2025年Top 5：第3名：Tim Sullivan

这将是一个挑战。

It's gonna be a challenge.

鉴于这些变化的动态以及私募市场资本的可得性，您认为机构需要如何调整其对风险投资和私募股权的配置方式？

How do you think that institutions need to adapt the way they consider their allocations to both venture and private equity as a result of some of these changing dynamics and the availability of capital in the private markets?

他们需要对所能取得的成果保持非常现实的态度，尤其是在风险投资领域。

They need to be very realistic about the results that they can generate, particularly in the venture world.

这就像买彩票，而彩票系统性地集中在某些地方。

It's a lottery ticket business and the lottery tickets systematically end up in certain places.

如果你是一个没有这些现有关系，或没有充分理由相信自己能接触到这些公司的机构，你真的需要认真问自己：我在这里能获得什么成果？

If you're a institution that doesn't have those existing relationships or a good reason why you think you can access those firms, you really have to ask yourself some serious questions about, well, what results am I going to get here?

如果无法投资于顶级风投公司，那么这种脑力消耗、流动性差、耗时投入，以及我能获得的成果，是否值得？

Is it going to be worth the brain damage, the illiquidity, the time and what results am I going to get if I cannot invest with those top tier venture firms?

顶级风险投资家的名单可能比十五或二十年前更广泛，相比我职业生涯的大部分时间，现在有更多人从零开始就能进入这一领域。

The list of who's a top tier venture capitalist is maybe a little broader than it was fifteen or twenty years ago and there are probably more people that have, from a standing start, been able to move into that realm than was the case for a lot of my career.

如果你说：我进不了全球知名的红杉资本这类老牌机构，那我就投资新兴管理人，你必须非常现实地评估自己真正找到这些人的概率。

You want to be very realistic about your probability of actually finding those people if you're saying, I can't get into the established sequoias of the world, so I'll invest in emerging managers.

因为我认为你可能会发现，找到赢家非常困难，而且你可能无法频繁到足以弥补亏损或平庸投资的程度。

Because I think you may find that it's very hard to find the winners and you may not find the winners often enough to pay for the losers or the mediocre.

你必须非常现实地评估，你在进入这个领域时究竟拥有什么竞争优势。

You have to be very, very realistic about what competitive advantage do you have in terms of accessing that world.

生物领域没那么难进入。

The bioworld's not quite so hard to access.

你需要认真思考：这值得投入时间和精力，以及承受流动性不足的代价吗？

You need to think a lot about is this going to be worth the time and effort and illiquidity?

我是否为所承担的风险获得了相应的回报？

Am I getting paid for the risk that I'm taking?

人们常常忽视的一个风险是：如果你聘请了一位公开市场基金经理，两年后你发现，哎呀，我犯了个错误。

One of the risks that people do not think about is if you hire a public equity manager and two years later you've decided, oops, I made a mistake.

你可以解雇他并拿回资金，而且由于资产具有流动性，卖出的成本通常并不高。

You fire them and you get the money back and oftentimes because it's liquid, the cost of selling is not particularly high.

而在私募领域，如果你犯了错误，你就得被困住十五年或二十年，或者不得不在二级市场上承受巨大折价。

On the private side, if you make a mistake, you're stuck with it for fifteen or twenty years or you have to take a huge haircut in the secondary market.

有时候，你就是找不到愿意购买你那表现糟糕的基金的人。

Sometimes you just will not find people that want to buy your crummy fund.

这是关于非流动性资产的另一个重大风险，我认为人们没有充分意识到：我的资金在很长一段时间内被锁定，仅获得非常平庸的回报，这种风险有多大。

That's another big risk with illiquid assets that I think people do not think about properly is what is the risk of my money is stuck here for some very long period of time earning a very mediocre rate of return.

这使得你难以实现良好的整体组合回报。

That makes it all the harder for you to generate good total programmatic returns.

你的赢家必须更加努力地工作，才能弥补我们的损失。

Your winners have to work that much harder to make up for us.

如果你有

If you've got

你的资金被锁定在一只基金中长达十二年，仅获得3%的回报，这是一个非常糟糕的结果。

your money stuck in a fund for twelve years and it generates a 3% return, that's a really bad outcome.

在金融危机之前，尤其是在私募股权领域，你所投资的公司开始扩张。

Leading into the financial crisis, and particularly in private equity, you had this period of time where firms that you invested within started to grow.

曾经这些是小型公司，它们开始吸纳更多资本，开展更多业务。

There had been these boutique firms, and they started to take on more capital, do more things.

在2008年之前，你是如何思考管理那些你投资过的、从精品型公司逐渐变得不再精品的基金的？你如何决定是否继续与它们合作？

How did you think about managing up until 'eight, as firms that you had invested in as a boutique became less boutique and making those decisions of whether to stay with them or not?

我们投资的大多数公司都保持了精品型的定位。

Most of the firms that we invested with did stay as boutiques.

变化更多体现在资产管理规模上，以及它们所收购公司的规模上。

The change was more in assets under management and consequently the size of company they were buying.

我们非常关注我们的投资标的以适当的方式成长。

We were very cognizant of our firms growing in ways that are appropriate.

在收购领域，人们本质上都是从小规模开始的，因为当你没有业绩记录时，很难募集到大量资金。

In the buyout world, people by definition start out small because when you don't have a track record, can't raise that much money.

如果你成功了，就可以募集更多资金，设立更大的基金，收购更大的公司，而收购大公司时感觉很好，因为大公司通常就是更好的公司。

If you're successful, you can raise more money, you have bigger funds, you can buy bigger companies and buying the bigger company feels good while you're doing it because bigger companies just tend to be better companies.

它们拥有更深厚的管理团队。

They have deeper management.

它们对少数客户的依赖性较低。

They're not as reliant on a few clients.

它们有更好的系统。

They have better systems.

它们更容易获得融资。

They're easier to finance.

它们更容易出售。

They're easier to sell.

许多收购经理在成长过程中会想，太好了。

A lot of buyout managers, as they're growing, they think, oh, this is great.

我正在收购这些好得多的公司，我不必再花六个月时间去偏远地区的某家公司当紧急首席财务官，因为那家公司根本没有首席财务官。

I'm buying these much better companies and I don't have to go spend six months as the emergency CFO in the middle of nowhere at some company because we don't have a CFO.

在这个过程中面临的挑战是，有时适用于小公司的技能并不适用于大公司。

The challenge along the way is that sometimes the skill set that works with the small company is not applicable to the bigger company.

此外，大公司通常管理得更好，因此在你持有它们期间，你能做的改进可能更少。

Also, bigger companies tend to be better managed, so maybe there's less you can do with them while you own them.

有时会出现彼得原理的现象：公司起步时规模小，表现良好，然后成长，收购更大的公司，但更大的公司更昂贵，收购竞争更激烈，持有期间你能做的改进更少，回报开始停滞。

There is a Peter principle thing at work sometimes that firms start out small, they do well, they grow, they buy bigger companies, but the bigger companies are more expensive, it's more competitive to buy them, there's less you can do with them when you own them, do the returns start to stagnate.

但对机构投资者来说，问题在于确实有一些公司成功完成了这一转型。

But then the problem for the institutional investor is that there are actually some firms that have made that transition well.

你怎么知道哪些公司会成功，哪些不会呢？

How do you know which ones are gonna be the right ones and which ones are not?

这很难。

It's hard.

如果容易的话，每个人都会去做。

If it was easy, everyone would do it.

我们曾与一家公司合作过。

We had a firm that we worked with.

在2000年代初，我们参与了他们的前两支机构基金。

We were in their first two institutional funds in the early two thousand period.

这两支基金都取得了巨大成功。

They were both spectacularly successful.

当他们募集第三支机构基金时，目标是筹集一笔规模为第一支我们投资的基金七倍半的基金。

When they raised their third institutional fund, they set out to raise a fund that was seven and a half times the size of the first fund we had invested in.

在此期间，第一个基金包含了20家公司。

And in the interim, that first fund had 20 companies in it.

他们现在谈论的基金将包含100家公司。

The fund they were now talking about was gonna have a 100 companies in it.

这家机构从最初只有两位负责人和大约八名下属，发展到如今两位负责人和八十名下属。

And the firm had gone from being two head guys and maybe eight people underneath them to now being the two head guys and 80 people underneath them.

这一切都发生在短短五年之内。

And this is all in the space of five years.

随后，他们开设了多个办事处，包括至少一家在欧洲的办事处。

And then they'd opened several offices including at least one in Europe.

而这两位负责人仍然基本上在做所有决策。

And the two head guys were still basically making all of the decisions.

他们并没有真正建立起一个让人心生信赖的管理团队，团队中缺乏足够的资深人员。

They really hadn't grown out of management team around them that you had confidence that there was a lot of seniority there.

我们看了之后说：看吧，这趟列车正朝着我们无法接受的方向前进，所以我们决定下车。

We looked at that and said, look, this train is headed in a direction we're just not comfortable with, so we're getting off the train.

在这个过程中，我们向他们提出了很多尖锐的问题，他们的反应是：你们为什么对我们这么苛刻？

We asked them a lot of tough questions in that process and their reaction was, why are you guys being so mean to us?

我们为你们和所有其他有限合伙人创造了如此好的业绩，其他LP都欣喜若狂，因为可以给我们更多资金。

We've done so well for you and all the other LPs are ecstatic that we're raising this big fund because they can give us more money.

你们为什么向我们提出这么多尖锐的问题？

Why are you guys asking us all these tough questions?

所以我们没有参与那只基金。

So we didn't do that fund.

十八个月后，他们筹集了一只比那只基金大得多的基金。

They then, eighteen months later, raised a much larger fund than that fund.

然后2008年来了，那两只基金的表现远不及我们所参与的那两只基金。

Then 2008 happened, those two funds certainly didn't match the performance of the two funds we were in.

我认为它们并非彻底失败，但业绩确实非常平庸。

I don't think they were total disasters, but they're very mediocre outcomes.

这对我们来说是一个完美的例子，说明一家公司如果在太多维度上过快扩张，却缺乏对以下问题的深入思考：我们擅长什么？为什么擅长？如何以与我们的优势一致的方式成长？如何构建人才基础和决策机制，以确保我们在扩张过程中持续保持高效？

That was to us a perfect example of a firm that was growing too quickly along too many different dimensions without enough thought about what are we good at, why are we good at it, how can we grow in a manner that is consistent with that, how do we build out a talent base and a decision making process that enables us to continue to be effective as we grow?

花大量时间去理解，这种增长是出于正当理由，还是仅仅因为市场上资金充裕，只要我们把钱收进来，就能获得大量管理费，至于怎么投资，以后再说。

Spending a lot of time trying to understand is the growth for good reasons or is it because there's a lot of money out there and if we collect it, we'll get a lot of fees and we'll figure out how to invest it later.

顺便说一句，一只50亿美元的基金以15%的回报率复利计算，其业绩报酬远高于一只5亿美元的基金以30%回报率计算的业绩报酬。

And by the way, the carried interest on a $5,000,000,000 fund compounding at 15% return is a lot more than the carried interest on a $500,000,000 fund compounding at a 30% rate of return.

此外，管理费显然是十倍之多。

Plus, obviously, the fees are 10 x.

我们始终试图弄清楚这家公司的竞争优势是什么。

Always trying to understand what is the competitive advantage this firm has.

这种优势是否具有持久性？

Is it going to be enduring?

随着公司成长、人员更替、战略演变，这家公司是否在变得越来越好？

Is the firm getting better as it grows, as it cycles through people, as it evolves its strategy?

这对我们来说极其重要。

Very, very important to us.

你提到精品公司逐渐发展为综合性机构，我们一直非常担心人们会分心。

Your point on boutiques becoming broader firms, we always worried a lot about people having distractions.

我们非常欣赏这样一种理念：当我们的经理们早上醒来时，他们想的是我们所投资的基金，而不是他们的房地产基金、对冲基金、信贷基金或其他任何项目。

We really liked the idea of being able to know that when our managers woke up in the morning, they were thinking about the fund that we were invested in, not their real estate fund or hedge fund or credit fund or whatever else they had going on.

我们真正喜欢的是那些专注于做一件事并成为世界上最好的人，而不是那些想着‘我有个品牌可以授权，这能提升我管理公司的估值，但谁在乎这对有限合伙人回报意味着什么’的人。

People that focus on doing one thing and being the best in the world at it is what we really like as opposed to people thinking, oh, I've got this brand name that I can franchise and it'll be great for my valuation of my management company, but who cares what it means for the LP returns.

以这一点为例，有一句沃伦·巴菲特的名言说得很好：当潮水退去时，你才知道谁在裸泳。

Maybe with that one as an example, there's this great Warren Buffett line that when tide goes out, you learn who's swimming naked.

等了一段时间后，这种情况真的发生了吗？

After a wait, did that actually happen?

你能看出有哪些公司是在裸泳吗？

Could you see that there were certain firms that were swimming naked?

这句话绝对正确。

That quote is absolutely true.

我职业生涯中一个塑造性的经历，这要追溯到互联网泡沫时期。

One of the formative experiences of my career, this goes back to the Internet bubble.

我曾为耶鲁大学在石油和天然气行业做了大量工作。

I did a lot of work in the oil and gas industry for Yale.

在九十年代互联网泡沫破裂之前，石油和天然气交易是我必须应对的头痛问题中占比最大的部分。

Prior to the internet bubble bursting in the nineties, the oil and gas deals were vastly disproportionate share of the headaches I had to deal with.

尽管我们已经仔细审查过它们，并花了大量时间去了解它们，但结果发现它们并不是好的合作伙伴。

Even though we had vetted them very carefully and spent all this time getting to know them, turned out to be not good partners.

我会想，天哪。

And I would be like, oh my god.

休斯顿的水里是不是有什么东西，让人行为如此异常？

What is there something in the water in Houston that causes people to behave this way?

为什么这些人不能像我们的风险投资家那样友善呢？

And why can't these people be nice like our venture capitalists?

然后互联网泡沫破裂，许多风险投资公司陷入了极其糟糕的境地，尤其是涉及追回条款的问题，投资组合中突然出现了大量烧钱、裁员、关闭公司的企业。

Then the internet bubble bursts and a lot of venture firms found themselves in really messed up situations with particularly clawback issues, but portfolios that suddenly had companies that were hemorrhaging cash and having to fire people and having to close companies down.

于是合伙关系内部出现了各种奇怪的动态：一些长期在公司的人在上升期赚了大笔钱。

And then you had all these weird dynamics within the partnerships where you had people that had been there for a long time and they'd made a ton of money on the upswing.

而那些后来加入的人则心想：天啊。

And then you had people that joined late in the game and thought like, oh, wow.

我要成为一名风险投资家，赚一大笔钱。

I'm gonna be a venture capitalist, make all this money.

现在突然间，业务一团糟，出现了追回条款，有些人已经离开了公司，你该怎么把钱要回来。

And now suddenly, the business was terrible with the clawbacks, who had left the firm, and how are you gonna get the money back from them.

这些公司内部存在很多 dysfunction，有时还表现为与有限合伙人之间的矛盾。

And there was a lot of dysfunction in these firms and it sometimes manifested itself in problems with the LP base.

但这让我开始思考，石油和天然气业务与风险投资业务的区别在于，石油和天然气业务每两年就会经历一次繁荣与萧条，因为油价剧烈波动。

But really made me think, oh, the difference between the oil and gas business and the venture business is the oil and gas business has a boom and a bust every two years as oil prices shoot all around.

而风险投资业务的萧条期每十年、十五年甚至二十年才出现一次，真正考验人们是否是好伙伴的时候，正是在困难时期。

The venture business has its bust every ten or fifteen or twenty years and it's when times are bad that you really learn, are people good partners?

当所有人都赚大钱时，做一名好伙伴很容易。

It's easy to be a good partner when everybody is making lots of money.

我们和经理们签订的协议中明确规定了利润实现后如何分配收益。

We would have deals with our managers that basically said, this is the way we are going to divide the pie when the profits are realized.

经理们心里却想着：我至少得拿到这么多份额。

The manager would have it in their head that, well, I need to have at least this much pie.

如果由于环境不佳，无论出于什么原因，蛋糕突然变小了，他们会说，但我还是想要我的那份蛋糕。

And if because the environment was bad for whatever reason suddenly the pie was much smaller, they'd say, but I still want my pie.

无论从哪里，只要能拿到我的那份蛋糕，我就从我的有限合伙人那里拿。

Wherever I can get my pie from is from my LPs.

我们不得不说，不行，不行，不行。

And we'd have to say, no, no, no.

这不符合协议。

That was not the agreement.

这些对话变得非常艰难。

Those conversations got very difficult.

2008年之后的一些基金也发生了类似情况。

That happened with some of the post 2,008 firms too.

尽管，2008年之后的时期并没有像我们当初担心的那么糟糕。

Although, the post 2008 era was not as bad as I think we feared it was gonna be.

当然，在2009年，我们看到很多企业，心想：天啊，这些都成了零价值了。

There were certainly a lot of businesses that in 2009 we were like, oh my god these things are zeros.

事实证明，大体上并非如此。

That by and large proved not to be the case.

杠杆收购经理们花了五六年甚至八年的时间，从因在周期错误时支付了过高价格的困境中挣扎出来。

The LBO managers spent five or six or eight years digging out from having paid too high a price at the wrong point in the cycle.

但总体而言，他们收购的都是优质公司，这些公司能够在动荡的世界中生存下来，许多交易在八年后实现了本金1.4倍的回报，这虽然不算理想，但远好过血本无归。

But by and large, they had bought quality companies that could survive in a volatile world and a lot of those deals wound up being 1.4 times your money after eight years, which is not a great outcome, but it's a lot better than a zero.

几乎没有出现过因为投资组合彻底崩溃而导致公司完全倒闭的情况。

There weren't as many situations where a firm just completely imploded because its portfolio was just dead.

我只能立刻想到一两家公司，它们已经一无所有，接下来该如何处理善后？当没有激励报酬可发放时，又该由谁来支付关机的费用？

I can only think of one firm off the top of my head, maybe two that were holes in the ground and then how do you deal with the damage and how do you pay somebody to turn off the lights when there's no incentive compensation left to give anybody.

在这些情况下，你们该怎么办？

What'd do in those situations?

你只能硬着头皮熬过去。

You just had to work through it.

这很艰难。

It was hard.

一些原始的普通合伙人二手交易就源于那个时代。

Some of the original GP secondaries came out of that world.

正是这种现象的起源：在二月时代，出现了这些‘僵尸基金’，很明显普通合伙人无法获得收益分成，但必须找到某种解决方案，需要想办法支付仍留在岗位上处理资产的人员，并引入新的资本，为那些只想退出的有限合伙人提供流动性，同时为这些管理团队提供一些收入，或许还能获得新资本来开展新交易并重建信誉等等。

That's how that whole phenomenon started that you had these zombie funds in the February era where it was clear that there was no way for the GP to earn a carry, but there needed to be some kind of resolution and you needed to figure out a way to pay the people that were still around to work out the assets and bringing in some fresh capital to provide liquidity to LPs that just wanted to be gone and to provide some ability for these management teams to have some income and maybe some fresh capital to do new deals and reestablish their credibility and so on.

这就是它的起源，后来逐渐演变为今天规模大得多的业务。

That's how that started and then it morphed into what it's become today, a much bigger business.

回顾过去十五年，私募股权领域出现了许多投资策略和公司的创新或演变。

As you look at the last fifteen years, there have been a lot of innovations or evolutions of some of the investment strategies and firms in private equity.

你有软银老虎基金的成长阶段和风险投资模式。

You have the SoftBank Tiger growth stage and venture.

你有安德里森·霍罗威茨的全方位风险投资模式。

You have the Andreessen full service model to venture.

从你希望进行运营驱动型收购的视角出发，以及那些倾向于持有‘彩票式’投资的风投公司。

Starting with that lens of you want operational driven buyouts and the certain venture firms that tend to be where the lottery tickets are housed.

你是如何思考这两个资产类别内部的不同子领域的？

How did you think about looking at these different sub areas within the two asset classes?

我们在耶鲁所做的每一件事都是以人为本的。

Everything we did at Yale was people first driven.

我们想和这些人成为合作伙伴吗？

Do we want to be partners with these people?

在这样一个竞争激烈、成本高昂的世界里，他们凭什么能成功？

Why are they going to succeed in a crowded, competitive, expensive world?

他们是否会成为好的合作伙伴，在困难时期不会要求分走更大一块蛋糕？

And are they going to be good partners that are not going to demand their extra large piece of pie when times are bad.

如果这一点不存在，无论别人提出什么样的创新都无关紧要。

If that wasn't there, it didn't matter what kind of innovation somebody was proposing.

很多时候，如果你已经确立了自己作为成功风险投资人或成功杠杆收购公司的地位，你就无需向有限合伙人提供什么全新的‘捕鼠器’来筹集资金。

And a lot of times, if you were somebody that had already established yourself as I'm a successful venture capitalist or I'm a successful LBO firm, you didn't need to offer the LPs some different mousetrap in order to raise money.

有时存在一点选择偏差：如果有人带着不同的结构或经济条款来找我们，你就得问，为什么这个人觉得必须这样做才能吸引我们的资本，而不是像其他人那样直接沿用已被证明有效的方式？

Sometimes there was a little bit of selection bias that if somebody was coming to us with a different proposition in terms of structure or economics, you'd have to ask, well, why does this person feel like they need to do this in order to attract to our capital as opposed to just doing what has worked for so many others?

这并不是说公司就不应该创新。

That's not to say firms shouldn't innovate.

安德里森在构建一种不同于传统模式的风险投资模式方面非常成功，传统模式是让五六个或八个普通合伙人围坐桌旁，各自负责自己的项目，寄希望于一切顺利；而他则建立了庞大的内部资源，从早期到后期全程介入，全方位地创造价值。

Andreessen was very successful in building a different venture model from this traditional, oh, let's have five or six or eight GPs sit around the table and everybody do their own deal and hopefully it all works out to having a ton of internal resources and doing things soup to nuts in terms of stage and ways to try and add value.

这种创新很有趣，比如收购基金在如何与投资组合公司合作或如何创造投资机会方面的创新，我们总是希望了解这些方面。

Innovation like that is interesting and buyout firms innovating in the way that they worked with their portfolio companies or in the way in which they tried to generate investment opportunities, We always wanted to understand those things.

一些结构性创新从未真正吸引过我们。

Some of the structural innovations never really appealed to us.

如果结构变得过于复杂，这通常是一个问题的信号。

If things got too complicated structurally, that was often a sign of a problem.

我从来不喜欢的一点是，收购基金来找我们，说他们打算从中小企业管理局获得大量杠杆资金。

One thing I never liked was we would have buyout firms come to us and talk about, oh, we're gonna get all this leverage from the small business administration.

这将帮助他们提升回报，做各种巧妙的操作。

That's gonna allow us to goose the returns and do all this clever stuff.

对我来说，这始终是这些人的潜台词：他们无法以正常方式筹集资金。

To me, that was always the code for all these people can't raise money in a normal way.

他们必须依赖政府来获得大部分资本。

They have to go to the government to get a lot of their capital.

总的来说，这些公司表现并不好。

By and large, those firms did not do very well.

坚持你所熟悉的事物，尤其是在结构层面，是有一定价值的。

There's some value in sticking with things that you know, particularly from a structural standpoint.

我们看到一些公司以可能对普通合伙人和其管理公司价值有利的方式发展业务，但这些方式未必能带来有限合伙人的高回报；大型公司上市后管理着庞大的保险资产，实际上它们现在更像信贷业务，而非杠杆收购业务，尽管杠杆收购仍是其品牌所关联的核心。

We've seen firms evolve their businesses in ways that might be good for the general partners and good for the value of their management companies, but are not good necessarily for LP returns and the very large firms going public and managing these giant pools of insurance assets and they're really more credit businesses now than they are LBO businesses and the LBO business is kind of on the side even though it's what the brand name is still associated with.

在我看来，这并不是让有限合伙人获得卓越回报的合理方式。

To me that doesn't seem like a way for LPs to be expected to generate exceptional rates of return.

同样，许多公司现在正将财富管理领域作为下一个资金来源。

Similarly, a lot of those firms now turning to the wealth management world as their next source of capital.

十年后，许多医生和牙医将会对他们财务顾问将资金投入私募股权所获得的净回报感到非常失望。

Are gonna be a lot of doctors and dentists who are pretty disappointed ten years from now with the net returns that they're getting from their financial advisor plowing their capital into private equity.

毛回报可能还不错，但扣除普通合伙人收取的费用和投资顾问收取的费用后，实际收益可能就没什么吸引力了。

Gross returns might be fine, but between the fees that the GP is charging and the fees that the investment advisor are charging, then that might not be very interesting.

今天另一个重大问题是流动性瓶颈，尤其是在私募股权领域。

The other big questions today is this liquidity bottleneck, particularly in the private equity side.

很喜欢你对今后几年可能如何发展的看法。

Love just your perspectives on how this might play out over the next several years.

显然，世界上一系列问题促成了这一点。

There've obviously been a series of issues in the world that have contributed to it.

利率环境的变化、股市的上下波动、关税，所有这些因素都加剧了这个问题。

The change in interest rate environment, the stock market's been up and down and up and down and up and down, the tariffs, all of these factors that have contributed to the problem.

但我认为，收购领域（可能在风险投资领域某种程度上也是如此）的根本问题在于，就像2006年、2007年那样，2020年和2021年的人们在如今截然不同的世界里为资产支付了过高的价格。

But I think the fundamental problem in the buyout world and probably to some extent in the venture world is that not unlike 2006, 2007, people in 2020, 2021 paid too high a price for assets in a world that is now very different.

收购公司经常为优质企业支付超过20倍的EBITDA，但这些企业可能并不值得如此高的估值。

Buyout firms routinely paying 20 plus times EBITDA for quality businesses, but businesses that probably should not trade at that high evaluation.

在利率为零、政府在新冠疫情期间向经济注入大量资金的时代，他们只是在周期的错误时点支付了过高的价格。

Doing that in a world where interest rates were zero and there was a lot of money being pumped into the economy by the government in the COVID era, they just paid to a higher price at the wrong time in the cycle.

这些企业确实是优质企业。

They're quality businesses.

其中许多企业最终能够渡过难关，但普通合伙人要摊销他们多付的款项，将需要很长时间。

A lot of them will be able to play through, but it's gonna take a long time for the GPs to sort of amortize their overpayment.

会有大量这类资产，私募股权经理在八年后只能获得1.4倍的回报。

There are gonna be a lot of those assets that the GP makes 1.4 times their money after eight years.

要他们决定在四年后就以1.4倍回报退出非常困难，因为他们总抱有事情会变好的希望。

It's very hard for them to decide to make 1.4 times their money after four years because there's always the hope that things will be better.

哦，如果我们请来一位新CEO，给他几年时间，或者如果我们做点聪明的事呢。

Oh, and if we bring in a new CEO and give him a couple years or if we do this clever thing.

私募股权经理面临的一个问题是，他们总以为自己能解决所有问题。

And one problem buyout managers have is they think they can fix everything.

有时候他们确实能改善状况，但他们过于依赖成本作为价值衡量标准。

And sometimes they do fix things, but they get too anchored to cost as a measure of value.

如果无法降低成本，他们会想尽一切办法把成本赚回来。

And if they can't get cost, they're gonna do whatever they can to get their cost back.

事实上，他们不如直接出售那些无论持有多久都不会表现良好的投资，这样不仅能释放资本，更重要的是能释放时间。

And in fact, they might be better off to sell an investment that is not going to perform well no matter how long you own it, freeing up your capital and probably more importantly freeing up your time.

从而可以真正去寻找并投入时间做好今天的优质交易，而不是试图把一个糟糕的交易变成一个平庸的交易。

So you can actually go out and do a good deal today and spend your time working on that instead of trying to make a bad deal into a mediocre deal.

有很多事情需要发生，人们必须正视现实：我为这家企业支付了太多钱，我必须接受一个平庸的回报。

There's a lot that needs to happen in terms of people coming to grips with the reality that look, I paid too much for this business and I'm gonna have to accept a mediocre outcome.

这种情况还因募资市场一直艰难而加剧，因此，如果你在三年后以成本的0.8倍出售资产，这在下一轮募资推介中看起来会很糟糕。

Then it's compounded by it's obviously been a tough fundraising market and so if you sell an asset for point eight times your cost after three years, that doesn't look good in the next fundraising pitch.

我不知道什么能打破这种僵局。

I don't know what breaks the logjam.

过去三年里，私募经理们反复告诉我们：哦，投资银行家说六个月后情况就会好转。

It seemed like a pretty consistent refrain over the last three years that the biomanagers would tell us, oh, the investment bankers tell us six months from now things will be better.

无论当时说的是哪个日期，都从未实现过。

Whatever the date was, it would never get here.

人们必须认识到这一现实并加以应对。

People are gonna need to recognize that reality and deal with it.

这次可能不同的另一个挑战是，2006年、2007年、2008年的投资，管理者花了很长时间才决定退出。

The other challenge that might be different this time around is those 2006, 2007, 2008 deals took a long time for managers to decide to get out of those.

但至少当时他们是以平庸回报出售这些资产，而那个时代他们做的2009年、2010年、2011年的投资实际上表现相当不错。

But at least they were selling those assets for mediocre returns in an era where then the deals that they did in 2009, 2010, 2011 are actually doing pretty well.

他们在三四年之后出售这些资产，并获得了良好的回报，因为过去三四年里，由于市场的各种独特原因，人们很难买入资产。

And they were selling those things after three or four years and earning good returns because it's been hard for people to buy things over the last three or four years for all the idiosyncratic reasons in the market.

可能不会再有那么多2022年的投资在2025年以三倍半的回报出售，让你看起来像个天才。

There may be not gonna be as many good 2022 deals that were sold in 2025 for three and a half times your money and you look like a genius.

与金融危机后相比，整个行业可能更难维护自身的声誉。

It might be harder for firms as a whole to protect their reputations the way that maybe they were able to do after the financial crisis.

你认为二级市场在这一切中扮演了什么角色？

How do you think the secondary market plays into all this?

在某种程度上，二级市场可能缓解了普通合伙人所承受的压力，因为他们可以告诉有限合伙人：如果你需要流动性，你可以选择出售你在我们基金中的权益，或者我们可以为部分资产安排由普通合伙人主导的二级交易。

It does in some ways maybe take some pressure off the GPs that they can tell the LPs, there's liquidity if you want it, and either you go out and sell your interest in our fund or we'll arrange a GP led secondary for some portion of our assets.

然后，是否买卖就由你自己决定。

And then it's up to you whether to buy or sell.

从我的角度来看，问题在于我们一直认为，耶鲁大学聘请这些人的原因之一，就是因为他们知道何时是出售资产的最佳时机，而我们依赖他们来做这个决定。

And the problem from my standpoint is we always thought at Yale, one of the reasons we hire these guys is because they know when's the right time to sell an asset, and we're sort of relying on them to do that.

但如果他们把这一决策推回给我们，说：‘你可以选择在二级市场上出售，也可以不卖。’

And then if they default that decision back to us and say, well, you can sell on the secondary or not.

这由你决定。

It's up to you.

我们不知道该如何做。

We don't know how to do that.

你们才最清楚这个资产的合理价格。

You're the ones that know this is a good price for this asset.

这就是你们应该交易的估值。

This is the valuation at which you should trade.

这不在我们的能力范围内，也不是我们过去花时间去做的事情。

That's not our skill set and that's not something we've spent time historically doing.

因此，仅仅把这种选择丢给我们，并不意味着做得很好，这实际上并没有为你的有限合伙人提供真正的服务。

And so the idea that we're just being given this option and isn't that great, it's not really doing your LPs a service.

为了获得流动性而不得不接受的折价，尤其是在那些并不景气的情况下，可能并不是好的退出方式。

The haircuts that you wind up taking to get liquidity, particularly in situations that are not really humming, those are probably not good exits.

这种动态如何与我们当前的环境叠加？当前环境中，人们对分配和交易活动存在疑问，这与经济环境和定价环境有关。

How does that dynamic playing out layered onto the environment that we're in where there's questions about distributions and deal activity given the economic environment, given the pricing environment?

你必须同时把这两件事结合起来。

You have to put those two things together at the same time.

对于私募股权（包括风险投资、收购及相关领域）而言，要像过去三十五到四十年那样，继续成为机构投资者唯一的阿尔法创造策略，将变得非常困难。

It's gonna be very difficult for private equity broadly defined venture and buyout and related stuff to be the single defining alpha creating strategy for institutional investors the way that it's been over the last thirty five, forty years.

回想起我刚入行的时候，如果我们从第一性原理出发，我们当时做的很多事情其实都很明显。

Looking back on when I started, a lot of what we did was pretty obvious if you started from first principles.

如今，成功的策略已经被太多人复制了。

Now, the successful strategies have been copied by so many people.

资金太多了。

There's so much more money.

有太多聪明的人试图在这些领域取得成功，以至于整个市场变得极其、极其、极其高效。

There's so many more smart people trying to be successful in these fields that it's gotten very, very, very efficient.

我认为，在风险投资和收购领域，仍然会有一些公司，当你回顾时会说：‘哇，这些人做得太棒了。’

I think there will still be firms in both the venture and the buyout world that you look back on and say, wow, those guys did a fantastic job.

但要提前识别出这些公司，并确信‘这些才是你该押注的标的，回报自然会随之而来’，将会变得更加困难。

It's gonna be harder to prospectively identify them and know that, well, these are the horses you want to bet on and the returns will take care of themselves.

机构必须对这些类别所能带来的回报保持非常现实的态度。

Institutions have to be really realistic about the returns they can expect from these categories.

特别是在风险投资领域，创业者与资金提供方之间的权力平衡已经发生了巨大变化。

Particularly in the venture world, things have changed there so much in terms of the balance of power between the entrepreneurs and the funding sources.

这里的数学逻辑已经完全不同了。

The math is just completely different.

当我刚入行时，如果你是硅谷的一个聪明人，你会爬着双手和膝盖沿着沙丘路去找红杉或凯鹏华盈，恳求他们投资。

When I started, if you were a smart guy in Silicon Valley, you crawled on your hands and knees up Sandhill Road to Sequoia or Kleiner Perkins and begged them to invest.

他们会投资300万美元，换取你公司30%的股份。

They'd invest $3,000,000 and own 30% of your company.

而现在，情况反过来了：红杉和凯鹏华盈正爬着双手和膝盖去恳求那位炙手可热的AI初创公司创始人，希望投资5000万美元，只换取公司3%的股份。

Now it's the other way around that Sequoia and Kleiner Perkins are crawling on their hands and knees to the hot person in the AI startup and begging to invest $50,000,000 and own 3% of the company.

也许今天的潜在回报更大，因此这在一定程度上弥补了部分损失。

And maybe the outcomes today are bigger, so maybe that makes up for some of it.

我确信未来还会出现风险投资的繁荣期，但要系统性地找到那些持续产生20%以上回报、偶尔还能出现80%回报基金的公司，这种事再想规律性地发生，将会变得极其困难。

And I'm sure there will be times in the future where we have venture booms again, but the odds of systematically finding firms that are consistently producing 20% plus returns and the occasional 80% returning fund, it's gonna be very very hard for that to happen with any regularity.

在风险投资方面，从那时到现在，这一路上经历了许多迭代。

On the venture side, on the path from then to now, there's a lot of iterations along the way.

你是如何思考在这样一个不断变化的环境中进行投资的？越来越多的机构最初都发现了这个领域。

How have you thought about investing in that continually changing landscape with more and more institutions initially finding the space?

始终关注你想要与之合作的人。

Always a focus on who are the people you want to be partnering with.

归根结底，这本质上是一个关于人的生意。

At the end of the day, it is very much a people business.

创业者，尤其是今天，对于与谁合作非常挑剔。

Entrepreneurs, particularly today, can be very choosy about who they want to work with.

你要确保你支持的人与创业者有共同的思维。

You want to make sure that the people you're backing have the mind share with the entrepreneurs.

这需要花大量时间实地走访，既会见风险投资人，也努力接触行业中的重要人物。

That requires spending a lot of time out on the ground meeting both the venture capitalists, but then also trying to spend time with important people in the industry.

在过去十年里，耶鲁的人在这方面做得非常好。

That's something the people at Yale have done quite well in the last ten years.

我大概在八九年前就退出了风险投资行业，因为同时做两件事变得太复杂了。

I got out of the venture business probably eight or nine years ago now because it was getting too complicated to do both.

但我把投资组合交托给的人，我认为他们很好地找到了方法，即使我们已经远离了早期阶段，仍能保持在信息流中。

But the people I turned the portfolio over to, I think have done a very good job of figuring out how do we stay in that information flow when we're a couple steps removed from the coal phase.

特别是在硅谷，但也包括其他地方，花时间建立一个由聪明年轻人组成的网络，他们很可能做出有趣的事情，并且了解他们正在关注谁，这非常重要。

Spending time particularly in Silicon Valley but elsewhere trying to build a network of smart young people that are probably gonna do interesting things and know who they're thinking about, that's really important.

多年来，当你在风险投资领域工作时，你最想问哪些关键问题？

Over the years when you're doing it on the venture side, what were the magic questions you would want to ask?

我们发现，与风险投资公司的投资组合公司首席执行官和创业者交谈非常有帮助，这让我们有了一个耳目一新的体验。

We always found it extremely useful to talk to the CEOs and the entrepreneurs of the portfolio companies of the venture firms and we had a sort of eye opening experience.

那是八十年代末。

This was in late eighties.

我们曾投资过一家风险投资公司。

There was a venture firm we backed.

这是我们第一次投资一家非知名品牌的公司。

It was the first time we backed a firm that wasn't a brand name firm.

这些家伙虽然没有凯鹏华盈那样的名气，但他们看起来聪明、有野心且有趣。

Well, these guys, they don't have the marquee of the Kleiner Perkins, but they seem smart and hungry and interesting.

几年后，我们参加了他们的年度会议。

And we were then at their annual meeting a few years later.

我的同事迪恩·塔卡哈西坐在他们一家公司的CEO旁边，而这家机构刚刚投资了该公司的B轮融资。

My colleague, Dean Takahashi, was sitting next to the CEO of one of their companies, and this group had just invested in the company's series b round.

他从四家A轮风投公司拿了钱，而这四家公司恰好都是我们合作过的。

He took money from four series a venture firms and there happened to be four firms that we worked with.

因此，我们对这家公司有相当程度的敞口，尽管这家公司最终归零了。

So we have a reasonable exposure to this company, which actually then was a zero ultimately.

迪恩问他：你为什么选这四家公司？

Dean asked him, why did you pick those four firms?

他对每一家公司都有很好的理由。

And he had a very good reason for each one of those firms.

一家能帮他招聘，另一家有企业资源，但他选择这些公司甚至特定风投人的原因都非常低调且有深意。

This one was gonna help him recruit and that one had the corporate relationships, but very discreet reasons why he wanted that firm and maybe even that person from the venture firm to be on his board.

然后我们问，你们为什么选择这家新公司作为B轮投资方？我们之前已经投资了这家公司。

And And then we said, why did you pick this firm for the series b, the new firm that we had invested with?

他说，因为他们有钱。

And he said, oh, they had money.

这可不是一个好答案。

And that was not a good answer.

找到那些回答不仅仅是‘他们有钱’的人，真的非常重要。

Trying to find people where the answer is not just they had money is really important.

这在私募投资领域也是如此，有钱的人太多了，市场上资金也太多了。

That's true across the private investment world is there are tons of people with money, there's tons of money out there.

你需要问清楚，做出决策的人为什么选择你们可能要投资的这个机构的资金。

You need to ask why the people that are making the decision are taking the money from the group that you might be investing with.

你发现新经理进入你们尽职调查流程最有效的方式是什么？

What did you find were the most successful ways that a new manager made their way into your diligence process?

来自熟人的引荐总是有帮助的。

A warm introduction from somebody would always help.

特别是在风险投资领域，我们发现很多方式是通过与我们网络中的人交谈来找到这些公司，无论是其他风险投资人，还是我们认识的创业者或其他人，我们总会问：‘最近有哪些新锐且有趣的投资机构是我们应该去了解的？’这为我们发现了一些机会。

Particularly in the venture world, a lot of ways that we found firms, whenever we would sit down with somebody in our network, be it another venture capitalist or if we've gotten to know entrepreneurs or whomever, always ask, hey, who out there is new and interesting that we ought to get to know that did identify some opportunities for us?

在并购领域，这种情况更难，因为人们不太愿意合作。

That's harder in the buyout world because people are much less prone to be working together.

通常情况下，他们彼此竞争，而根据定义，许多并购管理者如果被人抢走了交易，就会认为对方很愚蠢。

Normally, they're competing with each other and a lot of buyout managers, by definition, if someone outbids them for a deal, then that person is stupid.

他们为这家公司付了太多钱。

They paid too much for the company.

在这个领域，我们更多是通过大量会面来寻找璞玉，很多时候会议进行十五分钟，我们就基本能判断：‘这可能不适合我们。’

In that universe, it was a little more taking a lot of meetings and looking for the diamond in the rough and we'd have a lot of meetings that fifteen minutes in, you sort of knew, well, this is probably not for us.

但我们会坐上一小时、一个半小时，或许能了解到他们投资的公司的一些信息，这些信息后来可能在其他地方派上用场。

And you'd sit there for an hour, an hour and a half, maybe learn something about the companies they were investing in that was then useful somewhere else.

但偶尔，你会遇到一个团队，觉得‘这个故事真的很有趣，他们做的事情很有意思，背景也很独特，而且看起来非常渴望成功、积极进取，值得深入了解一下。’

But occasionally, you'd meet a group where, hey, this is a really interesting story and they seem like they're doing interesting stuff or they have an interesting set of backgrounds and they seem really hungry and aggressive and let's dig into that.

在私募市场中，当一个管理者面临压力时——比如业务表现不佳，或者出售部分资产后回报看起来不理想——可用的数据点就非常有限，难以评估。

In the private markets, when you have a manager that's under pressure, maybe the businesses aren't doing that well, maybe the returns aren't going to look good if they sell some of those assets, there aren't as many data points to try to assess.

与公开市场相比，当公开市场有大量想法更替时，他们是否头脑清醒，并在何时出售方面做出明智的决策？

Are they clear headed and making good decisions about when to sell as compared to the public markets when there's so much more turnover of ideas?

你如何理解与你投资的普通合伙人（GP）的心理，他们的前提本应是买入、改善、出售，并且尽可能做好这三件事？

How do you think about getting inside the head of a GP that you have money with where the premise was supposed to be you buy, you improve, you sell and you try to do those all well.

但现在出现了影响他们出售决策博弈的干扰因素，比如业务的可持续性以及他们业务的下一代传承问题。

But now there are these confounding factors about the sustainability of the business, the future generations of their business that impact how they might think about that game theory of a sell decision.

你必须尝试与管理者进行坦诚的讨论，问问他们对这个资产的想法：它似乎没有前景，你们对它有什么计划？

You just have to try and have good candid discussions with managers about what are you thinking with this asset, it doesn't seem like it's going somewhere, what are your plans for it?

我认为机构在向普通合伙人询问出售决策方面做得并不好。

I think institutions don't do a good job of asking GPs about sell decisions in general.

当我们第一次与管理者会面时，我们总会在初次会谈中问一个问题：你们已经向我们详细介绍了你们如何收购这些企业。

When we're sitting down with a manager for the first time, one of the questions we always ask in the initial meeting is, you've told us a lot about how you buy these businesses.

那么，请告诉我们，你们是如何决定出售的？

Tell us about how do you decide to sell.

很多时候，我得到的回答是：哦，从来没有人问过我们这个问题。

And a lot of times the response I get is, oh, no one ever asks us that question.

我并不是说，有人认为一家好企业应该在三年内出售。

And I'm not saying this is somebody who thinks, oh, a good business ought to be sold in three years.

事实上，如果说有什么的话，我认为杠杆收购公司可能过早地出售了他们的好企业。

In fact, if anything, I'd say that buyout firms are probably too quick to sell their good businesses.

与其每三四年就轮换一次你的好公司，不如让它们多运行一段时间，让它们复利增长五年、六年，甚至更久。

Rather than churning over your good companies every three or four years, maybe you want to let them run a little longer and let them compound for maybe five or six years instead or maybe even longer.

最终的结果是，好企业三年或四年就被卖掉了，而差企业却滞留十年甚至十二年。

What winds up happening is the good businesses get sold in three or four years, the bad businesses hang around for ten or twelve years.

私募股权管理者只是觉得，我能修复这个问题，两年后它就会变得更好。

The GPs just think, well, I can fix this and two years from now it'll be better.

很多时候，当一项资产表现不佳时，它就永远都不会好转。

And a lot of times when an asset isn't performing, it never performs.

与私募股权管理者坦诚讨论何时是退出的最佳时机。

Having frank discussions with GPs about when is the right time to exit.

在任何环境下，理解基金的战略和心态都很重要。

It's important in any environment, understanding the firm's strategy and mentality.

特别是在这样的时期，你希望了解这些公司是否明白这笔资本非常宝贵，时间正在流逝，如果你认为额外的回报值得，持有资产是可以接受的。

Particularly in a time like this, you want to know that the firms have some understanding that this capital is precious and there's clock ticking and it's fine to hold things if you think the incremental return is worthwhile.

但如果你只是抱着虚无的希望，期待某天情况会好转，而没有充分的理由相信这一点，那就该退出了。

But if you're just holding this in the vain hope that someday things are going to be better, if there's not a good reason to expect that, it's time to exit.

当然，我们也知道，如果一家企业表现不佳，要卖掉它是非常困难的。

That's all said with knowing that if a business isn't performing, it's pretty hard to sell it.

在你所有的经验中，我很好奇，有没有过经理犯了错误，或者你看到商业上的失误，于是你选择不投资的情况。

In all your experience, I'm curious about times when a manager made mistakes or you saw business mistakes, you chose not to invest.

后来，也许他们吸取了教训，让你感到安心，于是你重新回归，再次考虑曾经拒绝投资的那位经理。

And then later, maybe they learned lessons you were comfortable with, you came back, revisited a manager you chose not to invest with at some point in time.

当然有一些人，我们最初觉得他们还太年轻，但后来我们又觉得，好吧，我们确实应该投资。

There were certainly people who we might have thought, well, this is early and then later on we're like, okay, yeah, we ought to do this.

绝对没有出现过我们曾经是某人的投资者，然后他们退出了，我们又重新加入的情况。

There certainly weren't instances where we were an investor with somebody pulled the plug and then got back on board.

那通常实在太难了。

That was often just too hard.

我不想说这是情绪化的问题，但也不是因为受伤的感情或人们生气。

I don't wanna say emotionally but it wasn't hurt feelings or people getting angry.

这对双方来说都是一个巨大的障碍。

It's a big hurdle on both sides to overcome.

很多时候，当我们终止与某位经理的合作时，他们会把它当作个人攻击。

A lot of times when we would pull the plug on a manager, they take it very personally.

我想，大多数我们最初拒绝但后来又投资的项目，原因更多是让我们再等等，让事情成熟，而不是现在搞砸了，然后他们回来告诉我们‘我们已经修正了那些错误’。

I would say most of the time when we passed on something that we ultimately did later, it was more, let's let this mature as opposed to screwing something up now and then they come back and say, we fixed those mistakes.

当你展望

As you look

回顾你参与耶鲁大学的四十年，你认为私募股权和风险投资中最重要的成功因素是什么？

back on the forty years you're involved at Yale, what do you think of as the biggest success factors in private equity and venture investing?

大卫对在这两种投资策略中取得成功所需的因素有一些深刻的见解。

David had some great insights about what is it going to take to succeed in these two investment strategies.

坚持这些见解真的、真的非常重要。

Sticking to those insights was really, really important.

努力确保我们与世界上顶尖的人才合作，他们是我们在顺境和逆境中值得信赖的合作伙伴和资金守护者。

Trying to make sure that we were with the very best people in the world, great partners, great stewards of our money in good times and bad.

将这一标准保持得非常高，至关重要。

Keeping that bar really, really high was super important.

我不认为我们花了大量时间去纠结那些错过的项目。

I wouldn't say we spent a lot of time worrying about the ones we missed.

当然有一些风险投资公司，我们本可以与之合作，而且他们做得非常成功，但我们没有。

There were certainly venture firms that we might have worked with that did very well, but we didn't.

我们确实合作过的那些公司都非常出色。

The ones that we did work with were fantastic.

为‘我们为什么没和那个公司合作’而彻夜难眠，没什么意义。

There wasn't much point in losing sleep over, well, why weren't we with this other one?

在整个过程中，保持谦逊的态度非常重要。

One thing that was very, very important was a sense of humility in the whole process.

许多机构常犯的一个错误是认为：‘我和这些人一样聪明。’

One problem a lot of institutions fall into is thinking, I'm just as smart as these guys.

为什么他们比我富那么多？

Why are they so much richer than I am?

我坐在这边的桌子旁，但我很容易也会坐在另一边，而他们有时会制造对立，尤其是在公司遇到挑战时。

I'm on this side of the table, but I could easily be on that side of the table and they make things confrontational, especially if there are challenges around the firm.

他们有时喜欢抓小辫子。

They wanna play gotcha sometimes.

普通合伙人不会欣赏这种做法。

GPs are not going to appreciate that.

这最终会适得其反。

It winds up being very counterproductive.

我们一直努力保持一种意识：我们希望他们成为我们的优秀合作伙伴，同时我们也想成为他们的优秀合作伙伴。

We always tried to have a sense for we want them to be great partners for us but we want to be great partners for them as well.

当然，有时情况会出现分歧，我们必须采取措施保护我们的利益，或与人进行不愉快的对话。

And there are obviously times where things might diverge and we'd have to do something to protect our interests or to have unpleasant conversations with people.

但我们要始终以尊重和礼貌面对这些情况，努力寻求对所有人都有利的解决方案，而不是不惜一切代价捍卫自己的地盘。

But to always try and face those situations with respect and courtesy and try to work to a solution that works for everybody as opposed to defending your turf at all costs.

在提供支持的同时，也要以一种让所有人都能事后感到满意的方式提出要求，找到这种平衡。

Getting that balance right of being supportive, but also being demanding in a way that everyone can feel good about it afterwards.

你在风险投资和收购中的一些失误，可能有所不同。

Some of the misses that you had maybe separated in venture and buyouts.

即使你不会纠结于‘我们错过了那一个’，你从中学到了哪些经验，以改进流程，确保下一次选择更准确？

What are some of the lessons that you tried to take away even if you're not gonna dwell on, oh, we missed that one, in improving your process to get the next selection right?

一个不可避免的挑战是样本量太小。

One challenge just inevitably is sample size.

我们曾与一家公司合作，那家公司由几位人士领导，下面还有一些人，他们以单笔交易的方式在不同模式下做过一些交易，并且表现相当不错。

There's a firm that we worked with that were a couple of guys and then some people underneath them who had done some deals basically on a deal by deal basis in couple different formats and they had done quite well.

这些交易中大约有五到七笔表现非常出色，但整个公司整体表现不佳，我们参与了他们的两个基金，这两个基金合计为我们带来了低个位数的回报。

There were probably five or six or seven of those deals which had performed very well in total and then the firm didn't perform and we were in two funds that collectively produced probably low single digit return for us.

于是我们问：哪里出了问题？

And we said, well, what went wrong?

我们思考后认为，问题的一部分在于，如果一个人只有五到六笔交易的业绩记录，这根本不能代表真实水平。

And thought, well, part of what went wrong is just that if people have five or six deals in their track record, that's really not a representative set.

也许他们只是连续五次抛出了正面，看起来很厉害。

Maybe they did just flip heads five times in a row and look good.

其中一个问题是，你永远看不到那些连续五次抛出反面的人，因为他们根本没法去募资。

And one of the problems is you never see the people who flipped tails five times in a row because they don't try to raise money.

显然，他们做不到。

Obviously, they can't.

你该如何应对这些小样本集？

How you deal with these small sample sets?

我认为这又回到了挑选新兴管理者的困难之处。

And I think it gets back to the difficulty of picking emerging managers.

我们在风险投资方面曾深入思考过一个问题：在2000年代中期，确实出现了一些公司，创始人曾是成功的创业者，后来成为天使投资人，他们在这里投5万美元，那里投5万美元。

One thing we thought a lot about on the venture side was in the mid two thousands, there had certainly emerged some firms where people had been successful entrepreneurs then became angel investors and they'd put $50,000 here and $50,000 there.

结果其中一家是Twitter，另一家是Uber，还有其他一些公司。

It turned out one of them was Twitter and one of them was Uber and what if whatever else.

于是，哇，这些家伙真厉害。

And, wow, these guys are really good.

但我们认为，如果硅谷有5000个人在向创业者发放这些天使投资，其中一些人最终创办了像优步这样的公司。

But we think if there are 5,000 people in Silicon Valley writing these angel checks to entrepreneurs, some of whom end up starting the Ubers of the world.

你的结果会呈现一个钟形曲线，有些人之所以处于曲线顶端，是因为他们确实擅长自己的工作，或者只是运气好。

You're gonna have a bell curve of outcomes and somebody can be on the top end of the bell curve because they're really good at what they do or they can just have been lucky.

你如何区分这两种情况？

How do you distinguish?

我们可能比其他人更慢地投资那些来自那个圈子的人。

We were probably slower to back people that came out of that world than maybe some other people were.

其中一些人实际上确实很擅长自己的工作，并取得了成功。

Some of those people actually wound up being pretty good at what they did and being successful.

因此，也许我们错失了一些机会，但我确信我们也错过了一些人——他们只是恰好在对的时间出现在对的地方，而这种情况是不可复制的。

And so maybe we did miss out on some opportunities there, but I'm certain we missed some that, again, the people were just in the right place at the right time and that was not repeatable.

在你从事这一行的这么多年里，尤其是耶鲁声名鹊起的时期，你接触过那么多后来成为其他机构首席投资官的人，我想知道，你为什么选择一直留在原地，直到退休？

In all the years you're doing this and particularly through Yale's prominence, all the people you worked with that became CIOs elsewhere, curious to ask why you chose to stay in the same spot until it was time to retire.

我从未想过要当首席投资官。

I never wanted to be a CIO.

大卫真正的才能之一是他擅长很多不同的事情。

One of David's true talents was he was really good at a lot of different things.

我看了这些事情，觉得我自己肯定做不好。

I sort of looked at a lot of those things and thought, I would be terrible at that.

与教职员工、校友以及学生打交道，这部分工作，我会做得一塌糊涂。

Dealing with the faculty and the alumni and dealing with the students, that aspect of the job, I would be terrible at.

我本可以去一个非捐赠基金的机构，但那份工作的一些部分并不吸引我。

I could then have gone to a non endowment place, but there were parts of the job that didn't interest me.

至于耶鲁的债券组合应该是什么样子，我对此毫无见解。

So what Yale's bond portfolio should look like, I have no insight into that.

我一直觉得自己非常幸运，偶然进入了私募股权领域，在这里我接触到了一群做着非常有趣事情的出色人物。

I always felt like I was very lucky to have wound up by accident in this private equity world where I dealt with a bunch of really interesting people doing really interesting things.

我为什么要去做别的事情呢？

And why would I want to do something else?

我为什么要花时间去思考耶鲁的支出政策应该是什么？

Why would I want to have to spend time thinking about what Yale's spending policy ought to be?

我很乐意让大卫和迪安去构建他们的模型，深入思考这些问题，这让我有时间去做自己感兴趣的事情。

I was very happy to let David and Dean build their models and do all their thinking about that stuff and it gave me the time to then do the things I was interested in.

此外，留在耶鲁也有一些很好的理由。

There were also some reasons why staying at Yale was a great opportunity.

我一起工作的同事们都非常出色。

The people I worked with were fantastic.

耶鲁的名声总是为我打开许多如果我去别处就不会有的机会。

The Yale name always opened a lot of doors that would not have been open if I'd gone somewhere else.

我和新港地区有一些家庭联系，因此留在新港从这个角度来说是合理的。

I have some family ties to the New Haven area, so being in New Haven made sense for that reason.

从来就没有一个充分的理由离开，所以我留了下来。

There was just never a good reason to leave, so I stayed.

那现在呢？

What now?

这可是你整个职业生涯中唯一的一份工作，对吧？

This has been the one job you've had your whole career Right.

现在终于到了退下的时候了。

And it's finally time to step away.

我不打算再找一份朝九晚五的工作了，但我有兴趣找到一些保持参与的方式。

I'm not gonna have another nine to five job, but I am interested in finding ways to stay engaged.

多年来，我一直在两个基金会的投资委员会中任职，真的很享受这份工作。

I've been on a couple of investment committees for two foundations for many years, and I've really enjoyed doing that.

我对更多类似的角色感兴趣。

I'm interested in more roles like that.

我正在与一家欧洲基金会做一些工作，帮助他们思考如何建立运营、组建团队和构建投资组合。

There's a European foundation I'm doing a little bit of work with, helping them think about some of the ways that they establish their operations and build their team, their portfolio.

我收到了一些公司的联系，特别是那些关于新兴年轻公司如何构建自身、成长以及融资的议题。

I've gotten some outreach from some firms, particularly in the world of how do younger, newer firms think about how they ought to build themselves, grow themselves, how do they raise money.

我可能会参与类似的事情。

I could end up involved in something like that.

我非常愿意与个别普通合伙人合作，为他们提供有限合伙人的视角，帮助他们思考关于公司战略、成长、演变、融资等各方面的问题。

I'm very open to working with individual GPs that might look to have somebody that brings an LP perspective to what they're doing to think about issues around firm strategy and growth and evolution and fundraising and all of those things.

总会有下一个阶段是什么的问题。

There's always this question of what's next.

在早期，风险投资和杠杆收购，然后是私募股权，是当时的主流。

In the early years, venture and LBOs then private equity was the thing.

你现在和你合作的人、以及你合作的基金会，是如何思考这个问题的？

How do you think about that question with people you're working with, foundations you work with now?

嗯。

Yeah.

等你找到答案时告诉我。

Well, let me know when you find the answer.

事后看来很明显，但如果这个问题的答案很容易知道，那每个人都会去做了。

It's obvious in hindsight, but if it was easy to know the answer to that, then everybody would be doing it.

我确实不知道下一个阶段会是什么。

I sure don't know what's next.

我认为，对于机构来说，要像过去三四十年里那些捐赠基金那样取得成功，并系统性、持续性地做到这一点，将会非常困难。

I think it's gonna be really hard for institutions to have the kind of success that particularly the endowments had over the last thirty, forty years and to do that systematically and repeatedly.

让我惊讶的是，机会领域变得饱和的速度竟然如此之快。

It's amazing to me how much more quickly areas of opportunity become saturated.

对于高回报资产的竞争似乎越来越激烈，而在资本充裕的世界里，有趣机会的回报率会迅速下降。

It just seems like competition for high return assets, it just gets more and more intense all of the time and they're in a world where there's a lot of capital, returns in interesting situations get down very quickly.

我们一直愿意尝试新事物和进行实验。

We were always willing to experiment and try new things.

我认为我们从未将我们的技能视为：现在是投资某个特定行业、某个特定地区，甚至某个特定资产类别的时机。

I don't think we ever viewed our skill set as being, oh, now's the time to invest in this particular industry or now's the time to invest in this particular geography or even this particular asset class.

如果我们遇到聪明有趣的人，他们在某个领域进行开创性的工作。

If we met smart interesting people who were doing pioneering work in a category.

我们可能会觉得这值得进一步了解。

We might decide this is worth learning more about.

让我们给他们一点资金。

Let's give them a little bit of money.

看看情况如何发展，能走到哪一步。

Let's see how it goes and see where it goes.

事情并不总是如愿。

It didn't always work out.

我花了很长时间寻找矿业和矿物领域的投资机会，但始终找不到合适的公司合作。

I spent a long time looking for opportunities in the mining and minerals world and really could never find the right firm to work with.

这是一次我们主动决定花时间研究这个领域的情况，因为作为我们自然资源投资的一部分，也许这是一个值得添加到投资组合中的方向，但我们找不到合适的管理者合作。

That was one instance where we did say, oh, let's spend time proactively looking at this sector because as part of our natural resources effort, maybe that would be an interesting arrow to add to the quiver and we couldn't find the right managers to work with.

我们在农田领域也有类似的经历。

We had a similar experience in farmland.

我们原本希望在中国开放投资机会时赚取巨额利润。

Whereas we wanna make a huge amount of money in China as China opened up as an investment opportunity.

但很多机会的出现，是因为我们与张磊（Lei Zhang）的关系，他创立了高瓴资本，并且恰好在耶鲁商学院学习，还曾在我们的办公室实习。

But a lot of that happened because of our relationship with Lei Zhang who founded Hill House, and he happened to go to Yale's business school and he happened to intern in our office.

大卫和迪恩足够聪明，意识到这是一个非常聪明、非常有趣的人，正在探索一个全新的机会，于是决定支持他，看看会走向何方。

And David and Dean were smart enough to recognize, here's this really smart, really interesting guy who's pursuing this virgin opportunity and let's go along with him and see how it goes.

我们确实对新兴市场整体感兴趣，但并不是说‘现在中国成了该投资的领域’。

We had definitely had an interest in emerging markets generally, but it wasn't as if, oh, now China's the thing to do.

当时我们觉得，找到了一个非常棒的人，那就支持他，看看会发生什么。

It was, oh, we found this really great guy and let's back him and see what happens.

留意那些富有创意、可能正在开辟新道路的人，观察他们的进展，这种策略比自上而下地决定‘我们现在必须投入这个领域’要成功得多。

Keeping an eye out for interesting creative people who maybe are trying to blaze a new trail and seeing how it goes, that was a much more successful strategy for us than a sort of top down decision to now we need to be spending time on this.

所以大卫开始

So David came

在2000年左右出版了他的第一本书，这为其他人理解耶鲁正在发生的一切打开了大门。

out with his first book around 2000 and that opened the door to other people understanding everything that was happening at Yale.

我很想听听，一方面，这极大地巩固了耶鲁的声誉，当时你是什么感觉？

I'd love to hear what that felt like when on the one hand, it really cemented Yale's reputation.

另一方面，这可能也激发了大量的竞争。

On the other hand, it probably encouraged a lot of competition.

我觉得这比那还要早一些。

I'd put it a little earlier than that.

那是当乔什·莱纳对我们的办公室做了第一个哈佛商学院案例研究时，主要聚焦在私募股权领域。

It was when Josh Lerner did his first Harvard Business School case study on our office, which was focused mostly on the private equity world.

我总是觉得，如果大卫是可口可乐的首席执行官，他会把秘密配方送人。

And I always felt if David were the CEO of Coca Cola that he gave away the secret formula.

我确信，世界上每一个基金的基金经理都会带着这份案例研究的重印本出差，并把它留下，说：读一读，如果你投资我们，你就能像耶鲁一样。

I'm certain that every fund to fund manager in the world brought that reprint of the case study on their trips and left it behind and said, read this and if you invest with us, you can be like Yale.

所以我一直对此感到矛盾。

So I was always very ambivalent about it.

他特别喜欢在耶鲁的原因之一，是他能参与教育使命，而这与为学校筹款密切相关。

One of the things he really liked about being at Yale was the sort of educational mission he got to be involved in and that had a lot to do with funding the place.

但他也非常享受他所教授的课程，以及与在我们办公室实习的学生们的互动，所有这些事情。

But he also loved teaching the classes he taught and interacting with the students who interned in our office and all of that stuff.

我认为他最初把案例研究，然后是这些书籍，都视为这一教育使命的一部分。

And I think he looked at first the case study and then the books as part of that educational mission.

耶鲁履行其使命的方式不仅限于课堂，更体现在它为世界树立的榜样，以及它日常所做的一切。

Yale's fulfillment of its mission is not just in the classroom, but it's in its example to the rest of the world and its things it does on a day to day basis.

很难反驳这一点。

It's hard to argue with that.

我担心这些书会带来‘湖温贝贡效应’——每个人都认为自己能力超群、智力出众，但事实上，有一半的人在这些方面其实低于平均水平。

The worry I had with the books is is it the Lake Wobbegong effect where everyone thinks that they're of above average ability and of above average intelligence, but turns out half of the people are below average in each of those things.

人们读了这本书，看到耶鲁在私募股权和对冲基金领域取得的所有成功，而这些领域的成功很大程度上取决于基金管理人的选择。

People read the book and see all the success Yale has had in the private equity world and the hedge fund world in places where manager selection is really by far the most important factor in success.

于是他们想，我也是一个挺聪明的人。

And they think, well, I'm a pretty smart guy.

我也能做到。

I can do that too.

总有人在支持那些表现垫底的基金，但事实证明，并不是每个人都能称得上聪明。

Somebody's backing those lower quartile funds and not everybody is turns out to actually be a pretty smart guy.

他在书中也做了一些免责声明，提醒读者必须确保自己具备执行这一计划所需的技能、资源和其他条件。

And he had some disclaimers in the book about you should make sure that you really have the skill set and the resources and everything else to execute on this program.

但很多人会忽略这些提醒，心想：‘当然，我都有这些条件。’

But that's the sort of thing a lot of people would brush over and say, well, of course I do.

所以我确实担心，他可能把一把上膛的枪交到了一些人手里。

So I did worry that he was maybe putting a loaded gun in some people's hands.

这个模式对我的职业生涯非常有效。

It's a model that worked very well for my career.

我认为未来这个模式会是什么样子是个问题，可能不会是同样的模式。

I think there is a question about what the model for the future is going to be and it may not be the same model.

但如果我知道答案，我今天可能就会做别的事情了。

But if I knew the answer to that, I'd probably be doing something else today.

好的，蒂姆。

Alright, Tim.

我想确保有机会问你几个总结性的问题。

I want to make sure I get a chance to ask you a couple of closing questions.

除了工作和家庭之外，你最喜欢的爱好或活动是什么？

What is your favorite hobby or activity outside of work and family?

我喜欢旅行。

I love to travel.

我工作的一个巨大优势是它让我有机会以耶鲁的名义去很多有趣的地方，但我一直都很喜欢旅行，现在我不再全职工作了，我们会有更多时间去做这件事；与此相关的是，我在旅行时会拍很多照片。

One of the great things about my job was it enabled me to go to a lot of interesting places on Yale's Dime but I've always traveled a lot in addition to that and now that I'm not working full time anymore, we'll have more bandwidth to do that and related to that, I do a lot of photography when I travel.

这两者的结合

The combination of those two

我一直非常享受，以后会更加享受。

things is something I've always really enjoyed and will do so even more.

有什么事情是大多数人不知道但你觉得有趣的吗？

What's one thing that most people don't know about you that you find interesting?

很多认识我的人都知道我喜欢啤酒，但他们可能不知道我有多喜欢啤酒。

A lot of people who know me will know that I like beer but they may not know how much I like beer.

我昨天算了一下。

I counted it up yesterday.

自2000年以来，我造访了美国的616家不同的精酿啤酒厂，以及一些其他国家的啤酒厂。

Since the start of 2000, I have been to 616 different microbreweries in The United States and several other countries.

这是一种有趣的探索各地的方式。

Then a fun way to see places.

我去过伦敦无数次，无论是工作还是休闲，伦敦所有著名的旅游景点我都看过了。

Now I've gone to London a million times both for work and pleasure and I've seen every sort of touristy thing ever to do in London.

我上次在伦敦时，大部分空闲时间都花在乘坐地铁上，然后步行前往伦敦郊区的小型啤酒厂，这些地方通常不在房地产昂贵的区域。

The last time I was in London, I spent most of my free time riding the tube and then walking around neighborhoods on the outskirts of London to go to these little breweries which tend not to be in places where the real estate is expensive.

所以我看到了一些以前从未见过的伦敦部分，这是一种体验城市不同区域的有趣方式。

So I got to see parts of London I'd never seen before and it was a fun way to experience different part of the town.

哪两个人对你的职业生涯影响最大？

Which two people have had the biggest impact on your professional life?

一个是大卫，显而易见。

One is David, obviously.

能跟他共事并向他学习是一次绝佳的机会，我吸收了他所有的投资策略。

It was a tremendous opportunity to work from him and learn from him, absorbed all of the investment strategies.

但我真正欣赏大卫的一点是，他确实非常傲慢，但这种傲慢并非毫无根据。

But one thing I really appreciated about David was he could be incredibly arrogant, not undeservedly so.

但我想，他也清楚自己的局限，知道自己擅长什么，以及耶鲁机构擅长什么，我们从不试图去做其他事情。

But he also, I think, had a good sense of his limitations and he sort of knew what he was good at and what Yale as an institution would be good at and we didn't try to do other things.

办公室里偶尔会有人想做某件事，他就会直接说：不，我们不擅长那个。

And there would occasionally be conversations in the office where somebody wanted to do something and he just say, no, we're not good at that.

我们在那里没有优势。

We don't have an advantage there.

这对我们来说没有意义。

That doesn't make sense for us.

这种清楚自己擅长什么、坚持下去、不把时间浪费在没有优势的事情上的感觉。

That sense of knowing what you're good at and sticking to it and not wasting time on things where you don't have an advantage.

我认为这非常有价值。

I think that was really valuable.

我总是这样告诉我们的经理们。

That's something I always told our managers.

你应该专注于自己擅长且喜欢做的事情，别管别人在做什么。

You should stick to what you're good at and what you like to do and who cares what everyone else is doing.

只要做你擅长且让你快乐的事情，成功自然会随之而来。

Just do the things that you're good at and make you happy and then success will take care of itself.

所以我认为这是我从大卫那里学到的重要一课。

So I thought that was really important lesson that I learned from David.

另一个答案是我的父亲。

The other answer is my father.

我父亲职业生涯的大部分时间都在一家财富500强公司担任高管。

My father was a executive at a Fortune 500 company for most of his career.

他有着相当成功的职业生涯。

He had a pretty successful career.

他明确地让我明白，你可以在商业上取得成功，但并不需要成为一个混蛋或忽视家庭。

He definitely showed me that you could be successful in business but it didn't require being a jerk or neglecting your family.

所以，正确地实现工作与生活的平衡，对我来说是一个非常重要的教训。

So getting that work life balance right, that was a really important lesson for me.

你最大的投资反感是什么？

What's your biggest investment pet peeve?

每当管理者冒险失败，却把结果归咎于天意，声称根本无法预见，因此不应为此受罚时，我总是非常反感。

It always really bugged me when managers would take a risk and then the risks blew up in their face and they'd act like it was some act of god that they couldn't possibly have foreseen and so shouldn't be punished as it were for.

我们之前谈到了RJR和纳贝斯克，但对我来说，那一直是这种情况的典型代表。

We talked a bit about RJR and Nabisco, but that was to me always the poster child of that.

这笔交易对KKR来说并不顺利。

The deal didn't go very well for KKR.

你知道，我认为在很长的持有期内，内部收益率只有个位数。

You know, I think it was a single digit IRR over a very long holding period.

其中一个主要原因是，他们在收购后不久，政府就开始严厉打击吸烟行为，加强对烟草的监管，并对烟草公司提起诉讼，而烟草业务是RJR的重要组成部分。

One of the big reasons for that was that shortly after they bought it, the government really cracked down on smoking and regulations around tobacco and lawsuits against tobacco companies and tobacco was an important part of RJR's business.

当时我们并不是KKR的投资方。

We were not investors with KKR at that time.

我们从未与他们就此事进行过直接交流。

We never really had direct conversations with them about it.

但我的感觉是，他们会说，这笔交易没做好。

But my sense was that they would say, well, the deal didn't go well.

政府采取了这些措施，我们无法预见。

The government did this and we couldn't have foreseen that.

你怎么可能没预见到呢？

How could you not have foreseen that?

当然，这是一项风险。

Of course, it was a risk.

也许风险会以某种方式显现，但你赌的是这个颇具争议的业务所处的监管环境会相对宽松，而事实并非如此。

Maybe the risk would play out one way or another or whatever, but you took a bet that the regulatory environment around this reasonably controversial business would be relatively benign and it wasn't.

坦然接受吧。

Just own it.

相反，我们有一位经理，最近他们做了一笔非常复杂的分拆交易。

Conversely, we had a manager who this is a recent deal where they did a very complicated carve out.

结果，分拆由于各种原因进行得非常糟糕，这笔交易一直举步维艰。

Turned out the carve out went very badly for all kinds of different reasons, and the deal has really struggled.

事后他们非常坦诚地表示，我们真的搞砸了。

They've been very upfront about in hindsight, we really blew it.

我们没料到分拆会这么困难。

We didn't think the carve out would be as hard as it's been.

我们以为管理团队能胜任，但他们并没有，我们会尽全力解决这个问题，但我们确实犯了大错。

We thought the management team was up to it and they weren't, and we're gonna do our damnedest to fix this thing, but we really screwed up.

这是一场好得多的对话。

That's a much better conversation to have.

他们承担了风险，但没有得到回报，而且他们对此直言不讳。

They took the risk and it didn't pay off and they're upfront about that.

蒂姆，最后一个。

Tim, last one.

如果未来五年是你人生中的一个章节，这个章节讲的是什么？

If the next five years are a chapter in your life, what's that chapter about?

我会去很多地方旅行。

Gonna do a lot of travel.

我们有一些非常复杂的行程即将开始。

We have some pretty complicated trips coming up.

就在四周前的今天，我第一次当上了祖父。

I also just four weeks ago today became a grandfather for the first time.

这对我们的生活来说是一个新的篇章，到目前为止既令人兴奋又有趣，我相信我们会一直如此。

That's a new chapter for us and exciting and fun so far and I'm sure we'll continue to be.

我只是在寻找与金融界有趣人士互动的方式，无论是作为投资委员会成员、顾问还是咨询角色。

Just looking for ways to engage with interesting people in the financial world, be it on an investment committee or as an adviser or consulting.

我还没有明确的计划来确定具体该做什么、和谁合作，但我对各种想法持开放态度，看看会有什么结果。

I don't have any firm plans as to exactly what that ought to be and who it ought to be with, but I'm open to ideas and we'll see what comes of it.

我很幸运，可以只和我想合作、喜欢合作、尊重的人一起工作，并且对做的事情有所选择。

I'm in the fortunate position of I can just work with people that I wanna work with and enjoy working with and respect and be choosy about what I do.

如果最终我什么也不做，只是旅行、陪伴家人，那也没关系。

And if I wind up doing nothing and just travel and spend time with the family and all of that stuff, that'll be fine.

蒂姆，非常感谢你抽出时间。

Tim, thanks so much for taking the time.

嘿。

Hey.

不客气。

My pleasure.

谢谢收听本节目。

Thanks for listening to the show.

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以及更多内容。

and a lot more.

祝你今天愉快，

Have a good one, and

下次见。

see you next time.