Opendoor：2026 年第一季度财报 - [商业拆解，第 245 集]

本集由Portrait赞助播出。

This episode is brought to you by Portrait.

这是我用来准备今天这一集以及所有商业拆解节目的AI研究系统。

It's the AI research system that I used to prepare for today's episode and for all business breakdowns episodes.

Portrait由前买方投资者打造，他们深知优秀的投资不在于从低质量渠道获取更多信息。

Portrait was built by former buy side investors, and they understand great investing isn't just about having more information from low quality sources.

而在于把正确信息以正确的方式组织起来。

It's about having the right information organized the right way.

如果你常听这个节目，就会明白，深入研究包含很多方面。

And if you listen to the show, you appreciate diligence consists of many things.

比如深入考察一家公司的历史，厘清微妙的竞争格局，追踪围绕你投资逻辑的关键信号。

Diving into the history of a business, framing the nuance competitive dynamics, tracking key signposts around your thesis.

过去，这些工作会占用大量时间，而你根本没那么多时间。

And historically, that would take up material time that you do not have.

但Portrait就像为你的团队增添了一支分析师大军。

But Portrait is basically like adding an army of analysts to your team.

它由一套专为投资研究流程设计的AI系统驱动。

It's powered by an AI system specifically designed for investment research workflows.

因此你能获得更深入的创意生成。

So you get nuanced idea generation.

Portrait会分析我们在这档节目中讨论的那些定性特征，帮你找到符合你投资框架的企业。

Portrait assesses the same types of qualitative attributes that we discuss on this show, and that can help identify businesses which fit your frameworks.

Portrait还能自动生成研究报告。

Portrait also customizes research report generation.

我用Portrait提前生成了背景资料，并梳理了几个有力的看空观点，为今天的讨论做好铺垫。

And I used Portrait to generate a primer and lay out bold bear cases ahead of today's episode to help frame the conversation.

第三，它具备智能投资逻辑监控功能，每天会分析成千上万个价值链数据点，提炼关键洞察，助力决策。

And third, there's intelligent thesis monitoring, and that's where Portrait assesses thousands of data points across value chains each day, extracting the insights, driving the business.

这些工作以往通常要花上好几个小时。

Again, all this work would typically take hours and hours and hours.

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It's at your fingertips now.

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Visit portraitresearch.com to start your free trial today.

我是马特·拉塞尔，今天请到了Opendoor的首席执行官卡兹·内贾蒂安，他刚发布完2026年第一季度的财报。

This is Matt Russell, and today I have Kaz Nejatian, CEO of Opendoor fresh off the first quarter twenty twenty six earnings release.

我们深入探讨了是什么推动了公司从季度到季度的强劲表现。

And we get into what is driving the strong execution quarter to quarter here.

我们看到了产品上线、销售增速，以及利润率的提升，这些让Opendoor在2026年4月1日实现了EBITDA盈利，并有望在年底前实现调整后净利润转正。

We've seen the product rollouts, the sales velocity, and the margin improvements that have Opendoor EBITDA positive as of 04/01/2026 and on track to be adjusted net income positive by the end of the year.

卡兹是一位非常值得关注、追随和聆听的首席执行官，他果然没有让人失望。

Kaz is a fascinating CEO to watch, to follow, to listen to, and he does not disappoint.

接下来，请欣赏我们的对话。

So please enjoy our conversation.

我想先从更大的格局说起。

I actually wanna start bigger picture here.

如果回溯到2025年2月，你当时还在Shopify。

If you go back to February 2025, you are still at Shopify.

你当时都打算卖光所有家当，加杠杆买下Opendoor，把它私有化。

You're ready to sell all of your possessions, lever up, and buy Opendoor, take it private.

而你最终是以一种更传统的方式当上了CEO，我觉得是这样。

You end up becoming the CEO in a much more traditional way, I would say.

但如果你回过头来看你当初的投资逻辑，再对比现在你接手公司一段时间后的实际情况，这期间变化有多大？

But if you just look back on your thesis then compared to where you are now having run the business for some period of time, how much has changed since you've taken over and been inside the operation?

主要有两方面。

It was like two things.

首先，是我老婆想让我把所有家当都卖了去收购Opendoor，至少是她一直鼓励我这么想。

First, it was my wife that wanted to sell all of our possessions to take Opendoor, or at least she was one who encouraged me to think about it.

但真正一直在我脑子里的，其实有两点。

But there are two things that have actually held in my mind.

我总是尽量认真地思考这些问题。

I like to try to be, like, thoughtful about this.

第一点是，这家公司的基本面实际上比我想的要好得多。

The first is the company is actually structurally in much better shape than I thought it would be.

公司的底层模型、数据库和流程，都比我原本想象的好得多。

Like the underlying models of the company, the underlying databases, the underlying processes are just in much better shape than I expected they would be.

我觉得公司之前确实陷入了一个不断下滑的恶性循环，但那种感觉，就像《夺宝奇兵》里守着圣杯的那个守卫一样。

I think the company had kind of started this doom loop of going down and down down, but it does feel a lot like in Raiders of the Lost Ark when there's a guy guarding the cup.

这里有不少人一直在默默守护着这个核心，才让公司维持得不错。

There's a bunch of people here who were still guarding the cup and that had kept it in a really decent shape.

但说实话，公司的底层架构真的非常扎实。

But actually, the underlying model is just honestly just very good shape.

我们投入了不少资源，但我还是被深深震撼了。

We've invested a lot in it, but I'm actually very impressed.

第二点，我完全低估了交叉销售的潜力。

Second, I significantly underestimated the attach opportunity.

我整个职业生涯都在做交叉服务这一块，但没想到我们第一次尝试就取得了这么好的效果。

I have basically done this whole, like, attach services thing my whole career, and I did not expect our first rack at this to go so well.

这两点都是意外的惊喜。

Those are two two upsides.

总的来说，我真的非常 impressed。

Generally, I'm just been very impressed.

要说主要的不足，说实话，我自己也挺震惊的，原来这家公司长期被外部顾问掌控着。

The main downside, honestly, just to be very, like, self reflective, I was honestly shocked by how the company was basically being run by outside consultants for so long.

那些做决策的人，几乎对决策结果毫无利害关系。

Like, it feels like the people who were making decisions for the company basically had almost no stake in the outcome of those decisions.

运营支出简直荒唐得离谱。

So the OPEX was just honestly stupid.

不只是荒唐，还全花在了错误的地方。

And not just stupid, but, like, spent on the wrong things.

我觉得这简直让人无法接受。

And I think that was actually offensive.

从你接手后现在的运营支出数据来看，你确实采取了措施。

Based on the OPEX metrics today versus when you stepped in, you've done something about that.

所以你的行动已经体现出来了。

So I think it's been reflected in terms of your actions.

我想稍微回溯一下你提到的关于情感连接的问题，还有更宏观的一些看法。

I wanna go back a little bit to your point on the attachment and even just higher level.

我刚接触Opendoor的时候，觉得它就是一个靠科技驱动的房地产资产管理公司，但这种理解太简单了。

When I first came across Opendoor, I had a very simple view that it was essentially a real estate asset manager based around tech, and that is overly simplified.

但你明确地把它定义为一个软件平台。

But you clearly distinguished it as a software platform.

当你用技术来支撑整个业务时，你怎么看待其中所需的资本投入和风险评估能力呢？

How do you think about the capital intensity and the underwriting skill set required to run the business when you're clearly aiding all that with the technology.

你觉得这一块该怎么理解？我觉得很多传统投资者，比如东海岸那边的人，容易在这上面卡住。

But how do you think about that aspect of it, which I think many, let's say, traditional investors, the East Coast types can get hung up on?

我认为人们对这个业务的根本前提完全理解错了。

I think that the underlying assumption about the business are just fundamentally wrong.

顺便说一句，我说的这些根本前提，确实是错的。

And by the way, I say the underlying assumptions are fundamentally wrong.

以前公司内部也有一段时间，不少人持有这些错误的假设。

Those assumptions were held by some people inside the building for a while.

但也不是说纽约的人就对了，旧金山的人同样也错了。

But it's not like people in New York were wrong, people in San Francisco were also wrong.

说Opendoor是个碰巧有软件的房地产资产管理公司，就像说亚马逊早期只是个刚好有软件的图书仓库一样。

Saying Opendoor is an asset manager that happens to have software is like saying Amazon in its early day was a a warehouser of books that just happened to have software.

亚马逊真有囤书吗？

Did Amazon warehouse books?

有啊。

Sure.

但它是个图书仓库吗？

But was it a warehouser of books?

不是。

No.

真正的价值根本不在这儿。

Like, that's not where the leverage comes from.

对吧？

Right?

自营交易台和做市商之间有实实在在的区别，如果你是自营交易台，持有资产是为了赚钱，那你做的一套事情是这样的。

The very real difference between being a prop desk and a market maker, like if you're a prop desk and you hold assets for profit, you do one set of things.

如果你是做市商，核心职责根本不是靠持有资产赚钱，那你做的就是另一套事情。

If you're a market maker and your fundamental job is to not hold assets for profit, you do a different set of things.

Opendoor 是做市商，不是自营交易台，这是从资产层面就决定的。

Opendoor is a market maker, not a prop desk, a core asset level.

所以我们得在核保方面做得非常出色吗？

So do we have to be very good at underwriting?

那当然了，必须得做到顶尖。

Damn right we do.

我们拥有业内最强大的核保系统。

We have the best underwriting engine in the business.

没有任何其他公司能跟我们比。

There's nothing close to it.

对吧？

Right?

我说这话可是真心实意的科技迷。

And I say this as a honest to goodness nerd.

但这个估值引擎的发力方向，确实有本质区别。

But there is a very real difference about where that underwriting engine is pointed towards.

如果你看看像 Citadel 这样的公司，它们收集的数据量大得惊人。

If you look at a company like Citadel, Citadel gathers a crap ton of data.

那它们为什么要这么做？

Why do they do it?

结果和手段同样重要。

Like, the end matters as much as the means matter.

我渐渐明白，很多人当时都陷在‘相信流程’里了。

I'm coming to appreciate many people got caught up with trust the process.

我觉得你真正强调的是‘相信结果’和‘相信最终目标’。

I think you're you're really like trust the outcome and trust the endpoint.

你把这种思路推到了风口上，这一点我非常认同。

You're putting that into vogue, which I I can appreciate.

说到这点，我觉得这确实是区分做市商和自营交易台的一个绝佳角度。

And on that point, I think it's a really great way to distinguish market maker versus prop desk.

这就牵扯到价差和周转速度之间的概念。

It gets into this concept around spread versus velocity.

在实际操作中，真正注重周转速度意味着什么？

What does it mean in practice to really focus on velocity?

是专注于那些房屋交易更频繁的市场吗？

Is it really focusing on markets where there's higher turnover of homes?

还是说，只是通过压缩价差，来加快成交速度？

Is it really just focusing on capturing less spread, therefore, we can sell faster?

如果要给这种对周转速度的专注排个优先级，你觉得最关键的因素有哪些？

If you were to rank the really important drivers to that focus on velocity, what would those be?

如果你仔细想想，Opendoor 在资本成本上，相比其他所有房地产买家和卖家，都有一个天然优势。

If you think about it, Opendoor has an embedded advantage compared to every other buyer and seller of real estate in our cost of capital.

我们就是规模更大。

We're just bigger.

对吧？

Right?

我们只是相对规模大一些。

We're just relatively big.

我们有个出色的资本市场团队，但公司还没充分用好他们。

We've got great capital markets team, but that has not been adequately used by the company.

归根结底，你之所以总想待在交易活跃的市场里，就像二十一点桌上的算牌手，每手牌都打。

The best reason why you want to always be in a flow market, at the end of the day, like, card counters at the blackjack table play every hand.

他们每手都打，是为了获取更多信息。

The reason they play every hand is to get more information.

关键就在于信息本身。

Like the information is the point.

对吧？

Right?

当我们大量买入又快速售出房屋时，就能实时获得关于市场真实状况的反馈。

When we buy lots of homes and sell them very quickly, we get very live feedback about actual market conditions.

不只是关于清仓价格，还涉及翻新流程，以及影响其他所有需求的市场需求。

Not just about the clearance price, also about the renovation process, also about the demand that impacts every other demand.

我们收集数据的方式是别人完全做不到的。

We actually pick up data in a way that no one else does.

顺便说一句，我们比市场领先一步。

And by the way, we're ahead of the market.

即使你把所有MLS上的数据都爬下来，也比我们慢了九十多天到一百二十天，因为我们抓的是实时数据。

So even if you were scraping all data you could from MLSs, like ninety, a hundred and twenty days behind us because we're picking up live.

我们获取数据的途径，是极少有人能比得上的。

We have access to data in a way that like very few people do.

对吧？

Right?

当你是个做市商或者证券交易所的时候，人人都能看到价格的涨跌。

Like, when you are a market maker or a stock exchange, everyone sees the up and down.

我们比市场领先九十多天到一百二十天。

We have a ninety to a hundred twenty day advantage on the market.

这确实是实实在在的优势，但如果你每笔交易都非要赚超高利润，这个优势就用不上了。

It's a very real thing, but you can't use that advantage if you decide you want to have very high margin on every single trade.

比如说，你在买资产的时候想把价差拉得特别大。

Let's say you wanna have high spreads in buying an asset.

我来找你，你觉得你的房子值四十万美元，我也同意这个估价。

So I come to you, you think your home is worth $400,000 I agree it's worth $400,000.

但如果我只出三十万，你肯定直接让我走人。

If I offer you $300,000 for it, you will tell me to take a hike.

你唯一不会让我走人的状况，就是你掌握了一些我不知道的信息。

The only scenario under which you will not tell you tell me to take a hike is if you know things I do not know.

我其实是在为一个负面反馈循环买单。

I am paying for a negative feedback loop.

我根本拿不到十万美金的价差。

I'm not actually getting a $100,000 of spread.

房地产里没那么多套利空间。

There isn't that much arb in real estate.

但如果我能把价差压得非常小，小到你能算清楚：我要是挂房出售，得付中介费、税费、持有成本。

But if I actually am able to have very tight spreads such that you can say, look, if I list my home, I have to pay realtor fees, taxes, holding costs.

还得承担交易失败的风险。

I have to have an audit of the home falling through.

而且得等上九十到一百二十天才能成交。

I have to have ninety to a hundred and twenty day hold periods.

这些对我而言都是有成本的。

It has a cost to me.

如果我能把这些成本加总起来，然后告诉你：我可以更快、更便宜、更稳妥地帮你处理。

If I can add those up and I can come to you saying, look, I will do it for you faster, cheaper, more certain.

作为一个理性的人，你肯定会答应我，而我依然能保留可观的利润空间。

You'll say yes to me as a rational human being, and I still have significant room for margin.

只要我能把流程压缩得更高效，我就能以更优的价格从你手里买下房产，而你卖到市场、下家从市场接手时，也能获得更优的价格和更高的确定性。

If I can compress that, I can buy from you at a better deal with more certainty you would sell them to market and sell to the next person at a better deal more certainty would buy from market.

我只是在扩大我的信息优势。

I'm just increasing my information advantage.

顺便说一下，正如我们所展示的，我们还有很多交叉销售的机会。

And by the way, as we've shown, we also have significant attach opportunities.

对吧？

Right?

我们 owns 一家产权和托管公司，发展得非常快。

We own a title and escrow business, which is growing very quickly.

我们还有抵押贷款产品，效果特别好。

We have mortgage product, which is like just excellent.

无论是为了收购房产做尽职调查，还是为贷款或保险做评估，这些流程本质上都是一样的。

And the things you need to do to underwrite a home to acquire it, underwrite the home for mortgage, and underwrite a home for insurance are all identical to each other.

在传统的做市商模式里，比如股票市场，交叉销售的机会没那么大。

In a traditional market maker world, like in the stock market, the attached opportunities aren't as significant.

但在这个领域，交叉销售的机会就大得多。

Whereas in this world, the attached opportunities are significant.

所以只要我能快速行动，这生意就能跑起来。

So as long as I can move fast, the business works.

如果我要

If I were

卖房子的话，为什么我要选Opendoor？

to ever want to sell my house, why would I pick Opendoor?

因为能更快搞定。

Because I could do it faster.

能快速拿到报价，成交概率也高。

I could get the offer quickly, the likelihood of closing.

我知道不是每份合同都能最终成交，但他们的重点就是快，尽量消除房产交易中那些烦人的环节——而这些环节可真不少。

I know there's still you know, not every contract you go into closes, but that's focused on speed and almost removing the inconveniences associated with real estate sales, which there are many.

你觉得这是对客户群体的准确描述吗？还是说我把目标客户范围定得太宽了？

Would you say that's an accurate depiction or am I shrinking the customer base too widely when you think about who the ideal partners are?

不是。

No.

你确实把目标客户范围定得太宽了。

You're you're shrinking the customer base too widely.

我觉得你刚才说的，确实是几年前公司的情况，那时候找Opendoor卖房的人，都是想快速出手，哪怕代价高一点。

I think what you're saying was true of the company some time ago, where the people who sold to Opendoor were people who wanted to move fast at a high cost.

对吧？

Right?

死亡、离婚、拖欠贷款。

Death, divorce, delinquency.

就拿我们财报里提到的沃森一家来说，他们其实并不着急。

If you look at the family that we talked about in earnings, the Watsons, they weren't in that much of a rush.

他们只是想从加州搬到科罗拉多。

They wanted to move from California to Colorado.

什么时候搬其实都行。

They could have moved at any time.

但他们选择从Opendoor买房，是因为价格实在划算。

But Opendoor, they bought a home from Opendoor because it was a great deal.

他们向Opendoor申请房贷，也是因为条件优厚，卖房给Opendoor，更是因为这确实是笔很划算的交易。

Took a mortgage from Opendoor because it was a great deal, and they sold a home to Opendoor because it was objectively a great deal.

但并不是说他们特别看重确定性，实际上如果他们去测试这个市场，结果反而会更糟。

But it wasn't that like they value certainty obviously, but they could have tested that market and they would have been worse off.

我的工作就是去跟家庭说，这个产品真的更适合你。

My job is to go to a family and say the product genuinely is better for you.

这正是我们想做的。

And that's what we wanna do.

对吧？

Right?

而且说实话，绝大多数情况下都是这样。

And by the way, like, overwhelmingly, that is true.

我们会越来越擅长这件事。

Like, now we are going to get better and better at this.

我们的价差会随着时间越来越小。

Our spreads are gonna get tighter and tighter over time.

但我的任务是确保，当你准备下一次搬家、买房或卖房的时候，你会像想到Uber、亚马逊或者你的做市商那样，第一时间想到Opendoor。

But my job is to make sure that when you want to take your next move and you wanna buy a home, sell a home, are you thinking of Opendoor the way you think about Uber, the way you think about Amazon, the way you think about your market maker?

说到附加服务的可能性，你们已经开始推出一些了。

To your point on attachment possibilities, you've started to roll out some of these various options out there.

我想知道，从长远来看，当价差不断收窄、交易量持续上升时，这对公司的利润空间意味着什么？

And I am curious when you think about long term, that spread being tight, seeing more velocity going through, what do those represent just in terms of the profit pool and the pie for the business?

哪些服务是房地产交易中自然能附带的？又有哪些地方藏着潜在的利润或成本优化空间？

What are the things that naturally attach to real estate and what are the embedded margin or at least the embedded gross cost opportunity?

对吧？

Right?

目前交易成本大概在百分之六到七之间。

There's a transaction cost of six to 7%.

大家都清楚这一点。

Everyone understands it.

产权和资金托管这部分，成本大约占百分之一到二。

The title and escrow cost of one to 2% there.

按揭贷款方面，平均利润率通常在三到四个百分点之间。

There is mortgage where the average margin is 300, 350, 400 basis points there.

保险的话，平均利润率大概是一到两个百分点。

There's insurance where the average margin is, you know, a hundred, two hundred basis points there.

还有家政服务、卫星电视、太阳能这些，加起来都是不小的数目。

There is home care, there is satellite, there's satellite, there's solar, all these things add up.

对吧？

Right?

有些是必要的成本，有些则是高端服务。

Some of these are friction, some of these are premium products.

有些是刚需，比如贷款，大多数人没得选，必须找贷款机构。

Some of these you have to have, like mortgage isn't an option for most people, you have to have a mortgage provider.

如果我能把一堆分散在碎片化市场里的服务整合起来，而这些服务的客户满意度普遍都很低，那就能做到一件事：

Now, if I can take a series of services in a highly fragmented market, all of whom have very low end NPS scores and jam them all together and say, great.

把这些环节里所有玩家赚的钱，还有他们各自因为要承担获客成本而产生的低效，全都收归我这里，因为我根本不用付这些钱。

All the profit made by all these players in the stack and all the inefficiencies by all these players in the stack because they all have to pay for CAC and I don't.

他们每个人都得花钱去收集信息，而我不用。

They all have to pay for gathering of information.

我不用。

I don't.

这正是机会所在。

That's like the opportunity.

而且，这是全球最大的市场。

And look, it is the single largest market in the world.

它的规模远超股票市场。

It is significantly bigger than the stock market.

你可以对Opendoor的主营业务持任何看法。

And I think you can believe like whatever you want about the underlying business of Opendoor.

你对Opendoor和我本人可以有各种不同的观点。

Like you can just you have a variety of opinions about Opendoor and me.

但要说美国上市的最大房地产公司不可能规模很大，这根本说不通。

What I think is very hard to say is that the largest real estate company on the public market in The United States could not be very large.

在美国公开市场上，还没有一家房地产公司的市值达到一千亿美元。

There isn't a $100,000,000,000 market cap real estate company in the public markets in The US.

这确实像是系统里的一个漏洞。

That does feel like a flaw in the matrix.

关于附加服务的机会，你经常提到，你不喜欢在产品正式发布前提前透露或预热。

On the attachment opportunities, you you are often mentioning that you don't like to announce or tease products before they are formally launched.

但如果你想想优先级——这对你推出产品来说很重要——在按揭、产权和托管、附加率这些方面，你有没有一个大致的先后顺序或关注重点？

But if you just think about prioritization, which is a big thing for you in rollouts, do you have an an order of operations or an order of focus when it comes to mortgage, title and escrow, attachment rate, just generally speaking, anything along those lines.

要简化一个系统，关键是要打造一个极简的流程。

What you want to create in order to simplify a system is a thin waste.

你需要有一个极简的流程，才能让其他部分变得更简单。

You wanna be able to actually have a thin waste so can simplify the rest of it.

在电商领域，这个流程就是结账。

For e commerce, that's checkout.

结账环节实际上掌控着交易两侧的业务逻辑。

The checkout is what actually runs the business logic on either side of transaction.

但在房地产行业，这样的环节并不存在。

That doesn't exist in real estate.

对我们来说，当务之急是为美国房地产市场打造一个像结算系统一样的流程。

So for us, the priority is creating checkout for real estate in The United States.

这自然意味着我们非常重视产权和资金托管环节。

That by necessity means we care a lot about title and escrow.

产权和资金托管，这确实是我们的重点。

Like, title and escrow is a thing we care a lot about.

只要把产权和资金托管的问题解决了，整个系统就会简单很多。

On title and escrow, like, we solve that, lots of other things, the system just becomes simpler.

我们已经在科罗拉多州上线了房贷产品，接下来很快会扩展到其他多个州。

It's public that we have a mortgage product live in Colorado, and we'll have a bunch of other states soon.

这显然排在第二位。

That's obviously second.

我觉得房屋保修服务的优先级比保险和其他很多服务都要高得多。

I think home warranty is very high in the priority stack than insurance and then a bunch of other services.

说句题外话，其实不难理解，为什么OpenDoor几乎是最适合做太阳能服务的平台。

I think for what it's worth, think like it's not that hard to imagine why Opendoor is almost an ideal provider of solar services.

给我描述一下这个愿景。

Give me that vision.

我们买房子。

We buy homes.

我们买下的很多房子，其太阳能板都是从别人那里租来的。

Lots of homes we buy lease their solar panels from someone else.

很容易想象，我们可以直接买下这些太阳能板，再租给下一位业主。

It's very imagine easy to imagine how we can buy those solar panels and then lease them to next.

这只是最简单的一种方式。

That's just the easiest version of it.

还有几种更复杂一点的模式，但更重要的是，我们得从融资层面往下看。

There's a couple of versions that get slightly more complicated, but more importantly, just go down to stack of financing.

你以前是银行家。

You're an ex banker.

现在你对这个很在行了。

Now you're good at this.

想象一下，评估任何一类资产的风险需要什么条件。

So imagine like what it takes to underwrite the risk of any given asset class.

租赁太阳能板的风险和房屋本身有多大关联？

How correlated is a risk to leasing someone a solar panel to underlying home?

这个风险和房贷之间的关联程度如何？

How correlated is that risk to mortgage?

所有这些风险和保险之间的关联性又有多强？

How correlated are all these risks to insurance?

我觉得，你可能会发现，过去买车其实有一段很有趣的历史。

I think that you you'll get to a point where you used to actually buy cars have a very interesting history.

以前，人们是分开买发动机和车架的。

You used to buy your engine separately from the carriage.

这在当时还真是普遍做法。

It was like actually a real thing.

有人专门造车身，有人专门做发动机，你得分别去买，但后来我们觉得这做法实在太傻了。

There are people who make the body of the car, would make the engine and just go buy them, but we decide that was exceptionally dumb.

但我们买房子还是老样子。

But we still buy homes the same way.

买车的时候，我们通常从卖车的人那里贷款，而且车也基本是按我们想要的样子来的。

The way we buy cars is we usually get financing from the person who sells us the car, and the car usually comes the way we want it.

可买房子呢？得跟几十个不同的角色打交道，他们还互相看不顺眼。

The way we buy a home is we deal with a couple of dozen different parties in the system, and they all hate each other.

这整个系统其实是个很奇怪的凑合方案，却一直沿用至今。

It's a very, very weird hack on the system that has been maintained.

当你想到在买房或卖房过程中可以附加的各种服务时，每一样都可能带来麻烦。

When you think about introducing those various things that you could attach to the purchase or sale of a home, each one does potentially involve friction.

比如贷款批不下来，或者保险出问题，任何一个环节都可能卡住。

You know, the mortgage doesn't go through or the insurance, any one of these things.

既然这些附加服务听起来确实不错，可它们会不会反而增加阻力，拖慢整个流程的速度呢？

How do you solve for that when, yes, it's naturally, know, would be a great thing, but could they add friction, slow things down in terms of velocity?

你能不能告诉我，这个观点哪里不对，或者你打算怎么解决这个问题？

Tell me where that that thesis is wrong or how you solve for that.

马特，我觉得你完全错了，这事儿真的存在。

Matt, I think you're just straight up wrong, And I think there's a very real thing.

很多所谓的复杂性，其实是那些提供单一解决方案的人制造出来的，他们说自己的方案太复杂，根本没法和其他系统搭配使用。

I I think there's a lot of fud that comes from people who provide point solutions that say, my point solution is so complex that you could possibly never mix it with another one.

我给你举个例子。

Let me give you an example.

在Shopify，我们有两个产品：Shopify Payments 和 Shopify Tax，这两个产品的使用率都非常高，几乎人人都在用。

With two products at Shopify, Shopify Payments and Shopify Tax, both of which had extremely high penetration rates and used by basically everyone.

假设你是个纽约的餐厅老板，去选支付服务商时说：嘿，我正考虑用你们的税务服务。

If you happen to own a restaurant in New York and you went to get your payment provider and said, hey, I'm considering getting this tax.

你们能帮我处理税务吗？

Can you do tax for me?

对方却说：不行。

They're, oh, no.

你还是用我们吧，因为这事儿太复杂了。

You should stay with us because it's so complicated.

你看，系统里有没有复杂的地方？

Look, are there complexity in the system?

当然有。

Of course, there are.

当然有。

Of course, there are.

但对80%的人来说，这些服务都挺普通的。

But for 80% of people, 100% of these services are relatively vanilla.

那80%的用户带来的收益，正好能覆盖那20%的复杂成本。

80% of people are the margin opportunity that pays for 20% complexity.

可对这80%的人来说，这样实在太糟糕了。

It just seems terrible for those 80%.

但你觉得，一个身家上千万美元、没有美国居留权、全球遍布信托、名下好几辆车的人，难道不该能用上Opendoor的房贷、Opendoor的保险这些服务吗？

But do I think someone who wants to buy a $14,000,000 mansion who has no US residency, who has trust all over the world and multiple cars should be able to use, you know, Opendoor home loan and Opendoor insurance and all the other services?

我们显然不这么认为。

We're quite no.

我不觉得他们应该用我们的服务。

I don't think they should use us.

但我不觉得南达科他州的普通美国人应该为这种补贴买单。

But I don't think the average American living in South Dakota should pay the mark, like pay for that subsidy.

我们的职责是让普通人生活更轻松，比如老师、水管工、电工这些人。

Like our job is to make life easier for the average person, the home, like the school teacher, the plumber, the electrician.

他们不该因为系统里存在复杂性就多花钱。

Like, they should not have to pay more because complexity exists in the system.

顺便说一句，我自己生活里也挺复杂的。

And by the way, I say it as a guy who has complexity in his life.

普通人没理由为我的生活负担成本。

There's no reason why the average person should subsidize my life.

这听起来太荒谬了。

That sounds insane.

这正是我们之前的情况。

Like, that's what we had.

这就是我们生活的世界。

That's the world we live in.

对吧？

Right?

我在Opendoor的工作就是这个。

My job is this at Opendoor.

我希望堪萨斯城的一位老师，能一键完成房贷、产权、托管以及买卖房屋的所有流程。

I want a teacher in Kansas City to have a one click mortgage, title, escrow, and home buying experience and home selling experience.

我们就要解决这个问题。

That's what we're gonna work on.

我们要为堪萨斯城普通老百姓搞定这个事。

We're gonna solve this for a t shirt in Kansas City.

那些跟你一样住那儿、开玛莎拉蒂的人，让他们去找别人吧。

Like the dudes living where you live with their Maseratis can go to someone else.

车库里根本不会有玛莎拉蒂。

No Maseratis in the in the garage.

从未来发展的角度看，你多次提到，你们有一条通往盈利的路径，但同时也不怕为业务投入资金。

In terms of the go forward, you brought up multiple times, you know, you you have this path to profitability, but also you're not afraid to invest in the business.

我想从哲学层面了解一下，你是怎么看待这个问题的？因为有时候，一旦看到机会，就应该大力投入。

And I just wanna think about that philosophically, how you approach that because, you know, sometimes you wanna heavily invest when there's an opportunity to go after something.

你已经明确说过，你们在某些时间节点上，目标是实现EBITDA盈利和年末调整后净利润为正。

You've made it clear that that path to profitability at certain points in time in terms of EBITDA positive and adjusted net income positive by year end.

你是怎么平衡这个目标和业务再投资的需求的？或者说，你怎么协调这两者之间的关系？

How are you balancing that with whatever need there is to reinvest back in the business or how you're gonna balance the investment back in the business with that?

我老婆让我锻炼，就给我买了哑铃和健身凳。

My wife wanted me to work out, so she bought me weights and a bench.

但我根本没理它们，一次都没练过。

And then I, like, just totally ignored them and didn't work out.

后来她就把健身凳放在卧室门口，哑铃直接搁在上面。

So she then put the bench at our bedroom door and the weights on it.

我每次想出卧室，都得先看到这些东西。

I couldn't get out of bedroom without actually seeing those things.

我认为OpenDoor需要这种劲头。

I think Opendoor requires some of that energy.

OpenDoor在追求盈利方面一直缺乏纪律，因为它总能轻易从资本市场拿到钱。

I think Opendoor has had too little discipline when it comes to being for profit business because it has been able to reach for capital markets over and over again.

这其实对OpenDoor有害。

And I think that has been actually bad for Opendoor.

所以我们必须极度自律，这过程会非常痛苦。

So I think it's incredibly important for us to be incredibly disciplined, and this will be painful as hell.

真的会很痛。

It'll just be painful.

我希望这会是我最后一份工作，我关心的是十年后我所带领的这家公司会是什么样子。

This will hopefully be the last job I ever have, and I care about my job and the company I'm running a decade from now.

我对这家公司最好的贡献，就是让它成为市场上最有纪律、也最激进的科技公司。

And the best thing I can do for that company is ensure this company is the most disciplined and most aggressive tech company in the market.

这才是真正的答案。

That's the real answer.

现在，我是不是放弃了那些如果利润丰厚时本不会放弃的增长领域？

Now am I foregoing area of growth that I would not foregrow if I had lots of profits?

是的。

Yes.

我确实放弃了。

I am.

毫无疑问，我放弃了。

For sure I am.

但我认为，这里确实有一件很实际的事——这种自律其实是健康的。

But I think there's a very real thing, man, where I think this is healthy discipline.

我觉得这很健康。

I think it's healthy.

而且我认为，Opendoor 应该靠自己的现金流来维持运营。

And I think it's important that Opendoor be funded by its cash flow.

我猜很多人会惊讶，Opendoor 的工程师其实这么少。

I think it actually would surprise people to learn how few engineers work at Opendoor.

Opendoor 的工程团队不到 70 人。

Opendoor has fewer than 70 engineers.

我觉得这会让大多数人感到惊讶。

I think that would surprise most people.

靠着这 70 个工程师，我们干出了不少活儿。但我向你保证，我清楚他们每个人具体在忙什么，因为我们没那个奢侈去浪费资源。

We're getting a crap ton done with those 70 engineers, but I promise you, I know what every single one of them is working on because we don't have the luxury of waste.

我记得你在别的采访里提过，有些人在工程方面推动了一些相当有力的变革，而且他们是用 AI 系统来实现的。

I heard you mention in another interview that you you've had some people make some pretty powerful changes within the business along the lines of engineering changes, but they did it with AI system.

这正好顺理成章地引出了那个问题。

So it's actually a nice segue into into that question.

我是说，你们只有70名工程师，这种运营能力有多强？

I mean, how much is your ability to operate with 70 engineers?

无论是工程师还是非工程背景的人，都能在这方面发挥更大的作用。

Just the power of both those engineers and those without an engineering background able to do a lot more in that regard.

我们的工程师确实非常出色。

Our engineers are just excellent.

整体来说都非常出色。

Just generally excellent.

我们的数据负责人是一位前信号情报官员，曾经负责管理全球规模最大军队之一的复杂系统。

Our head of data is x signal intelligence officer who used to run a very complicated system for one of the world's largest militaries.

过去几个月里，我们团队里来了好几位YC创始人，光是我那一届的YC校友就有两位。

We have multiple YC founders in the building that have joined in the last few months, two from my batch at YC alone.

所以我们这儿的工程师，整体来说都非常出色。

So we have excellent, just generally excellent engineers here.

我们确实有出色的工程师，但他们的工作其实分两类：一类是打造能提升他人效率的系统，另一类是做前端。

We So have excellent engineers, but there's like a division of labor between systems that create leverage for other people and those front ends.

对吧？

Right?

我们的工程师花时间构建系统，让非工程师的同事也能大幅提升自己的工作效率。

So our engineers spend their time creating systems that allow other people who are not engineers to create leverage for themselves.

我刚来的时候，公司里有个专门的服务，负责计算员工的限制性股票单位分配，而且是由一位工程师专职维护这个任务。

When I got here, we had an entire service whose job it was to calculate and was maintained by an engineer whose job was to calculate RSU allocations for employees.

我真没法形容让工程师做这种事有多荒唐、多浪费时间，但几乎每家公司都这样。

I can't tell you how nutty of waste of time that is for an engineer, but basically all companies have this.

说真的，为什么非得让工程师干这种活？

Like, why is an engineer working on this?

如果你连用 Claude、ChatGPT、Codex 或 Grok 写个 SQL 查询都不会，就不该来科技公司上班。

Like, look, if you cannot using Claude or ChatGPT or Codex or Grok, write a SQL query, you should not be working at a tech company.

我们这可是科技公司。

This is a tech company.

我瞧见我们内部沟通负责人就在那儿。

I can see actually our head of internal internal comms right there.

我一来，我们所有的公关顾问就全走人了。

Our PR consultants all quit when I joined.

他们是气得直接辞职的。

They actually enraged quit.

现在负责内部沟通的负责人，每天就坐在自己工位上，大部分时间都在用 Claude，公司里其他人也都是这样。

And I can tell you our the head of internal comms who now actually out of her desk does this work for us, spends most of her time on Claude, and so is everyone else in the company.

我觉得这跟大多数公司都不一样。

And I think that is different than most other companies.

谢谢你刚开完电话会议还抽时间跟我们聊。

Thank you very much for taking the time after that conference call that you just had.

真的很感谢。

I appreciate it.

我得说说财报之后总是要提的那几句话。

And I will say the words that are always important after earnings.

恭喜你们这个季度表现出色。

Congrats on a great quarter.

你今天也过得愉快啊。

Have a great day, dude.

你也是。

Likewise.

《业务拆解》是一档深入探讨单一企业的访谈节目，嘉宾包括投资者和企业经营者。

Business breakdowns is a series of conversations with investors and operators diving deep into a single business.

节目中主持人和嘉宾表达的所有观点，仅代表他们个人的看法。

All opinions expressed by hosts and podcast guests are solely their own opinions.

主持人、嘉宾，以及他们的雇主或关联方，可能持有本节目讨论的证券。

Hosts, podcast guests, their employers, or affiliates may maintain positions in the securities discussed in this podcast.

本节目仅供信息参考，不应作为投资决策的依据。

This podcast is for informational purposes only and should not be relied upon as a basis for investment decisions.