鲍比·杰恩——Jain Global 多策略对冲基金的基本原则（第487期）

人们在股票上的配置更多，但他们承受不了股票的回撤风险。

People would have more in equities, but they can't afford the drawdown capability of the equities.

所以，过去这些非股票资产主要是债券。

So that not equities used to be bonds.

围绕这一点，他们创造了整个行业，比如风险平价等等。

They invented whole businesses around this, risk parity and all this.

而现在，你开始意识到，债券与股票之间的负相关性可能不会永远持续。

And then now, what you start realizing is that the bond market anti correlation to equities may not persist forever.

大家都在寻找其他实现这一目标的方法。

Everyone's trying to figure out other ways of doing that.

如果你把投资宇宙看作一个高达150万亿美元的庞大市场，其中35%到40%就是5060万亿美元，你需要这些分散风险的资产。

If you think of the investment universe as a giant $150,000,000,000,000 35, 40% of that's $5,060,000,000,000,000 dollars you need of diversifying assets.

多策略行业是其中之一，但还有其他类型。

The multi strategy industry is one of those, but there are other ones.

你可以投资基础设施和房地产，但它们是缺乏流动性的。

You could do infrastructure and real estate, but that's illiquid.

所以你的流动性预算可能已经被占用了。

So your liquidity budget may have been taken up.

因此你有私募信贷，但那非常缺乏流动性。

And so you have private credit, but that's pretty illiquid.

你有不相关的对冲基金行业，包括量化、宏观、多策略，可能达到一万五千亿美元。

You have the uncorrelated hedge fund industry, including quant, macro, multi strategy, maybe a trillion and a half dollars.

其中很大一部分已经对新投资者关闭了。

A lot of that is closed to new investors.

因此，在这些领域中的投资工具，尤其是多策略行业，数量并不多。

So the investment vehicles available in any of those sectors, especially the multi strategy industry, not that much.

我们业务中最大的趋势是阿尔法的私有化。

The biggest trend in our business is the privatization of Alpha.

阿尔法的归属地，既在自营交易公司，也在多策略公司；随着时间推移，多策略公司越来越多的资金来自员工，而可供投资者使用的资金越来越少。

Where the Alpha is residing, on the prop shops, as well as the multi strategy firms, The multistrategy firms, over time, have more and more employee money and less and less available to investors.

人们一直在撤回资本。

People have been giving back capital on it.

我说，这是一个从零创建弗兰克第一性原理多策略基金的机会，就连市场领导者也未必这样做过。

And I said, this is an opportunity to create, Frank First Principles, a multi strategy from scratch, which even the market leaders not necessarily did.

他们是逐步演变成这样的。

They evolved to that over time.

他们做得非常出色。

They did a great job.

但要从零开始创建一个。

But create one from scratch.

世界上第二个重大趋势是万物金融化。

The second big trend in the world is the financialization of everything.

一切都在变成可交易的资产。

Everything's becoming a tradable asset.

在这个过程中间，无论是自营交易公司、多策略基金还是银行，参与其中的人并不多，中介角色非常有限。

The amount of people that are in the middle of that, whether it's the prop shops, the multi strategy firms, the banks, there's not that many intermediaries for this thing.

所以我意识到，这是一个从零开始创建的机会。

So I said, here's an opportunity I have to start one from scratch.

我还足够年轻。

I'm still young enough.

显然，这个行业的进入壁垒非常高，但我认为Millennium处于一个非常好的位置，拥有极其优秀的人才。

Obviously, there's gigantic barriers to entry in this business, but I felt like Millennium was in a great place, extremely talented people.

因此，我觉得现在是我可以退出并自己干的时候了。

And so I said, this is a time when I can get off and do it on my own.

多策略公司的特点之一是它们都具备规模优势，这使得进入这一领域变得非常困难。

One of the characteristics of the multi strategy shops is they all have scale, and it's made it difficult to enter that space.

你是如何考虑在第一天就需要哪些资源，以便能够与大型机构竞争的？

How did you think about what you needed just to get going on day one so that you could compete with the larger players?

我父亲说过的一件事是：提前承受痛苦。

One of the things my dad said is take the pain up front.

让这件事具有意义的，是另一个真正可行、具有竞争力的一流对冲基金，从一开始就如此设计。

What makes this thing relevant, whatever one wants, is another viable, competitive, first tier hedge fund designed as such.

困难的部分是那些常规的事情。

The hard part is the normal stuff.

必须组建一个领导团队。

Have to put together a leadership team.

幸运的是，我从事这一行已经三十年了，所以那些人我早就认识。

Thankfully, I've been doing this for thirty years, so I knew those people already.

第二点是，你必须雇用一大批人和你一起打造这个事业。

The second is you have to hire a bunch of people to build this with you.

世界上大多数基础设施领域的人，目标只是做到B级。

Most people in the infrastructure side of the world are playing for a B.

他们进入的是一个已经存在的体系，然后说：嘿，去弄清楚怎么从数据中心迁移到云端。

They're coming into an existing thing, and they're saying, hey, go figure out how to go to the cloud from data centers.

去叠加这个东西。

Go stack on this thing.

去附加这个东西。

Go tack on this thing.

但如果你从一开始就正确构建架构，就会吸引很多人。

But build your architecture properly from the beginning attracted a lot of people.

然后你需要吸引一批敢于冒险的人，让他们说：我看到了你选择的路径。

Then you have to attract a bunch of risk takers to say, I see the lane you're picking.

我想成为第一个进入对冲基金的人，因为所有曾经进入过对冲基金的人都知道，最早进入的人比后来者表现得更好。

I want to be the first one in the hedge fund, because everyone that's ever been in a hedge fund knows that the people get that first do better than the people that get that later.

接着你需要组建一个投资者群体，这个群体要理解你正在做什么，曾经在这个行业待过，并且能看到隧道尽头的曙光。

Then you have to go put together an investor base, an investor base that understands what you're trying to do, has been in this industry before, and sees the prize at the end of the tunnel.

最大的进入障碍是人们会说：这像是先有鸡还是先有蛋的问题。

The biggest barrier to entry is people say, well, there's a chicken and an egg.

你必须先建立起规模。

You have to put together the scale when it comes first.

是投资者在构建规模。

The investors are putting together the scale.

实际上，根本不存在鸡和蛋的问题。

Actually, there's no chicken and egg.

这只是一个鸡。

It's just a chicken.

你必须完全依靠自己的资产负债表来构建，然后资金才会进来。

You have to build it all off your own balance sheet, and then the money comes in.

这是一道你必须跨越的进入壁垒。

That's a barrier to entry that you have to get through.

我对这一切都做好了准备。

I was prepared for all that.

在过去三十年里，我一直在脑海中反复思考这件事。

I had been doing this exact thing in my mind for thirty years.

在最初很多年里，作为现在所谓的投资经理，那时候你只是称之为交易员。

For the first many years as what's now called a PM, back then you just call it a trader.

在最近的很多年里，作为这些业务的领导者和设计者，我们用大约一年时间完成了启动，这从零开始构建一个项目是相当合理的时间。

For the last many years as a leader and designer of these businesses, we got the launch in about a year, which was a reasonable time to build something from scratch.

尤其是随着人工智能的出现，你不需要雇佣那么多程序员。

Especially with the advent of AI, you didn't have to hire as many programmers.

自主开发还是外部采购的决策变得更好了。

The build versus buy decisions were better.

我之前提到的那些数据相关的内容，现在可以很容易地购买到。

A lot of that data stuff I was talking about, you could buy a lot of that now.

最终，这是个开始的好时机。

In the end, it was a good time to start.

你提到这些多策略对冲基金各自有不同的操作方式。

You mentioned that all of these multi strategy hedge funds have their own different flavors of how they do things.

在经历了几十年的观察后，你在构建这个体系时秉持了哪些基本原则？

After seeing so much of this over a couple of decades, what first principles were you bringing to develop the chain?

首先，这种核心-卫星模式让我很不舒服。

First of all, this core satellite thing bothers me.

而且，当一家公司被贴上固定收益公司、股票公司或量化公司的标签时，就很难摆脱这个标签。

And it was something that, to the extent a firm is seen as a fixed income firm or an equities firm or a quant firm, it's difficult to shed that label.

当你吸引人们加入卫星策略时，有人曾经对我说过：‘你十年都没做过这件事。’

When you're attracting people into the satellite, someone said it to me once, well, you haven't done this thing in ten thousand days.

这对你来说不可能那么重要。

It can't be that important to you.

大家都明白这一点。

People know it.

如果你从一开始就着手，就能吸引到更优秀的人才。

You attract better people if you get it at the beginning.

一种方法是先聘请一批投资组合经理，之后再安排一位管理者来负责这项业务。

One way to do is hire a bunch of PMs and put in a manager later to run that business.

这样从一开始就构建起来会容易得多。

It's a lot easier to build it from the beginning that way.

它是你核心业务的一部分。

It's part of your core thing.

一开始你就有个七条腿的凳子，这跟我只有一条腿的凳子然后加上了第二层凳子，是两码事。

You have a seven legged stool at the beginning, that's a different topic than I have a one legged stool and I've added a second layer of stool.

当那件事进展不顺时，你自己的投资者、你自己的人都会问，你为什么要做那件事？

When that thing doesn't go right, your own investors, your own people say, why are you doing that thing?

不管那件事进展不顺，还是你的事进展不顺，人们都会说，你为什么不退出非核心业务呢？

Whether that thing's not going well, whether your thing's not going well, people say, why don't you get out of the non core thing?

核心与卫星的模式是首要的。

The core satellite thing is the first thing.

第二点是，世界混淆了某些概念。

Second thing is the world has confused a couple of things.

这个行业对产品经理的看法是，他们追求自主权。

The view of a PM in this industry is they want autonomy.

尤其是下一代人并不一定追求自主权。

Especially the people in the next generations don't necessarily want autonomy.

他们想要的是薪酬上的自主权，但并不一定想要生活方式上的自主权。

They want autonomy of compensation, but they don't necessarily want autonomy of lifestyle.

所以他们希望：如果我赚了钱，我就该为我的成果获得报酬。

So they wanna say, if I make money, I should get paid on what I do.

如果我没赚到钱，我就不该为我的成果获得报酬。

And if I don't make money, I don't wanna get paid on what I do.

这是很正常的。

That's a normal thing.

但他们确实明白，让五个人坐在一间房间里，面前摆着几台彭博终端和几部手机，并不是那么容易的事。

But they do appreciate that the concept of five people sitting in a room with a few Bloombergs and a few phones, not that easy.

你希望身边有人陪伴。

You want people around you.

你希望拥有知识产权。

You want IP.

你希望接入一个能为你所用的商业体系。

You want a business that you're tapping into.

你希望接入一个能为你所用的操作系统。

You want an operating system you're tapping into.

一些对冲基金这么做，而另一些则不这么做。

Some of the hedge funds do that, and some of the hedge funds don't.

这个行业的美妙之处在于，无论采取哪种方式，都有成功的对冲基金，但你需要选择一种路径。

The beauty of this industry is that there's successful hedge funds in every side of this, but you pick a link.

第三点是，我发现你们有几位非常出色的 talent 开发者，大多数刚毕业的人通过你们的培训项目进入，你们在教他们如何开展这项业务。

Third thing is, where I felt you had a few great talent developers, where 80% of the people coming out of college, and you're putting them in through your training program, you're teaching them how to do the business.

然后你还有一些出色的人才吸纳者。

And then you have some great talent acquirers.

过去十年中成长起来的许多企业都是人才吸纳者。

A lot of the businesses that grew up in the last ten years were talent acquirers.

人才吸纳是一项昂贵的业务，而且非常适合市场领导者。

Talent acquirers is expensive business, and it's a business that lends itself very well to the market leader.

他们拥有最多的资源。

They have the most resource.

缺失的是什么呢？那就是之前提案测试所涉及的：人才加速器、人才转化器。

What's missing, which is what the prop test was, was the talent accelerator, the talent transformer.

你是在交易台上培养市场制造者。

You're taking the market maker on the desk.

你是在从量化研究部门挑选人才。

You're taking the guy from Quant Research.

你是在把股票研究分析师培养成投资组合经理。

You're taking the equity research analyst, and you're turning them into PMs.

这就是你所做事情的核心能力。

That's the core competency of what you're doing.

你同时也在进行人才培育，也做一些人才引进，但你在这上面建立了核心能力。

You're also doing the talent creation, you're and also doing some talent acquisition, but you create a core competency in that.

我想成为一个35岁精英的事业。

I want to be a business of the 35 year old killer.

那个人拥有所有工具，但他们需要有人在身边支持。

The person that has all the tools, but they need people in their corner.

你可以称之为指导，也可以称之为建议。

You can call that mentorship, You can call that guidance.

你可以称之为辅导。

You can call that coaching.

你可以称之为风险管理。

You can call that risk managing.

这是我当时认为非常重要的部分。

That was a very important part of what I thought to do.

当然，我刚刚成立了一家公司。

Of course, I just started a firm.

我必须招募人才。

I had to acquire talent.

但我的核心商业理念是人才加速，让优秀的人变得卓越。

But my real business proposition is talent acceleration, taking good people and making them great.

我把世界划分为顶尖人才和稳定产出者。

I break up the world into killers, then steady producers.

你需要稳定产出者。

You need steady producers.

如果你全是顶尖人才，他们就会互相残杀。

If you had all killers, they'd start killing each other.

对顶尖人才和稳定产出者都保留选择权。

Options on killers and options on steady producers.

我希望顶尖人才、对顶尖人才的选择权以及稳定产出者之间保持平衡。

And I want a balance of the killers, the options on killers, and the steady producers.

第四点是，我想从一开始就打造一个多元化的业务。

And then fourth is, I wanted to create something which was diversified at the beginning.

整个体系都希望你按顺序逐步发展。

The whole system wants you to create sequentially.

他们说，鲍比，你为什么不在一个领域先起步呢？

They say, Bobby, why don't you start in one area?

先做一个一百五十亿美元的基本面股票业务，或者量化股票业务。

Start a billion and a half dollar fundamental equities business or quant equities.

等这个做成功了，再去做下一件事。

When that works, go do the next thing.

很常规。

Normal.

问题是，你现在已经开始做第一件事了，所有东西都是为它搭建的。

The problem is, now you started that first thing, you built everything for that.

你已经为它构建了风险系统。

You've built your risk system for that.

你已经为这个聘请了律师。

You've hired your lawyers for that.

你已经为这个建立了交易系统。

You've built your trading system for that.

现在你想做下一件事，比如量化或固定收益。

Now you wanna do the next thing, which is quant or fixed income.

A，你已经有四年没做过了。

A, you haven't done that in four years.

B，你遇到了核心-卫星问题。

B, you have the core satellite problem.

C，你的系统并不是这样构建的。

And C, your system isn't built that way.

我说，我想把它正确地建立起来。

I said, I want to build it properly.

好吧。

Fine.

一开始会更难一些，但随着时间推移，这会带来巨大的回报。

A little harder at the beginning, clearly, but over time, that pays huge dividends.

我在思考我们做出的这些决定。

I'm thinking about these decisions we made.

幸运的是，我们有一个统一的风险系统和统一的架构。

Thank God we have one common risk system and we have one common architecture.

第五，我在风险管理上选定了一个方向。

Fifth, I picked a lane on the risk management.

这个行业普遍向这些公司支付高额报酬。

This industry broadly pays all these firms.

当基金经理在场时，他们能拿到20%的分成，大致如此。

When the PM's there, they're getting paid 20%, round numbers.

有些人采用延期支付，有些人有追回条款，有些人则设有夏普比率门槛。

Some people pay deferred, some people have clawbacks, some people have Sharpe ratio thresholds.

但粗略来说，这就是我们所处的行业。

But in round numbers, that's the industry that we're in.

为什么你们要付给这些人这么多钱？

Why are you paying people even that much?

你们是在为夏普比率付钱，也是在为他们在止损情境下管理资金付钱。

You're paying them for a Sharpe ratio, and you're paying them to manage money in a stop loss context.

止损情境更难处理。

The stop loss context is harder.

如果你在某项投资上亏钱，如果你能买得更多，你就会不断加仓。

If you're losing money on something, it's easier if you could buy more, you buy more, you buy more.

但如果你必须在亏钱时割肉，这就更难了，所以人才能拿到20%的报酬。

If you have to cut when you're losing money, that's a harder game, and that's why people get paid 20%.

我一直试图强调，风险管理是核心。

I've tried to focus on risk management's a core.

这本质上就是一门风险管理业务——专注于控制亏损，让利润自行发展，但你必须在这上面明确选择立场。

This is what this is, a risk management business, focus on controlling the losses and let the profits take care of themselves, but you have to pick a lane on that.

我们现在暂停一下，来介绍一下Ridgeline。

We're gonna take a quick break in the action to tell you about Ridgeline.

想象一下，每天开始时对账工作已经完成。

Imagine starting your day with reconciliation already done.

无需电子表格，无需四处追赶，无需用胶带勉强维系系统。

No spreadsheets, no breaks to chase, no duct tape holding systems together.

Ridgeline 是首个专为投资经理打造的前后台一体化系统记录平台。

Ridgeline is the first front to back system of record built for investment managers.

一个平台，一个实时数据集，内置人工智能。

One platform, one real time dataset, embedded AI.

投资公司正在用这种全新的运营模式，取代那些零散且过时的订单管理系统、会计系统、报告插件和客户工具：自动化复杂工作流、扩展个性化客户体验，并释放人工智能的全部价值。

Investment firms are replacing a patchwork of isolated and dated order management systems, accounting systems, reporting add ons, and client tools with this fundamentally new operating model: automating complex workflows, scaling personalized client experiences, and unlocking the full value of AI.

如果今年你的公司准备现代化运营并利用人工智能，可以访问 ridgelineapps.com 了解更多信息。

If this is the year your firm is ready to modernize operations and harness AI, you can learn more at ridgelineapps.com.

现在，我们回到节目。

And now back to the show.

在所有这些地方，似乎总有一部分投资经理能够生成你所期望的阿尔法收益和夏普比率。

It feels like in all of these places, there's a certain number of portfolio managers that are able to generate alpha, the Sharpe ratio that you want.

你是如何吸引人才加入Jane的？

How did you go through the process of attracting talent to Jane?

有两个话题。

There's two topics.

一个是关于如何赚钱。

So one is how you make money.

赚钱有三种核心方式。

There's three core ways of making money.

第一种是世界在某种意义上给你钱。

One is that the world is somehow giving you money.

世界在说：我们希望你提供一项服务，我们会付钱给提供这项服务的人。

The world is saying, we want you to provide a service, and we're gonna pay somebody to provide that service.

如果政府想要发行2万亿美元的债务，就一定得有人来购买这些债务。

If the government wants to issue $2,000,000,000,000 of debt, somebody has to buy that debt.

当人们想要使用可移植阿尔法策略时，他们更愿意购买期货而不是债券。

When people wanna use portable alpha type strategies, they wanna buy futures instead of the bonds.

好的。

Fine.

他们会为这些期货支付费用。

They're gonna pay up for those futures.

那里有一个机会。

There's an opportunity there.

你可以提供流动性。

You can provide liquidity.

人们喜欢指数基金。

People love index funds.

好吧。

Okay.

但必须有人来维持这些指数基金的正常运行。

But somebody has to keep those index funds in line.

分散交易资产也是如此。

Same with the dispersion trade assets.

有时候，你可以为一项服务获得报酬。

Sometimes you can get paid for a service.

即使在基本面股票中，如果你这样理解，也必须有人为这些股票定价。

Even in fundamental equities, if you conceptualize it that way, somebody has to price these equities.

从长期来看，必须有人为它们定价。

Someone has to price them in the long run.

从短期来看，也必须有人为它们定价。

Someone has to price them in the short run.

指数基金依赖于这种定价服务的实现。

The index funds are relying on that pricing service to happen.

因此，有一些服务需要提供。

And so there are some services to be provided.

第二点是，他们都是聪明人。

The second is, they're clever people.

他们是经验丰富、曾经做过、并且理解这些的人。

They're people that are experienced, that have done it, that understand it.

第三点是一些知识产权。

The third is a bunch of IP.

如果你对某人说，去买卖股票，这非常困难，除非你为他们构建一个框架，告诉他们：这是我们做研究的方式，这是我们拥有的公司访问渠道，这是我们使用的研究模型，这是我们运行的因素模型，这样至少能给他们一个决策的框架。

If you said to someone, go try to buy and sell equity, it's very difficult unless you put them into a structure where you say, here's how we do research, here's the corporate access that we have, here's the research model that we have, here's the factor model that we run into, then at least you give them some framework to make decisions.

这不仅仅是人员的问题。

It's more than just the people.

最重要的是，很多人意识到这种多策略模式已经转向了自主性——薪酬自主、行动自主。

The biggest thing is that there are a lot of people that realize this multi strategy model has moved towards the autonomy section, autonomy of compensation, autonomy of action.

这正是吸引人们的地方。

That's something that attracted people.

我以培养人才著称，我和我们在这里雇佣的其他一些人负责运营这些业务。

I have a reputation for developing people, me and some of the other people that we've hired here to run these businesses.

第三点，这是一个非常重要的因素。

The third is it's a big thing.

那些最早来到这里的人，如果他们已经离开，那也是期权的问题。

People that get here first to the extent they're long gone option.

很多人希望在微软、谷歌和苹果工作，也有很多人想加入Stripe。

Many people would like to work at Microsoft and Google and Apple, and many people wanna work at Stripe.

人们都想在初创公司工作。

People wanna work at the start up.

这实际上是一个相当有吸引力的模式。

It's actually a pretty attractive concept.

2017年到2022年间曾爆发过一场激烈的人才争夺战。

There was a big talent war in 2017 to 2022.

利率当时为零。

Interest rates were zero.

在2016至2017年，整个多经理行业规模很小，当时Millennium和Citadel是唯二管理第三方资本的巨头。

The whole multi manager industry was tiny in 02/1617, when Millennium and Citadel were really the two big ones that were managing third party capital.

随后这些小型公司迅速壮大。

Then these smaller firms got big.

那时也爆发过一场人才争夺战。

There was a talent war then.

现在你必须提供有竞争力的薪酬。

Now you have to pay competitively.

如果员工创造了收益，你必须给予他们奖励。

You have to pay people a reward if they make the money.

但摩擦成本已经不像当年那么夸张了。

But the friction costs, not as crazy as it was back then.

我们成功吸引了很多人才。

We were able to attract a lot of people.

我们有七个人负责业务的投资部分，也就是各业务的首席投资官。

There's seven of us that are running the investment side of the business, the CIOs of the businesses.

他们中大约有40%，要么是我，要么是其中某个人早就认识的。

Good 40% of them, either I or one of them knew already.

这起到了稳定作用。

That created a ballast.

另一个话题是，很多人喜欢这种业务结构。

Another topic is a lot of people like this business structure.

PM结构的一个特点是，随着你筹集更多资本，会有很多人做和你同样的事情。

The PM structure, one of the things is, as you raise more capital, you're gonna have more people doing the same thing you're doing.

我确实会告诉人们，你并不能对任何人拥有否决权。

I do say to people, it's not like you get a veto on anyone.

我可能还是会雇用另一个做同样事情的人，但你会有一票表决权。

I might still hire another person doing that same thing, but you get a vote.

而且这种决策是经过深思熟虑的，我们会问：这如何帮助那里的人？

And it's gonna be done consciously, and we're gonna say, how is this helping the people there?

这如何帮助投资者？

How is it helping the investor?

这如何提升公司的整体回报？

And how is it an aggregate return of the firm?

如果你所在的业务中，有多个人接触市场，比如在交易商主导的市场中，这会让市场感到混乱。

If you're in a business where having multiple people touching the street, like in a dealer driven market, it gets confusing to the street.

提前考虑这一点，对人们来说是有吸引力的。

Having that thought of ahead of time is something that's attractive to people.

实际进行面试过程是很困难的。

It's hard to actually do the interview process.

这里所有的风险承担者，我说的就是我自己。

All the risk takers here, I meant myself.

我们没有庞大的业务拓展部门。

We don't have a giant business development department.

业务拓展方面只有两到三位专职人员。

There's two or three dedicated people in business development.

然后就是我和首席投资官们在做业务拓展。

And then it's me and the CIOs that are doing the business development.

如果你没有在一线干过多年，是很难做到的。

If you weren't in the trenches for years, it's very hard to do.

人们从一开始就心知肚明。

People know it right from the beginning.

你的对话会从‘我们来谈谈这笔交易’开始改变。

Your conversation changes from let's talk about this trade.

我认为这是一种以市场为导向的文化。

I think it's a markets driven culture.

这不是一种以招聘为导向的文化。

It's not a hiring driven culture.

你是如何进行面试和评估人才，以区分出顶尖人才和只是不错的候选人呢？

How did you go about interviewing and assessing talent to tease out who you think is top tier from maybe somebody who's just good?

这是一种模式识别。

It's a pattern recognition.

在过去二十八年里，我每年大概面试了200人。

I probably interviewed 200 people a year for twenty eight years.

第一，是培养一种直觉。

One is getting a feel for it.

第二，有一个词经常被提及，但我在这里要使用它，那就是契合。

Two is, there's a word that gets thrown around a bit, but I'm gonna use it here, is alignment.

我每天都在努力弄清楚：我和这里的人、这些敢于冒险的人，是否在理念上一致？

What I try to figure out every day is, do I feel aligned with the people that work here, the risk takers?

我觉得他们是否与投资者的利益一致？

Do I feel like they're aligned with the interests of the investor?

这些业务中固有的一种情况是，交易员如果表现良好，就能获得一部分收益。

Inherent in these businesses is the trader has an option that if it goes well, they get some percentage of that.

如果表现不佳，你就得承担这个赌注。

If it goes poorly, you're left with the bet.

我能感受到这条界限吗？

Do I feel the line?

很多人在最初的几分钟里就会谈到风险。

A lot of people, they talk about risk in the first couple of minutes.

他们在思考风险，有些人则是出于礼貌而有所保留。

They're thinking about risk, and some are hedging to be polite.

这是完全不同的事情。

That's a different thing.

有些人亏了钱之后，就开始使用被动语态。

Some people, when they lost money, they start using the passive tense.

所以当他们谈到赚钱时，会使用主动语态。

So when they talk about making money, they use the active tense.

当他们开始谈论盈利的交易时，会说这些交易是如何如何的。

When they start talking about the winning trades, they talk about however they were.

当他们谈到亏损的交易时，会说这是平仓的结果。

When they talk about losing trades, they talk about the unwind.

好的。

Okay.

那风呢？

What about the wind?

这一点，你能有相当清晰的感知。

That, you can get a pretty good feel.

你会开始思考他们如何看待为自己工作的人。

You start thinking about how they think about the people that work for them.

这些是为我服务的工具，还是那些有自己的目标和抱负的人，而你如何使用他们、如何培养他们？

Are these tools for me or are these people that have their own goals and ambitions and how you're using them, how you're developing them?

这个过程比你想象的更具自我筛选性。

This process is more self selecting than you would think.

人们会逐渐感受到你想要实现的目标以及他们自己的需求。

The people get a feel for what you're trying to accomplish, what they want.

越来越多的人会找到通往他们理想位置的道路。

What's going to happen more and more is people are going to find their way to where they want to be.

这将演变成一个人才发展行业。

It's going to become a talent development industry.

无论是人才发展还是人才加速，人们都会开始将他人塑造成他们看待世界的方式，而这些世界观将会各不相同。

Whether it's talent development, talent acceleration, the people are going to start molding people into the way that they think of the world, and those worlds will be different.

一些公司，虽然不在多经理领域，但在多策略公司中，他们希望在公司顶层实现全局优化。

Some firms, not in the multi manager world, but in the multi strategy firm, they want one global optimization at the top of the house.

Bruin Hunter 收集阿尔法收益，然后我们在公司顶层叠加风险。

Bruin Hunter gathers alpha, and then we rent as risk on top of the house.

你可以这么做。

You could do that.

你不能这样做，还给人们发净额薪酬。

You just can't do that and pay people un netted compensation.

有些人可能会逐渐朝这个方向发展，尝试改变他们的薪酬模式，比如说：好吧，我要实行追回条款，这样做。

Some people might move more towards that way and try to change their comp models and say, okay, I'm gonna do clawbacks and do this.

随着这个行业逐渐成熟，它其实并不算一个历史悠久的行业。

As this industry matures, it's not that old an industry.

你有一些参与者已经长期从事这一行，但真正达到规模，也就十年左右。

You had a couple of players that have been doing it for a long, long time, and then at actual scale, ten years.

所以，一旦你建好了结构并引入了这些初期人员，我很想深入聊聊投资模式。

So once you have the structure built and you've brought in these initial people, I'd love to dive into the investment model.

你们选择参与哪些策略？

What are the strategies you chose to participate in?

总的来说，在股权方面，有基本面、量化和套利策略。

Broadly speaking, the equity side, there's fundamental, quantitative, and arbitrage.

套利可以包括期权。

Arbitrage could be options.

它可能是所谓的Delta One或指数再平衡。

It could be what's called delta one or index rebalancing.

它可能是可转换债券。

It could be convertible bonds.

它可能是并购套利或其他类型的事件驱动交易。

It could be merger arb or other types of event driven trading.

在固定收益类策略中，利率和宏观是一类，信用是一类，商品则是另一类。

In the fixed income type strategies, rates of macro is one, credit is one, and commodities is a different one.

在我们构建的分类体系中，第七个业务板块是亚洲，因为我受够了人们要么在早上七点忙得不可开交时，要么在晚上七点疲惫不堪时，还试图从美国管理亚洲业务。

There's a seventh business in the way we created the taxonomy, which was Asia, because I'm sick of people trying to run Asia from seven in the morning when they're busy or seven at night when they're tired.

我说过，亚洲将是一个更加精细的市场，涵盖韩国、中国在岸与离岸市场、日本、印度和东南亚。

I said, Asia's going to be a more finessed market with a very Korea, China, onshoreoffshore China, Japan, India, Southeast Asia.

亚洲市场有更多复杂多样的活动。

You have a lot more going on in Asia.

试图通过美国的新闻滤镜从美国来操作这一切。

Trying to do that from The US through The US news filter.

这是一件很难做到的事。

It was a difficult thing to do.

所以这些就是七个业务板块。

So those are the seven businesses.

我认为我们的共同风险策略是关注尾部风险，并设法缓解尾部风险，但各自的投资方法不同。

I would view it as we have a common risk approach, which is focus on the tails and figure out how to mitigate the tails, but different investment approaches.

每个业务板块都有首席投资官。

There are CIOs for each of those businesses.

我就是其中之一。

I'm one of them.

我负责股票套利。

I'm for the equity arbitrage.

他们每个人对各自业务的阿尔法引擎都有略微不同的理念。

And each one of them has a slightly different philosophy as to what the alpha engine is for that.

团队之间协作的设计要素有哪些？

What are some of the design elements of collaboration across the teams?

我会说有三种模式。

I would say there's three models.

有一种是不鼓励协作，无论出于什么原因，比如a）吸引来的人都不愿意协作，b）某些结构上的原因让你不希望协作，可能是相关性之类的问题。

There's discouraged collaboration for whatever reason, because a, you're attracting people that don't wanna collaborate, b, there's something structural that you don't want collaboration, maybe it's correlation or something like that.

一种是强制协作。

One is enforced collaboration.

如果你想把一个想法纳入模型，就必须走进礼堂向所有人解释。

If you want to put an idea into the model, you have to come into the auditorium and explain it to everyone else.

还有一种是鼓励协作。

And one is encouraged collaboration.

我属于鼓励协作的模式。

I'm in the encouraged collaboration model.

如果你问我这是如何发生的，这些对冲基金里，不管好坏，公司的文化都反映了其创始人的风格。

If you ask me how does it happen, what happens in these hedge funds, for better or worse, is that the culture of the firm reflects their founder.

我本人是个非常注重协作的人。

I'm a pretty collaborative guy.

当有人需要帮助时，我的第一反应是：你为什么不跟这些人聊聊？

My instinct is when someone needs something, I say, why don't you talk to these people?

这会变成一种文化现象，人们会意识到这就是当天公认的话题。

That becomes a cultural thing and people realize that's the accepted topic of the day.

这更多是一种文化层面的问题，而不是结构层面的问题。

It's more a cultural topic than a structural topic.

每个人吸收信息的方式都不同。

Everyone absorbs information differently.

有些团队每天都有电话会议，有些则是每周一次。

Some of the groups have daily calls, weekly calls.

我从不以这种方式构建信息。

I never build information that way.

我更倾向于通过阅读来吸收信息。

I'm more of absorbing information through reading.

我们这里并不依赖频繁的电话会议。

We're not a heavy call place.

话虽如此，在公司成立的前十八个月里，我们每周一早上都会开一个持续二十五分钟的电话会议，每次由一位项目经理站起来向全公司介绍他们的工作内容。

Having said that, for the first eighteen months of the firm, we did a weekly call every Monday morning for twenty five minutes, where all the call was was one PM got up in front of the whole firm, talked about what they do.

然后，来自支持岗位的人员也会介绍他们的工作内容。

Then someone from a staff role talks about what they do.

经过十八个月的坚持，我认为这为这种协作方式定下了基调。

After eighteen months of that, I think it sets a tone of that type of collaboration.

我想了解一下资本配置流程，从顶层的你开始，一直到各个首席投资官，再到投资经理。

I'd ask about the capital allocation process, both starting with you at the top, the individual CIOs down to the PMs.

首先，你有这些不同的业务板块。

First thing is you have these different businesses.

理想情况下，你不会过度偏向某一个板块而忽视其他。

Ideally, you don't get overweight one versus the other.

因此，你会努力将配置保持在一定的容忍范围或区间内。

So you try to keep it within some tolerances or ranges.

在这个范围内，你要以夏普比率来进行竞争。

Within that, you're competing with a Sharpe ratio.

你正在寻找那些夏普比率足以覆盖资本成本的策略。

You're trying to find strategies that have a sufficient Sharpe ratio that clears your cost of capital.

如果有人希望获得更多资本，只要他们处于相对夏普比率阈值内，你的本能就是给予支持。

If somebody wants more capital, your instinct is to give it to them as long as they're within the relative Sharpe ratio threshold.

只要不是过度集中，你就可以评估尾部风险。

You're not too overweighted, you can assess what the tails are.

但资本配置模型实际上比你想象的要静态得多。

But the capital allocation model is a lot more static than you'd think.

如果你观察大多数这些多经理公司，它们在一段时间内并不会发生太大变化。

If you look at most of these multi manager firms, it doesn't change all that much over a period.

在某些市场环境下，你会将资本转移到某个地方，但这并不是动态机制。

In certain market environments, you're moving capital to one place or another, but that's not the dynamic.

我们并不是每天都在说，从这个人那里撤资，转给那个人。

It's not like every day we're saying, let's pull it from this person, move it to that person.

过去十八个月，我们一直处于资本部署阶段。

We've been in a capital deployment phase for the last eighteen months.

我们筹集了数十亿美元。

We raised billions of dollars.

我们用了一年多的时间来调动这些资本。

We called the capital over a year.

我们花了大约十五到十八个月的时间来部署这些资本。

Took us about fifteen to eighteen months to deploy the capital.

现在你面临一点资本稀缺的问题。

Now you have a little bit of scarcity of capital.

我很想深入探讨一下基本面股票业务。

I'd love to dive into the fundamental equities business.

特别是，你如何看待你们团队的风险和资本配置，以及在一个存在许多类似基本面股票业务的世界中？

In particular, how do you view both the risk and the capital allocation both for your team and then in a world where there are a lot of other fundamental equity businesses like this?

在股票业务中有一些根本性的问题。

There are some fundamental questions in the equities business.

有一个概念是，你是否被因子忽视了？

There's a concept of, are you factor ignored?

现在没人真的这么做了。

No one's really doing that anymore.

你是否意识到因子的存在？

Are you factor aware?

你是否对因子着迷？

Are you factor obsessed?

我通常对模型持怀疑态度，尤其是实证模型。

I'm generally skeptical of models, especially empirical models.

我更倾向于做一个因子意识型而非因子痴迷型的模型。

So I'm a war in the factor aware than factor obsessed model.

实证模型是通过大量历史价格数据来建立某种关系。

The empirical models are taking a bunch of historic prices and then creating some relationship about it.

比如亚马逊的价值是微软的0.2倍，而其他的是0.3倍。

The one Amazon is worth 0.2 Microsoft and 0.3.

你对模型需要保持一点谦逊。

You need a bit of humility around the models.

所以这是关于这一点的一个问题。

So that's one question around that.

第二个你需要问自己的问题是，你如何看待拥挤程度，以及你如何衡量和应对它？

The second question you have to ask yourself is what are you thinking about crowdedness and how you're measuring crowdedness, how you're dealing with it?

第三个问题是，你是否将行业押注视为阿尔法押注还是因子押注？

The third question is, do you consider an industry bet an alpha bet or a factor bet?

这些是这些风险的不同维度。

Those are different dimensions of these risks.

我们试图以某种整合风险的方式运行，同时也会考虑每个行业中的人数及其相互作用。

We've tried to say we're going to run it in a somewhat integrated risk fashion with some logic also as to how many people in each sector, how they interact.

这既是艺术，也是科学。

It's as much an art as a science.

你如何考虑截断尾部风险？

How have you thought about cutting off the tails?

很多多基金经理团队中，一旦出现某种回撤，就会被剔除。

A lot of the multi PM pod shops, there's certain drawdown, and they're out.

你对此的博弈论是什么？

What's your game theory around that?

有事前复盘，也有事后复盘。

There's the premortem, and there's the mortem.

所以你要尽力弄清楚，你构建的投资组合的事前复盘是什么。

So you try to do your best to figure out what the premortem you've constructed a portfolio.

总的来说，我们95%以上的工作都是流动性的。

Broadly, 95% of what we do or more is liquid.

我们所做的绝大部分都是交易所交易的市场。

The vast majority of what we do is exchange traded markets.

所以在交易所交易的市场中，你至少通常有机会退出。

So at least you have a chance to get out generally in exchange traded markets.

如果你做了事前复盘，并且希望你构建的投资组合能够抵御许多针对你的风险。

If you do the pre mortem and you say, hopefully, I've constructed a portfolio that is robust to many of the things that are thrown against me.

一般来说，在这些模型中，你在高波动环境下赚更多钱，但在从低波动环境转向高波动环境时会亏钱。

Generally speaking, in these models, you make more money in a high vol environment, but you lose money in the move from a low vol environment to a high vol environment.

当你将风险资本扩展到市场，而风险资本的成本上升时，你将在当前的风险资本上面临按市值计价的亏损。

As you've extended risk capital to the market, and now the cost of risk capital has gone up, you're gonna lose on mark to market on your current risk capital.

第二点是事后分析。

The second thing is the mortem.

当事情发生时，你必须迅速行动，那么这是否会变得拥挤？

When it's happening, you have to move your feet of so does that get crowded?

你会不会看到所有人都同时涌向山顶？

Do you get everyone to rush the hills at once?

确实存在这种情况。

There's some of that.

相对于这个多策略行业的发展，市场已经变得如此庞大。

The markets have gotten so big relative to the growth in this multistrategy industry.

在过去几年里，这个行业增加了数万亿美元的市值。

The industry's put on tens of trillions of dollars of market cap in the last few years.

多策略领域增长了一千亿到一千五百亿美元。

The multistrategy has grown by a 100,000,000,000, 150,000,000,000.

第二点是，这个行业中的资本结构已经变得无限完善。

The second thing is the capital structures in this industry have gotten infinitely better.

人们有五年锁定期、三年锁定期、四年锁定期。

People have five year lockups, three year lockups, four year lockups.

所以，并不是每个人都会因为资产亏损而被迫抛售。

So it's not like everyone has to sell because they're gonna lose their assets.

第三点是，现在有许多不同的风险管理方法来做决策。

The third thing is, there are a lot of different risk management approaches that make a decision.

如果资产正在清算，我会买入更多。

If things are liquidating, I'm going to buy more.

如果我认为资产清算是因为基本面模型发生了变化，那我才会卖出。

And if I think they're liquidating because the fundamental model has changed, I'm only then going to sell.

大多数人因在回调时买入而获得回报。

Most people have been rewarded for buying on dips.

但现在，我不这么看待这个问题。

Now, I don't look at it that way.

每个人对它的看法都不同。

Everyone looks at it differently.

这正是市场的美妙之处。

That's the beauty of the markets.

我认为，在压力时期降低风险的原因是情况可能会变得更糟，因此你是在试图对冲。

I view it as the reason you're cutting risk in a time of stress is it might get worse, so you're trying to hedge.

坏处是你锁定了大量亏损，并支付了大量交易成本。

The bad news is you're locking in a bunch of losses, and you're paying a bunch of transaction costs.

好处是，当市场稳定下来，当波动率指数（VIX）从50回落到30、20或其它水平时，你就变得干净了。

The good news is when things settle down, when the vol the VIX goes from 50 back to 30 or 20 or whatever, you now are clean.

你不再被一堆头寸拖累。

You're not nursing a bunch of positions.

你有了主动出击交易的能力。

You have the ability to trade on offense.

因此，如何让自己处于主动地位，才是关键所在。

And so how do you get yourself on offense, is the name of the game.

如果你能这样思考，意识到这是一个机会，那么2020年这样做的公司表现远优于那些死守不动的公司。

If you can think that way and say, here's an opportunity, and the firms that did that in 2020 and thought that way did a lot better than the firms that were holding on.

因为他们死守不动。

Because they're holding on.

那东西从100跌到了80。

The thing went from a 100 to 80.

他们等着那80的东西回升到100。

They're waiting for that 80 thing to go back to a 100.

你以50的价格买入了别人不得不卖出的东西。

You're buying something at 50 that someone else had to sell.

你以9的价格卖出了，没问题。

You sold it at 9 d fine.

你锁定了亏损，但你买入了其他原本不在你计划内的东西，因为有人需要流动性。

You locked in a loss, but you're buying something else that wasn't even on your path, that someone needs liquidity.

这些都是按分钟计价的公司。

These are mark to minute firms.

你会先做事前复盘，然后再做事后复盘。

You'd run the pre mortem and you run the mortem.

这并不是公式化的。

It's not formulaic.

这就是对冲基金的本质。

This is what hedge funding is.

你必须准备好应对它。

You have to be ready to deal with it.

你们公司内部，投资组合经理在行为和心理层面的文化是怎样的？

What's the culture around the behavioral aspect, the psychology for your portfolio managers inside your shop?

当你刚创办一家新公司时，这是你其实并不真正了解的事情之一。

When you start a new firm, that's one of the things you don't really know.

在面试过程中，你往往会招到一些不太乐观的人。

In the interview process, you tend to get people that are a little less optimist.

如果他们更乐观、更有成长型思维，他们就会去那些可以只做多头投资的地方。

If they were more optimistic and more growth minds, that they would have gone to a place where they could just be long.

我们强调风险管理，所以大家都能理解。

We emphasize risk management, and so people get that.

我们有点幸运，因为金融危机发生在2025年3月和4月，正好赶上解放日之类的事件。

We got a little lucky in that the financial crisis happened in March and April 2025 with the liberation day and all that.

所以我亲身经历了，到底是我施加的压力有多大，以及人们反应有多大。

So I got to experience it of how much did I feel like I was pushing people, and how much did I feel like people were reacting.

结果发现，在那种环境下，我其实不需要做太多。

And it turns out, at least in that environment, I didn't have to do much.

大家都能明白。

People got it.

要推动人们承担风险，难度更大。

Harder to push people to take risk.

什么是对冲基金？

What is hedge funding?

对冲基金就是收集大量信息，将其转化为数据，基于这些数据形成观点，再根据这些观点在市场中采取行动。

Hedge funding is taking a bunch of information, turning it into data, taking that data and forming convictions on that data, then taking those convictions and doing things in the marketplace.

当数据较少时，尤其是在最初的十八个月里，很难形成这些确信的判断。

When you have less data, especially in the first eighteen months, it's hard to form those convictions.

你对自己系统的有效性、自己的风险模型、自己的投资组合经理都缺乏足够的数据支撑。

You don't have enough data on your own systems of efficacy, on your own risk modeling, on your own PMs.

他们也有同样的感受。

They feel the same way.

他们没有关于你在困难时期会如何反应的数据。

They don't have data on how you're going to react in a tough time.

所以，数据建设每天都在变得更好。

So that data building gets better every day.

起初，推动人们承担风险比阻止他们承担风险要困难。

In the beginning, it's harder to push people to take risk than it is to stop people from taking risk.

随着我们获得的数据越来越多，我们感觉正在转向进攻，但这需要一个过程。

As we've gotten more and more data, we feel like we're getting onto offense, but that's a process.

这是真实的。

That's real.

这并不是一个哲学问题。

It's not like a philosophical thing.

随着你积累更多数据、获得更多成就徽章、积累更多经验，这一切都会越来越好，每天都在进步，团队成员之间也一天比一天更默契，我能真切地感受到这一点。

It's like, as you get more data, as you get more badges, as you get more experience, that all gets better, it gets better every day, and the teams get more comfortable with each other every day, and I feel that palpably.

于是，这就形成了一种风险管理文化。

And so that becomes a culture of risk management.

你怎么看待薪酬方面的竞争？

How do you think about competing on compensation?

如果你试图在不同的薪酬模式下运行这个模型，也就是说，你必须依赖于你从未见过的公司其他人的做法，那将很难实现，除非你同时做人才培育的工作。

If you tried to run this model on a different compensation model, meaning you have to rely on how everyone else in the firm, people that you haven't even met are doing, It'd be hard to do that unless you did the talent creation side.

除非你决定从零开始招聘所有人，因为很多进入这个行业的人，原本就来自那样的环境——出于某种原因，他们认为自己的产出高于团队的平均水平。

Unless you said, I'm gonna hire everyone from scratch, a lot of the people that come into this industry are coming from places like that, where, for whatever reason, they think they're producing more than the median of that group.

这个世界把投资组合经理塑造成了一心只关注单一目标的人。

The world has constructed these portfolio managers as unitary one track mind people.

我只关心我的薪酬。

I'm just looking at my compensation.

人们希望获得有竞争力的薪酬。

People want to get paid competitively.

他们希望获得公平的薪酬。

They want to get paid fairly.

他们希望薪酬透明。

They want to get paid transparently.

一旦你以公平、有竞争力且透明的方式支付薪酬，那么其中的利润空间就会有更多的数学计算参与其中。

Once you're paying them fairly competitively and transparently, then the margin there has a lot more math going into it.

优化函数要复杂得多。

The optimization functions are more complex.

好吧。

Fine.

我可以多拿一点报酬，但必须在一段时间内退出市场。

I can get paid a little more, but I gotta sit out of the market for a period of time.

在那段时间里，策略会改变吗？

In that period of time, is the strategy gonna change?

我的市场会改变吗？

Is my market gonna change?

我得组建一个新团队。

I gotta put together a new team.

我喜欢来上班吗？

Do I like coming to work?

我觉得有人支持我吗？

Do I feel like people are in my corner?

我觉得成功的概率有多大？

Do I feel like what's the probability of success?

我觉得我的交易方式如何？

Do I feel like the way I trade?

我认为最重要的是，我实际与市场互动的方式，是否与这些人对市场的看法一致。

I think that's the biggest one, is the way I actually interact with the market in Simpatico with the way these people think about that.

这是一个很大的话题。

And that's a big topic.

当人们进来时，你应该能够90%的时间都做对。

You should be able to get that right 90% of the time when people come in.

这是一个复杂的优化函数，但总体上更注重匹配度，而不是薪酬。

It's a complex optimization function, but it's generally about fit more than about compensation.

一旦你做到了透明、公平、有竞争力，核心要点是你说了你要做的事，并且真的去做了。

Once you're in the transparent, fair, competitive, and the basic point is you said what you were going to do and you did what you were going to say.

一旦你做到这一点，你就有了一个良好的起点。

Once you do that, you're in a good starting point.

当你退一步，回顾过去所有你能赚钱的结构性方式，以及你现在试图做的那些，你最感兴趣的机会是什么？

As you take a step back and look at all the structural ways that you've been able to make money in the past and are trying to do it today, what opportunities are you most excited about?

你在寻找什么？

What are you looking for?

你在寻找那些资本不足以满足市场需求的领域，以及你能找到廉价波动性的领域。

You're looking for areas that there's not necessarily enough capital to provide for the service the market wants, areas that you can find cheap volatility.

有时你试图寻找那些愿意承担复杂性风险以进入某个市场的领域。

And sometimes you're trying to find areas where you're willing to take complexity risk to take to get into some market.

银行正在努力寻找合作伙伴，以对冲它们所面临的部分风险，这些风险要么占用大量监管资本，要么因其他原因资本效率低下。

Banks trying to figure out how to get partners in hedging some of the risks that they're left with that either take up a lot of regulatory capital or are not necessarily capital efficient for other reasons.

这被称为战略风险转移。

It's called strategic risk transfer.

我们已经建立了一个业务来实现这一点。

We've set up a business to do that.

亚洲有一些这样的情况。

Asia has some of that.

在复杂性方面，你在印度设立业务并不容易。

In the complexity side, you're setting up a business in India, not that easy.

但一旦你做到了，就可能获得一些机会。

But once you do it, you could probably get access to some things.

如果从更具体的业务层面来看，基础的股票业务，我在90年代中期开始交易指数。

If you took it at a business level, a more concrete level, the fundamental equities business, I started trading indexes in the mid nineties.

标普500指数当时在500点。

The S and P was at 500.

大约有5%的公司被纳入指数。

About 5% of a company was indexed.

现在，粗略估计，我随便说个数字，25%的公司被纳入指数，而标普指数上涨了14倍。

Now, round numbers, I'm making up a number, 25% of a company's indexed, and the S and P is up 14 x.

所以这增长了70倍。

So that's 70 times bigger.

因此，对于那些以系统化方式选股、做深入研究的股票投资者来说，鉴于当前市场规模，这真是个不错的生意。

So the fundamental equity, someone who's picking stocks in a structured way, doing the work, given the size of the market, pretty good business right now.

在流动性信贷市场中，确实存在机会。

There's really opportunity in the liquid credit markets.

许多人已经转向了非流动性信贷市场。

A lot of people have moved into the illiquid credit markets.

私募信贷业务在过去几年里一直是全球增长最快的业务。

The private credit business has been the biggest growing business in the world in the last few years.

这为信贷市场留下了一些机会。

That leaves some opportunities in the credit markets.

此外，我们所说的套利，存在于不同类型投资者和不同市场领域之间的缝隙中。

And then also, what we call arbitrage, there's some money in the seams of different types of investors and different types of arenas.

最大的主题是，在三到四年内，据我所知，直到去年我们的行业在资产规模上增长并不显著，尤其是多策略领域。

The biggest theme is in three or four years, apparently I read our industry until last year hadn't grown that much in terms of assets, especially the multi strategy.

我认为实际上几乎是停滞的。

I think it actually was flat.

在此期间，政府又发行了15万亿美元的债务。

In that time, governments issued another $15,000,000,000,000 of debt.

股票市场增长了30万亿美元。

The equity markets grew by $30,000,000,000,000.

市场已经变得非常庞大。

The markets have gotten really big.

公司又开始重新上市。

Companies are starting to go public again.

一些监管环境正在开始趋于平衡。

Some of the regulatory environment is starting to get balanced.

现在你面临监管竞争了。

Now you're getting regulatory competition.

不同的交易所开始说：在这里上市吧，对市场有好处，至少在短期内是这样。

Different exchanges are starting to say, list here, it's good for the markets, at least in the short run.

这些模型往往伴随着一种存在性风险的问题。

These models often bring with them a question of an existential risk.

大量的杠杆，杠杆可能会引发问题。

A lot of leverage, leverage can cause problems.

你怎么看待这种模式带来的更广泛的传染风险？

How do you think about the broader contagion risks of this model?

传染风险是我们每次都会彻夜难眠的原因。

The contagion risk is what we lose sleep about every time.

现在每个人都要开始撤离市场了吗？

Is everyone gonna start heading out of markets now?

也许下一个会更糟糕，但过去五六年里你已经经历过几次有趣的事件了。

Maybe the next one's gonna be way worse, but you've had a couple of interesting events in the last five years, six years.

新冠疫情是一次真正的事件。

COVID was a real event.

乌克兰战争是一次真正的事件。

Ukraine was a real event.

GameStop事件是一次真正的事件。

GameStop was a real event.

硅谷银行事件是一次真正的事件。

SVB was a real event.

假设数据在2005年变得良好。

Let's say the data got good in 2005.

因此，你至少拥有二十年的良好数据，可以让你对这些企业在这一时期的表现有所了解。

So you have at least twenty years of good data to give you some sense of how these businesses have done in that period.

显然，下一次事件可能会更糟。

And obviously, the next one could be worse.

现在，我们一生都在努力理解这一点。

Now, we spend our lives trying to understand this.

你唯一能应对的方法就是真正的多元化。

What are the only ways you can deal with is actual diversification.

其中一些策略实际上是多元化的。

And some of these strategies are actually diversified.

再次强调，做市和吃市。

Again, market make and market take.

你可以开始多元化的维度有很多，有些策略在压力时期能赚钱。

The amount of dimensions that you could start diversifying, you have some strategies that are gonna make money in times of stress.

你有很多不同的尾部对冲策略。

You have lots of different various tail hedges on.

市场往往很聪明，总会找到你没设对冲的地方。

The market tends to be clever and tends to find a way to find the hedges that you didn't put on.

你是否在承担一些拥挤的风险？

Are you taking some crowdedness risk?

这里面确实有一些这种情况。

There's some of that in there.

当我进入市场时，曾多次感到市场过于拥挤。

When I'm in the market, I felt it crowded in various times.

我觉得2010年到2019年期间市场更加拥挤。

I felt it more crowded in 2010 to 2019.

当时市场规模较小，但波动率很低。

The markets were smaller, but vol was low.

当波动率较低时，有些人接受较低的回报，而有些人则加杠杆来使回报持平。

And so what happens when vol is low is some people accept a lower return, and some people lever up to make the returns equal.

像我这样的人，会选择接受较低的回报。

People like me, we accept a lower return.

我们会明确传达这一点，因为我们最担心的是非对称性波动。

We communicate that because the thing that we're most worried about is the asymmetry vol.

2020年2月的十日波动率为7。

Ten day vol in February 2020 was seven.

两周后的十日波动率飙升至118。

Ten day vol two weeks later was 118.