马克·安德森，a16z和网景的联合创始人

那时候他们必须光着脚。

they had to be bare feet at that time.

我最喜爱的苹果轶事是，苹果历史上第一笔销售是在他赤脚走进比蒂商店时完成的。

My my favorite Apple lore is that the first sale in Apple in Apple's history was made barefoot when he walked into the bite shop.

他是赤脚的。

He was barefoot.

令人惊讶的是，你知道的，是的。

What's amazing about that is, you know yeah.

所以，WSDAF 肯定是惠普的。

So so WSDAF for sure were were for Hewlett Packard.

我所描述的一切都是20世纪40年代、50年代和60年代的惠普公司。

Everything I'm describing was Hewlett Packard in the nineteen fifties and nineteen 1960s and 1940s.

戴夫·帕卡德和比尔·休利特也是那种创始人类型。

That was also Dave Dave Packard and Bill Hewlett were that founder type.

戴夫·帕卡德和比尔·休利特两人共同经营公司长达五十年左右。

And Dave Packard and Bill Hewlett ran their company for between the two of them for like fifty years.

你觉得这是最重要的吗？顺便说一下，硅谷在很大程度上是建立在惠普之上的。

Do you think that's the most And by the way, Silicon Valley was built in large part on HP.

惠普是第一家真正的硅谷公司。

HP was the original Silicon Valley company.

好的。

Okay.

那是由创始人经营了五十年的公司，但人们却认为创始人不该管理公司。

That's the next Run by founders its for fifty years, and yet people concluded the founders shouldn't run the companies.

对吧？

Right?

所以，这是一件很奇怪的事——它明明如此显而易见，就在每个人眼前，但人们却不得不构建出一套套复杂的理论体系，来回避一个基本事实：你需要一个真正懂得如何应对问题的人来掌舵。

And so it's it's one of those things where it's like it's kind of so obvious it was staring everybody in the face, and so people had to construct kind of elaborate basically, these elaborate kind of lattices of theories to basically get around the fundamental fact that you need somebody who knows what to do after they run into the thing.

你觉得惠普可能是硅谷历史上最具影响力的公司吗？

Do you think HP might have been the most influential company in Silicon Valley history?

从1940年到1980年，它无疑是最具影响力的公司，之后可能就是英特尔了。

It was for sure the most influential company from 1940 to 1980, and then probably after that Intel.

你去了解英特尔的创始人，阅读他们的传记，他们会谈到以惠普为榜样。

You go to the founders of Intel and you read biographies of them, and they talk about modeling off of HP.

是的，没错。

Yeah, that's right.

是的，没错。

That's right.

那么，有多少创始人后来以鲍勃·诺伊斯和英特尔为榜样，包括史蒂夫·乔布斯，他甚至会去鲍勃·诺伊斯家吃晚饭？

And then how many founders modeled off of Bob Noyce and Intel after the fact, including Steve Jobs, who would go to Bob Noyce's house for dinner?

是的，没错。

That's right.

顺便说一句，这是另一个很好的例子。

By the way, that's another great example.

因为至少从鲍勃·诺伊斯的照片来看，你会觉得，哇，这个人简直就是社会的栋梁。

Because Bob Noyce at least, you know, present if you look at photos of Bob Noyce, you're like, wow, this guy's like a pillar of society.

他穿着非常得体，举止非常成熟，而且他 famously 是‘叛徒八人组’的领袖。

Like, he's, you he's very, very well dressed, and he's kind of very adult, and he's very, you know, he's famously the leader of the traitorous aide.

你知道，那个离开肖克利去创立仙童的团队。

You know, the the, know, the the the group that left Shockley to start Fairchild.

然后我们离开仙童去创立英特尔。

And then We left Fairchild to start Intel.

去创立英特尔。

To start Intel.

所以鲍勃·诺伊斯就是他那个时代的史蒂夫·乔布斯，只是穿着短袖白衬衫和细黑领带。

And so Bob Noise was 100% the Steve Jobs of his time, just in the short sleeve white dress shirt and the skinny black tie.

是的。

Yeah.

但这又是同样的事情。

But it was it's again, it's it's like the exact same thing.

所以，你知道，我从未有幸见过鲍勃·诺伊斯，但我完全可以想象鲍勃·诺伊斯和史蒂夫·乔布斯坐在一起，聊上三个小时，彼此完全理解，尽管他们的外表和气质看起来完全不一样。

And so I I, you know, I I never I, unfortunately never met Bob Noyes, but I I could easily imagine Bob Noyes and Steve Jobs sitting down and being able to talk for three hours and completely understanding each other despite the fact that they the the look and feel was, like, completely

不同。

different.

他几乎像是对史蒂夫的一种管教者，因为史蒂夫当时又狂野又鲁莽。

He was almost like a disciplinarian to Steve because Steve was, you know, wild and reckless.

我也曾又狂野又鲁莽。

Like, I was also wild and reckless.

你需要成熟起来。

You need to mature.

我觉得鲍勃的妻子可能也很早就去了苹果公司工作。

And I think Bob's wife maybe went to work at AppL early on, too.

他在他的传记里提到过这件事。

So it was he talked about this in his biography.

关于鲍勃·诺伊斯有几本很棒的传记，他说自己在功成名就之后花大量时间陪伴年轻创业者，是因为要为他钓鱼的那条溪流补充水源。

There's a few great biographies of Bob Noyes, but he said that the reason he spent so much time after he was really successful spending time with young entrepreneurs, he said it was restocking the stream in which he fished from.

太惊人了。

Amazing.

他认为这真的很重要。

He thought it was really important.

他说，我从我之前的那些人身上学到了很多。

He's like, I learned from all the guys before me.

我需要把我多年来积累的知识传递给下一代。

I need to take that knowledge I've built up over multiple decades and push it down the generation.

不过，我想回到创办这家公司的起点。

I want to go back to starting the firm, though.

这很有趣。

This is interesting.

在那个时候或之前，你的生活中发生了什么，让你意识到这件事必须去做？

What was occurring in your life either at that time or before that that you had this observation that this had to be done?

哦，你看，我们有这么多复杂的理论。

Oh, so see, I've you know, we've got all these elaborate theories.

但实际上，我和我的合伙人本已经成为非常活跃的天使投资人。

The the practical reality of it was Ben Ben my partner Ben and I had become very active angel investors.

我从九十年代中期就开始做天使投资，但后来我和本开始真正投入大量时间来做这件事，大概是从2003年左右开始的。

And and I'd been an angel investor since, like, the mid nineties, but then Ben and I started doing it kind of as a, you know, as a as a as a as a real thing, putting significant time into it, probably starting in, you know, 2003.

嗯，我在2000年代初就一直在做，但真正开始是2003年、2004年。

Well, I I did it kinda throughout the early two thousands, but 2003, 2004.

现在回想起来有点难，但如果你回到2003、2004年，那时候根本没有成千上万的天使投资人。

It's hard to remember now, but if you go back to, like, 2003, 2004, there weren't, like, thousands of angel investors.

那时候大概只有八个左右。

There were, like, eight.

当时就那么几个人，比如罗恩·康威，还有其他寥寥数人。

It was, like, a sure you know, it Ron Conway and, you know, handful of people.

然后我和本就到处奔波，做这些投资。

And then I Ben and I were running around doing it.

这对风险投资行业的演变至关重要，因为正是在那时，传统的风投机构被天使投资人和种子投资者取代，他们提前介入，在创始人正式登场前就参与进来，这彻底改变了整个行业。

And this was very significant in the evolution of venture capital industry because this was the point at which the traditional VCs got disintermediated by angels and seed investors who kind of inserted in before the conceives arrived, which was this fundamental change that that changed the whole industry.

但你知道，我们就是这一波浪潮的一部分。

But, you know, we we were part of that.

因此，结果就是我们投资了大量新公司，基本上都是在它们刚成立的时候。

So but as a consequence, like, we were investing in all these new companies, you know, basically at the point of formation.

你知道，我们基本上是在做业余的早期风险投资，而且我们总是说，我们不会进入董事会。

You know, we're basically playing playing amateur early stage VC, and and we're getting and we're always like, we're not going on the board.

你知道，你以后会从真正的风投公司那里融资。

Like, you know, you're you're gonna raise money from a real venture firm later.

他们会进入你的董事会，跟你合作等等。

They're gonna go on your board and whatever and work with you.

但我们一再发现，自己最终被拉进了这些公司，要么是因为他们合作的其他人出了问题，要么是他们还没融到风险投资，或者他们找的风投帮不上忙，所以我们就被卷进去了。

And what we just found over and over and over and over again was we ended up getting pulled into these companies, either because there were issues that just like the other people that they were, you know, working with or their, you know, their they either hadn't raised venture yet or the VCs that they raised from couldn't help them with, and so we just got pulled in.

原因是我们那时已经经营公司差不多二十年了。

The reason was we had been running companies at that point for whatever twenty years.

所以我们至少知道自己在做什么。

And so we at least had some idea of what we were doing.

另外，我们还不断被卷入创始人和风投之间的冲突调解中。

And then the other is we kept getting we kept getting brought in into conflict resolution between the founders and the VCs.

对吧？

Right?

所以我们这么做，是因为尤其是在那个时候，这种情况非常普遍，特别是当风险投资人的基本观点认为创始人不会继续经营公司，我们需要尽快用职业经理人取代你。

So it's so that we would because, you know, it's like especially especially because, again, much more common at that time, especially if the VC's fundamental point of view is the founder's not gonna run the company, and we need to, like, replace you with the professional manager as as possible.

创始人不一定喜欢这一点，他们可能会抵制。

The founders are not necessarily gonna like that, and they might resist that.

顺便说一句，即使他们认同这个想法，也可能不喜欢风险投资人想引进的那个人。

And by the way, even if they're on board with that idea, they might not like the person who VC wants to bring in.

所以我们不断卷入这类情况，充当调解人——理论上，我们是被信任的中间人，因为我们既了解创始人，也了解风险投资人，能够帮助双方搭起桥梁。

And so we kept ending up in these kind of basically, as arbitrators in this sort of, you know, in theory, we were kind of trusted intermediaries because we knew the founders, we knew the VCs, and we could kind of help help bridge between that.

但事实上，过了一段时间，我们每天竟然要花八个小时来做这件事。

But literally what happened was after a while, we were, like, spending, like, eight hours a day just just doing this.

然后我们就想，好吧。

And and we're like, alright.

而且你知道，这感觉有点奇怪。

And and, you know, it's it's, like, weird.

你明明只是投了十万美元，却要花这么多时间去处理，然后还要去调解那个投了一千万美元的人。

It's like you're writing a $100,000 check, and you're, like, spending all this time doing it, and and then to basically arbitrate it to somebody who wrote a $10,000,000 check.

就这样吧。

And it's it's just like, alright.

我们干脆直接把那1000万美元的支票开出去好了。

Like, we should probably just write the $10,000,000 check.

我一直觉得，最优秀的创始人往往能够同时在战略和概念层面，以及实践层面自如运作——这是我关于人生的一个观点：伟大的创始人就是这样。

And and that was that was that so it was it was I always think, like, the best the the founders, always one of my theories of life, the great founders, is they they tend to be able to operate at kind of the strategic conceptual level and then the practical level at the same time.

所以我们当时有一整套理论，我可以带你详细梳理一下风险投资行业的演变过程。

And so so we had we had a whole theory I could take you through for the evolution of venture business.

说吧。

Do.

是的。

Yeah.

但在那背后，真正发生的是实实在在的、接地气的实践经验。

But but underneath that was just this actual, you know, the the lived experience of was actually happening on the ground.

我们当时对企业的宏大理论，是建立在创始人主导运营这一理念之上的，同时也源于对风险投资行业实际运作的结构性观察——我们按照你的理念，回头研究了许多与风险投资业务相似的其他企业。

The the big theory of the firm that we that we had at that time was linked to this idea of was linked to this idea of of founders running the show, but it was also a structural observation of what was happening in in the venture industry, which was we basically, what we did was we we in line with your philosophy, we went back and we studied a lot of other businesses that have similarities to the venture business.

所以我们研究了私募股权、风险资本——抱歉，私募股权、对冲基金、投资银行、律师事务所、管理咨询公司、广告公司和会计事务所。

And so we studied private equity, venture capital or sorry, private equity hedge funds, investment banks, law firms, management consulting firms, ad agencies, accounting firms.

基本上，任何以关系为核心产品、属于知识型工作关系的行业，而不是那些生产实体产品的行业。

Basically anything where the product is fundamentally a relationship, knowledge work kind of relationship as compared to something that gets manufactured.

我们观察到，好莱坞的经纪公司实际上是我们最常公开提及的案例，那是一个绝佳的研究案例。

And what we observed is basically, Hollywood talent agencies actually is the one we've probably talked publicly about the most, so that was a great case study.

几个月前，他还在这个工作室里。

He was in this studio a few months ago.

太棒了。

Fantastic.

而且，顺便说一下，他确实给了我们很多东西，我们一向注重致谢。

And so and and he actually and by the way, he he gave us you know, we make a point of crediting.

他为我们提供了大量这套理论，所以很多内容都源自于他。

Like, he he gave us a lot a lot of this theory, so a lot of this comes from him.

实际上，我会通过他的经历来讲述这个故事。

Well, actually, I'll I'll tell it through through through through through his through his his experience.

所以他创办经纪公司的时候，是80年代吗？

So when he started his agency in was it '80 whatever?

不是。

No.

是75年吗？

'75?

是75年。

'75.

在七十年代。

In the seventies.

应该是七十年代。

Think the seventies.

大概是七十年代中期。

Like in the mid seventies.

实际情况非常相似。

It was actually very similar.

从结构上来说，这和我们2009年创立a16z时的情况非常相似，当时整个行业的格局基本上是一堆规模很小的服务公司和人才经纪公司，没有一家达到很高的规模。

It was structurally, was very similar to when we started a16z in in in 2009, which was the configuration of the industry at that point was basically a bunch of essentially service firms, bunch of talent agencies, none of which were at very high scale.

而每一家公司本质上都是由一群独立运作的个体组成，就像独行侠一样。

And then each of them was basically a tribe of basically solo operators, kind of lone wolves.

所以在好莱坞，概念就是你有一个经纪人，那就是你的那个人。

And so so the so the concept in Hollywood was you had an agent, and that was your guy.

这个经纪人只认识他自己认识的人，拥有他自己建立的关系，但你所在经纪公司的其他经纪人对你来说是不可用的。

And that agent knew whoever that agent knew and had whatever relationships that agent had, but the other agents at your agency were not available to you.

你身处一家拥有不止你那个经纪人、而是上百个其他经纪人的公司，这并没有带来任何集体优势。

There was no collective benefit to the fact that you were at an agency that had not just your guy, but like a 100 other guys.

这种集体利益根本不存在。

There was no collective payoff to that.

他们之所以这样运营，是有特定原因的——这是一种‘你杀猎物你才能吃’的专业服务心态，每个人都必须自己去建立自己的客户资源。

They ran that in that way for a very specific reason, is this of this eat what you kill professional services mentality where everybody should have to go build build build their own book of business.

但结果就是，你只是在和一个个体打交道，而不是和一家公司合作。

But you you end up you're just dealing with a guy as opposed to a firm.

根本就没有一个公司。

Like, there there's no firm.

根本没有集体性的存在。

There's no no no collective thing.

这就是2009年风险投资的状况，那时候我们已经非常熟悉所有的风投人了，我们也融资过，还和许多其他融资过的公司合作过。

And that that was basically the the condition of venture capital in 2009, which is you you have been at this at this point, we knew all the VCs really well, and we had raised venture, and we had worked with all these other companies that had that had Raised Venture.

而当时所有那些老牌风投公司，都是这样的。

And and and basically, all of the sort of legacy venture firms at that point, they were all like that.

它们都只是孤狼组成的部落。

They were all just like tribe tribes of lone wolves.

而我们所知道、但外界并不了解的是，通常来说，这些公司内部的人甚至彼此不喜欢。

And then the thing that we knew that was not publicly known was, generally speaking, inside the firms, they didn't even like each other.

哦，我经常听到类似的故事

Oh, I hear stories like this all

到处都是。

the time.

所以呢，就是，你知道的，随便吧。

And so it's like, you know, whatever.

比如乔和玛丽，你知道的，他们是同一家风投公司的合伙人，你正在和乔合作，而玛丽恰好有你认为非常关键的资源。

There's Joe and Mary, you know, and we're partners at a venture firm, you're working with Joe, Mary has, like, a key connection that you think you need access to.

于是你问乔：玛丽能帮我引荐一下某某人吗？

And so you ask Joe, can Mary introduce me to so and so?

但你不知道的是，他们俩正在经历一场激烈的争吵。

And what you don't know is they're having, like, a brutal fight.

他们其实是在拼命想搞垮对方，因为从根本上说，这关乎经济利益。

They're, you know, they're they're like trying to destroy each other because they're they're because they're fundamentally economics.

他们争的是如何分得更大的利润蛋糕。

They're they're going for, you know, the a a greater slice of of the profit pool.

所以他们斗得非常厉害。

And so they're really going at it.

所以我们看到一个又一个例子，这些风投公司基本上就只有两种情况。

And so we we just we saw example after example of venture firm that was basically either two things, actually.

一种是由于内部纷争和冲突而崩溃。

One is either melting down due to just internal strife and conflict.

顺便说一下，另一种是代际传承。

Or by the way, the other was generational succession.

对吧？

Right?

2009年时，许多主导性的风投公司已经存在了三、四十年，如今他们已经进入第三代合伙人，甚至正迈向第四代。

The other the other issue is a lot of the dominant venture firms in 2009 had been around for thirty or forty years, and they were now on their third generation of partners going to their fourth generation of partners.

而且，说到底，情况都一样。

And and and, you know, and again, it's the same thing.

这些公司是由充满活力的创始人创立的，但后来的几代人却不再像那样了。

They they had been founded by dynamos, and then the later generation people were not like that.

我们基本上说：哦，这就是最老套的问题了，正如我们所说，这种模式不会持久。

We basically said, oh, this is where oldest thing comes in, as we said, look, that's not going last.

我们对它的理解被称为‘中间层的消亡’，有时我们更消极地称之为‘中间层的死亡’。

Our theory of it was what we call death of the middle, or we sometimes the negative way to frame it is death of the middle.

积极的一面是哑铃模式，这在所有其他行业中都发生了，整个行业就像太妃糖一样被拉开了。

The positive way is the barbell, which is what's happened in all these other industries, which is basically the the industry gets stretched apart like taffy.

你得到的就是这种哑铃结构。

And and and what you what you get is you you get this barbell thing.

在哑铃的一端，是早期的天使轮和种子轮投资者，他们作为首批资金进入，行动灵活，投资金额相对较小，但在企业非常早期就深度参与并承担巨大风险。

And on on one side of the barbell, get early stage angel seed investor who are really first money in, staying very light on their feet, writing a relatively small check, but being involved in companies extremely early on and taking a lot of risk.

而在另一端，则是规模化平台。

Then on the other side, you get basically scaled platforms.

对吧？

Right?

你得到的是大型企业，拥有大量资源、广泛网络和充足的资金。

So you get large scale enterprises that have a lot throwaway, a lot of access, very big networks, then access to a lot of money.

我们常做的另一个类比是零售业，过去曾有西尔斯和杰西潘尼这样的百货商店，它们的品牌承诺是提供相当不错的产品选择和价格。

The other comparison we always make is to retail shopping, right, which is there used to be department stores like Sears and JCPenney, which basically where the the the brand promise was pretty good selection of products and pretty good prices.

对吧？

Right?

而现在，那些都已消亡。

And then now those are dead.

取而代之的是精品店，比如古驰门店或苹果商店，还有像沃尔玛和亚马逊这样的超大规模电商公司。

And what you have instead are boutiques, like the Gucci store or the Apple store, and then you've got this super scale ecommerce companies like like Walmart and Amazon.

我们已经到了这样一个地步：根本没有理由再去百货商店了，因为它们的商品选择比沃尔玛和亚马逊还少，却又没有古驰或苹果那样的品质层级和独特体验。

And we were to the point where it's just like there's no reason ever go to a department store because it's got less selection than Walmart and Amazon, and it but it doesn't have the quality tier and the special experience of a goucier or or Apple.

当你创办a16z时，心里就是这么想的吗？

But you had that thought in mind when you started a16z?

百分之百。

A 100%.

是的。

Yeah.

没错。

Exactly.

对。

Yeah.

好的。

Okay.

当时，这对风险投资来说是一个概念上的飞跃，但同样的事情也发生在私募股权领域。

It was a conceptual leap for venture capital at the time, but the exact same thing had happened to private equity.

同样的事情也发生在对冲基金中，同样的事情也发生在投资领域。

The exact same thing had happened in hedge funds, the exact same thing had happened in investment.

你是怎么知道的？

You knew that by what?

只是通过阅读。

Just reading the Reading.

银行是一个典型的例子。

Banks are a classic example.

如果你阅读1880年至1920年间美国原始投资银行的历史，它们就像20世纪70年代和80年代美国的精品风险投资公司。

If you read about the original investment banks in The US between 1880 and 1920, they were all like boutique venture capital firms in the 1970s, 1980s in The US.

只有大约20个人。

There's like 20 guys.

这些更像商人银行。

These are more like merchant bankers.

是的。

Yeah.

还有那些经典的故事，我特别喜欢，J.P.摩根是我最喜爱的历史人物之一，他就是一个例子。

Well, and so the classic stories, which I love so much, so JP Morgan's one of my favorite historical figures, and JP Morgan was an example of that.

J.P.摩根投资银行本质上就是这样的，虽然非常重要，但规模非常小。

The JP Morgan Investment Bank was like this basically this it was very important, but it was like this tiny little operation.

就挤在一个办公室里。

Was, you know, fit in a single office.

大概只有20个合伙人和一些行政人员之类的。

It was, you know, probably 20 principals and some office staff or something.

你知道，规模并不大。

Know, it's not large.

实际上，JPMorgan的一个秘密是，他是摩根的儿子。

And actually, hidden secret to JPMorgan was he was the son.

他父亲叫朱利叶斯·摩根。

The father was Julius Morgan.

好的。

Okay.

你刚才说话的时候，我 literally 就在想：等等。

I literally when you were talking, I was like, wait.

你你你，我对你竟然选他感到震惊，因为我觉得他父亲比他更了不起。

You you you I was shocking that you would say pick him because I actually found his father more formidable individual than him.

他是的。

He was.

所以，他确实是这样，这几乎适用于所有知名公众人物——父亲的故事通常更引人入胜，这样的例子很多。

So he was, which is almost always the case of any famous public figure, is the father is almost always a more interesting story, which a lot of examples of that.

但无论如何，是的。

But however yeah.

所以，天才摩根。

So, genius Morgan.

然后，摩根大通承担了一种在历史中被遗忘的特定经济角色，本质上，天才摩根——也就是天才摩根银行——位于伦敦。

And then and then JPMorgan has filled a specific economic role that's gotten lost in history, is basically, genius Morgan the genius Morgan bank was in London.

摩根大通银行则位于纽约。

The JPMorgan bank was in New York.

摩根家族所做的，是将资金从欧洲增长缓慢的旧经济，注入到美国这个新兴的高增长经济中。

And the and what the Morgan family was doing was they were funneling money from the old slow growth economy of Europe into the new high growth economy economy of The US.

但同样，这正是你的观点。

But, again, it was exactly your point.

这只是一个小型的家庭式运作。

Like, it was this little boutique family operation.

那个时代历史的另一大特点是，这些银行完全按宗教划分。

The other great thing about that era of history is these these were they were they were all bifurcated by religion.

它们分为新教投资银行和犹太投资银行，彼此从不往来。

So they they were the Protestant investment banks, and they were the Jewish investment banks, and they did not mix.

不。

And no.

完全不是。

Not at all.

完全是两个不同的世界。

Completely different worlds.

因此，像JPMorgan这样的新教银行能够投资铁路，而铁路在当时被认为是真正的实业。

And as a consequence, JPMorgan was the the Protestant banks, like JPMorgan, were able to find, like, the railroads, which were considered, like, the real businesses at the time.

是的。

Yeah.

但那些不光彩的行业，比如电影公司和百货商店，都是犹太投资银行涉足的。

But then, like, the all the disreputable stuff, like movie companies and, like, department stores, like, that those are all the Jewish investment banks.

顺便说一句，犹太银行几乎全部由犹太人创立，比如高盛，而JPMorgan则是今天唯一幸存下来的大银行，现名为JPMorgan Chase。

By the way, the Jewish almost entirely Jewish founders with, like and then then Goldman's go and JPMorgan is the big survivor of that today in form of JPMorgan Chase.

而在犹太银行这边，高盛则是最大的幸存者。

Then and then on the on the Jewish side, it's Goldman Sachs, you know, is is the great survivor.

但如果你回溯过去，当时有

But again, if you go back, there was

所以你认为这是投资银行业的双端策略。

So that's you consider that the the barbell in investment banking.

一边是像摩根大通那样的家族合伙制，另一边则是完全不同的高盛模式。

You have the the JPMorgan kind of like family partnership, and then you have the complete scale of, like, Goldman Sachs.

结果是，一百年前，摩根大通和高盛都起步于同一个位置，或者说，它们当时其实处于中间地带。

And so what happened was both j p both JPMorgan and Goldman Sachs started out a hundred years ago, they were on the one side of the or a 100 a hundred years ago, were actually in the middle.

它们当时是精品投行，但按那个时代的标准，有点像今天的中型机构，也就是所谓的‘大额承销商’，而不是单打独斗的个体。

They were they were kind of getting this sort of you know, they were boutiques, but they were, like of their time, they were, like today, call them, like, mid market, you know, who sometimes called bulge bracket, you know, kind of thing as opposed to just, a solo operator or something.

实际上，肯尼迪总统的父亲最初是上世纪二十年代挂出招牌，成为一名银行家，约瑟夫·P·肯尼迪。

Actually, the the way JFK's father got started was he literally hung out a shingle in nineteen twenties, such as Joseph p Kennedy banker.

他是一名私人银行家，只做交易。

Private banker, he just did deals.

当时他是一名天使投资人。

Was an angel investor at the time.

而大型商业银行则对向这些投机性极强的创业者发放贷款毫无兴趣。

Then you had the big commercial banks, but the big commercial banks had no interest in issuing loans to these speculative crazy entrepreneurs.

那时候，摩根大通、高盛、Coinbase、德雷塞尔以及所有这些其他中型银行，包括后来成为摩根士丹利的那些机构，都属于中型机构。

In that time, JPMorgan, Goldman Sachs, Coinbase, Drexel, and all these other mid market banks, Morgan Stanley, the banks that became Morgan Stanley, were these mid things.

如今，一百年后的今天，这些机构已经变成了规模庞大的巨头。

Now what's happened sitting here one hundred years later, those are now the scale players.

那些没有扩张的公司早已被遗忘。

The ones who didn't scale are long forgotten.

尽管如此，仍有一家公司保留了旧有的模式，那就是艾伦公司。

Having said that, there there's one firm that survives in the old model, and that's Allan and Company.

如今虽然还有其他精品投资银行，但艾伦公司成立于二十世纪二十年代，是唯一一家始终坚持精品投行模式、并持续保持这一模式长达百年的公司。

And there are other boutique investment banks today, but Allan and Company was founded in the nineteen twenties and has you know, has is uniquely the one that survived in the in the original model of boutique and deliberately being a boutique investment bank, and it stayed that way for a hundred years.

因此，一种理解方式是：如今银行业的‘两端模式’中，一边是艾伦公司，另一边则是摩根大通和高盛。

And so one way to think about it is that today, that's the barbell in banking, is Allen Company on the one side and then JPMorgan and Goldman Sachs on the other side.

我在读《从零到一》这本书时，找到了我最喜爱的一句名言。

I found one of my all time favorite quotes when I was reading the book Zero to One.

这句话说：我注意到的最强大的模式是，成功人士总能在意想不到的地方发现价值，他们通过从第一性原理出发思考商业，而不是依赖固定公式。

The quote says, the single most powerful pattern I have noticed is that successful people find value in unexpected places, and they do this by thinking about business from first principles instead of formulas.

AppLovin正是这样做了，他们推出了全新的广告平台Axon。

That is exactly what AppLovin has done with their new advertising platform, Axon.

Axon是这一代最强大的广告平台。

Axon is the most powerful advertising platform in a generation.

Axon能够让你获得完全专注的注意力。

Axon allows you to capture undivided attention.

Axon广告是全屏视频，平均观看时长达到35秒，留存率远超其他广告平台，而且几分钟内即可上线。

Axon ads are full screen videos that are watched for an average of thirty five seconds, retention that blows other ad platforms out of the water, and you can launch in minutes.

你设定目标，Axon帮你实现。

You set the goal and Axon achieves it.

无需复杂设置，也不需要专业知识。

No complex setup, no expertise needed.

Axon能够快速扩展。

And Axon scales quickly.

他们可以将你的广告展示给超过十亿潜在客户。

They can put your ads in front of over a billion potential customers.

其他企业已经看到了立竿见影的效果，每日广告支出高达数十万美元，并且收入增长了数百万美元。

Other businesses have seen immediate results scaled to hundreds of thousands of dollars of spend per day and increased their revenue by millions.

但大多数广告主甚至还没有考虑过这个渠道。

And most advertisers aren't even thinking about this channel yet.

不到1%的广告主能接触到Axon，所以你得赶紧开始行动。

Less than 1% of advertisers have access to Axon, so you want to get started quickly.

你可以通过访问 axon.ai 来实现。

And you can do that by going to axon.ai.

那就是 axon.ai。

That is axon.ai.

所以你在创办公司的时候也在关注这些信息吗？

So are you reading about this while you're founding the firm?

是的。

Yep.

在你创办公司之前就关注了吗？

Before you're founding the firm?

就像你们俩一样。

Like, you both.

本和我花了大约一年半的时间来规划这家公司，其中一部分原因是他在我们称之为工业奴役的地方工作。

Ben and I spent about a year and a half planning the firm, and part part of it was he was in we call it industrial industrial servitude.

在我们把公司卖给惠普之后，他就在惠普工作。

He was working for Hewlett-Packard after we sold our company to HP.

当时他正在负责惠普的一个重要部门。

So he he was a he was running a big part of HP at the time.

所以我们直到他从那里解脱出来，才能真正开始全职的新事业。

So And we couldn't literally start a new full time thing until he got free of that.

因此，我们有一年半的时间来学习、思考和工作。

So we had a year and a half to of study and think and work.

因为从2002年或2003年你大量进行天使投资，到六七年之后你创办公司这段时间里，你一直在观察这个模式中的各种缺陷。

And because you had this period from 2003 or 2002 when you're doing angel investing a lot, till you start your company six, seven years later, you're observing all of the weaknesses in the model.

而正是在这段时间里，你想到：为什么我们不直接采用CAA呢？

And that's where you have, Hey, why don't we take the CAA?

我认为奥弗茨称之为‘方阵’，意思是如果你在CAA有一个代理人，你就拥有了我们所有人。

I think Overtz calls it like the phalanx, it's like, if you have one agent at CAA, you have all of us.

他们会大张旗鼓地一起出现。

And they would like roll deep.

他书里提到过，比如‘哦，我的经纪人要来首映礼了。’

Think he says in his book, like, was like, Oh, my agent's coming to the premiere.

不，其实是二十个经纪人一起来，我觉得他们穿的都是同一家裁缝做的西装，故意想用这种方式震慑竞争对手。

No, it's like 20 agents are coming, and I think they'd be dressed in like the same kind of suit maker, and like they were intentionally trying to intimidate like their competition.

我们的西装是比弗利山庄的Sulka衬衫品牌做的，衬衫都是素色的，白色衬衫。

Our mining suits, Sulka shirts was a shirt maker in Beverly Hills, and sober you know, all sober colors, white shirts.

我想他当时和当地一家捷豹经销商达成了批量采购协议。

And then I think he had a bulk purchase deal, I think, the local Jaguar dealer.

至少传说中是这样，所有车牌都写着CAA1、CAA2、CAA3。

And the legend, at least, has it is that the license plates all said CAA1, CAA2, CAA3.

所以，当你去参加首映礼时，会看到二十辆捷豹一字排开，然后二十个穿着一模一样西装的人走下来。

And so, hey, you'd go to a premiere, and there would be, like, 20 Jags lined up and then 20 guys in identical suits coming out.

而且，是的，这正是关键所在。

And, yeah, just this is exactly the thing.

这就像是好莱坞版本的那样。

It's just like that you that's that's the Hollywood version.

但想象一下，如果你是个老派经纪人，这种场面会带来怎样的心理冲击。

But, like, just imagine the psychological impact of that if you're just, like, an old school agent.

我的意思是，迈克·迈克尔是我非常要好的朋友。

I mean, is sort of the know, Mike Michael's a very dear friend.

他众所周知，多年来变得非常有争议。

He's you know, he he became very controversial over the years.

我认为他之所以如此有争议，就是因为他在竞争中彻底压倒了对手。

And the reason he became so controversial, I think, is just because he smoked his competition so severely.

他狠狠地打击了他们。

Like, he he pounded them so hard.

对方根本无从回应。

There was no response.

你只是一个在老式经纪公司上班的普通人，结果一堆混蛋客户突然找上门来。

You're just a guy you're just a guy working for an old agency, and you've got your clients in 20 a motherfuckers are showing up.

而且，就是这样，没错。

And, like, it's just yeah.

这是一种强大的力量。

It's this force.

如果你去问他，你会发现，他的很多客户至今仍然活跃着。

And the clients, if you talk to him, by the way, you know, lot of his clients are, you know, still still active today.

跟你聊过那段时期后，你就知道，确实如此。

You know, from from the period of talk to him, it's just like, yeah.

这根本不用想。

It's just a no brainer.

你是想跟一个个人合作，还是想跟一家公司合作？

It's like, do you wanna work with a guy, or do you wanna work with a firm?

这很明显。

It's just obvious.

他有没有告诉你这些故事，我不确定。

He has I don't know if he told you all these stories.

他跟你讲过他的早晨日程安排吗？

Did tell you about his morning schedule thing?

骑上自行车，做那个，不行。

The the getting on the bike, doing the No.

不行。

No.

不行。

No.

为了公司。

For the firm.

为了不行。

For No.

不行。

No.

所以，这又是好莱坞特有的东西，但这是一个很好的例子，好吧。

So so so this is, again, something that's specific to Hollywood, but it's it's a great example of Okay.

在他在CAA起步时，经纪行业已经有九十年历史了。

The agency business At the time he started CAA, the agency business was ninety years old or something.

这个行业最初是做杂耍剧场和音乐厅的演出安排，已经存在了几十年。

It started out doing vaudeville bookings and music halls, and it had been around for decades.

参与其中的人有几十年的时间思考如何做得更好，他们最终形成了一套做法——我想我表述得没错。

The people involved in it had had decades to think about the best way to do it, and they had arrived at a set of And one of the practices I I think I'm getting this right.

其中一种做法是，每个经纪公司都会在早上九点召开员工会议，把所有需要共享的信息都在那时传达出来。

One of the practices was at every agency, they would have their staff meeting in the morning at 9AM, and they would basically share you know, whatever information is gonna get shared in the agency would get shared at that point.

比如，这位制片厂主管想要一部剧本。

And, you know, this studio head wants a script to do.

他想拍一部犯罪惊悚片，这是剧本，等等。

He wants to do a crime thriller, and here's the script and whatever.

然后，这就是一个信息传递给其他经纪公司的最小化交接环节。

And then, you know, this is, the point where there would be minimal, you know, whatever, minimal handoffing system to the other agency.

所以，每个人都会在这里得到更新。

And and so this is where everybody would kinda get updated.

因此，员工会议会从早上9点持续到10点。

And so the the staff the staff meeting would go from, like, 9AM to 10AM.

然后在10点，他们会开始给客户打电话。

And then at 10AM, they would start calling their clients.

他们会说，哦，听说有个，呃，什么的。

They'd be like, oh, you know, we heard there's a, you know, whatever.

有个新的角色要选角，比如一个专业的窃贼之类的，你应该考虑一下。

There's gonna be a casting call for, you know, this great new role for this professional thief or whatever, and you should consider doing that.

所以，迈克尔当然说，好吧。

So, of course, Michael's like, alright.

那我们就把员工会议定在早上7点。

Well, we'll have our staff meeting at 7AM.

我们八点就能结束。

We'll be done at eight.

是的

Yeah.

八点到九点之间，我们会给客户打电话。

Between eight and nine, we'll call the clients.

顺便说一下，我们不只是给我们的客户打电话。

By the way, we won't just call our clients.

我们会给他们的客户打电话。

We'll call their clients.

对吧？

Right?

所以想象一下，你是保罗·纽曼，你一直和某个经纪人合作了二十年。

And so imagine you're whatever, Paul Newman, and you've got some agent you've been working with for twenty years.

他在上午11点给你打电话，说：我有个很棒的角色。

And he calls you at your agent calls you at 11:00, it's like, I've got this great role.

你会说：哦，CA那边的人三个小时前就跟我提过这个了。

And you say, oh, the guys at CA called me about that three hours ago.

你的经纪人会说：他们不代表你。

Your agent's like, They don't represent you.

保罗会说：是的，这不是很棒吗？

And Paul's like, Yeah, isn't it great?

这难道不完美吗？

Isn't that fantastic?

所以，你只需要一遍又一遍地重复这个过程上千次，对客户来说，该怎么做就再清楚不过了。

So you just, again, you just like, you rinse and repeat that a thousand times, and it's just to the client, it's just completely obvious what to do.

所以，我之所以讲这些，故事的寓意是，again，这是一种关于现状和既得利益的理念。

And so, yeah, so the reason I go through this, the moral of the story is, again, it's sort of this idea, incumbency status quo.

在任何行业里，你最终都会陷入这些根深蒂固的假设。

You just end up you up in any business, you just end up with all these embedded assumptions.

九十年后，那些经纪公司的创始人早已不再参与其中。

Ninety years later, the founders of the agencies were ninety years ago, they weren't involved anymore.

当时经营竞争性经纪公司的都是经理人，而不是创始人。

The people who were running competitive agencies were managers, not same thing, managers, not founders.

管理者除非被迫，否则永远不会重新考虑基本假设。

The thing a manager never does unless they're under duress is reconsider fundamental assumptions.

他们讨厌这样。

They hate that.

管理一个大项目的核心意义就在于你不必做这些事。

That's not the whole point of running something big is you don't have to do that.

你可以规模化地运营这个大项目。

You get to run the big thing at scale.

你不必重新从零开始改造它。

You don't have to go in and reinvent it from scratch.

那听起来像一场噩梦。

That sounds like a nightmare.

但无论如何，结果就是，你最终会积累大量根深蒂固的假设，这些假设从未被言明，也没人质疑，根本没人去碰它们。

But anyway, as a consequence of that, you end up with all these embedded assumptions that are basically just unspoken, nobody's questioning, it's not happening.

如果你花点时间，就可以回溯到第一性原理，去重新审视，比如说：好吧。

And if you take the time, you can kind of go in and go back you know, first principles, you can kind go in and you can say, okay.

那么，他们是怎么得出这个结论的呢？

Well, how do they arrive at that?

我们在各行各业中发现的就是这样，我的意思是，我们的创始人每天都在做这件事。

And what what we found in just industry I mean, this is what our founders do every day.

就是一个行业接一个行业。

It's just industry after industry after industry.

这些根深蒂固的假设在1970年、1930年或1880年或许说得通，但现在完全不合时宜了。

There's all these embedded assumptions that made sense in 1970 or 1930 or 1880 that just don't make sense anymore.

我很喜欢你这么做。

I love that you did it.

我总是说，重要的不是你做什么，而是你怎么做。

I always say it's like not what you do, it's how you do it.

即使我并不经营一家经纪公司，但这么多原则其实都可以应用到风险投资上。

And if the idea that you could take, I'm not running a talent agency, but there's so many of these principles that I could apply to venture capital.

你的博客存档我超爱，我跟你说过我读过好多遍，我还专门做了几期节目讨论它，你当时给年轻人提了很多建议。

And your blog archive, which I absolutely love, and I told you I've read like multiple times, I did episodes on it, you would give advice to like young people.

我的建议是，去一个行业的创始人仍在工作的行业工作。

It's like, my advice is like, go work in an industry that's still, the founders of that industry are still working.

当我读奥维茨的书时，我会这样总结他的方法，因为他并不是那种庞大、僵化、行动迟缓、非常官僚的组织。

When I read Ovets' book, the way I would summarize his approach, because he isn't this big, stodgy, slow moving, you know, very bureaucratic organization.

平庸总是隐形的，直到热情出现并将其暴露出来。

It's like, oh, mediocrity is always invisible until passion shows up and exposes it.

有意思。

Interesting.

对。

Yes.

没错。

Right.

这就是他所做的。

And that's what he did.

是的，没错。

Yeah, that's right.

他就是觉得，你们在这儿有很多事情可以做得更好。

He's just like, there's so many things that you guys could be doing better here.

我在印度没法这么做。

I can't do it in India.

如果我没记错的话，他把这些想法告诉了他的老板。

If I remember correctly, he took some of these ideas to his boss.

哦，是的。

Oh, yeah.

对。

Yeah.

因为那个人是他的导师。

Because that guy was his mentor.

想不起他的名字了。

Can't remember his name.

他 famously 曾为威廉·莫里斯公司的首席执行官工作。

Famously worked for the CEO of William Morris.

是的。

Yeah.

对。

Yeah.

那是当时最大的经纪公司之一

Which was the biggest of the talent agencies at

所以你们和本当时基本上是在设计你们自己作为创始人时希望拥有的东西吗？

So the were you were you and Ben essentially just designing what you wish you had when you were founders?

是的。

Yeah.

没错。

That's right.

而且再说一遍，如果你曾经是客户，这可能就是一个捷径，没错，因为如果你亲身经历过，这些事情自然就变得清晰多了。

And and again, that may be a cheat code, yeah, if you've been the customer, obviously, this this this all becomes a lot more obvious.

我不知道你是否愿意回答这个问题，但沃伦·巴菲特在给股东的信里有一句很棒的话，大意是，选择与弱小的对手竞争非常重要。

And I don't know if you wanna answer this question or not, but in Warren Buffett shareholders, he has this great line where it's, like, really important to pick to to play against weak competition.

你有没有觉得，在风险投资的历史进程中，你会面对的是较弱或更弱的竞争者？

Did you feel that there was gonna be weak like, that that in time in venture capital history that you were going to be playing against weak or weaker competition?

我想说，并不完全是这样。

I would say not exactly.

我们并不认为他们是弱的。

We didn't view them as weak.

我们把他们看作是固守现状理念的一群人。

Viewed them as basically we viewed them as running on a status quo set of ideas.

而且要明确的是，我们之所以这样思考，是因为在那个时期，我们需要融资，而我们可能是当时最顶尖的两家风投公司之一。

And and to be clear, like, part of why we think about this, we had to raise money from the time in in the time, we're probably the two best venture Fisher firms.

所以，九十年代的克拉伦斯·珀金斯，以及我在网景公司与约翰·多拉紧密合作了五年。

So Clarence Perkins in the nineties, and I worked with John Dora very closely for five years in Netscape.

然后我们在CloudCloud融资时，找的是Benchmark，那时他们正处于巅峰，安迪·拉特克利夫是该公司的创始人之一，是一位传奇且卓越的风险投资人。

And then we we CloudCloud, we raised money from from Benchmark when they were like King of the Hill, and Andy Ratcliffe, who was one of the founders of the firm and is, you know, legendary, brilliant VC.

因此，我们恰好因为历史的机缘，长期与这个领域中顶尖的五位人物中的两位合作过。

And so we we had worked with we just had, you know, for accident of of history, we had worked with two of the whatever top five or whatever people in the field, you know, for a long time.

而且，他们当时和现在都非常擅长执行他们所处的这种模式。

And and and and they were and are, by the way, brilliant at running on on the model that that that they that that existed.

比如，约翰在这方面非常出色。

Like, John was brilliant at that.

安迪在这方面也很出色。

Andy's brilliant at that.

他们今天依然非常出色。

They're still brilliant today.

这并不是一种竞争，比如这些人很软弱，或者这些人不够聪明。

It was less a competition of, oh, these people are soft or these people aren't smarter.

完全不是这样。

It was none of that.

不是的。

It was no.

他们非常擅长执行这套特定的打法。

They're they're really good at executing against this particular playbook.

所以，顺便说一下，这就是为什么这没问题。

So that and by the way, that's why it's okay.

比如，如果我们打算这么做，我们就得

Like, if we're gonna do this, we need to be we need to

按照不同的打法来。

be playing by by a different playbook.

那时候根本不存在所谓的规模化风险投资吗？

There was no such thing as, like, scaled venture capital at the time?

没有。

No.

那时候没有。

At the time.

没有。

No.

没有。

No.

因为所有公司都遇到了这个极限。

Because the the firms all hit this they all hit this limit.

它们从根本上都碰到了这个极限。

They all fundamentally hit this limit.

它们都遇到了这样一个极限：无论是平等合伙制还是等级制合伙制，到了某个点就崩溃了，因为内部分歧实在太多了。

They all hit this limit where they just couldn't the idea of a partnership of equals or even a hierarchical partnership, it just breaks at some point because there's just too much internal dissension.

协调太难了，每个人都争抢着分一块当时被视为固定大小的蛋糕。

It is too hard to coordinate, then everybody's fighting for slices of what was viewed at the time to be a fixed size pie.

因此，其他公司从结构上根本无法实现规模化。

And so none of the other firms could Structurally, there was just no way to get to scale.

除了好莱坞的经纪人业务和商业银行、投资银行业之外，你还从哪里汲取了灵感？

Where else did you take ideas from besides the agent business in Hollywood and the merchant bank, investment banking industry?

哦，我的意思是，这在私人领域非常明显，你知道，当时正是像KKR这样的公司开始大展身手的时候，它们实际上正在内部建立大量的运营能力。

Oh, I mean, was just very obvious that it happened in private Like, you know, this this was the this was the time when, like it was actually really this was around the time when, like, KKR and firms like it were hitting their stride with they're actually building, like, a lot of operational capabilities in house.

它们实际上是在内部建立自己的投资银行。

They were actually building their own, actually, investment banks in house.

我们从未做过的一件事，但一直列在理想清单上，就是真正建立一家内部银行。

One of the things we've never done, but it's always been on the ideal list, is to actually just have an in house bank.

KKR实际上已经这么做了，他们建立了一家专属银行。

KKR had actually done that, just build a captive bank.

他们做过很多类似的事情。

They had done a bunch of things like that.

我们看到了这种情况的发生，即中型私募股权公司正在崩溃。

We saw it happening, which is the mid tier private equity firms were collapsing.

你要么需要一个非常灵活的独立操作者，专门做小交易，要么就需要像KKR那样的规模平台。

And you either needed a solo know, very light on your feet kind of solo operator on the one side doing small deals, or you needed to have a scale platform like KKR.

这种情况也发生在对冲基金领域。

It happened in hedge funds.

这种情况也发生在……等等，其实早在电视剧《广告狂人》里就体现了。

It happened in but, I mean, it had long actually actually, the TV show Mad Men.

《广告狂人》讲述了六七十年代广告行业发生这种结构性变化的故事。

Mad Men tells the structural story of this happening in the advertising field in the sixties and seventies.

我会毫不留情地剧透《广告狂人》，因为这部剧已经播出二十年了。

And and I I will ruthlessly spoil Mad Men because it's been it's been it's been out here for, twenty years at this point.

但《广告狂人》剧情的一大主线是，那些人工作的斯特林·库珀是一家典型的中型广告公司，对吧？

But, you know, a big part of the arc of Mad Men is those guys are working Sterling Sterling Cooper is a classic mid market ad agency.

对吧？

Right?

然后，然后剧情发展到，不管怎样，

And and then and then it's and then then it and for whatever.

第三季时，他们把公司卖给了麦肯，也就是当时那个规模庞大的巨头。

The third third season, they they sell it to McCann, which was the the scale player at the time.

剧中展示了所有优势，显然他们采访过真正经历过这种转变的人，详细呈现了在麦肯工作的利与弊，因为麦肯是个庞大的机器。

And and they show you all the pros and they clearly talk to people who had been through this because they showed you all the pros and cons of working for McCann because McCann's this giant machine.

唐·德雷珀过去习惯自己做所有创意决策，现在却只能坐在会议室里和别人争论，最后干脆站起来走人。

And so Don Draper is used to, like, making all the creative decisions, and now he's just in this conference room arguing with people until he just, like, gets up and walks out.

但随后，唐·德雷珀和罗杰·斯特林创办了自己的初创公司。

But then Don Draper and Roger Sterling start their own startup.

他们创立了斯特林·库珀·德雷珀·普赖斯，这是第二个公司，一开始是一家真正的初创公司，一家真正的精品公司。

They start Sterling Cooper Draper Price, the that's the second one, which starts out as a as a true startup, as a true boutique startup.

然后他们经历了大约一年半的地狱时光。

And then they have this, whatever, year and a half, just just fucking hell.

他们根本打不开局面。

Like, they can't get anywhere.

他们拿不到客户，因为他们太小了。

They can't get clients, like, because because they're too small.

你知道的吗？

You know?

他们规模太小了。

They're they're subscale.

然后我想，最后，我记不清了，因为太久没看了，但我觉得最后他们还是把公司卖了。

Then I think in the end, I forget it's been too long, but I think in the end, end up selling it.

不，不，不。

No, no, no.

抱歉。

Sorry.

我搞错了。

I got it wrong.

他们把第一家卖给了英国广告公司，结果对方彻底毁掉了它。

They sell the first one to the British ad agency that just completely destroys it.

然后他们把第二家卖了出去。

Then they sell the second one in the can.

他们实际上展示了这个过程发生了两次。

They actually show that process happening twice.

再说一遍，如果你回溯历史，就会发现20世纪40年代到70年代广告公司里到底发生了什么。

Again, if you go back in history, is what happened in the ad agencies basically between the 40s and the 70s.

基本上，电视的出现催化了这一变化。

Basically, television catalyzed that.

当电视兴起时，广告的重要性比以往大得多，必须以一种全新的方式实现专业化。

When television emerged, advertising became a much bigger deal than it had been before, and it just had to be professionalized in a different way.

另一件发生的事是，外部环境发生了变化。

The other thing that happened is, of course, the external environment changes.

对吧？

Right?

所以我们刚才讨论的一切，都只是关于这些事物内部运作的机制。

So so everything we just talked about just has to do with the internal mechanics of how these things run.

但另一件发生的事是外部环境发生了变化。

But but the other thing that happens is the external environment changes.

对吧？

Right?

所以我认为迈克尔会说，我想你会同意这一点，使CA成为可能的部分原因在于，一度好莱坞只是电影，然后还有一个所谓的低层次的电视部门。

And so part of what I think what Michael would say, I think you would agree with this, part of what made CA possible is at one point, basically, Hollywood was just movies, and then there was, like, whatever, a low kind of TV division.

到了七十年代和八十年代，好莱坞的规模早已远不止电影了。

And and by the seventies and eighties, the you know, Hollywood was becoming much bigger than just movies.

对吧？

Right?

当时是电影、电视、广告、音乐、体育，还有政治、文化，各种各样的东西。

It was movies and TV and advertising and music and sports and, you know, you know, politics and culture and, like, all kinds of things.

公平地说，我们的竞争对手，硅谷在1950年到2010年之间主要只是做工具生意。

In fairness to our competitors, Silicon Valley between, call it, 1950 to 2010 was primarily just in the tools business.

从惠普开始，我们当时所有创办的公司基本上都是在制造工具。

Primarily the companies that starting with Hewlett-Packard, the companies that we all back then built were basically just building tools.

你制造一种工具，比如操作系统或硬盘，然后卖给人家，让他们自己去琢磨怎么用。

And you build a tool like an operating system or a disk drive or something, and you'd sell it to people, and they'd figure out what to do with it.

就在我们公司成立前后，硅谷正从主要做工具业务转向直接在传统行业中建立具有竞争力的公司。

It was right around the time we started our firm that the Valley was going from being primarily tools businesses to actually building directly competitive companies in incumbent industries.

对吧？

Right?

比如Airbnb直接进入酒店业。

And so Airbnb going directly into the hospitality industry.

对吧？

Right?

所以，在另一个平行宇宙中，Airbnb 只是为 Airbnb 开发的精品酒店预订软件，对吧？

So alternate universe Airbnb is just boutique booking hotel software, right, for for an Airbnb.

所以它只是一个小小的精品业务，本质上就是在开发一个小电子表格软件。

So it's a tiny little boutique business building basically a little spreadsheet software.

但不，Airbnb 的布莱恩·切斯基做出了一个极其聪明的决定。

But, no, Airbnb, Brian Chesky decided, brilliantly.

我们就直接进入酒店业，和酒店正面竞争。

We're just gonna, like, go into the hospitality business and compete with hotels directly.

Uber 和 Lyft 在过去只是出租车调度软件。

Uber and Lyft in the old world were just taxi dispatch software.

在新的世界里，它们成了完整的交通服务提供商。

In the new world, they're full transportation providers.

在过去，特斯拉可能只是开发自动驾驶汽车的软件。

Tesla in the old world would have just been software for self driving cars.

而在新世界里，特斯拉则打造了整辆汽车。

Tesla in the new world builds, you know, the entire car.

顺便说一下，Facebook也是同样的情况。

By the way, face Facebook, same thing.

在Facebook之前，如果你开发了在线广告软件，你会把它卖给媒体公司。

Prior to Facebook, if you built, like, online ad, you know, software, you were selling it to the media companies.

马克说，不。

Marc's like, no.

我们要直接打败媒体公司。

We're just gonna beat the media.

我们要把整个东西都做出来。

We're just gonna build the entire thing.

对我们来说，另一件发生的事是，那时正是硅谷的雄心从仅仅构建工具转向直接进入传统行业的转折点。

And so this was the other thing that happened was for us was that that was right around the pivot point when the Valley's ambitions went from just building tools to going directly into incumbent industries.

然后这就回到了规模的问题上。

And then this goes back to the scale thing.

问题是，为什么你需要扩大一家风投公司的规模？

It's like, okay, why do you need to scale a venture firm?

因为这些公司需要扩张。

Because the companies need to scale.

对吧？

Right?

当然，现在AI让这一点变得再清楚不过了，对吧？

Then, of course, AI now makes that crystal clear, right?

因为领先的AI公司正在筹集数十亿、上百亿，有些甚至达到数千亿美元的资金。

Because the winning AI companies are raising billions, tens of billions, in some cases hundreds of billions of dollars.

对吧？

Right?

过去那种一千万、三千万或五千万美元的投资额，也就是风投公司资金耗尽的水平，已经完全过时了。

The old world of $10,000,000 or $30,000,000 or $50,000,000 checks, you know, where VCs tap out is just not relevant thing anymore.

但你在创立这家风投公司的时候，知道规模正在发生变化吗？

But did you know the scale was changing at the time you founded the firm?

我们当时已经有相当清楚的认识了。

We had a pretty good idea.

所以我从Facebook创立之初就一直以非正式的方式参与其中，然后从2007年开始正式担任董事会成员。

So I've been I've been involved with Facebook, you know, basically, you know, informally since inception and then formally on the board since 2007.

所以我亲眼见证了它在曲线上的拐点出现。

And so I I saw the and that thing hit the knee in the curve.

这一点对我们来说非常清楚。

It was just very clear.

对我们而言，虽然我们不知道它会发展到多大，但显然它会比早期互联网1.0时代的公司大得多。

It was to us, it was just, like, very that we didn't know how big it was gonna get, but it was gonna get much, much bigger than the Internet one point o companies had gotten.

所以这就是其中一个因素。

So there was that.

还有别的吗？

What else?

那段时间苹果公司也直接进入了手机市场，这也是另一个很好的例子。

It was also around the time Apple was directly entering the cell phone market, which was another great example of this.

硅谷过去并不生产手机。

Silicon Valley didn't used to make cell phones.

最初的手机并不是由硅谷制造的。

The original cell phones weren't made by Silicon Valley.

它们是由索尼、诺基亚、摩托罗拉（位于伊利诺伊州）等大型工业公司制造的。

They were made by these giant industrial companies like Sony and Nokia and whatever and Motorola in Illinois or whatever.

而硅谷则负责制造手机内部的芯片或软件。

And then Silicon Valley would make the chips that go into them or the software.

当然，史蒂夫当时说：是的。

And of course, Steve was like, yeah.

不。

No.

去他的。

Screw that.

我们就直接造一部手机吧。

We're just gonna make a phone.

对吧？

Right?

当时已经有一些迹象表明这件事正在发生，而另一件事则是互联网本身正在走向成熟。

There were these signals that it was happening, and then the other thing was just the Internet itself was maturing.

对吧？

Right?

那时，消费互联网已经发展了十五年，我们见证了这一过程的每一个阶段。

And so at that point, the consumer Internet was fifteen years in, and we had seen every part of that.

所以我们知道，我忘了具体数字，但那时全球互联网用户数量正从十亿迈向五十亿。

And so we know, we I forgot what the number was, but that was probably around the time the global Internet penetration was crossing a billion users on its way to 5,000,000,000.

是的，你有着非常独特的亲身经历，因为你亲身经历了互联网的起步阶段。

Yeah, you have a very interesting lived experience where you were there at the very beginning of the internet.

我特别感兴趣的一点是，这实际上将要

One thing that I'm fascinated by, this is actually what's going to

成为第一个

be the first

问题，因为我从未听你谈过这个话题，至少在播客里没有，但你和吉姆·克拉克的合作与关系。

question for you, because I've never heard you speak about this, at least on a podcast, but your partnership and relationship with Jim Clark.

你见到他的时候，大概20岁吧？

You were, what, 20 when you met him?

你当时多大？

How old were you?

我比较传统。

I was old fashioned.

我确实大学毕业并拿到了学位。

I actually graduated from college and got my degree.

在今天看来，这简直是石器时代的概念。

It's a very stone age concept these days.

那是1994年，所以我大概是1994年，22岁。

So that was in 1994, so I was probably 2022, '22.

有一本特别棒的书。

So there's this great book.

我甚至不觉得你喜欢迈克尔·刘易斯写的那本关于硅谷的书，我都没读过。

I don't even think you like the book written by Michael Lewis, Silicon Valley I've skipped it.

我读过两遍，只是因为我也不知道书里写的是否属实，但他描绘的这个非常古怪的人物形象，对我来说简直太有趣了。

I've read it twice just because I don't know if anything's in there is true, but the portrait he paints of this very eccentric character is just wildly entertaining to me.

但让我震惊的是，当你和年轻的创业者交谈时，我会想，这家伙创办了三家我认为他是历史上第一个创立了三家独立的十亿美元科技公司的人。

But what's shocking to me is when you talk to young founders, I'm like, this guy started three I think he was the first person in history just to found three separate billion dollar technology companies.

我觉得没错。

I think that's right.

但几乎没人知道他是谁。

And almost no one knows who he is.

你能谈谈你是怎么认识他的吗？

Can you just talk about how you met him?

和他共事是什么感觉？

What was it working with him?

我完全知道他是谁，原因是他创办的第一家公司——硅谷图形公司，在大约1987年到1994年期间，是硅谷的巨头公司。

I knew exactly who he was, and the reason was because his company, Silicon Graphics, his first company, they were the company in the valley between, like, call it '27 call it, yeah, '87 to '94 or something.

他们就像当时的谷歌、OpenAI或者你想到的任何一家公司一样。

They they were like whatever, Google or OpenAI or whatever, you know, comp comp you wanna make.

他们就是那个标杆公司。

Like, they were like the company.

我的意思是，他们是所有行业里最聪明的人都想加入的公司。

And and by that, I mean, like, they were the company where the smartest people in industry all wanted to work there.

他们开发的产品，是你能想象到的最酷的产品。

The prod they they built the products that were, like, the coolest products you could possibly imagine.

他们拥有极其年轻、充满活力和动感的文化。

They had this incredibly young and vibrant and dynamic culture.

然后在1992年左右，他们迎来了一场不可思议的文化转折点，那正是电影行业的重要转折点，因为计算机图形技术真正开始崛起。

And then they hit this, like, cultural moment that was just incredible in, I think, '92, which was the, yeah, which was the turning point in in in the movie business when, you know, computer graphics really kicked in.

紧接着上映的两部电影是《侏罗纪公园》和《终结者2》。

And the the two movies back to back were Jurassic Park and Terminator two.

这些机器是他们制造的。

Brought on the machines they made.

我们是基于他们研发的技术进行开发的。

We built on the machines they it's the technology they made.