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作为一个欧洲大陆人，我其实一直不太理解那种站在吧台前喝一两杯或三杯啤酒，然后聊天的传统。
You know, as a continental European, I kind of never got the tradition of standing at the bar and having a pint or two or three and then having a conversation.
你们都聊些什么呢？
What do you talk about?
干杯。
Cheers.
干杯。
Cheers.
很多人从事各行各业，但你们这行特别擅长发现名人。
Many people across many jobs are in the town spotting business, but you're especially in the town spotting business.
你到底是怎么认出Kimi的呢？
How do you actually spot a Kimi?
我怎么认出Kimi的？
How do I spot a Kimi?
我觉得在……
I think in the...
说到赛车手，你很快就能从小孩卡丁车的表现看出他有没有潜力成为职业赛车手。
You know, when it comes about about sporting racing drivers, you can judge pretty early on in a kid's karting performance whether that kid has the potential to be a professional racing driver.
即使是那些小孩子，你也能看出谁比同龄人表现更好。
Even with the tiny ones, you can identify the ones that are doing better than their peers.
比如说，如果有个八岁的孩子能打败十岁的，那就能看出他有没有那种潜力。
Either because they are younger, you know, if someone that's eight years old beats the ones that are 10 in that group, you can have those very early signs of whether that kid has the potential.
你可以看到谁在卡丁车里很自在，你知道吗。
You can see when someone is comfortable in the cart, you know.
在下雨天以一百公里的时速行驶，那个孩子跑第一圈就能把车横着过弯，没问题。
Going at a 100 kilometers an hour in the rain and that kid does his first lap and comes across the corner, you know, sideways, you know, okay.
这就是成为好车手的条件。
There are the ingredients for being good at it.
这有多量化呢？
How quantitative is it?
就像某些运动，比如自行车运动里有个指标叫阈值功率，而世界上最好的车手塔德伊·波加查，在这个单一指标上——每公斤体重能产生多少功率——显然就是世界第一。
Like, you know, in certain sports, in cycling, you know, there's a metric called threshold power, and Tally Pugacha, the best in the world, is very clearly just the best in the world on this single metric of, you know, how much power for your weight can you can you produce.
有没有哪个数据是基米和乔治·拉塞尔比其他车手更突出的？
Is there some number that, you know, Kimmy and George Russell would stand out on compared to other racers?
这就是我们这项运动的独特之处。
This is what makes our sport so unique.
没有。
There isn't any.
像塔德·波加查，你可以看到他每公斤的阈值功率，对吧。
With Tade Pogacar, you know, you you can see that the threshold watt per kilogram Mhmm.
最大摄氧量。
VO two max.
这些都是可以量化的。
These are things that are measurable.
但我不知道塔德12岁时的数据是多少。
But I don't know what Tade's metrics was when he was 12.
所以也许那时候他并不是最顶尖的。
So maybe that was not best in class.
也许那是后来才有的。
Maybe that came later.
成功的要素里有些是没法衡量的，比如个性。
And ingredients of success that you can't measure personality.
你面对压力能有多坚韧？
How resilient are you to pressure?
你能多大程度地融入团队？
How much can you play the team game?
说到赛车手，那些……
When it comes to racing drivers, the...
显然也有类似的KPI。
There are obviously similar KPIs.
秒表，秒表从来不说谎。
The stopwatch, you know, the stopwatch never lies.
但把他们放进同一辆车里，秒表就会决定你表现好不好。
But put them in the same car, the the stopwatch is gonna decide whether you're being judged good or not.
但在秒表之下，还需要技术能力。
But underneath the stopwatch, there needs to be technical ability
需要正确调校赛车、与工程师沟通、还要具备一定的社交能力，确保能拉到赞助。是的。
To set your car up in the right way, interact with the engineers, have some kind of social competence of making sure you have sponsors Yeah.
好好对待他们。
Treat them well.
有些天赋极高的孩子最终一事无成，就是因为他们人品太差。是的。
You know, they have been extremely talented kids that never went anywhere because they were just simply bad people Yes.
或者不够聪明。
Or not intelligent enough.
然后还有一个最重要的部分，就是我们所说的速度。
And then there is the kind of overwhelming part, and that is this what we call speed.
什么是速度？
What is speed?
以及你所有的认知能力和神经感知能力。嗯。
And all of your cognitive abilities and neurosensors Mhmm.
人类拥有数十亿个传感器，赋予了你一种绝大多数人都不具备的能力。
The sheer billions of sensors that a human has that give you an ability that not many have.
那就是真正感受到车子在你身下的动态。
It's actually to feel what the car does underneath of you.
你会发现那些顶尖车手，他们感知力更强，与赛道上的赛车之间的连接感比任何人都要紧密。
And you can see with the extraordinary drivers, they feel much more, they feel more connected to the car on the road than anybody else.
举个例子，我的老朋友兼车手刘易斯·汉密尔顿。
One example is, you know, old friend and driver of mine, Lewis Hamilton.
车有两个轴，前轴和后轴，中间是底盘。
You have two axles, a front axle, a rear axle, and you have the chassis in between.
所谓转向不足，就是当你打方向盘的时候，车却直着走。
And when you call a car understeer, it means when you turn the wheel and it goes straight.
这种情况发生在轮胎和前轴。
And that happens over the tires and the front axle.
这很常见。
It's pretty normal.
但刘易斯有次在聊车的时候说过一句话。
But Lewis once said something when talking about the car.
他说这车从前面那个轴到我坐的位置都在转向不足。
The car understeers from the front axle to where I sit.
那不就是车的中段嘛。
Well, that's the middle of the car.
那地方怎么能转向不足呢？
How can that understeer?
工程师也搞不懂他到底想表达什么，但那就是他的身体或者大脑告诉他的车在做什么。
And the engineers couldn't really identify what he meant, but that is what his body told him or his brain told him the car is doing.
如果一位车手能拥有那层天生的感觉，那就很难被超越了。
And if a driver is able to have that fun underlying layer of of of ability, then that becomes unbeatable.
但那靠的是基因。
But that is, you know, genetics.
顶尖车手是把车绑在自己身上。
The great drivers strap the car onto themselves.
他们不是坐在车里，而是有一种连接感。
You know, they don't sit in the car and there's a connectedness.
完全正确。
Absolutely.
连接感，连接感确实是恰当的词。
Connectedness is connectedness is the right word.
实际上就是与车融为一体，对吧。
It's actually being one with the car Mhmm.
还有与道路融为一体。
And and and with the road.
在天赋识别这个话题上，你是如何决定自己不够格成为职业车手的？
How did you decide that you weren't good enough to be a professional driver on this topic of talent identification.
问题是，
I mean, that's
说到做决定。
Talking about decision.
说到羞辱和创伤，它们其实是日后成功的催化剂。
Talking about humiliation and trauma as ingredients for later success.
我小时候或者青少年时期，不管是学习、体育还是社交，都没有什么特别出众的地方。
When I was a child or a teenager, there wasn't really anything differentiating me or outstanding, be it academically or in sports or socially.
18岁那年，纯属偶然，我去了一个……
And when I was 18, by sheer coincidence, I ended up on a on a...
跟朋友一起在赛道上看F3比赛，那是一个初级方程式。
With friends on a racetrack watching an F3 race, which is a junior formula.
当我走进那片围场，就像是一下子找到了自我。
And when I stepped into this paddock, it's like I've I've gotten my identity.
这就是我想成为的样子。
This is what what I wanted to be.
我想当赛车手，一个能够驾驭这台机器的人。
I wanted to be a racing driver, Someone that is able to tame this machine.
从那时起，我的赛车手生涯就正式开始了。
And this is when I started, you know, basically my my career as a driver.
但我来得太晚了，你知道的。
But I came too late to the party, you know.
我没有那些卡丁车的背景，本来可以教我一些基础的物理知识。对。
I didn't have all of this karting background that teaches you the fundamentals of the physics Yeah.
比如在比赛中怎么摆放赛车的位置。
Of how to position your car in the race.
但我还是成了职业车手。
But I became I became a pro.
我经历了初级方程式赛车的各个阶段，进入了所谓的GT赛车。嗯。
I went through the various stages of junior formula racing into what we call GT cars Mhmm.
比如房车或者跑车，也取得了一些成绩。
Touring cars or sports cars with a certain amount of success.
我觉得差不多就是这样，做自己的事吧。
And it is, you know, like you do about your business, I guess.
而我现在做的，就是带着这种渴望醒来，也带着这种渴望入睡。
And what I'm doing today is, you know, I woke up with that desire and I went to bed with that desire.
而且这持续了相当长的一段…
And that lasted for for quite some few few...
好几年。
A few years.
那个…
The
那你可能比较少提到的一个方面，显然大家都很关注谁当车手、谁会拿到下一个席位之类的。
the other maybe less talked about part, you know, obviously, there's a huge amount of fixation on driver selection and who'll get the next seat and everything like that.
估计你花很多时间在招募合适的工程师、空气动力学家这样的人才上。
Presumably, a lot of what you spend time on is recruiting the right engineers and aerodynamicists and things like that.
那你是怎么发现这类人才的呢？
How does spotting that kind of talent work?
你是从其他F1车队挖人，还是从其他行业或外面找？
Are you trying to pull people from other Formula one teams or from other industries and outside?
那你又是怎么…
And how are you...
那除了车手之外，你对人才方面有哪些了解？
Just what have you learned about talent outside of drivers?
所以当你从外面看F1车队的时候，你……
So when you when you look
作为车迷，你会看到两位车手。
at the Formula one Team from outside as a fan, you see two drivers.
你会看到一个像我这样坐在屏幕前的人，然后你会看到机械师。
You see then a guy like me who is sitting in front of a screen, and then you see the mechanics.
有时候还会看到维修区墙上的工程师。
And sometimes the engineers on the pit wall.
你会觉得这就是整个车队了。
This is what you expect to be the racing team.
但这只是冰山一角。
But this is just the tip of the iceberg.
包括市场营销在内，大约有150人随队去赛场。
It's about a 150 people that go to the tracks, including marketing.
所以有大概90个技术和运营人员。
So it's 90 technical operational people.
但我们总共有两千五百人。
But we are two and a half thousand.
在英国这边，我们有两个基地。
You know, here in The UK, we have two hubs.
一个负责……
One that is...
发动机。
Does the engine.
另一个，我们叫它底盘。
The other one, what we call the chassis.
那是工厂车队。
That is the works team.
我们这2500人所在的这个机构可是相当庞大，如果你看看那两辆车的话。
And we are 2,500 people in an in an organization that is quite vast if you if you look at the two cars.
对我来说，选人的过程和选赛车手在模式上是一样的，或者说是相似的。
And for me, the selection process of the people that I want to work with is the same or is similar in terms of the pattern than for racing drivers.
我总说，团队里没有两个超级明星。
And I always say, there is not two superstars in the team.
而是有两千五百个。
There's two and a half thousand.
我对他们所有人都一视同仁。
And I treat all of them equally.
我们从十多年前的奥尔德斯（或类似机构）学到了东西，他们在训练场上有句格言，我们一直沿用着这句格言。
And we've learned from the old blacks ten or more years earlier, and they have a saying, which is on their training ground, that says no And we have we have continued to run that motto.
那些非凡的科学家或工程师，如果不具备……
The extraordinary scientist or engineer that isn't...
如果不具备谦逊、正直、诚实、热情这些价值观，那么在这个组织里就没有未来。
Hasn't got the right values of humility, integrity, honesty, enthusiasm will have no future in the organization.
我们试图尽早地把这些人筛选出去。
We're trying to filter that out pretty early.
有时候你后来才发现，但这里容不下那种天才混蛋。
Sometimes you find out later, but no place for the, genius asshole.
你说到了很多
You're describing a lot
组织内需要人们协作，还有团队合作。
the need for people to collaborate within the organization and the the the teamwork.
但有趣的是，你有不同的领域，比如空气动力学、电池系统、内燃机动力总成、牵引力等等。
But what's interesting is you have these different domains where you have aerodynamics, and you have the battery systems, and you have the internal combustion powertrain and, traction and everything.
所以研发几乎全部用于那些你知道规则的赛车上。
So the r and d almost entirely goes towards cars where you know the rules.
没有太多空间做通用研发，因为你根本不知道……
There isn't much room for general r and d because you just don't know...
比如，在你知道电池方面到底允许什么之前，你不会去研究电池之类的。
Like, you're not gonna work on batteries before you know what exactly will be permitted when it comes to batteries and things like that.
你必须知道你在设计的目标是什么。
You have to know the target that you're designing.
我们又做到了。
We did it Again.
很久以前，但一级方程式赛车在几年前引入了成本上限。
Long time ago, but Formula one introduced the cost cap a few years ago.
对。
Yep.
所以你投入到工程里的每一份资源
So every resource that you deploy into engineering
是的。
Yes.
都会计入成本上限，这个上限大约是每年两亿多美元。
Is being counted for in the cost cap, which is 200 and a bit million dollars a year.
因此，长期的研发工作、实验室工作
And therefore, long term r and d work, lab work
是的。
Yes.
实际上，很不幸，这方面的投入非常有限，因为你得在算力投入上做选择。
Is actually, unfortunately, very limited because you need to decide between deploying compute power Yeah.
比如，三个月后可能会用到的前翼，和某些长期项目之间要做取舍。
In a front wing that you might have in three months against some long term.
所以对所有F1车队来说，成本上限改变后，投机性的研发就没法做了，因为你的资金是固定的，必须把所有资源都投入到本赛季和下个赛季。
So for all F1 teams, one thing is the cost cap changed is speculative r and d just had to go because, ultimately, you have fixed dollars, and you have to put absolutely everything you can towards this season and next season.
我不认为所有研发都必须砍掉。
I wouldn't say all of it had to go.
你仍然需要在……
You still need to make the...
在未来赛车的预期收益上找到平衡。
You know, find the right balance between what you think future cars Mhmm.
以及这项研发能否带来好处。
Are are going to benefit from Yes.
在它能带来的圈速提升和当前赛车的需求之间权衡。
Value the lap time effect it can have versus the current cars.
而且，不幸的是，研发和实验室工作这部分，我其实很喜欢，但它能发挥的空间比较有限。是的。
And and, unfortunately, that percentage of r and d development of science and lab work, which I love, has a more limited Yes.
范围有限。
Scope.
你不仅受总预算上限的限制，还有像风洞测试次数和CFD模拟次数这样的限制。
You have not only the overall cost cap, but you have things like limits on the number of wind tunnel runs and CFD simulations.
这难道不有点奇怪吗？
Isn't that a bit weird?
也就是说，你其实可以随意支配你的研发预算，对吧？
Thus, you can spend your r and d budgets exactly as you want to?
所以这得从两方面来看。
So there's two sides of that coin.
首先，F1一直……
The first one is to say Formula one was all...
一直是预算无上限，所以设备极其精密。嗯。
Always unlimited budget and therefore ultra sophisticated machinery Mhmm.
这导致了大车队，像梅赛德斯、法拉利、红牛，把其他所有车队都远远甩在了后面。
Which led to a situation that the big teams, Mercedes, Ferrari, Red Bull, were leapfrogging all of the other teams.
因为我们背后有那些大靠山。
Because for us, we had those big mother ships Mhmm.
我们后面有大股东，要么像红牛那样特别热衷，要么像梅赛德斯那样觉得这是巨大的品牌宣传，相比我们的全部营销费用，这笔开销相对很低。
Behind us that benefited from either shareholder that was extremely keen like Red Bull or Mercedes that said this is a huge branding exercise for us, and the spending is relatively low in comparison to all of our marketing.
所以结果就是，只有这三支车队真正赢过比赛。
So what happened is only these three teams actually won races.
所以
So
一级方程式说，我们希望所有人都在相同的预算下竞争。
Formula one said we want everybody to compete on the same budgets.
这就是引入这个规则的原因。
And that was the reason why it was introduced.
现在你可以看到，这确实限制了F1中的科技含量，但也带来了更多的竞争。
Now you can see that limited very much, you know, the kind of science aspect of Formula one, but it brought also more competition.
这是其中一个积极的影响。
And that's one of the positive effects.
另一个是，当年的F1首席执行官蔡斯·卡里克说，我们需要保护你们，不让你们自己犯错。
The other one is that Formula one back in the day, Chase Carrick, who was the CEO, said, we need to protect you from yourselves.
因为当时我反对预算上限。
Because obviously, I was against the cost cap.
因为我知道我们梅赛德斯有这个实力。
Because I knew that Mercedes, we had might.
最坏的情况可能是输给法拉利或红牛，但绝不是输给迈凯伦、威廉姆斯或者其他车队。
And that probably the worst case scenario was to lose against the Ferrari or against the Red Bull, but not against the McLaren or Williams or anybody else.
所以他就这么跟我说了。
So he said that to me.
最后，这事儿没有商量余地。
Eventually, it was a take it or leave it.
你在投入资源，试图在赛车上争取微小的优势。
You're investing, trying to eke out tiny advantages in the car.
有趣的一点是，
And one of the things that's interesting is this.
规则就是规则。
There are the rules.
有些东西明显是违反规则的。
There are things that are clearly against the rules.
有些东西是允许的。
There are things that are permitted.
而在这两者之间，还有一片灰色地带。
And then there's a spectrum between those of the gray areas.
问题在于，你捍卫了某个你认为很棒且完全允许的东西，但结果它在赛季中途或者下个赛季被禁了。
And when the challenge is is, like, you defend something that you think is great and clearly allowed, but then it's banned midseason or it's, you know, banned in the next season.
那为了那么一点微不足道的优势付出这么多努力，真的值得吗？
And so was it really worth all that effort, you know, to get, like, a, you know, trivial advantage?
也许值得，也许不值得。
Maybe, maybe not.
我觉得我们学到的教训是，需要和管理机构进行对话。
And I think the lesson we've learned is that it needs the dialogue with the governing body.
如果你觉得你的创新在组织内部通过了第一轮的红脸测试，是的。
If you feel you have an innovation that passed the first red face test within the organization Yes.
也就是说，主要工程师，有时候也包括我，会在桌上进行一场模拟审判。
That means the leading engineers, sometimes myself on the table, we are carrying a mock a mock trial.
而那些发明了漏洞或机会的人，对，
And the people that have invented Yeah.
他们会扮演检察官的角色。
The loophole or the opportunity, play the prosecutor.
所以他们需要反驳自己的论点。
And so they need to fight their own argument.
然后另一边，有工程师为创新辩护。
And then on the other side, there is the ones engineers that defend the innovation.
然后是我们的总法律顾问凯莉和我担任法官。
And then is our general counsel, Carrie, and myself were the judges.
然后你们试着看看这个辩护有多有说服力？
And you try to see how how convincing the defense is?
没错。
Exactly.
辩护的说服力有多强，以及你如何能够推翻那个实际上合法的论点？
How convincing is the defense and how can you destroy the argument that is actually legal?
对。
Yes.
所以那可能是一个极端的情况，在工程团队内部，我们对某些事情难以界定。
So that would be an extreme case where there is something that we we we struggle within the engineering community to define.
但显然，与FAA的对话非常重要，要尽早让他们参与进来。
But, obviously, the dialogue with the FAA is important and bring them on very early.
但你会不会……
But so will you...
如果你有一个非常秘密的专有改进，你不想公开，它会在梅赛德斯内部完全保密，但你也会让FIA参与进来吗？
If you have a very secret proprietary improvement that you don't want to unveil, it will be totally top secret within Mercedes, but you will also bring the FIA into it?
如果我们觉得这是百分之百站得住脚的，那就好。
If we think it's 100 defendable Okay.
完全站得住脚，是的。
While crystal clear defendable Yes.
那我们就把它装到车上，然后论证为什么它是对的。
Then we will deploy it on the car, and then we will make the argument why it's right.
通常情况下，FIA会说，我们不喜欢
And normally, the FIA will say, we don't like
这个。
it.
是的。
Yes.
他们可能会说我们喜欢这个，但它绕过了规则的基本原则，所以我们要禁止它。
They could say we like it, but it circumvents the principle of the regulation, so we're gonna ban it.
因为规则的原则是公平竞争的最大化。
Because the principle of regulation is most equal competition.
对。
Yes.
所以如果他们公平的话，他们会说明年禁止使用。
So if they're fair, they're gonna say ban it next year.
如果他们觉得这确实非常强大，而且不是他们想看到的或预期的。
If they believe it's really very powerful and it's not what they wanted to see or intended
对。
Yes.
如果定义上的话，那可能会更早被禁止。
To define, then it could be banned much earlier.
这就是政治因素介入的地方。
This is where the politics come into play.
所以基本上，如果他们觉得这是个公平的漏洞，他们会给你一个赛季的优势。
So, basically, if they think it's a fair loophole, they'll give you one season of advantage.
我会说这是……
I would say this is...
把这当作我们拥有的那种经验吧。
Call it the kind of experience that we have.
是的。
Yes.
因为他们也是创新者和工程师，他们会尊重这一点，是的。
Because they are, you know, innovators and engineers too, and they will respect Yes.
如果出现类似的情况。
If something comes up like this.
一个例子就是我们称之为DAS的系统，就是你有很多不同的维度，如何……
You know, one example was was the system that we called DAS, which was, you know, you have the various dimension how you...
方向盘上的操作，你做什么。
Of the steering wheel, what you do.
不知道你有没有听说过。
I don't know if you heard about it.
你可以向左打方向，也可以向右打方向。
You can steer to the left, and you can steer to the right.
那现在说到那个延续的部分。
That parlay now.
到目前为止我明白你的意思。
I'm with you so far.
到目前为止。
So far.
那就像飞机里一样。
That's like in an airplane.
不。
No.
在飞机里，你还可以
In an airplane, you can also
前后移动。
go forward and back.
完全正确。
Exactly.
其实根本没有那样的事。
There's actually nothing like that.
而这里，就变得有趣了。
And here, it becomes interesting.
所以我们做的，实际上是利用方向盘创造了另一个维度，在一级方程式赛车中推拉方向盘。
So what we did, we created another dimension with the steering wheel, actually, to push and to pull the steering wheel in a Formula one car.
它的作用是，
And what it did, it
改变了。对，
changed Yes.
我记得这个。
I do remember this.
它改变了前轮在牵引力效果方面的运作方式。
It changed the way the front wheels were operating in terms of its tow effect.
它的作用是，我们能够转动方向盘。
What it did is we were able to turn the the wheel.
我们制造了一个拖拽效应，通过基本拖拽轮胎来帮助它们表面升温。
We created a tow effect, which helped us to heat up the surfaces of the tires by basically dragging them up.
你们那样做效率不高。
You were running them inefficiently.
他们尊重创新。
And they respected innovation.
我记得第一次测试时，天空电视台在场，他们说：这里发生了什么？
I remember the first test, Sky had it on board and said, what's happening here?
他们在推拉方向盘。
They're pushing and pulling the steering wheel.
然后当……
And when...
这件事在我们真正实施前四五个月展示给我看。
It was shown to me four or five months before we actually produced it.
他们叫我到测试和开发部门的一个测试台那里。
They called me to a rig in in test and development.
是的。
Yes.
然后那个方向盘就在那里。
And there was the steering wheel.
他们跟我说，现在向左转，再向右转。
And they said, now turn to the left and turn to the right.
我当时是试车手。
You know, I was a driver.
所以……
So...
然后我就说，现在推它，再拉它。
And then I said, now push it and pull it.
然后我就说，这样不行。
And I said, well, that doesn't go.
就像我习惯的那样，为了把方向盘固定在我想要的位置上。
It's like, you know, I'm used to it in order to fix the steering wheel to this, you know, where I wanted to have it.
但实际上，方向盘上有这种额外的动作会让人感觉非常不舒服。
But it feels deeply uncomfortable actually to have this additional motion in the steering wheel.
然后前院的司机打电话进来说，不。
And then the front lawn drivers called in and said, no.
我们想试试看。
We'd like to try it.
结果真的有效。
And and it really worked.
所以他们就回来了。
So come back.
我觉得如果你想…
I think if you wanna be...
你得和联邦航空管理局沟通，确保自己没有站在错误的一方。
You you want to have the the the exchange with the FAA to make sure that you're not on the wrong side of the argument.
那这样，他们最后是禁止了还是允许了？
But so with that, did they end up banning it, or they ended up permitting it
在那个地区？
in the region?
一年后就被禁了。
Banned it after a year.
那为什么一年后就禁了呢？
So why did they ban it after a year?
他们为什么不说，好的。
Why didn't they say, okay.
这是F1赛车现在可以
This is one of the things that F1 cars can
做到的事？
do now?
我不知道。
I don't know.
也许我们在政治争论中输了，没能证明它是有益的。
Maybe we lost the political argument that it was good.
其他车队说复刻它成本太高，但他们其实能做到。
Other teams said it would cost so much to replicate it, and they could.
但这真的是规则的本意吗？
But is that really the intention of the of the regulations?
为什么你们选择用推拉杆而不是方向盘上的按钮来实现？
Why did you do it as a push pull rather than a button on the steering wheel?
或者说，为什么推拉杆成了控制方式？
Or, you know, why was the push pull the control mechanism?
我觉得当时规则允许使用一种机械系统……
I think there was a regulations that allowed to have it, like, a mechanical system that was...
规则的核心是：车手必须驾驶赛车。
You know, the the the rule is the driver must drive the car.
对。
Yes.
所以它得通过机械系统由车手来操控。
So it needed to be deployed for the driver through a mechanical system.
这个嘛……
It's...
我觉得这就是原因所在。
I believe that was the reason.
明白了。
I see.
所以这样做是最稳妥的，能站得住脚。
So that was the best way to have it defensible.
这真的很有意思。
That's so interesting.
那关于……
What about the...
压缩比那个争议，环境温度和测量温度的事，你会怎么归类？
Where would you categorize the compression ratio kerfuffle, you know, ambient temperature versus, you know, measuring a temperature?
这在那个范畴里属于哪一类？
Where where does that fit on this spectrum?
这不过是其他车队因为没有正确理解规则而心里不舒服。
This was just other teams feeling sore about not having read the regulations in the right way.
当今世上任何一辆有内燃机的车，压缩比都是在冷态下测量的。
You know, today, on any vehicle in the world with a combustion engine, you measure compression ratio in a cold state.
不然还能怎么测呢？
Because how else would you measure it?
热态在特定温度、考虑其他环境因素的情况下，又有什么意义？
What does hot state even mean at a certain temperature with other ambient factors that that that matter?
而且这是一种——
And it's a...
它可能是一个可以被操控的数值。
It could be a manipulative value that you have.
所以其他车队就说，这不公平。
So the other team said, quite unfair.
规则说要在冷环境下测量，是的。
You know, the rules say it needs to be measured in the cold environment Yes.
或者冷发动机。
Or cold engine.
而梅赛德斯所做的就是，一旦发动机热起来，它就会膨胀变大，从而提取更多的动力。
And what Mercedes has done is once it's running hot, it basically grew in size and therefore extracted more power.
我们并没有确认这一点。
And we didn't confirm that.
你们的热膨胀比其他发动机更大吗？
You had more thermal expansion than other engines did?
对。
Exactly.
因为你们设计的时候就是这样，嗯，这个我确实没法确认。
Because you engineered in Well, I can't really confirm that.
抱歉。
Sorry.
好。
Okay.
但大家都这么说。
But that's what people say.
大家都这么说。
That's what people say.
因为测量明确是在发动机冷态阶段进行的。
Because the measurement was clearly identified to be in in the cold in the cold phase of the engine.
是的。
Yes.
那这算是钻空子吗？
And so was it a loophole?
这是其他车队的失误吗？
Was it a a shortfall of the other teams?
我觉得这是其他车队的失误。
I think it was a shortfall of the other teams.
所以这变成了一个挺有政治色彩的争论，后来在测量方式上找到了某种妥协。
So it became quite a political argument, and then some compromise was found in how the measurement worked.
有趣的是，这其实对我们没什么影响。
And actually, you know, funny bit is it didn't make any difference for us.
所以那是一场持续了一个月的争论，来回拉扯，我们纯粹是为了原则才坚持的。
So it was a month long argument going back and forth, and we fought it for the sheer principle Yes.
是的。
Yes.
创新。
Innovation.
要保守这些顶级机密改进方案，难吗？
Is it hard to keep these top secret improvements a secret?
确实很难，因为各车队之间人员流动很自然。
It is because there is a natural fluctuations of personnel between the teams.
你们会做信息隔离吗？
Do you compartmentalize?
就像曼哈顿计划那样。
It's like the Manhattan Project.
对，你需要这样做。
You know, you need to Yeah.
你知道，就是防火墙之类的。
You know Firewall things.
你……
You...
我们确实会设置一些防火墙，而且不会……你知道，我算是比较……
We firewall certain things, and we don't, you you know, I'm pretty...
我可能在组织内部算是比较极端的。
I'm maybe more on the extreme side within the organization.
不是每个人都需要知道所有事情。
Not everyone needs to know everything.
但最终，总会有一群人，我称之为二三十人，他们必须了解最新的情况。
But eventually, you will always have a a group of, what I call it, 20, 25 people Who need to be in the now.
他们必须参与其中，如果他们换团队，那显然就会泄密。
Who need to be in in there, and and they may change team, and then that obviously leaks.
你能阻止人们在赛季中换队吗？
Can you prevent people from changing team within a season?
所以，每个国家都有自己的监管环境。
So there is the, you know, regulatory environment of every country.
实际上你能禁止一个人为别人工作多久？
How long can you actually prohibit someone to work for
为另一个队？
For another team?
根据我们的合同……
With our contract...
合同框架。
Contractual frameworks.
而在英国，可以做到长达十二个月。
And in The UK, can do it up to twelve months.
好的。
Okay.
展开剩余字幕（还有 480 条）
但有些国家像瑞士，就是三个月。
But there are countries like Switzerland, for example, where it's three months.
好的。
Okay.
所以……
So...
所以在瑞士招人得小心点。
So you gotta be careful who you hire in Switzerland.
比如我们在瑞士没有奥迪。
We haven't got a Audi's in Switzerland, for example.
你得……
You gotta be half...
在别的地方招人也得小心。
Careful who you hire hire elsewhere.
是的。
Yes.
但你总是要考虑到，人们可能会因为个人原因而换团队。
But you always need to account for the fact that the people may change teams because of personal reasons.
这完全是合理的观点。
Absolutely, you know, fair arguments.
对。
Yes.
而这就是为什么，你怎样才能确保信息不会太容易泄露，但最终它们总是会泄露出来。
And that's why how can you make sure that things are not leaking too easily, but they will eventually always come out.
对。
Yes.
如果你能制定规则，你会怎么改？
If you could write the rules, how would you change them?
嗯，我有点纠结。
Well, I'm in two minds.
我内心的创新部分和听工程师的话，就是放开手脚。
You know, the innovation part in me and listening to my engineers is free rein.
我们有一个预算上限，是的。
We have a budget cap Yes.
那是两亿美元，然后你想怎么开放就怎么开放。
That is 200,000,000 and then make it as open as you want.
对。
Yes.
因为那会很棒，是的。
Because that would be magnificent Yes.
从科学的角度、工程的角度来看，那会很了不起。
From a magnificent from a scientific standpoint, an engineering standpoint.
但那样会……
But it would...
那样会发生的是，最优秀的工程师们，在……
What what would happen is the the best engineers in the...
能力最强、基础设施也最好的那些团队，会造出一辆比其他车队优越得多的赛车。
With the most, you know, capability also in terms of infrastructure will come out with a car that is much superior than some of the other teams.
这样一来，赛道上就会出现第一名比第二名快五秒的情况。
And it would create a a field where the leading car could be five seconds quicker than the next one.
但这并不是一级方程式想要看到的。
And that is not what Formula one wants.
所以规则变得越来越严格。
So it's becoming more and more restrictive.
对。
Yes.
这是好事还是坏事？
Is that good or bad?
我觉得需要有个度，因为这仍然是世界上最快的实验室。
You know, I think it needs to be it needs to be sensible because this is still the fastest laboratory in the world.
这已经刻在我们的基因里了。
That is in our DNA.
而且我认为，这种情况仍然在发生。
And I think it's, that is still happening.
当然，工程师们总会说，这不如以前好玩了，但还是挺有意思的。
Obviously, engineers will always say, well, it's not as much fun as it was in the in the past, but it's still a lot of fun.
你在描述开发新技术变革时面临的一类风险，也就是监管风险。
You were describing one set of risks in developing new technical changes, which is the the regulatory risk.
风险在于，你能否被允许使用哪怕一个赛季，或者多个赛季？
You know, the risk, will you be allowed to have us even for one season or or certainly multiple?
但另一类风险就是纯粹的技术风险。
But the other risks is just technical risks.
你知道吗？
You know?
它能行得通吗？
Will it work?
而且我觉得在任何一个研发组织里……
And I think in any r and d organization...
我们在Stripe也是这样，我们的时间就这么多。
You know, we have this at Stripe where we only have so much time.
我们的资金也有限。
We only have so much money.
我们的工程师也只有这么多，我们需要把他们投入到那些最有可能成功的项目上。
We have only so much engineers, and we need to put them on the very...
就是那些最有可能出成果的项目。
You know, towards the projects that are most likely to work.
而且你事先根本不知道哪个项目会成功。
You And don't know upfront what's gonna work.
所以，这种特殊能力的一部分就在于，能判断出这个产品方向是好的，而那个方向只是……
And so part of the special sauce is that ability to predict this product direction is a good one versus this one is just...
不是那么糟糕。
I mean, it's not awful.
只是不是最优的选择。
It's just not the not the best.
本质上，你就是在玩一个如何分配筹码的游戏。
And you're fundamentally playing this game of where you spread the poker chips.
你如何管理技术风险？
How do you manage technical risk?
你如何考虑分配那些非常宝贵的资源？
How do you think about allocating those very precious chips?
而且，在如今这个成本上限的新时代，它们变得更宝贵了。
And, again, they're even more precious now in the new cost cap era.
不幸的是，在我看来，你的业务要复杂得多。
So the unfortunate part of it is that your business is far more complex, in my opinion.
为什么？
Why?
因为你面对的是最终客户，或者不管客户是谁，一个组织，一个实体，或者一个人。
Because you deal with the end customer or whoever the customer is, an organization, an entity, or or a or a person.
因为你是不是……
Because are you...
你可以定义你认为能让流程更好、更高效或更成功的技术规范。
You know, you can define technical specifications that you believe make the process better or more efficient or successful.
但最终总得有个人来买你的产品，那个人或那个组织会衡量那些真正使用他或她产品的用户是否满意，对吧。
But there is someone at the end that actually needs to buy your product, and that person or that organization is gonna measure whether the humans that are actually his customers or her customers Yes.
用户是否喜欢它。
Are gonna like it.
是的。
Yep.
那你怎么预测这一点呢？
How how can you predict that part?
对我们来说，一切都靠数据和模拟。
With us, it's all data and the simulation.
这更容易量化得多。
It's much more measurable.
这更容易量化得多。
It's much more measurable.
在非常早期的阶段，我们就会确定这个部件预计在生命周期内带来的贡献。
That at a very early stage, we will define what is the lifetime contribution that we that we imagine of that part.
对。
Yes.
而且这一切都始于虚拟世界。
And that all starts in the virtual world.
全是模拟，不管是CFD也好，对。
It's all simulation, whether it is CFD Yes.
或者不管是我们测量风洞的方式，还是我们分配下压力和阻力，还是我们建立的数学模型。
Or whether it's the wind tunnel in the way we we measure it or we attribute downforce and drag, or whether it is mathematical models that we have.
在整个过程中，你不断和你的预期进行对比验证。
And all along the process, you continue to correlate with your expectations.
偶尔会有些情况，你以为某个东西最终装到车上能让平均单圈快零点一秒，但结果发现并非如此。
And there are rare occasions where you believe that something eventually when it ends up in the car is gonna be a tenth of a second in average overlap quicker, and you realize it's not.
或者你发现车手对它感觉不舒服，感觉不够，对。
Or you realize that the driver doesn't feel comfortable with it and isn't feeling, you know, isn't feeling Yep.
不够安全，对。
Safe enough to Yep.
去驾驶它。
To drive it.
所以我们也需要考虑，如果我们确切知道终端客户……嗯——
So we need to consider also if the end customer, which we know exactly Mhmm.
也许你无法从那个虚拟的、理论上的圈速优势中获益。
You maybe not, will be able to extract from that virtual, let's say, theoretical lap time benefit.
但它更容易测量。
But it's much more measurable.
工程师们容易爱上自己的想法，只需要再多跑一次模拟，或者再多……你懂的……
Engineers like to fall in love with their ideas, and I just need one more simulation run, or I just need one more, you know...
我们没有那个条件。
We don't have that.
所以……
So...
但是，你是不是得扼杀他们的想法，因为他们太爱这些想法，但他们就是行不通，或者你就是没有资源去投入呢？
But do you have to kill people's ideas because they're they're in love with them, but they're just not gonna work, or you just don't have the resources to staff it?
我觉得确实有这样的人，如果他们性格也比较强势，就可能会给组织施加压力，让这个实验继续进行下去，哪怕早就该停了。
I think we have we have people like this who, if they are also forceful, they might put the organization under pressure to actually continue with the experiment beyond the, you know, reasonable point.
但他们已经不属于这个组织了。
But they are not part of the organization anymore.
这是我们非常看重的一种性格特质。
This is this is one of the personality traits that that we hold dear
就是你需要……
That you need...
从根本上说，它必须为总圈速目标做出贡献，是的。
It needs to fundamentally contribute to the overall target of lap time Yes.
而不是像我们之前讨论的那样，只是为了部门的目标。
Rather than what we discussed before to the department's target.
所以，会在团队内部，然后在更广泛的技术管理层里做出决定，说我们现在就停掉这个。
So there will be a decision within the group and then in the wider technical management to say, we're stopping this now.
所以，如果我去跟梅赛德斯的工程师聊，我会发现他们出奇地冷静和理性，不会特别执着于某一种技术方案，也不会对自己的想法过于自恋。
So so if I was to talk to an engineer at Mercedes, I would find them surprisingly dispassionate and analytical where they're not falling in love with a particular technical approach or they're not falling in love with their idea.
要么行，要么不行。
It's either it works or it doesn't.
对。
Exactly.
你爱上的是结果。
You fall in love with the result.
就是赢下比赛时那种极端的情绪和满足感，对。
It's that these extreme emotions and gratifications that you feel when you win a race Mhmm.
或者赢得冠军。
Or a championship.
所以，我希望工程师的理性部分能胜过，比如说，对自己开发的东西产生的那种情感上的执着。
And therefore, the kind of rational part of the engineers, I would hope is superior against, like, let's say, an emotional falling in love with your development part.
我想问一下
I wanna ask a bit about
你的投资背景，因为显然正是这个背景让你走到了赛车领域的这个位置。
your investing background because, obviously, that is how you ended up in the position that you're in in racing.
首先，你之前是做私募股权还是风险投资的？
First off, were you a private equity or venture capital investor?
我听说各种报道里两种说法都有。
I've heard it described as both in accounts.
都不是，
None of that,
我本来想说因为……
I would Because
这一切是怎么开始的呢，就是当我决定停止赛车时，我有一小段时间在一家钢铁制造公司上班，但我不喜欢那份工作。
how it all started is that when I decided to stop my racing, I had a short period of time where I was an employee in a in a in a steel manufacturing company, didn't like that.
后来我偶然读到了关于美国互联网公司的文章。
And then ended up reading about Internet companies in The US.
我知道你请过马克·安德森来节目。
And I know you had Marc Andreessen here.
所以我最早感兴趣的公司之一就是网景。
So one of the first companies that I got interested in was Netscape.
然后还有雅虎。
And then you had Yahoo!
美国在线。
AOL.
这些是当时的明星公司。
And these were the star companies
是那个时代的顶尖公司。
of the companies of the time.
没错。
Exactly.
我当时想...
And I thought...
我在维也纳生活，然后我想，好吧，现在我明白他们在做什么了。
You know, lived in Vienna, and I thought, okay, I understand now what they were doing.
然后我看了看德语区国家，想着，在奥地利、德国和瑞士，谁在做这样的事？
And I looked at the, let's say, the German speaking countries to say, who is doing that in Austria and in Germany and in Switzerland?
是的。
Yes.
然后我发现这些……
And I found out that these...
这些确实存在，但有时候只是一些小创业公司，甚至都没有正式注册。
That that existed, but sometimes it was just little startups that weren't even in a in a legal entity.
是的。
Yes.
年轻人就在自己家的儿童房或者卧室里干活。
Young people working out of their children's room or kids' room.
然后我做的事情，显然就是纳斯达克开始产生影响的时候。是的。
And what I did is then, you know, obviously, the effect of the Nasdaq started to to kick in Yes.
那些没有收入的公司，估值却高得离谱。
With absurd valuations for no revenue companies.
然后德国有“新市场”，就是类似的东西，但在上市流程方面更加疯狂。
Then in in Germany, was the Neuemakt, which was the equivalent, but even crazier in terms of process of being able to list.
对。
Yes.
那时没有任何限制。
There was no boundaries.
你可以这样形容。
You can call it like this.
所以我就到处打听这些公司，然后亲自开车过去，跟人家说，我很喜欢你们的业务。
And so I found out about all of these companies, got myself into my car, went there and said, I like your business.
我会……
I'll...
我想帮你们融资，或者帮你们把公司上市。
I want to help you to raise some equity or list your company on the stock exchange.
如果成功做到其中一步，我想要公司10%到50%的股份。
And if it was successful with the first or the latter, I would like to have 10, 50% of your company.
这后来也带来了一些……
And that led to some...
然后，就涉及到一些股权分配，因为有些人说，我的公司价值一千万欧元，而我知道那根本不值。
To to to some, you know, shareholding because some of some of the people said, well, my business is worth €10,000,000, and I knew it was not worth it.
但我说，好吧。
But I said, okay.
如果值一千万，那我就帮你融资五百万，或者我们以两千万上市。
If it is 10,000,000, then I'll raise 5,000,000 for you, or we IPO for 20.
我能拿公司一半的股份吗？
Can I have half of the company?
他们就说，当然可以。
And they said, of course.
那是一个
You know, there was a
双赢的局面。
win win.
有点像这些互联网公司的投资银行家。
Almost like an investment banker to some of these dot com companies.
你可能不会这么形容，但你确实是在帮他们融资。
You probably wouldn't have described it that way, but you were helping them with financing.
我当时戴着袖扣，系着爱马仕领带，穿着细条纹双排扣西装，但后来我把它塞进一个山洞里，再也没穿过。
I was wearing cufflinks, an Hermes tie, and a pin striped double breasted suit, but eventually put it in in a cave and never wore it again.
不过还有另一段经历。
But there was another experience.
但，不，并不是那样的。
But, no, it wasn't.
不，实际上，那更像是汗水股权加早期微型投资的混合体，对。
It was it it it was actually a hybrid between sweat equity, early stage micro investments Yes.
再加上成功后的股权激励或期权。
And equity kicker or options related to success.
一开始就是这么运作的。
And that's how it worked at the beginning.
后来我们筹集了资金，但不是那种基金结构。
And then eventually, we raised capital, not fund like structure.
公司还是我的，但我们引入了两家私募股权和两家风投公司，每家各占10%。
It was still my company, but we got two private equity, two venture capital companies in that each owned 10%.
所以我们拿到了真金白银，然后，对。
So we got real money and then Yes.
把这些资金的一部分投放出去了。
Deployed some of that.
而且你还有一个很重要的优势，就是市场时机把握得好。
And you also importantly had good market timing.
因为对于当时不在场的人来说，1999年到2000年那段时间简直疯狂，而你说过，那些估值已经和现实完全脱节，随后不久就崩盘了。
Because, I mean, for people who weren't around, the ninety nine, two thousand period was crazy, whereas you say, the valuations just became fairly disconnected from reality, and then they crashed hard shortly afterwards.
所以在那个时期做得好的很多人，都是足够乐观、能进入这些公司，但又足够谨慎，会卖掉部分收益，而不是只是眼睁睁看着账户——
And so a lot of the people who did well in that ninety nine, two thousand era were people who were optimistic enough to get into these companies, but then skeptical enough to sell some of the proceeds rather than just watching the account
余额涨了又跌。
balance go up and then down.
而且运气也好。
And lucky.
所以，在我们的案例中，两年之内，我们从我向一个没有公司的企业家推销一个想法，发展到上市。
So in in our case, within two years, we went from actually me pitching an idea to an entrepreneur that didn't have a company around him to an IPO
那真是疯狂。
Which was crazy.
我们发现自己身处上市后的派对，那是我们以前常做的，我们觉得三个月前我们还一文不值，而现在有了1亿欧元。
You know, we found ourselves in the after IPO party, which we used to do back in the day, and we thought that we had zero value three months ago and now a €100,000,000.
我推销的那些公司中，有一个是……
You know, one of those companies that I pitched is...
我发现有一个门户网站，一个免费的短信门户网站。
I I found out that there was a web portal, free SMS web portal.
它叫sms.at。
It was called sms.at.
你要做的就是，在界面上编写短信，而且完全免费。
And what you did, basically, you wrote your your SMS on the interface and at no cost.
当时奥地利大约有900万人，其中有200万人在使用这个服务。明白。
And Austria back then had around 9,000,000 people, and 2,000,000 were using this Mhmm.
因为短信当时很贵。
Because SMS were expensive.
那时候发短信要花钱。
SMS cost money back then.
当时确实要花钱。
Cost money back then.
每条九美分。
9¢ a message.
那是很贵的。
It was a lot.
后来我发现这网站是一个奥地利格拉茨的十几岁男孩在运营的。
And so I found out that this was run by a teenage boy in Austria in Graz.
我去见了他。
Visited him.
然后基本上，按照那个模式，我打算为你的公司筹集资金，后来那公司非常成功。
And, basically, with the model, I'm gonna raise money for your company, which then was very successful.
你把它包装成了一个合法的实体。
You wrapped it into a legal entity.
我当时问他，你是怎么做到的？
When I said to him, how how do you do that?
他说，我在黑进去。
I mean, he said, I'm hacking.
我在黑进大型电信公司的SMSC服务器。
I'm hacking into the SMSC servers of the big tel...
电信公司。
Telcos.
我说，好吧。
I said, okay.
然后……
And then...
我又说，好吧，他们最终会发现数据量比平时大，然后把我关掉。
And I said, well, eventually, they find out that the data volume was bigger than, let's say, on normal days, and they shut me down.
然后我说，好吧。
And I said, okay.
如果发生了这种情况，你会怎么做？
And if that happens, what do you do?
嗯，我有计划。
Well, I have a plan.
比如，今天我在用尼日利亚电信，下周就在挪威了。
So for example, today, I'm running on Nigeria Telecom, and next week, it's gonna be Norway.
所以，好吧，我们把它放到一个实体里，然后我开始联系奥地利电信，那是奥地利最大的电信公司，还有T-Mobile，也是奥地利最大的两家电信公司之一。
So, okay, we put it in an entity, and I started to visit Telecom Austria, the biggest Austrian and T Mobile then, the two biggest Austrian telcos.
他们说，我们讨厌SMSAT。
And they said we hate SMSAT.
我们非常讨厌它，但我们不能把它关掉。
We absolutely hate it, but we can't shut it down.
那么，我们能一起做些什么呢？
So what is what is it we can do together?
而且最终，在两年之内，那家原本不存在的公司就以2.5亿的价格卖给了T-Mobile。
And, eventually, you know, within two years, that nonexistent company was sold for 250,000,000 to T Mobile.
卖了2.5亿？
For 250,000,000?
哇。
Wow.
所以人们会忘记这些事情。
So This people forget.
2000年？
2000?
那是2000年吗？
This is the year 2000?
那显然是……
That is obviously the...
那只是……
It was just...
那是个不同的时代。
Was a different era.
不同的时代。
Different era.
可能现在看2.5亿，放到今天AI这个局面，那就是250亿了。
You know, maybe the kind of 250,000,000 today, when you look at the AI situation, that's gonna be 25,000,000,000.
但从相对的角度看，
But on a relative basis,
对，相对来看，那笔钱和估值简直是天文数字，非常惊人。
yeah, relative, it was unbelievable and enormous money and valuation.
所以……
So...
而且这其实是个幸运的时刻。
And this was the lucky moment, actually.
不仅仅是他们买下了……
Not only And they bought
买下来是为了关掉它吗？
it to shut it down?
不是。
No.
他们买了其中很大一部分，并把它整合进了……
They bought a large part of it and integrated it in...
接管了客户，然后整合到了他们的系统里。
Took over the customers and integrated it in their systems.
所以事情是这样的，我们在波恩签了协议，当时那是德国电信的总部。
So what happened is we signed the deal in Bonn, which was Deutsche Telekom back in the day.
T-Mobile 当时是德国电信的子公司。
T Mobile was a subsidiary of Deutsche Telekom.
然后我和我的首席财务官一起飞回去，坐的是奥地利航空。他比我大十五岁，负责奥地利国家钢铁公司的并购部门。
And I flew back with my CFO, Austrian Airlines, And he was fifteen years my senior and was running the m and a department of the Austrian National Steel Company.
我们坐在奥地利航空的航班上，拿了一杯便宜的气泡酒，说这次交易干得不错。
And we were sitting in Austrian Airlines and got a glass of cheap bubbly and said that was a good transaction.
然后他说这里有点不对劲。
And he said something's going wrong here.
我就问，为什么？
And I said, why?
他说那个业务收入其实很少，但客户群很大。
He said that business with literally tiny revenue with a lot...
客户基数很大。
But with a large customer base.
也就是说潜力很大，但实际上不知道怎么变现，也不知道怎么收回资本开支的投资。
That means with lots of potential, but no way of of actually knowing how to monetize it or how to repay the CapEx investment.
这和现在的市场情况挺相似的。
There's quite some correlation to the current markets now.
当时被估值到了那个离谱的...
Was valued as at this absurd...
被估到了一个离谱的数字。
With this absurd amount.
在...
In...
相比之下，他那个专业的芦荟业务，当时可是产生了三千万的息税前利润。
Compared to my specialized Aloe business that he had that was generating 30,000,000 in in EBIT.
所以肯定出问题了。
So something's going wrong.
我告诉他，没出问题。
And I said to him, nothing's going wrong.
互联网会主宰一切，你看不见那庞大的客户数量吗...
The Internet is gonna dominate, and can't you see the amount of customer...
那些客户...
Customers that
新范式，你那一套过时了。
The new paradigm, your old fashioned.
完全正确。
Exactly.
对。
Exactly.
然后他说，不。
And he said, no.
不。
No.
我敢肯定这会崩掉的。
I'm sure this is this is gonna collapse.
这个估值太离谱了。
The valuation's absurd.
然后我们经历了……
And we had a...
我们把另一家公司推上了股市，从跟那些争得头破血流的银行家们谈判，到上市那天，花了三个月。
We listed another company on the stock exchange, which was between pitching into the bankers that scratched the eyes out of each other to do this to the day of listing in three months.
然后他说，我跟你保证，我们得看看那个。
And and he said, I promise you, we need to look at that.
我觉得这个撑不下去。
I don't think this is sustainable.
他在从波恩到维也纳的那一小时航班上给我的那种直觉，足以让我们审视整个投资组合里的九项投资。
And that impulse that he gave me from this one hour flight from Bonn to Vienna was enough to look at our whole portfolio of nine investments.
然后我们决定全部退出。
And we decided to exit all of them.
那是从九九年年底开始，一直持续到整个2000年。
And that was started end of ninety nine and went all through 2000.
显然，2000年春天市场崩盘时，大家还指望能反弹。
Obviously, when the market collapsed in spring two thousand, people were still hoping for a rebound.
这只是暂时的小故障。
It was just a glitch.
是的。
Yes.
但后来市场再也没有恢复，我们就把那些投资全撤了。
And then the the market never came back, and we exited all of those investments.
它们是一家。
They are one.
一家以色列的初创公司，我们退不出来。
An Israeli startup that we couldn't exit.
然后我们就撤了。
And and we were out.
剩下的就是一个风险投资公司的空壳，规模大幅缩减，是的。
And what remained was a skeleton of a venture capital company, very much downsized Yes.
继续寻找机会，同时心里清楚，这种情况短期内不会好转。
To continue to look for opportunities whilst having the philosophical idea of this is not gonna come back for a long time.
我觉得优秀投资者一个被低估的特质就是知道什么时候该卖出。
I think this is an underrated aspect of good investors is knowing when to sell.
而且我觉得在投资圈里有一种倾向，大家都喜欢说，哦，我们很早就发现了这个创始人，我们买了股票，然后它就一直涨一直涨，我们想一直陪它走下去。
And I think there's an incentive in the investor ecosystem where they all like talking about, oh, we found this founder very early, and we, you know, bought the stock and, you know, it grew and grew and grew, and, you know, we we want to be on the journey forever.
我觉得那些神话故事往往都是关于早早入场、做长期合作伙伴的。
I think all of the myth making tends to be about getting in early and being a very long term partner.
我注意到一个很少被提到的事情，但在最成功的投资者中却非常普遍，那就是他们有一种蜘蛛侠般的直觉……
I noticed a thing that doesn't get talked about, but is a very common trait amongst the most successful investors, is they have this spidey sense for...
就像电影《盗火线》一样。
You know, it's like the movie Heat.
你得知道什么时候该抽身。
You gotta you gotta know when to get out.
很多非常优秀的投资者都有这种商业嗅觉……
And a lot of the very good investors have this very commercial sense for...
再说一次，你处在九九年、两千年这样的时期，这是一个重要的卖出时机。
Again, you're in this period, like ninety nine, two thousand, and it's an important moment to sell.
这件事很少被提及，因为它听起来很胆小，或者让人觉得你不相信这个让你赚了很多钱的公司，因为你现在在卖股票，但这确实是一个有趣的角度。
And it doesn't get talked about because it sounds cowardly or it sounds like you, you know, you don't believe in this company that you made a lot of money from because, you know, you're you're now a seller, but it's, it's an interesting aspect.
我来自一个经济上非常困难、或者说整体比较贫穷的家庭背景。
I came from a very financially or generally poor family background.
没有钱。
No money.
所以对我来说，经济上的安全感和机会一直是一个非常强的驱动力。
And financial safety and opportunity was always a very strong driver for me.
而且那家公司我占90%的股份。
And I owned 90% of that company.
它不是基金。
It wasn't a fund.
我也不是帮别人管钱。
I wasn't managing anybody else's money.
那是一家公司实体。
It was a corporate entity.
你自己有风投投资人，但公司本身全是控股。
You had your own venture investors, but it itself was all holdings.
所以那是一家私人有限公司，我最初100%持有，后来卖了20%给一些...
So it was a private limited company from which I owned a 100%, sold 20% to someone, to some...
给一些风投公司。
To venture capital companies.
而那80%的股份，大部分都是我的，我们还有一些……
And all of the 80% or most of it, we had some...
一些……
One...
我的一些好朋友和同事……
Some of my dear friends and colleagues were...
持有少量股份。
Had a few shares.
但所有的股份，都在我手里。
All of it, I owned.
所以当真正有机会退出并赚到一大笔钱，足以改变人生的时候，是的。
So when the opportunity came of actually exiting and generating a vast amount of money, which was life changing Yes.
这是创造世代财富的机会，我做出这个决定更容易，因为我想，我从来没有什么钱。
Generational wealth opportunity, it became easier for me to do that because I thought, okay, I never had any any money.
而现在突然间，我赚了这么多，甚至在我做决定的那一刻，我都花不完这些钱。
And now suddenly, I was able to generate so much that I couldn't even spend it at the at the time I made the call.
我觉得可能会更加激进一些。
I think it would have been probably more aggressive.
会…
It would...
如果是别人的钱，能收管理费，还有可能分到上涨收益的话。
If it would have been other people's money, generating management fees, potentially carry upside.
但事实是，你自己的钱让你能够务实。
But the fact was your money allowed you to be pragmatic.
对。
Exactly.
而且还有一种安全感，或者说，想要稳妥一些的愿望。
And have a certain sense of safety also or or or a desire for being on the safe side.
在赛车时代之前，你表现最好的投资是什么？
What was your best performing investment before the racing era?
梅赛德斯F1车队。
Mercedes, the F1 Team.
但在梅赛德斯时代之前，我投资了威廉姆斯，那还挺成功的。
But before the Mercedes era, I was invested in Williams, which was pretty successful.
在那之前，是一家我一直很喜欢的公司，叫HWA，那是一家……
Before that, a company that I loved forever called HWA, which was a...
明白。
Sure.
但这些全都是赛车公司吗？
But these were all racing companies?
全都是赛车公司。
That was all racing companies.
在那之前，我觉得可能是SMS公司。
So before that, I would say probably that was the SMS company.
叫UCP的那个？
What's called UCP?
是的。
Yes.
从做SMS的创业者变成了赛车行业的创业者。
SMS entrepreneur turned racing entrepreneur.
不是。
No.
其实我之前是个赛车手。
I was a race driver before, actually.
赛车手变成SMS创业者，又变成赛车行业创业者。
Racer turned SMS entrepreneur turned racing entrepreneur.
所以确切顺序是这样的。
So the the exact sequences.
赛车手变成钢铁工人。
Racer turned Steel worker.
在华沙做银行实习生，然后变成东欧的钢铁销售经理，再变成风险投资人，不过那时候更多是‘风险’，没怎么‘投资’。
Bank banking intern in Warsaw, turned steel sales manager in Eastern Europe, turned venture capitalist, although it was more venture than capitalist.
后来把这些投资都卖了，又变成了年轻车手的管理人。
And then turned young driver manager once I sold all of these investments.
然后我开始投资赛车公司。
And then I started to invest in motor racing companies.
这是托托为你们准备的最新推特简介。
This is Toto's new Twitter bio just for you guys.
所以很明显，那……
And so obviously, that...
我没有社交媒体。
You know, have no social media.
嗯，你有点……
Well, I mean, you're you're you're kind of...
你……
You're...
你已经够曝光了。
You you you have enough exposure.
我觉得大家不用你发推特也知道你在想什么。
I think people know what you think without without tweeting.
你管理团队的方式有什么不同吗？
Do you get to manage the team in a different way?
因为，怎么说呢，你不太担心工作保障的问题。
Because, I don't know, you're less worried about job security.
你可以冒更大的风险。
You can take bigger swings.
或者说就是……
Or just...
托托管理团队的方式和其他所有F1车队负责人有什么不同？
How is Toto managing the team different from all the other F1 Team principals managing the team?
我有过这样的机会……
I have had this opportunity...
当年戴姆勒的管理层给了我巨大的机会，那时候的CEO是迪克兹。
Immense opportunity given to me by the board of management of Daimler back in the day led by Dickheads, the CEO.
但实际上，所有的董事会成员都非常支持这个想法。
But actually, all of the board members were very supportive of the idea.
所以事情是这样的，他们收购了一支小车队，布朗车队，它在2009年拿了冠军，本来指望它能成为F1的霸主。
So what happened is they bought a small team, Braun, that won the championship in 2009, expecting it to be a dominant force in Formula one.
这也是梅赛德斯首次以厂商车队身份参赛，拥有自己的引擎和底盘。
And it was the first Mercedes Grand Prix Mhmm.
这是第一支拥有自己引擎和底盘的梅赛德斯厂队。
Owned team with its own engines and its own chassis.
但它的表现并不好。
And it underperformed.
年复一年，成绩确实很不理想。
Year after year, the results were really not satisfactory.
直到2013年，他们只赢过一场比赛。
And until 2013, they won a single race only.
而那时我正在和创始人一起经营威廉姆斯车队，我们也赢过一场比赛。
And I was at the time running Williams with the founder, and we also won a race.
所以有位董事会成员联系了我，邀请我去斯图加特。
So one of the board members approached me and invited me to Stuttgart.
他说，怎么会你们那个小私人的车队能赢一场比赛呢？
And he said, how can it be that your private little team can win a race?
而我们梅赛德斯，却只能做到这样。
And we, Mercedes, we can't do any better than that.
我就说，我不知道。
So I said, I don't know.
于是他们就让我看看他们的设施、数据，还有所有东西。
So they they gave me the opportunity to look at their, you know, setup, their numbers, and everything.
我回来后问，你们的期望是什么？
And I came back and said, what is your aspiration?
他们说，当然是赢得世界冠军，因为我们买的车队曾经做到过。
And they said, well, winning world championships because we bought the team that did that.
我说，好。
And I said, okay.
那我们之中有一个是错的，因为我的预算相同，而我在想的是进入前六名。
Then one of us is wrong because I'm working on the same budgets, and I'm thinking about finishing in the top six.
他们说，不对。
And they said, no.
不对。
No.
不对。
No.
不对。
No.
不对。
No.
预算不一样。
It's not the same budget.
你看。
Look.
我们多花了一个亿。
We we spent a 100,000,000 more.
然后我就说，对。
And I said, yeah.
那一个亿，你花在了米克·舒马赫、海涅、尼科·罗斯伯格身上。
Those 100 millions, you spent on Michel Schumer, Heine, Nico Rosberg.
顺便说一下，我有个来自委内瑞拉的付费车手，还赢了比赛，速度更快。
I have a paid driver from Venezuela who won the race, by the way, faster.
这就是主要区别。
That's the main difference.
所以他们非常不喜欢这种情况。
So they didn't like that situation at all.
所以我现在就是个乱摊子……
And so I'm just a mess...
信使。
Messenger.
你懂吗？
You know?
别……
Don't...
然后我打算回到威廉姆斯那边。
And I'm gonna go back to William.
所以最后他们回来说，我们认为我们那种公司化的F1车队运营模式行不通。
So eventually, they came back and said, we think our model, corporate running a Formula one Team doesn't function.
因为这种……
Because this...
它需要更多以企业家精神为主导。
It needs to be much more entrepreneurially led.
你需要被授权……
You need to empower...
你需要被授权当场做决定，我们想让你来负责这个。
You need to be empowered to take decisions on the spot, and we want you to run this.
然后我说，我得掐一下自己，因为担任梅赛德斯赛车运动的负责人可能是这个行业里最好的工作之一，除了当法拉利的那个家伙之外。
And I said, I need to pinch myself because, you know, being the head of Mercedes Motorsport is probably one of the best jobs in the industry other than being Ferrari, the Ferrari guy.
我当时不得不拒绝，因为我是威廉姆斯的股东，而且我一直是个创业者。
And and I I had to say no because I was a shareholder in Williams, and I have been always an entrepreneur.
他们说，你这么说可真巧，因为我们刚买了阿布扎比主权基金40%的股份。
And they said, funny that you say that because we've just bought 40% of the Abu Dhabi sovereign fund.
我们把它买回来了。
We bought it back.
你可以买下那部分。
You can buy that.
我说，我这辈子混得还不错，但也买不起啊。
And I said, did well in my life, but I won't be able to afford it.
但他们帮你融资了。
But they they helped you finance it.
对。
Exactly.
他们问，你能出多少钱？
They said, how much can you afford?
是的。
Yes.
于是我说，我一直算是比较保守的那种人。
And I said, I'm always, you know, on the on the, let's say, conservative side.
我经历过财务困难，不想再落到那种地步。
I've gone through financial hardship, and I don't wanna end up there.
你准备投入多少钱？
How much are you prepared to put into this?
我就说，就是那个数目。
And I said, well, that's the amount.
他们说，好。
They said, okay.
他们会融资……
We're gonna finance...
帮你解决剩余的资金。
Help you finance the rest.
而当时我就是这样。
And here I was.
而直到今天，随着管理层变动，现在由奥拉·卡莱纽斯和他的同事领导，梅赛德斯CEO给了我一个框架，让我可以在公司结构之外，为赛车队的最佳利益行事。
And until today, with the change of management now led by Ola Calenius and his colleagues, the CEO of Mercedes, they, you know, they give me a framework that I can act in the best interest of the racing team outside of the corporate structure.
我非常幸运能有这样好的共同股东、合作伙伴，以及我所关联的品牌。
And I couldn't wish for a better co shareholder, partner, and and brand, like the brand that I'm associated with.
所以我们做决策很快。
So the decisions that we make are quick.
这些决策都是为了团队的最佳利益，同时也会考虑对品牌的影响。
They are in the best interest of the team whilst thinking about the consequences for the brand.
我把它当作一个20人的组织来运营。
And I run it like a 20 people organization.
那么，你是怎么运营的……
And how is...
你运营的方式，和雇佣其他车队负责人管理车队有什么不同？
How you run it different from just hires team principals, how they run teams?
每支车队都不一样。
Every every team is different.
但比如说，你看法拉利，车队负责人是向CEO直接汇报的十个人之一。
But for example, when you look at Ferrari, the team principal is one of 10 direct reports to the CEO.
所以车队里的市场人员跟车队负责人的级别是一样的。
So the marketing person in the racing team is gonna be on the same level that the team principal.
然后还有像红牛这样以股东为主导的组织，他们会雇佣一个车队负责人，向他汇报……
Then you have others other, you know, very much shareholder led organizations like Red Bull, where you would have an employed team principal that's report...
或者说向一群股东汇报。
Or reporting to a group of shareholders.
然后还有像奥迪那样严格的公司结构，对。
Then you have a strictly corporate structure Mhmm.
他们会从集团和一级方程式那边招人来经营车队。
Like Audi, where you have people from the group and from Formula one are being hired to run the team.
这些人拿的是固定工资。
They have a salary.
他们可能有奖金。
They might have a bonus.
所以我之前被赋予的那份自由度挺大的……
So that kind of long leash that I was given...
如今没有什么自由度了，因为我们是合作伙伴。
Today, there's no leash because we are partners.
但确实是这样。
But Yeah.
他们……
They...
做决策的能力……
The the ability of taking making...
我拥有做决策的能力，这是非常特别的，因为这些人都需要向某个人汇报。
Of taking decisions was given to me was extraordinary because all of these people, they need to fundamentally report to someone.
对。
Yes.
而且总有风险，比如……
And there's always the risk that by...
如果你在没有真正通过层级上报的情况下就做了决定，是的。
If you take a decision without having actually escalated it through the hierarchy Yes.
你可能会面临风险，甚至丢掉工作。
You might be exposed and lose your job.
对。
Yes.
所以在我现在的位置，除非我真的很糟糕地搞砸了，我要对我的决定负责，这一点我很清楚，但我不会被解雇。
So where I am until I really badly screw up, I'm responsible for my decisions, I'm very clear about that, but, I can't be fired.
那……
And that...
这正是有趣的地方。
And that's what's interesting.
你在硅谷能看到这种情况，由创始人运营的公司通常拥有比普通公司更多的战略自由度。
I mean, you see this in Silicon Valley where companies run by founders often have different strategic degrees of freedom available to them than other companies.
所以你看，比如Meta，它并不是完全由股东掌控的公司。
And so you look at, say, with Meta, you know, it's not a company that's just run by the shareholders.
它是由马克掌管的，他坚信走在AI前沿非常重要。
It's run by Mark, and he has a strong view that being on the forefront of AI is very important.
之前也有过几波他持有强烈观点的浪潮，现在他们在AI领域做得很好，而如果是一个职业管理团队，可能股东或董事会不会允许他们投入那么多钱，而且需要很长时间才能证明回报，诸如此类。
And there's been kind of previous waves where he's had strong views, and now they're doing very well in the AI space where maybe a professional management team would not have had the, you know, license by shareholders or the board to spend so much money on that, and it took a long time to prove out and things like that.
你经常会看到这种效应。
And you see that effect oftentimes.
而且，再说，梅赛德斯几乎是唯一一个由创始人掌管的
And, again, this is the Mercedes is kind of the only founder run
F1车队。
F1 Team.
但这有点像你和你的兄弟，关于Stripe。
But it's a little bit like you and your brother, around Stripe.
你们能够做出一些决定，在动态环境中，几年后可能被证明是错误的或判断失误。
You know, you are able to take decisions that, in a dynamic environment, may prove to be false or misjudged after a few years.
你看马克·扎克伯格管理公司的方式，真的很了不起。他可以决定在某领域投入大量资金，然后说，好吧，这个发展方向跟我想的不一样。
You know, when you look at the ability that, you know, the way Max Zuckerberg leads the company is is is quite amazing because you can decide to pour quite some investment in a certain field and then say, okay, well, that hasn't developed in the way I thought.
有一天，红牛的创始人迪特里希·马特希茨跟我说了一句很有意思的话。
And Dietrich Matysitz, the founder of of Red Bull, said something quite interesting to me one day.
他说，作为企业家，你需要像高山速降滑雪运动员一样。
He said, as an entrepreneur, you you you need to be like a downhill ski racer.
对。
Yes.
但你还得能停下来，然后走回山坡上。
But you need to be able to stop and walk back up the hill.
我觉得作为企业家，你能做到这一点。
And I think as an entrepreneur, you can do that.
而且你也有长期的眼光。
And you have the long term horizon also.
而职业经理人可能更受短期激励的驱动。
A manager will probably be short term incentivized.
你的合同是三年还是五年的。
You know, you have a three or you have five year contract.
是的。
Yes.
你有股票期权。
You have stock options.
你想最大化这些期权的价值。
You want to you want to maximize the value of these.
而且还有对失败的恐惧。
And there's a fear of failure.
还有怕做出在评估你的人眼里看起来不好的事，因为你一直在被评估。
There's a fear of doing something that looks bad to the people who are grading you because you're always being graded.
没错。
Exactly.
没错。
Exactly.
所以这就是我一开始想说的。
So that's what I meant at the beginning.
我的时间观念变了。
You know, my time perspective has changed.
现在看的是十年。
It's ten years.
不是一年两年的事。
And it's not it's not one year.
对。
Yes.
大家都知道你是球队的大股东。
People know that you're, you know, a large owner of the team.
我觉得知道INEOS的吉姆·拉德克利夫也是球队大股东的人就没那么多了。
I don't think quite as many people know that Jim Radcliffe of INEOS is also, you know, a major shareholder of the the team.
他这个人怎么样？
What's he like?
所以，那时候对梅赛德斯和吉姆来说，真是一个难得的机会。
So that was a a real opportunity back in the day for Mercedes and for for Jim.
而他已经建立起了一个庞大的组织帝国。
And he's built an empire of an organization, you know.
这是个化工集团。
This is a this is a chemicals conglomerate.
而且有三个股东。
And and there are three shareholders.
他们按照自己认为明智的方式来管理。
They run it in the way they think it's intelligent.
说起以前，尼基·劳达不幸去世了。
And back in the day, Niki Lauda, unfortunately passed away.
他是我最好的朋友。
He was my my best friend.
那些股份又重新回到了集体中。
And those shares went back into the pool.
实际上，吉姆·拉特克利夫和德尼罗开始大力赞助我们。
And Jim Ratcliffe and De Niro started to sponsor us with quite extensively, actually.
最后我们和奔驰的CEO、吉姆·拉特克利夫和我自己坐在桌子旁讨论赞助事宜。
And we ended up sitting on the table with the CEO of Mercedes, Jim Ratcliffe, myself talking about the sponsorship.
那是在新冠疫情爆发前。
And it was it was when just before COVID hit.
当时车队都没有估值。
Teams had no valuations.
我们都在亏损。
We were all loss making.
这项运动远没有今天这么发达。
The sport wasn't anywhere near where it was today.
吉姆说，如果我能赞助6亿，他就准备好投入。
And Jim said, I'm prepared to commit 600,000,000 as a sponsorship if
我可以
I can
我要拥有车队的一部分股份。
have a stake in the team.
我们说，那合理。
And we said, well, that makes sense.
我稍微增加了我的股份，然后我们各占三分之一。
I increased my stake a little bit, and then we were all one third.
如今，吉姆是我需要不同观点时的一个很好的资源。
And today, Jim is a great resource that I use if I need to have a contrarian view.
他经验丰富，而且看待自己的生意也很精明，同时也是一个非常愉快的、不真正干预的联合股东。
If someone that is highly experienced, but also shrewd in in the way he he looks at his businesses, And a very enjoyable, co shareholder that isn't really interfering.
但是，是的。
But Yeah.
因为我觉得我们做得很好，享受这个过程，而且他是一个我们可以利用的资源。
Because I I guess we do well enjoys enjoys the ride and is a resource that we can that we can utilize.
一级方程式车队变得非常有价值了。
F one teams have become radically more valuable.
比如，这次交易把梅赛德斯的一级方程式车队估值到了46亿英镑，这比几年前可是涨了七倍多。
Like, this transaction valued Mercedes as f one as, £4,600,000,000, and that's many, many, seven times increase from even just a few years ago.
这种现象在其他体育项目里也出现了，比如美式橄榄球联盟的那些球队。
That phenomenon has also happened in other sports like NFL and teams like that.
对于价值的上涨，你可以有两种解释。
There's two explanations you could have for the increase in value.
一种有点像货币理论，就是说有更多有钱人想买球队。
One is sort of a monetary theory that you have more rich people who want to buy into teams.
所以生意本身没变，但想当球队老板的人多了，钱也多了，都去追那点少得可怜的资产。
And so the businesses are the same, but you just have more demand, to become a sports team owner and more more dollars chasing fewer assets.
另一种说法就是……
The other is that you can say...
当然，这对一级方程式来说多少也是事实。
And, obviously, this is somehow true for f one.
它们成了更好的生意。
They've become better businesses.
观众增长了很多，还有《极速求生》之类的节目也起了作用。
I mean, the audience has grown so much, and you have drive to survive and things like that.
就想想奔驰和F1车队价值的增长，有多少是因为F1车队变成了更有吸引力的资产，又有多少是因为它们现在真的是非常好的生意呢？
Just as you think about the increase in value in Mercedes and f one teams, how much of it is f one teams have become a more desirable asset, and how much is it that they're actually just very good businesses now?
现在买车，有时候你会用理性的理由来说服自己，比如马力大、设计好，或者因为是电动车，因为想要一辆高效的车。
You know, when you buy a car today, you justify it with sometimes rational decisions, like lots of horsepower or good design or it's EV because I wanna, you know, I want to have an efficient car.
但实际上，你买车是出于情感上的决定。
The truth is it's an emotional decision why you buy a car.
而这个情感决定，是关于你想成为什么样的人，你想被别人怎么看。
And the emotional decision is how you want to be, how you want to be perceived.
我想被认为很前卫吗？
Do I want to be perceived progressive?
我想被认为很富有吗？
Do I want to be perceived affluent?
对。
Yes.
这些都是。
All of this.
所以这个答案会有点长。
So that is gonna be a longish answer.
目前体育队伍非常稀缺。
Sports team are scarce as of today.
在一级方程式中，我们只有11支队伍。
You know, in F1, there's just 11 of us.
理论上可能再增加12支，但没人真正热衷于此。
And you could potentially have another 12 front that's within the ranks, but nobody's really keen.
而且它是当今全球最大的体育赛事。
And it's the biggest global sport in the world today.
奥运会和足球世界杯规模更大，但它们每四年才举办一次。
The Olympics and the football world championship are bigger, but they're only for every four years.
是的。
Yes.
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