Read_881 - 问题远不止垃圾邮件这么简单

比特币的一个支柱功能从未如中本聪设计时预期的那样运作，这已是公开的秘密。

It's an open secret that one of Bitcoin's pillars never worked as Satoshi predicted at the time he designed Bitcoin.

早在比特币获得实际关注之前，这一功能就已失效。这个失败存在已久，我们已将其视为墙上的裂缝般习以为常，尽管它多年来不断蔓延，我们却学会了视而不见。

It faltered even before Bitcoin started getting any real traction, and this failure has been part of the landscape for so long that we normalized it like a crack in the wall that's been growing for years, but we learned to ignore.

虽然表面上与当前NIMPUL政策辩论（被民众称为垃圾邮件过滤器）无关，但它实际上是问题的核心。

It doesn't seem to have any relation to the current NIMPUL policy debate that are known among the plebs as spam filters, but it's actually at the center of the issue.

显然我指的是挖矿去中心化——或者说它的缺失。

I'm obviously referring to mining decentralization or the lack thereof.

比特币精髓的有声呈现。

The best in Bitcoin made audible.

我是盖伊·斯旺，这里是《比特币有声读物》。

I am Guy Swan, and this is Bitcoin Audible.

大家好，最近怎么样？

What is up, guys?

欢迎回到《比特币有声读物》。

Welcome back to Bitcoin Audible.

我是盖伊·斯旺，我对比特币的阅读量比你认识的任何人都要多。

I am Guy Swan, the guy who has read more about Bitcoin than anybody else you know.

本期节目由人权基金会赞助播出。

This show is brought to you by the Human Rights Foundation.

请访问hrf.org了解他们所做的杰出工作，同时订阅他们精彩的《金融自由报告》通讯，获取关于金融压制、央行数字货币、政府监控、通过银行货币体系实施的威权主义，以及我们反击这些问题的工具相关资讯。

Check them out at hrf.org and the incredible work that they do, as well as subscribe to their amazing newsletter, the Financial Freedom Report, for news around financial repression and CBDCs and government surveillance and authoritarianism through the banking and monetary infrastructure and the tools that help us fight back against that.

您可以在节目备注中找到相关链接。

You'll find the link right down in the show notes.

当然，如果你正在寻找一个非托管的、让你掌握链上密钥且闪电网络功能完备的方案，不妨试试BitKit移动钱包，支持iOS和安卓。

And of course, if you were looking for a non custodial, you hold the keys on chain and lightning that just works, check out the BitKit mobile wallet for iOS and Android.

好的。

Alright.

今天我们要深入探讨一篇我刚读完某人观点后发现的文章。

Now, today, we are gonna dig into a read, which I found just after I finished the guy's take.

我认为这篇文章非常精辟地指出了问题本质，因为感觉我们一直在核心问题上隔靴搔痒。

And I thought this was just a really good a really clean framing about what the real issue is, because I feel like we're we're arguing one layer up above the core issue.

我几乎反感关于垃圾信息和JPEG的争论让Ocean沦为是否运行过滤器的焦点——这可能导致不想运行过滤器的人抵触Ocean，甚至误以为使用Ocean矿池就等于支持过滤器，事实绝非如此。

And I almost don't like that the issue around spam and JPEGs and everything has been has basically put Ocean as the crux between whether or not you want to run filters so that people who think you don't want to run filters are likely to actually be disincentivized to use ocean or think that ocean is bad and that what they are doing or using ocean the ocean mining pool would somehow be supporting filters, is not the case.

它捍卫的是矿工自主构建模板的权利，在我看来这是保障比特币未来最重要的项目。

It is supporting the right for the miner to build their own template, and it is the most important project for securing Bitcoin's future in my opinion.

这些本质都在JPEG是否该上链的争论中遗失了——无论我们能否通过内存池策略解决这个问题。

And I think this has all got lost in the debate, the issue of whether or not we want JPEGs on the blockchain and or if there's anything that we can do about them, whether it be a mempool policy or not.

我要质问所有支持移除OP_RETURN过滤器、力挺Core反对Luke的人：除了矿池中心化和矿工不自主构建模板的问题，还有什么项目比这对比特币安全、长期存续和去中心化更重要？

And I actually challenge anybody who is totally supportive of removing the op return filters and is supportive of CORE and against Luke to tell me what project you think is more important to the security and long term viability and decentralization of Bitcoin than the mining pool centralization problem and the fact that Bitcoin miners, the actual miners themselves, are not building their own templates.

若你认同该问题的重要性，请问哪个项目比Ocean更具实践意义？

And if you do agree on the importance of that issue, what project is doing more practically?

目前没有其他项目能取得比Ocean更实质的成果。

It's actually achieving more in the real world results than ocean right now.

因为我真切认为这是最重要的问题，而Ocean是唯一真正付诸行动的项目。

Because I genuinely find this the most important issue in combination with the most important project actually doing something about it.

仅因在Nimple政策辩论中立场不同就否定这一切，就像断言Bitcoin Core毫无价值、参考客户端是垃圾一样愚蠢。

And to dismiss that just because you're on the different side of a debate about Nimple policy is as dumb as saying Bitcoin Core is completely lost, has never contributed anything of any benefit, and that the reference reference client is garbage.

我认为，如果我们真想解决比特币的主要问题，就必须认识到这两种说法的谬误之处——仅仅因为我们在其他议题上存在分歧，就无视其优点，这种做法实在愚不可及。

I think if we actually want to solve Bitcoin's major problems, recognizing the fallacy of both of those statements and not being able to appreciate the good because we disagree on some other topic, I think is just deeply foolish.

我觉得这篇文章很好地勾勒出了更重要的宏观图景，并阐述了当前的实际应对措施。

And I thought this article did a great job of framing the more important picture and what's actually being done about it.

闲话少叙，我们直接进入文章内容，标题是《Lop Return Wars》。

So without further ado, we'll go ahead and just jump into the article, and it's titled Lop Return Wars.

问题根源远非垃圾邮件过滤器那么简单。

The Problem Is Deeper Than Spam Filters.

《Stratum v1必须被淘汰》——Unhosted Marcellus著。

Stratum v one Needs to Die by Unhosted Marcellus.

比特币的支柱功能之一从未如中本聪设计时所预期的那样运作，这已是公开的秘密。

It's an open secret that one of Bitcoin's pillars pillars never worked as Satoshi predicted at the time he designed Bitcoin.

早在比特币获得实际关注度之前，这个功能就已失效。这个长期存在的缺陷如同墙面上逐年扩大的裂缝，我们却习以为常地选择了忽视。

It faltered even before Bitcoin started getting any real traction, and this failure has been part of the landscape for so long that we normalized it like a crack in the wall that's been growing for years but we learned to ignore.

表面看来它与当前MIMPOL政策辩论（即大众所说的垃圾邮件过滤器）无关，实则正是问题的核心所在。

It doesn't seem to have any relation to the current MIMPOL policy debate, better known among the plebs as spam filters, but it actually is at the center of the issue.

我指的显然是挖矿去中心化（或者说其缺失）问题。

I'm obviously referring to mining decentralization or the lack thereof.

中本聪最初的误判。

Satoshi's original miscalculation.

如今人们普遍承认，中本聪未能预见到矿池的兴起。

It is well acknowledged today that Satoshi didn't predict the rise of mining pools.

细读白皮书就能发现，他显然认为网络会采用现在所谓的彩票挖矿模式——大量匿名小矿工凭借微不足道的算力份额随机出块，可能终其一生仅有一次机会。

If you read the white paper, it seems clear that he thought the network would work on what today is called lottery mining, where large numbers of anonymous small miners with an imperceptible chunk of the total hash rate would be finding blocks at random, maybe just once in their lifetime.

系统的这一特性构成了比特币主要防御体系和抗审查能力的基础。

This property of the system was the basis for Bitcoin's primary defense system and censorship resistance.

如果全球任何比特币节点都可能成为下一个区块的挖矿者，那么强制执行OFAC合规列表或恶意分叉等行为将变得极其困难。

It's very difficult to do something like enforcing OFAC compliance lists or a malicious fork if literally any Bitcoin node around the world could be the one that mines the next block.

换句话说，要使挖矿按照比特币发明者预期的方式运作，你既无法预测哪些节点将挖掘接下来的数百个区块，也无法识别它们的身份。

In other words, for mining to work as desired by Bitcoin's inventor, you should not be able to predict which nodes would mine the next hundreds of blocks nor identify who they are.

以下是白皮书中的几个片段，强调了节点参与挖矿过程的重要性。

The following are a few fragments of the white paper that highlight the importance of the node's involvement in the mining process.

五。

Five.

网络。

The network.

运行网络的步骤如下：一。

The steps to run the network are as follows: one.

新交易向所有节点广播。

New transactions are broadcast to all nodes.

二。

Two.

每个节点将新交易收集到区块中。

Each node collects new transactions into a block.

三。

Three.

每个节点致力于为其区块寻找一个高难度的工作量证明。

Each node works on finding a difficult proof of work for its block.

四。

Four.

当一个节点找到工作量证明时，它会将该区块广播给所有节点。

When a node finds a proof of work, it broadcasts the block to all nodes.

节点只有在区块中所有交易都有效且未被花费时才会接受该区块。

Nodes accept the block only if all transactions in it are valid and not already spent.

节点通过将已接受区块的哈希值作为前一个哈希值，开始创建链中的下一个区块，以此表示对该区块的接受。

Nodes express their acceptance of the block by working on creating the next block in the chain, using the hash of the accepted block as the previous hash.

参考另一部分：工作量证明还解决了在多数决策中确定代表权的问题。

Referencing another section: The proof of work also solves the problem of determining representation in majority decision making.

如果多数决策是基于一个IP地址一票，那么任何能够分配多个IP的人都可以破坏这一机制。

If the majority were based on one IP address one vote, it could be subverted by anyone able to allocate many IPs.

工作量证明本质上是“一个CPU一票”。

Proof of work is essentially one CPU, one vote.

多数决策由最长的链代表，这条链投入了最大的工作量证明努力。

The majority decision is represented by the longest chain, which has the greatest proof of work effort invested in it.

如果大多数CPU算力由诚实节点控制，诚实链将增长最快，超过任何竞争链。

If a majority of CPU power is controlled by honest nodes, the honest chain will grow the fastest and outpace any competing chains.

节选结束。

End excerpt.

众所周知，比特币挖矿很早就不是这样运作的了。

As we all know, Bitcoin mining stopped working like that very early on.

在Laszlo Hyniax和Arzforce的时代，由于各自独立开发了GPU挖矿技术，他们每人持有的总算力份额与今天的Foundry或Ant Pool相当。

In the times of Laszlo Hyniax and Arzforce, each of them held slices of the total hashrate comparable to Foundry or Ant Pool today, as a result of having independently developed GPU mining.

中本聪甚至通过电子邮件告诫拉斯洛，因其挖出了过多区块，这催生了多笔比特币披萨交易，这些早期币的分发正是出于去中心化的无私努力。

Satoshi even admonished Laszlo over email for mining too many blocks, which gave birth to several Bitcoin Pizza transactions in an altruistic effort to decentralize the issuance of those early coins.

2730年11月，首个矿池Brains（前身为Slushpool）上线，几年后Stratum V1协议最终定稿并席卷了整个挖矿领域。

On November 2730, the first ever mining pool launched, Brains, formerly Slushpool, and a couple of years later Stratum V1 was finalized and took the mining scene by storm.

余下的都已成为历史。

The rest is history.

作为比特币矿工，加入矿池共享收益有显而易见的理由，但Stratum V1存在重大缺陷。

As a Bitcoin miner, there are obvious reasons for joining a pool and sharing rewards, but Stratum V1 has a major flaw.

只有矿池运营者运行比特币全节点，矿工仅接入他们的哈希机器，完全不了解比特币协议。

Only the pool operator runs a Bitcoin node, and miners only plug in their hashing machines, completely unaware of the Bitcoin protocol.

这意味着最初理解的'矿工角色'实质上已经消亡。

This meant the death of the quote miner role as was understood at the outset.

它被分割为仅将专业设备接入电源接收定期支付的'哈希工'，和运行全节点、保管收益并组织分发的'矿池运营者'。

It was split into the hasher that just plugs his specialized machines into the power outlet to receive periodic payouts, and the pool operator that runs the Bitcoin node, takes custody of the rewards, and organizes the payout.

与此同时，'节点运行者'这一角色应运而生。

Separately, the role of the node runner emerged.

这些用户通过维护节点来验证自己的支付，但并未贡献算力维护链的诚实性，如今他们构成了比特币节点的绝对主体。

These are users that maintain a node to verify their own payments but who don't contribute CPU power to keep the chain honest, and today make up the absolute majority of the Bitcoin nodes.

尽管理论上哈希工可以随意切换矿池，这种架构确实为少数大型玩家主导的中心化挖矿格局埋下伏笔。

Even though in theory hashers can switch pools on a whim, this architecture did set the stage for a mining landscape centralised on just a few big players.

如今向比特币网络投入更多算力（确切地说是ASIC算力）已不再有助于维护区块链的诚实性。

Today adding more CPU power to the Bitcoin network, or rather ASIC power, no longer contributes to keeping the chain honest.

诚实性反而依赖于矿池运营者霸主们的仁慈。

Honesty rests instead on the benevolence of our pool operator overlords.

矿池规模的参考图：挖矿的绝对现状。

Reference image for the size of mining pools: The absolute state of mining.

你知道吗？超过50%的算力也是符合KYC要求的。

Did you know that over 50% of hash rate is KYC compliant too?

节选自Greg Maxwell和Peter Todd在2013年邮件中讨论的、令人联想到海洋的矿池设计方案。

Excerpt from Greg Maxwell and Peter Todd discussing a mining pool design reminiscent of oceans in an email dated from 2013.

我在会议上和Gregory Maxwell讨论了去中心化挖矿的问题。

I was talking with Gregory Maxwell about decentralizing mining at the conference.

他提出了利用Luke Dasher的GitBlock模板协议将挖矿功能紧密集成到客户端的想法。

He came up with the idea of tightly integrating mining functionality into the client using Luke Dasher's GitBlock template protocol.

现有的Git工作与ASIC不兼容。

The existing Git work is not compatible with ASICs.

这个想法是尽可能简化独立挖矿，并将矿池转变为仅协调份额支付而非区块构建的结构。

The idea would be to make solo mining as easy as possible and furthermore, to move pools to a structure where the pools function is to coordinate share payments, not block construction.

本质上，矿工将成为真正的矿工，自主选择交易，而矿池则根据份额给予信用并进行核算。

Essentially, hashers would become true miners, doing transaction selection on their own, and then pools would credit them for their shares and do the accounting.

在这种模式下，矿池最多只能欺诈矿工，而无法危害整个网络。

In this model, all a pool can do is defraud minors rather than harm the whole network.

聪明的想法。

Smart idea.

引用结束。

End quote.

虽然大多数开发者都承认这是个问题并设计了一些解决方案（如上例），但他们普遍认为不该由他们来解决这个问题。

While it's true that most developers acknowledge this as a problem and have devised a few solutions, example above, they generally don't feel like it's up to them to fix this issue.

归根结底，从事软件工程师或应用密码学工作与投身残酷无情的比特币挖矿业务截然不同。

At the end of the day, working as a software engineer or applied cryptographer is very different than going into the ruthless and unforgiving business of Bitcoin mining.

但时至今日，挖矿中心化仍是个大问题，更令人担忧的是，它引发了一种二阶效应，赢得了众多开发者的心。

But to this day mining centralization is still a big problem, and even more worryingly, it led to a second order effect that has won a lot of developers' hearts and minds.

这是MIMPL一致性的诱惑之歌。

The siren song of MIMPL consistency.

简而言之，MIMPL一致性是指网络中所有节点都运行与矿池运营商相同的MIMPL策略的情景。

In summary, MIMPL consistency is a scenario where all nodes in the network run the same MIMPL policies as the pool operators.

事实证明，当这种情况发生时，网络运行会更加顺畅，也让基于比特币开发的开发者生活更轻松。

It turns out that when that happens, the network can run much smoother and makes the lives of the developers building on top of Bitcoin much easier.

随着时间的推移，他们逐渐接受了矿池中心化这一既定事实，并开始越来越依赖这种现象来构建高级比特币功能。

Over time, they learned to accept mining pool centralization as a given, and they started to rely more and more on this phenomenon to build advanced Bitcoin features.

我将介绍最早期的案例之一，也可能是最重要的一个。

I'll cover one of the first ones and arguably maybe the most important.

MEMPUL一致性的典型代表：紧凑区块中继（Compact Block Relay）。

The poster child of MEMPUL consistency: Compact Block Relay.

BIP 152紧凑区块中继由Matt Corallo于2016年提出，并在比特币核心0.13版本中首次亮相。

BIP 152 Compact Block Relay was proposed in 2016 by Matt Corallo and made its debut in Bitcoin Core 0.13.

在此之前，当矿池运营商发现新区块并将其广播到点对点网络时，节点会连同其中的所有交易一起转发完整区块。

Until that point, when a pool operator found the block and broadcasted it to the peer to peer network, nodes relayed the full block along with all the transactions in it.

紧凑区块中继（CBR）提出，节点只需转发80字节的区块头，让每个节点利用本地MIM池中已有的未确认交易自行重建完整区块。

Compact Block Relay or CBR proposed that nodes just relay the block header, only 80 bytes, and let each node reconstruct the full block locally using the unconfirmed transactions it already has in its own MIM pool.

CBR解决了旧点对点网络在发现新区块时出现的流量激增问题，被认为是有助于维持挖矿去中心化的积极举措。

CBR fixed the traffic spikes that plagued the old peer to peer network when a new tip was found, and it's considered a positive nudge towards keeping mining decentralized.

传播速度较慢意味着，平均而言，连接状况不佳的小矿工相比通过高速链路直连的大矿池，其区块被孤立的概率更高。

Slower propagation means that on average, small miners with bad connectivity would see more of their blocks orphaned compared to the large pools peered directly over high speed links.

另一个真正受益于MIMPUL一致性的例子是手续费估算，这对L2协议的平稳运行尤为重要，因为所有这些协议都对时间敏感，需要及时确认链上交易。

Another example of something that really benefits from MIMPUL consistency are the fee estimations, which in turn are more important for the smooth operation of L2 protocols because all of them are time sensitive and require timely confirmation of their on chain transactions.

引用。

Quote.

运行诸如不接受铭文等自定义MIM矿池策略会破坏你节点的CBR功能吗？

Does running custom MIM pool policies such as not accepting inscriptions ruin CBR for your node?

并不完全如此，因为当节点因违反策略规则而丢弃未确认交易时，并不会彻底删除该交易。

Not exactly, because when a node discards an unconfirmed transaction due to violating a policy rule, it doesn't remove it altogether.

它会将交易保留在二级内存池中，目的正是为了紧凑区块中继，预期该交易仍会被挖出，但关键在于不会将其转发给对等节点。

It keeps it around in a secondary MEM pool precisely for the sake of compact block relay, expecting that it should still be mined, but crucially, it is not relayed to your peers.

但对于违反大多数节点强制执行策略的交易则不同，因为这种情况下你的对等节点一开始就不太可能转发这些交易给你。

This is not the case for transactions that violate a policy that is enforced by a super majority of nodes, because in that case it's unlikely that any of your peers will ever relay these transactions to you in the first place.

如果'MIM矿池一致性'意味着所有节点运行相同策略以看到相同交易，那么当矿池运营者在其挖出的区块中包含带外交易时，这种一致性就会被彻底打破。

If 'mim pool consistency' means that all nodes run the same policies in order to see the same transactions, nothing it up more royally than when a pool operator includes out of band transactions in a block they mined.

归根结底，我认为这正是过去两年开发阶层强烈反对更新内存池策略（俗称垃圾邮件过滤器）的主要原因，并对自行处理此事的节点运营者采取如此激烈的手段。

Ultimately, I believe this is the primary reason why the developer class has been so opposed for the last two years to keeping mempool policies, colloquially known as spam filters, up to date and act so viciously against node runners taking the matter into their own hands.

从他们的角度来看这是合理的，他们最关心的是内存池一致性。

It makes sense from their point of view, their primary concern is mempool consistency.

他们显然无法强制大型矿池运营者的老男孩俱乐部运行合理策略。

They clearly cannot force an old boys club of large pool operators to run sane policies.

因此要让所有MIM矿池保持最低阻力路径，就是把策略制定权从被视为信息闭塞、易于引导的节点运营者手中夺走。

So to keep all MIM pools equal to the path of least resistance is taking the policies away from node runners, who are perceived as being less informed and easier to lead as a herd.

他们的最终目标是让矿池运营者没有任何理由接受带外交易。

Their end goal is that pool operators don't have any reason to accept out of band transactions.

这也正是他们为何大肆夸大MIMPUL政策在现实中被规避的程度（参见0xB10C关于非标准交易的链上研究，该研究得出了相同结论）。

This is also why they greatly exaggerate the extent to which MIMPUL policies are being bypassed in the wild (see also this on chain study on non standard transactions from 0xB10C, which comes to the same conclusion).

内存池政策，揭穿恐惧、不确定性和怀疑的叙事。

Mempool policies, debunking the FUD narratives.

关于内存池政策的误导性言论如此之多，以至于我需要专门用一章来解释其本质并驳斥恶意叙事。

There is such a level of shackery surrounding Mempool policy that I need to dedicate a chapter explaining what it is and debunking malicious narratives.

首先，我认为将它们与共识规则进行比较会很有帮助。

To start, I think it's helpful to compare them to consensus rules.

共识规则是对区块头或其任何交易执行的检查，若不符合将标记该区块为无效并被所有节点拒绝。

A consensus rule is a check performed either on a block header or any of its transactions that will flag that block as invalid and rejected by all nodes.

共识规则的一个例子是：交易不能凭空创造聪（Satoshi）。

An example of a consensus rule is that a transaction may not create Sats out of thin air.

如果矿池运营者将此类交易打包进区块，整个区块都将被拒绝。

If such a transaction were to be included in a block by a pool operator, the whole block would be rejected.

MEMPUL政策是对新出现的未确认交易执行的检查。

A MEMPUL policy is a check performed on a newly seen unconfirmed transaction.

它可能导致你的节点不转发该交易，也不将其存储在内存池中。

It may prompt your node to not relay it and not store it in its MEMPUL.

但除此之外，按照共识规则它仍是有效交易。

But otherwise, it's a valid transaction by consensus rules.

例如试图支付每虚拟字节0聪手续费的交易，或操作码返回数据超过83字节的交易。

An example would be a transaction that is trying to pay a fee of 0 SAT per V byte, or a transaction with an op return larger than 83 bytes.

NimPul政策不在共识范围内，因此每个节点运行者实际上可以自由选择他们想要实施的策略。

NimPul policy is outside of consensus, and thus each node runner can actually run whatever policies they want in practice.

其中部分策略可在比特币配置文件中设置，而KNOTS比Core提供了更多此类选项。

A few of them are configurable in the Bitcoin dot conf file, and KNOTS has more of these settings than Core.

Luke Dasher最近通过现场演示如何向NOTS添加新的MEMPUL策略，有力地阐明了这一点。

Luke Dasher recently drove this point home by doing a live walkthrough on how to add new MEMPUL policies to NOTS.

自2010年起，MEMPUL策略就已在比特币核心中投入使用。

MEMPUL policies have been in use in Bitcoin Core since 2010.

据开发者Antoine Poisson所述，这些策略主要发挥三种作用：阻止可能导致节点崩溃的恶意DoS交易；阻止即将在软分叉中失效的旧交易类型；以及他称之为升级钩子的功能，最后还包括轻微抑制某些活动的行为引导。

And according to developer Antoine Poisson, they have three primary roles: discouraging malicious DoS transactions that can crash nodes discouraging old kinds of that are about to be invalid in an impending soft fork what he calls upgrade hooks, and finally, quote nudging behavior to mildly deter certain activities.

如你所见，开发者并不认为MIMPOL政策无用或低效。

As you can see, developers don't think MIMPOL policy is useless or ineffective.

事实上，这是他们工具箱中依赖度极高的重要工具。

In fact, it's an important tool in their belt on which they rely a lot.

但如果矿池运营商不遵守某项政策，或开发者预期他们未来不会遵守——即所谓激励不相容政策——开发者宁愿从核心代码中移除该政策，也不愿牺牲内存池一致性。

But if pool operators don't respect a certain policy, or developers expect they won't respect it in the future, what they call incentive incompatible policies quote unquote, they'd rather remove it from core than sacrifice MEM pool consistency.

至此，我希望已经清晰展现了矿池运营商中心化与开发者优化内存池一致性之间的关联。

At this point, I hope I've made the connection apparent between pool operator centralization and developers optimization for MIM pool consistency.

现在该探讨过滤派（filter boys）的观点了，他们的主张基于逆转比特币诞生初期就存在的挖矿中心化，而非优化内存池一致性。

Now it's time to explore the point of view of the filter boys, which is based on reverting the mining centralization we lost almost since the start of Bitcoin instead of optimizing for MEMPUL consistency.

反垃圾邮件阵营的回应是：DATAM，而非任何特定政策。

The anti spammer response: DATAM, not any particular policy.

自2024年10月18日起，你可以用比特币节点单独挖矿，同时仍能与其他矿工共享矿池收益——这是比特币历史上从未实现过的壮举。

Since 10/18/2024, you can solo mine with your Bitcoin node and still share pool rewards with a group of other hashers, a monumental feat that had never been possible before in the history of Bitcoin.

那是在Ocean推出其Datum挖矿协议的时候。

That was when Ocean launched its Datum mining protocol.

Datum将比特币节点的运行权交还给哈希计算者，让个体矿工重新掌握决定权，包括选择将哪些交易打包进区块、支持哪些分叉等。

Datum pushes the running of the Bitcoin node back to the hasher, giving individual hashers power again about what transactions they want to include in their blocks, what forks they want to signal support for, etc.

矿池仅负责协调奖励分配，并确保矿工不会通过向矿池提交份额却将全额奖励据为己有的方式作弊。

The pool only takes care of coordinating the split of the reward and making sure that miners don't cheat each other by submitting shares to the pool while paying the full reward to themselves.

Datum使得矿池运营者和哈希计算者的角色可以重新合并为统一的矿工角色。

Datum makes it possible for the roles of the pool operator and the hasher to merge again into the unified role of the miner.

这意味着每个哈希计算者个体的CPU算力将再次为维护链的诚实性做贡献，而非将份额出售给大型矿池运营商。

This means the individual CPU power of each hasher contributes again to keeping the chain honest instead of selling their shares to a large pool operator.

DATAM还有其他让我兴奋的地方。

There are other things that excite me about DATAM.

例如，即使Datum矿池算力超过51%也无妨，因为矿池并不控制比特币节点。

For instance, it wouldn't matter if a Datum pool went over 51 of hashrate, as the pool doesn't control the Bitcoin node.

另一个非常酷的特点是Datum支持任何规模的挖矿。

Another super cool thing is that Datum works with mining at any scale.

如果你现在已经是节点运行者，可以用约150美元的Bitaxe设备在家挖矿，自行提供区块模板，以小规模真实矿工身份参与网络。

If you are already a node runner today, you can start mining at home with a Bitaxe for about $150 feeding it your own block templates and participating in the network as a real miner at a small scale.

虽然大多数开发者不会认同，但我认为摧毁矿池运营者的中心化，远比不惜一切代价维护MEMPUL一致性更有价值。

While most developers won't agree with me, I posit that destroying pool operator centralization is a much more worthwhile endeavor than protecting MEMPUL consistency at all costs.

我很喜欢这条推文对相关权衡的总结。

I really like how this tweet summarizes the trade offs at stake.

埃里克·霍尔登的推文。

Tweet by Eric Holden.

海洋。

Ocean.

你的哈希。

Your Hash.

你的区块。

Your Block.

你的节点，你的中继策略。

Your Node, Your Relay Policy.

其他所有矿池：你的哈希，我的区块。

Every other pool: Your Hash, My Block.

你的节点，我的中继策略。

Your Node, My Relay Policy.

这是对比特币的攻击。

This is an attack on Bitcoin.

我邀请阅读本文的矿工和节点运营者了解Datum，成为自主的比特币矿工。

I invite both hashers and node runners who read this article to look into Datum to become sovereign Bitcoin miners.

如果你是矿池运营商，我希望你开始考虑逐步淘汰stratum v1，转而采用DATAM或stratum v2。

And if you are a pool operator, I would like you to start thinking about phasing out stratum v1 in favor of DATAM or stratum v2.

比特币需要stratum v1消亡。

Bitcoin needs stratum v1 to die.

DATAM与stratum v2之争。

DATAM versus stratum v2.

引述，我之所以在本文中重点讨论DATUM而几乎未提及Stratum V2，主要原因是它已经上线并可供使用，而Stratum V2尚未就绪。

Quote, The main reason I focused on DATUM in this article and hardly even mentioned Stratum V2 is because it's live and ready to use, while Stratum V2 is not.

Ocean公司工程副总裁Jason Hughes最近在2025年比特币++大会上发表的演讲中，解释了为何他们选择从头构建挖矿协议而非采用Stratum V2。

Jason Hughes, VP of Engineering at Ocean, recently went over why they chose to build a mining protocol from the ground up instead of adopting Stratum V2 in a presentation he gave at the twenty twenty five Bitcoin plus plus conference in Austin.

下一个话题。

Next up.

有个重要议题我不得不从本文中略去，否则文章长度会翻倍。

There's a big topic I had to leave out of this article or it would have been twice as long.

这个常见观点认为：『任何支付手续费的交易对比特币都是有益的』。

It's the common claim that quote, Any transaction that pays a fee is good for Bitcoin.

这主要是围绕经济学的讨论，因此我倾向于分两部分进行。

This is a discussion mostly centered around economics, so I prefer to do it in two separate parts.

下篇文章将准确定义比特币的安全预算，论证垃圾交易为何会损害安全预算，并分析几个凯恩斯主义修复方案，尤其是Peter Todd提出的滞期费和尾部发行方案。

The next article will give a proper definition of Bitcoin's security budget, argue why spam is bad for the security budget, and analyze a few Keynesian proposals to fix the security budget, most notably the demurrage and tail emission proposals by Peter Todd.

我认为这是聚焦核心差异的绝佳方式，因为我确实认同CORE团队在困境中尽力而为，但他们采取的政策方法似乎与真正解决问题背道而驰——这根本不是关于MIM矿池一致性的问题。

I thought this was a really great way to focus main difference because I do agree that CORE or I do think that CORE is trying to make the best of a bad situation, but they are taking a policy or an approach that seems to be at odds with actually fixing the situation and what the problem itself even is because it's not about MIM pool consistency.

这也让我回到之前提出的观点：根据挖矿中心化程度和网络默认策略，MIM矿池不一致性对矿工的损害可能不亚于对节点的损害。

And this also lead leads me back to a point that I made in the guy's take is that depending on the centralization of mining and the default policy of the network, the MIM pool inconsistency could just as could just as easily be bad for the miner as opposed to some node.

所谓『对节点有害』的说法，等于承认矿池运营商和大矿工的中心化现状不会改变——我认为我们不该放弃改变，更不该基于这种假设进行开发。

The idea that it's quote unquote bad for your node is an admission that there's not going to be any change in the centralization of the pool operator and large miners, which I do not believe is something that we should be giving up on or something that we should be building under the assumption that it's going to stay that way.

我认为有理由相信，当前发展路径正是基于这种假设。

And I don't think it's unreasonable to believe that this is what the path is making this is the assumption that that path is making.

我对听众的呼吁是：将你们的矿机指向Ocean矿池。

And my call to action to anyone listening to this is to point your miners at ocean.

无论你是否想使用过滤器或MIMPOL策略，无论你是否运行Core客户端，这些都无关紧要。

Whether you wanna do use filters or MIMPOL policy or not, or you're running core or not, it does not matter.

将你的矿机指向Ocean并运行一个节点，构建你自己的区块模板。

Point your miner at Ocean and run a node and build your own block template.

这对于比特币的未来、去中心化、抗脆弱性和安全性至关重要，我无法用言语充分强调其重要性。

This is so unbelievably important for the future and decentralization and resiliency and security of Bitcoin, I don't know how to stress it enough.

无论你对这个特定问题、OP_RETURN、垃圾交易或其他任何问题持何种看法，请将你的矿机指向Ocean。

Regardless of how you feel about this particular issue or op return or spam or anything, point your miner at Ocean.

运行你自己的节点。

Run your own node.

构建你自己的区块模板。

Build your own block templates.

如果我们不解决这个问题，随着时间的推移，它将会变成一个更大的问题。

If we don't fix this problem, it's going to be an even bigger problem the longer this goes on.

如果你是开发者或建设者，去和矿工们交流。

And if you are a developer, if you're a builder, go talk to miners.

开发相关软件。

Build the software.

事实上，我...唉。

And and in fact, I can't yeah.

我脑海中不断浮现一个念头：也许我应该为此做些什么，但我现在正被其他无数事务淹没。

I keep it keeps coming back into my head that maybe I should try to do something about this, but I'm just so drowning in so many other things.

我觉得在考虑这件事之前，必须先完成另一个项目。

I feel like I need to get this other project done before I even think about it.

但如果有人正在寻求帮助，或想讨论什么，或尝试获取想法，去和矿工谈谈。

But if anybody else is out there and is looking for help or wants to talk about something or try to get ideas, talk to a miner.

找个人聊聊。

Talk to someone.

振作起来。

Be okay.

好的。

Okay.

你如何将你的软件接入矿池运营商？

How do you plug your software into the pool operator?

你如何管理运行ASIC芯片的电脑？

How do you manage your computer that runs your ASICs?

你遇到什么问题了？

What's your problem?

你需要怎样的界面才能自己创建模板并运行节点？

How do you need this to look in order to make it so that you can build your own templates and run your own node?

那就为矿工开发个傻瓜式操作界面，让他们能像现在直接提交给矿池运营商一样轻松地创建自己的模板。

Then build that dumb simple UX for the miner to build their own templates as easy as they are giving that right away to the pool operator right now.

这是可以实现的。

That is possible.

有种即插即用的解决方案——无论是正在听这段话的人，还是通过其他渠道看到这个内容的人，或是与听众交流后得知这个信息的人，甚至只是读到相关文章的人，都不重要。

There is a plug and play way to make this work, and somebody listening to this, or somebody who gets linked to this from somewhere else, or gets told and has this conversation with somebody who is listening to this, or read the article, doesn't matter.

总有人能解决这个问题，真正实现即插即用：让你能轻松创建自己的区块模板并运行节点，这比当前连接矿池运营商的设置要简单。

Somebody out there can fix that problem, and actually make it easier to do a plug and play, build your own block template, and run a node, then the current setup is to connect to a pool operator.

我向你保证这绝对可行，而且一定会有人实现它。

I promise you that is possible and somebody could do it.

数据在那里。

Datum is there.

它已准备就绪可以使用。

It is ready to use.

如果你在挖矿，就用它。

If you are mining, use it.

如果你是开发者，请尝试帮助它让其他人更容易使用。

If you are a developer, please try to help it make it easier for other people to use it.

如果你是关心比特币未来的矿池运营商，就实施它。

If you are a pool operator who cares about the future of Bitcoin, implement it.

我想提出另一点，我在那篇文章中也提到过，关于政策另一面——不处理交易或铭文（抱歉），或者不转发铭文，以及这将对你的节点造成什么负面影响。

And I wanna bring up another point that, another one that I made in the guy's take as to the the opposite side of the the policy being to to not have the transactions or inscriptions, excuse me, or not relay the inscriptions and how this is gonna be bad for your node.

因为实际上有两件事，其中一件我以为需要自行设置，但我没意识到紧凑区块中继的实现方式已经包含了这点。

Because there were actually two things, and one thing, I thought you would have to set this yourself, but I actually didn't realize that how compact block relay is actually implemented apparently has this already.

我会深入验证这个说法是否属实，如果确实如此会非常有趣。

I'm gonna try to dig in to make sure that this is true, but it's really interesting if it is.

不过这里有段引述：

Here's the quote though.

CBR（紧凑区块中继）提议节点只需中继区块头，让每个节点用自己内存池中已有的交易本地重建完整区块。

So CBR, the compact block relay, proposed nodes just relay the block header, and let each node reconstruct the full block locally using transactions it already has in its own min pool.

基本上每个矿工或节点都用已接收过的交易重建区块，如果缺少某笔交易，就会向周围节点请求。

So basically, every miner or every node just rebuilds the block with transactions it's already heard from, and if it doesn't have a transaction, it will just request it from the nodes around it.

所以这从根本上，用引号说'解决了旧P2P网络发现新链顶时出现的流量高峰问题'。

So this was a massive it, quote unquote, it fixed the traffic spikes that plagued the old peer to peer network when a new tip was found.

因此，当新区块被发现并传播时，这会带来巨大的带宽效率提升，因为区块中的所有信息已经分发，除非节点确实没有这些数据，否则没有理由再次下载。

So this is a massive, massive efficiency gain in bandwidth spikes when new when blocks are found and propagated because all of the information in the block is already distributed, so there's no reason to download it a second time unless it's specifically something that nodes don't have.

引用原话，这被视为推动挖矿去中心化的积极举措。

So quote, it's considered a positive nudge towards keeping mining decentralized.

传播速度较慢意味着，平均而言，网络连接不佳的小矿工相比通过高速链路直连的大型矿池，其区块成为孤块的概率更高。

Slower propagation means that on average, small miners with bad connectivity would see more of their blocks orphaned compared to the large pools peered directly over high speed links.

但这也意味着反向情况——这正是最初构建紧凑区块中继的原因：由于存在孤块风险，这些区块超出网络传播数据信息的能力范围，难以到达更多节点，而大型矿工和连接良好的节点更易成功传播其区块。

But this also means, in the reverse, like this is why compact block relay was built in the first place because of the risk of having orphaned blocks that are outside of the the scope of or the the peak ability to propagate data and information through the network to get to a fewer nodes when big relays or excuse me, big miners and well connected nodes are more likely to actually get their blocks propagated.

这旨在平衡竞争环境，正是MIMPOL政策会左右天平的关键所在。

This was trying to even the playing field, which is exactly what would make MIMPOL policy tip the scales one way or the other.

如果我们都构建自己的区块模板，像Mara这样包含链外交易并试图发布到比特币节点的行为，相比遵循大多数节点内存池政策的矿工，其区块将面临巨大的传播延迟。

And why if we were all building our own block templates, somebody like Mara including out of band transactions and then trying to publish to the Bitcoin node would have such a huge propagation delay of their block versus miners that were in line with mempool policy for the majority of nodes.

他们的区块能更快到达网络中更多节点，而Mara包含的链外交易越多，其区块成为孤块的风险就越大。

Their block would get to more nodes on the network faster, and Mara runs the risk of orphan of having their own blocks orphaned the more out of band transactions they include.

请注意，这里特指链外交易——不仅是不在内存池中的JPEG等数据，而是所有节点内存池都未包含的特定链外信息。

And keep in mind, this is specifically out of band, not just stuff that ended up in the mempool that has JPEGs or whatever, but specifically out of band things that the MEM pools of all of the nodes don't have.

与其妥协，建立这些条件并解决这两个问题实际上能从经济上抑制此类行为。

Rather than giving into it, establishing those conditions and fixing those two problems would actually disincentivize it financially.

他们将牺牲自身的延迟和区块传播能力，只为从那些向区块发布垃圾信息的人身上榨取微薄的手续费边际。

They would punish their own latency and their own ability to propagate blocks in order to try to get some tiny extra margin of fees from people publishing garbage into a block.

这才是我们期望的局面，我认为这正是我们应该推动的方向，且无关其他考量。

That is the scenario we want, and I think that's what we should be pushing for, and that is not even regardless.

这甚至还未涉及我们是否在判定何为垃圾信息的问题。

That's that's not even considering whether or not we're deciding what is spam and what is not.

但具体来说，你如何设定条件，使得在被禁止的交易中，使用诸如剥离滑流之类的东西对Mara不利。

But specifically, how do you make the conditions such that out of banned transactions, that using something like strip slipstream is not good for Mara, but bad.

但问题是这样的。

But here's the thing.

我再说一次，这触及了我认为实际上需要手动配置或类似操作的要点。

I again, this is going to the point that I thought was actually something you had to manually configure or something.

我原以为这是需要自行摸索的事情。

I thought this was something that you'd have to custom figure out.

但这个引述很有趣，我实在查不到它的出处。

But this quote is interesting, and I can't actually figure out where it's from.

他似乎没有提供相关链接。

It doesn't seem he has a link for it.

如果他听到或看到这个，我真的很好奇这段话的来源。

If he listens to this or sees this, I'm I'm really curious what this is from.

还是说这只是他的解释？

Or is this just him explaining it?

那么，引述原话：'运行自定义MIMPL策略（如不接受铭文）会破坏你节点的CVR吗？'

So, quote, does running custom MIMPL policies such as not accepting inscriptions ruin CVR for your node?

并不完全是这样。

Not exactly.

因为当节点因违反策略规则而丢弃未确认交易时，并非彻底删除它。

Because when a node discards an unconfirmed transaction due to violating a policy rule, it doesn't remove it altogether.

节点会将其保留在二级内存池中，正是为了紧凑区块中继——预期它仍可能被挖出，但关键是不会转发给对等节点。

It keeps it around in a secondary MEM pool precisely for the sake of compact block relay, expecting that it could still be mined, but crucially it is not relayed to your peers.

对于违反由超级多数节点强制执行政策的交易来说并非如此，因为在这种情况下，你的任何同行节点从一开始就不太可能将这些交易转发给你。

This is not the case for transactions that violate a policy that is enforced enforced by a super majority of nodes, because in that case, it's unlikely that any of your peers will ever relay these transactions to you in the first place.

所以我之前不知道这一点。

So I did not know that.

我原本以为处理方式会是直接丢弃这笔交易。

I was under the assumption that the action would to would be to drop the transaction.

但当大家都在讨论这会对费用估算产生负面影响、阻碍交易传播、使你的节点获取新区块变得异常困难时，我第一反应是：最简单的解决方案应该是接收但不丢弃。

But my immediate thinking when everybody's talking about this is gonna be bad for your fee estimation, and this is gonna be bad for propagation, and you getting new blocks is just gonna be terrible for your node, is that the simple fix is like, okay, we'll take it, but don't drop it.

你只需选择不转发它，因为你视其为垃圾信息，不想把垃圾信息传给其他节点。

Just choose not to relay it because you consider it spam and you don't wanna send spam to your friends.

基于完全相同的原因，我们制定了MIMPLE政策——不接受也不传播任何零手续费（0 sat）的交易。

For exactly the same reason, we have the MIMPLE policy of not accepting and propagating anything that zero sat that doesn't pay a fee.

虽然这些交易本身也是有效的，但为了防止拒绝服务攻击，我们没有任何政策会限制它们的传播。

Like, all of those transactions are valid too, but because we want to protect ourselves from denial of service, we have no policies that don't propagate them around.

而且这套机制行之有效。

And it works.

确实有效。

It works.

运行得非常完美。

It works perfectly fine.

这正是内存池政策保护节点间数据传播网络的合法且简单的应用场景。

That is a completely legitimate and simple use for how for what we do with mempool policy to protect the network of propagation, of data propagation around the nodes.

我认为与其在假设矿池一致性问题永远存在的前提下追求MIM池一致性，或是优先朝这个方向开发（这并非正确路线），不如集中精力解决区块模板和矿池运营商中心化问题才是更合理的做法。

And I think it's a perfectly reasonable thing to try to focus on the block template and the pool operator centralization problem, than thinking that trying to get MIM pool consistency under the assumption that that problem will never go away or prioritizing development in that direction is not the right course of action.

不，这也不是要求核心必须或应该这样做。

And no, this isn't a demand either that core has to do this or should do this.

他们可以专注于他们认为应该做的事情。

They can work on what they think they should work on.

但我的主张和观点是，Datum和海洋采矿所做的工作比任何关于op return的废话重要一千倍，而且要注意改变或取消op return限制并不会解决任何关于铭文的问题。

But my claim and my opinion is that Datum and what ocean mining is doing is a thousand times more important than any bullshit with op return, and to note that changing or removing the op return limit isn't gonna fix anything about inscriptions.

这也不会解决UTXO膨胀的问题，因为他们特意这样做是为了在见证数据中添加100KB甚至1MB的内容，这些数据能获得四倍折扣或75%的折扣。

It's not gonna fix anything about the UTXO bloat because they are specifically doing it to add a 100 kilobytes met a whole megabyte into witness data that gets a four x discount or gets a 75% discount.

他们不会转向使用op return。

They're not gonna switch to op op return.

这一切只是引发了一场极具争议的辩论，由于矿池中心化的问题，这场辩论在实现内存池一致性方面不会有任何实质进展。

All this did was create a hugely contentious argument that won't move the needle on anything in an effort to get mempool consistency because of problems from mining pool centralization.

我真的认为，双方的技术论点在很大程度上都是准确的。

And I really think that this with all you know, again, so much of the technical argument on both sides is actually accurate.

无论从哪个角度看，都存在很多担忧。

There's lots of concerns one way or the other.

问题在于网络和矿工生态系统的哪些条件会产生哪些经济结果。

The question is what conditions of the network and of the mining ecosystem exist in order to produce which economic results.

因为这并不像总是单向发展那么简单。

Because it's not so simple as that it's always one way.

这基于对网络状况、矿工状况、有多少人在构建自己的区块模板、有多少哈希算力、有多少人实际运行自己的节点，以及90%节点网络运行的内存池策略版本的假设。

It's based on the assumption of what the conditions on the network are, what the conditions of the miners are, how many people are building their own block temperate templates, how many hashers are, how many people are actually running their own node, which version of mempool policy is on 90% of the node network.

所有这些因素都会影响技术结果或任何这些决策的后果，以及任何所谓'解决方案'的有效性。

All of those things matter to the technical outcome or the consequence of any of these decisions and the effectiveness of any one quote unquote solution.

我真的很喜欢这句话，所以我要再强调一次。

So I just really like this quote, so I'll hit it one more time.

引用。

Quote.

如你所见，开发者并不认为内存池政策无用或低效。

As you can see, developers don't think mempool policy is useless or ineffective.

事实上，这是他们工具箱中依赖的重要工具。

In fact, it's an important tool in their belt on which they rely a lot.

但如果矿池运营商不尊重某项政策，或开发者预期他们未来不会遵守——即所谓的‘激励不兼容政策’，他们宁愿从核心中移除也不愿牺牲MIM池一致性。

But if pool operators don't respect a certain policy, or developers expect they won't respect it in the future, what they call quote incentive incompatible policies, they'd rather remove it from core than sacrifice MIM pool consistency.

至此，我希望我已经阐明了矿池运营商中心化与开发者优化MEMPUL一致性之间的关联。

At this point, I hope I've made the connection apparent between pool operator centralization and developers optimization for MEMPUL consistency.

现在该探讨‘过滤器派’的观点了，他们的立场是基于恢复比特币初期就几乎消失的挖矿去中心化，而非追求MIMPL一致性。

Now it's time to explore the point of view of the quote filter boys, which is based on reverting the mining centralization we lost almost since the start of Bitcoin instead of optimizing for MIMPL consistency.

我认为这种表述是公允的。

I think that is a fair way to frame it.

我不觉得这有什么不合理，而且移除限制讨论中的所有论点都围绕着灵活一致性——尽管费用预测永远不可靠，但‘你的费率方案行不通’这类观点始终存在。

I do not think that is unreasonable, and it seems that all of the arguments from the remove limit discussion are about nimble consistency, are about your fees aren't gonna work even though fee predictors just are never gonna be relied upon.

费用预测永远不可能可靠到让你设定完费率就能撒手不管。

They're never gonna be so reliable that you can just set a fee based on a fee predictor and then just walk away from it.

你必须持续关注网络动态、区块生成情况、交易量大小以及区块实际产出或被发现所需时间。

You always have to watch the network and what the blocks are doing and how much how many how much volume of transactions are coming in and how long, blocks take to actually come in or be found.

这正是为什么我们有完整的MIMPL rb全rb MIMPL全rb管他妈的什么玩意儿。

This is exactly why we have full MIMPL r b full r b MIMPL full r b whatever the fuck.

这就是为什么我们有RBF（费用替代），以及为什么如果你最终错误预估了费用，可以通过增加费用来进入下一个区块。

And it's why we have RBF and why you can bump the fee in order to get into the next block if you end up having miscalculated the fee prediction.

而且你永远无法知道下一个区块需要多少分钟才能生成。

And you're never gonna know how many minutes the next block is gonna be.

很可能需要十分钟，但也可能是一分钟，甚至八十分钟。

We it's probably going to be ten, but it might be one, it might be eighty.

你是否拥有MIM池中的每一笔交易，并不会成为决定你费用预估是否有效的最大因素。

Whether or not you have every single transaction in the MIM pool is not going to be the biggest factor that determines whether or not your fee prediction works.

关键取决于区块链上的‘天气’——即当前有多少人在发布交易，自你发布交易后又有多少人发布了交易，以及自你发布交易后已经产生了多少个区块。

It's going to be the weather on the blockchain, which is how many people are publishing right now, and how many people have published since you have published your transaction, and how many blocks have come in since you've published your transaction.

这些区块是快速生成还是缓慢生成？

And are they coming in fast or are they coming in slow?

另一个问题则再次涉及到紧凑区块中继的议题。

And then the other is again about the compact block relay issue.

这取决于数据在网络中的传播速度。

It's how fast does this data propagate through the network.

因此我认为可以公平地说，他们的优先级和所有论点都围绕着实现MIM池一致性，而这个问题源于矿池中心化。

So that seems fair to me to say that their priority and all of their arguments are centered around getting MIM pool consistency, which is a problem because of mining pool centralization.

然而真正明确的解决方案——实际上解决这个核心问题——应该是解决矿池中心化问题，并集中我们所有时间和精力去做这件事。

Whereas the clear actual solution, actually fixing the big problem here is to fix mining pool centralization and put all of our time and effort into doing exactly that.

如果你关心这个更重要的问题，那就运行一个节点，使用Datum，并在Ocean上挖矿。

If you care about the more important problem here, then run a node, use Datum, and mine on Ocean.

自从我接触比特币以来，这个问题就一直存在。

This problem has been a problem since I got into Bitcoin.

我很久以前就加入了。

I got in a long time ago.

我希望看到这个问题得到解决，而且我绝不认为它无法解决，或者是在浪费时间，也不因为那些大型矿池运营商不愿意做就放弃。

I want to see this fixed, and I certainly have not reserved myself to the idea that it can't be fixed, or that it's a waste of time, or that just because everybody, the big pool operators don't wanna do it.

去他妈的。

Fuck that.

我不管谁愿意做。

I don't care who wants to do it.

我们一定要解决这个问题。

We are going to fix that.

我们必须解决这个问题。

We have to fix that.

我们没有选择的余地。

We don't have an option.

我们要么解决它，要么付出极其惨重的代价。

We either fix it or we're going to pay for it very dearly.

在足够长的时间跨度里，我们所有的中心化问题和缺乏弹性鲁棒性的缺陷都会反噬我们。

On a long enough time frame, all of our centralization problems and lack of resiliency robustness will come back and bite us in the ass.

这是必然的。

It just will.

所以我会附上Ocean的链接以及如何在Datamol（或你们正在使用的任何启动工具）上实施的详细说明。

So I'm gonna include a link to Ocean and details on how to implement Datamol your start nine or whatever it is you're using.

这并不难。

And it isn't that hard.

如果你不熟悉命令行操作，可能会觉得陌生，但我鼓励你直接尝试使用默认设置。

It's if you're, you know, not familiar with the command line, it might seem unfamiliar, but I encourage you to just try and just use the default settings.

你不需要过滤任何内容。

You don't have to filter anything.

你不需要考虑那些。

You don't have to think about that.

只需使用你自己的节点，因为仅此一点就意味着矿池运营商无法欺骗你，也无法通过让你为不认可的内容进行哈希计算来破坏网络。

Just use your own node, because that alone just means that the pool operator can't screw you, can't screw the network by making you hash for something that you don't agree with.

即使你一无所有，也要明白Ocean无法强制你进行过滤。

Even if you have nothing, understand Ocean can't force you to filter.

我很希望看到Ocean能占据全网10%、20%的算力。

And I would love to see Ocean become 10%, 20% of the of the hash on the network.

我很期待看到新的区块模板出现。

I would love to see new block templates coming in.

Ocean在过去一年已经取得了更多成就，这些都可以在链上直接看到。

Ocean has already done more in the last year, which you can just see on chain.

无可否认的是，相比网络中其他所有部分的总和，实际地址获得的支付更多——就像节点运行区块模板那样。

There is no this is undeniable that there have been more payouts to actual addresses with with actual like, the node ran the block template than any than the entirety of the rest of the network.

所有区块模板和支付地址...我甚至记不清具体数字了，大概是70左右吧。

All of the block templates and payout addresses have been I I can't even remember what it is, but it's something like 70 or something.

整个挖矿生态系统中实际存在的变体微乎其微，那些比特币的去向也几乎一致。

There's like a tiny, tiny, tiny amount of actual variation in the mining ecosystem and where those Bitcoin go.

而Ocean矿池已经成为最重要的存在，其各种模板和支付量远超其他所有矿池的总和。

And ocean the ocean pool is already the most significant, is far and away the majority of the various template and payouts.

说真的，别以为他们只占网络的1%甚至更少，他们实际上已经成了多数派。

Literally, by naughty, don't even think they're they're like 1% of the network or even less, and they're already a majority.

他们为挖矿生态系统带来的真正去中心化程度，远超整个生态系统的其他部分总和。

They are more they're providing more genuine decentralization to the mining ecosystem than the entirety of the rest of the ecosystem.

这就是这个问题的重要性所在，也是他们构建的工具的重要性所在。

That is how important this issue is, and that is how important the tools that they have built are.

我根本不在乎你怎么看待垃圾信息或JPEG图片问题。

And I don't care what you think about the spam or the JPEG problem.

比起有人是否决定用节点广播JPEG图片，你更应该关心网络的去中心化和挖矿中心化问题。

You should care more about the decentralization of the network and the mining centralization problem than you do about whether or not somebody is deciding to broadcast JPEGs around using their node.

这就是我的观点。

And that's what I think about it.

我认为这是篇非常棒的文章。

I thought this was a really great article.

我非常欣赏这种分析能力，同时我也认为这对核心立场非常公正。

I really appreciate the ability to break this down, and also I'm I also think this was very fair to the core position.

我觉得这篇文章诚实地呈现了事实，而不是简单地称他们为山寨币骗子之类。

I think this represented it honestly as opposed to, you know, just calling them shitcoiners or whatever.

这很重要，因为那样做说服不了任何人，而我们确实需要说服别人。

And that matters because you're not gonna convince anybody by doing that, and we do need to convince.

在我看来，有很多人需要正确理解这个问题。

There's plenty of people that need to need to get a proper framing of the problem, in my opinion.

希望我的发言能对此有所贡献。

So hopefully, I'm contributing to that.

别忘了关注人权基金会及其杰出工作，感谢他们对比特币Audible的支持，还有Bitkit钱包。

Don't forget to check out the Human Rights Foundation and their amazing work, and thank them for supporting Bitcoin Audible, and also the Bitkit wallet.

我其实很快就要发布一些东西了。

I've actually got something coming very soon.

这将是非常酷的公钥相关内容，敬请期待。

This is gonna be really cool about pub key, so stay tuned.

别忘了订阅并分享这期内容。

Don't forget to subscribe and share this out.

各位，我们下次见，这就是我的两聪之见。

And until next time, everybody, that's my two sats.

愚蠢与聪明人之间的区别——无论他们是否受过良好教育——在于聪明人能理解微妙之处。

The difference between stupid and intelligent people, and this is true whether or not they are well educated, is that intelligent people can handle subtlety.

尼尔·斯蒂芬森，《钻石时代》。

Neil Stevenson, The Diamond Age.