲尔，你做了什么？

Phil, what did you do?

我做了什么？

What did I?

我什么都没做。

I didn't do anything.

你做了什么？

What did you do?

引发了所有这些头条新闻。

Causing all these headlines.

好吧。

Alright.

最近你有多忙？

How busy have you been lately?

比平时更忙，我觉得。

Busier than normal, I would say.

那我们从这里开始。

So let's start here.

是的。

Yeah.

你

What do you

为人们介绍一下Phil。

Introduce think Phil for the people.

哦，对不起。

Oh, I'm sorry.

Phil是我的好朋友。

Phil is good friend of mine.

我只是觉得每个人都在我脑子里。

I just feel like everybody is in my inside my brain.

我想这也不对。

I I guess that's not true.

所以Phil是那个什么什么。

So Phil is the something something.

你的头衔是什么？

What's your title?

投资组合解决方案主管。

Head of Portfolio Solutions.

好的。

Alright.

所以菲尔是Cliff Water的投资组合解决方案负责人，而Cliff Water是私人信贷领域的开创者，也是首个指数的创建者。

So Phil is head of Portfolio Solutions at Cliff Water, and Cliff Water is the OG of private credit, the first index creator.

对吗？

Correct?

对。

Correct.

最大的资产配置方吗？

Biggest allocator?

最大的，我的意思是，是的。

Biggest I mean Yeah.

300多亿美元的投资组合？

30 something billion dollar portfolio?

更大吗？

Bigger?

是的。

Yeah.

大约在两只信贷基金中总计近400亿美元。

About almost 40,000,000,000 across two two credit funds.

而且，我们在这个领域已经配置了将近二十年。

And, we've been allocating in this space for almost twenty years now.

好的。

Alright.

因此，如果顾问们在配置另类信贷，他们很有可能使用的是Cliff Water。

So if advisers are allocating to private credit, there's a very good chance that they're using Cliff Water.

不是自夸。

Not to brag.

对吧？

Right?

好的。

Okay.

所以出现了很多传言，原因多种多样。

So there's been a lot of smoke and, for a lot of different reasons.

你认为媒体反复炒作的、他们急切盼望崩盘的那件事是什么？

What do you think is what is the thing that you see repeated over and over by the media who is just dying for a meltdown?

就是急切盼望崩盘。

Like, dying for a meltdown.

你看到的哪一点是完全胡说八道的？

What is the one thing that you see you're like, that is bullshit.

就是那部分根本不真实。

Like, that part is not true.

没错。

Right.

你对金融时间做了什么？

What did you do to the financial time?

没有单一的因素。

There's no one thing.

有很多事情，我们会一一讨论。

There's many things, and we'll talk about all of them.

它们的共同点是

The summation of what they're all

试图达到的。

trying go.

是的。

Yeah.

它们都试图得出的结论是：私人信贷正处于泡沫之中。

The summation they're all trying to arrive at is private credit is in a bubble.

就像迈克尔·基特克斯刚刚试图消除人们对人工智能会让顾问过时的担忧一样，我要说的是，私人信贷并没有处于泡沫之中。

And much in the same way Michael Kitces just hopefully alleviated any concerns people have of AI, you know, making advisors obsolete, I'm here to say that private credit is not in a bubble.

过去六个月左右你所读到的很多内容，混淆了各种与私人信贷生态系统实际健康状况无关的问题，我们可以讨论其中一些。

A lot of what you've been reading over the past six months or so, is conflating a variety of different issues that have nothing to do with the actual health of the private credit ecosystem, and we could touch on a number of those.

我要说的是，这并不是从六个月前才开始的。

What I'll say is that this didn't start six months ago.

至少在过去六年里，金融媒体一直持续不断地对私募信贷发出负面论调，而在我看来，过去六个月里这种负面声音已经被放大到了极致。

There has been a steady negative drumbeat in the financial press around private credit for at least the last six years, and I think in the last six months, it's been turned up to 11.

为什么会这样呢？

Why is that?

因为我们都知道这个资产类别已经存在二十多年了，但对很多投资者、顾问来说，它还是相对陌生的，这和它过去五年多来实现的迅猛增长有关。

Because, well, you have a asset class that while we know it's been around for over two decades, it's relatively new to a lot of investors, advisers that, given the growth that it's had over the past five plus years.

所以它自然而然地吸引了大量关注，而且我发现，《金融时报》、彭博社，乃至整个金融媒体界，还有越来越多的Substack撰稿人都得出了一个“正确结论”：只要你写一个关于私募的负面标题或者负面报道

And so naturally, it attracts a lot of attention, and I think the Feet and Bloomberg and the financial press broadly and increasingly a lot of sub stackers have come to the correct conclusion as if you write a negative headline or a negative story about private

信贷方面，我觉得还有，你会

credit I think there's also you'll

获得点赞和点击量等等。

get likes and clicks, etcetera.

人们看到这个收益率就会说，这不可能是真的。

People see the yield and they go, it can't be real.

绝对不可能，这肯定是假的。

There's no way that it's gotta be fake.

这个数学计算根本对不上。

There's no way the math works out.

所以我认为，从人们一开始了解这个资产类别时，就一直持怀疑态度。

So I think I think people have been skeptical from the start as they learned about this asset class.

我们所处的位置以及拥有自2004年以来的历史数据指数，使我们能够衡量这个资产类别在过去二十年、多个市场和经济周期中的表现，并清楚地了解总回报是多少。

Of the position we sit in and having the benefit of this index that we have that has history dating back to 2004 is that we can measure how the asset class has performed over two decades, over many different market and economic cycles, and have an understanding of, okay, what have total returns been?

收益是多少？

What has income been?

实现的信用损失是多少？

What have, realized credit losses been?

历史违约率等等。

Historical default levels, etcetera.

因此，我们有一个可靠的基准可以参考。

So we have a good base rate to go off of.

我认为你现在看到的是，只要出现任何减记或违约，文章就会立刻附上这样的标题：天啊，这个东西要崩了。

And I think what you're seeing now is any time there's a write down or a default, the article wants to attach that to, oh, jeez, this thing is blowing up.

这就像煤矿里的金丝雀。

There's a canary in the coal mine.

这就像蟑螂。

There's cockroaches.

为了让大家有个清晰的认识，目前中小企业贷款这一资产类别中，有超过一万个不同的借款人。

To level set with everybody, you have an asset class, the middle market, that has over 10,000 unique borrowers in it today.

如果你再把广泛发行的贷款市场中大约1400个借款人加进来，并使用过去二十年平均约2%的历史违约率来估算，会怎么样呢？

If you add to that another, call it, maybe 1,400 or so borrowers in the broadly syndicated loan market, you and you use a historical default rate, which has been the average over twenty years of about 2%, guess what?

那么你大概应该预期每年会出现超过200起违约事件。

You should probably expect over 200 defaults in a given year.

显然，有些年份违约会更多，有些年份则会更少。

Obviously, there's going be years where there's more, years where there's less.

目前，违约率仍然低于平均水平，但这一点从新闻头条中是看不出来的。

Right now, defaults are below average still, which you wouldn't know by reading the headlines.

所以，如果你试图把每一次违约都当作下一场金融危机的前兆，我想你会失望的。

And so if you try to treat every default as if it's something that's a harbinger of the next financial crisis, I think you're gonna be disappointed.

这很奇怪。

It is weird.

负面情绪正在自我强化，你看到大规模的赎回。

Like, the negative momentum is feeding on itself, and you're seeing massive redemptions.

这周你看到了黑石集团的情况。

You saw it at BlackRock this week.

你也在黑石看到了。

You saw it at Blackstone.

这真的很奇怪，因为这些公司的股权正在被严重打压。

And, it's it's just very bizarre because the equity of these companies are getting demolished.

所有上市的BDC都以远低于其净资产价值的折扣交易。

All of the publicly traded BDCs are trading at a severe negative discount to their NAV.

所以，我认为主要的担忧是，这些投资组合大多集中在软件领域。

So there is I think the primary concern is a lot of these portfolios are heavily based in software.

B级信贷占26%，而借款人的性质是，目前的违约情况看起来还不错。

B credit was 26%, and the nature of the borrower, yeah, the defaults look fine today.

投资组合的基本面今天看起来没问题，但客户担心未来五年会变成什么样。

The fundamentals of the portfolio look fine today, but clients are worried about what is it gonna look like over the next five years.

所以我认为这完全合理。

So I think that's a 100% valid.

我认为他们确实应该担心。

I think they should be worried.

但我还认为，让我们把公开市场的估值作为基准，它们已经把这种风险定价进去了。

I also think, though, that a lot of the let's use the publicly traded marks as a as a benchmark, they're pricing it in.

所以这很奇怪。

So it's weird.

就像，它们已经把我们见过的最糟糕的潜在情景都定价进去了，而这些情景还没发生。

Like, they're pricing in some of the worst potential scenarios that we've ever seen, and we haven't seen it yet.

这简直是一种怪异的环境。

And it's just like a bizarre sort of environment.

有没有人报告过什么？人们一直说的一件事是，天啊。

Is is there anything is is any of the stuff that people reporting that like, the one people keep saying is, my gosh.

25%的贷款与软件相关。

25% of the loans are software related.

我认为关键问题是，这些说法有道理吗？

That's the big thing I think really like, is any of it valid?

批评的声音是，这些说法有道理吗？

The criticism is any of it valid?

是的。

Yeah.

还有件事，菲尔。

One more thing, Phil.

不。

No.

但好吧。

But Alright.

因为那些关于软件违约的负面新闻，今天不会停止。

Because those negative headlines about the software defaults, like, it's not going to stop today.

这更像是菲尔不得不为自己辩护，而不是达莉尔·汉娜为一段爱情故事辩护。

It's Phil's having to defend himself more than Daryl Hannah for a love story.

有没有人是JFK Jr.的粉丝？

Any JFK junior people out there anyway?

但这些关于AI的负面新闻，会持续下去，只会不断吓到人们。

But it's it's But I'm But it's gonna these negative headlines about AI stuff, like, that's gonna continue, and it's just gonna continue to scare people.

是的。

Yeah.

所以我会尝试从几个角度来解决这个问题。

So I'll I'll try to tackle it a few ways.

那我们先从软件开始。

So we'll start with software.

这是最大的技术领域，可能是指数中最大的板块。

It's the largest technology, probably, the largest sector of the index.

比如，我们有这个指数。

Like, we have the index.

我们看到它是最大的。

We see it's the biggest.

为什么它是最大的？

Why is it the biggest?

嗯，从历史上看，它是违约率最低的行业。

Well, historically, it's it's been the sector with the lowest default rates.

贷款方喜欢它是有原因的。

There's a reason why lenders have liked it.

显然，软件作为一个类别正处于转型期。

Obviously, the software as a category is going through a period of transition.

我不认为软件不是一个持续经营的业务。

I'm not of the mind that, software is not a going concern.

你知道小熊维尼的梗吗？

You know the Winnie the Pooh meme?

是的。

Yeah.

遭受重创，正处于转型期。

Getting wrecked, period of transition.

人工智能绝对会颠覆某些传统软件公司，但许多公司会蓬勃发展并利用它来获得优势。

AI AI will absolutely disrupt certain softwarecom legacy software companies, and many companies will thrive and utilize it to their advantage.

显然，这种重新估值已经发生在那些遭受重创的上市公司身上。

Obviously, that rerating has already taken place in the public stocks that have been wrecked.

向企业提供高级贷款的机构，其地位与它们前面的股权方截然不同。

Senior lenders to companies are in a very different position than the equity in front of them.

许多关于私人信贷的新闻报道常常忽略了一个关键点：私募股权，而大部分融资实际上都流向了私募股权。

Often what gets left out of lot of these private credit related headlines is any mention of private equity, which is where most of this financing is going to.

处于第一损失位置的私募股权支持的公司。

Private equity backed companies who are in a first loss position.

因此，如果你是一名私人信贷投资者，却不是，或至少没有像私募股权投资者那样承担同等甚至更大的风险，那你并没有完全坦诚或真实。

And so if you are a a private credit bearer and you're not a equal, if not more bearer of private equity, you're not being entirely forthcoming or truthful.

这是一个有趣的观点，因为KKR以及所有这些被重创的公司，总是被归为私人信贷的新闻。

That is an interesting point because KKR, all of these names that are getting destroyed, it's always like the private credit headline.

等等，等等。

It's like, wait a minute.

KKR 是一家私募股权公司，而 KKR 的股权正被压制。

KKR is like the private equity shop, and the equity of KKR is getting smothered.

对。

Right.

所以我认为，作为这些企业的贷款方，软件重估并不会让你受益。

And and so I think what's software rerating, like, as a lender to these businesses, you don't benefit from the growth.

你只是为收益而放贷。

You you're you're you're lending for yield.

你并不一定需要长期的上行空间。

You're not necessarily in in need of the upside long term.

尽管许多企业的终值面临挑战，因此它们现在的估值更低，也不再被视为低风险的年金，但你也不是在永久性地向它们放贷。

And while the terminal values of a lot of these businesses are challenged, hence why they're now being valued lower and they're not being treated like these low risk annuities, you're not you're not you're not lending to them on a perpetual basis.

短期内的现金流并不一定有风险。

And near term cash flows are not necessarily at risk.

作为贷款方，要按面值收回本金，需要相当激进的假设。

And so to be paid back at par as a lender requires a pretty aggressive set of assumptions.

我问你一个问题。

Let me ask you this.

所以这是这个故事中非常关键的一部分。

So that's a this is a very important part of the story.

所以利率是浮动的。

So the the rates are floating.

对吧？

Right?

对。

Right.

2022年利率上升时，这些公司能够挺过去，大家都很高兴。

So when rates went up in 2022 and these companies were able to withstand it, everybody loved it.

没有违约。

No defaults.

我的债券被击垮了。

My binds got killed.

贷款给我支付高收益，一切都很顺利。

The loans pay me high yields, and everything was copacetic.

一切都很好。

All great.

但这些贷款的期限很长，比如说，五年左右，不管怎样。

But the duration of some of these loans so let's say that, like, it's it's five years, whatever.

对吧？

Right?

你欠我们钱。

You owe us money.

你把钱还给我们，那就很好。

You pay us back, and then good.

但需求在哪里呢？我想，谁知道呢？

But where does the where does the demand I guess, who knows?

那之后，贷款的需求从何而来？

Where does the demand for loans come after that?

如果这些公司今天还健康，我想这正是人们所担心的。

And if these companies are healthy today, I think that's what people are worried about.

是的，没错。

It's like, yeah.

这些贷款看起来没问题。

The loans look fine.

当前的基本面看起来不错，但我担心的是，如果Salesforce下跌了60%，这家中型软件公司三年后会是什么样子？

The fundamentals look fine today, but I'm worried about what is this middle mark if Salesforce is down 60%, what is this middle market software company gonna be like in three years?

他们怎么还我们钱？

How are they gonna pay us back?

这又因公司而异，他们得看看，当需要再融资时会发生什么。

Again, it's gonna vary by company, and they'll have to you know, again, they're they're gonna see what happens when they need to go refinance.

历史上，这类资产中的贷款虽然期限为五到七年，但实际到期时间通常为三到四年。

The loans themselves historically in this asset class, while they might be five to seven years in in term, typically, have an effective maturity of three or four years.

所以，许多这类讨论忽略了一个方面，那就是与私募股权、房地产或风险投资相比，这个资产类别具有更多的内生流动性。

So part of what also gets left out of a lot of these conversations is relative to, say, private equity or real estate or venture capital, there's a lot more organic liquidity in this asset class.

通常来说，如果你的平均有效期限是三到四年，但一个三十年的组合每年都会有一部分还款。

Typically, most you know, if you if you have a average effective maturity of three, four years, but, you know, about a thirty year portfolio is repaying on an annual basis.

因此，你有一个天然的流动性来源，即来自到期贷款的还款。

So you have an like, natural source of liquidity just from maturing loans.

因此，与其他任何私募市场资产类别相比，这个资产类别最适合半流动性、永续结构。

So this asset class relative to, I would say, any private market asset class is the best suited for semi liquid evergreen structures.

现在有这么多资金涌入这个资产类别，这是否意味着，正是因为如此，才导致了某些问题？

Is is there any credence to the fact that, listen, there's so much more money that's in this asset class now, and they're just because of it.

这些基金中，肯定存在一些糟糕的贷款标准。

There had to be poor poor lending standards for some of these funds.

可能不是你，但其他一些基金确实存在这样的问题，而正是这些基金将会出事。

Maybe not you, but may other funds, like, have have and those are the ones that are gonna blow up.

人们会说，看，就是这样。

People are gonna go, see, look.

这并不新鲜。

That's not new.

一直以来，优秀的贷款机构和较差的贷款机构之间都存在差异。

There has always been a dispersion of of really good lenders and not so great lenders.

这并不新鲜。

That's not new.

市场上有超过300家直接贷款机构。

There's over 300 direct lenders in the marketplace.

我们一直以来都认识他们所有人多年了。

We've been again, we've known all of them for years now.

我们对贷款机构有一个ABC评级体系，我们认为这300多家中大约有50家符合我们的A级标准。

We have a ABC rating system for lenders, and we think about 50 of that 300 plus kind of meet our A rated standards.

因此，表现优异的贷款机构和遇到问题的贷款机构之间始终会存在分化。

So there's always going to be a bifurcation of the better performers and the better lenders and the ones that run into issues.

所以我认为，信贷周期将会暴露一些较弱的贷款机构，它们可能

And so I think, again, a credit cycle will expose some of those weaker lenders that may

不再拥有那些了。

not don't have have those anymore.

信贷周期？

Credit cycles?

我们实际上

We literally

嗯，那就是

have Well, that's the

另一件事。

other thing.

再说一遍，就像有

Again, again, like, there's a

泡沫和信贷周期之间的区别。

difference between a bubble and a credit cycle.

我觉得现在‘泡沫’这个词被用得太频繁了。

And I think this term bubble thrown around so much these days.

对我来说，泡沫意味着估值或价格完全不合理，无论从任何未来的收益预期来看都不成立。

And to me, a bubble implies, you know, valuations or prices that make no sense for any future, you know, return expectation.

当你真正观察当前的利差时，无论是绝对水平还是与广泛发行的贷款相比，它们比几年前更窄，但还没有达到那种表明——好吧——的程度。

When you actually look at where spreads are today, both on an absolute basis and in relation to broadly syndicated loans, they're tighter than they were a couple years ago, but they're not at levels that would indicate, okay.

你并没有因为你承担的风险而获得相应的补偿。

You're not being compensated for the risk that you're taking.

这个资产类别的问题在于，问题并不在于贷款本身。

Here's the problem with this asset class, and it's it's not the loans per se.

而在于购买和出售这些贷款的人，因为顾问可能完全清楚发生了什么，但客户只会看到新闻标题，然后说：我不在乎。

It's the people that are buying them and the people that are selling them Because the advisors might understand exactly what's going on, but the client is going to see the headlines, and they're just gonna say, I don't care.

而顾问也不会为私募信贷挺身而出。

And the advisor's not gonna stand up for private credit.

好吧。

Fine.

让我们在别人之前先把钱拿回来。

Let's let's get our money back before everybody else wants it.

而这就是我其中一个担忧，它可能会像千刀万剐一样，缓慢地走向死亡，用更贴切的话来说。

And that's one of the fears that I have is that it's just going to be this thing that is a slow death by a thousand cuts for lack of a better word.

这些工具的流动性限制确实存在，而且情况各不相同。

This the the constraints on liquidity in these vehicles and, again, it varies.

BDCs、定期基金和其他类型基金之间的限制略有不同，等等。

It's a little bit different for BDCs than it is for interval funds versus others, etcetera.

这些机制的存在是为了保护剩余股东的利益。

Those are there for the benefit of remaining shareholders.

尽管目前赎回需求相比历史水平略有上升，但绝大多数投资者依然对这一资产类别有信心，并希望保留这些保障机制，以避免基金被迫出售非流动性资产来应对赎回。

And as much as elev as redemptions are a bit elevated today versus history, the vast majority of investors still have conviction in the asset class and like having these guardrails in place so that a fund is not necessarily forced in a position where they need to sell illiquid assets to meet redemptions.

有效管理这些工具的关键之一，是实施一套周密的流动性与负债管理方案。

A big part of managing these vehicles effectively is having a thoughtful liquidity and liability management program implemented.

有些机构做得比其他机构好得多。

Some do it much better than others.

我认为外界普遍存在一种误解，认为为了满足赎回需求，这些管理者必须出售私人贷款。

You do I think there's a perception out there that to meet redemptions, these managers have to sell private loans to meet investor redemptions.

那么它是如何运作的呢？

So how does it work?

做得最好的那些基金，最不想做的事情就是在急需资金时才去筹钱。

The ones that do their best job have the the last thing you wanna do is ask for money when you need it.

运作得最好的永续结构，都建立了流动性管理计划，这些计划并不依赖于持有大量可以随时出售的公开信用证券。

The best run evergreen structures have built out liquidity management programs that are not predicated on holding a bunch of public credit securities that they can sell at a moment's notice.

而是通过建立强大的循环信贷额度，并与多种不同的贷款机构合作来实现。

It's in in through building out significant revolver capacity, working with a variety of different lenders.

每个这样的结构在基金层面所能使用的杠杆比例都不同。

Like, each of these structures has different amounts of leverage they can incorporate at the fund level.

其中一部分是为了略微抵消费用，让投资者能够更好地获得预期回报。

Some of that is to maybe offset fees a little bit so investors can, you know, capture more of the expected return.

另一个原因是，这是一种灵活的资金来源，可以通过利用大多数基金都有的信贷设施来满足投资者的赎回需求。

Another is it's a sore it's a flexible source that you can utilize in order to meet investor redemptions by tapping into the to those credit facilities that most funds have.

对。

Right.

所以你并不是因为这些东西是流动的、卖起来更难而进行抛售。

So you're not just doing a fire sale because these things are liquid, so it's harder to sell them.

对。

Right.

你应该知道，你应该围绕着这样一个认知来构建负债管理计划：总会有一些压力时期。

You should be you you should know you should build the liability management program around understanding that there are gonna be periods of stress.

会有资金流入放缓、资金流出增加的时期。

There are gonna be periods of inflows slowing, outflows going up.

你需要能够应对那些很可能在事后看来是周期性的阶段。

You wanna be able to withstand what are likely going to be, you know, in hindsight, cyclical periods.

如果你能在不被迫出售的情况下度过这些时期，你最终会变得更强大。

And if you can weather those without being a forced seller, you should come out the other side stronger.

我认为，如果我们一年后坐在这里，希望那时我们回望这段时期，会认为这充分证明了该资产类别和这些结构的有效性——它们确实可行。

And I think if we're sitting here in a year, hopefully, we're looking back at that this was a great, proof point for the asset class and for these structures that they can and do work.

这并不意味着所有人都能成功。

It doesn't mean everyone's gonna work.

再次强调，基金表现会出现分化，但这些机制的存在是有其原因的。

Again, there's gonna be dispersion in terms of fund performance, but, again, these mechanisms are in place for a reason.

目的是保护剩余的股东。

It's to protect remaining shareholders.

我认为一些文章中常被忽略的一点是，如果基金必须按比例处理投资者的赎回请求，作者们往往会说‘基金被冻结了’。

And I think the other thing that gets tossed out in some of these articles is that if a fund has to prorate investor redemptions, the the authors love to throw out, oh, the fund is gated.

他们并不是完全不让赎回。

They're not letting no.

即使在按比例赎回的情况下，大多数人仍然能拿回大部分资金。

Most people are getting most of their money out even when funds are prorated.

并不是说他们的全部资本都被锁住了。

It's not like a 100% of their their capital is trapped.

事实根本不是这样。

That's just not not the case.

我有个问题。

I have a question.

那我来说说我目前对这个资产类别的看法。

So let so here's here's I think where I'm at with this with this asset class.

如果软件企业占到指数的三分之一，我觉得很多这类公司都会面临压力。

If software is a third of the index, I think that a lot of these companies will have stress.

其实不到三分之一，不过你继续说。

Not a third, but go ahead.

那具体是多少

What is

还有问题吗？

it?

大概刚过20%。

About, like, a little over 20%.

好的。

Okay.

那我先随口举个例子。

So I'm making this up.

假设违约率达到10%，这已经很高了。

Let's say that default distress hits 10%, which is high.

对吧？

Right?

比如，金融危机时是多少？

Like, what what was the GFC?

12%？

12?

是的。

Yeah.

所以，这其实是一个很好的练习。

So here this is actually a great exercise to go through.

我们的指数回溯到2004年。

So we hit our index goes back to 2004.

所以，如果我要问一个问题。

So I if I'm gonna ask a question.

你觉得哪一年的指数回报最差？

What would you think is the calendar year with the worst index returns?

这并不是一个陷阱问题。

And it's not a trick question.

我保证。

I promise.

好的。

Okay.

2009年？

2009?

2008年。

2008.

好吧。

Okay.

就像大家预期的那样，金融危机——我们多年来见过的最严重的衰退和危机的中心——2008年指数下跌了大约6.5%。

Like, as as everybody would expect, the GFC, the epicenter of the biggest recession and crisis we've seen in years, the index was down about six and a half percent in 2008.

你知道2008年的信贷损失是多少吗？

Do you know what credit losses were in 2008?

大约60个基点。

About 60 bps.

哇。

Wow.

那为什么会这样呢？

So why why is that the case?

这是因为，尽管反对者会声称所有贷款机构都把每笔贷款按面值持有，直到变为零，但这并不属实。

Well, because as as much as, the naysayers will try to say that all these lenders are holding every loan at par until it becomes zero, that's not true.

实际上，我们看到贷款的未实现损失——也就是估值下调——是基于对未来预期信贷损失的预判。

We see in practice that unrealized losses in loans, in other words, values being marked down, are done so in anticipation of expected realized credit losses in the future.

通常，市场在下调估值时反而过于激进。

Often, the market actually is over aggressive in marking down low.

因此，通常发生的情况是，一些被定价为违约的贷款最终确实违约了，并产生了信贷损失。

So what happens typically is that some loans priced for default end up defaulting, and there are credit losses.

很多被定价的贷款，如果最终没有变成实际损失，就会变成收益。

A lot that were priced, if they don't turn into a realized loss, it becomes a gain.

因此，在危机期间的三年里，真正的信用损失发生在2010年2月左右。

And so the real credit losses in the crisis, that three year period were in 02/2010.

我认为2009年的信用损失大约为7%，2010年约为3%。

I there think was about 7% roughly credit losses in 2009, about 3% in 2010.

你知道那几年指数表现如何吗？

Do you know what the index did in those years?

这两年的涨幅都达到了显著的两位数。

It was up meaningful double digits in both those years.

换句话说，收入是回报中稳定的部分，而未实现损失和已实现损失则构成了动态变化。

So in other words, the income is the consistent piece of returns, and then you have the dynamic of unrealized and realized losses.

已实现损失应当跟随未实现损失而来。

The realized losses should follow unrealized losses.

换句话说，就像银行设有贷款损失准备金一样，我认为贷款方在标记高风险头寸时是相当审慎的，其中一些最终会演变为实际损失。

In other words, like, much in the same way that a a bank has loan loss reserves, again, lenders are, I think, thoughtful about marking positions that are at risk accordingly, and some of them turn out to be to be realized losses.

这都是事后才发生的。

That happens after the fact.

所以就在那之后买入黑石。

So buying Blackstone right after this.

那个家伙刚说的全是胡扯。

Everything that guy just said is bullshit.

所以。

So

我认为，在这个资产类别中，你需要有长期视角。2022年利率上升时，大量新资金涌入，收益率达到12%以上，所有人都以为这就是他们预期回报的基准水平。

I I think when you have to have a long term perspective in the asset class, I think what happened when when rates went up in 2022, a lot of new money flooded in, yields were at 12 plus percent, and everyone expected that to be, like, the baseline of what they expect in returns.

事实上，这是一个年化回报在8%到10%左右的资产类别。

The reality is this is more of an eight to 10% return asset class.

当收益率和利差收窄，基准利率下降，回报不再像之前那么高时，确实有一些资本退出了，这些资本可能只是暂时性的，带点投机性质。

And when when yields when spreads came in, when base rates went lower and returns weren't the same that they got, yeah, you have some capital exiting that was maybe temporary in nature and a bit more touristy.

真正理解其长期本质的人知道，是的，这不可能总是风和日丽、万事如意。

Those that really understand the long term nature of it is that, yes, you're going not it it's not always gonna be sunshine and rainbows.

这仍然是信贷。

It's still credit.

你之所以能获得显著高于无风险利率和公开信贷的收益率，是有原因的。

There's a reason you're paid significantly higher yields than the risk free rate, than public credit, etcetera, over time.

我们认为，通过与优秀的贷款方合作并构建最大程度的多元化，可以有意识地缓解这种风险。

We think it's a risk that you can thoughtfully mitigate by working with great lenders and by building a maximum lead diversified We

明白了。

get it.

我们

We

明白。

get it.

是的。

Yeah.

好的。

Alright.

所以我认为，三年后我们回看时，不会觉得：天啊，我们当初对私人信贷做了些什么？

So I I I don't think that in three years, we're gonna look back and be like, could you guys believe what we did with private credit?

那简直是个疯狂的泡沫。

That was a crazy bubble.

我也觉得，显然存在一些苗头。

I also think that there's there's obviously smoke.

这还用说吗。

Like, duh.

我不知道这些会不会演变成一场大火。

I don't know if that turns into a fire.

我觉得我有点倾向于菲利普这边的看法。

I think I'm a little bit I think I'm I'm I'm team Phil on this one.

好的，菲利普。

Alright, Phil.

谢谢。

Thank you.

谢谢，菲尔。

Thanks, Phil.

我不

I don't

能上来接受调侃吗？

get to stand for the roast?

你可以留下来。

You want you could stay.

好吧。

Alright.

是的。

Yeah.

也许我也可以把你们分开。

Maybe I can separate you too.

不行。

No.

我这就走。

I'll get off.

好的。

Alright.

谢谢，菲尔。

Thanks, Phil.

好吧。

Okay.

所以这是‘谢谢，菲尔’。

So here's Thanks, Phil.

在考虑我们打算做些什么来逗大家一笑时，上周我们收到了一封邮件，我当时就想，你知道吗？

So in thinking about what we were gonna do to to have a few chuckles, we got an email last week, and I was like, you know what?

我们就这么干吧。

Let's do this.

那封邮件内容是什么？

So what was the email?

好的。

Okay.

如果迈克尔生活中没人指出这一点，那我就来吧。

In case no one in Michael's life is calling him out on this, I figured I would.

我没数过 transcript，但感觉在过去三集中，迈克尔至少用了15次‘Anywho’作为过渡。

Haven't counted the transcript, but feels like Michael has used Anywho as a transition at least 15 times over the past three episodes.

我都没注意到。

I didn't even notice.

我都没意识到自己是个‘Anywho’ guy。

I didn't realize I was an Anywho guy.

你就是个‘Anywho’ guy。

You're an Anywho guy.

所以迈克尔说，是的。

So Michael said, yeah.

咱们来互相吐槽吧。

Let's let's roast each other.

我说，好的。

And I said, okay.

这是老鹰乐队解散的时候。

This is, when the Eagles broke up.

这可能是我们最后一次做动物精神了。

This might be the last animal spirits we do.

但在开始之前，我得说，我有一对八岁的双胞胎，乔治和凯特，他们特别喜欢互怼比赛。

But we're gonna I guess before we start, my I have eight year old twins, George and Kate, and they are big into roast battles.

现在他们在学校就是这样做的。

That's what they do at school now.

他们会怼人。

They roast people.

他们其实不太擅长，但他们听说我们要做这个，特别兴奋。

And they're really not good at it, but they found out we were gonna do this, and they got really excited.

他们还给我们准备了怼人的段子。

And they rode out roasts for us.

所以我们先读一些他们的吐槽，来热一下场。

So we're gonna warm up the crowd a little bit by reading some of their roasts.

好吗？

Okay?

他们吐槽了我们两个人。

And they roasted both of us.

哦，好的。

Oh, okay.

这是给我儿子乔治的。

This is for my son, George.

迈克尔，你太懒了，你最喜欢的运动就是瘫在沙发上。

Michael, you're so lazy, your favorite sport is sitting on the couch.

这还不算糟。

That's not bad.

好吧。

Okay.

迈克尔，我来一个。

Michael, I I'll do one.

爸爸，你太矮了，连蚂蚁都能和你击掌。

Dad, you're so short, you can high five an ant.

这还不错。

That's not bad.

迈克尔，你穷得叮当响。

Michael, you're so broke.

小偷闯进你家时，你还得帮他们找钱。

When burglars broke into your house, you had to help them look for your money.

好。

K.

爸爸，这是我女儿，你是摸黑穿的衣服，还是故意这么穿的？

Dad, this is my daughter, did you get dressed in the dark or did you do that on purpose?

昨晚可能我们俩都这样了。

That could've been both of us last night maybe.

迈克尔，凯特在秃头这件事上真是玩过头了。

Michael, the Kate went really hard into the bald stuff.

你这秃头亮得跟太阳似的。

Your bald head is so shiny, looks kinda like the sun.

迈克尔，今天你的头撞上了太阳，结果我们突然多了一座灯塔。

Michael, your head hit the sun hit your head today and suddenly we got a lighthouse.

最后，你们俩的故事太烂了，连ChatGPT都看不懂。

And finally, both of you, your stories are so bad, not even chat GPT can understand it.

好吧。

Alright.

好吧。

Alright.

那就是

That's

好了，乔治和凯特。

Alright, George and Kate.

好的。

Alright.

好的。

Alright.

你先来。

You go first.

让

Let

我们来一来一往地轮流说。

let We'll do, like, a back and forth.

说吧。

Let me have it.

好的。

Okay.

好的。

Alright.