#55 拳击手——特里·史密斯谈质量、估值与长期复利

他说我们聊了一会儿。

And he said he very we had a little chat.

就这样了。

That was it.

之后他给我发了一封邮件，说他曾经被一些骗子收取3%的费用，结果却一塌糊涂。

And he he wrote me a a an email something after saying, you know, I've been with various little charlatans who charged me 3% fees and produced terrible results.

而不同的是，现在我和我的家人觉得我们的退休生活有了保障，这都要归功于你为我们的资金所做的一切。

And the difference is now my and my family feel that our retirement is secure because of what you've done in terms of the money.

我不希望人们以为我不是资本家，因为我确实是。

And And, I don't want people to think that I'm not a capitalist because I am.

如果有一天我说我对这些都不感兴趣了，那你最好赶紧逃命，头发都烧着了。

The day I say, I'm not interested in all of that is a day you should run away with your hair on fire.

当然，我相信资本主义是有效的，我是认真的。

Of course, I think capitalism works and I mean it.

但想到有像这样的人，我们正在为他们做这些事，我感到非常欣慰。

But it gives me good feeling to feel that there are people like that that we're doing that for.

一想到他们可能已经到了那种地步，心里会想：天啊，这可不太妙，是不是？我就觉得特别不舒服。

It gives me a very bad feeling to think, you know, that that they might have have got to the point where they feel, blimey, that's not very good, is it?

我不喜欢这样。

I I don't like it.

当这种情况持续很长时间时。

And when it goes on for an extended period.

让我们假设一种情况，它持续了很长一段时间。

So, let's just take a hypothetical situation where it went on for an extended period.

但实际上，它已经发生了，

Well, it already has,

我觉得是的。

I think.

我们大概已经进入第五年了。

We're in about the fifth year, roughly.

是的。

Yeah.

但话说回来，几年之后，你必须想想：等等，是不是发生了结构性变化？

But well, so I mean, after a few years, you've got to think, well, hang on a second, is there a structural change?

那么，你该如何思考这个问题呢？

So how do you go about thinking through that?

尼克做过的一件事是，试图减少对消费者的过度关注，转而关注一些人工智能的周边受益者之类的方向。

One of the things that Nick has done is to try and shift away from like the biggest emphasis on the consumer and shift away to some AI peripheral beneficiaries, that sort of thing.

你怎么

How do

我们早就这么做了。

you We did that some time back.

我的意思是，我们早就投资了微软、旧版的Facebook和Alphabet了。

Mean, we've been in Microsoft and the old Facebook and Alphabet for quite some time.

我真的这么做了。

I've really done that.

我觉得这有点像这样。

I think it's bit like this.

我们为什么对人类进行尸检？

Why do we have postmortems for human beings?

难道是因为人们喜欢摆弄尸体吗？

Well, is it because people like messing around with cadavers?

也许他们确实喜欢，但那真的不是主要原因吧？

Well, maybe they do, but that's not really, is it?

当有人在不明情况下死亡时。

Somebody dies in circumstances where we don't know what it is.

我们进行尸检是为了确定死因，因为可能需要采取某些措施。

We have an autopsy in order to determine the cause of death because there might be something we need to do about it.

可能是他杀。

It might be foul play.

也可能是一种我们尚未掌握的病毒。

It might be a virus that we have.

这就是我们的做法。

That's what we do.

我们通常会进行分析，查看具体原因，以判断这些原因是否源于我们的执行问题，是否是因为战略在某些我们未曾预料到的方式下失效，还是其他重要但不太可能持续的因素。

We tend to go through and have an autopsy and look at what the causes are to see whether or not the causes are us in terms of execution, whether the causes are the strategy no longer functioning in some way that we hadn't foreseen, or whether it's other factors which are important but not likely to persist.

因此，我们只能咬紧牙关，戴好护齿套，继续前进。

And therefore, we just got to sort of grit our teeth, bite down on our gum shield, and keep going.

我们通常会尝试分析这些因素，找出其中最主要的部分。

And we we tend to try and analyze into those factors and see what's the biggest part of this.

明白吗？

Alright?

过去几年里，我们基本上就是这样做的。

And that's what we've done over the last few years, basically.

我认为这里发生了很多事情，促成了这一切。

And I think there are a lot of things that have gone on here which helped cause all this.

我完全愿意坦诚讨论我们犯过的错误，因为相信我，确实有不少。

And I'm perfectly willing to talk through the mistakes we've made because believe me, there are a few.

所以，那远不是最主要的部分。

So that's not the biggest part of it by far.

最主要的原因是利率上升，这对质量型策略构成了问题，因为我们持有的资产相当于长期债券。

The biggest part of it are rise in interest rates, which is problematic in a quality strategy because we are owning the equivalent of long dated bonds.

我们从不持有的那些周期性股票和金融股，反而会上涨。

We're always the things that we won't own, the cyclicals and those financials are going to rise.

这种情况在2022年和2023年发生了。

So that happened in twenty twenty two, twenty twenty three.

就在我们刚松了一口气的时候，利率似乎已经见顶了。

And then just as we were breathing a sigh really well, the rates seem to have peaked.

猜猜发生了什么？

Guess what happened?

突然间，‘七巨头’崛起了。

Suddenly the magnificent seven arose.

我的意思是，早在2023年5月，这个说法就被提出来了，意思是市场上有七家公司表现极为出色，几乎所向披靡。

I mean, literally in like May 2023, that phrase was coined, which was telling you there were these seven companies, which were all conquering in the eyes of the market in terms of their performance.

然后，2023到2024年就这么过去了。

And then so just that was 2023 to 2024 gone.

你可能会想，我们已经看到了很多这样的情况，也许这一种就是其中之一。

And you might think, we've seen an awful lot of that, maybe that one probably.

英伟达的首席执行官黄仁勋在2024年5月上台表示：人工智能。

Jensen Huang, the CEO of NVIDIA got up in May 2024 and said, AI.

于是，我们在资本支出和股价表现上开启了一场军备竞赛。

And then we're off to an arms race in terms of capital spending and share price performance.

我们已经到达这样一个阶段：标普指数中排名前十的公司，如今贡献了标普指数三分之二的回报。

And we've got to the point where the top 10 companies in the S and P are now two thirds of the return of the S and P.

还有一些其他有趣的统计数据，或许美国的全部GDP增长都来自人工智能支出。

And some other interesting statistics, probably the whole of the GDP growth of America is AI spending.

这简直让人惊叹，这些数据确实很有趣。

It's like, wow, these are kind of interesting statistics.

因此，我们经历了利率上升、七大巨头和人工智能。

And so we had interest rate rise, magnificent seven, AI.

与此同时，除了这些事件之外，我们还迎来了一股巨大的顺风——指数基金的兴起。

And then as well as all these events that were going on, we had this huge tailwind that was going on at the same time, which was the rise of index funds.

上一次出现这种情况还是在互联网泡沫时期。

So the last time we had an episode like this was the .com era.

那确实挺有意思的。

And that was pretty interesting.

我的意思是，当时管理资金的人，也在努力遵循我们如今所坚持的纪律。

I mean, for people running money at the time, we were trying to follow a discipline of the sort that we're following.

他们当时面临的问题和我们现在一模一样。

They had exactly the same set of problems.

我认为这次更极端，因为在2000年，当我们接近互联网泡沫顶峰时，指数基金在资产管理中的比例还不到10%。

I think it's more extreme this time because in 2000, when we were running into the peak of the .com, early two thousand, the proportion of assets under management in index funds was under 10%.

现在这个比例已经超过50%了。

It's now over 50%.

人们有时在投资时，因为使用了某些标签而误导了自己，他们会说：哦，这些是被动型投资。

And people think when we don't help ourselves in investment with the labels that we use sometimes, people say, oh, these are passives.

但严格来说，它们是被动的，因为没有基金经理，没有尼克·特雷纳、特里·史密斯来做出决策。

Well, they're passive in the sense there's no fund managers, no Nick Trainer, Terry Smith, pulling the trigger on making decisions yet.

但这不是被动策略，而是动量策略。

But it's not a passive strategy, it's a momentum strategy.

如果你对我感到厌倦，在这次对话结束后把钱从我的基金里撤出，转投指数基金，或者你的听众这么做，资金会按市场中各公司的规模比例投入指数基金，这意味着英伟达将获得最多的资金。

If you get fed up with me and take your money out of my fund at the end of this and put it into or your listeners do, put it into an index fund, going to go in the index fund in proportion to the size of the companies in the market, which means NVIDIA is going to get the most.

而我根本不持有英伟达的股票。

And I don't own any NVIDIA.

所以你猜这会对英伟达的股价产生什么影响，尤其是当你开始关注资金流动规模的时候。

So guess what that's going to do to the share price of NVIDIA, particularly when you start looking at the size of the flows.

因此，这就是这一切的背景。

And so that's the backdrop to all this.

当整个‘七巨头’的AI热潮兴起时，我们也看到了资金持续流入被动型基金，这实际上为市场注入了动量。

As we had this whole magnificent seven AI boom hype coming through, we also had the flow of funds going into passives, which were giving it a momentum basically.

先锋基金的创始人约翰·博格，当然也是指数投资的先驱，在2017年伯克希尔·哈撒韦年会上接受过采访。

John Bogle, the founder of Vanguard, who was of course, in many ways, the pioneer of index investing, was interviewed in 2017 at the Berkshire Hathaway Annual Meeting.

你到现在还能在网上找到那段采访。

You can still find it online.

有人问他：你认为指数基金的资产管理规模是否会达到扭曲市场的程度？

And he was asked, do you think there will be a level of AUM that's in index funds which will distort markets?

他回答：当然会。

And he said, oh, certainly.

接着他们问：你能告诉我们具体是多少吗？

And then they said, can you tell us how much?

他给出了一个猜测。

He had a guess.

他说：但这只是纯粹的猜测。

He said, but no, it's just a pure guess.

他说：我并不是从科学角度来判断的。

He said, I'm not any way of scientifically.

我认为我们可能已经达到了这种状态：资金正涌入这些公司，而它们贡献了市场三分之二的回报，无论其质量或估值如何，资金都持续流入。

Think we may already have found that where money is going into these companies that they are delivering two thirds of the market's return and it's going into them irrespective of their quality or valuation.

我的意思是，一旦我开始说这个话题，你可能接下来一整分钟都不用说话了。

Are I mean, once you've got me started this, you may not need to speak for a minute of interview.

它所造成的问题是资本配置问题。

The problem that it's causing is one of capital allocation.

当市场出现这种狂热时，资本配置就会发生扭曲。

When you get these crazes in markets that go on, capital allocation is where it distorts.

股市的存在并不是为了提供一个在线赌场的替代品。

So the stock market isn't there to provide an alternative to online casino.

这并不是它的真正功能。

So it's not actually its function.

真的吗？

Really?

是的，我知道这对很多人来说是个震撼。

Yes, I know that's a shock for a lot of people.

它的作用是作为融资和流动性的机制，并为这些功能提供估值基础。

It's there as a mechanism for capital raising and liquidity and to provide a valuation as a basis for those things.

一旦我们开始扭曲这些功能，就会产生一些非常有趣的结果，因为人们开始根据股价来决定如何配置资本，而不是反过来。

And once we start distorting these things, you get some very, very interesting results, basically, because people start making decisions on how to allocate capital based upon share prices, not the other way around.

股价应该跟随资本配置的实际成果，而不是反过来。

Share prices should follow what's being made in capital allocation, not the other way around.

人们会陷入各种疯狂行为。

And people get all kinds of madness.

如果我们回溯到互联网泡沫时期，当时的一个高潮是沃达丰对曼哈顿的收购。

If we go back to the.com, one of the the heights of the.com, you may recall, was Vodafone bidding for management.

当时沃达丰和曼哈顿的市盈率都超过了50。

Vodafone was on a PE of over 50 and so was management.

沃达丰收购时的股价约为570便士。

At Vodafone was the share price when they bid was about 570p.

现在股价是88便士。

It's 88p now.

尽管如此，那仍然算很高。

Still, that's that high.

是的。

Yeah.

我知道。

I know.

很震惊，不是吗？

Shock, isn't it?

它已经回升了一些。

It's rallied a bit.

但天啊。

But wow.

如果你因为这样做而摧毁了数百亿欧元的资本，就会发生这种情况。

That's what happens if you destroy a couple of €100,000,000,000 of of capital by doing that.

当时人们在这些狂热时期会想出各种各样的专家观点。

I was and people come up with all kinds of when these manias are running, people come up with all kinds of expert.

他们从不直接说这可能是一场狂热，因为那样你会显得格格不入，并且有显得非常愚蠢的风险。

They never just say it might be a mania because then you're kind of standing out for the crowd and you've got this risk of looking very stupid.

所以他们从不这么做。

And so they never do that.

他们都会找理由解释，不是吗？

They rationalize it, don't they?

总是因为要回溯过去。

It's always because go back.

你不必盯着互联网泡沫时期的股市，或者我们现在的情况。

You don't have to look at the stock market in the.com or what we've got now.

回看20世纪80年代末的日本。

Go back to Japan in the late 1980s.

日经指数在1989年达到峰值，市盈率超过50。

The Nikkei peaked in 1989 on a P of over 50.

那是因为日本公司的会计准则非常保守。

That was because Japanese company accounting was very conservative.

不，实际上只是被高估了。

No, it was just overvalued actually.

我认为花了整整二十四年才重新回到峰值。

And it took, I think, twenty four years to regain its peak.

但人们会忘记，你会经历很长一段时期，这种类型的破坏会带来非常糟糕的结果。

But people forget, you get these long periods when destruction of the sort that this may lead to produces some very bad results.

我的意思是，标普指数在2000年左右见顶，我想纳斯达克也是。

I mean, the S and P peaked in 2000, I think, along with the NASDAQ.

纳斯达克更极端，但标普现在呢？

NASDAQ was more extreme, but the S and P now, right?

所以，一个包含许多其他成分的指数在2000年见顶了。

So sort of an index with a lot of other stuff in it peaked in 2000.

它直到2007年才勉强恢复到之前的高点。

It just about regained that peak in 2007.

然后在信贷危机中再次暴跌，再也没有回升。

And then it fell over again in the credit crisis and didn't get back.

我的意思是，现实情况是，它直到2013年才在持续的上涨中恢复到2000年的水平。

I mean, the reality is it took till 2013 to get back to where it was in 2000 in a persistent upward movement.

这就是会发生的事情，因为这就是这种状况导致或可能导致的结果。

That's what happens because that's what this leads to or can lead to.

你有各种各样的事情

There's all sorts of things you

希望现在开始，别

Wish that started me now, don't

吗？

you?

不。

No.

我只是在想该问什么，我的意思是，你觉得我们该经历一次大调整了吗？

I think I'm just trying to work out what to ask I mean, do you think we're overdue for a big correction?

严重超期了，我觉得。

Massively overdue, think.

是的。

Yeah.

我的意思是，看看上一次经济衰退，别忘了，是在2002年到2009年。

I mean, look, the last economic downturn, try and bear in mind, was in 02/2009.

是的。

Yeah.

所以我们现在已经从那时起过了十六年。

So we're already sixteen years out from that.

从经济周期的角度来看，这已经相当长了，不是吗？

It's quite a long time, isn't it, in economic cycle terms?

我总是回过头来看，实际上，上一次正常的经济衰退是在2002年到2003年。

Well, I always look back and say, well, actually, the last normal economic downturn was 2002, 2003.

对。

Yes.

因为2008年，世界停摆了。

Because in 2008, the world stopped.

我甚至不确定

I'm not even sure

那算正常吗。

that was normal.

我的意思是，你得回溯很久才行，我认为你可能得回溯到很久以前。

I mean, last you've got to go back quite a long I reckon you probably got to go back.

上一次并非由股市泡沫破裂或类似2000年那样的信贷危机引发的经济衰退，大概是1990到1992年伊拉克入侵科威特之后的那一场。

The last one, which was not in some way around a stock market bubble unraveling or a credit crisis like we had in 2000 was probably the nineteen ninety, nineteen ninety two one that followed the invasion of Kuwait by Iraq.

然后我们经历了格林斯潘每次市场下跌时都出手救市的时期。

And then we had the whole Greenspan sort of saving every time the market fell.

接着我们又经历了互联网泡沫破裂。

And then we had the .com meltdown.

是的。

Yes.

但那真的算风险吗？

But was it really risk?

我想问大家一个问题。

Here's a question I would ask people.

除了雷曼兄弟，你能说出在信贷危机中倒闭的其他公司吗？

Other than Lehman Brothers, name a company that went bust in the credit crisis.

我去给自己倒杯咖啡，而你正经历一场重大的——我并不是

I'll go and get myself a cup of coffee while you've got a significant I'm not

我不确定这里有没有信号。

sure if I've reception in here.

你有没有信号我根本不关心。

I don't care if you've got reception.

即使你有信号，答案也是一样的。

The answer would be the same even if you had reception.

根本没有这样的公司。

There aren't any.

根本没有这样的公司。

There aren't any.

不，当然没有。

No, of course.

但这并不正常。

Well, that's not natural.

这不正常。

It's not normal.

是的。

Yeah.

我们已经从这后果中被拯救了，资本主义确实需要创造性破坏，这非常痛苦，那些参与创造性破坏的人们。

We've been saved from the consequences of this, capitalism does need its creative destruction, which is very painful, the people involved in the creative destruction.

如果我们没有——我非常相信我们应该对他们抱有同情，对吧？

If we don't have and I'm a great believer and we should have sympathy for them, right?

我们确实需要一个安全网，但我不是那种罗伯特·巴伦式的人，信或不信吧。

We do need a safety But I'm not sort of Robert Barron, believe it or don't.

但我确实认为拥有它是必要的。

But I do think that it's necessary to have it.

对。

Yeah.

好吧，我们很快就会看到。

Well, we'll soon see.

嗯，挺有意思的。

Well, interesting.

因为很可能，我的意思是，通常情况下，我跟托尼·戴伊关系还不错，因为他在掌管PDFF的时候我还在瑞银。

Since it might be, I mean, typically, of course, what happens is I was reasonably friendly with Tony Dye because I've been at UBS when he ran PDFF.

当然。

Of course.

是的。

Yeah.

当然，如果我们查一下，几乎就是他被PDFF解雇的那天，互联网泡沫破裂了。

And of course, think if we look it up, it's almost to the day that he was fired from PDFM that the the the.com boom collapsed.

是的。

Yes.

所以，你知道，时间非常接近。

So, you know It was very, very close.

总得有人为推行我们的战略或类似举措而承担责任，以此标志这一阶段的结束。

Somebody has got to be has got to fall on their sword in terms of pursuing our strategy or something like it to mark the end of this one.

我很有趣。

I'm Interesting.

关于游戏化，有两点我想提一下。

There's two things just to mention about the gamification.

理查德·塞勒，也就是《助推》这本书的作者，最近在伦敦演讲。

Richard Thaler, the guy who wrote the book Nudge was speaking in London.

十天前，他接受了蒂姆·哈福德的采访。

He was interviewed by Tim Harford ten days ago.

我去听了，他确实提到，在Robinhood上，最受欢迎的产品是周度期权。

And I went along and he actually said that on Robin Hood, the most popular product is weekly options.

有点长，嗯，是的。

Bit long, bit Yes.

很长。

Long

他们更愿意在此之前下注。

prefer to bet on it by then.

但我对这一点感到震惊。

But I was shocked by that.

我不明白我为什么会感到震惊。

I don't know why I was shocked.

我的意思是，我并不真的感到意外，但这确实揭示了市场的很多状况。

I mean, I'm not really surprised, but it does tell you quite a lot about the state of the market.

我本来想提的另一个观点是，我不知道你是否读过迈克尔·格林关于简化投资的任何内容，但他对被动投资做了大量研究。

The other point I was going to make, I don't know if you've ever read anything by Michael Green of Simplify, but he's done a lot of work on passive investing.

我会把十年期的资料发给你。

I'll send you the ten year stuff.

他认为，投入1美元到英伟达会产生8美元的影响。

And he reckons that $1 into Nvidia has an $8 impact

不，我明白。

No, on see.

我看过这项研究的基础资料。

I've seen the basic research on which this is based.

最近几年，美国国家经济研究局（NBER）发表了一篇论文，研究了将资金投入像英伟达这样的公司所产生的乘数效应。

There's a National Bureau of Economic Research, the NBER, paper on it, in recent years, a couple of years back, which they came up with a multiplier of a dollar invested into funds going into NVIDIA like that.

乘数效应大约在三倍到八倍之间。

There's something multipliers somewhere between three times and eight times.

是的。

Yeah.

因为他们指出，很少有人能采取相反的做法，因为首先，大多数资产现在都是指数化的，所以他们无法反向操作，对吧？

Because they point out that there are very few people who can go the other way because first of all, the majority of assets are now indexed, so they can't go the other way, can they?

其次，即使在主动型投资者中，也有很多人实际上是在跟踪指数。

Secondly, even out the active people, a lot of people, of course, are positive indexes.

他们紧紧跟随指数。

They're hugging the index.

坦白说，考虑到不这么做感觉有多难受，谁能责怪他们呢？

And frankly, given how it feels not to, who can blame them?

不，完全正确。

No, absolutely.

我

I

我的意思是，我们对此应该保持合理的诚实。

mean, I hope we're reasonably honest about it.

我们对人们说，如果你想要指数基金，那就去买指数基金。

We say to people, if you want the index, go buy the index.

它更便宜。

It's cheaper.

你至少能得到确切的结果。

You'll at least get the exact result there.

但这些数字在乘数效应方面确实令人惊叹，不是吗？

But yeah, those numbers are pretty awe inspiring, aren't they, in terms of the multiplier effect?

嗯，如果情况反过来，那确实会令人惊叹。

Well, it will be awe inspiring if it goes the other way.

嗯，确实会。

Well, it will be.

不，我认为我的观点是，当市场走向相反方向时，这迟早会令人惊叹。

No, I think my view is it will definitely be awe inspiring at some point when it goes the other way.

我只是不知道这会在什么时候发生，或者会如何发生。

I just don't know when that will happen or how that will happen.

不。

No.

但我相当确信它会发生。

But I'm fairly certain it will.

我的意思是，从很多方面来看，主动型基金经理的梦想应该是成为最后剩下的那一位主动型基金经理。

I mean, many ways, the dream of the active manager should be to be the last active manager left.

但我

But I

我觉得到达那里可能会相当痛苦。

think it could be rather painful getting there.

我不确定这会是好事，因为如果你是最后一位主动型基金经理，那就没有价格发现机制了。

I'm not sure that it would be good because if you were the last active manager, there's no price discovery.

不。

No.

但那时，你就是价格发现的主体，不是吗？

Well, you are the price discovery at that point, aren't you?

是的。

Yes.

我的意思是，那确实是个糟糕的情况，但我们已经走得太远了。

Mean, that is the no, that would be a dreadful But we I mean, we have gone too far.

那就是结论。

That was the conclusion.

我对此毫不怀疑。

Look, I have no doubt about that.

但那当然并不意味着我们不能走得更远。

But that, of course, that doesn't mean we can't go farther.

这就像在资产被高估时卖出一样。

That is like selling things when they get overvalued.

是的。

Yeah.

或者在资产被低估时买入。

Or even buying things when they get undervalued.

你必须接受，如果你的计算和分析是正确的，而它们被高估了，它们可能会变得更加高估。

You have to accept that if your calculations, analysis is right, and they are overvalued, they could become more overvalued.

如果它们被低估了，它们也可能变得更加低估，不是吗？

If they're undervalued, they could become more undervalued, couldn't they?

没有任何东西能阻止它们。

There's nothing to stop them.

目前它们已经走到这一步了，我认为它还会继续。

There's no sort of, well, it's got that far at the moment that I think it's going to

在这里停止。

stop here.

为什么？

Why?

而且没有纠正机制，因为即使我们都承认指数已经过高，也没有办法逆转。

And there's no correction mechanism because even if we all accepted the indexing had gone too far, there's nothing to reverse.

我看不到任何这样的机制。

None that I can see.

是的，这实际上有点令人担忧。

No, which is actually a bit of a worry.

是的，我觉得确实如此。

Yeah, I think it is.

你为什么选择这个角色？

Why did you choose this role?

我不知道，当时觉得是个不错的主意。

I don't know, seemed like a good idea at the time.

所以你提到，与尼克不同，你对科技行业有相当大的接触。

So you mentioned that unlike Nick, you've had quite a big exposure to tech.

但如果你回看的话，你的接触比例大约是百分之二十多。

But your exposure, if I look back, your exposure was like 20 something percent.

这取决于你怎么定义科技。

Depends what you count as tech.

我的意思是，你在……方面有点谨慎。

I mean, you've a little careful in

这个定义，因为它不涉及通信。

the definition because it doesn't involve it doesn't involve communication.

比如，Facebook就不包括在内。

Facebook is not in there, for example.

所以你在定义上得稍微小心一点。

And so you've to be a little bit careful in terms of

但你改变过你的定义吗？

But have you changed your definitions?

没有。

No.

因为那样的话，维萨按行业划分真的算金融吗？

Because then rely on so Visa is a financial according to the sectors, really?

不，这实际上是科技。

No, it's actually tech.

我的意思是，维萨确实是科技公司。

I mean, Visa is really tech.

不，不，当然了。

It's No, no, sure.

自动数据处理其实就是工资处理。

Automatic data processing is really payroll processing.

这名字本身就是线索，自动数据处理。

It's really I mean, the name is a clue, automatic data processing.

但如今，它们虽然不是人工智能和超大规模计算的前沿，但绝对是科技企业。

But today They're not the commanding heights of AI and hyperscaling, they're but definitely technology businesses.

不，当然了。

No, of course.

但如今，你把10%的配置放在科技板块，这排除了Meta和那些公司。

But today, you've got 10% in tech, that excludes Meta and excludes those companies.

我不知道，也许五年前，你有百分之二十多。

I don't know, maybe five years ago, you had 20 something percent.

如果你保持百分之二十多的配置，你会表现得更好吗？

If you'd kept the 20 something percent, would you have done better?

是的。

Yeah.

那么当时这样做的理由是什么？

So what was the rationale for that then?

当时的思路是，某些情况下可能已经过度了，而且一些投资是买了那些属于科技领域的公司，它们的资本回报率非常高，因为它们是资本密集度较低的业务。

The thinking that things have probably gone a little too far in some cases, and that some of the investment was we bought the companies that were tech, which had fantastic returns on capital because they were pretty capital light businesses.

这之后，我们追求的是良好的增长速度。

And that's after one thing we're seeking and good growth rates.

而且坦率地说，是强大的市场主导力。

And quite honestly, big market power.

Facebook或现在的Meta，实际上是社交媒体领域占主导地位的通信技术公司。

Facebook or Meta, as it now, is really the dominant communications technology company in terms of social media.

或者谷歌母公司Alphabet曾是主导的搜索引擎及其相关广告业务。

Or Alphabet is now is was the dominant search engine and the advertising that goes with it.

微软曾是主导的企业操作系统公司。

Microsoft was the dominant business operating systems company.

这些公司目前看起来都还不错。

Were all looking good at the moment.

然后，随着数据中心的超大规模扩张，以及如今人工智能的发展，这种情况开始改变。

Then this started to change with hyperscaling in terms of data centers and now with AI.

我们正迅速走向那些几乎不需要大量资本投入的公司。

We're heading rapidly towards companies which are not very capitalized at all.

它们拥有海量的……资本支出，我认为我预见了未来，试图主要利用这一点。我认为最终会发生的是，回报率会大幅下降，这目前看来非常可能，届时这些公司将不再像我们原本希望投资的那种公司。

They've got lots and lots of And CapEx I think I've foreseen the future of trying to use a bit of a mostly, I think what will happen is either the returns will come down very significantly, which I think is quite likely at the moment, in which case they won't look anything like the companies that we sought to invest in.

所以，即使眼下发生这些变化，退出这些领域也还算可以接受。

So it's kind of okay to be out of there, notwithstanding what's going on.

或者，人工智能所承诺的愿景不会以人们预期的时间表或方式实现收入增长，届时它们就会停止投入。

Or the promised land of AI won't arrive in anything like the timescale or manner that people think in terms of generating revenues, and they'll stop it.

我认为这相当讽刺，因为他们的盈利能力会再次回升。

I think that would be rather ironic because what will happen is their profitability will go back up again.

而且我认为他们的股价会崩盘。

And I think their share prices will collapse.

但每个人都会说，哦，是的。

Except everybody go, Oh, yeah.

这并不会发生。

It's not happening.

但我的意思是，这显然再明显不过了。

But I mean, it seems blindingly obvious.

我的意思是，我和播客上的几位嘉宾讨论过这个问题。

I mean, I've had this conversation with a couple of guests on the podcast.

你知道，投入的资金那么多，却没有任何回报。

You know, the amount of money going in, there's no return.

所以从算术上讲，回报率必然下降。

So the returns arithmetically have to go down.

但股票市场完全忽略了这一点。

But the stock market has completely ignored it.

是的。

Yeah.

另外，我们要考虑到我们现在所做事情的规模。

Plus look, the size of what we're doing now is something else to bear in mind.

如果你回溯到我们科技股占比达到20%多的时候，再往前看几年，个人和企业对科技行业的支出规模，比五年前、十年前、十五年前要高得多。

If you go back to when we had 20 something percent in tech and go back a few years, the size of the technology sector in terms of spend by individuals and companies is significantly higher than it was back five, ten, fifteen years ago.

所以，如果我们确实迎来一个经济周期——我相信迟早会来——考虑到我们现在有大量固定资产投资，而且科技在商业和个人支出中的占比更大，你觉得科技行业比过去更周期性还是更非周期性？

So if we do get an economic cycle, and I'm sure we're going to get one at some point, do we think tech is more or less cyclical than it was in the past, given that we now have big fixed asset investments and it's a bigger proportion of business and personal spend.

我认为它会变得更具周期性。

I think it's gonna be a lot more cyclical.

你是专业投资者吗？

Are you a professional investor?

你每年会看多少份10-K报告和年报？

How many 10 k's and annual reports do you look at in a year?

你是否曾希望可以拨开噪音，更快、更有效地处理这些信息？

Ever wished you could cut through the noise and process them faster and more effectively?

我们为大型机构客户在他们的办公室举办法务会计课程。

We run a forensic accounting course for larger institutional clients in their offices.

对于较小的投资基金和个人，我们也在伦敦、纽约和通过Zoom进行面对面授课。

For smaller investment funds and individuals, we also do them in person in London and New York and over Zoom.

请发送邮件至 info@behindthebalancesheet.com

Email us at info@behindthebalancesheet.com

获取更多详情。

for more details.

作为投资者，获得优势意味着拥有正确的工具，而引领这一领域的平台是 OfferSense。

As an investor, getting an edge means having the right tools, and one platform leading the way is OfferSense.

被全球75%的顶级对冲基金使用，OfferSense 是一个市场情报平台，为机构投资者提供超过五亿个优质信息源，涵盖公司文件、券商研究报告、新闻、行业期刊等。

Crossed by 75% of the world's top hedge funds, OfferSense is the market intelligence platform that gives institutional investors access to over 500,000,000 premium sources, from company filings and broker research to news, trade journals and more.

通过最近收购 Tigus，它还整合了全球最大的专家访谈 transcripts 库，包含超过20万次通话，覆盖24000多家上市公司和私营企业，所有内容都集中在一个平台上，帮助投资团队更快行动、深入分析，并自信地做出高确定性的决策。

And with its recent acquisition of Tigus, it also includes the world's largest library of expert interview transcripts, over 200,000 calls covering more than 24,000 public and private companies, all in one platform so investment teams can move faster, go deeper, and make high conviction decisions with confidence.

现在，

Now,

OfficeSense

OfficeSense

通过推出其深度研究工具，正在变革研究流程，这是其AI驱动平台的下一代功能。

is transforming the research process with the launch of its deep research tool, part of the next generation of its AI powered platform.

与其他深度研究工具不同，OfficeSense版本专为投资研究量身打造。

Unlike other deep research tools, the Officeense version is purpose built for investment research.

它利用OfficeSense专有的内容（包括那些专家访谈记录）进行多集迭代分析，几分钟内就能揭示出需要多次访谈和数日挖掘才能发现的洞察。

It runs multiset iterative analysis using Officeense proprietary content, including those expert transcripts, and in minutes surfaces insights that would take multiple interviews and days of digging to uncover.

这就像为你的团队增加了十名分析师，帮助你加速分析、深化理解并做出更精准的决策。

It's like adding 10 analysts to your team, helping you accelerate analysis, deepen understanding, and make sharper decisions.

在 alpha-sense.com/btbs 观看实际演示。

See it in action at alpha-sense.com/btbs.

这是严肃投资者不愿缺少的工具。

This is a tool serious investors won't want to work without.

现在我想问你，这个基金可能只剩下峰值时的一半了。

Now I wanted to ask you, the fund is probably, what, half where it was at the peak.

指的是规模吗？

In terms of what size?

是的。

Yeah.

对，略超一半。

Yeah, bit over half.

而且

And

你每个头寸大约有十亿美元。

you've got sort of a billion dollars in each position.

所以你仍然受到相当大的限制。

So you're still pretty constrained.

我想问问你关于头寸规模的问题。

I this is I want to ask you about position sizing.

是的。

Yeah.

好的。

Okay.

你是怎么做呢？

How do you do it?

因为你必须持有非常大的股票。

Because you've got to own very big stocks.

现在，好吧，

Now, okay,

你可以持有尽可能多的微软股票，我想。

you could have as much you want of Microsoft, I suppose.

但有趣的是，讽刺的是，这在最近并没有成为障碍，因为我们本应持有的正是规模最大的股票，这又回到了分析市场动向的问题上。

But interestingly, ironically, that hasn't really been a handicap in recent times because what we should have owned is the biggest stocks of all, which comes back to analyzing what the market's doing.

前进的方向并不是去寻找中盘股中的那颗宝石，因为那里的流动性有限，所以我心想，我真的很想持有它，但我不能，因为它太小了。

The way forward wouldn't have been to find that gem down in the mid cap area, which was limited liquidity, therefore, I go, I'd really like to own that, but I can't because it's too small.

不。

No.

我本该直接去买英伟达的，那是一家价值五万亿美元的公司，对吧？

I should have just gone and bought NVIDIA, dollars 5,000,000,000,000 company, shouldn't I?

这难道不是一个有趣的反思吗？我觉得是。

Which is kind of isn't that an interesting reflection, I think.

但在仓位配置上，我们实际上无法持有。

But on position sizing, we can't really own.

我们刚刚对了，我们的规模大约在十亿美元左右。

We was just right, 1,000,000,000 is about where we're at.

因此，我们无法持有任何市值低于一千亿美元的公司，因为我们不能持有该公司10%的股份，而我们也不想持有10%的股份，因为我们是一个开放式每日交易基金，对吧？

We can't therefore own anything under about $10,000,000,000 market value because we don't 10% of the company and we don't want to own 10% of the company because we're an open ended daily dealing fund, right?

不管好坏，这都是市场所期望的。

For good or real, that's what the market wants.

这正是市场所拥有的。

That's what the market's got.

顺便说一下，从结构上讲，这对很多策略来说完全是无稽之谈，但市场就是想要这样。

Think, by the way, as a structure, that's nonsense personally for an awful lot of strategies, but that's what the market wants.

市场就是如此。

That's what it has.

因此，我们必须能够提供流动性，因为人们已经用缺乏流动性的开放式基金做过压力测试，我们都清楚接下来会发生什么。

And therefore, we've got to be able to provide liquidity because people have destruction tested open ended dealing funds with no liquidity, and we all know what happens next.

所以我们不会那么做，对吧？

So we're not going to do that, are we?

所以我们不会买入任何市值低于约100亿美元或略高于这个数值的资产。

So we are not going to buy anything under about $10,000,000,000 or a bit above that.

但在英国，有很多公司我们对规模问题特别纠结。

But there's quite a lot of companies out there that we get terribly worked up in The UK about size.

史密斯的基金规模大约是350亿美元，他的单笔持仓是10亿美元，我的意思是，我们完全可以把整个基金都投进微软，形成一个需要披露的仓位。

Smith has got sort of $35,000,000,000 in his funds and his position size is $1,000,000,000 I mean, we could put the entire lot into Microsoft, the entire fund and have a disclosable position.

我并不是指那个，我更想说的是你如何确定单个仓位的规模，如何

I didn't mean so much that I meant more about how you size the individual positions, how

你在加权。

you're weighting.

不同，答案就是不同。

Differently, differently is the answer.

我们永远不会持有超过30只股票。

Look, we will never own more than 30 stocks.

对。

Right.

对。

Right.

我们就这么定了。

That's we put that down.

我们永远不会持有少于20只股票。

We'll never own less than 20 stocks.

你不可能在只有20只股票的情况下满足工作中的集中度限制。

We can't you can't make the concentration limits that are mandated in the work with 20 stocks.

这是不可能的。

It's impossible.

所以是二十多只股票，好吧？

So it's 20 something stocks, okay?

所以你看看这个，会说，是的，我刚才向你描述的，我们的平均持仓实际上大约是十亿美元。

So you look at that and say, yes, well, what I've just described to you, we're going to have an average position of about 1,000,000,000 point dollars actually.

然后这取决于我对事情的信心程度，以及我坐下来考虑该做什么的时候。

And then it depends how confident I feel about things and when I'm sitting, looking at what to do.

所以如果你回看，我们买入欧莱雅的股票是因为我们真的很看好欧莱雅。

So if you look back, we bought our L'Oreal position because we really liked L'Oreal.

后来贝当库尔家族内部发生了一些争执，玛乔丽·阿吉耶尔·贝当库尔被她的女儿起诉，人们开始担心家族控股权将如何运作。

And then there was a bit of a family spat involving the Betancourt family when the Major Arguerillian Betancourt was sued by her daughter and there was a bit of sort of how is this going to work out in terms of the family controlling stake.

因此，这件事当时笼罩在一片阴云之中。

So that was under a bit of a cloud from that.

与此同时，高乐氏被卡尔·伊坎收购，而高乐氏主要生产漂白剂。

And at the same time, Clorox was bid for by Carl Iken, which makes bleach essentially.

我们看了这两个估值，心想：你绝不能这么想，这简直是不言而喻的。

And we looked at the two valuations and went, that thing you should never think, this is a no brainer.

于是我们立刻卖掉了所有Clorox的股票，全数买入了L'Oreal。

And so we sold all of our Clorox and bought all the L'Oreal on the spot.

我说：我就想把那个清掉，把这个按规模补上。

I said, I just want I want that out and I want that in, in size now.

你们能帮忙做一笔大宗交易吗？尽量多买一些，我们就这样做了。

Go and do me a bulk deal if you can to get as much, and we did.

我的意思是，我们几乎在一瞬间就完成了从一个到另一个的转换。

I mean, it was almost in an instant we were from one to the other.

很好。

Good.

然后你还会遇到像Fortinet这样的公司，我们持有它，它生产40端口路由器和网络安全设备。

And then you get something like Fortinet, which we own, which makes 40 gate routers, Internet security.

它们的年增长率达到了20%左右，这很不错。

And they were growing at 20% per annum or something like that, and that was good.

然后新冠疫情来了，我们都开始在家办公。

And then along came COVID and we were at work from home.

所以，我们所有人都让我的IT人员把一台40端口的路由器放进我书房的柜子里，公司里每个人也都配了一台。

So all of us, I did certainly have my IT man putting a 40 gate router into the cupboard in my study and everybody at work had one of those.

于是，增长率飙升到了40%。

And so growth went up to 40%.

而老股市真是挺奇怪的，不是吗？

And then the old stock market is a funny thing, isn't it?

当新冠疫情缓解后，增长率降到了10%。

When COVID subsided, growth went down to 10%.

所以，我们当然得经历一场大规模恐慌，对吧？

So of course, we had to have a mass panic then, didn't we?

股价直接腰斩，但我们买进了一大笔，而且是分三个阶段买入的，因为从40%的增长率降到10%并不是某一天突然宣布的。

The share price halved and we bought a load of it, but we bought it in three stages because the way that the drop from 40% growth to 10%, it wasn't that one day they said, well, we're going to 10%.

它是一步一步降的：从40%降到大约30%，再降到20%，最后降到10%。

It went from 40% to sort of 30% to 20% to 10%.

当然，每次有预警时，股价都会再跌一步。

And of course, every time there was a warning, it had another step down.

所以我说，你看，这些事情总是三连发。

So I said, look, these things come in threes.

我们都清楚，这些事情总是三连发。

We all know that these things come in threes.

所以我要在这次回调中买进我们持股的大约三分之一。

So I'm going to buy about a third of our stake off this back.

然后过一段时间，我会再买进三分之一，接着再买进第三个三分之一。

And then a bit later on, I'm going to buy another third, and then I'm going buy another third.

如果股价还在下跌，我就承认我错了。

And then if it's still going down, I'm going decide I'm wrong.

然后我就停手，但我会这样操作。

And I'm going to stop there, but that's how I'm going to do it.

所以这取决于情况。

And so it depends.

没有一种固定的购买方法。

There's no one methodology of buying things.

有时候，如果表现非常好，可能会达到基金的10%。

And sometimes if they perform very well, might go to 10% of the fund.

我的意思是，微软和Meta，我们并没有一开始就买入基金的10%，对吧？

I mean, Microsoft and Meta, we didn't buy 10% of the fund, did it?

我们只买了基金的3%。

We bought 3% of the fund.

然后它涨到了10%

And it went to 10%

的基金。

of the fund.

而且你有一个严格的10%上限

And you've got a hard stop at 10%

因为我们的硬性上限是10%，这是强制规定的。

because We've a the hard use stop is at 10 which is mandated in.

而且使用规则也规定，持股超过5%的股票总和不能超过40%。

And uses also says that can't have more than 40% in stocks that are over 5%.

这一点也被固化在系统里了。

That's hardwired into it as well.

好的。

All right.

明白了。

Okay.

我不知道这一点。

I didn't know that.

是的，确实如此。

Yes, it is.

对。

Yes.

如果没有10%的硬性限制，你会乐意持有超过10%的仓位吗？

If you didn't have the 10% hardwired, would you be happy owning a position that was more than 10%?

你会让盈利的仓位继续持有吗？

Would you just let the winners run?

意思是，是的。

Mean, yes.

我会说 yes。

I'd say yes.

我愿意这么做。

I'd be willing to.

我不是说我会总是让盈利的仓位继续持有。

I'm not saying I would always let a winner run.

我只是说，我会准备好承担由此带来的集中度风险。

I'm just saying I'd be prepared to take the concentration risk involved in that.

是的。

Yes.

有意思。

Interesting.

我认为当前的使用设计对投资者并不友好。

Now I don't think the design of usage is particularly friendly to the investor.

比如它的集中度问题。

Like the concentration of it.

所以如果某只股票达到10%，或者超过5%的股票上涨了40%，我就得卖出股票。

So if something goes through 10% or if the ones over 5% go 40%, I've got to sell stock.

正如我曾经向我们的监管机构解释的那样，我说：有些日子我进来时，反而担心自己最大的持仓会表现太好。

And as I explained it to our regulator on one occasion, I said, I come in some days and I'm worried that my biggest stocks will perform well.

你觉得这合理吗？

Do you think that's sensible?

我只是想说，我们处理集中度的方式不应该是设定僵化的硬性上限。

I'm just saying, I think the way we should handle concentration is not by having hard wide limits.

我认为我们应该只是给人们提供信息。

I think we should just give people information.

我们应该明确告知：我们的集中度是多少。

We should say, here's what our concentration is.

如果他们认为风险太大，那就撤回他们的资金。

And if they think that's too much of a risk, then take their money away.

只要让他们了解我们的操作，他们就能据此做出是否承担风险的明智决定。

Just give them information on what we're doing so they can make an informed decision about whether they want to run risk.

但监管机构真的很无知，不是吗？

But the regulators are pretty clueless, aren't they?

我本来想问你，监管机构是不是很无知，但你或许已经有所了解。

I was going to say I was going to ask you, the regulators are pretty clueless, but you've perhaps got one

我不会对此发表评论。

to wouldn't possibly comment.

如果你对监管机构有这种看法，那你可以这么说。

You wish to say that about the regulators, then I you can say

不会。

wouldn't.

但我们来到这座城市时，那里一切都基于原则，言而有信，人人互信。

But we arrived in the city at a time when it was all principles based, where your word was your bond and you were trusted.

我刚入行时是一名卖方分析师，当时会收到内部信息，客户会打电话过来。

When I started, I was a sell side analyst and I was given inside information and a client would call up.

在我收到内部信息之前，我会记录下自己对客户说过的话。

And I used to write down what the client I'd said to the client before I was given the inside information.

然后我就只是重复同样的内容。

And I just used to say the same thing.

而且

And

没人觉得这有什么不对，因为我是诚实的，一切都很顺利。

nobody thought there was anything wrong with And was an honest individual and it worked fine.

但现在我们似乎把每件事都监管到了极致。

But now we seem to regulate everything down to the nth degree.

我同意。

I agree.

同意。

Agree.

我在运营Tullet Prebon这家货币经纪公司时，正值信贷危机末期，曾与英格兰银行的副行长进行过一次对话。

I had a conversation when I was running Tullet Priebond, the money broker, at the tail end of the credit crisis with the deputy governor of the Bank of England.

我们多年来与央行有大量互动。

We had a lot of interaction with the bank over time.

我们讨论了信贷危机期间的情况，因为我们身处银行体系的核心，从事着与银行之间的存款、利率互换、债券和外汇等交易。

And we were talking about how things had gone during the credit crisis because we were sitting at the center of the banking system doing trades with banks in deposits and interest rate swaps and bonds and foreign exchange and so on.

因此我们能清楚地看到这些变化，甚至有些事情直接影响到我们，比如雷曼倒闭后如何处理结算等问题。

So we sort of could see this very much and literally some of the things could affect us here in terms of settlement and so on with Lehman going bus and how do we handle that?

他当时说了一些类似的话：是的，因为他觉得，你其实来自另一个世界，至少是这样。

And he said something along the lines, said, yeah, because he said, you've come from another world really coming at least.

你来自一个作为经纪公司合伙人的世界，那里用的是你自己的钱和你的声誉。

You come from a world where you were a partner in a broking firm and it was your money and your reputation.

你以所有者的角度来思考这些问题。

You think about this as an owner.

他说，现在这种事已经不再发生了。

He said, that's now something that doesn't happen.

他说，你打交道的大多数人都是拿薪水的、靠高额奖金的人，他们是为钱卖命的雇佣兵。

Said, majority of the people you're dealing with are salaried and highly bonus individuals who are guns for hire.

他说，我们现在所处的世界已经完全不同了。

He said, and it's a different world that we're operating in now.

他说，你有点像是老派的人。

He said, you're kind of you're old school.

原则。

Principles.

原则才是关键。

Principles were the thing.

他大致就是这个意思。

He was roughly saying that.

他说，这关乎原则——我们不需要一本长达300页的规则手册来判断你刚刚做的对还是错，对吧？

He said it's about principles, about we don't need to have a rule book that runs to 300 pages to decide whether what you just did was right or wrong, do we?

所以我想聊聊会计，因为这是我们两人都感兴趣的话题。

So I want to talk a little bit about accounting because it's an interest of both of us.

而我的看法是，如今收益管理非常普遍。

And my perception is that earnings management is very prevalent these days.

我的意思是，比以往任何时候都更普遍。

I mean, greater than it ever used to be.

既然如此，为什么人们不去阅读财务报表呢？

So given that, why don't people read the accounts?

我的意思是，很明显他们根本不去看。

I mean, it's pretty obvious that they don't.

而且

And

他们根本不看财务报表，这一点显而易见。

It's blindingly obvious that they don't read the accounts.

我的意思是，你可以坐在这里听到很多这样的例子。

I mean, there's many examples of that as you could sit here and listen to.

IBM的现金流表现非常出色。

Well, IBM cash flow The IBM cash flow is a cracker.

我给他们发了邮件。

I emailed them.

你至少得到了回复。

You at least got a response.

我连回复都没有收到。

I didn't even get a response.

类似这样不看财务报表的人还有很多。

Mean, plenty more where that's coming from in terms of people not reading the account.

我的意思是，这或许是个不公平的问题。

I mean, it's perhaps an unfair question.

但你有没有什么理论能解释为什么人们不这么做？

But do you have a theory why people don't do this?

我觉得这很明显，

Well, think it's plainly obvious that

你应该这么做。

you should.

像大多数事情一样，我认为这是多种因素的综合结果。

Like most things, I think it's a combination of factors.

这通常是很不人道的。

It normally is inhumane.

其中一个原因是有点懒惰，真的。

And one of them is sort of a bit of laziness, really.

既然管理层已经给了你那份演示文稿，为什么还要去做呢？

Why do that when you've the management presentation that they've given you?

当然，管理层的演示文稿在提到调整后的数字时，都会带有一个小星号。

Of course, the management presentation has that little asterisk when it says adjusted Yeah.

针对所有那些负面内容等等。

For all the bad stuff and so on.

问题是，如果你是唯一一个认真阅读财报的人，你可能会变成那个老笑话里的人物：一位母亲去桑赫斯特军校的阅兵式。

And the problem is if you're the one guy who reads the accounts, you can become like that old joke about the mom who went to the passing out parade at Sandhurst.

阅兵结束时，一位军官问她：你觉得怎么样？

And at the end of it, one of the officers said to her, what did you think?

她说这是一个美好的场合，只是所有人都步调不一致，只有我儿子Johnny跟上了。

She said it was a wonderful occasion, just that everybody was out of step except my Johnny.

你可能会变成那样。

You could become like that.

因为如果别人都不看财务报表，而是依赖管理层提供的演示材料，而且从彭博社传出的 headlines 也是这个方向，而你却坚持另一个方向，这到底有什么帮助呢？

Because if everybody else is not reading accounts using a management presentation, and if the headlining that's come up from what they say on Bloomberg is going that way, you're the one going that way, how does this help exactly?

所以我认为，那些坚持做传统分析的人——他们去查阅10-K报表或财务报告，进行深入分析和计算——这种做法有点像傻瓜的游戏。

And so I think it's a bit of a mug's game in terms of people doing good old fashioned analysis where they take the 10 ks or the reporting accounts and do some proper analysis and do some numbers.

他们经常发现，自己的分析结果似乎指向了错误的方向。

Quite often, they'll find that they're heading in what seemingly is the wrong direction.

我认为这也是其中一部分原因。

I think that's part of it.

我们正在处理的，部分就是我们之前已经讨论过的关于当前市场本质的问题。

We're partly dealing with the same sort of thing that we've discussed already about the nature of markets now.

还有那种对调整后EBITDA以及成本节约预期的完全依赖。

And the whole sort of reliance on adjusted EBITDA and adjustments for the run rate of cost savings.

我之前在播客上采访了格雷格·彼得斯，他是PGIM的首席投资官，PGIM管理着大约7000亿美元的信贷资产。

I I had mean, Greg Peters on the podcast, he manages he's the CIO of PGIM, which manages, I think, 700,000,000,000 of credit.

我问他：你为什么要忍受这种情况？

And I said to him, why do you put up with this?

他说，关键是现在有太多资本在追逐向这些公司放贷的机会。

And he said, well, the thing is that there's so much capital chasing the opportunity to lend to these companies.

私募股权公司基本上是在借钱。

Private equity firms are basically borrowing the money.

他们决定贷款条款的条件。

They dictate what the covenants will be.

而资本提供方却没有话语权。

And the providers of capital don't have the power.

这看起来是不是很奇怪？

It seems like a bizarre situation, isn't it?

我觉得确实很奇怪，没错。

It seems like it to me, too, yes.

我的意思是，当然。

I mean, of course.

明白。

Understand.

我写过一本关于会计的书，也做过分析师，所以对此感到震惊。

Where I'm coming from and having written a book on accounting and having been an analyst and so on, I'm flabbergasted by it.

但我的意思是，你之前提到过，我们该如何彼此相处？

But I mean, we quite often in you mentioned earlier how do we deal with each other?

我们确实会写下大量内容，比如我们的研究积累，我不知道有多少百万字、无数表格，我们每天都会记录，否则记忆会出错。

We do write quite a lot down in terms of really our research drives have got, I don't know, millions and millions of words, tables, we write things down each day because otherwise your memory can play tricks.

而且我们经常在彼此写的材料中提到，即使只有我们自己关心，比如基于股票的薪酬，SBC。

And very often we'll say in something we've written to each other, even though we were the only people who are concerned with it, share based compensation, SBC.

有多少人会从收益中剔除这项？那到底是什么呢？

The number of people who x that out from their earnings, what is it then exactly?

知道这一点，也会扭曲现金流。

And knowing that, it distorts the cash flow as well.