第074集 "现代安提法：美国的共产主义叛乱 第三部分"

军队不喜欢一天内发生多起灾难。

The army doesn't like more than one disaster in a day.

在报纸上形象糟糕，还扰乱了平民的早餐时光。

Look bad in the newspapers and upset civilians at their breakfast.

我是比尔·布珀特，退役军官，常规战争实践者与学者。

I'm Bill Bupert, retired army officer and a regular warfare practitioner and scholar.

欢迎收听《追猎幽灵》——一档非常规战争播客节目，我们将探讨那些构成非常规战争的神话、失落历史、错误思维、军事失误和政府无能。

Welcome to Chasing Ghosts, an irregular warfare podcast, the show that examines the mythos, lost history, bad thinking, martial malpractice, and government incompetence that inform so much of irregular warfare.

今天，我想揭开叛乱与反叛乱及其间所有事物背后庞大的运作机制和荆棘丛生的政治面纱。

Today, I want to peek behind the curtain at the vast machinery and briar patch politics of insurgency and counterinsurgency and everything in between.

现在让我们一起开启幽灵追猎之旅吧。

Now let's go ghost hunting together.

你好。

Hello.

我是比尔，欢迎收听《追猎幽灵》非常规战争播客。

This is Bill, and welcome to chasing ghosts and irregular warfare podcast.

这是第74期节目：美国现代反法西斯共产主义叛乱（第三部分）。

This is episode 74, modern antifa communist insurgency in The US part three.

对于跳过前两期（第72和73期）直接收听本期的听众，我想说明的是：虽然我的论述兼具线性和非线性特征，但在推进之前，我们必须先搭建好认知基础——这至关重要。

So for those of you who may be stepping into the breach here to listen to this episode independent of the first two parts, which were seventy two and seventy three, and I think that what I'm trying to do here is make a case that is both linear and nonlinear, but it is tremendously important for us to put the building blocks together before we proceed forward.

因此按照惯例，我建议听众先收听前两期再接触本期内容。

So in in a typical note to my listeners, I would recommend that you, listen to the other two before you listen to this one.

在第72期中，我探讨了二十世纪共产主义的起源及其对美国的影响。

In episode 72, I discussed the origins of twentieth century communism and its influence in The United States.

第二期则快进到五六十年代至七十年代，借用布莱恩·伯勒的话说，那正是共产主义叛乱‘狂暴之日’付诸行动的时期。

And in the second one, we fast forwarded to the nineteen fifties, sixties, and seventies, and to borrow Brian Burroughs phrase, the days of rage of the communist insurgency that went kinetic during that time.

今天我们将回归基础议题：什么是共产主义？从中我们能提炼出什么？以确保对这个复杂分析对象形成最精准的认知图景。

Today, we're going to, go back to basics a little bit in order to discuss what is communism and what can we gather from that to make sure we get the single most accurate picture of this very thing or complex of things that we're trying to analyze here.

在这种情况下，我支持使用一个统称，即政府至上主义，指的是那些推崇集体高于个人理念的人。

And in this case, I I I'm in favor of using an umbrella rubric for this, which would be government supremacism, those who prize the notion of the collective over the individual.

E。

E.

O。

O.

昆虫专家威尔逊——或许可以称他为某种进化生物学家——当时问道：你对社会主义或共产主义的看法如何？

Wilson, the insect specialist, and I guess one could call him an evolutionary biologist of sorts was the one who was asking, well, what do you think of socialism or maybe it was communism.

在我看来，他的回应相当简洁而精妙。

His response was rather simple and elegant in my mind.

伟大的理念，但用错了物种。

Great idea, wrong species.

作为一位研究蚂蚁生态群落及其他昆虫行为的知名科学家，他最终指出：共产主义、社会主义、国家社会主义等所有以集体主义自居的主义，在我所称的政府至上主义框架下，最终都传达着同一个核心理念——个人及个体社群对国家集体政治意志的屈从。

He being a a renowned scientist who had studied the ecology and community of ants and other insect behavior because in the end, communism, socialism, national socialism, all of these isms that embrace themselves under collectivism, under the rubric that I refer to as government supremacism, are all those that communicate one singular idea in the end, which is the subservience of individuals and communities of individuals to the collective and political will of single entities in the state.

因此，正如我们在美国和整个西方（尤其是欧洲）所见，这种犹太人民阵线与犹太民族阵线在民族社会主义与共产主义之间的分化被广泛接受，他们甚至以此作为定义时刻，宣称这是右翼而那属于左翼。

So this entire people's front of Judea and Judean people's front bifurcation between national socialism and communism, as we have seen, which is so popular in The United States and by extension the West, especially in Europe, where they use this as a defining moment to say that this is right wing and that is left wing.

本质上，他们所谓的左翼右翼可追溯至18世纪末那场臭名昭著的血腥法国大革命——当时用议会左侧来定义政府至上主义者。

And what it basically means is that they're saying left wing and right wing referring back to the late eighteenth century infamous and bloody French Revolution, which used the left side of the aisle to define the government supremacists as it were.

而在这种情况下，议会右侧更多是君主制的定义标准而非个人主义。当然，经过数百年甚至上千年的演变，君权神授观念已有所改变，虽然戴王冠者仍会宣称'这是神赐权利'，但某种程度上他们试图通过更显性的方式使其民主化，表面上顺应民意。

And in in this case, it wasn't that the right side of the aisle was so much the definitional standard for individualism as the definitional standard for monarchy, which, of course, over hundreds of years, if not over millennia, had changed from a god given right to one in which those on the throne wearing the crown would sometimes say, oh, indeed, this is my god given right, but they tried to democrat democratize it to a certain extent by making it more manifest and doing the will of the people as it were.

我个人认为左右之分是种魔法思维。

I happen to think that left and right is magical thinking.

这是障眼法。

It's misdirection.

这是账簿领域的概念。

It's ledger domain.

这种分类人为制造了本无实质价值差异的虚假对立。

It's a way to artificially induce constructs of difference where no real difference of any value is.

例如，有人说，世界上存在法西斯主义、共产主义和社会主义。

For instance, there are those who say, well, there's fascism, and there's communism, and there's socialism.

谈到共产主义者时，共产主义者会挥舞武器，不在乎外界看法。

When it comes to communist, communist brandage the weapon and are not worried about the optics.

而社会主义者则倾向于隐藏武器，不轻易示人。

When it comes to socialism, they tend to hide the weapon and not brandish it.

那把武器会在之后才亮出来。

That weapon comes out later on.

至于法西斯主义——它有多种定义，在政治领域我不会依赖字典里的解释，因为这个问题要微妙得多。

When it comes to fascism, which by a variety of definitions, and I'm not going to rely when it comes to politics for the definitions that are accepted in a dictionary or anything like that because it's much more nuanced of a conversation to have when it comes to that.

我会给出我对法西斯主义的定义：现代发达国家的纵向与横向监管及税收体系，被用来操控、影响甚至直接指挥该国私营企业、公司和实体的行为。

I'm going to give you what I would say is my definition of fascism, which is the vertical and horizontal regulatory and taxation framework in advanced modern states that uses that to manipulate, influence, and even direct how private entities, corporations, and firms behave in that country.

例如美国有庞大的监管体系，欧盟亦是如此，世界其他所谓第一世界的国家也都如此。

For instance, there is a tremendous regulatory framework in The United States, same thing in the European Union, same thing in other countries around the world, and what all of us would call the first world.

本质上，我们面对的是一个由国家主导的统治光谱——从轻微管控到全面控制，以及介于两者之间的一切程度。

So in essence, what we have here is a spectrum of domination by the state that is either lesser or total and everything in between.

无政府状态则是理论上没有统治者只有规则的状态，但就民族国家而言，这几乎在全球都不存在。不过你会发现，越是发展中国家或第三世界国家，这些非第一世界成员往往倾向于社会主义、共产主义或盗贼统治（通过窃取建立的政权）。

When it comes to anarchy, anarchy would be the definitional standard by which there are no rulers but only rules, but that tends to be something that is arguably nonexistent around the world as far as nation states are concerned, but you do find that the more developing world or third world centric these various entities may be that are not members of the first world, that they tend to socialism, communism, kleptocracies, which is nation states by theft.

也可能是恶人政治——由最劣质群体统治的国家。

They could be cacocracies, nation states run by the worst among them.

有人认为，任何谋求政治职位的人很可能都不配担任该职位，因为他们渴望统治他人。

There are those who are of the opinion that anybody who seeks political office most likely doesn't deserve that political office because they wish to rule over others.

记得有次与同事交谈时，他不断强调国家存在的必要性，认为在相对自由的社会里，个人无法理性负责地指导自己的原子化行为和交易，需要某种枷锁约束。

I remember one time when I was having a conversation with a colleague of mine, and, he was going on about why it was so necessary for the state to exist and why individuals could not responsibly or rationally direct their own atomistic actions and transactions in a relatively free society and that they needed a yoke of sorts on them.

我反问道：那我们该去哪里找这些天才？他们如何能掌握数十亿条交易信息和日常决策数据？如果个体无法自治，一个人及其授权的监管机构又怎能统治数百万人？

To which I responded, so where do we find these individuals who are so gifted and so knowledgeable about all the billions of pieces of transactional information, the data and the datum in the everyday decisions that are made by individuals, how does one person or that person and their delegated regulatory apparatus rule over millions if single people can't rule themselves?

当然，这不过是修辞性的反问。

Nonetheless, that's rather rhetorical.

我们没能找到答案，但这为对话提供了很好的素材。

We didn't come up with an answer, but it made for good conversational fodder.

作为一名受过训练的奥地利学派经济学家，今天我们将稍微偏离常规，探讨非常规战争、迫在眉睫的冲突、战争、军事事务等话题。我们将深入挖掘那些导致美国当前处于自然状态的根源性原因和近因——按我的说法，美国正处在一种初现端倪的不对称性内战状态。

As a trained Austrian economist, we're gonna go a little bit off the reservation today when it comes to irregular warfare, impending conflict, wars, military affairs, and that stuff, and we're going to dig a little bit in the weeds on what are these formative root causes and proximate causes that have brought us to the state of nature The United States is presently at when it comes to what I would say is an incipient asymmetrical, one could say, civil war that is emerging here in The United States.

那么英国会比美国更早爆发内战吗？

Now will The UK beat The US to civil war?

我认为这种情况很可能发生。

I suspect that that may very well be the case.

如果你听过我之前几期关于内战的节目，我提到过戴维·贝茨博士——他和我不同，是靠研究这些议题谋生的专业人士，而我只是业余爱好者。他是位出色的学者，曾提出：如果把内战爆发比作午夜时分，那么英国现在距离午夜只剩片刻。

If you had a chance to listen to an episode I did several episodes ago with about civil war, I mentioned doctor David Betts who actually makes a living and gets paid to think about these things unlike myself, or I do this as an avocational hobby to, think about these things, but he's actually a scholar over there who does really good work And he said, if midnight is the time that things go kinetic in a civil war, there are a few moments from midnight in The United Kingdom.

当然，将他们推向这种境地的正是政治。

And what has brought them to this, of course, is politics.

这里的政治指的是特定人口中的派系和群体，他们试图在主权国家疆域内对受控人群实施统治并获取供养。

And politics in this case is going to be those factions and fractions of a given population that are seeking domination over and sustenance from captive captive populations within the borders of recognized sovereign states.

因此我试图建立一个解释框架，让我们能审视这些信仰体系。自十八世纪之交至今，人类始终在探究国家与个人之间的关系。

So what I'm trying to do here is to provide an explanatory framework where we examine a little bit of these belief systems, and of course, mankind especially since the cusp of the eighteenth century until this time has been examining this relationship between the state and individuals.

我们将要梳理的是——假设各位已听过前两期节目——基于美国存在共产主义叛乱的前提，追溯其根源。

So what we're going to try to tease out here is that I'm assuming that you've listened to the other two episodes, so we're going to proceed forward with this notion that there is a communist insurgency in The United States, and we're gonna try to tease out where does that come from.

若要寻找零号病人，这个案例中的传染源就是教育体系。

Well, where it comes from, if we're looking for patient zero, in this case, it's the education system.

西方各国现行的教育体系主要源自1763年普鲁士建立的第一个义务初等教育制度。

The education system that has largely been reflected in Western nations was one that is largely credited to Prussia in 1763, where they established the first compulsory primary education system.

霍勒斯·曼在十九世纪发现了这种模式。

Horace Mann discovered this in the nineteenth century.

他在美国发起了公立学校运动，到二十世纪蓬勃发展后，最终成为联邦政府及各州的完全附属机构。我们选择在家教育所有孩子，就是不愿让他们接触这个逐渐异化的系统。

He championed a common school movement in The United States, which would later, especially blooming in the twentieth century, would become a wholly owned subsidiary of the national government and the respective states so that those states would become the primary provisioners of that accepting private schools or as we did, we home educated all of our children because we did not want them exposed to what that system has become over time.

1837年，被誉为美国教育之父的霍勒斯·曼开启的改革造就了我们今天所见的教育体系。

1837, Horace Mann, considered the father of American education, began the reforms which led to what we see today.

到1870年，所有州都建立了税收支持的小学体系。

And by 1870, all states had tax supported elementary schools.

尽管入学并非总是强制性的，但在19世纪，随着教育体系的建立，九年级之前的入学往往成为强制性要求。

Though attendance was not always mandatory, in the nineteenth century, that attendance tended to be mandatory through the ninth grade as they established it then.

进入20世纪后，教育创新推动了九年级至十二年级及高中体系的普及。

And then with the twentieth century, it became popular with the innovations in creating nine through 12 and high school and such.

随后，美国和欧洲国家自然出现了大学教育的蓬勃野心。

And then, of course, collegiate ambition in The United States and European countries.

快进到二战后，我们发现五六十年代的美国与其他国家不同，开始向民众灌输大学教育理念——无论是STEM（科学、技术、工程、数学）领域，还是分析性与实证性较弱的学科，比如社会学，甚至经济学（作为受过训练的奥地利经济学派学者我敢说），突然间大学入学在美国呈现爆发式增长。

Start fast forwarding past World War two, we discover that in nineteen fifties and sixties, unlike other countries, The United States started to imbue in its citizenry that a college education, whether it was in STEM, science, technology, engineering, and mathematics, or things that have a lesser analytical and empirical rigor to them, studies, sociology, dare I say economics as a trained Austrian economist myself, and others where all of a sudden university attendance became massive in The United States.

这些历史趋势在1970年真正开始加速。

Those historical trends really started to ramp up by 1970.

1970至2010年间，大学招生规模显著扩大，总入学人数增长近四倍，到2010年达到2100万人的峰值。2010年后这一趋势有所逆转，但细究数据会发现，这主要体现在男女入学比例的变化——非STEM领域女性因多种原因开始超过男性。

1970 and 2010, a significant expansion in college enrollment with total enrollment nearly quadrupling to a peak of 21,000,000 students by 2010, and post 2010 has seen something of a reversal of this trend, but when you tease out the figures, what you see is a reversal in male enrollment versus female enrollment, and female enrollment for a variety of reasons in non STEM has started to exceed male enrollment in the same.

大学教育成本随时间推移变得极其昂贵。

Colleges became enormously expensive over time.

部分原因在于州政府和联邦政府对大学贷款担保的道德风险，这导致学生债务人群急剧膨胀。

Part of this was the moral hazard of the underwriting by states and the federal government of college loans, which led to tremendous expansion of those who had student debt and such.

但这也几乎在兰花屋（喻指温室环境）培育了集体主义思想的温床，特别是在非STEM领域的大学在读生、毕业生及研究生群体中。

But what this also led to is almost a breeding ground in Orchid House for collectivist thinking, especially among non STEM college attendees, graduates, those doing postgraduate work.

我们逐渐发现这些机构与其说是多元大学（heteroversities），不如说是清一色的左倾大学——虽然我几分钟前试图摒弃这个陈词滥调，但鉴于它仍是大众普遍理解的解释框架，我们暂且沿用。

What you started to find was that these were certainly universities and not heteroversities because the left of center, to use that tired old trope that I tried to dispose of just a few minutes ago, but we're gonna stick with it because that seems to be the explanatory framework and sphere of understanding that most people apprehend.

左倾意味着更多政府干预。

Left of center would mean more government.

右倾则意味着更少政府干预——尽管我认为实际运作未必如此，因为我更倾向用个人主义与集体主义的二分法。

Right of center would mean less government even though I don't think that's the way it necessarily works out because I like to use the bifurcation between individualism and collectivism.

集体主义自然与干预主义绑定，无论是国内政策还是海外战争；而个人主义倾向不采用干预主义来维护自由，除非受到威胁，也不会主动选择战争。

And collectivism, of course, is harnessed to interventionism, whether that's domestic or war making overseas, whereas individualism tends not to adopt interventionism as the way to preserve freedom and liberty when not under threat and not engage in wars of choice.

但从二战结束至今，不可否认的是，在学术界和大学里的教授群体中，那些持有博士学位或正在攻读博士学位的教学助理们——他们惊人地承担了近半数四年制院校的课程教学。

But from the end of World War two until today, it is undeniable that when it comes to the professoriate in the academy and the university and those who are teaching, those holders of PhDs or their aspirants who are seeking PhDs who happen to be teaching assistants, who amazingly enough tend to teach nearly half of all classes in four year schools and such.

在国家学者协会的一篇有趣文章中，作者提出疑问：为何大多数大学教授都是自由派？

At the National Association of Scholars, they had an interesting article where the article said, why are most colleges college professors liberal?

新研究对此展开调查。

New studies investigate.

两项研究。

Two studies.

某种政治倾向是否会增加一个人进入该领域的意愿或机会？

Does a certain political orientation boost a person's chances of getting in, of wanting to go in the first place?

彼得·伍德在《高等教育纪事报》创新博客上讨论了两份报告及相关文章。

Peter Wood discusses both reports and articles at the Chronicle of Higher Education Innovations blog.

其中一项被彼得称为'初衷良好但基本无价值'的研究中，作者向研究生招生办发送了虚假申请信。

In one study, which Peter called well intentioned but essentially worthless, the author sent fake letters to graduate admissions officers expressing interest in attending the program.

部分信件提到曾为奥巴马或麦凯恩的竞选团队工作。

Some letters mentioned working in either the Obama or McCain campaign.

格罗斯及其合著者想观察这些信件是否会因提及的候选人不同而收到鼓励或劝阻的回复。

Gross and his coauthors wanted to see whether these letters would get responses that indicated encouragement or discouragement according to which candidates were mentioned.

这个实验从表面看就显得肤浅可笑。

It it seems fatuous and silly on its face.

所以我同意他的观点，这确实像是个毫无价值的研究。

So, I agree with, with him that that seems like a pretty worthless study.

另一项研究试图分析人们攻读博士学位的动机。

The other one sought to analyze the reasons people have for seeking PhDs.

彼得写道：'为什么教授群体以自由派为主？'

And p Peter writes, quote, why is the professoriate predominantly liberal?

答案A：因为自由主义与智力存在内在关联，高学历者的自由派观点反映了自由派更强的学术潜力。

A, because there an there is an intrinsic link between liberalism and intelligence such that the more liberal views of those with advanced degrees reflect liberals' greater academic potentials.

自由派更聪明理论B认为，认知发展源于额外的教育年限，导致知识分子对保守派意识形态的简单化倾向提出批评。

The liberals are smarter theory b because cognitive development occurs within additional years of schooling, leading the intelligentsia to find fault with what they see as simplistic conservative ideologies.

知识越多收益越大——自由派理论。

The more learning makes profits, liberal theory.

C理论认为，教授群体寻求与中产阶级和商业精英区分开来的途径。

C, because the professoriate seeks a way to differentiate itself from both the middle class and business elites.

教授转向自由派是因为他们反感中产阶级理论。

The profs turned liberal because they resent the middle class theory.

D理论指出，占据知识工作领域的主导地位的自由派拒绝雇佣持异议观点的同行。

D, because the entrenched liberals who dominate knowledge work fields refuse to hire colleagues with this the dissenting opinions.

自由派对保守派存在偏见。

The liberals are biased against conservatives.

E理论认为，教授职业获得自由派职业的声誉，当代自由派基于此声誉选择与其政治身份相符的职业，因此比保守派更可能选择学术道路——自我选择理论。

Theory E, because the professoriate acquired a reputation as a liberal occupation and liberals today acting on the basis of this reputation and seeking careers that accord with their political identities are more likely than conservatives to aspire to become academics, the self selection theory.

F理论认为保守派思想僵化，回避需要开放思维的学科——自由派更开放理论。

F, because conservatives are dogmatic and turn away from disciplines that require open mindedness, the liberals are more open minded theory.

G理论指出教授比大多数美国人更倾向居住在城市且生育较少，这有利于他们接受自由派政治观点——生活方式自由主义理论。

G, because professors tend more than most Americans to reside in cities and have fewer children, which favors their embracing liberal political views, the lifestyle liberalism theory.

H理论认为教授平均宗教信仰程度低于其他美国人，这与其更倾向自由派相关。

H, because professors are on average less religious than other other Americans, which corresponds with their being more liberal.

研究生院吸引世俗主义者理论。

The grad school appeals to secularist theory.

I理论认为保守派更物质主义，倾向私营部门工作；而更关注人生意义的自由派则更可能被学术工作吸引——保守派重金钱轻学习理论。

I, because conservatives are more materialistic and are drawn to private sector jobs while liberals concerned more with their sense of meaning are more likely to be drawn to academic work, the conservatives prefer money to learning theory.

这份解释目录可在伊桑·福斯、杰里米·弗里兹和尼尔·格罗斯昨日发布的新工作论文前11页找到。

This catalog of explanations is to be found in the first 11 pages of a new working paper by Ethan Foss, Jeremy Freese, and Neil Gross released yesterday.

他们的答案明确指向E理论——自我选择，他们认为这是唯一能找到坚实实证支持的答案。

Their answer is an emphatic e, self selection, in their view, is the only answer for which they can find robust empirical support.

如果他们是对的，这将改变当代高等教育中最持久且往往最激烈的辩论之一。

If they are right, this should change one of the longest running and often most bitter debates in contemporary higher education.

彼得得出结论，自我选择绝非排除了偏见存在的可能性。

Peter concludes that self selection is by no means ruling out the possibility of bias.

他表示，最有效的方法不是直接禁止不受欢迎的群体进入，而是确保该群体中几乎无人愿意加入。

The most effective way, he says, is to keep out a whole class of people who are unwelcome isn't to bar entry, but to make sure that very few in that class will want to enter.

因此他们说，因为教授群体获得了自由派职业的声誉。

So, they said e because the professoriate acquired a reputation as a liberal occupation.

如今，基于这种声誉行事的自由派，寻求与其政治身份相符的职业，比保守派更有可能渴望成为学者。

Liberals today acting on the basis of that reputation and seeking careers that accord with their political identities are more likely than conservatives to aspire to become academics.

我觉得这些解释框架很有趣，但并不完全令人信服。

I I find these explanatory frameworks intriguing, but not wholesale compelling.

我想告诉你的是，作为一所真实大学的客座教授（本案中是在密西西比大学），从行政到选拔，再到博士委员会和博士生导师，整个体系都在排斥那些不认同多数从业者所持中间偏左政府至上主义框架的人。

What I would tell you is that having been a visiting professor at a real university, in this case, Ole Miss, the entire system from administration to selection to PhD boards to those who oversee PhD aspirants and all of it, militates against anyone who doesn't share the left of center government supremacist framework that the majority of these practitioners do.

记住，大学体系是理想化的。

Remember, in the university system, it is idyllic.

我怀念在那里任教时那间宽敞的办公室，满墙书籍让我看起来比实际更博学——我热爱那种氛围，热爱一切，但发现自己在道德、智识尤其是实证层面，与那里大多数同行存在分歧。

I have fond memories of my rather large office when I taught there, festooned with all of my books making me look much more studied than I actually am, and, I just love the groove of it, loved all of it, but found that I disagreed morally and intellectually and more so empirically with most of my colleagues in, in my particular profession there.

我发现学术界不仅容易变成镜屋，还会成为某种回音室——正如我所说，这是'单一性大学'而非'多元性大学'，因为他们不容纳那些不符合其'中间偏左即美德'理念的思维模式和世界观，无论这种理念体现为自由左派、社会主义、国家社会主义还是共产主义。

I have found that when it comes to academia, they have a tendency to become not only a house of mirrors, but an echo chamber of sorts in which, as I mentioned, it is a university and not a heteriversity because they do not entertain other kinds of thought patterns and apprehensions of the world that don't conform to what they wish to express as the virtue of being left of center, whether that's a liberal leftist, a socialist, a national socialist, a communist, or whatever the case may be.

我认为这解释了为何古典学系日渐式微，也解释了为何古典学者们（向维克多·戴维斯·汉森致敬）不愿学习希腊语、拉丁语等古老语言——这些语言本是他们获取专业原始文献的钥匙。

I think this is one explanation why classics departments are dying on the vine and why classicists themselves, shout out to Victor Davis Hanson, don't want to learn Greek, they don't want to learn Latin, they don't want to learn the older languages that allow them to access the primary source documentation for their profession.

在历史学界，无论美国历史学家组织还是美国历史协会，几十年来（甚至几代人）都被类马克思主义教授、思想领袖和知识阶层把持，他们不允许出版任何挑战其世界观基石的著作。

In the historical profession, whether I am a member of the Organization of American Historians or the American Historical Association, both of these have been commandeered by Marxoid professors and thought leaders and intelligentsia for decades, if not generations, and they do not allow the publication of things that fly in the face of these given totems and shibboleths that inform how they view the world, how they see the world.

同属这个历史学界的还有玛丽·比尔德这样的善意学者——这位偏重罗马史的希腊罗马史学家，创作过小说和非虚构作品，却犯下了史学原罪'现代主义'，竭力将当代情感、道德和政治观点投射到古代。

This is the same historical profession that has good meaning people like Mary Beard, the Roman and Greek historian, more so Roman, who has written both novels and non fiction works out of the out of The United Kingdom, who suffers from that historical sin of sins, which is presentism, in which she has gone to great lengths to take her contemporary feelings, morals, and political viewpoints and try to project them backwards in time.

例如：有多少女性曾掌握实权。

For instance, how many women participated in positions of power.

她最近甚至表示，跨性别现象可能是当时情况的一部分。

She's gone on of late to even say that trans may have been a part of what was going on at the time.

现代主义意味着你将当下的核心信念投射到过去，并困惑为何前人未能拥有你今天所持的高尚、崇高且备受尊敬的道德立场。你可以疏远他们，谴责他们是愚昧且道德蒙昧的族群，只因他们未能接受这些观念——而这些观念恰巧在当时根本不存在于他们的道德想象中。

Presentism means that you are taking your core beliefs of today and you are projecting those backwards, and you're wondering why they did not have the high, elevated, and prestigious moral positions that you hold today, and you can hold that hold them at arm's length and condemn them for being the dim witted and morally darkened peoples that they were for not accepting these things, which, by the way, didn't happen to be in their moral imagination at the time.

例如，奴隶制在当代历史分析中是个重大议题。

For instance, slavery is a big deal as far as contemporary historical analysis and such.

当然，当涉及种族、阶级和性别时，这三大要素几乎构成了当今所有学术期刊的论述基础——那些电子期刊随处可见，供有意者阅读。

Of course, when it comes to race, class, and gender, that is the trifecta which informs almost all academic journaling today in the journals, all these electronic journals that are out there and available for folks to read if they wish.

我建议你即便有机会也别去读，因为它们充斥着术语、废话、剽窃，完全缺乏可复现性，甚至连脚注都与作者原本要表达的内容南辕北辙——全被扭曲了。

I would urge you not to if you get the opportunity because it is so filled with jargon, nonsense, plagiarism, and a total lack of reproducibility, and even footnotes that don't speak to what the author or authors of said journal article were using them to speak to in the first place because they twisted up.

如果你有机会浏览'撤稿观察'这类网站，会发现学术欺诈、剽窃和愚蠢行为泛滥成灾。

If you get the opportunity to go to a place like Retraction Watch, you will discover that the amount of journalistic fraud, plagiarism, and stupidity is so rampant.

我一直呼吁埃隆·马斯克或其他有资源的人资助开发AI调查取证工具，扫描美国和全球所有电子学术期刊（先从英语期刊开始），核查数据来源、准确性、语言精确性，比对脚注与正文中的推测、猜想及结论。

And I have had a running plea to Elon Musk or whoever has the means to fund this to develop an AI investigation and forensic tool that goes to every electronic academic journal in America and around the world, let's start with the English language, and you examine it for its data provenance, you examine it for its data accuracy, its precision of language, You examine the footnotes versus the conjectures and speculation and conclusions that are in the body of the journal article.

接着当然要进行大规模剽窃检测，看看这些学术精英们是窃取了观点还是整段照搬。

And then, of course, you run a big plagiarism check to see where these worthies have stolen either their ideas or lifted entire paragraphs.

那位可敬的盖伊女士——哈佛大学前校长——不仅在论文中剽窃，连致谢词都是抄的。

There was the estimable miss Gay, who was the president of Harvard, who not only plagiarized in her articles, she even plagiarized acknowledgments.

简直懒惰到令人发指且荒谬绝伦。

Talk about incredibly lazy and wrongheaded.

但我想和你们聊聊近期的一个历史切片——迈克尔·A·贝里塞尔斯所著《武装美国：国民枪械文化的起源》。

But I wanna talk to you about a snapshot in time that was recent, and that would be Arming America The Origins of a National Gun Culture by Michael a Bellisales.

发生了。

Happens.

有位叫克莱顿·克莱默的枪械爱好者，第二修正案支持者，在我看来是位有价值的历史学者——和我一样没有专业资质，但属于业余历史学家。

There's a guy out there by the name of Clayton Kramer, a gun enthusiast, a second amendment enthusiast, a historian of merit, in in my opinion, like me, not a credentialed historian, but an amateur historian.

但这本书出版了。

But the book came out.

于是它在2001年获得了班克罗夫特奖。

So it wins the Bancroft Prize in 2001.

后来它成为首个被撤销该奖项的作品。

It later became the first work for which the prize was rescinded.

《武装美国》的核心论点是：美国枪支文化并非植根于殖民时期和建国初期，而是在19世纪50至60年代才兴起的。

Here's the thesis of arming America, is that the gun culture in The United States did not have roots in the colonial and early national period, but arose during the eighteen fifties and sixties.

该书主张枪支在美国殖民时期、建国初期及内战前和平年代都并不常见。

The book argues that guns are and were uncommon during peacetime in The United States during the colonial, early national, and antebellum periods.

为便于理解，我们将这段时间称为1700年至19世纪末，期间枪支使用稀少，普通美国人的枪械使用技能也很生疏。

For those who don't know, we're gonna call that from 1700 until the end of the nineteenth century, and that guns were seldom used and that the average American's proficiency in use of firearms was poor.

事实证明，该奖项确实因其内容糟糕而被撤销。

Well, it turns out that, yes, that prize was rescinded because it was so awful.

再次感谢克莱顿·克雷默发现这一点。

And again, I thank Clayton Kramer for discovering this.

罗杰·莱恩在《美国历史杂志》上评论称，该书的研究细致而全面。

Roger Lane reviewed this in the Journal of American History, and he said that the book's research was meticulous and thorough.

他写道，贝拉·塞尔斯攻击了全国步枪协会对第二修正案解读背后的核心神话。

He wrote that Bell of Sales had attacked the central myth behind the National Rifle Association's interpretation of the second amendment.

莱恩宣称贝拉·塞尔斯的证据如此有力，若这个议题还接受理性辩论，争论早该结束了。

Lane declared Bella Sales evidence so formidable that if the subject were open to rational argument, the debate would be over.

另一位评论者彼得·S·奥努夫称该书是"破除神话的离婚宣言"。

Another one, Peter s Onuf called the book a myth busting toward divorce.

这时克莱顿·克雷默出现了。

Enter Clayton Kramer.

这位业余历史学家兼枪支爱好者克雷默——他自1996年读到贝拉·希尔斯的文章后就对其论点持怀疑态度——后来指出：历史学家之所以轻易接受《武装美国》的荒谬主张，是因为这些主张完美契合他们的政治世界观。

An amateur historian and gun enthusiast Kramer who had been skeptical, this is quote, Kramer, who had been skeptical of Bella Seal's thesis since reading his 1996 article, later argued that the reason why historians swallowed army in America's preposterous claims so readily is that it fit into their political worldview so well.

他们甚至没停下来思考其中可能存在的问题。

They didn't even pause to consider the possibility that something wasn't right.

历史学家彼得·查尔斯·霍弗是枪支管控的支持者，曾在2004年对贝拉·西尔斯案件的研究中声援克莱默的Chargewin组织。

Historian Peter Charles Hoffer, an advocate of gun control and support to Kramer's Chargewin in a 2004 examination of the Bella Seals case.

他指出，历史学界有影响力的成员们已就社会暴力问题及其与枪支管控的关系采取了鲜明立场。

He noted that influential members of the historical profession had taken strong public stands on violence in our society and its relation to gun control.

例如，贝拉·西尔斯著作作者阿尔弗雷德·A.克诺普福克为获取推荐语而联系的学者

For instance, the academic solicited by for blurbs by Bella Seal's author Alfred A.

部分原因在于该书抨击了枪支游说团体。

Knopfork static in part because the book knocked the gun lobby.

最终根据罗伯特·C.威廉姆斯的说法，

Now in the end, according to Robert C.

对该问题而言，历史学家们更关注的是贝拉·西尔斯可能进行了错误、欺诈性及不道德的研究，而非其政治立场。

Williams, the politics of the issue battered less to historians than the possibility that Bella Seals might have engaged in faulty, fraudulent, and unethical research.

当批评者们仔细审查该书的历史主张时，他们证实贝拉·西尔斯的大部分研究——特别是对遗嘱记录的处理——存在不准确甚至可能是欺诈的情况。

As critics subjected the historical claims of the book to close scrutiny, they did demonstrate that much of Bella Seal's research, particularly his handling of probate records, was inaccurate and possibly fraudulent.

这些批评包括指出该书及《美国历史杂志》文章中表格的多处严重错误，特别是未提供案例总数且所列百分比明显错误。

This criticism included noting several serious errors in the tables published in the book as well as the Journal of American History article, namely that they did not provide a total number of cases and gave percentages that were clearly wrong.

西北大学法学教授詹姆斯·林格伦在两篇学术文章中指出：在《美国军队》中，贝拉·西尔斯声称统计了17-18世纪罗德岛普罗维登斯约100份遗嘱中的枪支数量，但这些遗嘱根本不存在——因为死者均未立遗嘱。

Now in two scholarly articles, law professor James Lindgren of Northwestern University noted that in Army in America, Bella Seals had purported to count guns in about a 100 wills from seventeenth and eighteenth century Providence, Rhode Island, but these did not exist because the decedents had died intestate without wills.

他还声称统计了19世纪旧金山县的遗产清册，但这些记录已在1906年地震火灾中被毁。

A purported to count nineteenth century San Francisco County probate inventories, but these had been destroyed in the nineteen o six earthquake and fire.

对此贝拉·西尔斯辩称实际查阅了附近康特拉科斯塔县更完整的档案，但委员会同样驳斥了这一说法。

On this point, Bella Seals claimed he had actually consulted the more complete archives at nearby Contra Costa County, but the committee also disputed this claim.

他报告的18世纪遗产清册中枪支持有率的全国平均值在数学上不可能成立，并歪曲遗嘱记录中枪支状况的描述以迎合其论点——例如声称普罗维登斯记录中多数枪支标注为老旧或损坏，而实际标注比例不足10%。

He reported a national mean for gun ownership in eighteenth century probate inventories that was mathematically impossible, misreported the condition of guns described in probate records in a way that accommodated his thesis, as for instance, claiming that in Providence records, most guns were listed as old or broken when fewer than 10% were so listed.

他错误引用了19世纪马萨诸塞州人口普查中的枪支数量，在佛蒙特州统计枪支时错误率超60%，而对17世纪普利茅斯殖民地涉枪凶杀案的引用错误率竟达100%。

He miss cited the counts of guns in nineteenth century Massachusetts censuses, had more than a 60% error rate in finding guns listed as part of the states in Vermont, and had a 100% error rate in the cited gun related homicides of seventeenth century Plymouth Colony.

批评者们还指出了贝拉·西尔斯引用方法存在的问题。

Critics also identify problems with Bella Seals' methods of citation.

克莱默指出，贝拉·西尔斯歪曲了乔治·华盛顿对三支准备不足的民兵部队质量的评价，使其批评看似针对整个民兵体系。

Kramer note that Bella Seals had misrepresented a passage by George Washington about the quality of three poorly prepared militia units as if his criticism applied to the militia in general.

华盛顿曾强调这三支部队只是例外情况，但她当然没有提及这点。

Washington had noted that the three units were exceptions to the rule, but, of course, he didn't include that.

当时埃默里大学进行了调查，随后相关人员辞职。

There was an Amory investigation, a concomitant resignation.

2002年，哥伦比亚大学校董会撤销了班克罗夫特奖，这在该奖项历史上尚属首次。

In 2002, the trustees of Columbia University rescinded the Bancroft Prize, the first such action in the history of the prize.

阿尔弗雷德·克纳普没有续签贝利西尔的合同，国家人文基金会也从纽伯里图书馆授予贝利西尔的奖学金中撤回了冠名。

Alfred Knapp did not renew Bellisiels' contract, and the National Endowment for the Humanities withdrew its name from a fellowship that the Newberry Library had granted Bellisiels.

正如某位绅士所言：'埃默里大学、班克罗夫特奖评委会和克纳普对贝利西尔的谴责，为枪支游说团体提供了攻击整个历史学界的弹药'。

And as one gentleman said, quote, Bellisiels' condemnation by Emory University, the trustees of the Bancroft prizes, and Knopp provided the gun lobby with information to blast the entire history profession even though H.

尽管H·劳、阿马亨德罗研究所、OAH等机构迅速声援，并表明反对历史政治化的原则立场，但他们迟迟没有追问同样关键的问题：他是否操纵了这些机构并背叛了他们的信任。

Law, the Amahundro Institute, the OAH, and the rushed to his side and stated principled objections to the politicization of history, they hesitated to ask the equally important question of whether he had manipulated them and betrayed their trust, end of quote.

我认为这个具有代表性的案例之所以发人深省，是因为贝利西尔事件在学术界绝非个例。

What I find so revealing about this snapshot episode that I'm using to be illustrative of what's coming out of the academy and the university is that what happened with belliceales is not unusual.

不同寻常的只是公众知晓了此事。

What's unusual is that the public knows about it.

我想告诉收听这期节目的每位听众：美国每本学术期刊都充斥着类似文章。

I would suggest to everybody within earshot of this podcast that there are journal articles in every academic journal in America.

顺便说一句，希望你现在是坐着的。

By the way, I hope that you're sitting down.

虽然无法精确统计这些学术期刊的总量，但显然有数万种——有消息称同行评审期刊约2.5至3.5万种。

There's no exact number for the total number of those academic journals, but there are tens of thousands apparently with some sources indicating that the number of peer reviewed journals could be around 25,000 to 35,000.

若计入非同行评审期刊及其他语种刊物，总量可能达4至5万种。

The overall count of all academic journals, including non peer reviewed, and those in different languages is likely 40 to 50,000.

因此每年发表的学术论文数量也相当惊人。

So the number of academic papers published per year is also rather imposing.

当然，这些期刊会成为那些论文的合集。而在STEM领域的可重复性及类似问题上，这些论文中有多少存在严重的脚注引用问题呢？

Of course, the journals would be collections of those papers, And how many of those papers have had significant problems when it comes to footnote citation in the STEM fields reproducibility and those kind of things?

这已是众所周知且不胜枚举。

It is legend and legion.

因此我认为美国从幼儿园到博士的政府教育体系存在诸多问题，具体来说，我想延伸至其他英语国家，甚至欧洲那些虽不说英语但与我们共享罗曼语系的国家，那里同样充斥着大量学术骗局、欺诈和造假行为，规模之巨令人震惊。

So I think there are so many things wrong with the government education system, k through PhD, in America specifically, and as I want to say, by extension, other English speaking countries or even those that don't but share our romance language in Europe where you find a tremendous number of these kind of academic shams, scams, and frauds going on to such a large extent.

再次向马斯克先生喊话——如果你在听的话，虽然我怀疑你是否会听到。

And, shout out again, mister Musk, if you're listening, and I doubt whether you are or not.

请让你的团队开发一个人工智能代理，彻底筛查那2.5万至3.5万种学术期刊，不仅要检查出版当年（即最近年份）的内容，还要回溯历史数据，设计某种算法来识别、提取并向世界揭露美国学术界正在发生的欺诈行为的数量与规模。

Please find an AI agent that one of your teams can assemble that will scour those 25 to 35,000 academic journals, not only for the year in which they are published, which would be the most recent year, but going back over time and developing some kind of algorithm that can suss out, tease out, and reveal to the world the amount and magnitude of academic fraud that is going on in America.

这涉及巨额资金，这也引出了本集节目的最初论点：我要论证为何K-12教育只是序章，而真正的温室——培育所有娇嫩的共产主义花朵直至成熟，然后放任其影响世界的场所——是学院，是学术界，是大学。

It is a tremendous amount of money, which brings us to the original point of this particular episode, which is where I'm trying to make the case why the k through 12 schools are a preamble, but the finishing house, the orchid house, the place where all the delicate communist flowers bloom and come into their adulthood and go out to have their way with the world, it is the college, it's the academy, it's academia, it's the university.

因为透过政府至上主义的棱镜观察世界的人，或是那些幻想在政府至上主义外衣下的社会主义/共产主义的人，他们总认为中央计划行之有效，这与詹姆斯·布坎南的公共选择理论背道而驰——该理论指出公共部门的个体与私营部门一样会出于私利行事。这看似是不言自明的道理。我特别欣赏他某天对提问者做出的精妙回应，当被问及'什么是公共选择理论'时，他说：

Because what you find time and time again for those who look at the world through a lens or a government supremacist lens or have this illusion that socialism communism under the rubric of government supremacism, that central planning works and that contrary to what James Buchanan taught us concerning public choice theory, which argues that individuals in the public sector, the government sector, act out of self interest just as they do in the private sector, That seems to be something that comes from the university of the intuitively obvious, and I am so fond of his rather elegant repost one day to someone who was asking him where he said, well, what is public choice theory?

这不过是祛除浪漫色彩的政治学。

It is simply politics without romance.

公共选择理论的核心观点认为，这些政府行为者并非利他主义者，而是基于自身利益行事。

A core concept in public choice theory argues that these government actors are not altruists, but acting in their own self interest.

所以我引导你们得出这个结论，并提供大量证据来阐明：整个支持共产主义、社会主义、政府至上主义、中央计划，以及彻底控制、摧毁自由市场和 Ludwig von Mises 所称'人类行动'中数十亿原子化交易的论述体系，始终受到政治阶层的阻挠——他们极力确保'大政府'永远不受质疑。

So I brought you to this conclusion and and provided you with this raft of evidence to make the point that the entire corpus of advocacy for communism, socialism, government supremacism, central planning, and the total control and demolition and destruction of free markets and the billions of atomistic human transactions that take place in what Ludwig von Mises would call human action, that they're constantly stymied by a political class that has a very certain investment in trying to make sure that maximum government is never questioned.

我人生中总感到惊讶的是（再次借用左右派的惯常划分），作为受过奥地利经济学训练的前辩论教练，当我与偏左人士讨论时——越是极端左派，其合理化能力、认识论水平及应对苏格拉底式盘问乃至激烈交叉质询的智力表现就越是微不足道，最终往往沦为辱骂和'真正的苏格兰人'谬误。

And one thing that I always find so surprising in my life, and again, we will employ the common characterization of left and right, is that as a trained Austrian economist and a former forensics coach and such, I find that when I have discussions with those who tend to be left of center, the more left, the more extreme this seems to be, their rationalizations, epistemology, and intellectual ability to Socratically drill and even answer to cross examination that is rather vigorous is always miniscule and usually results in name calling and true Scotsman's fallacies.

事实上，与这类人打交道时，我反复遭遇的是一场谬误的狂欢。

As a matter of fact, it's a circus of fallacies that I find again and again when it comes to dealing with folks like this.

因此为何我要在播客节目中谈论这些？为何我创办《追魂索影》并研究非常规战争的方方面面？因为我必须理解这些冲突中的人类行为者。

So why do I bring all of this up in my podcast episodes and my entire raison d'etre with doing chasing ghosts and examining all the aspects of irregular warfare is because I have to understand the human actors in these conflicts.

如果你研究西班牙内战、共产主义内战或存在共产主义势力的国际/国内竞争，就会发现道德堕落的程度——正如《共产主义黑皮书》作者所记载的那种杀戮行为（尽管他们因此遭受批评），我强烈建议你们购买此书典藏。

And what you find if you examine the Spanish civil war and you examine communist civil wars or communist impositions and interstate or interstate competition in which there are communist forces is that the amount of moral depravity, the engagement in the kind of killing that takes place in this case as the authors of the Black Book of Communism were criticized for, and I urge all of you to buy that book and put it in your library.

若有机会尝试，定会令人毛骨悚然。

If you get the chance, it is hair raising.

它将在智识与道德层面留下伤痕，但这一系列案例研究充分展示了共产主义为何总以同一种方式终结——那些高居共产主义官僚体系顶端的少数人，无论承认与否，其存在就是为了确保绝大多数民众在该体制下的生活水平永远无法媲美拥有个人自由与市场经济的社会。

It will, leave scars on you intellectually and morally, but it is a tremendous boatload of case studies and showing you why communism always ends in only one fashion, and that's where that tiny sliver of the nomenclature, those people on top in a given communist palette bureau, are there to ensure, whether they acknowledge it or not, that the majority of people living under said government are not going to live as well as they would in free markets with individual liberty and freedom.

但你知道吗？

But guess what?

事实表明，在美国及西方众多'安提法'抵抗运动中活跃的二三十岁青年，他们挥舞锤子镰刀旗帜，透过马克思主义棱镜审视国家与同胞，几乎所有人都坚信：唯有将个人意志屈服于集体，他们那彩虹独角兽般的共产主义乌托邦——无论冠以社会主义还是其他政府至上主义名号——才是唯一出路，而暴力则是实现手段。

It turns out for 20 and 30 that populate so many of the Antifa plus resistance and insurgency movements in The United States and the West tend to fly flags with hammers and sickles, and they tend to have a Marxist lens through which they view the state and through which they view their fellow man, and they are convinced almost to a man and a woman that it is only under the yoking of the individual to collective will that their rainbow and unicorn fart nirvana of communism, socialism, whatever government supremacist rubric they are working under and laboring under at the time is the only way for things to happen, and that violence is the answer.

我并非指大多数教授或共产主义理想信奉者都主张暴力，但必须明白：要真正理解'安提法'，就必须洞悉共产主义在其终极目标追求者思维中的运作机制。

I'm not saying that violence is the answer for the majority of the professoriate, for all people who profess communist or socialist ideals, but I am telling you that when it comes to Antifa to fully understand what you're looking at is that you must understand how communism works in the minds of those who profess that as their end goal and template for what they wish to do.

不过，共产主义者在叛乱活动中确实具备某些优势。

Now, communists though do have some advantages when it comes to insurgencies.

正如往期节目所述——无论是谈及法国外籍兵团在越南作战，还是偶尔讨论共产主义中国，或是追溯1917至1930年代初俄国布尔什维克主义的根源——那种严苛的纪律性既源于运动个体的自我约束，更源于'不为他们战斗就必死无疑'的生存法则。

As I've mentioned in past episodes, when I've talked about French foreign legion fighting in Vietnam, when I've talked about communist China on occasion, when I've talked about the roots of Russian Bolshevism from 1917 until the early nineteen thirties, and all the rest, the tremendous amount of discipline, which comes from both self discipline of individuals in the movement, and also the discipline of knowing that if you don't fight for them, you will end up dead nonetheless.

加入这些军队某种程度上是别无选择，但其中也不乏真正的信徒。

So it's somewhat of a Hobson's choice when you're fighting in these armies, but there are true believers.

有些人自认为与那些践行政府至上主义的共产主义、社会主义或国家社会主义者不同。

There are those who think that, well, they did not ply the government supremacist trade communism, socialism, national socialism, what whatever the ism is that is assumed.

他们觉得前人做得不够好，而当代的我们定能做得更出色。

They have not done it as well as we're going to do it contemporaneously.

他们笃信自己掌握着所有答案——这很可能犯了'现代主义'的历史编纂谬误——且对此深信不疑。

And we have all the answers, again, probably practicing that historiographical fraud of presentism and thinking that they have all the answers, and they are thoroughly convinced.

重点在于：大学不仅塑造了我们所见全部共产主义叛乱战术的思想主干与血脉，更是让我们以理性务实视角看清敌人的本质，从而洞悉其行为模式与思维逻辑。

So yay and verily, what the point that I'm trying to make here is not only does college inform the backbone and probably the arterial bloodstream of all of the communist insurgency tactics that we are presently seeing employed, but this is a way to wholly see the enemy in a realistic and rational fashion so that you know how they operate and how they think.

情报官员（甚至美军士官）的核心能力之一——看看越南如何运用敏锐的战术、战役及战略情报对抗法国和美国这类一流对手——就在于准确把握敌人的行为动机，这点在此同样关键。

One of the critical things that intelligence officers or even intelligence noncommissioned officers serving in the US army or any army for that matter, I mean, look what the Vietnamese were able to accomplish against, first world foes, in this case, the French and The United States, with very keen tactical, operational, and strategic intelligence was they knew what made the enemy tick, and that's also important here.

我们必须成为'第十人'。

We must be tenth men.

我们必须保持逆向思维。

We must be contrarian.

我们必须成为那些对现状进行红队演练的人，这样我们不仅能预测敌人的行动、部署和构成——即他们将出现在哪里、会动用哪些力量，还能了解他们的作战和战略目标是什么？

We must be those who are red teaming what's going on so that not only can we project what the enemy is going to do, disposition, composition, that would be where are they going to be, what forces will they bring to bear, but what are their operational and strategic objectives?

这些目标如何在战略叙事中传达？

How are those communicated in the strategic narrative?

这些内容如何在视频中传达？

How are those things communicated in video?

它们如何在招募过程中传达？

How are they communicated in recruitment?

有哪些手册可供他们使用，以此作为扩充队伍的手段？

What manuals are out there for them to use these as a means to expand their ranks?

所有这些资料都对感兴趣的人开放。

All of this stuff is available to those who are interested.

我在大型中央政府中看到的一个问题（我认为美国也包括在内），就是他们往往在认知世界的方式上变得僵化，而且不幸的是，存在官僚主义的法律体系。

One of the problems I see in large central governments, and I would include The United States, is they tend to get hidebound in the way they apprehend the world, and, unfortunately, there is a law bureaucracy.

我是杰瑞·佩内尔的忠实粉丝，并有幸与他的一位儿子共事——他显然是一名退役海军指挥官，也是一位非常敏锐的防务分析师，他算是我与这位先生的纽带，我年轻时乃至成年后都读过这位先生的作品。

I'm a big fan of Jerry Pernell, and I've had the pleasure of working with one of his sons who apparently, I think he's a retired naval commander and he's a very keen defense analyst, and he's sort of my connection to this fellow whose works I read in my youth and even past my youth.

他说：‘在任何官僚体系中，致力于维护官僚体系本身利益的人总会掌权，而那些专注于实现该体系本应达成目标的人，其影响力会越来越小，有时甚至被完全排除在外。’

He says, quote, in any bureaucracy, the people devoted to the benefit of the bureaucracy itself always gets in control, and those dedicated to the goals that the bureaucracy is supposed to accomplish have less and less influence and sometimes are eliminated entirely, end of quote.

亚当·卡罗拉对此提出了一个精彩观点：政治立场偏左的人往往更关注流程。

Adam Carolla makes a great point when it comes to this, and his point is that those left of center tend to be concerned with process.

而政治立场偏右的人（我再次用这种框架阐述，因为这是大多数人理解这类事务的方式）则更关注实际成果。

Those right of center, again, I'm entertaining those because that is the framework upon which most people understand these kind of things, of getting stuff done on the right.

正因为他们不太关注流程而更注重结果，他们往往不是政客——这就是为什么你会发现政治作秀和代表会议吸引的是那些只热衷于流程却从不实现目标的人。

And because they're not so concerned with process and getting things done, they tend not to be politicos, which is why you find that political circuses and representational assemblies and such attracts people who are attracted to simply doing process and never achieving what they need to do.

在官僚体系中，那些真正实现该体系目标的人，反而会被体系内的其他人侧目而视——因为如果你实现了目标，这个体系还有什么继续存在的必要呢？

In bureaucracies, those who achieve the goals of the bureaucracy are going to be looked at askance by others within said bureaucracy because if you achieve the goals, why must you exist any longer?

这对那些希望它作为一台自我延续的机器继续运转的人来说是个巨大威胁。

And that's a big threat to those who wish for it to go on as a self perpetuating machine.

布珀特对阿克顿公理的推论是：权力吸引易腐化者，而绝对权力会吸引更恶劣的人。

Bupert's corollary to Acton's axiom is that power attracts the corruptible and absolute power attracts even worse.

因此，当你环顾我们这个时代的全球格局，再回望历史，你会发现极少有真正实现其初衷的庞大官僚利维坦——除了那些掌权政客们自我膨胀和扩张权力的行为。

And hence, when you look around the world within our contemporaneous time, and then you look back in history, and you find so few large leviathan, all consuming bureaucracies that really achieve the things they set out to do, accepting the aggrandizement and expansion of power for those politicos in power.

甚至有位绅士以类似精神提出了官僚主义的第二铁律，引述如下：'系统会自我复杂化'。

There was even a gentleman who proposed a second iron law bureaucracy in a similar spirit, quote, systems complexify.

任何官僚系统都会倾向于积累复杂性和控制层级，这并非原始设计者的本意，但却是更广泛背景下的必然结果，引述结束。

Any bureaucratic system will tend to accrete complexity and layers of control unintended by the original designers but necessitated by the broader context, end of quote.

我认为这个观点很有道理。

I think there's a lot to be said for that.

对于我的老听众来说，你们知道我非常推崇纳西姆·塔勒布关于脆弱性与反脆弱性的概念——若用这些概念来观察官僚体系，它们确实显得极其脆弱。

For my longtime listeners, you know that I am very fond of Nassim Taleb's notions of fragility and anti fragility, and that if you look at the ecology of those notions, bureaucracies tend to be very fragile indeed.

决策过程脆弱，执行能力脆弱，整个流程难以引导他们找到具体解决方案，而这些方案本应减少其存在的必要性。

Fragile in a decision making process, fragile in their ability to take the process and have it lead them to a concrete solution set that lessens the need for them to exist in the first place.

因为从人类行为角度思考：在大型集体组织中，你会真心想要解决那些可能让你失业的问题吗？

Because think about it from a simply a human action perspective, Would you really want to, in a large aggregation of individuals, a collective as it were, want to solve the problems that would put you out of a job?

大概不会。

Probably not.

当然，我们可以反复探讨各种定律、推论、人类行为，以及企业或政府组织的生态结构。

Now, of course, we can go on here again and again to look at laws and corollaries and human behavior and the ecology of corporate organizations or government organizations.

但我确实想和你们聊聊阿奇博尔德·波茨，波茨定律与成功的技术官僚。

But I do wanna talk to you about Archibald Potts, Potts Law and the Successful Technocrat.

引述非常简单：

Quote, very simple.

技术领域由两种人主导：懂技术却不管理的人，和管理他们不懂的技术的人。

Technology is dominated by two types of people, those who understand what they do not manage and those who manage what they do not understand.

我...我恳请各位就座。

I I I would urge all of you to take a seat.

如果你愿意，甚至可以重放那段内容。

You can even replay that if you want.

事实上，我会再重复一遍。

As a matter of fact, I'll repeat it.

技术领域由两类人主导：一类是理解自己未管理之事的人，另一类是管理自己不理解之事的人。

Technology is dominated by two types of people, those who understand what they do not manage and those who manage what they do not understand.

你会发现，对民众福祉构成更大威胁的往往是后者而非前者。

And what you find there is that it is the latter and not the former that is far more of a threat to people's well-being than not.

现在，波特推论从这一定律延伸而来，它指出：每个技术层级随时间推移都会出现能力倒置现象。

Now, Pott's corollary follows from that initial law and it states, every technical hierarchy in time develops a competence inversion.

用医学术语来说，我们称之为医源性效应——这意味着它不仅无法达成使命目标，反而极可能适得其反。

In medical terms, we call this iatrogenic effect, which means that it is not going to it is not only not going to achieve its mission end state, but it will most likely do just the opposite of what it thought to do.

若有正规大学甚至企业的调查人员在场，过去七分钟我阐述的这三个要点，通过观察加州洛杉矶政治局及其政治角色处理帕利塞德山火事件的表现便可得到充分印证。

Now if there were legitimate university or maybe even corporate investigators out there, a great lesson in all three of these things that I've suggested to you in the past seven minutes can be summed up by observing the behavior of the Los Angeles Politburo in California and its political actors in handling the Palisades fire and what's happened with that.

我期待未来能有严谨的学者研究此事，并思考这个案例所揭示的深层含义：一个不仅完美契合我刚谈到的能力倒置推论，更通过官僚疏忽、缺乏远见和科学预判不足，在火星引燃、火势蔓延、余烬复燃的每个环节都埋下隐患，最终导致灾难远超出应有规模的体制。

I'm hoping that there may be legitimate scholars in the future who will look at this and consider what are the implications of having a state in this case, which not only in the best fashion of the corollary that I just talked about with competence inversion, put everything in place to guarantee that once that match was struck, once that fire took hold, once those embers were oxygenated, that the disaster that would result from that would be far worse than it would ever be because of bureaucratic neglect, lack of foresight, and the insufficiency of scientific forecasting.

这些都没有发生。

None of that happened.

人们可将洛杉矶事件视为缩影，它集中体现了几乎所有大型政治体系都会出现的流程僵化、决策犹豫和医源性效应——无论其高举何种旗帜。

And one could characterize what happened in LA as a microcosm, as it were, of the kind of process paralysis, indecision, and iatrogenic effect that takes place in almost all large political systems regardless of what flag they may fly.

根据最后这条原则可知：技术能力将沉淀在科技企业的基层。

As here's what we know from that last principle, the competence will concentrate in the lower ranks of the tech firms.

能干者始终负责技术运营，而无能者却在技术官僚层级中步步高升。

Competent people would continue to handle the operational side of the technology while the incompetent ones would be promoted up the techno technocratic hierarchy.

因此归根结底，我试图串联起的并非统一场论——毕竟没人能做到这点。

So in the end, when we look at what we have here, what I'm trying to weave together is not a unified field theory because none of us have that.

我试图构建一个叙事框架，描述这场共产主义叛乱的面貌、其起源、以及是什么在助长这场即将吞噬国家的初起野火，同时为那些关注者提供调查和鉴证工具，让他们认清这个敌人是谁、他们打算做什么、动机何在，以及这将如何影响作为一个运作政体的美国。

I'm trying to weave together the narrative framework of what this communist insurgency looks like, where it came from, what is feeding the oxygen to this incipient wildfire that's going to consume the country, but also giving an investigative and forensic tool set to those who are paying attention to know who this foe is, what they're going to do, what they're motivated by, and what impact this is going to have on America as an operating polity.

因为在这个时代，当你回望时会想，关于战争、冲突、内战、大规模战争这类事情，大多数情况下，那些参与这场复杂适应性系统碰撞的人——正如我之前描述的——似乎没有意识到，无论他们制定了什么计划，怀揣何种野心，在技术、生态、人类系统、经济等所有构成我们复杂凡尘生活的因素交织的摩擦与迷雾中，他们终将发现事情不会按照交战各方的计划和野心发展。

Because this is a time in which when you look back, you think to yourself, well, when it comes to war and when it comes to conflict, when it comes to civil war, when it comes to mass war and all those kind of things, for the most part, those who are playing at this complex adaptive systems clash as I've described before don't seem to realize that for whatever plans they have laid down, which are whatever ambitions they may have, they are going to discover in the friction and fog of that collision, technologically, ecologically, human systems wise, economically, all the factors that make us living human beings in this complex mortal coil that it is not going to go according to the plans and ambitions of the parties who are fighting each other.

因此我想留给各位这个思考：将当前局势框定为美国一场初现端倪的内战至关重要，这能让人们清晰认识到那些可能即将到来、并将彻底改变美国在本世纪剩余时间里整体面貌的生死抉择。

So I'd like to leave you with this thought, framing what is currently happening in what I would characterize as an incipient civil war in The United States is so important to grant the clarity to the life and death choices that are probably on the horizon, that are going to change the entire tapestry and fabric of what The United States looks like for the remainder of this century.

我还想留给各位这句话。

And I wanna leave you with this.

挑起战争的既不是自由主义者、保守派、共和党人，甚至可能也不是主流民主党人——因为我两党都不属，大可对他们统统加以指责，愿他们两家都遭殃。

It isn't libertarians or conservatives or republicans or even probably mainstream democrats because I'm a member of neither party, I can cast aspersions on them and and wish a box on both their houses.

但在这个案例中，即将发动内战的并非我刚才提到的那些人。

But in this case, it is not those people I just mentioned who are going to start this civil war.

他们当然会卷入其中。

They will certainly be involved in it.

但始作俑者总是那些集体主义派系，那些政府至上主义派系——他们挑起国内冲突，挑起州际冲突，挑起种种可能最终导致（这次或许）半球范围甚至世界大战的事端。

But it is always the collectivist factions, the government supremacist factions that start intrastate conflicts, that start interstate conflicts, that start all of these things that could lead to, in this case, possibly a hemispheric, if not a world war.

不过我们其实并不确定。

But we don't really know.

所以下期节目，我们将揭开这辆特定汽车的引擎盖。

So next episode, we're going to lift up the hood on this particular car.

我们要探讨：共产主义叛乱是如何运作的？

We're gonna examine, well, how does communist insurgency work?

我们现在是否正目睹它的某些表现？

Are we seeing some manifestations of it now?

以及应当如何应对？

And what should the response be?

我能在下期节目里完成这个任务吗？

Could I complete that task in the next episode?

我对此表示怀疑。

I doubt it.

我们拭目以待吧。

We'll see what happens.

我想这会分成很多部分。

I I suppose that this is going to be many parts.

不过还是感谢你陪我这么久。

But thanks for staying with me this long.

我希望确保为你们提供解释性框架和详细说明，这些工具将帮助我们不仅分析当前局势，还能预测未来走向。

I wanted to make sure that I provided you with the explanatory framework and explication that would give us the forensic and methodological tools that we need to figure out not only what is happening now, but forecasting what's going to happen in the future.

感谢收听。

So thanks for listening.

如有问题、意见或建设性批评，可通过节目说明中的Substack链接联系我。

If you have questions, comments, constructive criticism, direct them my way at either my Substack, which you'll find in the show notes.

可发送邮件至cgpodcast@pm.me联系我。

You can email me at cgpodcast@pm.me.

邮箱是cgpodcast@pm.me。

That is cgpodcast@pm.me.

另外，Scott Horton学院现已上线。

Also, the Scott Horton Academy is live now.

我的课程是四位学术研究员中首批发布的。

And my course, I'm one of four academic fellows whose course has been published there.

那里设有门槛。

There is a gate.

需要付费才能成为Scott Horton学院的会员。

You have to pay to be a member of the Scott Horton Academy.

我的课程《血泪之路：1945年以来美军败绩》将详尽剖析从二战结束至今的历史，揭示数万亿美元国防预算如何与美国文化深度捆绑，却始终难逃屡战屡败的宿命。

My course is Trail of Tears, US Military Defeat Since 1945, where I go in excruciating detail with the conclusion of World War two up until present day and how the trillions that have been spent on the defense complex that is married and woven into the culture of The United States since that time and its allies has done so poorly.

感谢收听。

So thanks for listening.

我是比尔，通话结束。

This is Bill out.