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大家好，我是史蒂夫·普拉瑟姆，欢迎收听《资产负债表背后》播客，在这里我们将与顶尖投资者和评论员见面，学习投资与世界的相关知识。
Hi, I'm Steve Platham and welcome to the Behind the Balance Sheet podcast, where we meet leading investors and commentators and educate ourselves about the world of investing and the world.
我们的使命是消除投资中的神秘感，提升我们对成功投资者策略与技巧的理解。
Our mission is to remove some of the mystique around investing and improve our understanding of successful investors' strategies and tactics.
《资产负债表背后》是一家投资培训咨询公司。
Behind the Balance Sheet is an investment training consultancy.
我们帮助专业人士提升财务分析能力，并且运营着一所在线学校。
We help professional up their game in financial analysis, and we have an online school.
已有超过一千名学生，包括专业人士和业余爱好者，参加了我们的课程。
Over a thousand students, professional and amateur, have taken our courses.
我们的旗舰项目——分析师学院，曾帮助一位年轻分析师成功获得伦敦一家大型对冲基金合伙人的职位，也帮助另一位成功的企业家增强了投资信心。
Our flagship Analyst Academy helped one young analyst land a dream job as a partner of a major London hedge fund and helped another successful entrepreneur improve his investing confidence.
他在第一年就赚到了七位数的收入。
He made a 7 figure sum in year one.
请访问我们的网站 behindthebalancesheet.com 了解这所学校，那里可以找到本播客的节目笔记。
Check out the school on our website behindthebalancesheet.com, where you can find the show notes to this podcast.
同时，在那里别忘了订阅我们受欢迎的免费每周Substack。
And while you're there, don't forget, sign up for our popular and free weekly sub stack.
点击主页右上角的注册按钮。
Hit the sign up button on the top right of the homepage.
我很高兴宣布我继续与Officeense合作，这是全球金融专业人士信赖的领先市场情报与研究平台。
I'm delighted to announce my continued sponsorship with Officeense, the number one market intelligence and research platform trusted by financial professionals around the world.
Officeense一直是我的长期合作伙伴，我亲眼见证了他们如何革新投资研究。
Officeense has been my long term partner and I've seen firsthand how they're revolutionising investment research.
投资中最困难的部分之一，就是比其他人更早发现变化。
One of the hardest parts of investing is seeing what's shifting before everyone else.
几十年来，只有最大的对冲基金才负担得起大规模的渠道研究计划，以在财报发布前发现转折点，领先市场共识。
For decades, only the largest hedge funds could afford extensive channel research programmes to spot those inflection points before earnings and stay ahead of consensus.
与此同时，较小的基金只能拼凑临时的渠道情报，或依赖卖方过时的报告。
Meanwhile, smaller funds have been forced to cobble together ad hoc channel intelligence or rely on stale reports from the sell side.
但渠道调研已不再是奢侈品。
But channel checks are no longer a luxury.
它们正变得不可或缺。
They're becoming table stakes.
一直以来的挑战在于规模、速度和一致性，而这正是AlphaSense的用武之地。
The challenge has always been scale, speed and consistency, which is where AlphaSense comes in.
AlphaSense正在重新定义渠道研究。
AlphaSense is redefining channel research.
AlphaSense不再提供静态的、某一时间点的报告，而是通过价值链中真实的运营商、供应商、分销商和渠道合作伙伴的访谈，提供持续更新的需求、定价和竞争动态视图。
Instead of static, point in time reports, AlphaSense delivers a continuously refreshed view of demand, pricing and competitive dynamics, powered by interviews with real operators, suppliers, distributors and channel partners across the value chain.
每月数千次一致的渠道对话，提供清晰、可比的信号，帮助投资者在财报或市场共识出现之前数周就发现转折点。
Thousands of consistent channel conversations every month deliver clean, comparable signals, helping investors spot inflection points weeks before they show up in earnings or consensus estimates.
最棒的是：这些专有的渠道调研可以直接整合到AlphaSense研究平台中，该平台已被全球75%的顶级对冲基金信赖，并可访问
The best part: these proprietary channel checks integrate directly into AlphaSense research platform, trusted by 75% of the world's top hedge funds, with access
到
to
超过5亿个优质信息源。
over 500,000,000 premium sources.
从公司文件和券商研究报告，到新闻、行业期刊，以及超过24万份专家电话会议记录。
From company filings and broker research, to news, trade journals, and more than 240,000 expert call transcripts.
这种背景将原始信号转化为坚定的判断。
That context turns raw signal into conviction.
率先洞察胜机者，其余人紧随其后。
The first to see wins, the rest follow.
亲自访问 alphasense.combtbs 体验一下。
Check it out for yourself at alphasense.combtbs.
更多详情请访问 alphasense.combtbs，了解《资产负债表背后》。
That's alphasense.combtbs for Behind the Balance Sheet.
乔纳森·特普纳是我的朋友，我们在伦敦录制了这段对话，当天正是他新书《向上突破》的发布日，这本书是他童年在马德里的回忆录。
Jonathan Tepper is a friend of mine and we recorded in London on the day of the launch of his new book Shooting Up, a memoir of his childhood in Madrid.
他的父母是传教士，创办了一家慈善机构，帮助戒除毒瘾者康复，其中许多人后来成了他的朋友。
His parents were missionaries and launched charity to rehabilitate drug addicts, many of whom became his friends.
这是一本很棒的书，乔纳森在我们的访谈中详细谈到了它。
It's a wonderful book which Jonathan discusses in our interview.
除了大学时光，他部分时间接受家庭教育，基本上是自学成才，却最终成为牛津大学的罗德学者。
Along with his university days, he was partly homeschooled and essentially self taught, yet ended up as a Rhodes scholar in Oxford.
他解释了自己如何创立了成功的卖方研究公司Variant Perception，为何撰写《资本主义的神话》一书，探讨美国垄断和竞争消亡的现象，以及在2020年创立自己的投资公司Prevatt Capital的过程——该公司的投资理念部分基于投资于竞争有限的公司这一原则。
He explains how he went on to set up the successful sell side research firm Variant Perception, why he wrote the Myth of Capitalism, a book about monopolies and the death of competition in The United States, before founding his own investment firm Prevatt Capital in 2020, whose philosophy is in part founded on the principle of investing companies with limited competition.
乔纳森是一位真正富有原创思维的人，头脑异常敏锐。
Jonathan is a true original thinker and has a wonderfully sharp mind.
我不确定他的成功是源于还是 despite 他的成长经历，但我知道你一定会喜欢我们的对话。
I'm not sure if his success has come in spite of or because of his upbringing, but I know you're bound to enjoy our conversation.
所以，乔纳森，我总是欢迎嘉宾时说，我一直在期待与你交谈。
So Jonathan, look, I always welcome my guests by saying I've been looking forward to talking to you.
这确实总是真的，因为我只邀请我想与之交谈的人，但你很特别，因为我们是朋友。
And it's actually always true because I only invite people that I want to talk to, but you're very different because we're personal friends.
我对此感到非常兴奋，因为你的新书《向上攀升》今天在伦敦录制时正式发布，明天将在纽约发布，书中讲述了你的童年经历。你曾来我家吃晚饭，讲过八岁时被父亲送进海洛因窝点的故事。
And I'm really excited about this because you've got your book coming out Shooting Up is launched today as we record in London and tomorrow in New York and it talks about your childhood and you came to dinner at our house and you told the story of at eight years old being sent into a heroin den by your father.
简单聊聊你的童年和这本书吧。
Just talk a little about about your childhood and and the book.
当然。
Sure.
所以几乎所有注射毒品和海洛因的活动都发生在户外，比如公园里和吉普赛人村庄附近。
So almost all the shooting up and heroin was happening outdoors, like in parks and by a gypsy village.
但背景是，我的父母是基督教传教士，1983年搬到西班牙，定居在圣布拉斯区。
But but the the background is that my parents were Christian missionaries and moved to Spain in 1983, and settled in the neighborhood of San Blas.
当时，那里是欧洲海洛因使用率最高的地区之一，青少年犯罪率也极高。
And at the time, that had the highest rate of heroin use in in Europe and one of the highest rates of juvenile crime.
吸毒者从整个城市赶来购买海洛因。
And addict would come from all over the city to buy their heroin.
起初，我父母想为学生服务，担任大学牧师，但需求实在太迫切了。
And initially, my father and mother wanted to work with students and, you know, be a university chaplain, but the need was so great.
他们开始帮助吸毒者，把他们送到马德里以外的康复中心，因为当时马德里几乎没有任何这类机构。
They started helping addicts, sending them to centers outside of Madrid because there were almost none in Madrid at the time.
所以你的父母是传教士？
So your parents were missionaries?
是的。
Yes.
对。
Yeah.
他们意识到需求如此巨大，必须在马德里建立一个药物康复中心。
And they realized that they the need was so great, they needed to start a drug rehab center in Madrid.
所以，在中心成立前的七月，我和我的兄弟们就开始在街上分发传单，上面写着我们家的电话和地址。
So my brothers and I, and it was, like, from July before the center started, were out handing out flyers with the number and address of our home.
我们的客厅基本上成了想戒毒的瘾君子们的聚集中心。
And our our living room basically was like a grand central for addicts wanting to get off drugs.
这个药物康复中心于1985年成立，当时只有一位瘾君子。
And the drug center started in 1985 with one addict.
四十年后，它已扩展到20个国家，项目中拥有超过2000名戒毒者，多年来帮助了数十万人。
And forty years later, it's in 20 countries with over 2,000 addicts in the program, and it's helped hundreds of thousands over the years.
但这是一个关于爱与失去的个人故事，因为早期的瘾君子共用针头，因此感染了HIV。
But the story is very personal story of love and loss because the early addicts shared needles and through that became HIV positive.
所以早期的那一代人死于艾滋病，他们对我来说就像兄弟姐妹一样
So the early generation died of AIDS, and they were like brothers and sisters to me
还有我的兄弟们。
and my brothers.
那么在这么年轻的时候经历失去，是一种什么样的感受？
And what was that like experiencing loss at such a young age?
我的意思是，这对你产生了怎样的影响？
I mean, how has that affected you?
所以我觉得
So I
我昨天刚和一个人聊过，他大约两年前失去了妹妹，他问，你知道，要多久才能从悲伤中走出来，才能重新做回自己？
think that I was chatting yesterday with someone who had just lost his sister about two years ago, and you know, he was asking, like, you know, how long does it take to get over grief or be back to yourself?
我认为你再也回不到原来的自己了。
And I don't think you're ever yourself again.
我觉得你会变成另一个人。
I think you're a different person.
我认为，特别是当一个人成年后，悲伤是很难承受的，但当你还年轻、个性还在形成时，这种痛苦会更加剧烈。
And I think that particularly and grief is hard, you know, when you're an adult, but it's, I think, that much harder when you're young and a lot of your personality is still forming.
你知道，每个人应对的方式都不同，但就我的经历和我的家庭而言，我认为这让我变得更加严肃，让我意识到我们的生命是有限的，必须追求有质量的生活，而非仅仅追求长度。
And, you know, so it makes I think it makes you everyone reacts differently, but at least in my experience and and my family, I think it it made me much more serious, made me realize that, you know, our our our days are are are limited, and you have to try to live a life of quality over over quantity.
这还让我变得更加内向和勤奋，我想这也部分解释了我为何在学业上如此努力，我将一些说不清道不明的情绪——也许是焦虑或悲伤——都倾注到了其中。
And I think it it made me also much more introverted and studious, and so I think that accounted for some of the academic drive, you know, and where I channeled some of that, I don't know what to call it exactly, maybe angst energy or sadness.
我一直在想，你小时候知道自己家境贫寒吗？
I I wondered I mean, did you know when you
你成长过程中知道自己家境贫穷吗？
were growing up that you were poor?
这是否促使你去投资？
And is that I mean, did that lead you to investing?
没有。
No.
抱歉。
So sorry.
你问的是个两部分的问题。
That's a you asked a two part question.
首先，是的。
So first, yes.
我非常清楚我们家很穷。
Very aware that we were poor.
我父亲曾在剑桥学习经济学，后在哈佛获得MBA，但后来经历了一次宗教体验，成为了一名传教士。
My father had studied economics at Cambridge, got his MBA at Harvard, but then had a religious experience and became a missionary.
当我回美国探望他的父母和朋友时，我能明显看出我们家确实很穷。
And, you know, I I could see going back to United States visiting, like, his parents and friends that, you know, we we definitely were were poor.
到了二十世纪八十年代，如果你还记得的话，美元曾出现过大幅波动。
And then in the nineteen eighties, if you remember, there was the the dollar had some pretty big moves.
不是。
No.
它在1985年达到峰值。
It peaked in '85.
对吧？
Right?
是的。
Yes.
在1985年，美元变得非常非常强劲。
It got very, very strong in '85.
你知道，我父母虽然是贫穷的传教士，但生活得非常好。
You know, my parents, even though they were poor missionaries, lived very well.
然后，在接下来的两年里，美元对比比索贬值了大约一半。
And then, you know, the the dollar lost about half its value versus the Peseda over the the coming two years.
所以，我母亲最终决定在家教我们，因为他们连送我们去那所小小的传教士学校的钱都没有，持续了大约两年。
So my my mother ended up teaching us, homeschooling us because they didn't even have money to send us to, like, the the small missionary school for about two years.
我父亲会在餐巾纸背面画图表，因此我了解了当时《经济学人》发布的巨无霸指数。
And my father would draw diagrams on the back of napkins, and so I I learned all about that was at the time The Economist had come out with the Big Mac Index.
所以我记得，当时他教我购买力平价理论，他就在餐桌上用餐巾纸背面教我经济学和会计知识。
And so I remember, like, learning about purchasing power parity theory, and and so he just taught me economics and accounting and you know, on the back of napkins at the dinner table.
所以我认为，让我走向经济学和投资的并不是贫穷本身。
And so I think the it wasn't the being poor that drove me to economics and investing.
而是那种想要理解市场运作方式的求知欲，无论是货币还是股票的波动。
It was just the intellectual curiosity to understand sort of how markets and, you know, whether it's currency or or stocks move.
你的父母，尤其是你父亲，经常读给你听，你在书中描述了极其丰富的阅读内容。
And your your parents, especially your dad, used to read to you, and and you describe in the book an astonishing variety of material.
你读的不只是《圣经》，还有但丁的《神曲·地狱篇》、班扬的《天路历程》、奥古斯丁的《忏悔录》。
You didn't just read the Bible, you read Dante's Inferno, John Bunyan's Pilgrim's Progress, St Augustine's Confessions.
我的意思是，这个阅读范围太惊人了。
I mean it's a remarkable range.
我知道你至今仍是如饥似渴的读者，但你的阅读范围是不是依然很广泛？
Are you I know you're still a voracious reader, but is it still is very I mean, it's varied.
我的阅读内容往往会因年份而变化。
So my my reading tends to vary by year.
我之前写过《资本主义的神话》，这是一本关于垄断和寡头的书。
I I previously written like the Myth of Capitalism, which is a book on monopolies and oligopolies.
然后为了写《Shooting Up》，我可能去读了一百多本国家图书奖和普利策奖得主的回忆录。
And then Shooting Up, I probably went away and read, like, a 100 memoirs, National Book Award winners, Pulitzer Prize winners.
我这辈子大概不会再读回忆录了。
I I probably won't read a memoir again in my life.
我觉得我已经看太多了。
I think I've overdosed on that one.
所以当我所管理的Prevatt资本基金投资某个行业时，我会去尽可能多地阅读与该行业历史、首席执行官和公司发展历程相关的书籍。
And so I tend to read a lot tied to like, when the Prevatt Capital, my fund, when we're investing in an industry, I'll try to go away and read as many books as I can on the history of the industry, CEOs, company histories.
我的阅读往往是集中爆发的，但阅读量很大，而且总是与我正在做的事情相关。
So my my reading tends to go in spurts, but there's, a lot of reading, and it tends to be tied to whatever I'm I'm doing.
你在书中有一句精彩的话：‘日程表是小头脑的暴政’，你还说家里钟表很少，你父亲的教会礼拜经常不准时开始。
And you had a brilliant line in the book, schedules are the tyranny of small minds, and you said there were a few clocks in your house and your dad's church services often didn't start in time.
我的意思是，这
Well, I mean, did this
小时候是否给了你极大的自由？
give you sort of enormous freedom as a kid?
我跟我父亲恰恰相反，我总是因为事情没有准时开始而感到烦躁，而他则会说，事情该开始的时候自然会开始。
I was like sort of the opposite of my father, I was always like annoyed that things weren't starting on time and that's what he respond and he'd say that things will start when they need to.
我认为，九到五的工作时间或其他任何固定工作时间，确实是一种专制。
And I do think that that there is some tyranny of nine to five or whatever the hours are that people work.
对某些人来说，我觉得这种安排挺好。
And for some people, I think that's good.
他们喜欢这样的节奏。
They they enjoy that.
对我来说，随着时间推移，我不敢说自己懒，但我确实会经历一段非常密集的工作期，然后需要休息，再重新投入。
For me over time, I think I wouldn't say I'm lazy, but I tend to do periods of very intense work and then need a break and go back to it.
因此，我的工作方式并不特别有规律。
And so I'm not particularly scheduled in the way I I work.
所以，尽管我当时很反感，但我想我还是从父亲那里继承了这种特质。
So I probably inherited that from my father even though I disliked it at the time.
而且，这本书跟你的前几本很不一样，你能谈谈为什么现在出版这本书吗？
And, mean, this book's very different from your previous books, but can you just talk about why you published this book now?
我当时在纽约SAC资本工作，时间大概是2003到2005年，大概在2004年底，我去了上西区的巴诺书店，看到一本非常漂亮的书，叫《飞越96街》，讲述的是一位东哈莱姆白人男孩的回忆录。
So I had written this when I I was working at SAC Capital in New York o three to o five, and it was probably late o four that I went into Barnes and Noble on the Upper West Side and saw this beautiful book called Flying Over 96th Street, and it was about a a it's called memoir memoir of an East Harlem White Boy.
他的父母在上世纪五十年代带他搬到东哈莱姆，他在非裔和波多黎各裔孩子中间长大，而他自己是个金发蓝眼的男孩。
And he his parents had moved him to East Harlem in the nineteen fifties, grew up around black and Puerto Rican kids, and he was a blonde haired, blue eyed boy.
我当时就想，这简直就像我自己的故事——父母带我去了某个地方，把我拉进他们的使命之中。
And I just thought, this is sort of my story of parents taking me, putting me somewhere, roping me into their mission.
这本书太美了，它唤起了六十年代民权运动时期的时代与氛围，以及他那些已经离世的朋友。
And it was just such a beautiful book, and it evoked a time and place in the civil rights movement in the sixties and his friends who'd who'd passed.
我就想，得有人为我的朋友们做点什么，因为你知道，他们中的许多人已经去世了。
And I just thought someone needs to do this for my friends because, you know, many of them had died.
于是我就写了这本书。
And so I I wrote it.
这本书被很多出版商拒绝了，这在出版行业其实挺正常的。
The book got rejected, you know, in quite a few places, which is, like, normal for the publishing industry.
所以我把它搁置在一旁，这些年我创立了Variant Perception，为对冲基金、家族办公室等提供研究服务，之后又创办了Prevatt Capital。
And, and so I just put it to to aside and, you know, over the years had started Variant Perception, which provided research to and provides research to hedge funds, family offices, and others, and then started Prevatt Capital.
于是它就一直搁在那里。
And so it was just sort of sat there.
后来我和一位导师共进午餐，他告诉我：你真该在你父亲去世前把这本书出版。
And then I had lunch with a mentor of mine, and he told me he said, you really should get this published before your father passes.
我希望他能健康长寿，但他已经79岁了。
I hope he lives many long years, but he's 79.
我就想，你知道吗？
And and I just thought, you know what?
我真的该去做了。
Like, I I should do it.
于是我稍作修改，最终拿到了合同，由小布朗出版社出版。
So I I worked editing it a little and then got the contract, and Little Brown is is publishing it.
我很庆幸，我的导师最终推了我一把，让这本书得以出版。
So I'm glad that he my mentor sort of just pushed me a little to get it published finally.
而且，这是一本非常个人化的书，写它一定很触动情感。
And, I mean, it's a it's a very personal book, so writing it must have been very emotional.
这很痛苦吗？
Was it quite painful?
有一部分是的。
Parts of it were.
我认为好的回忆录是诚实的。
And and I think that good memoirs are honest.
而且读者就像是一个谎言探测器，能察觉到作者是否在试图把自己塑造成更好的形象或夸大其词。
And and so and and the reader, I think, is a a bullshit detector and and realizes whether the writer is trying to either make themselves look good or exaggerate.
所以我认为你必须诚实且坦露脆弱。
And so I think you have to be honest and vulnerable.
而且因为它涉及失去，还有，我父亲是一个非常有魅力、富有远见但又复杂的人。
And then because it does deal with loss and then, you know, my my father is a very charismatic, visionary, but complex person.
小时候，我们很反感晚餐时的那些说教和管教。
And as a kid, we resented a lot of the readings at dinner table and discipline.
我试图如实地刻画他，保持诚实。
I I tried to capture him as he was and be honest.
我肯定，如果我儿子有一天写一本关于我的书，那肯定不是一切都完美无缺。
And I'm I'm I'm sure if my son wrote a book about me one day, you know, it's not all, you know, perfect.
所以我希望把人物写得真实可信。
And and so I I wanted to make the characters real.
因此，我认为其中一些部分，尤其是处理失去亲人的部分，确实很痛苦。
And so I think some of that, certainly dealing with the loss, was painful.
然后我写完后给家人看了，有时这会导致家庭破裂，或者至少引发怨恨，我脑海中浮现出一些记忆。
And then I I wrote it and showed it to my family, and sometimes it leads, you know, families to break apart or at least, you know, resent it, and you have, like, the you know, there's a few memories come to mind.
我父亲觉得我对他太苛刻了，但他很喜欢这本书，认为我如实写出了真相。
My father thinks I was too hard on him, but he he loves the book and thinks I told it as it was.
你父亲对这本书非常自豪。
Well, your father's very proud of the book.
我的意思是，是的，你父亲是个了不起的人。
I mean, yeah, I your father's an amazing amazing guy.
你后来去了美国上大学，之前你一直接受家庭教育，之后还成为罗德学者，去了牛津。
So you went to university in The US, you'd been homeschooled and you then went on to become a Rhodes scholar and went to Oxford.
你是怎么做到的？
How did you achieve that?
我的意思是，你在马德里的学校时，并不是最好的学校。
Mean, when you were at school in Madrid, it wasn't like the best school.
是因为家庭教育、学习和阅读吗？
Was it just this homeschooling and the education and the reading?
你从中学到了哪些经验？
And what lessons have you taken away from that?
当然。
Sure.
我母亲曾在家教育我们两年，所以我的教育并不是全程在家完成的，但我们上了一所非常小的传教士学校，班上只有八个孩子，几乎没有任何资源。
So my mother homeschooled us for two years, so I wasn't homeschooled all my education, but we went to a very small missionary school with eight kids in my class and, you know, with almost no resources.
所以我学到的大部分知识，首先来自于我父母书架上的读物。
And so almost all the education I got really came from, one, my my reading what was on my parents' shelves.
其次，我哥哥比我早两年上大学，他把他在大学用的所有书都寄给了我。
And then secondly, when my brother older brother went off to college two years before me, he sent me all his books from college.
所以当我进入大学时，我已经完成了大约十门大学先修课程考试，跳过了将近两年的大学课程，并在入学后又参加了更多考试以跳过一些课程。
And so by the time I entered college, I had taken about 10 advanced placement tests and placed out of almost two years of of college and took more exams when I arrived to be able to skip classes.
所以，虽然我可以更快地完成大学学业，但我认为，人生中能这样大量阅读又没有责任的时光只有这一次。
So the good I could have gone through college faster, but I thought, you know, it's the only time in your life where you get to read a lot, and you don't have responsibilities.
于是我写了两篇荣誉论文，做了很多独立研究，获得了多项奖学金，还去探索了许多随机的兴趣方向。
So I I ended up, like, writing two honors theses and doing quite a lot of independent studies and getting fellowships and just pursuing very random things.
我甚至学习了拉迪诺语——一种十五世纪混合了希伯来语的西班牙语，并获得了一项奖学金，前往以色列和纽约进行研究。
I ended up studying Ladino, which is fifteenth century Spanish mixed with Hebrew, and got a fellowship to go off to Israel and New York to to to do that.
所以我充分利用了这段时间，同时还在写一篇关于最优货币区理论的经济学论文。
So I just took advantage of the time, but I was, you know, also, like, writing an economics thesis on optimal currency area theory.
我必须说，我热爱投资的一点是，优秀的投资者本质上始终处于自我学习的状态。
So and the thing I love about investing, I have to say, is that, you know, if good investors, I think, really are in a way in a continuing mode of being self taught.
对吧？
Right?
你总是在观察公司或行业，深入钻研，因此作为投资者，持续自学的能力是必不可少的。
Like, you're always looking at companies or industries, digging in deeply, and so the the ability to sort of teach yourself is one that's ongoing as an investor.
但你一直想
But did you always want
当一名投资者吗？
to be an investor?
没有。
No.
我父亲学的是经济学，后来去了哈佛商学院，而那个药物康复中心经营着一些企业来提供免费康复服务。
I I think I was my father studied economics and then went to Harvard Business School, and and the drug rehab center ran businesses to provide for free rehab.
所以我从小就在商业环境中长大。
So I always grew up around businesses.
但对我来说，这看起来非常理论化和抽象。
But but for me, think it was just very theoretical and abstract.
就像我们之前讨论的购买力平价，或者最优货币区理论，这些概念其实并不能帮你挑选公司、成为一名投资者。
And, you know, it's like even purchasing parity, which we're discussing earlier, or optimal currency area theory, a lot of these things are you know, like, they're they don't help you pick companies and be an investor.
真正让我对投资产生兴趣，是在我离开牛津之后，一些朋友开始在对冲基金工作。
The investing bug really hit me after I left Oxford, and some of my friends were working at hedge funds.
当他们向我讲述他们的一天时，比如去日本分析公司和行业，以及一年中做各种不同的事情，我就在想。
And when they were telling me about their day where they were, like, going off to Japan to analyze companies and industries, I thought and and doing different things throughout the year.
我只是觉得，这是一份非凡的工作，你可以赚钱去学习各种东西。
I just thought, like, you did this is an extraordinary job where you could, you know, get paid to go learn things.
正是这一点让我想从事这个行业。
And so that that was the thing that made me want to do it.
然后你去了SEC Capital工作。
And you went to work for SEC Capital.
那感觉怎么样？
What was that like?
那是几年前的事了，那里的工作压力真的非常大，非常紧张。
So I I was there years ago, and it it really was, like, very sort of high pressure intense.
我当时为加布·马尚克工作，他后来去了Greenlight，还有安迪·科恩，他们教会了我大量关于投资的知识。
I was working for Gabe Marshank, who went off to Greenlight afterwards, and Andy Cohen, and they taught me an enormous amount about investing.
我是初级员工，所以一直在构建大量的财务模型。
And I was the junior guy, so I was, like, building tons of financial models.
所以我大概构建了大约一百个财务模型。
So I probably built, I think, about a 100 financial models.
但我学会了不同行业和企业的驱动因素、需要关注的关键变量，还做了大量渠道调研，就是试图了解客户对公司的看法，以及供应商等情况。
But I learned, like, what are the the the drivers for different industries and businesses and the key variables to look at, and then did an enormous amount of, like, channel checks where you're just trying to understand, you know, what do the customers think about the company or suppliers and things like that.
这就像一场绝佳的实战培训和教育。
So it was a great boot camp and education.
你写了两本关于宏观经济、债务周期、货币政策和系统性风险的书。
You wrote two books on macro economy, on debt cycles, monetary policy, systemic risk.
是什么让你对宏观经济产生了兴趣？
What led you to the interest in the macro?
你的起点是研究小公司，后来却转向了宏观领域。
Mean, you started off looking at small companies, and then you went to macro.
为什么呢？
What what
我去过美国银行，在伦敦的准备 desk 工作。
So I'd I'd gone over to Bank of America and was on the prep desk there in in London.
当时，我几乎所有的研究都集中在美國次級貸款、歐洲銀行體系以及高收益市場上。
And at the time, I I was doing almost all my work on, like, The US subprime lending and and then on the European banking system and the high yield market.
因此，很多宏觀觀點都是自下而上形成的，我研究了像Countrywide Financial、愛爾蘭聯合銀行以及西班牙銀行等機構，我也寫過關於它們的內容。
And so a lot of the macro basically came from the bottom up where I was looking at things like Countrywide Financial or, you know, Allied Irish and others and the Spanish banks, which I I wrote about as well.
這就是推動我這樣做的動力。
So that was the impetus for that.
我只是偶然接觸到這些觀點，然後意識到，比如我在2009年寫過關於西班牙銀行危機的內容，那時所有人都認為銀行是安全的。
It was more just coming across these ideas and then realizing that, you know, there was like, I I wrote about the Spanish banking crisis in the 2009 when everyone thought the the banks were safe.
我離開美國銀行，部分原因是他們不允許我們——至少我的團隊——進行我原本該做的業務；我加入時，本來是負責股票業務的，但後來他們取消了這項安排。
And I I left Bank of America, you know, in part, they wouldn't allow us to at least my desk, they'd when I joined, I was supposed be doing equities, and then they pulled that.
所以我只能做利率和貨幣業務，但我覺得股票才是我真正喜歡的領域。
And so I was doing rates and currencies, and I just thought, like, equities is what I enjoy.
而且，我還試圖獲得許可，去進行我剛才提到的那些交易。
And furthermore, like, I was trying to get permission to, you know, put on some of the trades that I just mentioned.
所以我離開了，開始用自己的資金進行交易。
And so I I left and was just trading my own money.
我和我亲爱的朋友特里一起创办了一个用户生成的新闻通讯，因为我当时暂时退出了投资圈。
And my dear friend, Terry, and I started a user generated newswire because I'd sort of gone off the investing world for a while.
我们后来把它卖给了比尔·盖茨拥有的Corvus公司。
We sold that to Corvus, which Bill Gates owned.
但我一直坚持撰写这些每周和每月的简报，后来逐渐发展成了‘Variant Perception’。
But I just kept on writing these sort of weekly and monthly notes, and then that turned into variant perception.
我们的许多客户是对冲基金和家族办公室。
And a lot of our clients were hedge funds and and family offices.
因此，通过与这些客户交流，我也从他们身上学到了大量知识，并继续沿着这条道路前行。
And so through that, I learned an enormous amount from our our clients too and continued essentially in that vein.
那‘Variant Perception’背后的初衷是什么？
And what was the idea behind variant perception?
你发现了市场中的一个空白。
There's a gap in the market you spotted.
首先，对我来说，纯粹是享受撰写这些内容的过程。
Well, one, was just like the, for me, the sheer enjoyment of writing about these things.
至于我自己的投资，我只是会写下我正在尝试做的任何事情。
And I I so I I for my own investing, I would just write about whatever it was that I was trying to do.
所以这基本上就是它的起源。
And so that was basically the genesis of it.
你知道，如果是的话。
You know, if yeah.
我觉得在人生中后悔一些事情是没有意义的，因为你无法回头去改变它们。
I I think it's sort of to regret things in in life because you can't go back and change them.
我本可能应该留在买方阵营，而不是写研究报告，但我真的很享受这个过程，结识了很棒的朋友，和许多Variant Perception的客户保持着良好关系，他们中的一些人在我创立Prevatt Capital时成为了投资者。
I I probably should have stayed on the buy side rather than, you know, write research, but I I really did enjoy it and, you know, made terrific friends and, you know, have great relations with a lot of the Verint perception clients who I'm still in touch with, and some of them are investors in Prevatt Capital when I launched it.
你当时有没有一个明确的计划？我的意思是，这一切都是偶然发生的吗？
And did you have a sort of plan at I any mean, this has just all happened serendipitously.
没有。
No.
没有。
No.
我我
I I
我想，如果我有计划，可能会更出色。
think if I'd had a plan, it might have been more brilliant.
但不，很多都是机缘巧合，或者是一些生活事件——你做了某件事，然后它就自己发展起来了。
But, no, it was a lot of it was serendipity or just sort of life events where you'd do something and then it acquires life of its own.
我认为这正是企业家的一个特点。
And I think that's one of the things with entrepreneurs.
你知道，你实际上是在向你的同事和客户做出一种承诺。
I you know, you really are making a commitment in a way to to your colleagues and clients.
我知道我想停止写作，转而去管理资金。
And I did know that I wanted to stop writing and, you know, manage money.
所以当我写《资本主义的神话》时，我研究了垄断、双头垄断和寡头垄断，以及产业集中度的上升，那时我还在大量研究各个行业。
And so then I when I wrote the myth of capitalism, looking at monopolies, duopolies, and oligopolies, and the rise of industrial concentration, that and then I was doing an enormous amount of work on all the the various industries.
所以这是一项极其繁重的工作。
So it's tons and tons of work.
但那正是我决定创立Prevatt资本的时候，该公司于2020年5月正式成立。
But that was basically when I decided to go start Prevatt Capital, which launched in officially in May 2020.
但显然，提前筹备工作早已开始。
But, obviously, it was a work in advance setting it up.
那么是什么促使你
So what led you
写出《资本主义的神话》这本书呢？
to write that book, The Myth of Capitalism?
是什么促使你？所以当时我
What was the impetus that So I was
我清楚地记得，我当时试图理解为什么企业利润相对于历史水平如此之高，为什么某些行业和公司的利润率更高，尤其是那些特别稳定的公司。
trying to I remember very specifically, it was like, I was trying to understand why corporate profits were so high relative to history, and why some industries and companies had higher profit margins than others and ones particularly that were were stable.
因为显然，某些周期性行业在短期内会有很高的利润率，但我试图理解这种高利润率的持续性。
Because clearly, you have, like, you know, some very high profit margins briefly in some cyclical industries, but I was trying to understand the persistence of it.
于是，这让我深入探究了美国工业集中度上升以及垄断现象的兴起。
And so that's what took me down the rabbit hole of rising industrial concentration and the rise in monopolies in The United States.
我说的垄断，也包括双头垄断和寡头垄断。
And by by monopolies, I mean, duopolies and oligopolies too.
所以这就是促使我写书的动因——我通常不是通过思考来理清思路，而是通过写作来澄清想法，这也就是《资本主义的神话》这本书的由来。
And so that was the the impetus for I tend to not think by writing, but I tend to clarify thinking by writing, and that was how the myth of
资本主义》这本书的由来。
capitalism came about.
如今，市场集中度比历史上任何时候都高，而且看起来还会继续上升。
And this idea about I mean, market concentration today is higher than historically, and it looks like it's only going to increase.
我曾看到高盛的首席执行官大卫·所罗门发言，他对自己的交易流水线感到非常兴奋。
I mean I saw David Solomon speak, the CEO of Goldman Sachs, and he was very excited about his pipeline of deals.
他说，首席执行官们希望在本届政府任内完成交易。
He said CEOs want to get deals done under this administration.
这种情况能逆转吗？
Is that going to be reversible?
我的意思是，这会带来什么后果？
I mean, what are the consequences of this?
因为你十年前就担心了，而情况只会变得更糟。
I Because you were worried ten years ago, and it's gonna get it's gonna get worse.
对吧？
Right?
是的。
Yeah.
所以我认为，集中度的提升或逆转，就像一个漫长的摆动。
So I think that the concentration or the reversal of it really happens in a a long pendulum.
这需要多年，几乎是数十年的时间。
And so it take it's like a multiyear, almost multi decade thing.
在罗斯福之后的时期，反垄断执法曾相当活跃。
And there was quite a lot of antitrust enforcement in the, you know, post Roosevelt.
而真正改变的是1982年，美国在里根政府时期修订了合并指南，这引发了一场美国的并购浪潮，此后又接连出现了多轮并购浪潮。
And it was really in 1982 when they changed the merger guidelines in in The United States under under Reagan where there was the whole it kicked off a a merger wave in The US, but then you had sort of a succession of merger waves after that.
因此，几乎每一次市场繁荣都伴随着高水平的并购活动。
So almost any market boom was generally associated with a high level of m and a.
而且对并购的挑战越来越少，我在书中对此进行了记录，当然附有大量的图表，但这类挑战变得越来越少。
And there were fewer and I I document it in the book, obviously, with quite a lot of charts, but there were fewer and fewer challenges to mergers.
然后，拜登确实反对了不少并购交易。
And then the you know, Biden had been opposing quite a few mergers.
就连特朗普和他的团队也曾谴责并购，但我认为事情可能正在朝相反的方向发展，或者说，这更像是一条曲折的路线，而不是从高度集中直接回归到更强的反垄断执法。
Even Trump and his sort of had also been, you know, condemning mergers, but I think things are probably moving the other way, you know, or or and and it's more probably a zigzag, if you will, than a straight line from a highly concentrated back to more antitrust enforcement.
我现在因为管理基金，没有那么密切地关注政策了，但看起来他们现在似乎在给并购开绿灯，我认为这不是好事。
I I don't really follow the policy as closely now that I'm running the fund, but I it looks like seem to be giving a green light to mergers now, and I don't think it's a good thing.
我刚才只是在思考机会与风险之间的权衡。
I was just sort of thinking about the sort of opportunities versus the risks.
所以，如果你投资于处于寡头垄断状态的公司股票，显然存在政治干预或监管 imposed 的风险。
So there's obviously a risk that if you enter into a stock that's involved in an oligopolistic situation, you've got the risk of political intervention or the imposition of regulation.
你认为这种风险，相对于人们低估了垄断所带来的长期收益，是更重要还是更不重要？
Do you think that is more important or less important relative to people undervaluing the duration that you get from owning a monopoly?
我认为最糟糕的并购，一方面是走向垄断的并购，另一方面是发生在高度监管行业中的并购。
Well, I think the worst mergers are sort of mergers to monopoly and also ones that are in highly regulated industries.
监管本身也造成了进入壁垒。
And the regulation itself creates barriers to entry.
如果你看看美国的医疗和保险行业，就会发现它正变得极度集中，我们正在推高价格，而支付方（即保险公司）、医院和制药公司之间则陷入了一场拉锯战。
And if you look at, for example, The US healthcare and insurance sector, like, it's becoming extremely concentrated We're basically escalating prices, and it's sort of a back and forth or tug of war between sort of the the payers, you know, which is the insurers and the hospitals and drug makers.
最终，几乎所有人都受到了损害。
And almost everyone's worse off in the end.
这就是为什么我认为，美国在医疗保健上的支出占GDP的比重，几乎高于世界上任何其他国家。
And that's why I think The US spends, you know, more on health care as a percentage of GDP than almost anywhere.
这些就是最糟糕的情况。
So those are the the worst cases.
有些行业如果集中度不高，合并后也不会获得多少市场支配力。
There are some industries that if if it's not very concentrated, you can merge and, you know, you're you're not gonna get much market power.
而在某些行业，如果进入和退出都很容易，那么市场结构就不会有太大影响。
And and in some, if there is ease of entry and and exit, then, you know, it's not going to to to matter.
但显然，一家公司通过提供顾客真正需要的优质产品或服务来获得更高的市场份额，远比通过并购这种往往不自然的手段来提升市场份额和权力要好得多。
But the the it's much better, obviously, for a company to be able to acquire higher market share through providing a great product or service that the customer wants rather than via mergers, which often are just unnatural ways to try to increase market share and power.
我的意思是，你觉得大型科技公司就像运河或铁路那样是垄断企业吗？
And I mean, you think that big tech companies are monopolies like the canals or the the railways?
我的意思是，这之间有相似之处吗？
I mean, is there a parallel?
我觉得是的。
I I think so.
我的意思是，如果你看看，比如Facebook，他们收购了Instagram和WhatsApp，你可以看到他们还几乎整合了整个在线广告的购买环节，也就是现在所谓的Google广告生态系统。
And I mean, if you look at, like, you know, particularly Facebook, right, where they acquired Instagram and and WhatsApp, and you can see that they're and and then, you know, Google basically rolled up the whole almost all the online ads, you know, the buying parts what are now the Google Ad ecosystem.
比如DoubleClick就是这样。
So, like, DoubleClick, for example.
很多这类收购本不该被批准或允许发生，但政府和法官似乎不愿意去逆转这些行为。
A lot of these, you know, shouldn't have been approved or allowed to happen, but the government and judges seem reticent to reverse it.
那么，你是否被这些股票吸引？
And so are you attracted to those stocks
是因为它们的垄断地位吗？
because of the monopoly?
还是你担心我
Or are you worried about I
我不持有这些股票。
don't own them.
你担心监管的实施吗？
Are you worried about the imposition of of regulations?
我的意思是
I mean
我们持有的公司通常拥有很高的市场份额，但我会以不同于经济学教科书的方式将它们称为自然垄断。
Well, the companies that we own do often have a high market share, but the ones that and I I refer to them as as natural monopolies in a different way than an economic textbook would.
经济学教科书会提到，比如电力公用事业，你并不希望在伦敦每户人家都铺设两套铜线，或者供水系统也是如此。
An economic textbook would talk about, you know, electrical utilities, for example, where you don't wanna lay down two sets of copper wires to every home in London or water utilities.
这些行业理应受到监管，价格被限制，并且能获得资产回报。
And those rightly are regulated and, you know, have the pricing capped and they get a a return on their assets.
我喜欢的是那些产品交付方式决定了只有少数参与者的企业。
The ones that I like are one where the delivery of the product dictates few players.
对吧？
Right?
比如在线平台，一般来说它们具有强大的网络效应，涉及需求方和供应方。
Where so for example, like online platforms, you know, in general, they're they have strong network effects, and you you have sort of the demand side and the supply side.
我管理的基金Prevatt Capital，在基金成立时就收购了Booking.com，当时正值新冠疫情中期，但我们从基金成立之初就持有Booking.com。
You know, the fund, Prevatt Capital, that I run, we've owned we bought it when the the fund launched, and it was in the middle of COVID, but we've we've owned booking.com, you know, since the beginning of the of the fund.
这正是一个明显为酒店创造价值的例子，因为房间夜数是无法储存的。
And that's one where where they're clearly adding value to the hotels because, you know, room nights are you can't store them.
你无法转售它们。
You know, you can't resell them.
是的。
Sure.
如果今晚房间空着，就永远卖不出去了。
If a room is empty tonight, it's never sold again.
尤其是在欧洲，酒店市场更加分散，如果你想吸引全球游客，最好的方式就是通过Booking这样的在线平台。
And so and then particularly in Europe where the hotel market is much more fragmented, you know, if you want to attract global customers who are tourists, you know, the way to do that is an online platform like Booking.
所以它存在是有理由的。
And so it has a reason for existing.
它为消费者增加了价值。
It adds value to the consumer.
它为酒店增加了价值。
It adds value to the hotel.
酒店可能会抱怨预订平台收取的佣金，但它们把你的页面翻译成了30种语言。
And, you know, hotels might complain about, you know, paying bookings take rate, but they're translating your page into 30 languages.
它们可以接受你想要的任何支付方式。
They can accept payments in any form that you want.
你知道，欧洲的普通酒店未必能做到这一点。
You know, the average hotel in Europe wouldn't necessarily be able to do this.
所以，这就像一个拥有高市场份额的在线平台，我认为这非常出色，而且它并不是通过收购达到这个地位的。
So though that's like, you know, an online platform that, you know, it does have high market share, but that I I think is terrific and it didn't really get there via acquisition.
显然，Priceline收购了Booking，但它们市场份额的来源是其自身的表现。
Obviously, bought it was Priceline bought Booking, but the origin of their market share comes from the performance.
是的
Yeah.
我知道。
I know.
它也有竞争对手。
And it's got it's got got competitors.
我的意思是，在美国某些地区，这看起来很奇怪。
I mean, seems bizarre to me, you know, in certain areas of The United States.
比如电信业。
So telecoms.
去年夏天，我在新泽西州，坐在酒吧里吃东西时，跟酒保聊天，他告诉我他的电话账单每月超过100美元。
So I was in New Jersey last summer, and I was having something to eat at a bar, and I was talking to the barman, and he was telling me that his phone bill was over $100 a month.
我当时想，这太奇怪了，因为我每月只付10英镑，不到15美元。
And I was thinking, that's bizarre because I pay like £10 a month, so less than $15 a month.
我订了一个Mint套餐，每月20美元，在美国也能用。
And I bought a Mint subscription, which is like $20 a month and works in The States.
我在想，为什么那个酒吧服务员每个月要付100美元，他完全可以选Mint服务呢？
I was saying, why is that barman paying $100 a month when he could be on Mint?
为什么这些公司没那么成功？
Why have these companies been less successful?
为什么主导企业如此有效地阻碍竞争？
And why are the dominant players so effective at obstructing competition?
这背后并没有什么合理的理由，对吧？
There isn't a logical reason for it, right?
是的。
Yeah.
我的意思是，很多原因——我在《资本主义的神话》一书的某一章里也写过。
I mean, a lot of it and I do write about it in one of the chapters in The Myth of Capitalism.
我认为这很大程度上与游说和监管有关，你知道，这种情况在各个行业都存在，比如限制新进入者，或者设置很高的转换成本。
I think a lot of it has to do with lobbying and regulation, and they, you know, it happens across industries where you try to restrict new entrants or you make it very difficult for, have high switching costs is another.
比如在欧洲，就有一些措施显然能遏制电信费用的上涨。
So there are certain there are things in Europe, obviously, that counteract the rise of prices in telecoms, for example.
所以你们有号码可携带服务，还有跨境通话费用上限，诸如此类的各种措施。
So you have, like, number portability and you know, they they they cap cross border calls, and there's all all sorts of things like that.
在美国，这种情况要少得多。
You get a lot less of it in The US.
在美国，有线电视基本上是地方性垄断，他们几乎可以随意定价。
And, like, cable in The US, basically, is like a a local monopoly, and, you know, they can almost price with impunity.
现在他们在传统电视业务上显然失去了客户，但他们通过数据服务弥补了损失。
Now they're obviously losing on the, you know, customers on the linear TV side, but, like, they're making it up on the data and data side.
但你其实根本没有选择余地。
But you don't really have have a have a choice there.
这很有趣。
It was interesting.
你提到人们不会在我家街道上铺设两套铜线。
You were talking about you you people don't lay two sets of copper wires down my street.
有两套电缆，所以我们刚换了宽带，当然，在伦敦市中心，那里有足够的客户。
There's two sets of cables, so we've just switched broadband, which is but, obviously, Central London, there's enough customers there.
所以我感到非常惊讶。
So I was astonished.
嗯，出于投资目的，我通常会避开很多这些行业，因为它们资本密集度很高。
Well, I I tend to avoid, for investment purposes, a lot of these industries because they're they're very capital intensive.
因此，我认为作为投资者，理想的企业应该是资本密集度低、资本回报率高，当然，这一点很明显，但投资的难点在于试图以低于其价值的价格买入。
And so I think the ideal business as an investor is one that has low capital intensity, high returns on capital, and then obviously, you know, which is fairly obvious, but the and then the hard part of investing is obviously trying to buy these at a discount to their value.
有时候，它们的股价确实被低估了。
And, you know, sometimes they're, like, booking.
在新冠疫情期间，我们能够以非常有吸引力的价格买入，因为当时价格被误判了。
We were able to buy very attractively during the COVID period where it was mispriced.
所以我们不仅试图找到好公司，还试图在市场因某些临时原因厌恶它们的时候买入。
And so we try to not not only find good companies, but also try to buy them in periods where there's some temporary reason why the market hates them.
或者它们的股价可能并没有大幅下跌，但可能只是不被市场青睐，交易价格低于其价值，
Or or they, you know, they might not even be down all that much, but they might just be, you know, like, unloved and trading at a discount to, you know,
也就是它们未来现金流的价值。
their the the value of their future cash flows.
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所以我们是在二月录制的这个内容。
So we're recording this in the February.
有很多公司过去更受喜爱。
There's quite a few companies that used to be better loved.
它们现在非常不受欢迎。
They're very un unpopular right now.
我认为，过度支付并投资科技领域的一个非常困难的地方在于，如今最受厌恶的一些公司，恰恰是2021年最受追捧的。
Well, I think that's the one of the very difficult things of, like, overpaying and investing in technology is that some of the ones right now that are the most hated were the most loved in 2021.
比如，SaaS在2021年非常火爆，但现在SaaS却被视为人工智能的最大输家。
Like, SaaS was all the rage in 2021, and now SaaS is is viewed as being, like, the big loser from AI.
我的意思是，你该如何应对这种情况？
And, I mean, how do you manage that?
我认为经典的价值投资显然需要保持安全边际。
So I think the classic value investing is, obviously, you have to try to have a margin of safety.
因此，如果未来充满不确定性，那么为这些事物支付极高的市盈率在我看来似乎有点不理性。
And so if the future is uncertain, then it seems slightly irrational to me to go out and pay very high multiples for things.
对吧？
Right?
你要么必须在价格中嵌入极高的增长预期，要么就是假设在很长一段时间内一切都不会改变。
You either have to have extremely high growth embedded in the price, or, you know, you're basically making the assumption that things aren't gonna change at all for a very long period of time.
当你支付五十倍、六十倍甚至更高的估值时，尤其是在科技领域，你根本看不到未来的发展方向。
You know, when you're paying sort of fifty, sixty times or something, you know, and and particularly in technology where you can't really see around the corner.
科技公司通常拥有大量现金，但这是因为技术变革是一种生存风险，因此它们必须做好防范。
And then technology companies often do have quite a lot of cash, but that's because technological change is an existential risk So that they have to protect
当你创立Prevatt Capital时，你有宏观评论员的背景。
when you set up Prevatt Capital, you had a background as a macro commentator.
说服人们投资你有多难？
How difficult was it to persuade people to back you?
我的意思是，我知道人们会认为你非常聪明，但聪明和成为一名成功的股票投资者是两回事。
I mean I know people would have realized you're very smart but it's different between being very smart and being a successful equities investor.
你的推介理由是什么？
What was your pitch?
不，我职业生涯初期是在SAC资本做个股投资。
No, so I had started my career at SAC Capital doing individual stocks.
我后来也一直个人投资，继续做个股。
I continued investing personally doing individual stocks.
在Verint Perception，我们会发布行业报告。
At Verint Perception, we would put out industry reports.
人们往往只记得那些负面的报告，也就是空头报告，因为它们更容易吸引关注。
And people tend to remember only the negative ones, the short reports, because they seem to attract more attention.
但我们也有许多正面的、做多的行业报告，比如关于业主经营型企业、集中度高且具有吸引力的行业的报告。
But we also had, you know, many sort of positive, you know, long reports on on industries, you know, like, owner operator firms, you know, sort of concentrated industries with attractive emotes.
所以我做了大量深入的行业研究，之后又花了几年时间研究资本主义的神话。
So I had done quite a lot of very deep industry work, and then spent a couple years working on the myth of capitalism.
我还写过另一本书，但永远不会出版，那是一本我们内部的Prevatt资本指南，里面有数百页关于行业和公司的研究资料。
I also wrote another book that'll never see the light of day, which is like our sort of internal Prevatt Capital guide where we have, you know, hundreds of pages of of research on industries and companies.
所以在创立Prevatt Capital之前，已经积累了大量的研究工作。
So there there's like an enormous amount of work that go that had gone on before starting Prevatt Capital.
我们对投资者和潜在投资者非常透明。
And, you know, we're we're extremely transparent with our investors and potential investors.
所以我们的网站和许多对冲基金一样，关于我们的信息非常少，因为我们不面向普通公众营销。
So our website has, you know, like many hedge funds, has minimal information about us because we don't market to the average public.
但如果家族办公室或捐赠基金想了解我们的做法，我们可以向他们发送非常详细的产品价值链、公司分析报告，以及我们所持公司的财务模型。
But, you know, if a family office or endowment wants to see what we're doing, you know, we can send them, you know, very detailed industry value chains, write ups in the companies, you know, financial models in the companies that we own.
因此，人们可以看到背后所投入的研究深度和思考过程。
So, you know, people can see the depth of the research and the thinking that goes behind it.
那么，即使是认真的投资者，也会花很多时间研究研究的深度吗？
And do do even serious investors spend much time looking at the depth of the research?
是的。
Yes.
我认为，当你把他们称为认真的投资者时，我认为他们确实会这么做。
I think well, you describe them as serious investors, and so I I think those do.
我认为有些投资者——很遗憾，这是人性的一部分——很多人根本不会做尽职调查。
I think there are some some investors who and it's unfortunately part of human nature, which is that a lot of people just don't do due diligence.
对吧？
Right?
你在FTX这样的案例中也看到过，没人去查看他们的账目，人们总是假设：如果红杉投资了，那肯定没问题。
And you you find this with things like FTX where no one looked at their accounts or, you know, and assumption is, well, if Sequoia invested, then, you it's good enough for me.
我认为在对冲基金领域，也存在一些这样的情况。
And I think there is some of that that goes on in the hedge fund world.
但我们与投资者乃至潜在投资者保持着非常紧密的关系，他们会仔细阅读并就我们的运作进行深入讨论。
But, you know, we have a very close relationship with our investors and even prospective investors where, you know, they they do read through and have detailed discussions about what we're doing.
所以他们不会跳过尽职调查这一步。
So they're not the kind that sort of skip the due diligence.
但写一份出色的研究报告和靠股票赚钱之间有很大区别。
But there's a big difference between writing a great piece of research than and making money in stocks.
我的意思是——我们已经运作六年了，对吧？
And I mean- So we've been running now for six years, right?
所以
And so
我当时想说的是刚开始的时候。
I was- But I was meaning more at the start.
所以当你刚开始时，你去找那些你前公司曾经的客户，告诉他们：我不做个股了。
So when you started out, you rock up to somebody that's been a client of your previous firm You say, I'm not going to do individual equities.
嗯，我是说
Well, I'm
我认为很多早期投资者显然看过那些研究和建议，并且发现无论是做空还是做多，这些策略都取得了不错的效果。
Well, I think quite a lot of the early investors had obviously seen the the the research and the recommendations, and, you know, they worked out well in terms of something on the short side and and the long side.
所以我认为，即使没有实际投入资金，他们也看到了这种策略是经过深思熟虑的，有能力产生回报。
And so I think there's that even if it wasn't actual money, I think they saw, you know, that the the approach was thoughtful and one that could generate returns.
当然，你是个非常聪明的人。
Look, obviously, you you're very smart guy.
对吧？
Right?
我只是觉得，对于一个大型捐赠基金来说，把钱投给一个没有业绩记录的人，肯定会遇到很大障碍。
So I I just would have imagined that there was a big hurdle for a big endowment to put their money down with somebody that didn't have a track record.
是的。
Yes.
不。
No.
嗯，我认为这是对的。
I well, I I think that's true.
作为基金经理，你唯一能做的就是管理好你的基金，建立业绩记录，然后他们可以具体分析你买入或卖出某些资产的原因、背后的逻辑，以及你的投资理念。
The the only thing that you can do as a manager is, you know, run your fund, generate a track record, and and then, you know, they can look at specific reasons why you may have bought or sold something and the rationale for that and what your what is your investing philosophy.
这就是你能做的全部。
And that that's that's all all you could do.
哦，不是的。
And Oh, no.
当然。
Sure.
你指出了一个鸡生蛋还是蛋生鸡的问题，我认为这是小型基金面临的最大障碍。
There's a chicken and egg issue which you identified, and I think that's the the biggest hurdle for small funds.
首先，要起步；其次，要达到成功所需的关键规模，因为大约三分之一的基金在头三年内失败，约一半在第五年时失败，而我们现在正接近第六年。
One, to start, and then two, to actually achieve a critical mass to succeed because most about a third of funds fail in the first three years and about half fail by year five, and we're approaching year six.
好的。
Alright.
不，但许多听这个节目的人可能会考虑设立自己的基金。
Well, no, but it's, a lot of people listening to this will be thinking about setting up their own funds.
我只是好奇，有没有什么关于如何成功的经验教训。
I was just curious as to if there were any lessons as to how to be successful.
显然，你的情况比较特殊，因为你作为投资者没有业绩记录，但你作为卖方机构有业绩记录。
And obviously, you were in an unusual situation in that you didn't have a track record as an investor, but you had a track record as a sell side firm.
我想聊聊这个，因为非常感兴趣，毕竟我非常熟悉Variant Perception的工作，以及将宏观思维与自下而上分析相结合的理念。
I wanted to talk about it, was very interested because obviously I'm very familiar with the work of variant perception and this idea of combining the macro thinking with the bottom up analysis.
他们为此开发了非常有趣的框架。
And they've got very interesting frameworks for doing that.
你们在
How do you do it at
普雷瓦特？
Prevatt?
对于普雷瓦特资本来说，自上而下的方法几乎完全不涉及。
So the top down really doesn't go into it almost at all for Prevatt Capital.
我们真正试图识别一小群公司。
We we really are trying to identify a concentrated group of companies.
你知道的？
You know?
因此，自基金成立以来，我们的投资组合平均保持在16到17家公司左右，这些公司都是我们认为可以长期持有的，并且能够产生自由现金流，这些现金流会以股息的形式，或者在股价被低估时通过股票回购的方式返还给我们。
So we've averaged about 16 to 17 companies in our portfolio for over the life of the fund that are that that we think that we can own for for the long term and that would generate free cash flow that will come back to us either in the form of dividends or if their shares are undervalued via share buybacks.
因此，我们极其专注于自由现金流收益率。
And so we really focus obsessively on free cash flow yield.
所以这完全是自下而上的方法，致力于理解公司和行业。
And so it it is very much bottom up and trying to understand the companies and the industries.
那为什么是16或17家公司呢？
And why 16 or 17 companies?
这个数字没什么神奇的，但你确实需要一个多元化的股票组合，超过某个点之后，新增的股票对整体贡献其实不大。
There's no magic to the the number, but one, like, you do have a diversified group of stocks, you know, beyond a certain point, you know, your marginal stock's not really adding much.
如果你有50个仓位，而且是等权重配置，其中一只股票翻倍了，它对基金的整体贡献也不会太大。
And if you had, you know, 50 positions, you know, and and equally weighted and one of them doubles, you know, it's the contribution to your fund is not gonna be all that great.
所以我们希望保持集中度。
So we wanted to have concentration.
然后有一个非常简单的经验法则：假设你想构建一个集中的投资组合，有20只股票，同时又不想成为任何一家公司的内部人士，那么你就不要超过5%的持仓比例。
And then there's a very easy sort of rule of thumb, which is like, let's say you wanna have a concentrated portfolio and you have 20 stocks and you also don't wanna make yourself an insider in any company, then you don't wanna go over 5%.
这就使得基金的资产规模与你能投资的最小个股规模之间形成了很好的对称性。
And so creates very nice symmetry between sort of the smallest stock you can invest in in the AUM of the fund.
所以我们保持在16到17只，最多可以到20只，这是我们的自我限制上限。
And so we have 16 to 17, and we can go up to about 20, and that's a self imposed cap.
20只是上限。
20 is a cap.
是的。
Yeah.
这迫使我们对我们持有的股票充满信心，同时避免持有过多股票而稀释我们的研究和回报。
It forces us to have conviction in the stocks that we own and sort of not own too many stocks and sort of dilute our research and returns.
但这一定让你
But it must give you
彻夜难眠吧？
some sleepless nights.
不是吗？
No?
我其实睡得很好，我现在有个两岁的儿子，晚上会醒过来。
I I actually sleep well, I now have a two year old son who wakes me up at night.
但不会。
But no.
我实际上睡得非常好。
I I I actually sleep very well.
我知道我们持有哪些股票，以及为什么持有它们。
I I know what we own, why we own it.
你知道的，特别是当公司产生大量自由现金流的时候。
It you know, particularly when companies generate quite a lot of free cash flow.
如果它们的股价下跌，它们可以更便宜地回购更多股票，你知道的，或者它们可以
If if their share prices go down, they can buy back more shares cheaply, you know, or they can
但公司并不这么做。
But companies don't do that.
不对。
No.
那不是真的。
That that's not true.
比如Booking，2022年旅游市场强劲复苏，但股市下跌，它们的股价已经接近新冠疫情期间的水平。
Booking, for example, in 2022, travel was roaring back, but the market was down, and they had gone close to where they were during COVID in terms of the share price.
我认为格伦·福格尔可能是世界上最好的CEO之一，那一年他回购了公司约7%的股份。
And I think Glenn Fogel is probably one of the best CEOs in the world, and he bought back about 7% of their shares that year.
我们目前的第一大持仓是CarGurus。
Our number one position right now is CarGurus.
这是一个在美国的汽车信息发布在线平台，首席执行官是杰森·特雷瓦森，他是一位非常注重资本配置的管理者。
It's an online platform for car listings in The US, and Jason Trevassen is the CEO, and he's a very thoughtful capital allocator.
去年，股价下跌了大约三分之一，原因是某一份财报后市场反应过度，他们回购了约6%的股份。
Last year, the stock was down, you know, by about a third and there's overreaction to you know, after one of their earnings reports, and they bought back about 6% of their shares.
我猜测他们现在可能会大量回购股票，因为不仅他们自己的股价下跌，所有在线平台都面临担忧——担心AI代理会绕过这些平台。
I suspect they're gonna be buying back quite a lot right now because the stock's down, not just their stock, but all the online platforms where the fear is that AI agents are gonna disintermediate the platforms.
因此，你处于一个非常有利的位置：即使市场下行，只要你持有的是高质量公司，它们就有能力通过某种手段创造价值。
And so you're in this sort of wonderful position where even when things are going down, if you do have a very high quality company, like, they have a lever that they can pull to create value.
所以我确实睡得很安稳。
So I I do tend to sleep well at night.
如果我不了解自己持有的资产，又觉得公司由糟糕的资本配置者管理，我可能会夜不能寐。
I think I I'd sleep poorly at night if I didn't understand what I owned, and I thought that the companies were run by bad capital allocators.
但说起来容易，
But the it's easier to say than
做起来难。
to do.
好的。
Okay.
你举了两个你持有的股票的好例子，但通常只有极为出色的管理者，才会在业务遭遇逆境、股价下跌时，愿意出手回购股票。
You've given two good examples of stocks that you own, but it tends to be an exceptional manager who, when things are going against the business, things are going against them in terms of share price, that's prepared to go and buy back stock.
更常见的情况是，人们在业务顺风顺水、现金流充裕、股价高企时才进行股票回购。
Far more frequent is to see people that buy back stock when things are going swimmingly well, and they're they've got lots of cash flow and the shares are high.
是的。
Yes.
这种情况确实很普遍，尤其是在科技行业，许多回购行为纯粹是为了对冲股权激励和稀释效应。
And quite a lot of that happens, and particularly, I think, in the tech industry where a lot of the buybacks are purely to offset stock based compensation and dilution.
因此，它们往往倾向于顺势而为、顺应周期，而在我看来，这实际上是在破坏价值。
And so they, you know, they're they tend to be essentially sort of pro momentum, pro cyclical, which to me is is value destructive.
我认为从来就不存在一种放之四海而皆准的资本配置策略。
And there's I don't think there's ever any one right capital allocation policy.
这真的取决于你可能从各种选择中获得的潜在回报。
It really depends on what are, you know, the potential returns that you might get from the various things.
所以，如果你的股价被高估了，就不应该回购股票。
And so, you know, if your share price is overvalued, you shouldn't be buying back shares.
而股息也是如此，显然，如果公司产生大量现金，有很多研究表明，支付股息的公司表现更好。
And dividends, likewise, obviously, if companies generate a lot of cash, it's there's quite a lot of research showing that dividend payers do better.
但如果你开始支付过高的股息，就会把自己困住——因为你吸引了希望获得股息的股东，然后无论这是否是资本的最佳用途，你都不得不继续这么做。
But, you know, if you start paying out too high dividend, you're gonna trap yourself essentially in by you've attracted shareholders who want the dividend, and then you'll continue to do that whether it's the best use of your capital or not.
因此，我们在与管理层沟通时，会努力确保他们采取灵活的方式，并在合适的时候选择最合理的方案。
So we try to when we engage with management, try to make sure that they have a flexible approach and try to pursue the one that makes the most sense at at the right time.
在美国，似乎有一种态度认为股息没什么吸引力。
There seems to be a sort of attitude in America that dividends aren't very attractive.
我不太明白这一点。
And I'm not sure that I understand.
我认为这其中部分原因是税务考量。
I think some of that's driven by tax considerations.
显然，股息是按收入税率征税的。
Obviously, dividends get taxed at income rate.
你知道，如果你不是在股票回购中出售股票的一方，但我们实际上在一个板块上有所上涨。
And you know, if you're not a seller of equity in the buybacks, but we're actually up one sector.
不。
No.
不。
No.
当然。
Sure.
我不确定，它下跌了很多。
I I don't you know, is is down a lot.
你是专业投资者吗？
Are you a professional investor?
你每年会看多少份10-K报告和年报？
How many 10 k's and annual reports do you look at in a year?
你有没有想过，能否摆脱干扰，更快速、更有效地处理这些报告？
Ever wished you could cut through the noise and process them faster and more effectively?
我们为大型机构客户在他们的办公室提供法务会计课程。
We run a forensic accounting course for larger institutional clients in their offices.
对于较小的投资基金和个人，我们也在伦敦、纽约和通过Zoom进行现场授课。
For smaller investment funds and individuals, we also do them in person in London and New York and over Zoom.
如需更多详情，请发送邮件至 infobehindthebalancesheet dot com。
Email us at infobehindthebalancesheet dot com for more details.
当今的领导者依赖于经过严格验证、深入思考且可信的分析，以做出正确的投资和企业战略决策，这意味着他们对任何AI模型的输出必须有极高的信心。
Leaders today rely on properly vetted, deeply considered, trustworthy analysis to make the right investment and corporate strategy decisions, which means they need extremely high confidence in the output of any AI model.
与我们的所有解决方案一样，深度研究将优质内容与专门为商业和金融工作流程设计的细致整合相结合，并确保完全可追溯。
As with all of our solutions, deep research combines premium content with thoughtful integration specifically designed for business and financial workflows, as well as complete traceability.
深度研究能在几分钟内完成原本需要数天甚至数周的工作。
Deep Research does days or even weeks of work in minutes.
对于每一个提问，深度研究都会执行50次以上的搜索，并阅读数百份文档。
For every prompt, Deep Research runs 50 or more searches and reads hundreds of documents.
在这里，它正在制定一个计划，以应对我交给它的研究任务。
Here, it's creating a plan for how it's going to tackle the research task that I've given it.
一旦思考完成，它会格式化并交付其分析结果。
Once it's done thinking, it formats and delivers its analysis.
无论您身处金融领域还是企业战略领域，深度研究都会以一种便于决策的方式整理信息，自动生成行业概览、投资备忘录和竞争格局等输出内容。
Whether you're in finance or corporate strategy, deep research formats information in a way that makes it readily available for decision making, creating outputs like industry primers, investment memos, and competitive landscapes automatically.
由于AlphaSense始终提供来源链接，您可以确信所获得的信息是准确且可操作的。
And because AlphaSense always provides links to sources, you can trust that the information you're getting is accurate and actionable.
这不仅仅是快速给出答案，更是提供您可信赖的全面、战略性分析。
It's not just about fast answers, but comprehensive, strategic analysis you can trust.
那么，自从创办公司以来，您犯过的最糟糕的错误是什么？
Well, what's been the worst mistake you've made since starting the firm?
我天性倾向于逆向思考，我们曾对酒精行业进行了重大投资。
So I do tend to be contrarian by nature, and I we had made a significant investment in the alcohol sector.
在过去这段时间里，基本上你经历了繁荣与萧条的周期，不仅限于酒精行业，而是许多不同行业都如此。
And over the last so, basically, you had this boom bust cycle, not just in alcohol, but in many different industries.
所以在封锁期间，你知道，人们基本上没怎么进行某件事。
So during lockdown, you know, people, you know, didn't do very much of of one thing.
然后人们以为出现了短缺，于是就开始大幅增加生产。
And then after and and then that people thought there were shortages, so then they'd ramp up ramp up production.
这在许多行业中都发生过。
This is across many industries.
所以酒精行业也有类似的情况，疫情期间，人们以为没人会去酒吧喝酒了。
So alcohol had a similar one where and during COVID, you know, people thought no one was gonna drink at bars.
但实际上，人们喝得相当多。
People actually drank quite a lot.
然后，在美国和许多其他地方，基本上存在一个三级分销体系。
Then and you have, like, a three tier system basically in The United States and many other places.
因此，很难准确判断需求。
And so it's difficult to gauge demand.
于是，中间商和供应商因为担心短缺，要求提供更多的酒精产品。
And so the middleman and suppliers were demanding even more alcohol because they were feared shortages.
等到疫情结束，人们喝得更多了。
And then once COVID ended, people drank quite a lot.
我的意思是，饮酒量确实大幅上升了。
I mean, like, the drinking volumes went up a lot.
随后出现了一个‘宿醉’效应，所有人都库存过剩，酒水远超需求，然后销量开始下滑。
And then there was essentially a hangover where then everyone was sort of overstocked, everyone had more than enough alcohol, and then it came down.
所以我们买入时，股价已经下跌了。
And so we had bought, the shares were already down.
我们买入时，股价大概是40到45美元。
It was, like, $40.45 percent when we bought.
我们大约两年前买入的，当时除了库存与销售之间的矛盾，主要担忧还在于一些结构性因素正在产生影响——并不是完全切断了需求，但确实在边际上造成了冲击。
We bought them about two years ago, and the main fears about alcohol, beyond this inventory to sales, issue was that there were some structural factors at play that were not, you know, turning the tap off on demand completely, but at the margin having an impact.
比如GLP-1类药物，人们在使用这些药物时，饮酒、吸烟和进食都会减少。
And so you have GLP ones, you know, where people just drink and smoke less and eat less when they're on these products.
还有大麻的兴起，以及年轻人饮酒减少，这些都属于社会层面的变化。
You have, you know, some cannabis and young people drinking less, and so there are some societal changes.
但更糟糕的是，还有特朗普和关税问题，这简直制造了一场巨大的麻烦。
But, and then to cap it all off, you have, Trump and the tariffs, which has sort of created a massive, headache.
所以我认为，在边际上，库存与销售周期的反转将会花费更长的时间。
And so I think that on the on the margins, you know, it meant that the turnaround in the inventory to sales cycle is gonna take much longer.
我认为这个行业可能一直依赖所谓的高端化策略，也就是稍微延长烈酒的陈酿时间，同时提高价格，从而以更高的价格提供更好的产品。
And I do think that the industry probably they were relying on what they call premiumizing, which is to say that you sort of age the spirits a little more, but you raise prices, and so you're offering a better product at a at a higher price.
我认为他们可能把这个策略推得过头了，导致消费者开始转向更便宜的选择。
And I think they probably took that too far, and so people can trade down.
因此，酒精类股票的反转花了更长得多的时间，而且它们继续与我们的预期背道而驰。
And so the the turnaround in the alcohol names took much much longer, and they continued to move against us.
但我确实认为人类会持续饮酒，而且这更可能是周期性的，而非纯粹结构性的。
And I do think that humans are gonna keep on drinking, and I do think that it's probably more cyclical than purely structural.
但与此同时，我们已经退出了这一仓位，部分原因在于，你正看到一些拥有极其稳健资产负债表和卓越商业模式的优秀公司，正因这场AI狂热而被非理性抛售。
But at the same time, we've exited the position And, you know, and partly now just because you're seeing just some terrific companies with, you know, very clean balance sheets and phenomenal business models are being sold off irrationally with this AI mania.
我始终在努力提升投资组合的质量和估值，不是激进地，而是深思熟虑地。
And I'm always trying to improve the quality and the valuation of the portfolio, not hyperactively, but thoughtfully.
因此，我们已经退出了Prevatt Capital，并买入了一些新仓位，我认为这些新持仓的估值更好、资产负债表更健康，而且表现非常出色。
And so, you know, we we have exited Prevatt Capital, and we have, you know, bought some new positions that, you know, I I think have even better valuation and even better balance sheets and, you know, are are terrific.
所以当你发现更好的机会时，你必须客观地做出调整并向前看。
So you you have to sort of be objective and move on when you find better opportunities.
不过，这确实很难，不是吗？
Quite difficult to do, though, isn't it?
是的。
Yes.
我认为，不幸的是，显然存在许多认知偏差，如果人们愿意，可以阅读相关书籍来了解它们。
I think that, unfortunately I mean, there there are many, obviously, cognitive biases, and people can read books about them if they want.
但我确实认为，如果你一直撰写投资者信件，你往往会把自己的自尊与持仓绑定在一起。
But I do think that you end up, you know, tying your ego into positions often if you've been writing investor letters.
我认识一些非常优秀的基金经理，正因如此，他们从不写投资者信，或者尽量减少撰写，以免把自己困在过去的立场里——比如对方会说：‘你上一封信里还说那件事呢’，结果你就无法改变主意或抓住更好的机会了。
And there's some great managers I know who, for that reason, don't write investor letters or keep it to a minimum because you're then sort of not, you know, pinning yourself into a corner where they're like, well, last letter you wrote to me about that, and then you're incapable of changing your mind or taking advantage of better opportunities.
那你又是如何克服这一点的呢？
And how have you overcome that?
我认为简单的答案是，你必须保持谦逊，并愿意承认自己可能错了。
I think the simple answer is you have to, I think, be humble and be willing to be wrong.
因此，谦逊和少一些自我，我希望自己能够做到，但这并不意味着我就是完美的，或者我不会在未来犯错。
And so probably like humility and lack of ego, which I hope I can have, but it doesn't mean that I am perfect or that I won't make future mistakes.
你只能尽量减少这些错误。
You just have to try to minimize them.
你的童年经历对培养谦逊和减少自我有帮助吗？
And your childhood, has that helped with the humility and lack of ego?
我希望如此。
I hope so.
那你的父亲呢？
And your dad?
嗯，我认为我的父母是极好的榜样。
Well, my father and mother, I think, were extraordinary examples.
他们经营戒毒中心长达四十年。
They ran the drug rehab center for forty years.
我母亲几年前去世了，但他们从未为自己所做的一切寻求过任何关注。
My mother passed away a couple years ago, but they never really sought any attention for what they did.
他们几乎没有关于他们所做之事的媒体报道，却帮助了数十万人。
They you know, there are almost no press articles about what they've done, and they've helped hundreds of thousands of people.
所以我认为，你其实并不一定非得这么做。
And so I think, like, you you don't really need to do it.
你知道，我以前做播客是为了讨论各种观点，比如当有报告发布或者我出书的时候。
Like, you know, I I used to do podcasts to, you know, talk about various things that variant perception, like, when reports would come out or or or when I had a book out.
但自从这之后，我只和泰德·西图斯做过一期播客。
But I've done one podcast with Ted Situs since this one.
我没听说过他。
I have not heard of him.
是的。
Yeah.
他是一位很棒的朋友和导师。
And, you know, he's a terrific friend and mentor.
而且，显然，我现在正在忙着进行一系列采访来推广这本书。
And then, obviously, I'm doing I'm doing, you know, shooting up interviews to to promote the book right now.
但你知道，一旦这些事做完，我就回到基金上，尽量埋头专心工作。
But, you know, once those are done, back to the fund and in terms of, you know, try to keep my head down and focus on work.
那么这家公司的最终目标是什么？
And what's the goal ultimately for the firm?
我的意思是，你想要打造什么样的东西？
I mean, what what do you want to build?
我只是希望几十年如一日地以高利率实现资本复利增长。
I I would like to just compound capital at a high rate for decades.
这就是目标。
That's the goal.
我认为投资真的是一场超马拉松。
And I think that investing really is an ultramarathon.
而且你知道，数字的规律是，你很容易在短期内高估自己的成就，却在长期中低估自己能实现的成果。
And, you know, the the way numbers work, you know, you can easily overestimate what you're doing in the short run and underestimate what you can achieve in the long run.
你复利的时间越长，这一点就越重要。
And the longer you compound, the more it matters.
所以，我建立这个企业是为了能长期运营下去，我们有一支非常出色的分析师团队。
So, you know, I've set set up the business to be one that can go on for years, and we have a great team of analysts.
我们规模不大，但有一支很棒的团队。
We're small, but, you know, we have a great team.
我希望我们能长期合作，为我们的投资者以及我们自己实现资本的复利增长。
And I hope we can all work together for a very long period of time and, you know, multiply the capital of our our investors in our own.
还有你的妻子Stacy，她很可爱，但在另一家机构担任分析师。
And Stacy, your wife, who's lovely, is an analyst at a different firm.
我只是好奇，你们在餐桌上会聊工作吗？
And I just wondered when you know, do you talk shop at the dinner table?
不会。
No.
她之前在另一家基金工作，后来Nathan出生了，之后就一直没再工作了。
So she had had been working with another fund, and then Nathan was born, and she's she's has not been working since.
但你可能会很惊讶。
But you'd you'd be surprised.
我们实际上几乎从不谈论市场或投资。
We actually don't talk about markets or investing almost at all.
我们通常就是想做个好父母，照顾内森，他一个人的能量比我们俩加起来还多。
We we're generally, you know, trying to just be parents with Nathan who has more energy than both of us put together.
这还挺有趣的。
Well, that's quite funny.
我的意思是，自从你开始以来，最大的意外是什么？
And I mean, what's been the biggest surprise since you started?
你没想到的是什么？
What didn't you expect?
这很难说，我其实还没好好想过这个问题。
It's difficult to say, I haven't really thought that through.
我觉得你总是要面对业务方面的问题，比如出去募资、跟资金配置方沟通。
I think you you always have the business side, you know, which is you have to go out and raise money and talk to allocators.
然后还有投资方面。
And then you have the investing side.
这两者非常不同。
Both are are very different.
我觉得投资者们非常深思熟虑。
I think I think allocators are very thoughtful.
对吧？
Right?
他们确实有非常重要的工作，但我认为他们本质上也是普通人。
And they have very important jobs, but I think they're ultimately human too.
所以，当我们跑输大盘时，就没人理我们。
And so, you know, when we're underperforming the index, you know, we get no love.
而当我们跑赢大盘时，就会有很多人想见我们、和我们交谈，给予我们很多关注。
And when, you know, we were ahead of the index, we got quite a lot of love in terms of people wanting to meet and talk to us.
对我来说，这一点有点出乎意料。
And that to me that to me was a little surprising.
但话说回来，事情就是如此。
But, again, like, it is what it is.
而且
And
这为什么让你感到惊讶？
Why did that surprise you?
因为我觉得他们自己的投资组合也非常广泛和多元化。
Well, because I think they have pretty broad diversified portfolios themselves.
所以，你知道，我们正在努力做点什么。
And so, you know, there's a we're trying to do something.
你知道，我们的活动有一定的细分领域，我觉得我们能够融入其中，而且我经常理解，配置者们有自己的限制。
You know, there's a certain niche to our our activity, and I would imagine that, you know, we can fit into that or that and and I and I understand it quite often, allocators, you know, they have their own constraints.
对吧？
Right?
因此，对他们中的许多人来说，他们与基金有着非常长期的关系。
So for many of them, they have very long relationships with with funds.
这有点像纽约爱乐乐团，你知道，除非首席小号手退休或去世，否则你不可能接替他的位置。
And it's sort of like the New York Philharmonic where, you know, you're not gonna play first trumpet until the first trumpet retires or dies.
对吧？
Right?
所以你得等到那里有空缺才行。
And so you have to wait till there there's an opening there.
因此，了解配置者的位置让我大开眼界，也让我对他们所做的工作有了更多的尊重和欣赏。
And so learning about the allocators positions has has been eye opening and leads me to have a lot more respect and appreciation of what they do.
但你知道，让我有点惊讶的是，这种兴趣的起起落落。
But, you know, it's the ebbs and flows of, you know, the the interest that I I was a little surprised by.
而在投资方面，我不能说有什么特别出乎意料的地方。
And then on the on the investing side, I can't say that they're, like, big surprises.
这更多是一种持续的学习过程，关于市场的认知。
It's just more I think it's a constant learning, you know, about markets.
我想，也许令人惊讶的是，或者是我还不够愤世嫉俗，即使我读过很多金融历史。
I think maybe the surprise or maybe I'm not cynical enough or even if I've read a lot of financial history.
就像我们之前谈到的SaaS，投资者如何在一年、两年或三年内发生变化，比如从2021年最受青睐的行业变成现在最不受欢迎的行业。
Just the the, you know, like, SaaS we're talking about earlier where how investors change, you know, within a year or two or three to, like, you know, from, like, most loved sector in 2021 to most hated now.
看到投资者情绪的转变，我觉得非常有趣。
And that's just very interesting to me to see shifts in investor sentiment.
而现在，这确实影响了CarGurus。
And now, I mean, that's affected CarGurus.
是什么让你买了这只股票？
What made you get into that stock?
因为它已经发生了很大的变化。
Because it's kind of changed its spots.
对吧？
Right?
不。
No.
CarGurus本质上是一个在线平台。
So CarGurus is fundamentally an online platform.
是的。
Yeah.
所以它并不是软件即服务。
So it's not a software as a service.
你在美國有幾家。
You have a couple in The US.
它們遠遠是最大的，擁有接近兩倍於前競爭對手的訪問量。
They are by far the largest, and they have, you know, close to, like, twice the visitors as an ex competitor.
所以你指的是Cars.com、Auto Trader，不是英國的那家，而是由科克斯家族擁有的那家。
So you like cars.com, Auto Trader, which is not The U UK one, but it's owned by Cox family.
當時，CarGurus的股價大幅下跌，因為他們收購了一家名為Car Offer的公司，而這家公司後來已經關閉了。
And CarGurus, at the time, the stock had gone down quite a lot because they had made an acquisition of a company called Car Offer where they which which they've since wound down.
而Car Offer本質上是取得車輛的所有權，並在經銷商之間進行批發交易。
And there, that Car Offer was essentially taking a title of the vehicle, and it was doing wholesale between dealers.
因此，這扭曲了它們的財務狀況——原本是一個高毛利、輕資產的業務，從不擁有車輛所有權或負責交付。
And so it was distorting their financials where you basically had a sort of high gross margin, capital light business, you know, where they never take title of any delivery.
突然間，一切都因為Car Offer變得混亂不堪。
It's just listings to suddenly having it all muddied and messed up with the car offer.
因此，我认为许多投资者抛售了这只股票，你知道，股价大幅下跌。
And so I think many investors sold the stock, you know, it it was down very significantly.
我们当时在研究，认为他们的在线核心平台是否完全正常？
And we were looking at it and thought, were their online core platforms totally fine?
而Car Offer最终，你知道，他们关闭了这项业务。
And, you know, car offer in in the end, you know, they shut it down.
所以，像出血一样停止了，我认为他们从中学到了教训。
So, like, the bleeding stopped, and I think they learned from the lessons.
我们与首席执行官杰森·特雷瓦特和管理团队进行了交流，你知道，我们觉得他们整体上确实是优秀的资本配置者。
And we spoke to Jason Trevatt, the CEO and management, and, you know, we we felt that they overall were actually good capital allocators.
而且，当然，自由现金流，显然我们认为会随着时间增长，事实也确实如此。
And, you know, sure enough, the free and then free cash flow, obviously, we thought would be growing over over time, which it has.
我认为他们根本没有行使多少定价权。
I don't think they've exercised much pricing power at all.
你可以看到，英国的Auto Trader利润率要高得多，而在线平台往往趋向于垄断或双头垄断。
And you can see that, like, Auto Trader in The UK has much higher margins, and the online platforms tend towards monopoly or duopoly.
因此，对于CarGurus来说，其发展方向非常明确，它向美国的经销商输送了更多且更优质的潜在客户，并且显然正在从竞争对手手中夺取市场份额。
So it was very clear the direction of travel, I think, for CarGurus, which sends more leads and better leads to dealers in The United States, and they're clearly taking market share from their competitors.
但我认为，一个担忧是，AI代理可能会绕过这些平台。
But I think one fear is that basically AI agents are gonna disintermediate the platforms.
一位深思熟虑的投资者——他也是我基金的投资人——告诉我，他认为预订量可能会降至零，比如你计划下周末去巴黎，可以直接让AI代理帮你订酒店。
And one thoughtful investor, he's an investor in my fund, told me that he thinks booking could go could go to zero, you know, where you could decide to, you know, ask the agent to go book you a hotel in Paris if you're going next weekend.
不过，基于多种原因，我对这种情况是否会真的发生持一定怀疑态度，但我想，纵观整个在线平台领域，不仅仅是CarGurus，许多公司的股价相比十二或十八个月前的高点，已经下跌了50%甚至更多。
Now I'm a little bit doubtful that that's gonna happen for a variety of reasons, but I think online platforms themselves, if you look across the board, not just CarGurus, but many are down 50% or more from, you know, their highs twelve or eighteen months ago.
因此，在我看来，当这些公司的企业自由现金流倍数低至个位数时，市场显然出现了过度反应，这时候正是入手的好时机。
So, you know, there clearly is an overreaction in in my view when you can start picking these up for, like, low teens, you know, multiples, you know, of free cash flow enterprise free cash flow.
但对我个人而言，使用ChatGPT或其他类似工具并不存在任何障碍。
But the the there isn't any obstruction to me going on ChatGPT or wherever.
我其实不太常使用ChatGPT，但有些平台会说：‘好吧，我三周后要去巴黎，你能帮我找找最优惠的选项吗？’
I don't actually use ChatGPT that much, but one of the platforms and saying, okay, I'm going to Paris in three weeks time, can you find the best offers?
即使今天还没有这样的功能，但三个月后、三年后，这种功能很可能就会出现。
And even if that facility isn't available today, facility may be available in three months' time or three years' time.
我的意思是，你确实提出了一个重要的观点，那就是这种情况确实可能发生，但我认为有几点因素会阻碍它：第一，为什么Booking或Expedia不利用AI来改进自己的产品，或者直接为你提供这个智能代理，而不是让一个独立的代理来做呢？
I mean, so the and you do you do raise an important point, which is like, it is possible that this will happen, but there's a couple of things that I think work against that, which is one, why is why Booking or Expedia not gonna use AI to, like, make their own product better or offer you that agent versus having a separate agent doing that?
那么，这些房源信息到底从哪里来？
And then, like, where is this listing coming from?
其他人的评价又是怎样的？
And what are the ratings of the other people?
你知道，他们在网站上积累了多年的用户评价，这些来自住过酒店的用户会告诉你真实体验。
You know, like, they have a long history of ratings on their site of other people who've been to the hotel will tell you what what it's like.
所以他们本质上是假设，某种AI会从零开始，自行收集所有这些数据。
So they're they're basically assuming that, like, from scratch, some AI is going to start pulling in all this data.
然后，谷歌，抱歉。
And then Google sorry.
顺便说一句，Booking支持翻译成大约30种语言。
Booking, by the way, translates it into, like, 30 languages.
无论你身处世界哪个国家，都可以使用你偏好的支付方式。
And no matter which country you're in in the world, you can use your, you know, preferred payment method.
你知道，如果一个中国人想去巴黎预订酒店，他们可以使用在中国常用的支付方式。
You know, so if a Chinese person wants to go to Paris and book, you know, they can use payment methods that, you know, are are used in China.
因此，你必须复制所有这些功能，才能为用户提供良好的体验。
And so you have to start replicating all of that to provide a good experience for the user.
而且，一般来说，人类喜欢比较事物。
And then furthermore, in general, humans like to compare things.
你知道吧？
You know?
所以不仅仅是说，帮我订一间房。
And so it's not just, you know, go book me a room.
而是你希望上网实际看看有哪些选项。
It's like you want to go online and actually see what some of the options are.
是的，当然。
No, sure.
但我的意思是，AI非常擅长规划行程。
But I mean, one of the things that AIs are very good at is planning trips.
所以它们非常擅长处理，因为旅行本质上是一个数学约束问题。
So they're very good at taking because a trip's a mathematical constraint.
你知道，我有十三天时间，想参观这些地方，顺便还得从这里到那里，而且我不知道该在哪里过夜。
You know, I've got thirteen days, I want to visit these, and oh, by the way, I've got to go from here to here, and I don't know where to stop overnight.
我的确用过它们来做这些事。
I mean, that's what I've used them for.
所以在这些巨大的市场中，存在一个合乎逻辑的延伸方向。
So there's a logical extension in these huge markets.
因此，一个合乎逻辑的延伸就是：好吧，我们建立一个包含所有酒店的数据库，去查询它——或者甚至不需要建立数据库，直接去快速完成所有搜索。
So a logical extension of that is to say, okay, well let's create a database of all the hotels and interrogate that or not even create a database but just go and do all the searches and do them really quickly.
你凭什么相信Booking或CarGurus能比其他公司做得更好？
What gives you conviction that a Bookings or a CarGurus that that they'll be able to do that better than
我的意思是，它们已经拥有了一些关系，比如Booking与这些酒店之间早已建立的合作关系。
I mean, they they already have, for example, relationships, like in the case of Booking with all these hotels already.
是的。
Yeah.
CarGurus 已经与经销商建立了关系。
CarGurus already has relationships with the dealers.
他们已经能够访问这些列表，并且可以预订房间或发送高意向的购车线索。
They already get access to to the listings and, you know, can book the the rooms or send the high intent car purchase leads.
所有这些基本上都需要由人工智能从零开始重新构建。
Like, all of this basically has to be recreated from scratch by AI.
所以这并不是说人工智能不重要，但在我看来，这些模型很可能表现得非常相似，最终模型会变成大宗商品，真正受益的是能够使用它们的人。
And so it's not to say that AI is not gonna matter, but I think it's far more likely in my view that a lot of these models perform very similarly where the models turn into commodity and the net benefit is people who can use them.
没有理由认为在线平台，甚至一些软件公司，不会自己从人工智能中获益。
And there's no reason why online platforms or even, you know, some software companies aren't gonna be the ones that benefit from AI themselves.
你在软件领域就能看到这种情况，比如薪资服务提供商的利润就大幅下降了。
And you find this in software, you know, or, like, payroll providers are down quite a lot.
对吧？
Right?
你想想，当你要处理极其复杂的本地和国家税收，以及因离婚或学生贷款而扣薪的情况时，有谁会天真地认为人工智能能替你管理所有薪资事务呢？
Like, you know, good luck to someone thinking that AI is gonna, like, manage all their payroll when you have to deal with an enormously complex set of local and national taxes, plus garnishing wages for divorce payments or student loans.
而且看起来，人们正在把婴儿和洗澡水一起倒掉，对这些公司有着非常二元化的看法。
And it seems that, like, people are throwing the baby out with the bathwater and and just, you know, very binary thinking about some of these companies.
有意思。
Interesting.
所以我非常喜欢
So I love the
你书中的那句引言。
quotation in in your book.
我们是自己心灵的雕塑家。
We are the sculptor of our own minds.
这太棒了。
That was amazing.
这句话来自圣地亚哥·拉蒙-卡哈尔，他是第一位获得诺贝尔医学奖的西班牙人。
And that that is a quote that comes from Santiago Ramon y Cajal, was the first Spaniard to win the Nobel Prize in medicine.
这句话被刻在以他命名的拉蒙-卡哈尔医院的入口处。
And that quote was at the entrance to the hospital, Ramon y Caja, was named after him.
我以前常去探望住在传染病病房的朋友。
And I used to go visit my friends who were in the infectious diseases ward.
你知道的，八九十年代他们得了艾滋病，那时我还没上大学。
You know, they had AIDS in the eighties and nineties before I went to college.
那句话真的激励了我去学习。
And that quote really was the inspiration for me to to learn.
嗯，这是
Well, it's
一个很棒的名言，你确实塑造了自己的思想。
a fantastic quote, and you have been the sculptor of your own mind.
我希望五年后我们还能再进行这样的对话。
I hope that we're gonna be doing this again in five years time.
到时候我们会谈论什么
What will we be talking about
呢？
then?
我希望，你知道，我们可能会讨论一些其他被忽视或不被看好的优秀投资。
I would I would hope that, you know, I mean, we we might comment on other great, investments that, are or hated and unloved.
我觉得，让我兴奋的是找到那些被误解或定价错误的东西，利用这些便宜货，毕竟，投资归根结底就是以低于其价值的价格买入。
I think, like, the thing that excites me is finding something that I think is misunderstood or mispriced and taking advantage of bargains and, you know, investing ultimately is about buying something for less than it's worth.
所以，我希望还能看到更多像Booking这样的例子，它为我们带来了非常好的回报。
So I hope there'll be be more examples of, you know, Booking, which has done very well for us.
不。
No.
而且，我真的不希望发生太多变化。
And and then I I honestly hope not that much changes.
我希望我的分析师们依然开心，我们大家依然能齐心协力、共同进步。
I hope my the analysts are still happy, and we're all working together and doing well.
这就是我的期望。
So that's that's my hope.
乔纳森，非常感谢你。
Jonathan, thanks so much.
谢谢。
Thank you.
我花了好几个小时与乔纳森交谈。
I've spent several hours talking to Jonathan.
每次与他交谈后，我总能学到一些东西，并为他知识的深度与广度感到惊叹。
I always come away having learned something and amazed by the depth and breadth of his knowledge.
那句话——‘你是自己心灵的雕塑家’——特别适用于乔纳森的人生。
That phrase, you are the sculptor of your own mind, is particularly applicable to Jonathan's life.
他的父亲埃利奥特是我心中的英雄，过着比我认识的几乎任何人都更充实的生活。
His father Elliot is a hero of mine and has achieved a more fulfilled life than almost anyone I know.
他的一生充满悲伤与失去，却依然保持着深厚的宗教信仰。
His has been a life full of sadness and loss, yet he retains a deep religious belief.
他是一位令人钦佩的人物，我知道乔纳森不会介意我在节目结束时向他父亲致以这份致敬，并提出两个请求：购买乔纳森的《吸毒成瘾》一书，你一定会非常喜欢。
He is an inspiring character, and I know Jonathan won't mind if I end the show with this tribute to his dad and two requests: buy Jonathan's book Shooting Up, you'll enjoy it immensely.
请访问 betel.org，也就是 betel.org/forward/slash/donate，给这个慈善机构捐一点钱。
And please visit betel.org that's betel.org forward slash donate and give the charity a little money.
谢谢。
Thank you.
《资产负债表》及其关联方和播客嘉宾可能持有本播客中讨论的证券的股份或经济利益，本播客仅用于您的教育和娱乐目的。
Behind the Balance Sheet and affiliates and podcast guests may own shares or have an economic interest in securities discussed in this podcast, which is aired for your education and entertainment only.
本播客中的任何内容均不应被视为投资建议，或用于投资决策的依据。
Nothing in this podcast should be construed as investment advice or relied upon for investment decisions.
请务必自行进行研究。
Always do your own research.
谢谢收听。
Thank you for listening.
希望您喜欢这一集。
I hope you enjoyed this episode.
如果您能将此节目分享给一位朋友，我会非常感激。
It would mean a great deal to me if you could please share this with just one friend.
欢迎通过订阅或在苹果播客或Spotify上留下评论来传播此节目。
And feel free to spread the word by subscribing or even leaving a review on Apple Podcasts or Spotify.
感谢您的支持。
Thank you for your support.
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