杰里米·格兰瑟姆——泡沫、价值投资与GMO的长期博弈（第493期）

只要照章办事，说些漂亮话，你就不会面临真正的危险。

Just execute and talk a good game and you will not be in any serious danger.

但如果你对抗牛市，最好做好亏掉大量业务的准备。

But if you fight a bull market, you better expect to lose tons of business.

你永远不会听到高盛或摩根大通告诉你，因为市场严重高估而退出市场。

You will never hear a Goldman Sachs or a JP Morgan tell you to get out of the market because it's ludicrously overpriced.

每个人都知道现在市场严重高估，但没人会告诉你，他们也永远不会说。

Everybody knows today it's ludicrously overpriced, but no one can tell you and they never will.

我完全理解这一点。

I completely get that.

我开始思考这个问题，很大程度上是因为科技泡沫破裂带来的痛苦。

I started thinking about that largely because of the pain of the tech buster.

这如何影响你的投资策略？正如你所描述的博弈论情境：如果你在熊市表现不佳不会被解雇，而所有人都喜欢牛市，那么从商业角度看，你似乎应该始终长期持有并保持强势。

How does that influence the investment strategy as you've laid out a game theory exercise where if you don't get fired underperforming in the down market and everybody loves the bull, that would imply you'd want to be pretty long and strong all the time from a business perspective.

是的，确实如此。

Yeah, it does.

除非你是独立的，否则你承担不起尝试按我们这种方式操作的奢侈成本。

You can't afford the luxury of even trying to do it our way unless you're independent.

个人是可以做到的。

An individual can do it.

我强烈建议那些关注市场、能够简单分析数据的人去尝试。

And I widely recommend that they try if they follow the market, if they can look simply at the data.

这并不是什么高深的科学。

It's not rocket science.

我最喜欢的泡沫是房地产市场。

My favorite bubble was the housing market.

从统计上看，房地产市场的泡沫比美国任何股市泡沫都要大。

The housing market was a bigger bubble statistically than any stock market bubble in America.

2002年至2007年的美国房地产泡沫。

The US housing bubble of 02/1967.

它在三年间稳步上涨，然后又对称地回落到了起点。

It went up beautifully for three years and then it went down symmetrically back where it came from.

以家庭收入的倍数来看，情况就是如此。

As a multiple of family income, that's what it looks like.

它吸引了大约3%从未通常购房的人。

It sucked in about 3% extra people who had never typically bought a house.

所以比例从62%上升到了65%。

So instead of 62%, it went to 65%.

然后这65%的可怜人又回落到62%，被挤出市场，损失惨重。

And then the 65 poor things went back to 62%, squeezed them out, cost them a lot of money.

残酷至极。

Brutal.

这种吸引这些人进入市场的行为本应被遏制，但却没有。

That kind of behavior, sucking those people in should have been discouraged, but wasn't.

我们发现每个泡沫都破裂了，并整理了所有主要资产类别——货币、商品、股票和债券——的顶级泡沫图表。

We found that every bubble had broken and we drew exhibits of all the top bubbles in currencies, in commodities, in stocks, and bonds.

在主要国家中，没有任何例外：一个价格高出两个标准差的市场，这只是一个统计学上的衡量标准。

In major countries, there was no exception to the principle that an overpriced market at two sigma, which is just a statistical measure.

如果你看价格，观察其向上突破，如果是两个标准差，那么所有情况都无一例外地回归到泡沫出现前的趋势。

If you look at the price, you look at the breakout on the upside, if it's two sigma, there is no exception to the rule that all of them went back to the trend that existed prior to the bubble.

这是一个非常严格的标准，而且已经发生过很多次。

That's a very stringent test, and there have been quite a few.

然后是经典的案例，比如日本1989年历史上最大的泡沫，股价飙升至盈利的65倍。

Then the classics like Japan, the biggest bubble in history in 1989, went much higher than anyone else, 65 times earnings.

当这种情况发生时，你付出的代价最终仍会回归正常。

The price you pay when that happens, you still go back.

不是两年内回归，而是花了二十年才回归，导致日本失去了十年甚至二十年的经济增长。

Instead of going back in two years, you go back in twenty years, and you cause a lost ten or twenty years in Japan.

1929年如此，1972年如此，漂亮五十股如此，科技泡沫如此，房地产泡沫如此，当然，2008年金融危机也是如此。

The same in 1929, the same in 1972, the nifty 50, the same in the tech bubble, the same in the housing bubble, and of course the great financial crash.

这次也一定会一样，毫无疑问。

And it will be the same this time, of course.

从来没有任何统计上的疑问。

There's never been any statistical doubt.

这件事似乎只有我一个人特别在意，别人都不当回事。

That's something nobody ever seems to make much of a fuss about except me.

在我和杰里米·西格尔辩论期间，我曾让现场的专业分析师们就一些具体问题进行投票。

In the period when I was debating Jeremy Siegel, I got the audience of professional analysts to vote on some particular issues.

在加利福尼亚举行的金融分析师年度会议上，有1200人参加。

On the annual gathering of the financial analysts in California, there are 1,200.

我记得这个数字。

I remember the number.

我们问了谁自认为是全职股票专业人士。

And we asked who considers themselves full time equity professional.

大约有400人表示自己是为机构业务服务的全职股票专业人士。

And about 400 people declared themselves as full time equity professionals for the institutional business.

这些人都是专业的金融分析师。

These are professional financial analysts.

我对他们说了两个问题。

And I said, I've got two questions for you.

第一个问题是：

One is this.

目前市场的市盈率为31倍。

The market is currently 31 times earnings.

如果在未来十年内，市盈率回落至17.5倍，是否能保证出现一次大熊市？

If it goes back to 17 and a half, anytime in the next ten years, will it guarantee a major bear market?

所有人都同意。

Everybody agreed.

他们没人认为不会这样。

None of them thought it would not.

于是紧接着提出了关键问题：你们中有多少人认为未来十年内市盈率会回落至17.5倍？

So the jackpot question followed, which is, and how many of you think it will go back to 17 and a half sometime in the next ten years?

超过99%。

Over 99%.

不到1%的金融从业者，那些来自高盛和摩根大通的人，相信数据表明这是一个全新的黄金时代；而99%的人则相信数据预示着必然会出现一次大熊市。

Less than 1% of the engine room who worked for the Goldman Sachs and the JP Morgans believed in data that it was a new golden era, and 99% of them believed in data that guaranteed a major bear market.

然而，在那个巨大的科技泡沫中，外面的人们以为意见是分裂的。

Yet the people out there in that great tech bubble, they thought opinion was divided.

是的。

Yes.

有几个悲观的老家伙，太过夸张了。

There were a few bears, silly old bears, getting carried away.

但来自摩根大通的主要主流观点是，一切都会好起来。

But the main top line opinion from the JP Morgans was things will be fine.

他们自己的核心团队完全同意我的观点，却与他们自己的宣传部门意见相左，而宣传部门必须反映符合合理商业策略所需的内容。

Their own engine rooms completely agreed with me and disagreed with their own propaganda department, which had to reflect what was required for a sensible business strategy.

但没有人对这种矛盾感兴趣。

And no one was interested in that dichotomy.

而我可以证明这一点。

And I could prove it.

我必须投票。

I had to vote.

想想看，为了肯定凯恩斯的贡献，他在1932年《通论》第12章中详细阐述了这一切，这难道不令人惊叹吗？

Isn't that amazing when you think about To credit Keynes, he lays all this out in the famous chapter 12 of the general theory in 1932.

他指出，职业风险才是关键。

And he points out that career risk is everything.

控制职业风险的关键是永远不要独自犯错。

The key to controlling career risk is never be wrong on your own.

务必确保你做的和所有人都在做的一样。

Make darn sure that you're doing what everyone else is doing.

正如他所说，要在执行上更迅速、更灵活。

As he would say be quicker and slicker in the implementation.

他说得对。

He's right.

他能如此精准地洞察，真是令人惊叹。

It's amazing that he nailed it.

世界上其余的人至今仍未跟上他的步伐。

The rest of the world still hasn't caught up.

他是唯一一个傻到敢承认我一直在告诉你们的事情的人。

He was the only one foolish enough to admit what I've been telling you.

人人都知道这是事实，但大多数人选择保持沉默，而他却愚蠢地开了口。

Everybody knows that's the case, but mostly they keep suitably quiet and he foolishly opened his mouth.

音乐响起时，你必须跟着跳。

You have to play when the music's playing.

这对我们没有任何影响。

It didn't change anything for us.

我们决定，因为我们是独立的，所以能承担别人不敢承担的风险。

We decided because we were independent, we could take those bets that the others could not take.

我们可能几年内都会失去业务。

We could lose business for a couple of years.

一切又回来了。

It all came back.

我们从320亿美元跌到了22亿。

We went from 32,000,000,000 to 22.

然后我们爆发了。

Then we exploded.

在四年里，我们从22增长到了165。

In four years, we went from 22 to 165.

我们决定，是的，这条路充满坎坷。

We decided that yes, it's a bumpy road.

我完全理解那些大公司为什么不这么做，事实上他们也不该这么做。

I completely sympathize with the big guys who wouldn't do it and indeed shouldn't do.

但只要我们还小且独立，我们就能随心所欲。

But as long as we were small and independent, we could please ourselves.

所以我们什么都没改。

So we changed nothing.

每一轮牛市，我们都被人认为是迷失了方向。

Every bull market, we're considered people who've lost our way.

普通的短期牛市对任何人来说都不算什么。

An ordinary quick bull market doesn't count for anybody.

生活中投资最重要的事情，就是伟大泡沫的形成与破裂。

The only things that matter in life in investing are the founding forming and breaking of the great bubbles.

这决定了一切。

That determines everything.

如果你能避开一半的痛苦，那将带来天壤之别。

If you can sidestep half of the pain, it will make all the difference in the world.

当你考虑利用估值泡沫的另一面时，会遇到难以预知它会持续多久、会走多远的挑战。

When you think about taking advantage of the other side of something that statistically is a valuation bubble, you run into the challenges of not knowing how long it's gonna go and how far it'll go.

在代表有限合伙人投资资本时，你是如何思考这些现实的？

How have you thought about those realities in investing capital on behalf of your LPs?

识别泡沫很容易。

Seeing the bubble is easy.

把握正确的时机显然不可能。

Getting the timing right is apparently impossible.

我们为此尝试过许多种方法。

We have worked on many iterations of that.

凯恩斯说，客户的耐心没有市场非理性行为的时间长。

Keynes said that clients' patience is not as long as the market's ability to be irrational.

这绝对是对的。

And that's absolutely true.

在巨大的泡沫中，它们不仅仅达到两倍标准差，那是泡沫区域。

And in the great bubbles, they don't just reach two sigma, which is bubble territory.

它们会继续攀升到两倍半甚至三倍标准差，而且持续数年之久。

They go on to two and a half or three sigma, but they go on for years.

只有这些才是真正重要的。

They're the only ones that really matter.

真正关键的是最后那一两年。

It's the last year or two that really counts.

客户已经变得不耐烦，无法忍受了。

The clients have become impatient and they can't stand it.

他们开始解雇你。

They start to fire you.

随着我们年龄增长、更加明智，我们在表达方式上变得更加谨慎。

As we got older and wiser, we were perhaps more careful in how we phrased it.

我们明确指出，美国股票并不是应该持有的资产。

We made it very clear that US stocks are not the thing to own.

长期以来，你应该持有非美国股票、发达市场的价值股以及新兴市场价值股。

For a long time now, you should be owning non US stocks, developed value stocks and emerging country value stocks.

当我与人争论时，没有机会说：重要的不是你没有持有美国股市，而是你持有哪些资产。

When I'm arguing with people, don't get the time to say it's not what you don't own, as in The US stock market, it's what you do own that counts.

如果你持有的资产表现更好，谁会在乎你没有持有美国股票呢？

If you own stuff that does better, who cares that you don't own The US?

从上到下，美国市场的价格都太高了。

The US is simply too high priced from top to toe.

如果你必须持有美国股票——很多人确实如此——那么你必须选择优质股票，因为它们更具生存能力。

If you had to own US, and a lot of people do, then you have to own quality stocks because they have survivability.

人们在1929年发现，价值股在大萧条期间有崩溃的危险倾向。

What people found in 1929 is the value stocks had a dangerous tendency to go bust in the Great Depression.

而那些价格高得离谱的可口可乐公司并没有破产。

And the Coca Colas that were horrendously expensive did not go bust.

最终，这就是你能够生存下来的原因。

In the end, that's how you stayed alive.

1929年时，那些买入价格严重高估的可口可乐股票的人，只要没有使用杠杆，就活了下来。

The people who went in with the super overpriced Coca Colas in 1929 survived if they were not leveraged with the portfolio.

而那些使用杠杆的人，无论持有何种资产，都破产了。

And the leverage guys went bust whatever they owned.

价值型投资者大多破产了，因为他们持有的是低质量公司，这些公司无法在大萧条中存活。

And the value guys mostly went bust because they had low quality companies that couldn't stand the depression.

股市中藏着一些值得铭记的宝贵经验。

There's some good lessons lurking around as a folk memory of the stock market.

我们稍作短暂休息，来介绍一下Ridgeline。

We're going to take a quick break in the action to tell you about Ridgeline.

想象一下，每天早上醒来时，对账工作已经完成了。

Imagine starting your day with reconciliation already done.

无需电子表格，无需追着处理中断，无需用胶带粘合系统。

No spreadsheets, no breaks to chase, no duct tape holding systems together.

Ridgeline 是首个为投资经理打造的从前端到后端的权威系统。

Bridgeline is the first front to back system of record built for investment managers.

一个平台，一个实时数据集，内置人工智能。

One platform, one real time dataset, embedded AI.

投资公司正在用这种全新的运营模式，取代那些零散的、孤立的数据管理系统、会计系统、报告插件和客户工具，从而自动化复杂的工作流程，扩展个性化客户体验，并释放人工智能的全部价值。

Investment firms are replacing a patchwork of isolated and data order management systems, accounting systems, reporting add ons, and client tools with this fundamentally new operating model, automating complex workflows, scaling personalized client experiences, and unlocking the full value of AI.

如果今年您的公司准备现代化运营并利用人工智能，您可以访问 ridgeline.ai 了解更多信息。

If this is the year your firm is ready to modernize operations and harness AI, you can learn more at ridgeline.ai.

现在，我们回到访谈。

And now back to the interview.

你在书中提到，试图建立一个模型，以判断自己是否处于泡沫的后期阶段。

You discussed in the book trying to create a model to give you a sense of when you were at the later stages of a bubble.

我非常想听听你在构建这个模型过程中学到了什么。

I would love to hear what you learned in creating that model.

我制定了一条唯一的规则，在美国历史上仅出现过四次。

I developed a singular rule that only has occurred four times in US history.

1928年领涨市场、涨幅高达70%的股票。

The stocks that have been leading the charge up 70% in 1928.

2020年的迷因股票，涨幅巨大。

The meme stocks in 2020, up huge amounts.

当它们开始大幅跑输市场，而牛市仍在继续时，想想这有多不寻常。

When they start to underperform dramatically the market, as the bull market continues, now think how unusual that is.

它们的贝塔值非常高。

They have a very high beta.

它们本应上涨标普指数的1.5到2倍，但在早期阶段却涨了三倍。

They're meant to go up one and a half to two times the S and P, and they've been going up three times in the earlier stages.

然后突然间，蓝筹股继续上涨，标普指数也继续上涨，而它们却下跌了。

Then suddenly the blue chips continue to go up, the S and P continues to go up, and they go down.

它们甚至连方向都判断错了。

They can't even get the sign right.

1929年，标普指数中前一年上涨了70%的低价股，在崩盘前一天，年内跌幅已接近40%。

In 1929, the S and P's low priced index that had gone up 70 the year before, The day before the crash was down almost 40% year to date.

这无疑是股市从内心发出的原始呐喊。

The primal scream from the stomach of the stock market, if ever there was one.

市场广度并不好，但这太荒谬了。

The breadth wasn't very good, but that's ridiculous.

这种高波动性、高风险的股票在牛市中表现不佳的情况，直到1972年‘漂亮五十’的最后一年才再次出现，随后迎来了自大萧条以来最糟糕的熊市。

Nothing like that happens again, that high volatile risky stocks underperform in the bull market until 1972, the final year of the Nifty fifty, followed by the worst bear market you could ever live through since the Depression.

依然毫不留情。

Still merciless.

所有股票都下跌了，小盘股、大盘股，无一幸免。

Everything went down, small, large, everything.

1973至1974年的熊市， preceded by 1972年，当时蓝筹股上涨了18%，而主板平均股票却下跌了18%。

The 'seventy three, 'seventy four bear market was preceded in 'seventy two by a market where the blue chips went up 18%, and the average big board stock went down 18%.

这种对称性让我终生难忘。

That symmetry means I can remember it forever.

然后直到2000年才再次出现这种情况。

And then nothing like that happens again until 2000.

你还记得2000年吗？市场在三月崩盘，但标普指数实际上在九月底又回到了同一水平。

Do you remember in 2000, the market, quote, breaks in March, but the S and P actually hits the same level again in late September.

到那时，成长型股票已经下跌了40%到50%。

The growth stocks by then are down 40 or 50%.

它们占了市场很大一部分，这意味着其余股票必须上涨15%、16%甚至17%才能平衡局面。

They were a big chunk of the market, which means that the rest of the market had to go up fifteen, sixteen, 17% to balance the books.

可口可乐等股票再次缓慢上涨17%来抵消领涨的成长股被重创，这相当奇怪。

That is pretty weird that the Coca Colas once again were grinding up 17% to offset the leading growth stocks getting trashed.

类似的情况再次出现是在2021年。

Nothing like it happens again until 2021.

2021年，你可能记得凯茜·伍德的投资组合突然开始大幅下跌，到年底时已下跌约35%。

In 2021, you may remember that Cathie Wood's portfolio peeled off and started to drop a lot and was down 35% or so by the end of the year.

然而，标普指数却继续稳步攀升。

And yet the S and P continued to climb very nicely.

我持有一只迷因股，当时我并没有意识到，我以风投的方式投资了QuantumScape，这是一家研发汽车第二代电池的公司。

I had a meme stock, I didn't realize it at the time, which I invested in as a venture capital, the QuantumScape with a second generation battery for cars.

几年过去了，他们还没有推出任何产品。

By a few years, they hadn't a product.

所以他们既没有利润，也没有销售收入。

So they had no profits, no sales even.

然而他们在2020年通过SPAC方式上市了。

And yet they came as a SPAC in 2020.

这发生在Cathie Wood的股票下跌之前。

This was before Cathie Wood's stocks had turned down.

我的股票在12月开始下跌。

Mine turned down in December.

它们上市时都是10美元，这是常态。

It came out at 10 as they all do.

到2020年，股价暴涨至131美元。

It exploded to 131 by the 2020.

一度它的市值超过了通用汽车。

For a second was worth more than General Motors.

距离实现任何销售还有好几年。

Years away from having any sales.

这是一些不靠谱的小研究，不过顺便说一句，这是一项了不起的研究工作。

This flaky little research, it's a terrific research effort by the way.

为了讲个好故事，我不该这么说。

I shouldn't say that for the sake of a good story.

这是一项了不起的研究，但背后仅仅是个实验室。

It's a terrific research, but it's only a research lab back there.

它的售价超过了通用汽车。

It sold for more than General Motors.

你一定在开玩笑吧。

You must be kidding me.

不管怎样，那是我迄今为止最大的一笔投资。

Anyway, that was by far the biggest investment I had ever made.

这是我唯一自己持有的，因为如果我们不大量购买，就没有机会投资它。

It's the only one I owned myself, because our opportunity to invest in it was only if we bought a whole lot.

这个持仓量过大了。

It was unsuitably large holding.

我想在2020年，我持有量子电池公司5%的股份。

I had 5% of QuantumScape, I think, in 2020.

它是第一个下跌的，但所有股票都跌了。

It was the first one to go down, but they all went down.

那些在2020年和2021年初表现优异的股票，开始一个接一个地下跌。

All of those stocks that had done so well in general in 2020 and early twenty twenty one started to peel off one by one.

到最后，大多数成长型小盘股都大幅下跌，凯茜·伍德也体会到了这一点，这就是信号。

By the end, most of the junior growth stocks were going down a lot as Cathy Woods found out, and that's the sign.

我写了一篇名为《让狂野的喧闹开始》的论文。

I wrote a paper called Let the Wild Rumpus Begin.

我深信语言至关重要。

I'm a great believer that language counts.

我一生中只有两次明确表达过，我认为现在就是时机。

There's only two times in my life did I make it absolutely clear that I thought it was now.

其中一次是2008年7月15日，我的季度信中使用了‘弃船’之类的措辞，并引用了老话‘别逞强，赶紧跑，留得青山在’，并在第一段明确建议大家不要承担任何不必要的风险。

One of them was 07/15/2008 when my quarterly letter used terms like abandon ship and quoted the old don't be brave, run away, live to fight another day, and recommended clearly in the first paragraph that you should take no unnecessary risk at all.

那些一直听从我们建议持有部分新兴市场资产的人，让我们再重申一次：他们应该卖出所有非必需的高风险资产。

Those people who'd been taking our advice to carry some emerging should allow us to recap that they should sell everything that was risky that they didn't have to carry.

而第二次就是‘让狂野的喧闹开始’，这几乎是最明确不过的宣告了。

And the second one was let the wild rumpus begin, which is about as clear an announcement as you can get.

而它确实开始了。

And it did begin.

2022年当然崩盘了。

2022 of course crashed.

这一年开盘时的弱势是自1939年以来最差的，也就是我出生后的那一年，前六个月都是如此。

It opened weaker than any year since 1939, the year after I was born, the first six months.

到年底时，标普500下跌了25%，成长型股票下跌了35%，MAG七巨头下跌了40%。

By the end of the year the S and P was down 25, the growth stocks were down 35, the MAG seven was down 40%.

债券市场经历了有史以来最糟糕的一年。

The bond market had its worst year in history.

但到了12月初，由于人工智能，局势发生了变化。

But then in early December, the game changed because of AI.

人工智能显然是一个重大的突破。

AI is clearly a dramatic development.

每个人都迅速去尝试了它。

Everyone quickly went on there and tested it.

我也试了。

I did.

我让它用十二个要点总结《战争与和平》，然后把整个内容翻译成德语。

I asked it to summarize war and peace in 12 points and then translate the whole thing into German.

它只花了七秒钟。

And it took seven seconds.

这简直太令人印象深刻了。

It was pretty damn impressive.

只有MAG七只股票上涨了。

Only the MAG seven went up.

在前将近十二个月里，MAG七只股票翻了一倍，而标普指数和其他广义市场的其余部分则继续小幅下跌，直到2023年10月左右，当人们充分认识到这场涨势的持久性时，它们才开始全面上涨。

For the first almost twelve months, the MAG seven doubled and the rest of the S and P and the broad market continued to go down slightly for the balance of the time until about October '23, when they became sufficiently impressed with the durability of the rally and they all started to go up.

聊天机器人和AI的兴起毁掉了我原本完美的熊市。

The invasion of chat and AI ruined my perfectly good bear market.

我依然经历了一个熊市。

I still got a bear market.

跌幅远远超过了20%，但并没有出现原本可能发生的超级泡沫破裂式的崩盘。

It was way over 20% decline, but it wasn't the crushing of a super bubble that would have happened.

如果没有与AI相关的巨额资本支出，没有MAG七只股票带来的巨大股市收益，市场情绪本会截然不同。

Without the great investment associated the CapEx associated with AI, without the huge stock market gains associated with the MAG-seven, animal spirits would have been quite different.

我的唯一偶像凯恩斯曾指出，最周密的计划也会落空。

And Keynes, my one and only hero, makes this point that the best laid plans go awry.

如果人们决定变得沮丧，市场就会一落千丈。

If people decide to be discouraged, the market will go to hell.

他们曾考虑过变得非常沮丧。

They were thinking about being very discouraged.

人工智能改变了这一点。

AI changed that.

如果按照两个标准差的定义，这个泡沫在反弹之前并没有完全回归到趋势线，那我们现在处于什么位置？

Where does that leave us today if the bubble as defined by that two standard deviation move didn't quite go back all the way to trend before it bounced?

没有。

No.

并没有。

It didn't.

远远没有达到趋势线。

By a considerable margin, didn't get to trend.

它必须再下跌20%才能达到一个关键节点。

It would have had to go down another 20% to get a checkpoint.

假设它只走了一半。

Let's say it was halfway.

它让我们现在面临一个前所未有的独特事件，而历史学家最喜欢的就是重复性。

Where it leaves us now is with a unique event that's never happened before, which is historians love to have repetition.

因此，你可以根据事物正常表现来制定作战计划。

So you can design a battle plan based on things behaving like normal.

从来没有任何第二个泡沫像那样出现过。

There's never been a second bubble coming in like that.

我认为，除非是一个真正了不起的新想法，否则这永远不会成功。

I don't think it would ever work unless it was a truly tremendous new idea.

人工智能以超高速发展，涉及的资本支出规模超过了以往任何和平时期的历史记录。

AI moving at warp speed, involving a greater capex program than has ever happened before outside of war.

这才是真正的高手。

This is the real McCoy.

这并不意味着AI不可能伴随泡沫出现。

That doesn't mean that you can't have a bubble associated with AI.

恰恰相反。

It's quite the reverse.

如果你回顾历史，会发现巨大的泡沫总是伴随着被过度炒作的重大投资理念。

If you look back in history, what you find is that the great bubbles are associated with great investment ideas that get overdone.

这必须是认真的。

It has to be serious.

而且最好是明显认真的。

And ideally, it has to be obviously serious.

铁路是最好的例子，其次是互联网。

Railroads are the best example, followed by the internet.

如果你看到铁路将改变世界，那么你当然会想要投资。

If you see that railroads are going to change the world, then of course you want to invest.

普通投资者也会被巨大的势头带动，所以所有追逐趋势的人都涌入其中。

The ordinary guys, you're going to have enormous momentum, so all the momentum guys are in there too.

正如笑话所说，你会在利兹和曼彻斯特之间修建六条轨道。

And you build, as the joke goes, six tracks between Leeds and Manchester.

一条轨道就够用了，两条也还说得过去，但所有人都亏了钱，最终一败涂地。

You could badly use one and two wouldn't be too bad, but everybody loses money and they all get cleaned out.

这并不意味着铁路没有改变世界，当然它们确实改变了。

Doesn't mean that railroads didn't change the world, of course they did.

但正是它们的显而易见性和重要性。

But it was precisely their obviousness and their importance.

互联网，大多数人能看出它相当重要，最终会改变世界。

Internet, most people could see that it was pretty serious, that it would eventually change the world.

亚马逊在2000年上涨了六倍左右。

Amazon went up six times, something like that in 2,000.

尽管这是一个成功的理念，但它下跌了92%。

Even though it was a successful idea, it went down 92%.

去查一下。

Check it.

在泡沫破裂时，它下跌了92%，然后又重新崛起，最终主宰了世界。

It went down 92% in the bust, and then it rose again to inherit the earth.

这在某种程度上并不罕见。

That isn't in a way exceptional.

这就是你应该预期的。

That's what you should expect.

所以我们现在看到英伟达像亚马逊的平方，其资金规模远超历史上任何资本支出计划。

So here we are with NVIDIA looking like Amazon squared, the money dwarfing any CapEx program in history.

每个人心里都清楚，这是他们一生中遇到过的最大的事情。

Everyone being clear in their mind that this is the biggest thing they've ever had in their lives.

他们是对的。

And they're right.

确实如此。

It is.

这就是为什么投资计划几乎肯定会过度。

That's why the investment program is almost certain to be overdone.

为什么不呢？

Why would it not be?

人类本就如此。

Humans being who they are.

这么重大且明显的事情，你为什么不超额投资呢？

Why would you not invest more than you should in something this big and this obvious?

这正是你预期泡沫破裂的地方。

This is exactly where you'd expect the bubble to break.

你还会预期其他事情也如此，它将由Navidea率先引领，紧随其后的是其他巨头。

And you would expect other things being even that it will be led down by Navidea, followed closely by the other giants.

会有一些与之相关的微小外围想法作为前兆，它们会最先崩塌，但其实并不重要。

There'll be little precursors of small peripheral ideas associated with it, and they'll go first, but they don't really count.

当真正的冲击来临时，受损的将是那些大公司。

Then when the real action happens, it's the big guys that get hurt.

事情就是这样发展的，我相信这次也会如此。

That's how things proceed, and I'm sure it will happen this time.

你有时在十五分钟内，有时在十分钟内，有时在二十分钟内，就总结出了你最钟爱的一些经验。

You've encapsulated some of your favorite learnings, sometimes in fifteen minutes, sometimes in ten minutes, sometimes in twenty minutes.

我现在回想起来，很想听听你最喜爱的一些投资教训。

I'd love to hear as you think back now, some of your favorite investment lessons.

最重要的是，一个保持清醒头脑的人会意识到，他们所获得的建议都带有乐观的倾向，并且明白这确实是事实。

The most important thing is that an individual who keeps his brains functioning and realizes that the advice they're getting has a optimistic spin and understand that, of course, that's the case.

大型投资机构必须做到这一点。

The great investment houses have to do that.

如果他们能有勇气坚持自己的信念就好了。

If only they could have the courage of their conviction.

人们往往认为，如果权威人士说了什么，而你觉得他们错了，那他们可能是对的。

The tendency is to think that if the authorities say something and you think they're wrong, they're probably right.

我不同意这种观点。

I just disagree with that.

权威机构是庞大而复杂的组织，拥有成千上万的人。

The authorities are great complex organizations with thousands of people.

要管理这样的庞然大物，你必须具备高度政治化的技巧。

To run such a beast, you have to have highly defined political skills.

政治技巧的关键在于凯恩斯第十二章。

And the key to a political skill is Keynes chapter 12.

永远不要在自己身上犯错。

Never be wrong on your own.

在重大转折点，他们坚持环顾四周、采取预防措施、做好准备，但直到别人都在撤退时才肯退出。

They insist at the great turning points of looking around, taking precautions, getting ready, but not pulling the plug until everyone else is pulling the plug.

这意味着，你能成为那个看清数据的个体。

That means you can be right individual who can see the data.

这些数据就像我的房地产泡沫。

The data is like my housing bubble.

就像你在飞机上奔跑，突然遇到一座落基山脉，然后又迅速退去。

It's like you're running along on the plane, you get one single Rocky Mountain, and back it goes.

如果你看不到这一点，那真是脑子出问题了。

You have to be brain dead not to see it.

这并不难看出来。

It is not hard to see.

就连美联储主席伯南克，在房地产泡沫顶峰时期，也从未见过美国历史上出现过如此情况。

Even Bernanke, who ran the Fed, at the top of the housing bubble, which had never anything like that had occurred in American history.

一个三西格玛事件，其罕见程度远超任何股市事件，包括1929年。

A three sigma event, much worse than any stock market event, including 1929 in terms of its unlikeliness.

是格林斯潘和伯南克多年来疯狂推动，才让泡沫遍布各地。

It took Greenspan and Bernanke pushing like mad for years to get it to bubble everywhere.

美国房地产市场曾众所周知在芝加哥、波士顿、加利福尼亚和佛罗里达等地出现过泡沫。

The American housing market had famously bubbled in Chicago and Boston, California, bubbled in Florida, etcetera.

但直到格林斯潘和伯南克时期，才首次全面爆发。

Never altogether until Greenspan and Bernanke.

就在这一三西格玛罕见峰值之际，伯南克却说：美国房地产市场只是反映了强劲的美国经济。

Right at the peak of that three sigma remarkable new Bernanke says, oh, The US housing market merely reflects a strong US economy.

美国房地产市场从未经历过重大下跌。

The US housing market has never had a major decline.

当然，它从未经历过重大下跌，因为它之前从未出现过如此大规模的泡沫。

Of course, it's never had a major decline because it's never had a major bubble before.

而每一个大规模泡沫最终都会破裂。

And every major bubble has broken.

为什么这一次会不同呢？

Why would this one be different?

当然，事实并非如此。

Of course, it wasn't.

这是一个完美且规范的泡沫，下跌时完全对称，正符合一个泡沫研究者所期望的那样。

It was a perfect well behaved bubble that went down symmetrically exactly as you'd hope as a bubble student.

这怎么可能呢？

How is it possible?

美联储主席写过一本关于1929年的书，却得出了所有错误的结论，这怎么可能？

How is it possible for the president of the Fed who'd written a book about 1929 and drawn all the wrong conclusions?

我应该说，他是个研究1929年的学生，身边围绕着大量统计学家和博士，却没人能说这是一次三西格玛事件。

He was a student of 1929, I should say, surrounded by statisticians, PhDs coming out of their ears, and no one can say this is a three sigma event.

它们通常都极其痛苦。

They tend to be very painful.

它完全按照旧的作战计划运行，而他却否认了这一点。

And it behaved perfectly according to the old battle plan, and he denied it.

这是这个领域的一部分。

It comes with the territory.

这并不是系统的漏洞。

It is not a bug in the system.

复杂的组织在重大转折点上总是会出错，或者几乎总是如此。

Complex organizations always get it wrong at major turning points or almost always.

作为个体，你不必这样做。

You as an individual don't have to do that.

一旦你成为机构，遗憾的是，你就不得不参与同样的政治游戏。

Once you're an institution, regrettably, you're in the same game playing political games.

作为一名养老基金官员，你面临大量的职业风险。

You have lots and lots of career risk as a pension fund officer.

他们过去常常给我打电话。

They used to call me up.

哦，再给我一些材料。

Oh, give me some more material.

我知道你是对的，但委员会马上就要淘汰你了。

I know you're right, but committee's about to shoot you.

然后过了一两个季度，杰里米，是你走还是我走，恐怕是你走。

Then a quarter or two later, well, Jeremy, it's you or me, and I'm afraid it's you.

当你能够从更长远的角度识别出市场中普遍存在的某些行为错误时，我想知道你对指数基金管理和主动管理的未来前景有何看法。

When you're able to identify, at least from a longer term perspective, some of the behavioral mistakes you see broadly in the market, I'm curious how you think about the big movement of index fund management and the potential for active management going forward.

我参与了指数基金的推出。

I was associated with the introduction of the index fund.

这个想法在1971年基本已经成型，当时我和拉巴隆院长受邀参加商学院的一个案例教学。

It was an idea that came more or less fully baked in 1971 in a case taught at the business school to which Dean LaBaron and I were invited.

我们坐在后排，看着他们犹豫是否要投资那些新兴的成长型公司，比如摩根担保信托公司、摩根大通，还是波士顿这家新兴的小盘价值型公司。

We sat on the back row, I watched them trying to decide whether they'd invest in the new growth guys, Morgan Guarantee Trust, JPMorgan, or this little new value small cap guys in Boston.

T.

T.

罗素价格是那些成长型公司。

Rowe Price were the growth guys.

很难想象增长曾经是个新概念，但当时确实如此。

It's hard to imagine that growth was a new idea, but it was back then.

这个观点是，这是一场零和游戏，对吧？

The idea was it's a zero sum game, isn't it?

在投资行业，我们并不生产实体产品。

We do not make widgets in the investment business.

我们只是在来回传递纸张。

We shuffle bits of paper around.

过去是这样，现在我们则是在传输电子数据。

In the old days, now we shuffle electrons back.

我们并没有增加社会的累积财富，恰恰相反。

We don't add to the cumulative wealth of society, quite the reverse.

那时，我们抽取了所有的交易摩擦成本，即每笔交易1%的佣金。

We extract back then all the friction, which was commissions were 1% of the trade.

所以你不仅要承受高昂的佣金，还要支付1%的管理费。

So you had painful commissions, and then you had 1% management fees.

这些都来自这个游戏。

And that comes out of the game.

所以如果你比较那些旁观扑克游戏的人，他们坐在酒吧里，却不用支付这些费用。

So if you compare the guys watching the poker game, they're sitting at the bar, and they're not paying these fees.

他们廉价地购买指数，而你却在扑克桌旁与顶尖玩家对弈。

They're buying the index cheaply, and you are down there in the poker game playing with the best players.

你认为谁会退出扑克联盟？

Who do you think drops out of a poker syndicate?

是顶尖玩家还是最差的玩家？

The best guys or the worst guys?

是那些最差的玩家退出，我可以肯定。

The worst guys drop out, I can assure you.

所以玩家变得非常聪明。

So the players get very smart.

根据定义，他们的总收益等于市场收益减去交易成本和所收取的费用。

By definition, they sum to the market minus the cost of transactions and minus the fees that they charge.

而坐在酒吧里看着你的那些人，他们的总收益为零。

And the guys at the bar watching you, they sum to zero.

他们没有任何成本。

There are no costs.

所以他们会击败你。

So they will beat you.

作为一个群体，他们必须超越你。

As a group, they must outperform you.

我职业生涯中在《投资组合管理杂志》上发表的唯一一篇重要论文，题目是《你不可能一直欺骗所有人》，这是林肯的一句名言。

The only serious paper I wrote in my career with the Journal of Portfolio Management was called But You Can't Fool All of the People All of the Time, which is a Lincoln quote.

我在1972年就认为我们会推出指数化投资，几年后指数化投资就会吞噬整个市场。

I thought back in 'seventy two that we would offer indexing, and in a few years, indexing would gobble up the market.

我们坐在那里，基本上就是等待。

We sat there and we waited basically.

有一个三十年的锁定期，直到2000年代初才发生什么显著变化。

There was a thirty year lock, and nothing much happened until the early 2000s.

然后它开始获得关注，在过去二十五年里迅速发展，如今已占据市场超过一半。

Then it started to get traction, and in the last twenty five years took off and is now more than half the market.

它为投资者节省了巨额资金。

It has saved an enormous amount of money for investors.

这是一个绝妙的点子，杰克·博格尔是我心目中的英雄之一，一位了不起的人物。

It is a brilliant idea and Jack Bogle was one of my heroes, a formidable fellow.

随着指数化投资比例逐渐接近100%，你会遇到一些理论上的难题。

You get into some intellectual problems as the percentage of indexing rises towards 100%.

最终，你仍然需要某种价格发现机制。

In the end, you have to have some price work.

你必须找到一种方式，支付数千名优秀的分析师来帮助确定股票价格。

You have to find a way of paying a few thousand good analysts to help price the equities.

我不知道他们将如何解决这个问题。

And I don't know how they will work it out.

这超出了我的能力范围，但也许在遥远的未来，可能会对所有股票征收极小的税，用以资助一万名训练有素的分析师来协助定价。

It's over my pay grade, but one day in the distant future, there might be a very tiny tax on all stocks to pay for 10,000 well trained analysts to help price it.

几十年来，我一直在客户和投资委员会的另一侧参与其中，我很想听听你对那些担任首席投资官或委员会董事会成员的人，你会给出什么建议？

Having sat on the other side of so many clients and investment committees for decades now, I'd love to hear your thoughts on what advice you give someone who's either in a CIO seat or a board member of a committee?

许多委员会的工作几乎不可能完成，尤其是在捐赠基金领域，大学里那些捐赠了大笔资金的富裕校友非常希望进入董事会。

Many committees are a nearly impossible task where particularly in the endowment business, colleges, because rich graduates who've made big donations would love to sit on the board.

他们受到特别优待，因为他们在私募股权、风险投资或对冲基金中擅长赚钱，并不意味着他们对所有事情都了如指掌。

They are treated with kid gloves because they're wonderfully good at making money at private equity or venture capital or hedge funds does not mean that they know everything about everything.

但这却让那些薪水相对较低的雇员陷入了困境。

But it makes it to the relatively lowly paid hired guns.

试图管理这些庞大自我的人，是一项几乎不可能完成的任务。

It's an impossibly difficult job to try and manage these giant egos.

对此没有简单的答案。

There's no easy answer to that.

一些养老基金已经非常专业地处理这些问题，并以非常理性的角度思考应对方式。

Some pension funds have become very professional at dealing with these things and thinking about how to deal with it on a very intellectual basis.

但这类机构只是少数。

But they're a small minority.

你必须认真思考，找出平衡这些诱惑的最佳实践。

You have to think about it, find out what are best practices to balance all these temptations.

他们能够更敢于逆向思考，更注重价值，承担更多商业风险，因为这并非他们的主业。

And they can afford to be a little more contrarian, a little more value oriented, and take a little more business risk because that's not their business.

从长远来看，他们的定位可能优于完全商业化的顾问和资产管理人。

They can be better positioned in the long run than fully commercial advisors, money managers.

其中一些人确实做到了。

And some of them are.

这并不容易。

It's not easy.

我们大多数人不得不顺应本地的职业风险：谁捐的钱多，谁就有更多投票权——这并非最理性的体系，但这就是现实。

Most of us have to bend with the local career risk, which is who gives more money gets more votes, which is not necessarily the most rational system, but that's life.

当你观察那些运作良好的养老基金、捐赠基金和基金会时，有没有哪个例子是你认为在应对这些挑战方面特别成功的？

As you've looked at examples of pension funds endowments foundations doing it well, what's an example of someone you would call out as more of a success in navigating those challenges?

那些认真勤奋的人，他们试图以最理性的方法来管理庞大的养老基金。

It's the earnest hardworking people who think they will try and get the most intellectual approach to managing a giant pension fund.

他们很努力。

They try hard.

他们常常能取得相当不错的成果。

They often succeed reasonably.

我不太愿意点名，但其中一两个最大的机构做得最好。

I feel uncomfortable mentioning any names, but one or two of the very largest are the best.

他们拥有最多的资源，并且非常明智地利用了这些资源。

They have the most resources and quite sensibly they've used them.

很多人都知道他们是谁，但我不能明说，除非我想得罪其他人。

A lot of people know who they are, but I can't really say that unless I want to offend everybody else.

我没什么职业风险，但这个问题可能是最具职业风险的。

I don't have a lot of career risk, but that's probably the question with the most career risk.

杰里米，多年来你与大卫·斯文森有着密切的合作关系。

Jeremy, for many years you had a close working relationship with David Swenson.

我很想听听你认为他做得特别出色的地方。

Would love to hear what you thought he did exceptionally well.

他拥有许多优势。

He had a lot of advantages.

在顶尖大学捐赠基金中率先行动，比大多数人更容易做到。

You can be an early mover at a leading college endowment more easily than most people can.

中型大型公司养老基金的官员面临巨大的职业风险，简直不知所措。

The pension fund officer of a medium large firm has got so much career risk, he doesn't know whether he's coming or going.

顶尖大学的光环在于，你被视为有智慧、有思想引领力的人。

The aura of a great university is that you're intellectual, you're a thought mover.

你拥有绝佳的条件来引领潮流。

You have a wonderful setup to lead the charge.

这就是背景。

So that's the background.

其次，他非常适合引领潮流。

Secondly, he was well suited to lead the charge.

他有很多好点子。

He had lots of good ideas.

他能像任何人一样捕捉到别人的优秀想法。

He could scoop up other people's good ideas as well as anybody.

他会收集最新、最前沿的想法。

He would gather the latest and greatest ideas.

当我们推出前沿新产品时，他会登门拜访。

When we had a cutting edge new product, he'd be knocking on our door.

当产品已经成熟并持续表现良好时，他早就离开了。

When it was well established and still doing well, he'd long gone.

所以我们对此习以为常。

So we got used to that.

这是一种极大的优势。

That's a great luxury.

他有一个巨大的优势：一旦建立了声誉，人人都想请他，他能进入其他人根本无法企及的基金。

He had the huge advantage that once he had a reputation, everybody wanted him, and he could get into funds that other people couldn't dream of getting into.

卓越的私募股权和风险投资。

Brilliant private equity and venture capital.

而且它们比普通的资产管理更持久。

And they are so much stickier than general money management.

在私募股权和风险投资中，资金周转没有那么快。

They don't turn over as fast in private equity and venture capital.

赢家往往持续获胜。

The winners tend to stay winners.

选对项目是一个更重要的因素。

Being in the right ones is a bigger factor.

他拥有这个优势，因为大家都想让他加入。

And he had that advantage that they wanted him.

他和任何人一样擅长分析谁是优秀的。

He could analyze who was good as well as anybody.

他们确实如此。

And they did.

所以他们拥有诸多优势，并且非常善于利用这些优势。

So they had lots of advantages and they were nicely suited to take advantage of them.

他们确实做到了。

And they did.

他们长期以来的组合堪称威力无穷。

Their combination for a long time was dynamite.

其他像普林斯顿这样的少数人也取得了类似的成就，拥有相似的优势，但程度略逊一筹。

One or two other people like Princeton, did approximately as well with similar advantages, but not quite as much.

我很好奇是什么促使你写了这本书。

I'm curious what led you to write this book.

这件事有点不光彩地发生了：我一位在GMO董事会的同事，同时也是我合著者的朋友，决定向董事会提议我们是否应该出一本书。

It was somewhat ignominiously One of my colleagues on the GMO board, who was a friend of my co writer, decided that she would ask the board if we shouldn't do a book.

最终决定要出版这本书。

It was decided to do it.

爱德华·钱德勒必须约束我，不让我在这上面做太多、在那上面做太多，否则会失去读者。

Edward Chancellor had to keep me under control and wouldn't allow me to do too much of this and too much of that because it would lose readership.

讽刺的是，这本书读起来却像是我的声音。

The irony is that it has my voice.

听起来像是我在说话，因为这本书最初基于1200页的季度信件，这些信件确实由我撰写，并且已经润色完毕，随时可以使用。

It sounds like I'm talking because it started with 1,200 pages of quarterly letters, which were indeed written by me and were well polished and ready to go.

所以他手头有1200页的材料，外加三十到四十小时的录音访谈，以及一些零散的文章。

So he had 1,200 pages plus thirty, forty hours of interview on tape, plus a few articles floating around.

他必须把这些材料打磨成型，使其变得易读。

He had to beat it into shape and make it readable.

这本书读起来并不枯燥。

It's not a painful read.

它不是在听格兰瑟姆试图解释生命与死亡的深层本质——那可能是我原本会陷入的议题；这本书相对轻松，读起来很快。

It's not listening to Grantham trying to explain the deeper essence of life and death, which I might have veered into on my It's reasonably light and a quick skip.

对读者来说幸运的是，我从1964年就开始投身投资行业。

And happily for the reader, I've been through the investment business since 1964.

在1964年，这个行业几乎还不存在。

It hardly existed in 'sixty four.

养老基金业务尚未起步。

Pension fund business had not started.

当时很少有才华横溢的人有理由进入股市。

Very few people with talent had any reason to go into the stock market.

1929年的崩盘并不遥远，才过去三十五年。

Nineteen twenty nine crash was not that far away, thirty five years.

GMO公司今年四十九岁了。

GMO is forty nine years old.

我刚入行时，距离市场崩盘的日子还很近。

When I started, it was much closer to the day the market crashed.

真正的痛苦不是1929年，而是1938年。

The real pain wasn't 1929, it was really 1938.

那离得更近。

That was much closer.

投资仍然是一个令人怀疑的行业。

Investing was still a suspicious business to be in.

正经的生意由摩根大通操持，而一些不太聪明的富家子弟则会邀请有钱人共进午餐，配上一瓶好酒，顺便给他们买几股可口可乐的股票。

The serious business was run by JPMorgan and the not so smart son of a well connected family who would take rich people out for lunch with a nice bottle of wine and he'd buy them a few shares of Coca Cola.

就是这样。

That was it.

当时没有期权模型。

There were no option models.

也没有定价理论。

There was no pricing theory.

没有人考虑过资产配置。

No one had thought about asset allocation.

一切都等着被人思考。

Everything was waiting to be thought about.

这让我非常着迷，思考如何玩这个游戏、这个垄断、这个复杂的东西，试图弄清楚是什么让它运转，以及什么能帮助你超越市场。

That was the big turn on for me, thinking of ways to play this game, this monopoly, this complicated thing, and try and work out what made it tick and what could help you outperform.

我提到过所有那些不公平的优势，我们多年来专注于小盘股，因为竞争很少，生活非常轻松。

With all the unfair advantages I mentioned that we specialized in small cap for years where we had little competition and life was easy.

过去几年，你花了不少时间和精力在环保事业上。

The last bunch of years, you spent a fair amount of time and your philanthropic efforts focused on the environment.

我们很想听听您如何看待投资领域与气候变化之间的某些相似之处。

We'd love to hear how you think about some of the parallels in the investment world and what you see happening with the climate.

在书的结尾，我意识到人类有一些非常强大的偏见。

At the end of the book, I realized that humans have some pretty powerful biases.

其中之一是我们对长期事务并不真正感兴趣。

One of them is we're not really interested in long term.

时间越长，我们的兴趣就越少。

And the longer the term, the less our interest.

其次，我们不喜欢坏消息。

Secondly, we don't like unpleasant news.

我们真的非常不喜欢。

We really do not like it.

所以我们总是倾向于积极的解读。

So we have a positive spin.

我相信乐观是一种生存特质。

I believe that optimism is a survival characteristic.

我怀疑，在过去二十万年里，真正的悲观主义者并没有真正的乐观主义者生存得那么好。

I suspect that the real pessimist didn't thrive as well as the real optimist for the last two hundred thousand years.

适者生存不仅包括更强壮和更快，还包括更乐观。

Survival of the fittest included, along with being stronger and faster, being more optimistic.

反叛者显然也生存了下来。

Contrarians apparently survived.

你的族群中需要一些少数的反叛者，让他们思考作物歉收时会发生什么、野牛消失时会发生什么等等，但这类人只能是少数。

You need the odd contrarian in your tribe useful to have someone thinking about what happens when the crops fail, what happens when there are no buffalo, and so on, but a small minority.

你必须应对乐观偏见和短期偏见。

You have to deal with an optimistic bias and a short term bias.

这解释了市场的很多现象。

That explains a lot about the market.

市场实际上只是对今天状况的外推。

The market really is an extrapolation of today's conditions.

大家都讲过这样一个笑话：市场是在向前无限推演一系列股息支付。

Everyone tells this joke story about the market is projecting forward in time an infinite series of dividend payments.

不，不是这样的。

No, it's not.

看看数据。

Check the data.

市场正在 extrapolating 当前的状况。

The market is extrapolating today's conditions.

如果你身处1929年，经历了出色的盈利，利润率是正常水平的一点五倍，你会预期糟糕时期会到来吗？

If you're sitting in 1929 and you've had wonderful earnings and profit margins are one and a half times normal, do you anticipate that bad times will come?

不会。

No.

你假设一点五倍的正常水平会永远持续下去，这解释了1929年7月的价格。

You assume that one and a half times normal will be there forever, and it explains the price in July 1929.

到了1974年，利润率被压垮，又遭遇石油危机，市场难道不会预期一场辉煌的复苏吗？

And you come back in 1974 and the margins are crushed and you've got an oil crisis, surely the market must expect a magnificent recovery.

绝对不是。

Absolutely not.

市场以七倍市盈率出售，表明它认为不会出现复苏。

The market sells at seven times earnings, indicating it thinks that there will be no recovery.

对于大多数股票来说，收益率达到百分之七、八、十是相当合理的，因为这就是你能得到的全部回报。

It's quite appropriate for most stocks to yield seven, eight, 10%, because that's all you're going to get.

因此，市场只取最差的情况并采用低市盈率，而将最好的情况乘以高市盈率。

So the market just takes the worst and has a low PE, takes the best multiplies by a high PE.

它在进行外推。

It's extrapolating.

凯恩斯再次提到，外推是我们采用的惯例，尽管我们从个人经验中知道这并不成立。

Keynes once again, he said extrapolation is the convention we adopt even though we know from personal experience that it is not the case.

因为如果你们都同意进行外推，那么你们就达成了共识。

Because if you all agree to extrapolate, then you're all on the same page.

你不需要猜测对手会做什么。

You don't have to guess what the enemy is going to do.

他也不必费心去琢磨你会做什么。

He doesn't have to work out what you're going to do.

你们都会一起跳下悬崖，但你们不会丢掉工作。

You're all going to jump over the cliff together, and you will not lose your job.

这如何反映你对人们对待环境方式的看法？

How does that reflect on how you see people treating the environment?

对长期性和不愉快的厌恶，想想这在气候变化中的体现。

The hatred of long term and unpleasantness, think about that in climate change.

我不想听那种说法，天啊，他们一直说气候不好。

I don't want to hear that, oh, god, they've been saying bad things about the climate forever.

不可能仅仅因为燃烧几加仑燃料就导致持续恶化。

Can't possibly be any sustained deterioration just because of burning a few gallons.

这一切都是完全可以预测、可以编程的。

It's all absolutely predictable, programmable.

你知道大气中每百万分之一的二氧化碳究竟会产生什么影响。

You know what the effect of each part per million really is of CO2 in the atmosphere.

你知道如果将其翻倍会发生什么，而我们正在恰恰这么做。

You know what happens if you double it, and we're doing precisely that.

气温正在上升，大致符合他们五十年前、八十年前和十年前的预测。

The temperature is rising, give or take, what they would have predicted fifty years ago, eighty years ago, and ten years ago.

但人们却愿意对此视而不见。

But people are prepared to ignore it.

今天的洪水和火灾不会让我的生活变得难以忍受，除非我住在火灾区或洪涝区，今年买不到保险。

Today the floods and fires are not going to make my life unbearable tomorrow, unless I live in a fire zone or a flood zone and can't get insurance this year.

所以问题已经开始显现，但才刚刚开始。

So it's beginning to bite, but only just beginning.

然后你会想到那些在长远来看真正重要的事情。

Then you think of everything else that really matters in the long run.

另一个问题是毒性正在破坏我们的健康。

Another one would be toxicity that is ruining our health.

我们制造了一锅有毒的混合物，正在丧失生育能力。

We've created a toxic stew and we're losing the ability to procreate.

没人愿意谈论这个问题。

No one will talk about that.

上周末我让AI解释为什么婴儿出生率在下降，并让它主导这个话题。

I asked AI over the weekend to explain why baby production was dropping and made it take the lead.

它逐步专业地列出了数十个不生育孩子的经济和社会原因，这与过去的情况大不相同。

And it gradually filled in very professionally all of the dozens of ideas, economic and social reasons for not having children like you did in the old days.

对此，当然谁都会同意。

To which, of course, one agrees.

然后我问它：你有没有遗漏什么？

Then I got to say, have you missed anything?

它又找出了三四个因素。

It found three or four things.

接着我进一步追问：对了，那毒性问题呢？

Then I bushwhacked it and said, yeah, what about toxicity?

哦，没错，毒性问题非常严重。

Oh, yes, toxicity is huge.

它详细阐述了整个论据。

And it lays out the whole case.

所有数据都显示精子数量下降。

All the data drops in sperm count.

这简直是个恐怖故事。

It's a horror story.

它说对了。

And it got it right.

它早就知道这一切。

It knew it all the time.

所以当它说完后，我基本上说：老兄，这到底怎么回事？

So when that finished, I said basically, dude, what is going on here?

人人都在告诉我你有多聪明。

Everyone's telling me how smart you are.

尽管你这么聪明，即使我不断追问，你还是漏掉了什么？

And despite your smartness, even when I'm pushing you, what have you missed?

你从不会提出一些你后来承认很重要的东西。

You don't come up with something that you then admit is important.

用五到六段话给出了一个非常容易理解的论述，没错，你说得对。

Gave a very easily understood dissertation over five or six paragraphs that, yes, you're right.

当然，我们只讨论那些引起关注的事情。

Of course, we only talk about things that are on the radar screen.

如果人们忽视它，我们也会忽视它。

If people are ignoring it, we ignore it.

就是这样。

That's it.

所以AI只会告诉你主流观点是什么。

So AI will only tell you what the mainstream is.

这种等待机制意味着，谈论的人越多，人们就越觉得它严重，它的作用就越大。

The waiting system means that the more people are talking about it, the more they think it's serious, the bigger the role is.

这就是你如何登上旧版谷歌搜索榜单的方式，也是你如何登上AI榜单的方式。

That's how you get to the top of the old Google list, and that's how you get to the top of the AI list.

如果你是个反主流的观点，它们会感到不适。

And if you're a contrarian idea, they're uncomfortable.

当我输入非主流观点时，每一段都回答：是的，但你意识到这并不被普遍接受。

When I feed it contrarian ideas, every paragraph says, yes, but you realize this is not commonly accepted.

你一次又一次地意识到这一点。

You realize this over and over again.

在机器能够感到不适的范围内，它似乎对非主流观点和有害内容感到不安。

To the extent that a machine can be uncomfortable, it appears to be uncomfortable with contrarian views and with toxicity.

它承认，人工智能的发展速度比气候变化更快，也更危险。

It admits that it's faster moving and more dangerous than climate change.

按照这种趋势，它将因缺乏新人而承受不住压力。

That at this rate, it will fail under stress from lack of newbies.

你知道日本20岁年龄段的人口只有1948年的百分之五十吗？

Do you know the 20 year old cohort in Japan is fifty percent of what it was in 1948?

百分之五十。

Fifty percent.

中国的生育率刚刚跌破1，这意味着每个年轻人需要抚养四位祖父母。

The fertility rate in China has just dropped below one, which means every young person has four grandparents to support.