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我一直将这称为渐进式印钞,也就是说,我们正在远离美联储资产负债表的缩减。
I've been terming this the gradual print, which is to say that we are away from fed balance sheet reduction.
我们已经转向逐步增加美联储资产负债表的模式。
We've shifted toward gradual fed balance sheet increases.
我倾向于对那些预测今年或明年将大规模印钞的观点持保守态度。
I tend to take the under on those that are calls calling for major printing this year or next.
确实存在可能发生这种情况的情景,但这些并不在我的基准预期之中。
There are scenarios where it could happen, but those aren't in my base case.
有了这位新提名人选,我必须审视情景的另一面,也就是,你知道的,有哪些情景可能导致资产负债表缩减,因为我们现在可能有了新的领导层。
And with this new nominee nominee, I have to look at the other side of the scenario, which is, you know, what are scenarios that could reduce the balance sheet because we have a new potentially new leadership in place.
林·奥尔登,能在这些动荡时期欢迎你重返银行列表,真是太好了。
Lin Alden, it's so great to have you back on bank list during these, chaotic times.
我其实想从一条推特说起,我的联合主持人大卫·霍夫曼说,这条推特深深触动了他。
I actually wanna start with a tweet that my co host David Hoffman said really spoke to his heart.
我们上周已经讨论过这个话题。
We talked about this last week.
好的。
Okay.
就在这里。
Here here it is.
这是某位网友发的推文。
It's a tweet from somebody, online.
我们会加上它。
We'll include it.
是的。
Yeah.
这是谁发的,大卫?
Who's this from, David?
我刚看到。
I just saw it
在推特上。
on Twitter.
饥饿池塘 x。
Hungry Ponds x.
饥饿池塘
Hungry Ponds
x。
x.
它反映了我们所有人正在感受的情绪。
It reflects the sentiment we're all feeling.
老实说,我不知道我们是接近崩盘、暴涨、第三次世界大战、工业革命、史上最大空头挤压、萧条、衰退,还是外星人降临。
I honestly have no idea if we are close to a crash, a melt up, World War three, an industrial revolution, a mother of all short squeezes, a depression, a recession, or aliens.
但感觉所有这些都同时发生了。
But it sure feels like all of them all at once.
林恩·奥尔登,世界上正在发生什么?
Lynn Alden, what is happening in the world?
也许这个问题有点太宽泛了。
And maybe that's a little too broad of a question.
在这片喧嚣与混乱中,投资者现在最应该关注什么?
What in all of this noise and chaos should investors be paying the most attention to right now?
这些问题问得很好。
Good set of questions.
我的意思是,我认为我们基本上正处于第四次转折期,这并不是我第一个这么说的。
I mean, I I I think we are basically in the fourth turning, which I'm not the first person to say that.
但我对它的划分方式略有不同,因为我更倾向于从定量角度来分析,也就是说,我们正处于长期债务周期的艰难阶段。
But the way I I break that up that a little differently because I look at things a little bit more quantitatively, which is to say we're on the rough side of the long term debt cycle.
而长期债务周期通常会伴随着其他现象,这就是为什么我总觉得所有事情都在同时发生。
And with a long term debt cycle tends to come other things along with it, which is why I always feel like everything's happening all at once.
因此,主权债务危机往往会引发更多战争,而战争也可能导致主权债务危机。
So sovereign debt crises tend to lead to more war, and war also can lead to sovereign debt crises.
这些因素彼此相互助长。
So these things kind of feed off each other.
它还往往导致几十年的债务积累,然后通常会出现法律体系的长期堆积,以及系统内的这种熵增现象。
It also tends to lead to, like, you have decades of debt building up, and then you usually have debt, like, decades of like laws building up and kind of like this this entropy in the system.
通常会有一个清算事件发生,这可能是一个相当危险或具有挑战性的时期,因为人们习以为常的种种规范此时都失去了保护。
And there's usually some sort of clearing event that happens, which can be a pretty dangerous or challenging time, because it's kind like the shields are down for all the the norms that people are used to.
与此相伴的还有一种制度周期,也就是说,许多由一代人建立起来并维持七十五年甚至更久的制度,其形态已不再适应我们当前所处的技术时代。
There's also kind of a institutional cycle that that goes along with that, which is to say many of the institutions that are kind of put in place by one generation and last for, you know, seventy five or a hundred years or more kind of in their form, they are they're no longer in kind of the built for the technological era that we're in anymore.
它们也不是由现在还活着的那些人所建立的了。
They're no longer built by the same people that are alive anymore.
在大多数情况下,人们对这些制度的信任已经瓦解,社会已经向前发展。
In most cases, trust in them is generally broken down, things have moved on.
但这里存在一个过渡时期。
But there's there's this kind of transitional period.
所有这些因素往往相互加剧,尤其是在经历长期债务周期时。
And these all tend to feed on itself, especially when you're going through that longer term debt cycle.
而这一次,与以往的历史情况相比,我们首次叠加了人口结构问题。
And this time, you know, compared to prior, you know, historical things, we can add demographics issues, like for the first time kind of ever.
未来的世代规模持续小于前一代,至少在可预见的未来都是如此。
You just got like future generations that are smaller than prior ones, kind of as far as the eye can see, at least, you know, any sort of, like, forecastable time horizon.
社交媒体当然增添了混乱。
Social media, of course, adds chaos.
比如,它不是像报纸和电视那样缓慢发生,而是以实时的点对点交流速度迅速传播。
Like, instead of happening, you know, at the rate of newspapers and TV, it happens at the rate of, like, real time, you know, peer to peer communications.
所以你可以实时用表情包调侃帝国的衰落。
So you can meme about the downfall of empires in real time.
因此,我认为这就是为什么一切感觉都同时发生的原因。
And so I think that's that's why it it generally feels like everything happening all at once.
显然,你应该关注的是那些在你能力范围内可以采取行动的事情。
Obviously, what you should focus on is more like what's in your wheelhouse to to do anything about.
所以我认为,作为人,我们某种程度上需要对多种事物保持广泛认知,但通常你希望将80%的注意力集中在你的专业领域、影响你工作、事业、家庭或兴趣爱好的事情上。
So I think to some degree as as, you know, as as as people, we have to have some of your broad awareness ideally of multiple things, but you generally want to have like your 80 focus, I'd say, on on things that are in your either area of expertise, things that affect your employment, your business, your family, your your hobbies and interests.
我认为人们应该把重点放在这些地方。
That's where I think people should be focusing.
对于很多事情来说,这其中包括人工智能。
Now, that will include like AI for a lot of things.
这将涵盖相当一部分宏观层面的问题,而随着你深入到其他更边缘的问题时,情况就逐渐减少了——这些可能是非常重要的问题,但普通人几乎无法对其采取任何行动,也无法通过自身努力来预防它们带来的直接影响。
That'll include macro for a decent chunk of things, and then it kinda goes less from there as you get into kind of the long tail of other issues where they might be very important issues, but there's very little that a given person can do about them or that those things will directly affect them that they can prevent in some way.
但这取决于他们生活在世界上的哪个地方。
So we but it depends on where they live in the world.
我在这里通常面向的是西方受众,但显然这取决于你住在哪儿。
I'm generally talking to kind of a Western audience here on average, but it obviously depends where you live.
我们确实生活在一个疯狂的时代,而且很多情况都是可量化的疯狂。
So we we certainly do live in crazy times, and and a lot of this is is quantifiably crazy.
2024年,新兴市场为投资者创造了超过1150亿美元的年收益,收益率介于10%至40%之间。
In 2024, emerging markets generated over a $115,000,000,000 in annual yield for investors, with yields ranging between 10 to 40%.
这些是地球上最高、最持久的收益率之一。
These are some of the highest, most persistent yields on earth.
问题是什么?
The problem?
去中心化金融无法接触到这些机会。
DeFi can't access them.
Bricks 改变了这一点。
Bricks changes this.
基于 Mega ETH,Bricks 将新兴市场货币市场和主权利差转化为可组合的原语,您可直接从钱包访问。
Built on Mega ETH, Bricks takes emerging market money markets and sovereign carry and turns them into composable primitives you can access straight from your wallet.
当 DeFi 投资者在稳定币和国债上获得 3% 至 6% 的收益时,机构却在获取由主权货币政策支持的 10% 至 50% 的收益。
While DeFi investors earned three to 6% on stablecoins and T bills, institutions have been harvesting 10 to 50% yields backed by sovereign monetary policy.
Bricks 通过机构级灰色代币化、本地银行通道、跨司法管辖区的合规性以及实时稳定币结算,连接了这两个世界。
Bricks connects these worlds with institutional gray tokenization, local banking rails, compliance across jurisdictions, and real time stablecoin settlement.
Bricks 承担了繁重的工作,使 DeFi 终于能够访问基于真实世界收益的真实抵押品和结构化产品。
Bricks does the heavy lifting so DeFi can finally access real collateral and structured products on top of real world yield.
即使是最好的利差交易也触手可及。
Even the best carry trades can be within reach.
Bricks 将 DeFi 的承诺带入新兴市场,同时将新兴市场的收益带到您的钱包。
Bricks brings DeFi's promise to the emerging world and brings emerging market yield to your wallet.
让收益通过 Bricks 流动。
Let the yield flow with Bricks.
在加密货币领域,很少有人在公开预测顶部或底部时真正押上自己的真金白银。
Few people in crypto put real skin in the game when they make public top or bottom calls.
DeFi报告就是其中之一。
The DeFi report is one of them.
在10月10日闪崩前一周,DeFi报告的迈克尔发邮件给他的整个通讯订阅者,称他将大幅降低风险,将大部分加密资产抛售并转为现金。
The week before the October 10 flash crash, Michael from the DeFi report emailed his entire newsletter saying he's going aggressively risk off and sold the majority of his book from crypto into cash.
那时以太坊价格约为4000美元,比特币价格为11000美元。
This is when ETH was about $4,000 and Bitcoin was a 110.
迈克尔运营着DeFi报告——这是一个以数据、周期洞察、风险管理、透明度,最重要的是,以真金白银的投入为基础的行业领先研究平台。
Michael runs the DeFi report, an industry leading research platform built on data, cycle awareness, risk management, transparency, and most importantly, skin in the game.
我们在Bankless喜欢迈克尔。
We like Michael at Bankless.
我们欣赏他的分析,这也是为什么你大约每月一次能在Bankless播客上听到他的声音。
We like his analysis, and that's why you hear him on the Bankless podcast about once a month.
DeFi报告正在为Bankless的听众提供一个月的免费访问权限。
And the DeFi Report is giving Bankless listeners one free month of access to the DeFi Report.
所以,如果你正在寻找一些敏锐、以数据为驱动的分析,以便对你的投资组合做出更明智的决策,你可以在DeFi Report Pro中了解迈克尔是如何预测顶部的,以及他接下来的计划。
So if you're looking for some sharp, data driven analysis to make better informed decisions around your portfolio, you can learn why and how Michael called the top and what he's doing next, all in the DeFi Report Pro.
去看看吧。
Check it out.
链接在节目笔记中。
There is a link in the show notes.
嗯哼。
Mhmm.
我想花一点时间,明确地说明你所说的‘第四转折点’是什么意思。
I'd like to just take a moment and really define illustrate what you mean by the fourth turning.
我们正处于第四转折点。
We're in the we're in the fourth turning.
这是一个由迈克尔·霍威尔(我认为是这个名字)推广的代际阶段转变概念。
This is a kind of a intergenerational phase change concept popularized by Michael Howell, I think his name is his name.
是的,这与雷·达利奥的长期债务周期非常相似,但它将周期置于大约八十年间代际角色的框架中。
Yeah, it's pretty similar to Ray Dalio's long term debt cycles, but it puts it into a framing of cross generational inner john generational like roles that they play across about like eighty years.
当你提到第四次转折时,意思是八十年的周期被分成四个阶段,八十年构成一个完整的周期。
When So you say a fourth turning, there's four chunks of an eighty year year period and eighty years is one big cycle.
你所说的,意思是我們正處在一個大周期的末尾。
And we're what you're saying is we're kind of at the end of one big cycle.
在雷·达利奥的长期周期框架下,处于八十年周期、第四次转折的末尾,这是一件非常重大的事情。
And it's a pretty big deal to be at the end of an eighty year cycle of a fourth turning of Ray Dalio's, you know, long term cycles.
为了更好地说明这一点,我们正处于二战后建立的世界秩序的另一端,那个从四十年代到六十年代的世界秩序,曾是全球的黄金时代。
And may maybe to really to illustrate that, we're on the other end of what came post World War two, the the world order that came post World War two, which was, you know, forties to sixties, a great era for the world.
那时,繁荣昌盛,各地都充满增长。
Like, lots of prosperity, lots of growth, lots of lots of growth all over the place.
你所要表达的是,我们正处于那个时代的下行阶段。
And what you're kind of illustrating was we're on the downside of that.
那个世界秩序正在逐渐终结。
That world order is kinda coming to a close.
这是一场跨越世代的巨大转变。
It's a big phase change across generations.
如果你相信这种第四转折周期的概念,那么这将是充满混乱的时期之一。
And it's one of the most chaotic times to be in if you believe in this fourth turning cycle concept idea.
也许琳恩,你能再详细说明一下,身处第四转折周期的下行阶段、混乱阶段意味着什么吗?
Maybe Lynn, you can kind of just like illustrate a little bit more about what does it mean to be inside of the the downside, the chaotic side of a of a fourth turning?
是的。
Yeah.
这个说法很到位。
It's a good way of putting it.
关于第四转折的批评,我们先从这些说起:人们会说这有点像占星术,比如人口统计学和代际理论,就像是某种文化上的玄学。
And, you know, to the criticism of fourth turnings, let's start with those, is that people will say it's kind of like astrology in a way, like demography generations, kind of like, you know, cultural woo woo.
我认为这其中确实有道理,因此我倾向于关注这个话题中更可量化的部分。
And, you know, I think that there's there's truth in that, which is why I I tend to focus on the more dahlia side of that topic, which is the the parts we can quantify.
我通常认为尼尔·豪和他的搭档们的框架很有用,因为社会层面的内容并非我关注的重点,但我发现它们很有参考价值。
I I generally find that that Neil Howe and his partner's framing of it is useful because the social aspects are less close to my area of focus, but I find them useful.
但我认为最有趣的部分是,历史上主权长期债务周期与第四转折周期高度吻合,我认为这绝非偶然,因为经历第四转折的一部分,往往就是出现主权债务问题。
But the parts that I find the most interesting are that historically the the kind of the sovereign long term debt cycles match up with the fourth turnings, which I don't think is an accident because kind of part of going through fourth turning is is having a sovereign, like, debt issue.
而且这些事情是有因果关系的。
And and these things kind of they have cause and effect.
这些事情并不是每隔几十年就随机出现的。
Like, it's not like these things randomly pop up every few decades.
这些事情会逐渐积累,而且只能持续这么长时间。
It's that these things kind of build and they can only only kind of go on so long.
所以经济周期、债务周期就是利率结构化下降。
So so the economic cycle, the debt cycle, is that you have kind of structurally falling interest rates.
债务占GDP的比例在上升,一段时间内这既包括私人债务,也包括公共债务。
You have rising debt as a percentage of GDP, and for a while, that's both private and public debt.
每次出现危机时,他们都会降息,试图重新启动债务引擎、银行放贷引擎或主权债务引擎。
So every time there's a crisis, they cut interest rates, they try to re re you know, restart the debt engine, the the fractures or bank lending engine, the the sovereign debt engine.
你会经历一些短暂的去杠杆时期,但从来不会把债务水平回落到之前五到十年周期的起点,而是从那里继续积累。
And you'll get these little periods of deleveraging, but you never deleverage back down to the earlier part of, like, that that particular kind of five or ten year cycle, and you start building up from there.
当你把足够多的这些周期串联起来,就会达到极高的债务水平,并且利率会一路降至零。
And when you string enough of those together, you get to very high debt levels, and you get interest all the way to zero.
然后,系统中基本上达到了最大比例的部分准备金制度。
And then you have basically maximum fractional reserve in the system.
自从上一次这种情况发生以来的三十年间,以及2008年危机,这些都属于私人债务周期泡沫的顶峰。
And what what happened both in the thirties since last time that happened, as well as, you know, the two thousand eight crises, those were kind of the peaks of the private debt cycle bubbles.
当私人债务占GDP的比例达到极限时,你无法再通过直接降息来显著缓解。
And what happens when you get private debt maxed out as a percentage of GP, you can't really cut in straight to meaningfully lower.
这时,他们通常会转向印钞,并逐步将债务从私营部门转移到公共部门。
That's when they generally shift toward printing money, and then gradually shifting the debt from the private sector more toward the public sector.
这种情况在整个三十年代后期一直持续到四十年代。
So that happened throughout the the later thirties and into the forties.
当然,还有其他因素在起作用,但它们是相互关联的。
Obviously, are other factors going on, but they were they were inter interlinked.
在2010年代乃至2020年代,我们看到更多这种转变:与全球金融危机前夕相比,美国和许多发达国家的私营部门杠杆率已不再那么高,但这些债务压力已被转移到主权层面。
And then we've seen that over the course of the twenty tens and here into the 2020s, that more of that shift from where we're not as leveraged in the private sector as we were in the eve of the global financial crisis in kind of US and many developed countries, but that's been put toward the sovereign.
在主权层面,除了货币贬值之外,几乎没有其他选择,因为大多数拥有自己货币的主权国家几乎从不会以本币名义违约。
On the sovereign level, it can't really go anywhere other than currency devaluation, because most sovereigns, at least the ones that have their own currency, will rarely ever default nominally.
因此,他们会通过购买力下降、货币贬值,有时削减对退休金或其他类似承诺的保障来违约。
So they'll default their purchasing power, debasement, sometimes trimming prior guarantees about retirement or things like that.
他们会采取一系列较小的、更隐蔽的违约方式来应对这种情况。
They'll make a series of kind of smaller defaults, more invisible defaults to deal with that.
而我们现在正处于并正在经历的阶段,正是如此。
And that's kind of the stage we're in now and we've been going through.
然后,正如我提到的,这些情况往往会与法律层面的重置、社会契约的改变以及对大约四代人之前建立的制度失去信心同时发生。
And then, like I mentioned, these things tend to coincide with legal resets in a way, changes in the social contract, loss of faith in institutions that were built in like, you know, the the prior four generations ago.
显然,这个确切的时间点可能有所不同。
Obviously that exact timeframe can differ.
有些制度,比如美国宪法,显然能跨越多个这样的大周期,而其他制度可能只维持一个周期。
Some institutions like the US constitution obviously will persist through multiple of these massive cycles, whereas other ones might only persist through one.
但总体来看,当审视公众对媒体、对国会、对大企业的信任度时,尤其是前两者,都处于非常低的水平。
But basically, there's when you look across the board at public trust in media, public trust in Congress, public trust in big corporations, they're all, you know, especially especially the first two, they're all really kind of low end.
当然,像军队或中小企业这样的某些机构,人们对其更有信任,但人们对大型结构的信任确实普遍较低。
You know, there are some institutions like military or small businesses and things like that, that people have more trust in, but there's really kind of big structures people have less trust in.
我认为这主要是有充分理由的。
I think mostly for good reason.
因此,当人们在经历主权债务危机的同时,又不信任政府或那些我们已经存在多年的机构时,一切都有可能被重新审视。
And so everything's kind of on the table when you're going through a sovereign debt crisis while people also don't trust the government or don't trust some of the institutions that were that we've kind of had in place for for many years.
两极分化正在加剧,因此可能会出现更多重大的变化。
There's rising polarization, and so a lot more big outcomes can happen.
此外,当债务从私营部门转向公共部门时,往往会伴随着更多的集中化。
And then in addition, when you have that kind of rotation from the private sector to the public sector of of debt, you tend to get more of a centralization.
因此,在20世纪30到40年代,你看到了整个罗斯福时期的集中化,以及大规模的产业政策。
And so, in the in the 1930s to 40s, you had the whole FDR centralization, you had really big industrial policy.
显然,每当发生大规模战争时,都会出现国家层面的集中化。
Obviously, whenever there's a massive war, there's going to be like sovereign centralization.
但即使没有战争,也会出现更多的产业政策和自上而下的资本配置,这是常见的趋势。
But even without that, you just have that more industrial policy, that more top down capital allocation that tends to happen.
我们最近普遍观察到这种趋势,比如全球金融危机中谁该被救助,就是一个高度集中的决策。
And we've been seeing that generally more recently, obviously, who to bail out in the global financial crisis was a pretty centralized decision.
而在整个封锁危机期间,如何决定救助谁,又是另一套高度集中的控制措施。
And then how to bail out who to bail out during the whole lockdown crisis was another set of kind of just centralized control.
而在更近的时期,我们看到贸易问题逐渐浮现,这些长期积累的巨大失衡再次指向了那些在当前结构性周期早期建立的制度——比如美元储备货币地位及其支撑机制。
And then more recent times, as we see just kind of, you say, trade issues coming ahead and these big imbalances that have been building for a long time, again, on institutions that were set up during this, like the earlier part of this kind of structural cycle that we're in, the dollar reserve currency and all the mechanisms that support that.
我们正在推行更多自上而下的产业政策,涉及稀土、半导体、人工智能,某种程度上也涉及贸易,本质上是在说:我们打算这么做,据称是为了国家利益,而非自由贸易。
We've got more like top down industrial policy around rare earths or around semiconductors, around AI, to some degree, around trade, basically saying that, you know, we're going to do this, you know, supposedly for the country rather than free trade, for example.
而且这些因素往往相互交织。
And that these things tend to come together.
它们通常不会孤立发生。
Like they, they don't tend to happen in isolation.
一个存在严重失衡的主权国家很少会说:‘我们就让市场自行其是吧。’
A sovereign that's in a major imbalance rarely just says, well, we're gonna let the market do what we're gonna do.
它们会开始动用手中可用的工具来遏制或引导这些问题,当然,与上一次发达国家经历这种情况——即20世纪40年代——相比,当时的区别在于,那场危机伴随着大规模战争。
They start using the tools that they have available to try to contain or redirect that issue with the difference, of course, being that compared to the last time that developed countries went through this, which was the forties that, you know, the nineteen forties, you had obviously major war at that time.
我们当时还有高度集中的媒体。
We also had very centralized media.
所以现在一切都变得更快,信息传播也更快。
So now it's everything moves faster, the information moves faster.
这显然给各国在应对这一过程时带来了巨大复杂性,而人们在某种程度上能更快地弄清楚正在发生什么。
So that obviously introduces a lot of complexity as nation states try to go through this while people can kind of, in some ways, figure out more quickly what's happening.
看到这里与上一次第四转折期(1929年至1945年)的相似性,真是令人惊叹。
I mean, is incredible to see the symmetries here to the last fourth turning, which was lasted from 1929 to 1945.
那是一个相当混乱的时期。
That was sort of that that chaotic period.
对吧?
Right?
而现在的第四转折期,如果按时间线来看,大约始于2008年,将持续到2030年至2033年左右。
And now the fourth turning now, if you kind of line the dates out, would have started around 2008 and last until about 2030 to 2033.
有趣的是,无论是社会层面的第四转折期,还是有些人将其视为星座运势,都与达利欧的长期债务周期高度吻合。
It is interesting that both fourth turning on the social level, and maybe you read that as horoscopes or, you know, some do, that lines very nicely with Dalio's long term debt cycles.
这是一个时间长度相当的时期。
It's kind of an equivalent period of time.
但我喜欢你所说的,琳恩,因为这真的很有共鸣,我认为对我和许多听众来说,作为第四代人,我们往往会忘记当初为何要建立这些制度。
But I like what you've been saying, Lynn, because this really rings true, I think, me and probably for many listeners that we sort of generationally by, you know, kind of the fourth generation, we we we tend to forget why we set up these institutions in the first place.
它们在很多方面也都在退化。
They atrophy atrophy in many ways too.
它们容易滋生腐败,而我们只是忘记了它们存在的初衷。
They become prone to corruption, and we just, like, forget the purpose of them.
也许其中一个自1945年及以后塑造了我们所处世界秩序的关键制度就是美联储。
Maybe one of those institutions that has been essential in the world order that we have lived in since the nineteen nineteen forty five and beyond is the Fed.
这很好地将第四转折时期的事件与债务周期联系在了一起,因为美联储恰恰处于债务周期的核心。
And that nicely ties kind of, I guess, fourth turning types of events, and then also they are at the center of debt cycles as well.
我联系你并邀请你来到Bankless,部分原因就是想深入了解美联储的情况,尤其是美联储的独立性。
I reached out and asked you to come on bankless as part in trying to understand what was going on with the Fed, in particular, Fed independence.
1月11日,美联储主席杰罗姆·鲍威尔发布了这一声明,并通过推特公布。
On January 11, the Fed Reserve chair, Jerome Powell, had this announcement, and he put it out on Twitter.
这是一段视频声明。
It was a video announcement.
他说自己遭到了特朗普政府的刑事起诉。
And he said that he was under criminal indictment by the Trump administration.
他说官方理由是,他们指控他在美联储大楼建设中虚报预算超支。
He said the stated reason was that he had you know, they were accusing him of lying about budget overruns in a fed building construction.
但他接着说出了真实原因,并直接向美国民众公开了这一点。
But then he said the actual reason, and he went right to the American people with this.
对吧?
Right?
他说真实原因是特朗普希望他降息,而他没有照做。
He said the actual reason was that Trump wanted him to lower rates, and he didn't do it.
他维护了美联储的独立性。
He preserved Fed independence.
你上面这段视频的推文只是简单地说:‘哇哦。’
Your your tweet above this clip was just simply, woah.
意思是,这可是新消息。
Like, this is new.
哇哦。
Woah.
发生什么事了?
What happened?
然后你接着说,这是自1951年以来美联储与行政分支之间最直接的冲突。
And then you followed up and you said, this was the most direct clash between the Fed and the executive branch since 1951.
二零年代等于十九四零年代的理论仍然成立。
The twenty twenties equals the nineteen forties thesis is still on track.
我们以前请过你做客,我知道你经常谈到十九四零年代与我们现在的情况非常相似。
We've had you on in the past, and I know you've talked a lot about the nineteen forties being similar to where we are now.
你对这段历史非常熟悉。
And you are so well versed in the history.
我想知道你能否把这一点梳理清楚。
I'm wondering if you could map that out.
为什么这是一个‘哇哦’时刻?
Why was this a woah moment?
为什么这件事像十九世纪四十年代?1951年到底发生了什么?
Why was this like the nineteen forties, and what happened in 1951?
当然。
Sure.
基本上,在大萧条开始后,整个三十年代,尤其是四十年代,美联储失去了大量独立性。
So basically, after the Great Depression began, so throughout the nineteen thirties and then and then especially in the forties, the Federal Reserve lost a lot of its independence.
我的意思是,这最初始于财政部拿走了美联储的黄金,转而给了它黄金凭证来替代黄金,这是一种不可兑换的凭证,本质上就是一种模因币。
I mean, it started basically with the Treasury taking its gold, giving it gold certificates in place of its gold, which is a non a non redeemable certificate, it's basically a meme coin.
就像是:给你一些黄金模因币,法律上可以充实你的资产负债表,而我们则实际拿走真正的黄金。
It's like, here's some gold meme coins that legally will shore up your balance sheet, and we're gonna actually take the actual gold.
美联储的资产负债表上原本有一些黄金。
So the Fed had some gold sitting on its balance sheet
是的。
Yeah.
财政部说:嘿,我拿走了。
And treasury went, yoink.
我们要拿走这些,然后给你欠条作为替代。
We're gonna take that, and we're gonna give you IOUs instead.
是的。
Yeah.
这些欠条,顺便说一下,他们至今还持有。
IOUs, which they still hold, by the way.
他们基本上填补了当时巨大而现在因名义价值增长而变得微不足道的会计漏洞。
They they they basically plugged a hole in their accounting that was massive at the time that is now tiny because of how nominally everything grew.
但他们至今仍把这些黄金凭证记在资产负债表上。
But they still have those gold certificates on their balance sheet.
因此,我们经历了一种财政部对金融事务的更大程度接管。
And so we had kind of a more treasury takeover of things.
而且当时,个人持有黄金是非法的,想想在一个号称自由的国家,这真是不可思议。
And that was also at a time, of course, when it was banned for individuals to own gold, which is crazy to think about a land of the free.
几十年来,他们合法地大规模禁止个人持有黄金。
They couldn't own gold for like decades legally, at scale.
当时行政命令 literally 是这样的:如果你有黄金,必须上交,还得以大幅折价——大约四五十%的折扣——强制卖给政府。
It was literally like the executive order at that time was literally if you have gold, bring it in, you have to force sell it to the government at a haircut at like a 4050% haircut discount, something like this.
他们的方式是,你可以按那个固定价格出售。
Well, way they did it was you could sell it at that price, which was pegged.
一旦他们完成了期限要求,就立即让美元相对于黄金贬值。
And then as soon as they had their kind of deadlines met, then they went and devalued the dollar relative to gold.
所以他们其实并不知道即将发生这种折价。
So it's like that they didn't that didn't know that that haircut was about to happen.
好的。
Okay.
所以这并不是说。
So it wasn't yeah.
这有点像抽签。
It was a little bit of a drug pull.
是的。
Yeah.
这就像老式的模拟药物操控在进行。
It's like old school analog drug pulls going on.
而且,我的意思是,英国在第一次世界大战期间也做过类似的事情,当时在全面战争的情况下,多个大国都出现了这种情况,而这就是美国特有的历史。
And, I mean, Britain did kind of similar stuff around World War I, so that was basically, when you have a world like a total war scenario, that happened in multiple countries, and that was kind of The US's particular history.
因此,从三十年代开始,美联储就被严重削弱了。
And so really starting from the thirties, the Fed was severely weakened.
基本上,他们通过这种黄金重估增加了货币基础。
Basically, increased the monetary base with this kind of gold revaluation.
他们勉强支撑了商业银行体系。
They kind of shore up the commercial banking system.
你知道,这些事情并不是孤立发生的。
You know, it's not like these things are done in isolation.
他们挑出一些敌人,说有人在囤积黄金。
They they pick enemies and say there are people hoarding gold.
有人在囤积各种东西,说是出于公众福祉的考虑。
There are people hoarding x y z for the sake of of public well-being.
我们得做所有这些事情。
We're gonna have to do all these things.
我们必须禁止囤积黄金的人。
We have to ban the gold hoarders.
我们必须集中管理这些事务。
We have to centralize things.
所以我们就这么做了。
So we do that.
现在显然,世界上大多数地方,比如美国,是你可以居住的最好地方之一。
Now obviously, most places you can live in the world, like America was one of the best places you could be living.
在很多方面,许多地方都走向了彻底的威权主义,而美国只走了一半的路。
It's like in many ways, a lot of places went kind of full on authoritarian, and The US only went like halfway there.
这在当时是一种合理的逻辑。
It was kind of the logic at the time.
于是我们做了这一切,当然,当各国经历大萧条时,这在某种程度上仍是第一次世界大战的余波。
So we did all that, and then of course, as you're going through the whole Great Depression in multiple countries, this was in some ways still a hangover from World War I.
我的意思是,第一次世界大战造成的许多失衡进一步加剧了大萧条,催生了这些泡沫,然后泡沫破裂。
I mean, lot of the imbalances that World War I caused then fed into the Great Depression, kind of created these bubbles that then popped.
接着我们进入了大萧条时期。
Then we're going through the Great Depression.
显然,经济环境恶劣,政治极端主义在多个地方兴起。
Obviously, you have a bad economic environment, political extremism grows in multiple places.
这在多个方面促成了第二次世界大战的发生。
This could this in multiple ways contributes to a World War II.
它并不是唯一的原因,但确实是一个因素。
It's not the only factor, but it's it's a factor.
第二次世界大战爆发后,又出现了另一个必须全面集权的理由——我们必须打一场总体战。
World War two happens, and then there's basically another reason to centralize everything, which is we have to go it's like a total war.
因此,在美国、英国以及其他地方,都实施了价格管制,出现了物资短缺,比如美国人不能使用某些东西,因为它们需要用于战争努力。
So, both in The US and The UK and elsewhere, you're doing price controls, you're doing, you know, supply shortages saying like, you know, Americans can't have this because they need it for the war effort.
而其中一部分是美联储完全被财政部控制了。
And then part of that was the Fed was totally captured by the Treasury.
所以他们实施了收益率曲线控制。
So they did yield curve control.
他们说:我们必须借下巨额债务来打这场战争,但当通胀肆虐、债务占GDP比例达到100%时,我们不能让市场决定利率。
They said, look, we we have to rack up all this debt to go fight this war, but we can't have market clearing interest rates when we have all this inflation happening, we have a 100% debt to GDP going on.
因此,美联储被迫实施收益率曲线控制。
So the Fed was forced to do yield curve control.
他们将短期利率维持在略高于零的水平,也就是略高于0%。
So they held the short end of the curve at just over zero, just over 0%.
他们将长期利率固定在2.5%,并基本维持这一水平不变。
They held the long end of the curve at 2.5 and they just held that pretty much firm.
他们根据需要做了些微调,但整个四十年代,官方记录的最高通胀率一度达到年均19%。
They made little micro adjustments as they needed, but then throughout the forties, like the peak inflation officially was like 19% year over year.
即使撇开峰值和低谷,平均通胀率也远高于目标水平。
The average inflation, even outside of the peaks and the valleys was was very much above target.
情况就像七十年代一样。
It was like the seventies.
当所有收益率都被固定在通胀率以下时。
While all the yields were pegged, like submerged below the inflation rate.
所以如果你持有现金或债券,那就惨了。
So if you were holding currency or bonds, you just got absolutely killed.
你真应该投资股票、房地产,或者走私的贵金属——这些当时是非法的——或者艺术品,这些相对稀缺的资产。
You'd really want to be in equities, real estate, or bootleg freshest metals, which were illegal or or fine art, maybe kind of these, you know, scarcer assets.
二战结束后,美联储在后期开始说:嘿,我们能拿回我们的独立性吗?
And then the fed was in the later period after World War two ended, the feds like, Hey, can we have our independence back?
而财政部则回应:嘿,我们还得重建东西呢,伙计们。
And then, you know, the treasury's like, well, we still got to rebuild stuff, guys.
这就像,是啊,谁愿意放弃权力呢?
It's like, yeah, who wants to give up power?
对吧?
Right?
所以当时还有一场法律上的拉锯战。
So there's, you know, there was like this legal wrangling going on.
最终,他们通过了财政部与美联储协议,更正式地将两者分离开来。
And eventually they passed the treasury fed accord, which which more formally separated them.
这赋予了美联储相当程度的独立性,当然,没有任何中央银行是完全独立的,因为官员们在某种程度上是由政府任命的。
It it kind of gave the Fed a significant degree of independence, which of course, you know, no central bank is entirely independent because the, you know, the officials are picked by the government in some capacity.
不同国家的情况会有所不同。
It will differ by by country.
在美国,你可以把美联储几乎看作是政府的第四分支,类似于最高法院,其成员由总统提名并经确认后任职,任期较长。
In The US, you can kind of think it almost like a fourth branch of government, kind of like the Supreme Court in a way where the members are nominated and then confirmed, and then they have these fairly long terms.
美联储本质上是一个公私混合机构,我们这里讨论的是联邦储备委员会理事,包括主席。
The Fed, course, it's a public and private hybrid, so we're talking about the Federal Reserve Board of Governors here and including the chairman.
它们采用了一种交错任期制度,这意味着美联储虽然为政府服务,但政府并不容易随意干预,比如在选举前直接要求降息这类短期行为;相反,它更像是一个难以轻易触碰的黑箱,除非出现极端情况,否则很难被干预——比如因严重失职而被弹劾或免职,而在现代环境中,这种情况正变得越来越相关。
So they they there's this kind of staggered thing, which is saying, It is it is serving the government, but it's not as though it's easy for administration to say cut interest rates right before the election and things that are kind of very short term oriented as opposed to basically be a kind of a black box that they can't really touch too much unless there's some extreme reason that could lead to impeachment or or, you know, just removal for cause, which is, you know, in in the modern environment becoming more relevant.
有趣的是,最近我们看到对美联储政策的公开批评增多,有时来自右翼的特朗普,有时来自左翼的伊丽莎白·沃伦等人。
And so what was kind of interesting about this recent one is that, you know, we've had more outspoken criticisms of the Fed's policy, sometimes on the right by Trump and sometimes on the left by, like, Elizabeth Warren, for example.
在这种环境下,特朗普毫不掩饰地表示,他希望利率能更低。
And in this environment, you know, Trump's made no secret of the fact that he would like lower rates.
不管好坏,人们可以同意或不同意这个决定。
For better or worse, I mean, people can agree or disagree with the decision.
尽管鲍威尔一直在降息,但他仍维持利率处于高位。
Powell's kept them, higher, even though he has been cutting them.
当然,这不仅仅是他的决定,而是美联储整个12人的联邦公开市场委员会的决定。
And, course, it's not just his decision, it's the entire 12 member FOMC at the Fed.
有趣的是,过去当鲍威尔受到批评时,他通常会淡然处之,或者巧妙地应对过去。
And what's interesting is that, you know, when Powell's been criticized in the past, he would generally kind of roll with the punches a little bit or kind of legalize his way through it.
当被问及是否会辞职时,他会直接回答不会。
You know, when asked if he's going to step down, he'll say no directly.
但除此之外,让这次事件更引人注目的是,他采取了一种全面反击的策略,不仅没有回避问题,
But like other than that, what made this this one more interesting was that they kinda he kinda took the scorched earth response, which was, you know, not only he's like, basically, you know, not not even like avoiding it.
他还明确指出问题正在发生,并且点明了核心:有人正在攻击美联储的独立性。
He's saying this is going on, but also here's what I believe the heart of it is, going after Fed independence.
当然,这还远未达到上世纪三四十年代那种被完全操控的程度。
And so I I with it's by no means the type of capture that happened in the four in the thirties and forties yet.
但一般来说,当债务达到如此高水平时,通常至少会出现某种程度的软性控制。
But generally speaking, whenever you have debts this high, you start to usually get some degree of soft capture at least.
因此,我不认为日本央行具有真正的独立性。
So I wouldn't say that the Bank of Japan has true independence.
我不认为欧洲央行能免受政治影响,尤其是在欧洲当前局势下。
I wouldn't say, you know, that the ECB is like, you know, immune from political influence given what's going on in Europe.
我认为,即使美联储目前仍保有一定的控制权,也不再具有真正的独立性。
And I wouldn't say that the Fed has true independence at this point, even though they still have some degree of control.
随着财政主导地位的加深,美联储的工具会逐渐受限,即使尚未被完全控制,也面临被彻底掌控的风险——因为政府可能会逐步任命更多倾向于按总统意愿而非历史利率政策逻辑行事的新董事会成员。
And the further we go into fiscal dominance, kind of the the the tools of the Fed start to narrow themselves, even if they're not captured, and then they do risk outright being captured, either because they kind of the administration could put, like, new board members in over time that are more, you know, less about kind of the historical reasons why you might hire raise or low interest rate and say, okay.
比如,现在我们要按总统的意愿行事,或者有时会采取更直接的法律手段。
Well, now we're gonna do things, you know, the way that the president wants, for example, or sometimes more legal attacks.
你可以说,我们要尝试从法律上寻找理由,看看能否以‘正当理由’为由罢免这些成员,从而加速董事会的更替。
You can say, well, we're gonna try to legally see if we can remove these members, see if this counts as for cause so that we can accelerate our our changeover of the board.
因为一般来说,要彻底掌控美联储,必须通过国会,而这会更困难。
Because generally speaking, to to fully remove control would go through congress, which would be harder.
那么,你如何在边缘地带实现软性控制呢?
So then it's like, well, how can you, around the edges, get soft control?
这正是最引人入胜的地方。
This is what's so fascinating.
所以你是说,在二十世纪三十年代和四十年代,美联储根本没有独立性。
So you're saying in the nineteen thirties and the nineteen forties, the the fed really had no independence.
它更像是财政部和行政分支的附庸,而直到1951年的那项立法,才开始确立更多的独立性,我们此后一直处在这一制度下,直到最近这些年代。
It was kind of an arm of the treasury and executive branch, and maybe if that legislative act in 1951, it started to establish more independence, and that's the regime we've been in until kind of these modern times.
而现在,我们正处于一种混合状态,美联储究竟有多独立,已经变得模糊不清。
And now we're in somewhat of a hybrid where it's unclear what how how independent the Fed really acts.
我想向你阐述一个关于特朗普的理论,因为他在这种第四次转折中,以多种方式扮演着核心角色。
And I wanna run one theory of the case by you with respect to, like, kind of Trump because he is a central figure in this in this fourth turning in many different ways.
但关于特朗普的一个观点是,他就是那个把隐晦的话直接说出来的家伙。
But one idea behind Trump is Trump is the guy that just says the quiet part out loud.
他只是公开地说出了某些话,比如:我掌控着美联储。
And he is just saying something out loud, basically, like, I control the Fed.
我想解雇美联储就可以解雇。
I can fire the Fed if I want.
但至少在2008年之前,美联储在应对2008年金融危机后的大量干预中,实际上并不独立,它更像是一个政治实体。
But it has been the case at least until 2008 with all of the intervention that the Fed did in the aftermath of the great financial crisis in two thousand eight, that the Fed really wasn't independent at that time, that it was a political entity.
现在特朗普登场了,他只是直话直说。
Now Trump is just coming on the scene, and he's just, you know, calling it like he sees it.
他只是把那些心照不宣的事情说出来了。
He is just saying the quiet part out loud.
我想表达的观点是,自2008年以来,美联储就不再独立了。
And the idea, I guess, is that the Fed hasn't been independent since 2008.
你怎么看这个说法?
What what do you make of that?
你对特朗普现在对全球秩序所做的事怎么看?
And what do you make of the idea that that's kind of what Trump is doing right now with the global order?
他实际上就是在把那些心照不宣的事情公之于众。
He's effectively just saying the quiet parts out loud.
我认为这个描述相当公正。
I I think that's a pretty fair characterization.
我的意思是,这取决于我们讨论的全球秩序的具体部分。
I mean, I I would say it depends on the particular part of the global order we're talking about.
我认为在某些领域,他不仅仅是说出来了,而是在加速这一趋势。
I mean, I think in some areas, he's accelerating it more than just saying it out loud.
在其他方面,他只是把那些已经酝酿已久的事情说出了口。
In other parts, he is saying it out loud, things that have already been building for a while.
所以有时候说出口会加速这些变化,或者有时候目标就是加速它们。
So sometimes saying them out loud accelerates them, or sometimes the goal is to accelerate them.
就美联储而言,这里涉及多个因素。
In the Fed's case, there's kind of multiple factors here.
我同意,自从全球金融危机爆发前起,美联储的独立性就大大减弱了。
I do agree that really ever since the run up to the global financial crisis, you have much less Fed independence.
而让这种联系更加隐蔽的原因是,美联储和行政分支通常都持一致意见,他们都认为:确实发生了重大危机。
And what made it kind of a more invisible type of connection there, is that there generally was a lot of agreement between the Fed and the executive branch, which was, they both said, Okay, there's a really big crisis.
我们触及了储备银行贷款的峰值断裂点,因此在这些问题上我们会非常鸽派。
We hit kind of peak fracture reserve bank lending, so we're going to be super dovish on things.
而且当时确实没有任何分歧。
And there really wasn't any disagreement.
所以当你几乎没有分歧时,独立性就无从检验。
And so when you don't really have disagreement, there's really no test about independence.
只有当你存在一定程度的分歧时,才会出现更明显的独立性考验。
It's only when you have some degree of disagreement do you have, you know, kind of a more overt potential test of those independents.
因此,在特朗普的第一个任期内,尤其是任期后期,鲍威尔和美联储一直在加息。
And so, you know, in Trump's first term, toward toward the later part of his term, Powell and the Fed were raising rates.
特朗普对这一做法并不高兴。
Trump was not thrilled about that.
他们在2019年底开始降息,当时经济已出现更多衰退迹象,甚至早于2020年发生的一切。
They started to cut them in in late twenty nineteen when we had more recessionary indicators even before everything that happened in 2020.
显然,他们在2020年和2021年采取了极其鸽派的立场。
They obviously were super dovish in 2020 and 2021.
还有另一个时刻,大家都达成了共识,事后回头看,这带来了痛苦,但当时确实没有任何分歧。
There's kind of another moment where they all agreed on what they're, you know, in hindsight, there's pain from it, but at the time, there's really no there's really no disagreement at the moment.
但到了2022年,情况有点像上世纪四十年代战争结束时那样。
But as we got into 2022, it was kind of like that moment in in, say, the forties where, like, the war is over.
美联储于是说,好吧,现在我们要稍微变得强硬一点了。
And the fed's like, okay, so like, we're going get a little more hawkish now.
然后行政部门说,还没到时候。
Then the executive branch says, well, not yet.
于是美联储尝试调整,他们表示:我们完全误判了通胀。
So we had the fed try and, you know, they were, they would say, okay, we totally misjudged inflation.
我的意思是,他们真的没有预料到通胀会发生。
I mean, were, they were really, they did not expect inflation to occur.
他们原本预测利率会保持低位,但通胀却出现了,而我们很多人当时就指出通胀很可能发生,于是他们迅速转向更鹰派的立场。
They had forecasts for low rates when inflation did occur, which many of us were kind of pointing out that it very much likely was going to occur, but they started to then, you know, rapidly turn more hawkish.
这发生在拜登政府时期,但他们在特朗普政府时期也继续维持了这一立场。
And this was this was during the Biden administration, but then they they kept it up in the Trump administration.
而且,你知道,特朗普一直非常明确地表示希望采取更宽松的政策。
And, you know, Trump's been very outspoken about wanting more dovish policy.
我认为,每当政策方向存在较高不确定性时,就像中央银行的利率,它实际上是控制资金价格和时间的定价机制。
And I think there's also whenever you have a period of higher uncertainty about what policy should be, I mean, is like, you know, central bank rates are literally price controls on, like, the price and time of money.
因此,在某种程度上,它们是最重要的价格控制手段。
So they're in some ways the most important price controls around.
如果你问大多数人,‘这个东西该不该有价格控制?’
Most people, if you you say, should this thing have price controls on it?
大多数人会说不,但中央银行的工作方式恰恰就是这样。
Most people would say no, But that's how the that's how central banking works.
你对货币和时间实施了价格控制。
You have price controls on money and time.
因此,一方面,通胀率仍高于目标水平,但主要原因是超出了美联储的控制范围,因为这不是由过度的银行放贷引起的。
And so you have on one hand, you have still above target inflation, but it's mostly outside of the Fed's wheelhouse because it's not excessive bank lending is causing the inflation.
这一轮通胀更多是由财政赤字造成的。
It's more fiscal deficits that been causing it in this cycle.
所以这与七十年代不同,利率对此影响不大。
So it's different than the seventies, and rates don't really affect that.
其次,像人工智能这样的重大变量,使得经验丰富的专家对AI可能带来的通缩程度有截然不同的假设,这取决于其生产力提升对经济影响的速度,以及这些影响是广泛分布还是高度集中。
And two, you have big variables like AI, where, you know, very experienced people can have very different assumptions for how deflationary AI might be due to how rapidly its productivity gains might impact the economy, and how spread out or concentrated those impacts might be.
因此,例如,新的美联储提名主席表示,AI很可能具有很强的通缩效应,因此我们可以在不引发通胀风险的情况下降息,因为存在其他通缩力量。
And so, for example, the new Fed nominee, the new chairman nominee is saying that AI is likely to be so disinflationary that we can probably cut rates and not risk inflation because you have other deflationary force.
而且,我的意思是,目前的变量比平常要多得多。
And and that is I mean, there are a higher number of kind of variables than normal.
因此,人们对当前最合适的利率政策可能产生非常不同的看法。
So you can get pretty divergent views on what the best policy rate should be right now.
他们应该采取鹰派立场,努力遏制仍高于目标的通胀,还是应该采取鸽派立场,预期生产力的提升?
Should they be hawkish, try to curtail still above target inflation, or should they be more dovish in expectation of productivity gains?
而正是在这里,目前存在分歧,也正是在这里,美联储的独立性受到了更大考验。
And that's where, know, there's a disagreement right now, and that's where that that Fed independence is more tested.
我认为,与三十年代和四十年代相比,它仍然远更独立,但如今确实正面临某种挑战。
And I would say it's, again, it's still way more independent than it was in the thirties and forties, but it's just it's being challenged in a way.
目前它正在某种程度上被逐渐削弱。
It's being chipped away at to to some periphery degree right now.
鲍威尔正在走向卸任,当然。
Powell is on his way to phasing out, of course.
你提到了新提名人。
So you mentioned the new nominee.
他的名字是凯文·沃什。
His name is Kevin Warsh.
假设他顺利通过流程并获得国会确认。
Let's say he gets through the process and he gets confirmed by congress.
凯文·沃什当然是由特朗普提名的。
Kevin Warsh was picked, of course, by Trump.
对吧?
Right?
因此,独立性中一个有趣的方面是,行政分支确实任命美联储主席。
So that's an interesting element of the independence, of course, is the executive branch does pick the the Fed chair.
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我有点搞不清楚凯文·沃什想做什么。
I can't quite figure out what Kevin Worsch wants to do.
我的意思是,这里有两个问题。
I mean and I think there's two questions here.
一个是,他的倾向是什么?他的偏好是什么?
There's one is, what's his bias and what are his proclivities?
第二个问题是,他在这个职位上实际上能做些什么?
And then the second question is, what can he actually do in the position?
比如,他的自由度有多大?
Like, how long is his leash?
即使他想做某件事,他是不是也受到太多限制?或者说,路径在某种程度上已经为他定好了,以至于他无法实现自己的想法?
Even if he wants to do a particular thing, is he, you know, too constrained, and is the path at some level already laid out for him so that he can't do what he wants?
有些人把他称为鹰派人物。
Some people are talking about him as a hawk.
事实上,比如在2010年或2011年,他曾在联邦公开市场委员会任职,当时他因为量化宽松政策而愤然辞职?
Indeed, like, was it, you know, 2010, 2011 he was on the FOMC, and he, like, rage quit because of quantitative easing?
这很有趣。
So that's interesting.
但他说话的方式也有一点民粹主义的味道。
But then he also talks a little bit like a a populist.
他谈到了美联储过去十五年的情况,用的正是我们平时说话的方式, basically 就是说:嘿。
So he talks about the last fifteen years of the Fed and talks the way we talk, which is basically like, hey.
美联储曾经实施了一些不负责任的货币政策,推高了资产价格,这对华尔街来说很棒,但对普通民众来说却很糟糕。
The Fed had some irresponsible monetary policy and pumped up asset prices, and that was great for Wall Street, but it kinda sucked for for Main Street.
而特朗普的民粹主义能解决这个问题。
And Trump populism fixes this.
对吧?
Right?
所以,他所说的内容中有一部分是这样,但还有一部分是,无论特朗普选谁,他都会选一个会降息的人。
And so you have that element of what he's saying, and then there's the other other element that just feels very much like Trump is going to pick, no matter who he picks, he's going to pick someone who's going to cut rates.
我的意思是,这就是他一直猛攻鲍威尔的原因。
I mean, that's why he's been hammering Powell.
所以我完全不知道该怎么看待凯文·沃什。
So I have no idea what to make of Kevin Warsh.
你觉得他上任后会做些什么呢?
Like, what do you think he's going to do when he gets in there?
也许这个问题根本无关紧要。
And, like, maybe maybe it's a moot question.
也许他根本做不了多少事。
Maybe there's not very much he can do.
也许他只是像上世纪三、四十年代美联储那样,沦为财政部的另一个工具。
Maybe he's just another arm of of treasury as the Fed was in the nineteen thirties and nineteen forties.
你怎么看这位提名人选?
How do you think about this nominee?
是的。
Yeah.
我不确定有人能说清楚整个情况,或者到底会发生什么。
I'm not sure anyone could tell you the the, you know, full story or, like, what what's definitely gonna happen.
更准确地说,有一系列我们可以指出的变量,能帮助我们预测可能发生的事情。
It's more like there's a set of variables we can point to that can help us predict what might happen.
所以我认为第一个出发点是,尽管主席权力很大,但他只是FOMC十二名成员中的一位。
So I think the first starting point is that although the chairman is powerful, he's just one of 12 members on the FOMC.
因此,他仍然在一种他无法完全掌控的制度框架内工作。
So he's still working within a kind of institutional apparatus that he doesn't have full control over.
因此,他单方面改变事物的能力是相当有限的。
And so his ability to kind of unilaterally change things is is somewhat limited.
所以这是第一个观点。
And so that's kind of the first point.
根据他的历史记录、最新的言论以及提名他的人,我假设他在利率问题上会持鸽派立场,很可能以人工智能和其他生产率因素作为这一立场的催化剂或依据,同时在资产负债表增长方面可能试图保持更为保守的态度。
Given his historical record, and given his kind of latest commentary and who nominated him, I would my assumption is that he will be leading dovish on interest rates, likely using AI and other kind of productivity forces as a kind of a catalyst for that or reasoning, while probably attempting to be a little bit more conservative on balance sheet growth.
所以这些是美联储拥有的两大主要工具。
So these are kind of the two main tool sets that the Fed has.
第三个主要工具可能是,他们可以单方面,或在许多情况下与其他联邦机构合作,影响对银行的监管。
Maybe the third main tool set is that they can either unilaterally or in many cases with other federal agencies, they can affect regulations on banks.
因此,利用这三大主要工具,我可能会在利率上偏向鸽派,在资产负债表上偏向鹰派,但这都受限于两个主要因素。
So using these kind of the the three kind of major tools that they have, I'd probably lean a little dovish on rates and a little hawkish on the balance sheet, but that's in the confines of two main things.
一是他并没有单边决策权,你知道的。
One is that he's only, you know, he doesn't have unilateral power.
二是他得应对一些棘手的难题。
And then two, he's got, you know, kind of uncomfortable things to try to manage.
首先,如果没有重大的监管改革,很难显著缩减当前水平的资产负债表。
So one is that without major regulation changes, it's very hard to meaningfully reduce the balance sheet from current levels.
美联储大约两年来一直预测,现在正是他们触及底部的时机,而过去四个月我们确实开始看到流动性短缺,他们确实已经触底。
The Fed has been predicting for about two years that this is roughly when they hit their bottom, and we started to get liquidity shortages show up in the past four months, they indeed hit their bottom.
我和其他的美联储观察者、宏观分析师也一直预测这个时间点。
Myself and other kind of like Fed watchers and macro, you know, analysts have been also kind of predicting around this time.
因此,在经历了多年的量化紧缩之后,如果没有重大的监管变革,很难将资产负债表降至当前底部以下。
And so without kind of major regulatory changes, it's really hard to get below the current floor after these years of quantitative tightening.
他们可以做一些事情来略微缩减资产负债表,但这些措施通常需要广泛的共识支持才能实施。
There are things they can do that could trim the balance sheet somewhat, but they generally require a lot of consensus buy in to do it.
而且它们对市场的影响未必如人们所想的那么大,因为它们只是改变了流动性分布的位置。
And they wouldn't necessarily impact markets as much as people think because they just kind of change where liquidity is.
例如,如果你让商业银行更容易持有国债,而不会影响它们的各种监管比率等,那么这可能允许美联储持有的国债减少一些,而让银行以部分准备金制度持有更多,这与美联储自己持有印刷的储备来持有国债并没有太大区别。
So for example, if you if you make it easier for commercial banks to hold treasuries without affecting their various kind of regulatory, you know, ratios and things like that, then it potentially allows the Fed to own a little bit less and stick a little bit more of them in the banks on fractional reserve, which is not that different than, you know, the Fed having its own printed reserves to hold treasuries.
此外,财政部一直处境艰难,因为它们希望保持长期利率处于低位。
In addition, the Treasury Department's been in a rough spot because, you know, they want to keep longer term rates down.
所以,所有关于利率的讨论并不一定会影响长期利率,而长期利率才是住房融资等主要活动的关键所在。
So all this talk about interest rates doesn't necessarily affect longer term rates, which is where, like, you know, most house financing happens, for example.
财政部在一定程度上一直在尝试做的一件事是,发行更多短期国库券,减少长期债券的发行,以减少长期债券的供给,从而避免利率被推得过高。
And one of the things the treasury has been been trying to do to some extent is that they shortened the you know, that they issued more T bills and less long duration bonds to try to have, you know, less supply of the longer term bonds so they don't drive interest rates up too much.
但讽刺的是,这在一定程度上影响了美联储的资产负债表,因为将平均期限缩短至国库券,意味着需要频繁再融资,从而需要持有更大的现金余额,而这些现金余额由美联储持有。
Now this ironically has somewhat of effect on the Fed balance sheet because by shortening the average duration towards T bills, they have to refinance it a lot, which means they need to hold a bigger cash balance, and that's at the Fed.
财政部可以做的一件事是,与美联储合作,表示我们将把平均现金余额从8000亿美元减少到4000亿美元。
One thing that the Treasury could do is they could work with the Fed and say, Well, we're going to reduce our average cash balance from 800,000,000,000 to 400,000,000,000.
为此,我们将更多地将债务长期化。
And to do that, we're gonna term out our debt more.
我们将发行更少的国库券和更多的长期债务。
We're gonna issue fewer T bills and more long term debt.
这是一个选择。
That's an option.
但这样会增加长期利率的压力,而他们并不希望如此。
But then they risk putting pressure on the long end, which they they don't want.
就连财政部长桑特也一直陷入这种困境,他曾批评前任耶伦,说她持有的国库券比例过高,却迟迟未能解决这个问题。
And even, you know, secretary Senth has been in this troubling thing where he criticized his predecessor, Yellen, for, you know, having such a high ratio of t bills and has been slow to tackle this.
我认为这是因为处理可能推高长期利率的问题具有政治敏感性。
I think because it's it's a it's a politically sensitive thing to tackle, to do things that might put pressure on the long end of the curve.
所以我认为,一旦你处于这些限制条件下运作,最终的结果可能比我们想象的更接近当前的状况。
And so I think that once you're in the position of operating with all these constraints, the overall outcomes are kind of maybe less divergent from what's happening now than we think.
尽管在边缘上,可能会略微左右调整原本可能采取的路径。
Even though around the margins, could shift things, you know, to the right or left a little bit compared to what they were otherwise going to do.
我一直称之为‘渐进印钞’,意思是我们的做法已经远离了美联储资产负债表的缩减。
And I've been, I've been terming this the gradual print, which is to say that we are, we are away from, you know, Fed balance sheet reduction.
我们已经转向逐步增加美联储资产负债表。
We've shifted toward gradual Fed balance sheet increases.
我倾向于对那些预测今年或明年会大规模印钞的人持怀疑态度。
I tend to take the under on those that are calls calling for, like, major printing this year or next.
确实存在可能发生这种情况的情景,但这些并不在我的基准预期之中。
There are scenarios where it could happen, but those aren't in my base case.
有了这位新提名人选,我必须审视另一面的风险,也就是,有哪些情景可能导致资产负债表缩减,因为我们可能迎来新的领导层。
And with this new nominee nominee, I have to look at the other side of the snare, which is, you know, what are scenarios that could reduce the balance sheet because we have a new potentially new leadership in place.
同样,这些情景仍属于我的基准预期之外,但由于这一变化,它们发生的概率有所上升。
Again, they'd be somewhat outside of my my base case, but they've they've somewhat increased in odds because of this.
好的。
Okay.
所以你觉得凯文·沃什会与财政部及政府其他部门合作,推动你所说的‘渐进印钞’?
So you think Kevin Warsh is going to orchestrate with the treasury and the rest of the administration something that you're calling the gradual print.
我觉得,我和大卫之前一直以为,特朗普选中的任何人,都会大刀阔斧地削减规模。
I think, you know, David and I were sort of under the impression that whoever Trump picks is going to be, like, cutting the cut face.
你知道的。
You know?
他只会一路把利率压到零,因为你知道,特朗普想要选举结果,如果需要,他会走捷径。
He's just gonna, like, shave rates all the way to zero because, you know, Trump wants he wants election results, and he's going to take shortcuts if he needs to.
他就是这种类型,这是他的倾向,他想要道琼斯指数、纳斯达克指数和标普500指数都高企,他会毫不顾忌地印钱。
He's, you know, that type that that's his proclivity, and he wants a high Dow, high Nasdaq, high S and P, and he's just going to print money like no tomorrow.
至少如果你让他完全掌控美联储,他就会这么干,毫无约束。
At least if you gave him total charge of the Fed, that's what he would do unconstrained.
但你说实际上存在各种制约因素,包括收益率曲线的长期部分,使得这种做法几乎不可能,否则就会出问题,市场开始剧烈动荡,而特朗普得到的是他不想要的结果。
But you're saying basically there are all of these constraints in place, including the long end of the yield curve that make that like impossible or else something breaks or the market starts coughing up blood and and Trump gets an undesired result.
所以你认为,无论特朗普提名谁,未来都更可能是逐步增印货币,而不是大规模注入额外流动性。
So you see the future as being so somewhat of a gradual money print rather than a massive injection of additional liquidity for, you know, whomever Trump picks.
是的。
Yes.
我还想补充几点注意事项。
I I would add a couple caveats.
首先,利率政策和资产负债表政策可能是完全独立的。
So one is that interest rate policy and balance sheet policy could be quite separate.
因此,他们可以在利率上采取非常宽松的立场,比如说,迅速下调150个基点。
So you could have them be quite dovish on interest rate and say, you know, we're gonna cut by a 150 basis points rapidly, for example.
但他们也可能表示,在未来六个月里不会扩大资产负债表,而是会尝试其他监管措施,比如让银行持有更多国债。
But then they also might say, we're not going to increase our balance sheet for the next six months, and we're going to try these other regulations to, you know, let banks hold more treasuries, for example.
在某些环境下,利率是瓶颈,正是它制约了银行放贷,从而影响了广义货币供应量的增长;而在其他时候,利率则不是瓶颈。
And then interest rates, there are some environments where interest rates are the bottleneck, and that they are what is, say, holding back bank lending, which would contribute to broad money supply growth, and there are times where they're not the bottleneck.
因此,你可能会遇到一种情况:即使降息,影响也不大,因为利率原本就不是瓶颈。
So you can have a situation where you cut interest rates, and it's not that impactful because they weren't the bottleneck.
你可能会降低短期利率,但长期利率却基本保持平稳。
That you cut short term interest rates and maybe long end rates just stay flattish.
利率会在一定范围内上下波动,取决于宏观经济状况,实际上并不会明显朝某个方向趋势性变动。
You know, there's in their range up and down depending on, you know, macro conditions, really going any trending in any direction.
即使你大幅降息,住房融资也未必会变得更容易。
And you can cut in trades by a decent amount, and the house financing doesn't really get any easier.
因此,这更多地影响了汇率差异。
And so that more affects, you know, currency differentials.
它可能对较短期的企业借贷产生一定影响,这确实相关,但并不显著。
It can have an effect on more shorter term, you know, kind of business borrowing, which is relevant, it's just not massive.
因此,我通常认为,无论他选谁,都会在利率问题上持相当鸽派的态度。
And so I I I would generally think that whoever he picks is gonna be pretty dovish on rates.
我认为这一点已经基本确定了。
I think that's been pretty much set in stone.
资产负债表则稍显不确定,但我总体认为资产负债表会逐渐向右上方攀升。
Balance sheet's a little bit more of a question, but I generally think balance sheet is kind of gradually up into the right.
我认为,利率和资产负债表的组合将在未来几年使广义货币供应量持续温和上升。
And I think that the combination of rates and balance sheet will keep the broad money supply kind of gradually up into the right for the next couple years.
因此,我通常会避开任何一方的极端观点。
So I I I generally am fading more of the extreme ends on either side.
我们已经经历了一次向资产负债表扩张的转变。
We have gone through a shift more toward that balance sheet increases.
关于美联储独立性的问题,因为我们之前已经对此讨论过一些了。
And kind of the note on on Fed independence, because we've we've gone back and forth about this a little bit.
全球金融危机发生后,这种情况变得极为明确。
It's like the set of circumstances sharply narrowed with the global financial crisis.
因此在许多情况下,美联储的独立性似乎已经消失,因为他们的选择范围缩小了,政府和美联储通常朝着同一个方向行动,这看起来像是被控制了——我认为这在一定程度上是真实的,但其实如果双方本来就意见一致,也不能算真正被控制。
That's why in many cases, it's kind of seemed like Fed independence has gone away, because the number of options they have has shrunk, and so there's generally been this case where the government and the Fed are moving in the same direction, and it seems like capture, which I think is is partially true, but it's also that they it's not really captured if they both agree anyway.
他们只是都处在相同的境况之中,是环境把他们困住了。
They're just both going in the it's like the the circumstances have captured them.
高债务水平把他们困住了。
The high debt levels have captured them.
如果他们的隐性目标是维持金融稳定,那么延伸来看,就意味着要维持国债市场的稳定,这意味着即使国债市场剧烈波动,你也必须有时印钱来维持其稳定。
If their shadow mandate is maintained financial stability, by extension, it means maintaining treasury market stability, which means even as treasury markets blow out, you have to sometimes print money to keep them stable.
因此,随着时间推移,他们可选择的余地已经大大减少了。
So the circumstances have kind of reduced the number of options they have over time.
而直到最近,才出现了更公开的对独立性的挑战,因为我们现在并不处于极端环境之中。
And then only in kind of recent times, has there been more overt challenges to independence, which is that we're not in an extreme environment right now.
我们目前没有处于全球金融危机中。
We're not in a global financial crisis.
我们也没有处于什么封锁状态。
We're not in a, you know, lockdown scenario.
因此,关于政策应该是什么,存在着一些相互竞争的观点,这实际上是自这个时代以来首次真正对美联储独立性构成挑战。
So there's a somewhat competing opinions around what policy should be, and that's where that actual independence is kind of challenged for the first time, really ever since this this era.
即使在全球金融危机期间,也只是出现了一些小小的挑战。
Even throughout the global financial crisis, there were only little mini challenges to it.
我的意思是,他在第一个任期内确实对这一点做了一些小的挑战,但这次是更明显的挑战。
I mean, in his first term did a little bit of a mini challenge on it, but but this is a more overt challenge on it.
关于美联储独立性的讨论一直是一个反复出现的主题。
This conversation about Fed independence has been a reoccurring theme.
琳恩,每次请你来做客时,总会有某种版本的这个话题融入我们的宏观讨论中。
Lynn, every every time we have you on, there's always some flavor of this conversation that's relevant into just a macro conversation.
这似乎是该话题的最新版本。
And this seems to be kind of the just like the the latest rendition of that.
我们两三年前还在讨论俄罗斯入侵乌克兰之后的事,当时我们冻结了一大批俄罗斯银行账户。
We two, three years ago, we were talking about post to the Russia invasion of Ukraine, and the and then we froze a bunch of Russian bank accounts.
我们讨论过这如何影响美元作为全球储备货币的性质,以及其他国家是否还愿意使用这种货币进行贸易,如果这就是我们展现出的行为的话。
We talked about how that kind of just in impacts the nature of the dollar as a global reserve currency and whether or not other countries want to even trade in that currency, if that's what we are proven to do.
这又是类似话题的另一种表现形式。
That was another rendition of a pretty similar conversation.
我认为,甚至在请你来讨论这一事件之前,我们就已经谈过特朗普如何受到特里芬难题的影响,以及我们国内制造业如何被掏空。
I think even before we had you on to talk about that current event, we talked we talked about how Trump was kind of downstream of the Triffin dilemma about how we've hollowed out manufacturing domestically.
这是因为我们享有美元作为全球储备货币的巨额特权。
And that's because we have this exorbitant privilege of The United States global reserve currency of the of the dollar.
每次请你来,都会有一些对话指向我认为我们在本集开头就已阐明的东西——即第四次转折、货币秩序的范式转变。
We every time we have you on, there's some sort of conversation pointing towards what I think we kinda illustrated in the very beginning of this episode is like this fourth turning, this phase change of the monetary order.
而现在,它似乎比以往任何时候都更真实了。
And now it kind of seems far more real than it ever has in the past.
网上有个著名的GIF,显示一辆货车正冲向一堵墙,眼看就要撞上,却在最后一刻突然转向,然后又再次冲向那堵墙,接着又再次转向。
There's that famous Internet GIF of like the the van rushing towards this wall and it's going to crash into the wall, but right before it does it cuts, and then it's rushing towards the wall again, but then it cuts.
它似乎从来不会真正崩溃。
It never seems to actually crash.
当黄金在过去几个月,也许是六个月里出现这样的走势时,一旦它在金融市场中显现,就会让人真切地感受到它的存在。
When gold does what it's done over the last, you know, months, maybe maybe six months, it actually starts to when it shows up in financial markets, it really starts to feel present.
我想问问你,关于鲍威尔说他被特朗普迫害的事。
And I want to ask you about like, well, we had that that Powell's talking about how he's being persecuted by Donald Trump.
还有什么能比这更真实呢?
How could it be any more real than that?
你知道,黄金实际上正在上涨。
You know, gold is actually running.
还有什么能比这更真实呢?
How could it be any more real than that?
所以我想问问你,关于黄金和其他贵金属的价格上涨,以及它与我们刚才讨论的主题,还有我们过去多次讨论的其他主题之间的关联性?
So can I want to ask you about just like the the price run of gold and other precious metals, and how related it is to the subject we just talked about and many of the other subjects that we've talked about?
也许,终于到了我们多年来每次请你来时所讨论的那些因素,在黄金价格上集中体现的时候了?
Maybe is it finally time for a lot of the inputs that we've been talking about every time we have you on over the years to show up in gold prices?
如果不是,那黄金的情况到底是怎么回事?
Or if not, then what's the deal with gold?
为什么它会表现出这样的走势?
Why is it doing the thing that it's doing?
是的。
Yeah.
我认为我们之前讨论的这些因素是造成这一现象的重要原因。
I think I think these things we've been talking about are a big factor in this.
我的意思是,我们几年前就谈过贸易问题,而现在我们正目睹更加极端的贸易政策,以及由此带来的严重失衡。
So I mean, the we talked about trade years ago, and now we are seeing more more extreme trade policy around this the the severe imbalances that it's gotten.
此外,我们还讨论过通货膨胀、货币供应增长,以及战争和储备资产被没收如何影响美元和国债的吸引力,如今我们看到贵金属价格飙升,央行也在大量增持。
And then in addition, we talked about, you know, inflation, money supply growth, how the the war and confiscation of reserves could impact the desirability of the dollar and the treasury, and now we see precious metals soaring and kind of central bank accumulation.
所以,这些因素正在不断积累,其间存在明显的因果关系。
So, these things are accumulating, and there is kind of cause and effect here.
当像 Citadel 这样的大型机构开始谈论美元面临的威胁之类的问题时,显然达莉亚早就一直在强调这一点了。
When you have major entities, Citadel, for example, talking about, you know, threats to the dollar and things like that, obviously, Dalia's been talking about it for a while.
在过去几年里,我亲自看到,财政主导权这类话题在主要的华尔街机构中已经逐渐成为广为人知的因素。
I've seen personally over the past several years that, you know, the topics of fiscal dominance and things like that have just become more of a known variable among major, you know, Wall Street institutions.
而早在2010年代,这些话题还主要出现在黄金爱好者通讯圈里,对吧?
Whereas, you know, back in the twenty ten's, this would have been more in like the gold bug newsletter community, right?
这曾经属于边缘话题,也许是一些比较激进、耸人听闻的人关注的内容,但如今,这种行业原本被贴上的标签,正逐渐变得真实起来——它开始渗透到主要机构,甚至有时进入政府内部,并且被更直接地讨论。
It's like the periphery, maybe people that were really earlier sensationalist on average, it's kind of that what an industry might be known for, has, has become we've kind of reached the point where it's becoming real in, in a sense, reaching into major, you know, institutions and, and sometimes within government itself, and it's more addressed outright.
因此,我认为我们正在见证一些切实可见的变化。
And so I do think that we are seeing pretty tangible things.
随着时间推移,中国持有的美国国债正在减少。
China over time is holding less treasuries.
美国和中国之间正发生一场轻微的金融冷战,这与2010年代初的情况截然不同,并且近年来明显加速了。
There's a little bit of a financial cold war going on between The United States and China, which is very different than the February and the early twenty tens, and it's of course accelerated in recent years.
再加上东欧战争以及储备资产可能遭遇的风险,越来越多国家开始考虑:也许我应该比以往持有更多黄金,或者至少适度多元化我的储备资产。
Then there's a, you know, with the whole kind of war in Eastern Europe and what can happen to reserves, there's just, you know, more countries saying, well, maybe I want to hold some gold more than I have been, or maybe I want to diversify my reserves a little bit.
再叠加一场贸易战,当美国可以说‘我们不喜欢你,所以要对你加征50%的关税’,或者‘如果你不这么做,我们就……’,这就意味着各国只是想要更多的选择余地。
And then when you add a trade war on top of that, right, when when just United States can say, well, we don't like you, so we're going to tariff you 50%, or, you know, if you don't do this, we're going to you know, so it's like they just want more options.
他们希望在那些他们原本以为不会发生、但突然却发生了的事情上,能有一些更多的余地。
They want a little bit more wiggle room on on, you know, when they when just things that they assume won't happen, but then suddenly do.
也就是说,我们到底有多依赖它呢?
It's like, well, how how, you know, reliant are we?
就好比,如果一个人把全部资金都存在银行账户里,结果账户突然被冻结,这时他们才发现自己没有任何替代方案——既没有黄金或白银藏在袜子里,也没有比特币、稳定币,或者任何其他可能存在于多重签名钱包里的资产。
It's like if if an individual has a 100% of their money in a bank account and it's just frozen, and you realize they had they had no alternatives, they didn't have any gold and silver stash in their sock drawer, they didn't have any, you know, Bitcoin or stable coins or whatever whatever else they might like on their on their, you know, multisig or whatever the case may be.
他们没有任何其他主权层面的选择。
They didn't have any other kind of sovereign options.
他们只依赖这种需要授权的系统。
They only had this like permission thing.
如今,主权国家正是以这种方式行事。
That's how sovereigns are kind of acting right now.
在华尔街,投资者和散户往往会对某些事情形成趋势。
Now, in Wall Street tends to and retail investors tend to make momentums out of things.
所以我认为,所有这些事情在六到十二个月内集中发生,某种程度上夸大了这个问题,因为一旦某物价格上涨,它就可能因为上涨本身而继续上涨,更多人只想跟风参与。
So I think that the fact that it's all happened in this six to twelve month period kind of exaggerates the issue in some sense, because once something's rising in price, it can just rise in price because it's rising in price and more people want to be on that.
所以这可能会自行发展,规模远超实际问题本身。
So that can take a life of its own, which is far larger than the actual issue.
因此,我一直认为这些事情还会持续相当长一段时间。
So I I've been of the camp that these things will still be playing on for quite a while.
事实上,对第四次转折的一个批评是,它给这些事件设定了时间框架,而我认为这些框架有些武断。
In fact, one of the criticisms of the fourth turning is that it it kind of puts these time frames on things, which I think are somewhat arbitrary.
第四次转折实际上已经持续得比他们最初的基准预测更久了。
This fourth turning has already kind of gone on longer than their original base case was.
我认为这种情况还会继续发展,即日本的整体局势将持续比人们预期的更久。
And I think that's probably going to continue to play out, which is that the whole situation in Japan is going to last longer than people think.
那些认为明天或明年就会爆发的人,会继续看不到这种爆发,而且会持续相当长一段时间。
You know, the people that think it's going to blow up tomorrow or next year, think are going to keep not seeing that for quite a while.
我认为,尽管美元有疲软的年份,有通胀,有贬值,但它在近期不会崩溃。
I think the the dollar, while it has weak years and has inflation and has debasement, it's not gonna blow up in in kind of the near term.
我认为这些情况还会持续相当长一段时间,但这并不意味着后果不会立即显现。
And I think these things are gonna go on for quite a while, but it doesn't mean that the consequences wait to hit.
它们已经开始产生了影响。
They start hitting already.
我们所看到的政治极化,部分是这一切的后果。
The political polarization we've seen is partially a consequence of all this.
封锁和货币印刷后出现的通货膨胀,也是这一系列问题的后果。
The inflation that happened after the shutdowns and the money printing was a consequence of this.
各国央行向黄金多元化,以及贸易战,都是这一问题的后果。
The diversification of central banks toward gold was a consequence of this, And the trade war is a consequence of this.
这些是我们长期积累的失衡,我们中的许多人早已谈论过,它们以爆发的形式出现,并且正在加剧,这是真实存在的。
These are imbalances we've building for a very long time that many of us have been talking about, and they come in bursts, and they are growing, and it is real.
只是最耸人听闻的解读往往并不正确,而且它们真正显现出来的时间通常比人们想象的要长,尽管其间会时不时出现一些小小的爆发点。
It's just that the the most sensationalist takes are rarely correct, and that they generally take longer to truly play out than people think, even though they are punctuated by these little exclamation points here and there.
是的。
Yeah.
我觉得最近这一周左右黄金价格的上涨,就是一个明显的爆发点。
One of the exclamation points I feel like is the gold price in the last just week or so.
波动简直太疯狂了。
The volatility has been crazy.
仅仅在短短几个小时内,就有数万亿美元在黄金市场的估值中进出。
Trillions has been going in and out of the gold market in valuation just in just a seemingly a few hours.
除了市场变得过热、投资者情绪狂热之外,还有什么其他原因吗?要知道,尽管黄金是全球市值最大的资产,但群体心理无论如何都会形成群体行为。
Is there anything to that other than just like it's getting frothy and the markets euphoric and despite you know, gold being the largest asset in terms of market cap in the world, doesn't really matter because herd mentality is going to be a herd no matter what?
还是说,除了投资者心理之外,还有什么突发且值得注意的事件发生了?
Or did something acute and noteworthy happen beyond just investor psychology?
或者也许这仅仅是个泡沫,波动性本来就是它的本质。
Or maybe maybe it was just like a bubble and it's volatile and that's just what it is.
你对此有什么看法吗?
Do you have any takes there?
我认为简短的回答是,两种情况都发生了:当一个泡沫形成时,只需要一个很小的理由,就足以让这个泡沫最终破裂,至少是暂时性的。
I think short answer, think both happen, which is that when you have a bubble, it only takes a small reason for that bubble to eventually pop, at least temporarily.
我之前已经明确表示过,我认为贵金属并不构成结构性的泡沫。
Now I'm on record saying I don't think precious metals is structurally RNA bubble.
我认为这主要是从被低估向合理估值的重新评估。
I think that this has mostly been a revaluation from undervalued more toward fairly valued.
但从短期来看,我认为它显然超买了。
But in near term sense, I think it clearly got overbought.
所以这更像是一个局部泡沫,而不是结构性泡沫。
So it's like a more local bubble rather than structural bubble.
当你遇到这种至少是局部的泡沫时,如果市场波动如此剧烈,尤其是在没有充分理由支撑的情况下,仅凭动能就推高了价格,那么它下跌时并不需要一个充分的理由——可能回落四分之一或三分之一,放弃一部分涨幅,这很正常。
When you have that kind of at least local bubble, you're prone to if you're that volatile, the upside, especially when you don't have a great reason why it just kind of momentum built like that, you don't have a great you don't need a great reason for it to come down, you know, a quarter of way or a third of the way and give up, you know, some of those gains.
我见过一些分析指出,比如亚洲的一家基金因一笔交易受损,然后转向另一笔交易,因此你常常能指出那些浮出水面的实体,或者成为特定日内波动事件的‘最后一根稻草’,但这些终究还是最初推动这种动能的表象。
Now, there have been analysis that I've seen where, you know, a fund in Asia, you know, got damaged by one trade and then shifts into another trade, so you can often point to bodies that float to the surface or or or entities that have been a kind of a last mile cause in a particular daily volatility event, but those end up still being symptoms of the kind of momentum that built it in the first place.
人们讨论的另一个重大结构性因素是日元套利交易,即日本长期以来一直存在结构性贸易顺差。
The other kind of big structural thing that people talk about is the yen carry trade, which is that, you know, Japan has been a you know, they they had a structural trade surplus.
它们至今仍保持着经常账户顺差。
They they still have a current account surplus.
它们积累了大量的资产。
They, you know, they build up all these assets.
然后许多其他实体会说,如果你的货币政策非常宽松,我就借日元,用它来购买其他资产。
And then many other entities say, well, if you're gonna be very dovish in your monetary policy, I'm gonna borrow yen, and I'm gonna use it to buy other assets.
因此,日本无论是直接还是间接,都是全球资产的重要资金提供者,这可能包括美国国债、美国股票,也可能包括X、Y、Z等国家的私募股权,总之无所不包。
So so Japan, both both directly and indirectly, is really big funder of assets globally, and that can include US treasuries, US stocks, that can include just private equity in in country x y z, I mean, across the board.
当日本政策转向更鹰派时,一些原本无人关注的小角落可能会突然在某一天崩盘。
When they get more hawkish, there can be these little pockets that no one was looking at that just kind of blow up one day.
他们可能原本持有着你喜爱的资产,但现在不得不去杠杆。
And they could be long the asset you like, and they got to deleverage.
而且,我再次强调,别以为这个月正在发生一场大规模的平仓,你知道吗?
And again, I would fade the idea that it's like this big unwind that's like happening this month, you know?
但背后确实存在一个现实问题:随着日本政策逐渐转向鹰派,债券市场从极低水平开始有所反弹,任何人的处境都像是在‘裸泳’。
But it is a real issue behind the scenes that as Japan's gets a little more hawkish, like the bond market kind of revolts a little bit from very low levels, anyone is kind of like the the financial term is swimming naked, basically.
就像你无法知道谁没有穿衣服,直到退潮时才看清楚,所以日本政策转向鹰派,就像是潮水开始退去一点点。
It's like the it's like the you don't really know who's not covered until the tide goes out in some way, so Japan getting more hawkish is like a little bit of the tide going out.
在美国,量化紧缩也像是潮水在退去一点点。
In The US, quantitative tightening was like a little bit of the tide going out.
这些小潮水有时会退去,有时会导致某个地方出现小小的崩塌,这在当时可能看起来非常严重,但几个月或几年后,它不过是漫长道路上众多事件中的一个注脚。
These little tides go out sometimes, and sometimes that causes a little bit of implosion somewhere, which can be really big in the moment, but it's still just kind of an exclamation point that months or years later, it's just one of many along the path.
是的。
Mhmm.
大家好,Bankless 社区。
Hey, Bankless Nation.
我是大卫。
It's David.
如果你正在听这段内容,那说明你正在收听免费的 Bankless 播客频道。
If you're hearing this, that's because you are listening to the free Bankless Podcast Feed.
你知道吗?还有一种付费的 Bankless RSS 订阅源。
Did you know that there is a premium Bankless RSS feed?
付费源包含我为个人研究而进行的额外访谈,以及一些关于加密行业更深入的问题——这些问题我想弄清楚,以便在 Bankless Ventures 以及我自己的个人投资组合中成为更明智的投资者。
The premium feed has extra interviews that I do for my own personal research and just deeper questions that I want answered about the crypto industry, questions that I want to answer so I can be more informed as an investor both at Bankless Ventures and also just in my own personal portfolio too.
而且,付费源没有广告,这意味着如果你选择收听付费源而非免费源,每年你能节省大约二十个小时的时间,因为你直接支持了 Bankless。
Also, are no ads, which means if you listen to the premium feed instead of the free feed, you'll get about twenty hours of your life back every year because you choose to support Banklist directly.
所以,如果你希望获取更多内容,同时跳过广告,或者只是欣赏我们在这里所做的工作并希望我们继续下去,我们非常感谢你注册Bankless高级服务,详情链接在节目说明中。
So if you're interested in getting extra content all while skipping the ads or you just appreciate what we do here and want us to keep doing it, we'd appreciate it if you signed up for bankless premium, and there is a link in the show notes to get started.
祝2026年一切顺利。
Cheers to a good 2026.
如果你能用与交易加密货币相同的工具和速度来交易黄金、外汇和全球市场,会怎么样?
What if you could trade gold, forex, and global markets with the same tools and speed that you use for crypto.
这正是Bitget TradFi所实现的功能。
That's exactly what Bitget TradFi unlocks.
在经历了强劲的测试期需求,包括单日黄金交易量超过一亿美元后,Bitget TradFi现已对所有用户开放。
After strong beta demand, including over a $100,000,000 in single day gold trading volume, Bitget TradFi is now live for all users.
在你现有的Bitget账户中,你可以交易涵盖外汇、贵金属、指数和商品的79种金融工具,所有交易均直接以USDT结算。
Inside of your existing Bitget account, you can trade 79 instruments across Forex, precious metals, indices, and commodities, all settled directly in USDT.
无需切换平台,也无需法币兑换。
No platform switching and no fiat conversions.
这就是Bitget通用交易所愿景的真正体现。
This is Bitget's universal exchange vision in action.
加密货币与传统金融并肩而行。
Crypto and traditional finance side by side.
你将获得深厚的流动性、低滑点,以及最高500倍的杠杆,让你能够将加密策略应用于宏观市场。
You get deep liquidity, low slippage, and leverage up to 500 x, letting you apply crypto strategies to macro markets.
对传统金融还不熟悉?
New to TradFi?
从黄金开始。
Start with gold.
黄金兑美元货币对流动性强,受宏观因素驱动,是加密货币与传统市场之间自然的桥梁。
The gold USD pair is liquid, macro driven, and a familiar natural bridge between crypto and traditional markets.
立即在 bitget.com 交易黄金。
Try trading gold on Bitget now at bitget.com.
点击节目说明中的链接获取更多信息。
Click the link in the show notes for more information.
这不是财务建议。
This is not financial advice.
当我们看到许多中央银行纷纷将黄金纳入储备时,我们也看到唐纳德·特朗普明确表示,他希望美国退出全球主导地位,这就像一个全新的世界秩序。
So as we see many central banks just diversify into gold, we also see Donald Trump explicitly saying he wants The United States to step back from being the global power, and, you know, it's like a new new world order.
美国该好好管好自己了。
United States is gonna take after itself.
欧洲,你们也该好好管好自己。
Europe, you ought to take after yourselves.
你知道的,做你自己就好。
You know, you do you.
我们也要走自己的路。
We're gonna do us.
你认为中国是否看到了这里的机会?
Do you think China sees an opportunity here?
如果美国正在制造某种权力真空,而中国又是世界上第二大经济体,你认为中国是否有意取代美元成为全球储备货币?还是说,中国也不想要这个负担?
If if The United States is leaving a power vacuum of sorts, you know, China is the next largest economic force in the world, do you think if the do you think that China has any interest in stepping into be the fiat currency that is the world reserve currency, or does China not want that curse either?
是的。
Yeah.
好问题。
Good question.
我会从两个方面来回答。
I would answer it in two parts.
所以就第一部分而言,我认为这比我们退后一步要复杂得多。
So for the first part, I think it's a little bit more complex than us stepping back.
我认为这是我们本可以选择的解决方案之一。
I think that's one of the solutions we could have picked.
如果说有什么的话,我认为这可能是一个更优雅的解决方案,但事实上我们一直在试图两全其美——我们仍然希望各国使用美元。
If anything, I think it might have been a more elegant solution, but instead we've kind of been trying to have our cake and eat it too, which is we still want countries to use the dollar.
我们希望各国与我们达成各种贸易协议,同时又在某种程度上退后一步。
We want countries to come to all these trade deals with us, while also stepping back in a way.
这可以说是心照不宣的真相,简直就像我们在说,希望世界向帝国纳贡。
Again, it's kind of the quiet part aloud, it's almost like we're saying we want the world to pay tribute to the empire, in a way.
我认为这是不可持续的。
And I think it's untenable.
我认为这增加了波动性。
I think it's adding volatility.
我认为从长远来看,这种方法不太可能奏效,尽管我确实认为解决贸易逆差是一个崇高的目标。
I think it's unlikely to kind of work in the longer run, even though I do think that some of the causes, like I do think it's a noble goal to try to fix the trade deficit.
实现这一目标有更优雅和更不优雅的方式。
There are just more elegant and less elegant ways to do it.
也有办法承认你在军事、货币和经济方面过度扩张,并逐步退出。
And there are ways to kind of acknowledge that you're overstretched military wise, you know, currency wise, economic wise, and to pull back.
我认为我们一方面试图退出,另一方面又不想退出,这很混乱。
I think we're, we're kind of trying to pull back, but also not pull back, which is messy.
所以我认为这加剧了波动性,也加剧了转向的力量。
So I think that's of that's adding to the volatility, that's adding to the force turning.
这就像一个机构在与自己辩论,因为即使在同一个政府内部,比如拜登政府,或者尤其是特朗普政府,也存在不同派系。
It's kind of like the institution debating with itself, because even within one administration, the Biden administration, or especially the Trump administration, there are factions.
并不是整个政府会统一行动。
It's not as though the whole administration moves as one.
因此,一方支持更自由的贸易,而另一方则全力支持关税政策。
And so you can have one faction that that wants more free trade and other side that's really on board with team tariff.
还有人说,我们其实很需要美元贬值。
Then there's other ones saying, you know, we we could really use a dollar devaluation.
这将极大地帮助我们解决贸易赤字问题。
It would really help with our trade, you know, deficit issue.
而另一方则说:不。
And the other side is saying, no.
我们想要强势美元政策。
We want strong dollar policy.
于是,这些相互竞争的派系导致最终结果混乱不堪,因此其影响可能不如各方协调一致时那么显著。
And so you have these kind of competing factions where the the end result is messy and therefore maybe less impactful than it could be if it was more aligned.
这是第一部分。
So that's the first part.
第二部分是,我认为中国只想走一半的路。
The second part is, I I think China only wants to go halfway.
正如我所见的所有分析所示,他们希望减少对美元的依赖,也就是说,他们希望加强自己的货币体系。
As in all the analysis I've seen, which is that they want to reduce their dollar, like, requirements, meaning that they they want to have their own currency system strengthened.
他们希望贸易伙伴在签订几乎任何合同时都越来越多地接受人民币作为支付手段。
They want to have their trade partners increasingly accept it as payment in contracting for almost anything.
他们希望用自己的货币购买大宗商品和能源。
They want to be able to buy commodities and energy in their own currency.
他们希望保持货币的足够稳定,使各方能够持有人民币,知道未来可以用它换取大量中国商品和服务,或在交易所兑换黄金。
They want to keep their currency stable enough so that entities can then hold it, knowing that they can then trade it for a lot of Chinese goods and services in the future, or can exchange it for gold on their exchange.
因此,他们采取了这些机制,试图让他们的债券更具吸引力。
So they have these kind of mechanisms to try to make the their their bonds more attractive.
我认为这一切都是真实的。
And I think all of that is real.
但我认为他们并不想重蹈美国过去几十年所面临的特里芬难题。
But I don't think that they wanna recreate the Triffin dilemma issue that The US has had over the past several decades.
我认为这一点在目前已经是相当普遍的共识。
I think that that's, at this point, somewhat common knowledge.
他们说,不想走得那么远。
They say, well, don't want to extend that far.
此外,中国长期以来一直存在人权问题,但这些问题通常局限于其周边地区。
In addition, China's obviously got a long history of human rights issues, but it tends to be pretty localized around their region.
他们声称某些地区属于他们,并声称有权对其人民实施某些政策。
They've got certain areas that they say are theirs, they've got certain mandates they say they can do on their people.
但就远距离投射武力而言,这并不符合他们的文化传统。
But in terms of like wanting to project force over long distances, that's not really culturally in their wheelhouse.
我认为,这是一种根本不同的看待事物的方式。
As I did think it's a it's a fundamentally different way of looking at things.
所以我认为我的看法是,他们想走一半的路。
So I I think that my take is that they wanna go halfway.
他们希望拥有自己的生态系统。
They wanna they wanna have their own ecosystem.
他们显然希望成为自己生态系统的中心,因为他们拥有能够实现这一点的经济实力,你知道,有可能。
They obviously wanna be, like, the the center of their ecosystem because they've got the economy that that can do that, you know, potentially.
但他们不希望陷入美国那种由世界帝国驱动的困境局面。
But they don't wanna they don't want this kind of world empire driven dilemma situation that The US has kind of found itself in.
所以我认为...
So what I think a
很多人正在试图弄清楚的是,接下来会发生什么。
lot of people are trying to figure out is what happens next.
下一个货币秩序会是什么?
What is the next monetary order?
我的意思是,这对投资者来说似乎很重要。在当前这个世界里,美元或美国国债作为全球储备资产的地位正在下降,尽管美元作为交易媒介仍然是全球储备货币,但以美元计价的资产,尤其是美国国债,正在下跌,特别是相对于黄金而言。
I mean, that seems relevant for investors, and we're in a world where the US dollar or, let's say, treasuries, US bonds is diminishing as the world reserve asset, while the dollar is still the world reserve currency from a medium of exchange perspective, treasuries and US bonds, dollar denominated assets are going down, in particular relative to gold.
迈克尔·豪威尔有一个框架,称之为资本战争,他将中国和美国定位为正在进行一场资本战争。
And Michael Howell has this framework of, yeah, capital wars, basically, and he sort of positions China and The US and engaged in a capital war.
当然,还有其他派系和参与者,但目前这两个是主要玩家。
Of course, there's other factions, other players, but those are the two big players right now.
现在有一个非常关键的问题:中国希望,或者说世界其他地区希望,将什么作为价值储存和储备资产?
And there's very much a question of what China wants, let's say, or what the rest of the world wants as the store of value of reserve assets.
因此,有一种观点认为,中国正在帮助推高黄金价格,大量购买黄金,当然,因为他们不希望美国国债成为世界储备资产。
So there's this idea maybe that China is helping with the gold price, buying lots of gold, of course, because they don't want treasuries, US treasuries, to be the world reserve asset.
他们希望黄金成为世界储备资产。
They want gold to be the world reserve asset.
他们不希望美元成为世界储备资产,但他们仍在积累美元。
They don't want the wand to be the world reserve asset, though, but they're stacking that.
然后,他们可能还会建立一种央行数字货币支付网络,从而在自己的货币中获得交易媒介,而价值储藏则使用黄金。
And then maybe they they pull off a central bank digital currency payment type of network as well so they get the medium of exchange in their currency, but their store of value is gold.
而美国当然一直享受着 incumbency 地位,长期以来美元和美国国债作为世界储备资产。
Now The US, of course, has enjoyed they're coming from an incumbency position where they've enjoyed dollars, treasury assets as the world reserve asset.
但也许这种局面再也难以维持,而特朗普政府内部的一些派别或许会占上风。
But maybe that's not tenable any longer, and some of those factions within the Trump administration somewhat win.
因此,他们可能也在转变模式——毕竟美国拥有大量黄金,所以回归金本位或许也未尝不可。
And so maybe they're swapping out the model too where I mean, The US does have a lot of gold, so I guess a gold standard would be okay.
但他们还拥有一套加密货币体系。
But then they also have a crypto stack too.
也许比特币会成为黄金作为价值储存手段的一部分,作为储备资产。
Maybe Bitcoin becomes a reserve asset as part of gold as a store of value.
然后,当然,还会大量投资于稳定币体系。
And then, of course, a lot of investment in the stablecoin stack.
对吧?
Right?
因此,你可以想象,这在某种程度上将成为贝桑特和未来美联储主席向全球输出美元的交易媒介。
So you could imagine that being sort of the medium of exchange in a way for Besant and future Fed chair to sort of export dollars across the world.
所以,几乎有两种体系正在形成:中国与黄金,以及他们的央行数字货币支付网络, versus 美国与黄金(稍微少一点),但再加上加密资产和稳定币。
So it's almost like two stacks are emerging, China and gold versus and and maybe their central bank digital currency thing, payment network thing versus The US and gold a little bit, but then crypto assets and stable coins.
你认为呢?或者你是否接受这种观点——我们正在试图预测二三十年代和四十年代的世界会是什么样子?
Which do you think or you do you do you accept this kind of we're trying to forecast what the world's going to look like in, you know, the twenty thirties and the twenty forties.
你怎么看?
What what do you think?
你认为其中一种愿景会胜出吗?
Do you think one of these visions win?
你同意这种对局势的描述吗?
Do you even agree with that framing of things?
我会说,我基本同意这种描述。
I I would say I mostly agree with that framing.
我认为更偏向多极化的那一方会胜出,也就是中国这一方——即人民币获得一定程度的美元独立性,而黄金等共同储备资产的地位得到提升。
I I do think the the more multipolar side wins, which is more of the China side, like, the more the day gets some degree of kinda dollar independence and and and mutual reserve assets like gold get elevated.
这并不一定对美国不利。
That's not even necessarily bad for The US.
事实上,这对我之前提到的三难困境之类的问题是有利的。
It's good good in fact, my prior point around triplets dilemma and things like that.
关键在于美国在这一过程中如何出牌。
It depends how The US plays its cards while this is happening.
而且,我读过几篇关于这个话题的文章。
So and I I've read a couple pieces on this.
其中一篇是2020年的。
One was back in 2020.
我之前谈到过这种多极化世界的兴起,当然,我在2023年的《破碎的货币》一书中也提到了这种向多极化世界的转变。
I talked about the more the the rise of this kind of multi polar world happening, and then, of course, I featured it in in Broken Money in 2023, this kind of shift toward a multi polar world.
而且,你知道,我无法确切预测会发生什么,但我们可以大致勾勒出几种可能性。
And, you know, I can't say exactly what's gonna happen, but I there's kind of a couple options you can lay out.
所以,其中一个观点是,世界上确实没有哪种货币——包括美元在内——
So one one kind of point there is that there's there's really no currency in the world, including the dollar.
听着,世界上没有任何法定货币——包括美元在内——
They listen, no fiat currency in the world, including the dollar.
它已经足够庞大,足以服务整个世界了。
It's big enough to serve the whole world anymore.
所以当这个美元体系建立时,我的意思是,美国当时占全球GDP的40%以上。
So when this dollar system was was established, I mean, US was over 40% of global GDP.
我们是二战后唯一屹立不倒的国家,而且我们必须,你知道,我们拥有所有的黄金,我们拥有所有的制造业,我们占全球GDP的40%,我们能够主导整个账本。
We were the only thing standing after World War two, and and we had to, you know, we had we had all the gold, we had all the manufacturing, we had 40% of global GDP, we could run the ledger.
几十年来,特里芬难题在某种程度上已经毒害了这口井。
Over decades, Trifan dilemma has poisoned that well to some degree.
此外,中国、印度、欧洲都已从整个殖民时期和全面战争时期中恢复过来。
In addition, China, India, Europe, they've kind of recovered from the whole period of colonialism that happened, whole period of total war that happened.
我们正逐渐接近历史上的GDP比例,这些人口密集的地区正重新回归其作为重要经济力量的正常地位。
We've kind of gotten closer to historical GDP ratios where these big population centers are rising back to their kind of normal place as pretty big economic powers.
而如今,没有任何一个货币集团足够庞大,能够在不使特里芬难题变得极其严重的情况下解决全球问题。
And there's really just no currency block big enough to solve the whole world without tripping dilemma being a really big deal.
因此,中国也不够强大。
So even China's not big enough.
美国也并不足够强大。
The US isn't really big enough.
这意味着,你通常需要以下两种方案之一。
And so that means you you generally need one of two things.
要么你需要多元化。
Either you need diversification.
也许你需要两个非常大的中心。
So maybe you have two really big hubs.
美国和中国是两个主要的中心。
You have The US and China has two really big hubs.
也许欧洲可以成为一个较小的第三个中心。
Maybe Europe, it's kind of its own third smaller hub.
因此,没有哪个账本试图服务整个世界。
And so no ledgers trying to serve the whole world.
这里的问题在于,货币具有网络效应。
The the challenge there is that money has network effects.
它倾向于集中到一种,而流动性会带来更多的流动性。
It tries to trend toward one, but liquidity begets more liquidity.
因此,这在一定程度上对这种多元化模式造成了压力。
And and and so, you know, it just it it puts pressure on that diversified model to some degree.
而另一种能缓解这一压力的选项是中立的储备资产。
And then the other option, the the part that kind of alleviates that is neutral reserve assets.
因此,你可以实现账本的多元化,同时还有这些连接它们的中立媒介。
So you can have a diversifying of the ledgers, but then also these neutral things that bridge them.
黄金作为现有的中立储备资产,显然是各国央行已经持有的首选。
Gold being the incumbent neutral reserve assets, the obvious first choice is the one that central banks already hold.
几乎世界上所有人都能某种程度上理解它。
It's the one that almost everybody in the world can under understand to some degree.
它拥有数千年的历史记录,主要的缺点是审计起来非常缓慢且成本高昂。
It's got this multi thousand year track record, with the main caveat being that it's really slow and expensive to audit.
因此,它作为储蓄手段非常出色。
So it's it's great as savings.
但作为结算手段就不那么理想了。
It's not great as as settlement.
比如,当德国想要将部分黄金运回本国时,花了数年时间。
Like, when Germany want to repay repatriate part of its gold, it took years.
尽管他们提前完成了任务,但仍然花了好几年。
And they finished ahead of schedule and it still took it took years.
只是比他们预期的时间少了一些而已。
It just took fewer years than they thought.
而比特币交易,平均一小时就能获得六次确认。
And that's I mean, you know, whereas like, you know, Bitcoin transaction, could you get six confirmations in an hour on average.
所以,这完全是另一个世界。
And so, you know, that's it's just like a a different world.
比特币既是结算网络,也是一种价值储存手段。
Now, Bitcoin is, I mean, it's it's a settlement rails and is a store of value.
它现在已经有了十七年的历史,但你知道,根据当前是牛市还是熊市,它的市值在一千亿到两万亿美元之间。
It's got seventeen years of track record now, but it's, know, we're talking, depending on if you're in a bull or bear market at the moment, it's a 1 to $2,000,000,000,000 asset.
因此,在网络效应的规模上,它仍然很小。
So it's still small on the network effect scope.
尽管它具备一定的流动性,但在流动性规模上仍然相当小。
It's still even though it's got reasonable liquidity, still pretty small on the liquidity spectrum.
还有一些人根本无法理解它。
And then, there are people that just don't understand it.
有些人会问,比如在五到二十年的时间范围内,它是否容易受到量子计算等风险的影响,而主权机构正是从这个时间维度来思考的。
There are people that say, well, is it prone to risk XYZ, let's say quantum, for example, in a five, ten, fifteen, twenty year time horizon, which sovereigns are gonna think in.
所以我认为这是一个正在崛起的竞争者,但我认为这是一场非常长期的游戏。
So I I I think that's a rising contender, but I think this is a very long game.
而且只有当比特币的市值再增加一个零时,它才可能成为与美元、人民币和黄金相抗衡的竞争者。
And it really not until, you know, Bitcoin has like an extra zero on it, would it like its market cap, would it be like a contender at the scales of of dollars and and Chinese currency and gold?
当我们审视稳定币时,这又回到了之前那个问题——一个既想追求多重目标的政府或国家。
And when we when we look at stable coins, that goes back to the the prior issue of an administration or a country that wants multiple things.
因此,美元的广泛使用历史上对华盛顿和纽约有利,因为它让我们能够对任何人实施制裁,所有事物都以我们的货币计价。
So the the widespread use of the dollar is historically good for Washington and New York, because it lets us sanction anyone, all the stuff's kind of priced in our currency.
它让我们能够大致看清一切。
It lets us kind of see everything.
我们还能普遍使我们的货币高估,从而很好地投射权力和军事基地。
And we can generally makes our currency overvalued, so it lets us project power and military bases pretty well.
但缺点是,这对普通民众不利,对美国工业也不利,损害了我们的出口竞争力。
But the downside, it's not great for Main Street, it's not great for industrial USA, it hurts our export competitiveness.
几十年来,这种失衡可能如此严重,以至于连华盛顿都难以从中获益。
And over decades, it can get so imbalanced that even Washington struggles to to, you know, benefit from it.
正如我们之前讨论的,我们已经看到从主权资产和国债转向,尤其是在它们资产组合中的相对比例上。
And we've, as we previously talked about, we have seen the shift away from sovereigns, away from treasuries, especially as a relative part of their stack.
现在,稳定币可能的作用是,即使主权国家不购买,人们可能仍然想买入美元。
Now, what stablecoins potentially do is say, even if sovereigns aren't buying, people still might want to buy the dollar.
比如在开罗的街头、黑市货币市场,人们想要的是美元。
Like on the streets of Cairo, the in black market currency markets, it's the dollar that people want.
不是人民币。
It's not Chinese currency.
也不是,你知道的,不是巴西的货币。
It's not, you know, it's not Brazil's currency.
美元主要依靠的是网络效应。
It's network affects the dollar, for the most part.
这在世界上许多国家都是如此。
And that's true for many, many countries around the world.
他们说,这种自下而上的需求,技术或许能够满足。
And they say, well, there's there's that bottom up demand, that technology can potentially let us meet.
我多年来一直看好多重稳定币,这确实是事实。
There's truth that I've been bullish on stablecoins for many years.
面临的几个挑战是,第一,我认为最终会遇到一个上限,因为人们只愿意持有有限数量的不计息美元。
Couple challenges is that one, I think you do hit a ceiling at one point, which is that people only want so much non interest bearing dollars for starters.
第二,一些国家会通过监管和打压来抵制,至少会增加一些摩擦。
Two, some countries will push back with with regulations and crackdowns, so at least add frictions to it.
他们无法彻底根除,但可以将其推向灰色市场,或在某种程度上破坏流动性。
They can't stamp it out entirely, but you could push it toward the gray market or or just kind of fracture the liquidity in in some partial way.
其次,美国仍然存在一个三难困境:如果你成功让稳定币被更多人使用,就很难解决贸易逆差,因为你同时在打两场仗。
And then two, it it actually still The US still has a tripping dilemma issue, which is if you do manage to get stable coins into more hands, it's hard to fix your trade deficit because you're you're trying to fight two battles.
你一方面说想收缩战线、聚焦自身,另一方面又想维持美元的主导地位,这更多是华盛顿和纽约派的观点。
You're saying we wanna pull back and focus on ourselves, but we also wanna keep our currency dominance that's more in the Washington and New York camp.
所以我认为,这之所以进展缓慢,部分原因在于不仅有大的派系相互竞争,
So I think that that's part of why this takes so long is that not only are there big factions competing against each other,
而且内部也存在相互竞争的派系。
but then there are internal factions competing within themselves too.
我们来多聊聊比特币吧,因为贬值叙事现在完全生效了,你说得对,这曾经是2000年代、2010年代黄金爱好者才会谈论的话题,如今已进入主流视野。
Let's talk more about Bitcoin because we do have the debasement narrative in full effect, and you're right that that has moved from kind of gold bugs who used to talk about it in, you know, the 2 thousands, twenty tens to now it's mainstream.
对吧?
Right?
现在大型金融机构都在承认并讨论这一点,而黄金也因此成为巨大受益者。
Now the big financial houses are acknowledging it, talking about it, and gold has been a massive beneficiary of this.
有些人看到黄金,再对比特币进行比较,说比特币本该在此时大放异彩,但它却表现不佳。
Some people look at gold, and then they compare Bitcoin, and they say, this was Bitcoin's moment to shine, and it is underperforming.
而且,我们之前也请你来谈过‘破损的货币’这个话题。
And, I mean, obviously, we've we've had you on and talk about broken money.
他们可能会说,达利奥是对的。
And they might say, well, Dalio was right.
林·艾尔登也是对的。
Lin Alden was right.
货币确实破损了,但解决方案似乎并不是比特币。
Money is broken, but the solution doesn't seem to be Bitcoin.
你对比特币相对于黄金的表现感到失望吗?
Are you disappointed with the way Bitcoin has performed relative to gold?
这会动摇你对比特币的长期观点吗?
And does that shake any of the the thesis you've had around Bitcoin, the long term thesis that you've had?
我一直认为,随着这个世界变得更加多极化,很难判断这些事情发生的时间框架,这很有趣,因为一些比特币支持者其实并不喜欢黄金。
So I've I've been in the camp that as I see this world get more multipolar, it's hard to know the time frames that these things happen on, which is it's funny because some some Bitcoin proponents really don't like gold.
一些黄金支持者也不喜欢比特币。
Some gold proponents really don't like Bitcoin.
我一直属于既看好又持有两者的一方。
I've been in the camp that likes and is long both.
所以我一直认为
So I've been That
顺便说一下,这是一种选择。
is an option, by the way.
你可以看多
You could be bullish
同时关注不止一件事。
on more than one thing.
是的。
Yeah.
这一直是一个选择。
It's been an option.
事实上,我持有贵金属的时间比持有比特币更久,因为最初我的观点是——
In fact, I've been long precious metals longer than Bitcoin, because initially my thesis okay.
这一切都在发生。
This is all happening.
我要持有黄金。
I'm gonna go own gold.
随着我了解得更多,我想,好吧。
As I learn more, I'm like, well, okay.
我也要将比特币加入这个观点中,因为从很多方面来看,它更优秀。
I'm gonna add Bitcoin to this thesis too, because it's, you know, many ways better.
所以,比特币在这段时间内表现优异,尽管最近表现不佳。
So it has know, it's been out you know, Bitcoin's outperformed during that time, even though it's underperformed more recently.
关于另一个问题,我确实一直认为,比特币在这一轮周期中的表现低于我的预期。
And to answer the other question, I I have been you know, Bitcoin has underperformed my expectations in this particular cycle.
我最初抱有保守的预期,认为2021年这一轮周期我们能达到一万亿美元的市值,结果确实达到了。
You know, I I started out with conservative expectations, which was the I thought the 2021 cycle, I thought we get to a trillion market cap, we did.
当我们达到那个目标后,我觉得,是的,我预计这一轮能涨到10万美元。
Once we got there, I was like, yeah, I could see us hitting a 100 k this cycle.
我们确实涨了,但只达到了大约6.9万美元。
We we did, and we only got to, like, 69 k.
所以,我后来上调的看涨预期没能实现,就连最初的预期也没完全达成。
So my my kind of revised bullish take wasn't quite met, even my first one was.
让我谈谈熊市。
Let me go into the bear market.
然后,我基本上说,这一轮我不会刻意设定价格目标,但如果非得说,我认为低于15万美元就算有点令人失望。
Then I I basically said, I'm not really gonna try to make a price target this cycle, but I when pushed, I would say anything under a 150 k is kinda disappointing.
我只达到了126,所以我会说这算是第二个不太理想的周期。
I've only got to a 126, so I would say it's it is kind of a second, you know, kind of a lackluster cycle.
我认为企业 treasury 取走了一些狂热情绪。
I think treasury companies took some of the euphoria out of it.
因此,原本可能进入冷钱包比特币的资金,转而投向了这些 treasury 公司的杠杆股票,这些股票的交易价格是其 MNAV 的若干倍,从而削弱了价格走势。
So some of the money that might otherwise have gone into, say, just cold storage Bitcoin goes into, you know, levered shares of these treasury companies that are trading at x times, you know, MNAV, which takes some of the price action out.
所以我认为,如果没有这些因素,价格可能会更高一些,但它们也在一定程度上推动了购买行为,尤其是 MicroStrategy。
So I think maybe without those, it could have gotten a little higher, but then they also they they were also partially fueling the buying of it to some degree, especially MicroStrategy.
所以总的来说,这个周期有点令人失望。
So, yeah, I think the overall, this was a a somewhat disappointing cycle.
但这并没有改变我对它的长期观点。
It doesn't change my long term thesis about it.
基本上,去中心化账本仍然非常有价值。
And that basically a a decentralized ledger is still very valuable.
这是我们目前已知的唯一一种实现无许可支付和可携式安全储蓄的方式。
It's the only way to do, you know, that we know of to do permissionless payments and portable secure savings.
而这个观点的第二部分是,这些事物具有网络效应。
And then the second part of the thesis is, well, that these things have network effects.
所以你要选一个你认为是去中心化、安全且最有可能赢得流动性战争和网络效应战争的。
So you pick one that you view as decentralized, secure, and is likely to win the, basically, the liquidity war, the network effect war.
显然,我们在比特币、以太坊和其他项目之间存在分歧。
Obviously, we have we have disagreements around, say, Bitcoin versus Ethereum and others.
我一直站在比特币这一边,也就是说,一个去中心化的账本是有价值的。
I've been in the the Bitcoin camp, which is, okay, so a decentralized ledger is valuable.
它是最大、流动性最强的那一个。
That's the largest, most liquid one.
它更注重简洁性以及最大程度的去中心化。
It's kind of the one that's kind of geared towards simplicity and kind of, you know, maximal decentralization.
因此,这个观点认为它将继续保持强势,同时我也对稳定币持看涨态度,尽管它们主要运行在其他系统上。
And so the thesis is that would would continue holding up, and also has bullish on stable coins along the way as well, even though they run on largely other rails.
我认为在这个周期中,比特币仍然是主导的加密货币。
And I would say in this cycle, you know, big Bitcoin is still, you know, dominant cryptocurrency.
所以十七年过去了,我认为这一部分的论点依然站得住脚。
So seventeen years in, I think that part of the thesis continues to hold up well.
人们对于量子计算以及其他在未来五到十五年可能产生影响的因素,各有自己的看法。
You know, people have their their views on quantum and other factors that contribute over the next five, ten, fifteen years.
但到目前为止,我认为这一部分的论点仍在正轨上。
But so far, I'd say that part of the thesis is on track.
而进展比预期更慢的部分,是市场对任何去中心化账本的需求——我依然认为它很有价值,但我觉得世界或许在认识它的用途上慢了一些。
And the part that's going slower than expected is just the demand for any decentralized ledger, which is I still think it's valuable, but I do think the world's kind of maybe a little slower to recognize its use.
作为一种货币资产,它不像你用完了石油那样,当天就会出问题。
And a monetary asset, unlike, you know, you're out of oil, you have a problem like that day.
而如果你还没认识到什么是好货币,很多人其实并不会因此受到伤害,因为这需要时间。
Whereas if you're if you do you know, if you haven't recognized good money yet, a lot of people, they're just not harmed by not, you know, it takes time.
不可能出现比特币短缺的情况。
It's not like someone can have a Bitcoin shortage.
所以除非你是交易所之类机构,否则基本上就像有些人被阻止进行支付,但他们有时会通过其他方式绕过,也许他们还没找到最好的方法。
So unless you're an exchange or something, like, basically, it's like, there are people that are blocked from making payments, and they, you know, they get around in other ways sometimes, maybe they haven't found the best way yet.
还有很多其他人说,虽然货币在贬值,但我的支付并没有被切断。
There are lot of other people that say, well, debasement's happening, but my payments aren't shut off.
只要我持有AI股票、黄金之类的东西,我就没问题。
So as long as I own AI stocks and gold and stuff like that, I'm fine.
所以我认为这些事情可能需要相当长的时间才能显现出来。
So I think these things can take quite a while to play out.
因此,我认为长期的论点依然成立。
So I think the long term thesis is intact.
但确实,这一轮我的预期没有实现,更令人失望的是,我一直认为你可以同时持有多种资产。
And but it's it is true that I'm, you know, I I it's underperformed my expectations this cycle, and the the softening blow is that I have been in the camp that you can own multiple things.
我的背景更多是从股票分析开始的,也长期持有大量股票。
I've also, I mean, my my history more starts with equity analysis, Some also long stocks to a very significant degree.
所以当你同时持有股票、黄金、比特币和一些现金流动性时,通常都能很好地度过这些时期。
So when you have stocks, gold, Bitcoin, you know, and some cash liquidity, you generally get through these things pretty well.
我本来想说,琳恩,如果你对这一轮比特币的表现感到失望,那你不妨试试做多以太坊,因为从这个角度看,情况可能更痛苦。
I was gonna say, Lynn, if you were disappointed with Ethereum this cycle or sorry, Bitcoin this cycle, you should try being an Ethereum bull because I think it's been pretty it's been a pretty painful from that perspective.
也许我们可以稍后再谈这个问题。
Maybe we could talk about that in just a minute.
所以某种程度上,我想知道比特币的采用情况,对于个人而言,为什么比特币作为价值储存资产相比黄金有诸多优势,这一点非常明确。
So somewhat, I wonder if the adoption around Bitcoin, it's sort of it's very clear for individuals why Bitcoin has a lot of benefits versus a store of value asset like gold.
但当你扩大到中央银行或国家层面时,它们很容易大量购买黄金,安全保管,甚至运输它,而且黄金市场规模巨大。
But then when you kinda scale up and you get to kinda central banks nation state level, right, it's fairly easy for them to buy gold in abundance and to secure it and to even transport it, and it's a massive liquid market.
而且黄金市场比比特币大得多。
Like and it's much larger than Bitcoin.
我们似乎正遇到一点瓶颈。
Seems like we're we're sort of hitting a little bit of a ceiling.
也许这只是一个暂时的瓶颈。
Maybe that's a temporary ceiling.
但就国家层面的比特币采用而言。
But with respect to Bitcoin adoption at the the nation state level.
也就是说,各国政府尚未开始大规模买入比特币。
I mean, the nation states haven't yet started buying campaigns.
我的意思是,即使是美国在比特币战略储备方面做得最好的情况,也只是持有他们没收的加密资产。
I mean, the best they're doing even with the the Bitcoin strategic reserve in The US is they're just holding, you know, crypto assets that they've seized.
所以也许我们得先经历这一阶段。
So maybe we have to get through that first.
不过我想问你关于加密货币的四年周期问题。
I wanna I wanna ask you though about four year cycles in crypto.
你相信这个说法吗?
Like, are you a believer in that?
因为对这一切最简单的解释,我认为,就是它总是以四年为周期上演。
Because one explanation for all of this, the Occam's razor type explanation, I think, is that it's always played out in four year cycles.
这是新的。
It's new.
它自身在不断演化。
Itself into existence.
是的。
Yeah.
而且,这基本上已经变成了一种自我实现的预言,也许还有一些与流动性相关的事情,而全球流动性通常发生在四到六年的周期中。
And, basically, it's now a self fulfilling prophecy, and maybe there's things tied into liquidity, which also happens on, like, four global liquidity, which happens on four to six year cycles.
但无论如何,现在只是比特币该涨的时候了。
But, anyway, it was just Bitcoin's time.
我的意思是,在四年周期的第四年,我们通常会迎来一次熊市,所以我们会经历一次熊市,这就是为什么现在正在发生这一切。
It's I mean, the the, you know, the fourth year in a four year we we have a it's time for a bear market, so we're gonna have a bear market, and that's why this is happening.
是的。
Yeah.
在我看来,早期阶段,四年周期确实有影响,因为新供应量非常大且意义重大,供应量减半确实显著影响了市场动态,成为推动下一轮牛市的催化剂,直到狂热情绪过度膨胀。
The way I look at it is that so in the early stages, obviously, the four year cycle was was impactful because the supply the new supply was so large and meaningful that a a half reduction in that new supply really affected market dynamics, and could be a catalyst for the next bear mark I mean, bull market until that euphoria gets overdone.
而现在,新供应量相对于其他因素——比如老玩家的卖出或不卖出速度、大型新买家的入场速度——已经变得微不足道。
Now, as the supply, the new supply has gotten so small relative to other factors like the rate of OG selling or not selling, the rate of of big new buyers coming in.
这些因素都比比特币减半带来的新增供应量要重要得多。
These are all much bigger factors than than than the new supply that comes from Bitcoin in in a halving.
因此,从基本面来看,我认为没有必要再期待四年周期的规律了。
And so fundamentally, I don't think there's any reason to have a four year cycle expectation in play.
我认为,行为往往会滞后于基本面发生变化。
I do think that behavior tends to change with a lag from fundamentals.
所以,尽管我认为这个周期中四年周期在基本面层面已经不重要了,而且上个周期可能也不是最主要的因素,但相比现在,它当时还是起到一定作用的。
So even though the the four year cycle I don't think it mattered fundamentally this cycle, and I think it last cycle still probably wasn't the biggest factor, but was, you know, a little bit more of a factor than this time.
我认为,心理层面的调整需要经历几个周期才能跟上。
I think it it takes a couple cycles for the psychology to catch up.
因此,我确实认为存在一种自我实现的预言:人们会说,如果比特币在这个周期只能涨到这个程度,然后就要面临两年的熊市,那不如现在就卖出,等以后再买回来。
And so I do I do think that there was some self fulfilling prophecy, which is that people say, well, if Bitcoin's only gonna get this far this cycle, and then I'm risking a a two year bear market, might as well get out now and see if I can buy back later.
如果足够多的人这么想,这种情况就会发生。
And if enough people think that, then you get that happen.
然后,当价格低于预期时,就会有一些人恐慌性抛售,或者如果他们使用了杠杆,就会被清算。
And then, of course, when it's down versus expectations, you have some people panic sell or get or get liquidated if they were leveraged.
于是,这种现象自我强化,清除了几乎所有因错误理由持有比特币或使用过高杠杆的人。
So then it fees on itself and you clean out pretty much anyone who owned it for the wrong reasons or that owned it on too much leverage.
我一直保持警惕的一点是,就在去年这个时候,我经常上播客节目,人们总会问:‘你对国家对比特币作为储备资产怎么看?’
The one part that I have been careful of is it was about this time last year, would get on podcasts all the time, and people say, Well, what do you think about the sovereign Bitcoin reserve?
我会对这一点提出异议,因为我的任何模型都不会包含这种情况,我宁愿向上惊喜,也不愿向下意外。
And that's the part I would kind of push back on and say, Any of my models are not going to include it, because I'd rather be surprised to the upside than surprised the downside.
我默认的看法是,他们大概会把已经持有的比特币隔离起来。
My my my default view was, okay, they're probably gonna ring fence the Bitcoin they already have.
他们基本上已经这么做了。
They've they've largely done.
但我不会押上全部身家,认为他们会不管某些提案如何,都去购买五十万枚比特币,因为政府的现状就是不改变。
But that I I wouldn't bet the farm that they're gonna go out and buy a half million coins regardless of what some of the proposals were just because the status quo for governments is no change.
显然,在特朗普政府下,情况会有所不同。
Obviously, in a in a Trump administration, there's variables.
我们刚刚讨论过,事情变化能有多快。
We just talked about how how does rapid things can be.
如果一年前你问我,关税会涨到这么高的水平,我大概会说,这不会是我的基准预期。
So if you ask me where the tariff were gotten this elevated a year ago, I probably said, it wouldn't be my base case.
对吧?
Right?
所以那达到了异常的水平,但国家比特币储备却没有。
So that that hit kind of the unusual levels, but the the the Bitcoin sovereign sovereign Bitcoin reserve didn't.
因此,谨慎对待期待有一大笔资金涌入并拯救一轮行情是正确的。
So I I think it is right to be cautious on expecting one big pool of money to come in and save a cycle.
如果你持有多头,这种情况发生当然是好事,但我不会以此为赌注。
You know, it's nice if it happens to the upside if you're long, but I wouldn't bet on that.
相反,我认为你应该保持保守的预期,更加谨慎地对待期望值。
Instead, I think you ought to have conservative expectations and and be more, you know, just like prudent with with with expectations.
我认为我们通常看到的是,这显然存在职业风险。
I think that the we've generally see like, so there's obviously this career risk.
对吧?
Right?
如果你是央行官员,买入比特币后比特币价格下跌,你可能会丢掉工作。
So if you're a central banker and you buy Bitcoin and Bitcoin goes down, you probably lost your job.
对企业来说也是如此。
Same thing if you're a a corporation.
总的来说,那些这么做的通常是像个人或小公司那样的主体。
So generally speaking, the ones that do it are ones that operate like an individual or a small company.
这是因为某些所有者,比如某位CEO,可能是创始人或主要股东,而大多数公司的股权分布则较为分散。
It's because some some owner, like some some CEO is like either the founder or a major, major shareholder, unlike most corporations where the ownership is pretty diffused.
所以像萨利尔这样的人,或者像布卡利这样的人,他们对自己所管理的实体拥有高于平均水平的控制权,能够做出接近单方面决策的决定,就像小企业或个人那样运作。
So someone like a sailor, someone like a bucali, that they have kind of a higher than normal level of control of the entity that they're overseeing, and that they can make, maybe not fully unilateral decision, but closer to unilateral decision to do something the way that a small business or an individual might operate.
只需要你,或者你和你的配偶,就能做出决定。
It only take you or your you and your spouse to make a decision.
我认为我们之前就处于这样的周期中。
And I think that that's kind of the cycle we were in.
在第一个周期里,其实没有人遵循什么策略,他们只是直接行动了。
Now, no one followed strategy really in that first cycle, they did it.
而显然,这一轮我们有了更多的模仿者,无论好坏。
And obviously, we've had more imitators this cycle, for better or worse.
所以我认为这些事情需要时间才能逐渐普及。
So I think these things take time to catch on.
所以每个周期,你可能会看到更多这样的参与者。
So every cycle, think you probably would get more of them.
但我不会把全部赌注押在任何一个巨头能拯救整个周期上。
But I wouldn't bet the farm on like any one giant one saving a whole cycle.
所以我认为保持谨慎是有好处的
So I think it pays to be kind
对预期要保持审慎。
of prudent with expectations.
关于比特币,你担心策略问题吗?
On Bitcoin, are you worried about strategy?
你担心数字资产 treasury 公司在当前熊市中可能破产吗?
Are you worried about digital asset treasury companies and them going perhaps belly up during this bear market?
那么量子呢?
And then also, how about Quantum?
量子对你来说是比特币的担忧吗?
Is that a worry for Bitcoin for you?
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