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我想从一个事实开始,你提到过paloaltodelivery.com,那是DoorDash之前的最简版最小可行产品。
I want to start with fact that you said that paloaltodelivery.com, which was DoorDash before DoorDash, the most minimal version of a minimal viable product.
你能解释一下你是怎么构建它的吗?
Can you explain how you built it?
好吧,只要你能在43分钟内交付某个东西来测试你的想法,我认为这已经很不错了。
Well, whenever you can ship something in forty three minutes to test your idea, I think that's pretty good.
而且这比大语言模型和AI工具兴起的十二、十三年前还要早,那时候做这些可没那么容易。
And certainly this is twelve, thirteen years before the rise of LLMs and AI tools to make it so easy to do that.
但基本上,我们四个人想测试一个想法:如果你想为那些从未提供过配送服务的地方提供配送,最快验证消费者是否在意的方法是什么?
But basically, the four of us wanted to test this idea that if you wanted to offer delivery from places that never offered delivery before, what is the fastest way to see whether or not consumers would care?
我的意思是,归根结底,配送并不是什么新点子。
I mean, at the end of the day, delivery is not a new idea.
所以我们觉得,也许2013年时配送还没普及的原因之一,就是根本没人想要它。
And so we thought actually one of the reasons why maybe delivery in 2013 hadn't been around yet was just because nobody wanted it.
所以我们上线了paloaltodelivery.com。
So we shipped paloaltodelivery.com.
这个域名售价9美元,所以我们买下了它。
That alias was available for $9 And so that's why we got it.
虽然这不是一个可扩展性很强的网址,但我们还是成功获取了它。
Not a super scalable URL, but we were able to get it.
那是一个静态页面,显示了我们在帕洛阿尔托常去的八家餐厅的PDF菜单。
It was a static page where you saw eight PDF menus of restaurants that we frequented in Palo Alto.
你下单的唯一方式是浏览菜单,然后拨打一个Google Voice号码,这个号码会同时响铃四位创始人的手机,其中一人会接起电话。
And the only way in which you can order is you can read through the menus, you can call a Google Voice number that would ring the cell phones of the four founders and one of us would pick up.
我们会记录你的订单,代你下单,去取餐,然后送给你。
We would take your order, place the order on your behalf, go and get the order, deliver it to you.
我曾经在Square实习,所以手头有他们早期的产品——那种白色的小插件,可以插入iPhone的音频接口,我们就用它来收款。
And I used to be an intern at Square and so I had these card readers, which was one of their earliest products, these white dongles that you could stick into the audio jacks of iPhones, and that's how we would collect payment.
我之前没想起来,因为现在DoorDash、Uber Eats这些服务感觉已经存在很久了,但当时其实并没有多少配送公司,你几乎是开创了这个市场。
Something I didn't remember until because it feels like DoorDash and Uber Eats and everything else has been around forever, there wasn't but What was the state of There was other delivery companies, but you essentially created the market for this.
当我告诉别人我即将去采访Tony,关于DoorDash的事时,他们都说:‘真不敢相信他能在这么激烈的市场竞争中活下来。’
Can you explain, like, when I was telling people, I'm really excited I'm going go speak to Tony for DoorDash, they were like, I can't believe he survived in this competitive market.
但他们只是假设,已经存在其他应用程序,为那些没有自建配送团队的餐厅提供配送服务。
But they just assumed that all like, there was other apps out there that were already delivering for restaurants that didn't have a delivery fleet.
那时候根本不存在这样的服务。
That didn't exist then.
不。
No.
实际上,是的,我认为我们在创立之初最大的误解之一,就是意识到这个领域有多么开放——美国大约有一百万家餐厅,但只有两万到两万五千家提供配送服务。
Actually, yeah, I think one of the biggest misconceptions when we were founded was just how wide open the space was, where there were about a million restaurants in The States and maybe 20,000 to 25,000 of them offer deliveries.
其中大多数是披萨店,还有一些位于纽约市、芝加哥或大城市中心的餐厅。
Most of them are pizza shops, places in New York City, some in Chicago, some in big city centers.
但除了披萨店和少数中餐馆之外,几乎没有其他餐厅提供配送服务。
But outside of pizza places, maybe a few Chinese restaurants, nobody offered delivery.
因此,DoorDash和PaloAltoDelivery.com真正要探索和验证的核心问题是:那其他所有餐厅呢?
So the real grand question or experiment of DoorDash, Palo AltoDelivery dot com, was, okay, what about everyone else?
如果能让每个人都提供配送服务,会怎么样?
What if you can enable everyone to actually offer delivery?
那需要什么条件呢?
What would that take?
首先,人们会在意吗?
First of all, would people care?
这正是我们如此迅速推出产品的原因,只是为了看看人们是否会真的来下单。
That's really why we ship something so quickly, just to see if people would actually come and place orders.
那么当时现有的公司都在做什么呢?
So what were the existing companies doing then?
说实话,他们主要是在传真订单,你敢信吗?
They were mostly honestly faxing orders, believe it or not.
他们会有个网站接收订单,如果你能相信的话。
So they would be a website that would receive orders if you can believe it.
他们会把订单直接传真到餐厅厨房或收银系统旁的机器上。
They would fax the orders literally into machines that would sit near the kitchen or the payment systems inside these restaurants.
然后餐厅自己出去送货。
Then the restaurants would actually go out and do the deliveries themselves.
所以当时它们是线索生成公司。
So they were lead gen companies at the time.
我听过你谈论构建最后一公里物流网络。
I've heard you talk about developing this last mile logistics network.
那你当时有考虑过这一点吗?
Did you think about that back then?
还是你只是想,嘿,我只是想扩大外卖市场的规模?
Or you're just like, Hey, I'm just going to try to expand the market for food delivery?
不,我们确实考虑过。
No, we did.
当我们起步时,或许应该先退一步,回溯到我们上线paloaltodelivery.com之前,甚至是如何走到这一步的——我的联合创始人和我之所以走到一起,是因为对小企业的共同兴趣。
When we started, I guess to take a step back before we shipped paloaltodelivery.com or even how we got there, my co founders and I really got connected because of an interest in small businesses.
我想我公开讲述过我的故事:我作为中国移民来到美国。
I think my story I've told publicly, is really, I grew up coming to The States as an immigrant from China.
我妈妈为了养家,连续十二年每天打三份工。
And my mom put food on the table by working three jobs a day for twelve years.
其中一份工作是在一家中餐馆当服务员。
One of those jobs happened to be at a Chinese restaurant where she was a waitress.
我可以和她待在一起,有时她允许我洗几个盘子。
I got to hang out with her, wash a few dishes when she allowed me to.
在我父亲在伊利诺伊大学攻读博士学位期间,我就是这样长大的。
That's kind of how I grew up while my dad was getting his PhD at the University of Illinois.
那是我在美国度过的童年最初的十年左右。
That was the first ten years or so of childhood growing up in The States.
那个时刻和经历始终让我对小企业主所代表的意义深怀敬意。
And that moment and experience always just gave me a deep appreciation for what small business owners represent.
我的意思是,对他们来说,根本没有‘工作’这个概念。
I mean, to them, there's no such thing as work.
工作和生活对他们来说是一回事。
Work, life, it's all the same thing.
他们根本没有周末或周六的概念。
There's no concept of a weekend or a Saturday.
星期六和星期二完全是同一天。
It's Saturdays and Tuesdays are exactly the same days.
你会不知不觉地陷入这种状态,以至于这成了你的身份认同。
And you just kind of get into this process where that becomes your identity.
这其实是我对美国这场伟大实验最着迷的地方之一,因为这种全身心投入最终带来了一个积极的副产品:他们不仅创造了出色的体验,比如餐厅、酒吧、家具店或T恤店,还实际上为我们的城市创造了GDP。
And it's actually one of the most fascinating things I find about the great experiment that's America, where because it becomes this all consuming thing, one of the nice positive derivatives is actually they don't just create great experiences like a restaurant or a bar or a furniture store or a T shirt shop, they actually create the GDP for all the cities that we live in.
正是这些GDP让我们拥有了美好的社区、学校,以及本地社区中发生的各种积极事物。
That GDP is what allows us to have great neighborhoods, schools, all the positive things that happen from a local community.
这一直是让我着迷的地方。
And that was always my fascination with it.
不过,当我们刚开始做DoorDash时,完全不了解这些商家面临的问题。
We had no idea, though, when we're looking at starting DoorDash about anything related to what these business owners' problems were.
因此,我的联合创始人和我走访了旧金山湾区从圣何塞到旧金山的约300家商户,包括餐厅、零售商和服务类企业。
And so my co founders and I, we spoke with 300 maybe businesses up and down the Bay Area from San Jose to San Francisco, restaurants, retailers, service businesses.
实际上,是一位面包师给我们看了一本三英寸厚的订单登记册,里面全是她不得不拒绝的配送订单。
And it was actually a baker who showed us a booklet, a three inch binder of delivery orders she had turned down.
她是个体经营,根本没有能力,或者说 frankly,也不想接下所有这些订单。
She was a one person shop who had no ability to fulfill or desire, frankly, to fulfill all those orders.
那一刻对我们来说非常奇怪,我当时就说:配送并不是什么新点子。
And that was just a very strange moment for us where I said, Delivery is not a new idea.
现在都2013年了。
It's 2013.
居然没人提供配送服务。
No one offers delivery.
为什么?
Why?
这真正促使我们思考推出paloaltodelivery.com,看看是否有人在意。
And that's really what prompted us to think about launching paloaltodelivery.com to see if people cared.
但关于你提到的物流网络问题,我们想,好吧,如果我们能帮助本地商家的第一个切入点是建立一个物流网络,那我们就得选个地方起步。
But to your question on logistics networks, we said, okay, well, if the first place in which we can help local businesses is by building a logistics network, we have to pick a place to start.
而这时,我想是我的数学思维发挥作用了——当我们研究了所有类型的本地零售业态,考虑从哪里开始,无论是餐厅、杂货店、便利店还是零售店。
And this is where, I guess, the math brain comes in for me, where when we studied every category of local retail of where we would start, whether it was deliveries for restaurants, grocery stores, convenience stores, retail shops.
所有这些都是一种选择吗?
All those are all options?
我们研究了所有这些选项。
We looked at all of them.
我们有一个假设:如果你想有机会建立一个真正成功、非常快速且高度灵活的物流网络——能够半小时内送达,也可以更长时间送达——你就需要网络密度。
And we had this hypothesis that if you wanted a chance of creating a logistics network that could actually be successful, that can be very fast, that can be very flexible, meaning it can deliver in thirty minutes or it can deliver longer than that, you needed network density.
你需要在消费者和商家之间建立最多的连接。
You needed the most number of connections between consumers and stores.
我们选择了餐厅,因为有一百万家餐厅。
We targeted restaurants because there were a million restaurants.
如果将这个数字与杂货店的数量相比,可能只有几十万家杂货店。
If you compare that to the number of grocery stores, was there maybe a couple 100,000 grocery stores.
当你考察其他零售类别时,餐厅的门店数量是最多的。
And you looked at other categories of retail, restaurants had the highest count of stores.
因此,我们很快假设:如果要选择一个领域来启动配送业务,那一定是餐厅和即食餐品,这样我们才有机会建立密度最高的网络,以便有一天能配送所有其他商品。
And so very quickly, we made the assumption that if there's any vertical to get started in doing deliveries, it would be restaurants and prepared meals to give us a chance to build the highest density network so that one day we can deliver everything else.
我想跟你们聊聊这个播客的赞助商Ramp。
I wanna tell you about the presenting sponsor of this podcast, Ramp.
我最近读了很多关于SpaceX的资料。
I've been reading a lot about SpaceX lately.
SpaceX是全球最有价值的私营企业之一,其历史中有一个理念,其他公司也该借鉴。
SpaceX is one of the most valuable private businesses in the world, and there's an idea from their history that more companies should use.
从一开始,SpaceX就不断挑战和质疑自己的成本。
From the very beginning, SpaceX was constantly attacking and questioning their costs.
Ramp帮助世界上许多最具创新性的企业实现这一点。
Ramp helps many of the most innovative businesses in the world do exactly that.
使用Ramp的公司,平均能将开支削减5%。
The median company running on Ramp cuts their expenses by 5%.
我通过阅读SpaceX的资料发现的一个重要理念是:对控制成本的执着有助于增加收入,因为你能够把握原本无法触及的机会。
And the important idea that I found by reading about SpaceX is that a religious dedication to controlling costs helps increase revenue because you can pursue opportunities you couldn't otherwise.
我们在Ramp的数据中也看到了这一点。
We see that in the Ramp data too.
使用Ramp的公司,其收入中位数也增长了16%。
The median company running on Ramp also grows their revenue by 16%.
所以当你在使用Ramp经营业务,而你的竞争对手没有时,你就获得了随着时间推移不断累积的巨大竞争优势。
So when you're running your business on Ramp and your competitors are not, you have a massive competitive advantage that compounds over time.
Ramp是唯一一个专为让财务团队更高效、更快乐而设计的平台。
Ramp is the only platform designed to make your finance team faster and happier.
我认识的许多顶尖创始人和首席执行官都在使用Ramp经营他们的业务。
Many of the top founders and CEOs that I know run their business on Ramp.
我自己用Ramp经营业务,你也应该试试。
I run my business on Ramp, you should too.
立即访问ramp.com,了解他们如何帮助你的企业节省时间、降低成本并增加收入。
Go to ramp.com today to learn how they can help your business save time, save money, and grow revenue.
那就是ramp.com。
That is ramp.com.
可能还有其他人有过类似的想法,但我记得你曾经讲过一个故事,说他们实际上进入了城市中心。
There was other people that had maybe a similar idea, but I heard you tell this story one time where you're like, well, they actually went into city centers.
而且
And
你拥有的一个优势,我甚至觉得这可能不是有意的,那就是你从帕洛阿尔托起步,而不是纽约市。
one advantage you had I don't even think this might have been accidental is that you started in Palo Alto instead of New York City.
你能谈谈
Can you talk
为什么这很重要吗?
about why that was important?
是的。
Yeah.
在帕洛阿尔托起步并不是一个有意识的选择。
Well, starting in Palo Alto was not a conscious choice.
那时我们只是学生,就在那里。
It was just where we were students at the time.
但我们最早进行的实验之一,就是在帕洛阿尔托和旧金山之间做配送对比——也就是一个靠近我们公司发源地的城市中心。
But one of the earliest experiments we ran at DoorDash was doing deliveries in Palo Alto versus doing deliveries in San Francisco, So a city center, if you will, that was close to where we started the company.
我们发现的一个有趣现象是,起初我们并不明白原因,但在帕洛阿尔托内部的配送速度实际上比在旧金山更快。
And one of the fascinating things we found out, and we didn't understand why initially, was we were actually completing deliveries faster inside Palo Alto than we were inside San Francisco.
显然,旧金山的人口密度更高。
Obviously, San Francisco is a more dense place.
但我们早期学到的一点是,帕洛阿尔托的停车要容易得多。
But one of the things we learned early on though was that obviously, in Palo Alto, had much easier parking.
你很少需要进入公寓楼,上下楼梯,寻找大堂或正确的电梯入口之类的事情。
You had a lot fewer apartment complexes where you had to go up and down the stairs and figure out where the lobby was or the right elevator entrance, things like that.
帕洛阿尔托的情况是这样的:如果你观察像帕洛阿尔托这样的地方,它代表了美国大多数城市或世界许多地方的模式——主街道是商业中心,而人们则居住在主街道外围的辐射区域。
Palo Alto had the following, which is if you looked at places like Palo Alto, represents, I think, most cities in The US or a lot of the world where you have main streets and then you have in the spokes outside of this main street hub of commerce, you have where the people live.
如果你聪明地思考这一点的真正含义,你就能通过有效利用这些中心与辐射点,构建一个非常高效的物流系统。
And if you actually thought intelligently about what that really told you, you can actually build a very efficient logistics system if you just understood how to manipulate some of these hubs and spokes.
这是我们最早的一个假设:在帕洛阿尔托这样的地方,物流业务完全可以比在旧金山更高效。
This was one of the earliest hypotheses we had that you can actually make a logistics business as efficient in a place like a Palo Alto versus San Francisco.
这一结论正是由这项实验所引导的。
That was guided by that experiment.
第二件事是与客户交谈。
The second thing was actually just in talking to customers.
客户告诉我们:‘在旧金山,我只要乘电梯下楼,走出大堂,就能找到几家吃饭的地方。’
What customers told us was they said, Look, in San Francisco, I can just walk down elevator and head out the lobby and we could probably find a few places to go and eat.
而在帕洛阿尔托,你得走上好几英里才能找到类似的地方。
In Palo Alto, you'd be walking for miles before you could achieve something like that.
比如,我们刚开始时,斯坦福大学附近最近的一批餐厅在大学大道上,距离两英里远。
The closest set of restaurants near Stanford University where we started this was two miles away on University Avenue, as an example.
在美国的许多地方都是如此。
That's true in a lot of places in America.
因此,如果我们想找一个消费者兴趣最高、且有可能让商业模式成立的地方,那一定是像帕洛阿尔托这样的地方。
And so if there was any place we thought where there would be the highest interest from consumers and a possibility where you can actually make the math work, it was places like Palo Alto.
对我们来说,问题只是:这样的地方到底有多少个?
And the question to us was just how many of them are there?
这时候在做配送的,只有创始人们吗?
And the only people doing deliveries at this time are the forefounders?
是的
Yeah.
最初的时候,只有联合创始人自己送。
In the very beginning, just the forefounders.
好的。
Okay.
你之前提到过这一点,说很明显,城市以外的需求更高。
So you had a line about this where it said, It became obvious that the need was higher outside of the cities.
当时我们还没有数据来证明这一点。
We did not have the data to prove it at the time.
我们有这种信念,因为我们亲自送餐,所以这可能是真的。
We had the conviction that because we were doing the deliveries ourselves that this could be true.
是的
Yeah.
亲自送餐的一个好处是,首先,你能亲眼看到每次准时、准确地把一份卷饼送到顾客手里有多难。
One of the benefits when you do the deliveries is, well, one, you see how hard it is to actually bring you a burrito on time every time correctly.
第二点是,你能看到客户是谁。
The second thing is you get to see who the customer is.
你发现客户几乎总是那些有年幼孩子的妈妈,她们时间不多,不想每天做饭,只想找任何能节省时间的解决方案。
You saw the customer actually almost always was a mom who had young children, who had not a lot of time, who didn't want to cook every single meal, who wanted to just look for any solution to save her time.
因此,当我们做这些配送时,我们看到,哇,原来有这么多年轻家庭。
And so when we did those deliveries, we just saw, wow, well, there are a lot of young families out there.
让我们去发现他们常去的地方。
And let's go find out where they hang out.
让我们去发现他们住在哪里。
Let's go find out where they live.
这就是为什么我们有这种感觉:可以以这个群体为基础来建立一项业务。
And that's why we had that sense that we can build a business with this audience to start.
这是不是从这些郊区或城市开始的另一个意外收获?
Is that another unexpected benefit of starting in these, basically, the suburbs or the cities?
想想典型的城市人口,比如更多是单身人士,或者只有一对夫妇。
Think about the typical city populations, like maybe more single people or maybe just a couple.
但并不是很多大家庭挤在这些楼里。
But it's not large families shoved in these buildings.
是的。
Yeah.
我的意思是,这可能是这一发现的衍生结果。
I mean, I think that was probably a derivative of the discovery.
但不,我认为在初期,尤其是当你作为一名创业者寻找产品市场契合点时,你是在寻找那些真正自发想要你产品的人。
But no, I think in the beginning, especially when you're looking for product market fit as an entrepreneur, you're looking for someone who actually just wants your product organically.
我们很快就能看出,那些有年幼孩子的父母,可能不想推婴儿车、收拾所有随车物品,再把婴儿车和孩子一起搬上车,然后下车,设法进入拥挤的停车场或餐厅——这样的人其实很多。
And we could tell very quickly that someone who has young children, who maybe doesn't want to take a stroller, pack it up, pack all the things that come with a stroller, then put that stroller and the children into the vehicle, then get it out, and then somehow get inside of a crowded parking lot or a restaurant, well, there are a lot of those people.
如果我们能为这个群体解决问题,我们就相信可以打造一个能够自然增长的业务。
If we can solve it for that group, then we believe we could build a business that can easily grow organically.
你说得对。
You're right.
还有一个衍生影响是,有家庭的人需要养活的嘴比城市里一两个人要多。
There's a second derivative, which is there are more mouths to feed when you have a family than when you have one or two people living inside of a city.
但这并不是我们最初的想法。
But that wasn't the first thought we had.
但甚至比第二层衍生需求更进一步,因为你刚才解释说,好吧,我是把东西送到某人家里的,我知道该停哪里。
But even more than a second derivative, because you were just explaining like, Okay, well, I'm delivering you somebody's house, I know where to park.
而不是我在城市里,得自己找大堂在哪儿。
As opposed to I'm in a city, you have to navigate where's the lobby?
我怎么进这栋楼?
How do I get in this building?
我该去哪一层?
What floor do I get?
怎么使用电梯?
How to access the elevator?
对吧?
Right?
是的,完全对。
Yeah, totally.
而独栋住宅的存在无疑让事情简单了很多。
And the presence of single family homes made it a lot easier for sure.
这正是向帕洛阿尔托这样的地方送货的优势之一。
That was one of the benefits of delivering to places like Palo Alto.
但同样,我认为这源于一个非常简单的实验,结果却出现了异常发现:为什么在帕洛阿尔托送货比在旧金山更快?
But again, I think it just came from this very simple experiment, had an anomalous finding, which is why is it faster to deliver in Palo Alto than it is in San Francisco?
换句话说,为什么在密度较低的地方送货更快?
Why is it faster to deliver in a less dense place, in other words?
没错。
Exactly.
这正是让我觉得有趣的地方。
This is what is interesting to me.
这几乎让人觉得,你的竞争对手似乎都做了最明显或最合乎逻辑的事情。
It almost made sense like your competitors seem to do the most obvious or like the logical thing.
但其实并不是,我需要的是订单密度。
It's like, no, I need order density.
人都去哪儿了?
Where are all the people?
我还是去城市里看看吧。
Let me just go to the cities.
当我们刚开始时,我认为每个创业者最关心的问题是:你有没有别人真正需要的东西?
We chased where the I think when you're starting out, the number one thing every entrepreneur is looking for is do you have something that someone else wants?
它是不是真实的?
And is it real?
意思是,它不是靠折扣、营销经费或其他人为手段人为地增长出来的。
Meaning like it's not artificially inflated with discounts and marketing dollars and just other ways to inorganically grow.
人们真的会使用它吗?
Will people actually use it?
如果他们真的喜欢这项服务,他们会告诉朋友吗?
Will they actually tell their friends about it if they actually liked the service?
我们在帕洛阿尔托这样的地方早期就发现了这一点。
That's what we found early on with places like Palo Alto.
即使你们从帕洛阿尔托搬到路易斯安那时也是这样吗?
Even when you were called Palo Alto to Louisiana?
尤其是在我们被称为帕洛阿尔托的时候。
Especially when we were called Palo Exactly.
我们的一切开销都从我的银行账户支出,因此我很早就意识到,尽管我们没有任何模型或单位经济效益预测之类的东西,但即使当时我的银行账户里还有学生贷款,账户余额也没有每周或每月都持续下降。
We ran this out of my bank account, And that's why I knew early on, even though, look, we didn't have any models or unit economic forecasts or anything like this, but even though it was running out of my bank account where I also had student debt at the time, my bank account wasn't going down every single week or every single month.
某种直觉告诉我,也许这件事有成功的可能。
Something was telling me that maybe this is a chance of working.
当时你们的成本是多少?
What were your costs at the time?
因为你们有四位创始人,本质上都是人力成本。
Because you have the four founders, essentially labor.
可能没有。
Probably not
给自己发工资。
paying yourself.
我们没给自己发工资。
Didn't pay ourselves.
是的,所以你们是
Yeah, so you're
不给自己发工资
not paying yourself
无偿劳动。
free labor.
只是投入了你们的时间。
Just your time.
你们建了一个89美元的网站。
You built an $89 website.
我听到一件特别搞笑的事。
I heard something that was hilarious.
我们当时想,反正没有复杂的调度系统,就直接用‘查找我的朋友’应用吧。
We were like, Well, we don't have a sophisticated dispatch system, so we just use the Find My Friends app.
我们用了Find My,我们用了Find My Friends。
We used Find My We used Find My Friends.
Friends。
Friends.
我们用了
We used
来追踪司机,这恰好都是我们的
To track the drivers, which just Our happened to be all of
联合创始人。
co founders.
你有
You have
一个Google Voice号码。
a Google Voice number.
我们有。
We do.
没有做任何市场推广,对吧?
There's no marketing advertising, right?
没有。
No.
不,我们当时没钱去
No, we had no money to
所以你们当时还有什么其他开销吗?你记得吗?
make So it or what other expenses did you have back then?
你记得吗?
Do you remember?
这完全是自筹资金的。
It was all kind of like self funded.
直到我们不得不开始招募司机,并且在我们四个人之外进行实际测试之前,整个活动都是自筹资金的。
This entire activity was self funded until we had to start recruiting drivers and actually testing this out beyond just the four of us.
你们是在这个时候申请了Y Combinator,还是不是?
This is when you applied to Y Combinator or no?
是的。
Yeah.
对,就是在那个时期。
Yeah, mean, in that time period.
好的。
Okay.
你们申请Y Combinator的时候,除了创始人之外,还有更多司机吗?
The time you apply to Y Combinator, do you have more than drivers than just the founders or no?
我们可能有一两个。
We may have had one or two.
好的。
Okay.
是的,我们很快意识到,我们当时还在上课。
Yeah, very quickly we realized, well, we're in class.
我们上课的时候轮流送件,但后来发现同时当学生和送件实在很难。
And we took turns doing deliveries while we were in class, but at some point, it's tough to be a student and do the deliveries.
你们还剩多少年才毕业?
How many years did you have left of business school?
你们上学的同时运营公司,一共持续了多久?
Like how many years were you in school and running?
我们离毕业大概还剩六个月。
We had maybe six months left before graduation.
我的意思是,在2013年那段时间,我们实际上就是斯坦福的配送服务。
I mean, we were effectively Stanford's delivery service for the half of or for the 2013, we were effectively Stanford's delivery service.
然后我们拿到了DoorDash的域名和公司名称,并在同年夏天,6月20日,从Y Combinator正式上线。
Then we get DoorDash, the URL and the company name, and then we launched out of Y Combinator in the summer, June 20.
我的意思是,现在当有人开始使用DoorDash,或者当我开始使用DoorDash的时候,对吧?
Was it like now, once somebody starts using DoorDash, or when I start using DoorDash, right?
我会觉得,哇,这太方便了,于是就一直反复使用。
I'm like, oh, this is very convenient, I just keep using it over and over again.
你们当时有没有观察到同样的行为模式?
Did you see that same behavior pattern back then?
是的,当时用户群体非常小,因为一开始我们的订单量并不高。
Yeah, with a very small group of users, because in the beginning, we actually did not have high volume.
我的意思是,每天大概只有10单左右,类似这样。
I mean, it was probably 10 orders a day, something like that.
也许我们最高的一天也只有21单左右,差不多就是这样。
Maybe our high day was like 21 orders a day, something like this.
但大多数订单都来自斯坦福的一小群用户。
Most of them, however, were done by a small group of users at Stanford.
当你看到同样的顾客反复下单,尽管业务并没有像野火一样迅速扩张,但我们的银行账户也没有快速耗尽,这
When you see that fact that the same customers are ordering over and again, even though it wasn't growing like wildfire, but our bank account also wasn't getting depleted, it
给了
gave
我们足够的信心继续坚持下去。
us enough conviction to keep going.
当你们看到这种情况时,创始团队之间都进行了哪些讨论?
What were the conversations amongst the founders when you guys are seeing that?
我们继续吧。
Let's keep going.
我认为我们更把它看作是一个项目,而不是一家公司。
I think we viewed it as a project more than we viewed it as a company.
事实上,我们几乎还没有注册公司。
In fact, we were barely incorporated.
我们在斯坦福大学运行这个项目时还没有注册公司,直到我们真正进入YC时才完成了注册。
We were not incorporated when we were running this at Stanford University, and then we just got incorporated when we actually got into YC.
当时,我们只是想看看下一阶段该做什么。
At the time, it was just like, let's just see what the next phase should be.
我认为,当你启动这些项目时,确实应该对它未来可能的发展方向有一个清晰的见解。
I think sometimes when you start these projects, you absolutely should have a point of view on maybe where this can go in terms of going the distance.
但最重要的是先开始行动,然后明确接下来的两到三个步骤。
But the most important thing is to just get started and then to have a sense of what the next two or three steps are.
没有人能预知未来的一切。
No one is able to know everything about the future.
对我们来说,那个夏天非常有启发性。
And for us, the summer was really instructive.
我的意思是,头六个月我们亲自送餐,这让我们清楚地认识到,夏天的核心就是回答三个问题。
I mean, summer, I think doing the deliveries ourselves for the first six months gave us the clarity that the summer was really about answering three questions.
消费者愿意为我们提供的服务支付6美元吗?
Would consumers want to pay us $6 which is what we charged?
有没有餐厅愿意以15%的分成与我们合作?
Are there restaurants who would be willing to partner with us for 15%?
我们能否负担得起给配送员的工资?
Could we afford a wage that we could pay dashers, the drivers for the service?
就这些。
That was it.
这就是YC夏天的全部内容。
That was the entirety of the YC summer.
这跟演示日、筹集最多资金,或者在某个活动中变得最受欢迎无关。
It was not about demo day or raising the most amount of money or becoming the most popular at some event.
只是回答这三个问题。
It was just answering those three questions.
如果我们对这三个问题有足够的信心,我们就会继续下去。
If we had enough conviction answering those questions, then we'd keep going again.
你讲过一个特别搞笑的故事,说夏天的时候,一些同学说,是啊是啊,我要去施塔特滑雪之类的。
You told this hilarious story where during the summer some of your classmates were like, Yeah, yeah, I'm going to go ski in Stadt or something like that.
你呢,托尼?你在做什么?
What are you doing, Tony?
我在我的本田车里送鹰嘴豆泥。
Like, I'm delivering hummus in my Honda.
是的,是的。
Yes, yes.
是的,我的意思是,我认为我们在斯坦福有很多同学看着我们,心想,天啊,我以为他们挺聪明的,但看来他们想把时间花在这种事上。
Was a yeah, look, I mean, I think we had a lot of classmates at Stanford who looked at us and just thought, boy, like, I thought they were like smart, but I guess they want to spend their time doing this.
所以你看,很多创业项目刚开始的时候,看起来都不怎么了不起,对吧?
And so look, in the beginning of a lot of these entrepreneurial ventures, nothing looks that amazing, right?
我们当时在一个公寓里工作。
We were working out of an apartment.
那个公寓里有配送员。
We had Dashers in that apartment.
联合创始人也住在这个公寓里。
We had the co founders live in that apartment.
我们每天从早上10点工作到凌晨2点。
We worked 10AM to 2AM every single day.
但这并不是什么光鲜亮丽的活动。
But it wasn't like this glamorous exercise.
我们也没有追求过这种光鲜。
Nor did we seek that.
我们只是想在那个夏天回答那三个问题。
We were just trying to answer those three questions that summer.
我们根本不太在意朋友们在做什么。
We didn't care that much about what our friends were doing clearly.
我们认为,如果真能回答这些问题,这件事就足够有趣,值得继续做下去,这说明我们可能真的发现了什么。
We thought that it was interesting enough to keep going that if we can actually answer these questions, I think we're actually onto something.
我们刚请了马克·安德森做节目,他说过一句很棒的话:我坚信,做出伟大事业的人都是在第一次做这件事。
We just had Marc Andreessen on the show, and he's got this great line where he says, I firmly believe that people that do great things are doing them for the first time.
有没有人曾经有餐厅经验?甚至都不用是餐厅经验,因为你们根本没在餐厅里?
Did anybody have any restaurant or actually not even restaurant experience because you're not even in the restaurant?
任何一位创始人有物流、配送方面的经验吗?
Any Any of the founders have anything to do with logistics or delivery or anything?
没有。
No.
没有。
No.
这正是我们必须亲自送餐的原因。
It's actually why we had to do the deliveries.
我们如此执着于亲自送餐,除了因为我们完全不知道能否招募到其他司机外,还因为我们需要弄清楚:这到底是怎么运作的?
The reason why we were so hell bent on doing the deliveries besides the fact that we had no idea whether we had any business recruiting other drivers was, how does this work?
它应该怎么运作?
How should it work?
我认为DoorDash早期,甚至到今天,但早期的时候,解释起来非常困难,因为就连构建MVP来测试,也只是这个网站:palalo.deelmeritu.com。
And I think DoorDash early on, even to this day, but early on, it was so hard to explain because it was actually even to build the MVP, yes, to test it was just this website, palalo.deelmeritu.com.
但我们必须构建四个东西。
But we had to build like four things.
我们需要为消费者搭建一个网站。
We had to build this website for consumers.
我们需要为餐厅开发一个应用程序,以便它们能够接收订单。
We had to build some app for the restaurants to actually receive the orders.
我们需要为司机(即Dasher)开发一个应用程序。
We had to build an app for the drivers, the dashers.
然后我们还需要构建一个调度系统,来统筹所有运营操作。
And then we had to build a dispatch system that actually could oversee all of the operations.
即使在最开始,我们就意识到,哇,这实际上相当有趣。
Even in the very beginning, we realized, wow, this is actually pretty interesting.
仅仅为了给你送一份卷饼,就需要构建这四个系统,这个问题真是太有趣了。
It's just such a fun problem that in order to actually just bring you a burrito, you have to build these four things.
而要真正做到极致,这就是为什么我们亲自完成所有配送,来弄清楚该如何真正实现这一点。
Then to do it really, really well, that's why we did all the deliveries to figure out how you actually do that.
所以你当时被误解了。
So you're misunderstood back then.
你刚才说了一件很有趣的事。
You just said something interesting.
你觉得到现在还是这样吗?
You think that's still the case to this day?
当然。
Absolutely.
因为我觉得大多数人我完全能理解。
Because I think most people and I totally get it.
把DoorDash当成一个消费者应用来看。
Mean, think of DoorDash as a consumer app.
你知道,大多数人把我们当成午餐和晚餐的平台。
You know, most people think of us as lunch and dinner.
我认为他们没看到的是幕后的一切。
And I think what they don't see is everything behind the scenes.
很多时候,作为消费者,你可以看看我们这样的产品,会觉得哇,这看起来和其他产品没什么不同。
I think a lot of times, I think you can look at products like ours, especially as a consumer, and you say, wow, this looks like any other product.
这样的产品太多了。
There are so many of them.
但我会问一个问题:为什么其中一个使用频率远高于其他产品呢?
But then I would ask the question, well, how come one just gets used more often than the next or the others?
这归根结底在于那些你看不见的东西。
And it comes down to everything that you can't see.
我们在达达公司内部经常说的一句话是:真正要命的,总是那些你看不见的数据。
One of the things we say a lot internally at the company at DoorDash is it's always the data that you can't see that kills you.
因为如果你能看到一辆卡车朝你冲过来,你只会躲开避让。
Because if you can see a truck coming at you, you're just going to dodge and get out the way.
但如果你看不见它,你就完了。
But if you can't see it, you're dead.
我们的业务也是如此。
And it's no different with our business.
我们的业务中,所有的魔力或所谓的秘诀,都藏在那些你无法看见的地方。
Our business is one where all of the magic or the secret sauce, if you will, are in things that you cannot see.
没有消费者在下单使用DoorDash时,会去思考配送员的体验应该是什么样,如何运营才能以最实惠的价格提供最佳体验,或者如何消除与餐厅或零售商合作中的每一处摩擦和成本,并确保即使商品不在眼前,也确实已经送达。
No consumer is sitting there while they're ordering DoorDash thinking about what the dasher experience should look like or what the operations should be to get the best quality experience at the most affordable price or what are the ways in which you take out every single friction and cost with a restaurant or a retailer and make sure that all the items are actually there even when they're not there?
我认为,正是这些因素让DoorDash与众不同,使其成为一种极难被复制的端到端体验。
I think all of these things are the things that make DoorDash special and make DoorDash an end to end experience that's very difficult to replicate.
但是的,我们早期就知道这一点,因为我们自己亲自完成了所有配送。
But yeah, I think early on we knew that because we did all the deliveries.
你知道谁最清楚这些吗?
You know who knows it?
你的竞争对手。
Your competitors.
所以你不会喜欢这个,因为在我看来,你真的很谦虚,甚至可能谦虚得过了头。
So you're not going to like this because you're, in my opinion, really humble, probably too humble for my liking.
但你这个行业里的人对你很害怕。
But people in your industry are afraid of you.
首先,我得告诉你一个连你都不知道的个人故事。
One, I have to tell you a personal story that I don't even think you know.
我之前也不知道自己早就听说过你。
And I didn't know I've heard about you before.
我当然没怎么想过,你用过DoorDash,我从来没留意过。
I didn't really obviously, you used DoorDash, I never thought about it.
你刚才描述的,完全就是我的经历。
What you just described is exactly my experience.
就是觉得,我有个神奇的按钮,能给我送来一份卷饼。
Was just like, I have a magic button that brings me a burrito.
明白吗?
Okay?
我超爱这个神奇按钮。
I love that magic button.
不管怎样,别把我的这个神奇按钮拿走。
Don't take that magic button away from me, whatever you do.
但大约一年半前,我在斯德哥尔摩,丹尼尔·埃克非常友善地招待了我和其他几位欧洲创始人。
But I was in Stockholm about a year and a half ago, and Daniel Ek was very kind to host me and, like, a handful of European founders.
当时和我以及丹尼尔一起吃晚餐的一位欧洲创始人,我以前从未见过,他就是Wolt的米基。
And one of the European founders that was sitting next to me and Daniel at dinner was somebody I had never met before, and it's Mickey from Wolt.
挺酷的。
Very cool.
但他跟我讲了一件有趣的事,因为基本上他的故事是:听我说,我打造了欧洲版的DoorDash,这就是Wolt的定位。
But he told me something interesting because, you know, basically the story was, he's just like, Listen, I built the DoorDash of Europe, I guess is how Volt was described.
我一直觉得自己是个创业者。
He's like, I always thought of myself as an entrepreneur.
我从没想过会为别人工作。
I never thought I would work for anybody.
他说,我们当时正处于一场正面竞争,对吧?
And he's just like, we were in a head to head battle, right?
他说,我当时面前摆着一份投资条款清单。
And he's like, I had a term sheet in front of me.
如果我没记错的话,他有能力再筹集十亿美元的资金。
If I remember the number correctly, was getting like a bill he had the ability to raise another fresh billion dollars of capital.
是的。
Yeah.
他看着那份条款清单,考虑要不要签字。
And he was looking at the term sheet, thinking about signing it.
然后他不由自主地说出了一句话。
And then he said involuntarily, something came out of his mouth.
他说,我赢不了他。
And he says, I can't beat him.
他说,我赢不了他。
He's like, I can't beat him.
他说:我简直不敢相信这话竟从我嘴里说出来了。
And he's like, I cannot believe that came out of my mouth.
他说,然后他低头想了想,要么就把这笔钱烧了,要么就把公司卖了,拿到改变人生的钱,去给托尼打工,学点东西。
And he's like And then he looked down, he's like, I could either light this money on fire I could sell my company for life changing money and go work for Tony and learn a lot.
我想直到今天,他仍然直接向你汇报,对吧?
And I think to this day, he still directly reports to you, correct?
是的。
Yeah.
对。
Yeah.
他负责我们所有的欧洲业务。
He runs all of our European business.
他当时试图向我和丹尼尔解释,别以为那有什么神奇的,其实原理非常相似。
And he was trying to explain to me and Daniel about just don't The magic is very similar.
那些你看不见的东西,有多难去与之竞争。
The stuff that you don't see, how hard it is to compete against.
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你还有另一个有趣的引述,我想读给你听。
You had another interesting quote I wanted read to you.
你说,达达之所以能取得如此大的成功,是因为成千上万次的试错,其中95%甚至从未到达顾客手中就失败了。
You say that the way that DoorDash has achieved so much success is tens of thousands of experience, 95% of which never even make it to the customer before they fail.
要提高配送的准确性,可能需要比你想象中更深入、更细致的细节。
The way to get more accurate on a delivery probably requires some level of detail that is lower and deeper than you realize.
你能解释一下你这句话背后的含义吗?
Can you explain what you meant behind that statement?
这又要从我们亲自去做这项工作说起,我们意识到,如果你真的想准时完成任务,刚开始时,光是站在外面做理论分析,很容易以为问题很简单。
This again starts from actually doing the work ourselves and realizing that if you actually want to get something on time, I think it's very easy to think about when you're just intellectualizing it on the outside when we're getting started.
哦,可能是交通问题,或者食物准备时间比预期长,诸如此类的原因。
Oh, maybe there's a traffic issue or maybe, oh, the food is taking longer than it should, whatever the reasons might be.
但除非你亲自去执行,否则你根本不知道一个订单中到底有哪些延迟来源。
But you actually have no idea actually what are all the sources of delay in an order until you actually go and do the work.
当然,有些问题你可能在外面就能想到。
Sure, there might be some of the issues that I think you can think about on the outside.
但很快你就会意识到,每一个环节都存在数秒的延迟。
But then very, very quickly, you realize that there's a lot of seconds of delay in every emotion.
事实上,你可以将一次配送分解为大约20个步骤。
In fact, there's about 20 steps you can decompose a delivery into.
而在每一个步骤中都会出现延迟。
And there's delays at each one of those moments.
如果配送地点不在餐厅内,情况会更加复杂。
And that's even more complicated if the delivery today is they happen outside of restaurants.
配送可能发生在超市或零售商品等购物场景中。
They happen inside shopping contexts like groceries or retail items.
或者发生在多层商场里,有时在地下,有时在地面以上。
Or if they happen inside malls that are multi story, sometimes below ground, sometimes above ground.
你开始意识到,原来导致延迟的原因真的非常多。
And one of the things you start realizing is, wow, actually, there are a lot of causes for delays.
除非你真正亲身体验过,否则根本不可能了解所有这些原因。
And there's no way that you're going to know about all of them until you literally actually encounter it for the first time.
DoorDash 难就难在,我们试图在一个混乱的世界中构建一个结构化的数据集。
A lot of what's difficult about DoorDash is we're trying to build a structured data set in a world that is chaos.
这就是现实世界。
That's the physical world.
之所以会有这么多错误、延迟和成本的来源,最终影响到客户的体验好坏,是因为根本不存在现成的数据。
One of the reasons why there's all these sources for mistakes, for delays, for costs that ultimately yield into costs and good or bad experiences for customers is because there is no data that exists.
没有像谷歌这样的公司为你整理好的优质数据集,因为这些都是物理世界的信息。
There is no nice data set that a company like Google or somebody else has organized for you because it's all physical information.
这些信息还在不断变化。
Information and it's also changing all the time.
当你走进一家杂货店,有人把苹果从6号通道移到8号通道,这种情况总会被记录下来吗?
When you go into a grocery store and somebody moves an apple from Aisle 6 to Aisle 8, is that always going to get documented?
当然不会。
Of course not.
这些正是我们每天都要应对的问题。
Those are the kinds of things we have to work on every single day.
而你根本不会知道这一点。
And you wouldn't know that.
如果我告诉你,延误的原因是那天有人想家了,你会怎么想?
What if I told you the cause for a delay was because actually somebody was homesick that day?
在这件事真正发生之前,你怎么可能知道呢?
How would you know that actually until that event actually transpired?
如果这种情况发生,你会如何应对?而这种情况每天都会发生。
And what would you do to respond to that event if that were to occur, which happens every single day?
当我们每天处理数百万笔订单时,百万分之一的概率事件也会频繁发生。
When we're doing millions of orders every single day, the one in a million event happens a lot.
而千分之一的概率事件发生的频率远高于此。
And the one in a thousand event happens way more than that.
因此,要构建一个系统,理想情况下能够检测并预防这些问题,同时还要具备极快的反应能力,像应急响应系统一样,在问题真正出现时迅速修复,这需要不断重复工作,构建一个能够随着时间推移不断学习、不断改进的系统。
And so building a system that can ideally detect and prevent these issues, but then also a very fast twitch muscle to actually be able to build this almost like an emergency response system when something actually goes awry to fix it, that requires doing the work over and again and building the system that can learn over time to get better and better and better.
大多数时候,我们根本一无所知。
Most of the time, have no idea.
我们从这些实验开始,因此大多数实验都会失败。
We start with these experiments and that's why most experiments fail.
但当你从中获得足够多的成果时,如果能在一年内让数以万计的实验中有5%成功,那将为明年所有用户带来巨大收益。
But when you get enough goodness out of it, if you can get the 5% out of tens of thousands of experiments to work in one year, that has the benefit on all of your audience for the next year.
然后你只需持续下去,这会为所有用户带来复利式的额外收益。
Then you just keep going, and that adds compounding surplus for all of the audiences.
Deel 将帮助您的企业在全球任何地方招聘、支付和管理员工。
Deel will help your business hire, pay, and manage any worker anywhere in the world.
Deel 是全球招聘基础设施建设领域最出色的公司。
Deel is the best company in the world at building infrastructure for global hiring.
Deel 是一个平台,支持在150个国家进行薪资、人力资源、福利和设备管理。
Deel is one platform for payroll, HR, benefits, and device management across 150 countries.
Deel 为您提供一切所需,让您在一个原生AI平台上高效运行全球团队。
Deel gets you everything you need to run a high performing global workforce on a single AI native platform.
从首次录用到最终离职,Deel 处理所有复杂事务,让您专注于业务本身。
From first offer to final off boarding, Deel handles the complexity so you can stay focused on your business.
世界上最好的创始人和运营者有一个共同点。
The best founders and operators in the world have one thing in common.
他们尽可能掌控自己的业务,而Deel的创始人正是如此。
They control as much of their business as possible, and the founders of Deel do exactly this.
当你使用Deel时,你并不是在使用第三方薪资处理服务商或混乱的本地供应商网络。
When you use Deel, you aren't using a third party payroll processor or a messy network of in country providers.
Deel构建并拥有整个基础设施。
Deel built and owns the rails.
这意味着更快的速度、更好的服务和完全的责任制。
That means faster speed, better service, and total accountability.
我用来为这个播客生成字幕的Eleven Labs的创始人,对Deel能给你的公司带来的价值有一个很好的描述。
The founder of Eleven Labs, who I use to make transcripts for this podcast, has a great description of the value that Deel can give your company.
他说,我们创建Eleven Labs是为了打破语言和沟通障碍。
He said, we built Eleven Labs to break down language and communication barriers.
借助Deel,我们能够在任何地方招聘和支持卓越人才,从而加速创新,让更多的声音、故事和想法传遍世界的每个角落。
With Deel enabling us to hire and support exceptional talent anywhere, we can accelerate our innovation and bring more voices, stories, and ideas to every corner of the world.
Deel 已获得超过四万家客户的信赖,并且正在快速增长。
Deel is trusted by over 40,000 customers and growing fast.
请前往 deal.com/senra 了解他们如何帮助您的企业。
Learn how they can help your business by going to deal.com/senra.
就是 deal.com/senra。
That is deal.com/senra.
不过,您是怎么进行这么多实验的呢?
How do you do that many experiments, though?
这是按年进行的吗?
Is this a yearly basis?
这是指 DoorDash 整个发展历程中的情况吗?
Is this like over the history of DoorDash?
意思是您每年都在运行成千上万的实验?
Like you're running thousands of experiments every year?
理想情况下是这样的。
Ideally.
是的,没错。
Yeah, yes.
我认为,当我们表现最佳时,正是这种情况在发生。
I think when we are at our best, that's what's happening.
但这始于建立一个真正渴望学习的系统。
But it starts with actually building a system that actually wants to learn.
如果你仔细想想,为什么我们必须学习呢?
If you think about it, like, why do we have to learn?
这是因为物理世界,首先,是没有结构的。
It's because the physical world, A, is not structured.
它 nowhere 被记录下来。
It's not documented anywhere.
你无法抓取它。
You can't scrape it.
它在不断变化。
It's constantly changing.
例如,现在东北地区正经历一场冬季风暴。
There's a winter storm right now, for example, in the Northeast.
这些事情都是以不同方式发生的。
These are all things that happen differently.
这里加利福尼亚的天气真美。
It's beautiful here in California.
是的,我知道。
Yeah, I know.
我们在这里根本无从得知。
We would have no idea here.
我们在湾区过得太安逸了。
We're spoiled here in the Bay Area.
但总的来说,这些事情每天每时每刻都在发生。
But in general, all these things are happening every single hour of the day.
好吧,今天可能会漏掉一些内容。
Okay, there's going to be some missing item today.
今天有一个订单花了比平时长得多的时间。
There's going to be some order that took a lot longer today.
我们可能会误入某个公寓大楼的错误入口。
There's going to be some incorrect gate we entered at an apartment complex.
会有配送员在这家办公楼的楼梯上迷路。
There's going to be some dasher who's going to get lost coming up the stairs of this office building.
这肯定会发生。
There will be, guaranteed.
所以问题在于,如果你能构建一个系统来学习如何处理这些情况,那么试图弄清楚所有这些细节几乎是不可能的。
And so the question is like, well, it would be impossible to try to figure out all of that if you can build a system to learn how to do this.
因此,最重要的是构建系统。
So the most important thing is actually building systems.
在DoorDash,构建系统实际上始于以一种非常操作性、临时性、不具扩展性的方式进行测试,然后将最终有效的方法和想法提炼出来,围绕它们打造产品,并对真正有效的方案进行工程化,从而让这个学习循环变得非常高效。
And building a system that at DoorDash really starts with testing things in a very operational hacky, do things that don't scale kind of way, and to then taking the things that ultimately work, the ideas, and actually building products around them, and then engineering the ones that actually work so that you're actually very efficient with this learning loop.
这样你才能从学习快速过渡到交付真正有效的产品,因为我们工程师数量有限,能交付的项目也有限,尤其是在高风险的情况下。
So that you can go from learning to shipping something that actually works because it's a resource constraint with how many engineers we have and how many things that we can actually ship, especially when the stakes are high.
你希望让这个循环尽可能紧密和快速。
You want to make that loop as tight and as fast as possible.
这就是你构建一个能够学习成千上万件事的系统的方法。
That's how you build a system in which you can learn thousands of things.
你只需要不断重复去做。
You just have to keep doing it over and over.
我们的业务理念是,我们必须每天重新赢得为你服务的权利。
Our business is one where we believe we have to earn the right to serve you the next day.
即使你今天在我们这里下了单,非常感谢你的支持,我们仍需再次争取。
Even though you ordered with us today, thank you very much for your business, we have to earn it again.
明天的评分表会清零,我们必须重新开始这一切。
The scoreboard goes back down to zero tomorrow, We have to just do that all over again.
你是在哪里学到这一点的重要性?
Where did you learn the importance of that?
什么?
Of what?
每天重新开始?
Of starting over again every day?
我以前就听过你说过这个,我非常喜欢这个理念。
I've heard you say that before and I love that idea.
在DoorDash早期,我们就意识到维持用户的信任有多难,而失去信任却有多容易。
Very early at DoorDash, we learned how hard it is to keep someone's trust and how easy it is to lose it.
我想我可能以前说过,但有一次斯坦福的橄榄球比赛,我们失去了大量信任,因为路上司机不够,所有配送都延迟了,而且我们无法关闭网站。
And I think I may have said this before, but there was a Stanford football game in which we lost a lot of trust, where we were late on every single delivery because we didn't have enough drivers on the road, we had no ability to shut down the website.
但类似的情况我们经历过很多次。
But we had a lot of those
不同的是,停一下。
different Pause there.
那么在DoorDash的历史中,这场比赛是什么时候?
So where in DoorDash history is this game?
这是我们的第三个月,2013年9月的一个星期六。
This is the third month of our operations, September 2013, where it was a Saturday.
我们无法处理涌入的订单。
We had no ability to fulfill the orders that came in.
我们甚至无法关闭网站,因此根本无法阻止订单洪流。
We had no ability to even shut down the website, so we couldn't even stop the floodgates.
通常为什么
And usually Why
为什么三个月就出现订单洪流了?
were you having floodgates three months in?
我们并不是在三个月后出现订单洪流,而是在那一天特定发生。
We had floodgates not three months in, on that day specifically.
不知什么原因,由于比赛结束的时间,人们纷纷在帕洛阿尔托订购多拉什晚餐,订单量急剧飙升。
For whatever reason, because of when the game ended, people wanted to order DoorDash for dinner in And Palo for whatever reason, that volume spiked pretty hard.
我们既无法关闭系统,也无法完成配送。
We had no ability to turn it off and no ability to fulfill.
因此,每单配送都至少晚了一个小时。
So we were late by at least an hour on every single delivery.
我认为,当你经历过这样的事情,而且不是一次两次,而是在DoorDash我们经历过很多类似的情况。
I think when you go through experiences like that, but not just once, but we've had a lot of those kinds of experiences at DoorDash.
我每天仍然在做客户服务。
I still do customer support every day.
我每天都能亲眼看到这些情况。
I see them literally every single day.
当你看到仅仅一个订单就可能失去客户的信任时,你就明白,第二天必须重新赢得他们的信任。
When you see that you can lose someone's trust on one order, you realize that you got to earn it again the next day.
根本不存在那种‘设置好就不管了’的心态。
And there is no such thing as this, you know, just set it and forget it kind of mentality.
是的,这种意识很大程度上源于早期阶段,但我觉得,当我每天做客户服务时,这种日常提醒也是一种很好的强化机制。
Yeah, that came a lot from the early days, but I think this daily reminder when I do customer support is also another great reinforcing function.
那晚比赛结束后发生了什么?
So what happened that night of the game?
我们每一份配送都延迟了。
We were late on every single delivery.
我想那时候大概是晚上10点左右,我们正在计算如果要弥补过失、把钱退给每个人,总共需要退还多少退款。
And I think it was probably somewhere around 10PM or something where we're tallying up all the refunds that it would cost us if we wanted to make right and give back everybody their money.
客户有要求退款吗?
Were the customers asking for the refunds?
没有,没有。
No, no
没人提出要求。
one was asking.
根本没人要求任何东西。
No one was asking for anything.
那天晚上结束了,我们完成了最后一单配送,然后说:好吧,这真是糟糕的一晚。
The night was over, we finished our last delivery and we said, okay, that was a terrible night.
我们接下来该怎么办?
What are we going do about it?
我们本可以抱怨这些订单什么的,但归根结底,我觉得在很短的时间内——大概十五秒内,我们就决定好了:我们必须对客户负责。
We could complain about the orders or something, but at the end of the day, I think within a very short period of time, fifteen seconds, we decided, okay, we got to make right by the customer.
我们必须给每个人退款。
We got to refund everybody.
问题是,当时我们一分钱都没有。
Now, the complication is we had no money at the time.
我很难筹集到这笔资金,这对我来说是个常态。
I was having a hard time raising this is a pattern for me.
在公司最初的几年里,我一直很难筹集到资本。
I've had a hard time raising capital for the company in the earliest years.
这从一开始就开始了。
That started right from the beginning.
我们当时只剩下两三周的现金了。
We were maybe two or three weeks of cash out.
这笔退款将耗掉我们银行账户约40%的资金。
And this refund would have cost us about 40% of the bank account.
这会让原本只剩两三周的现金流,进一步缩短到更少的天数。
It would have just made the two or three weeks and just shrunk that into even fewer days.
但你说得对,没人向我们要求退款。
But yeah, you're right, nobody asked us for the refunds.
我肯定他们很生气,但没人提出来。
I'm sure they were pissed, but nobody asked.
我们立刻办理了退款,然后那晚真的一直在烤饼干,大约五点的时候送了出去。
We did the refund right away and then we stayed up that night actually baking cookies And we delivered those cookies at around five a.
早上。
M.
在我们以为顾客会醒来之前。
Before we thought when customers would wake.
我们的理念是,宁愿在追求卓越的过程中失败,也不愿平庸地活着,做些自己都不引以为豪的事。
And the idea was we'd rather die trying to be excellent or at least die trying to do the thing that we want to stand for than to live to be mediocre and not something that we'd be proud of.
我们就是这么做的。
And that's what we did.
这太棒了。
That's excellent.
所以给我多讲讲关于构建这个自我强化的学习系统的事。
So tell me more about building the system, the self reinforcing, like, learning system.
你看,这些事情往往是逐渐发生的。
Look, these things kind of happen
一步一步来。
in steps.
最初是我们四个人亲自送餐。
It started with the four of us doing the deliveries.
好吧,我们可以继续自己送餐,但迟早会遇到规模问题。
Okay, well, we can keep doing the deliveries, but at some point, we're going to start running into scale issues.
四个人能做的配送是有限的。
Mean, four people can only do so many deliveries.
所以自然地,我们会开始招募骑手、吸引消费者、拓展餐厅合作。
So of course, we're going to start recruiting dashers, we're going start recruiting consumers, selling restaurants.
当你亲自送餐时,就会逐渐意识到必须开发产品来支撑规模化。
And you start noticing as you do the deliveries, well, you have to build products to scale yourself.
这是第一点。
That's one.
第二,你会开始注意到所有的问题。
Two, you also just start noticing all the problems.
每当看到一个问题反复出现超过一次,你就会对自己说,也许这是一个我们应该为此构建解决方案,或者开展实验来看看是否能真正解决的问题。
And whenever you see a problem recur more than once, you would say to yourself, maybe that's an example of a problem that we should actually build something for or actually run an experiment to see if we could actually solve.
我认为在很早的时候,行动导向就演变成了这种实验思维。
I think very early on, the bias for action turned into this experimentation mentality.
当时我们没有任何组织结构之类的东西。
Now, we didn't have any organizations at the time or anything like that.
只是有几个人在我公寓里。
Was just a few of us in my apartment.
并不是说,哦,我所谈论的是一个严谨的系统。
It wasn't like, okay, there's this rigorous system that I'm talking about.
不过,这可能是我们最初如何思考的雏形:从做那些无法扩展的事情,到识别需要验证的假设,再到开展实验,最后推出产品。
That's probably the earliest inklings though of how we thought about, okay, you can go from doing things that don't scale to identifying hypotheses to test, to then running experiments and then to shipping products.
那可能是公司最早期的时候,也就是第一年。
That was probably the earliest time, the first year of the company.
再往后推一年,当我们开始进入多个城市时,各个城市的总经理都会向我汇报,比如有人负责波士顿,有人负责达拉斯,有人负责其他城市。
You fast forward maybe a year as we started launching into multiple cities, all of the general managers of different cities, so you could be running Boston, someone else is running Dallas, someone else is running a different city.
他们都会向我汇报工作。
They would be reporting into me.
于是你开始发现,从城市A到城市B再到城市C,其实出现了一些模式,但这些模式仍然具有很强的地域性。
And you start seeing that, oh, okay, well, patterns actually emerge from city A to city B to city C, But they're still quite local.
比如在波士顿,汽车数量很少。
They're slightly for example, in Boston, there's not a lot of cars.
波士顿的汽车拥有率在美国是最低的之一,与其他地方相比。
Car ownership is one of the lowest in Boston in The United States versus other places.
由于这座城市的历史原因,其环形加放射状的交通结构导致了一些奇特的设置,这些设置实际上违背了我之前描述的模式。
There's some strange setups because of the historic nature of the city in terms of that hub and spoke nature I was describing that actually violate that setup.
因此,各地都有独特的细节,你开始意识到:我该如何把这种不具规模性的做事方式,转化为一套可推广的机制,让每个人都能实施我们已知有效的功能,从而同时开展更多实验?
So there are like local nuances and you start realizing, well, okay, well, how do I actually teach this way of doing things that don't scale all the way to shipping some feature that we know is going to work to each one of these people so that we could run more experiments at the same time?
然后我们会开发更多跨越这些不同模式的产品。
Then we would just build more products that would actually go across all of these different patterns.
这就是这个东西多年来演变的方式:你最初从某种基本的科学流程开始。
That's how this thing has morphed over the years where you basically start with some basic scientific process, if you will.
当你到达某个节点时,就必须找出下一个迭代版本,以实现这一流程的规模化。
You meet some point in which you have to figure out the next iteration in order to scale that process.
然后你就持续不断地推进下去。
And then you just keep that going.
你始终在测试是否为顾客带来了更好的体验。
And you're always testing against whether or not you're delivering better for customers.
无论这个流程是否真正产生了影响,这都将是你的北极星指标。
That's always going to be the North Star metric whether or not this process is actually making a difference or not.
如果更快、更便宜、更高效,这对顾客来说会更好吗?
Is it better for customers if it's faster, cheaper, more efficient?
比如,哪些方面是
Like what are the
是的,以上所有都是。
Yeah, it's all of the above.
所以你看,客户们,我说了,这个生意很难,因为客户们不幸地不会只从一个维度来评判我们。
So look, customers, I mean, this business is tough because customers unfortunately don't just judge us on one dimension.
有些客户,所有客户都希望拥有最广泛的选择。
Some customers, all customers want the widest available selection.
他们希望得到他们能想到的每一件商品。
They want every item they can get delivered.
他们希望价格尽可能低。
They want the lowest possible price.
他们希望配送速度尽可能快。
They want the fastest possible delivery.
他们当然希望没有任何错误。
They want obviously no mistakes.
他们绝对期望准时送达。
They absolutely expect it to be on time.
如果出了什么问题,当然他们应该得到正确的对待。
Then if something were to go wrong, of course they deserve to be treated correctly.
我们每一次订单都会在所有这些方面受到评判。
We get judged on all of those things on every single order.
这就是说,你可以围绕那些不变的东西来建立一个企业。
This is this idea of like you can build a business around things that don't change.
是的。
Yes.
从顾客的角度来看,对于DoorDash来说,哪些东西是不变的呢?
What are the things that don't change from the customer's perspective for DoorDash then?
顾客始终希望有更多、更丰富的选择。
Customers are always going to want more and more selection.
他们始终希望有更高的性价比。
They're going to always want more and more affordability.
他们希望配送更快。
They're going to want faster deliveries.
这就像亚马逊,几乎是亚马逊的完全镜像。
This is like Amazon, almost the exact mirror of what Amazon
我认为,当你只是想想人们想要什么时,实际上这很简单,因为我们自己就能扮演这个角色。
Well, I think when you just think about what people want, I actually think it's pretty easy because we can play that role ourselves.
是的,我认为你只需要问一些非常基本的问题,比如某些趋势的发展方向是什么?
Yeah, I think you just ask you can ask very basic questions about what's the direction of travel of certain things?
例如,你认为人们会期待更多的便利,还是更少的便利?
For example, do you think people are going to expect more convenience or less convenience?
尤其是在一个你认为人们收入在增加的世界里——无论是今天相比过去,还是明天相比今天,你觉得他们会怎么花这些钱?
Especially in a world where you think that people are earning more, whether it's today versus the past, tomorrow versus today, what do you think they're going to do with those dollars?
是会更多地用于消费吗?
Is it going to go more towards consumption?
他们是会期待或要求更多的便利,还是更少的便利?
Are they going to expect or demand more convenience or less?
我认为,当你开始大声提出这些问题时,你会得到一些常识性的答案,而这些答案正是你可以用来构建业务的基础。
I think when you start asking questions just out loud, you get the common sense answers in which you can build a business around.
我们早餐时和团队聊过这个话题。
We were talking about this with the crew at breakfast.
这就像,他们所展示的商业模式是人性中永远不会改变的特质,那就是我们想要更多的便利。
It's just like, well, they're corner showing their business is a trait in human nature that's never going to change, which is like we want more convenience.
是的,一直都是。
Yeah, always.
这其实并不复杂,我觉得。
It's not rocket science, I think.
真正复杂的是,你该如何实现它?
The rocket science is actually how do you make it happen?
是的,我喜欢这种想法——你把复杂性隐藏起来了。
Yeah, I love this idea of like you're hiding the complexity.
我曾和贝索斯一对一地聊了几个小时,我当然是他的超级粉丝。
I spent several hours with Bezos one on one, and I'm obviously a massive fan of his.
我已经做了关于他的15期节目。
I've done like 15 episodes on him.
他听我的另一个播客。
He listens to my other podcast.
我告诉他:‘老兄,你知道他们在华盛顿你家门前放了个断头台有多疯狂吗?’
I told him, was like, Dude, you know how crazy it is that they put a guillotine in front of your house in Washington?
我说:‘你创造了一个神奇的按钮,我一按,东西就压缩好了。’
I go, You made a magic button I compress.
我想要世界上任何东西,都能在两天内送到我家,现在甚至只要几个小时。
Anything I want in the world shows up to my house in two days, and now it's like a few hours.
我只需要按一下按钮,其余所有的复杂工作都由你来处理。
And all I do is press the button, you handle all the other complexity behind it.
我当时说:‘你配得上所有的钱。’
I was like, You deserve all the money.
他只是笑啊笑啊笑个不停。
Hope you have He all the just laughed and laughed and laughed.
你刚才说了一句什么。
You said something.
你每天都在做客户服务。
You're doing customer support every day.
这些是客户服务邮件吗?
Is this customer support emails?
这是什么?
What is this?
邮件或者聊天,有时候是电话。
Emails or chats, sometimes phone calls.
每天都是。
Every day.
是的。
Yeah.
再多说说这个。
Say more about this.
那你为什么要做这个呢?
Well, why do you do this?
我之前说过,这有几个原因。
I was saying earlier that for a few reasons.
我们之前讨论过,像DoorDash这样的公司之所以如此神奇或困难,是因为所有那些你看不见的部分。
One of the things that we were talking about earlier is that so much of the magic or the difficulty of building a company like DoorDash is in all the things you can't see.
所以你首先要做的,就是在各个地方建立可观测性。
So the first thing you got to do is you got to build observability everywhere.
当然,可观测性可以通过仪表板、系统,以及越来越多的AI工具来实现。
Of course, there's observability with dashboards and systems and increasingly AI tools.
但同时,我也可以看到来自客户的反馈,无论是消费者、商家、配送员还是广告商。我可以选择忽略他们。
But also, can see the inbound of customers who write us, whether it's a consumer, a merchant, a dasher, an advertiser, And I can choose to ignore them.
但这些反馈都是免费的。
But those are freebies.
我的意思是,我有多幸运,能拥有一个让客户如此在意的产品?
I mean, like, how lucky am I to actually have a product in which people care enough?
你知道,即使这些邮件并不都是正面的,但至少他们愿意告诉我他们的想法。
You know, even I mean, they're not very positive emails, but I mean, like but they care enough to actually let me know.
你知道吗,我认为企业最大的杀手通常是沉默。
You know, I think the greatest killer of a business is usually silence.
而在这里,他们甚至关心到愿意告诉我他们的体验出了问题。
And here, they're actually they care enough to actually let me know something went wrong in their experience.
我不仅欠他们一个回应,更认为我有责任去真正解决这个问题,这不只是礼貌,而是义务。
I owe them certainly not just a response, but actually, I think and not the courtesy, but I owe them the responsibility of actually solving that problem ultimately.
所以,首先,这是对客户的义务。
And so first, it's an obligation to customers.
其次,这也是我希望公司其他人都去做的事情。
Second, it's actually something that I want the rest of the company to do.
我认为,当公司稍微变大、取得一些成功后,最简单的事就是他们与客户或待完成的任务之间出现了更多障碍。
I think one of the easiest things as companies get a little bit bigger, perhaps earn a little bit more success, is there are more obstacles between them and the customers or the jobs to be done.
例如,当你成为一家公司后,突然间,唯一被关注的只有财务指标——你的收入、利润,而这些都不是客户关心的指标。
For example, when you become a company, all of a sudden, the only things that get spotlighted are the financial metrics, your revenue, your profits, none of which are metrics that customers care about.
我们作为上市公司所报告的任何指标,客户很可能根本不知道,也不关心。
There are no metrics in what we report as a public company that customers know about probably or care about, frankly.
这总是让我很困扰,因为正是我们服务客户的能力,才有可能实现投资者关心的强劲财务指标。
That always is quite bothersome to me because it's because of our ability to serve customers that can hopefully achieve strong financial metrics that investors care about.
我努力做的很多事,就是建立尽可能多的强化和重复性机制与流程,包括我个人所做的事情,让这家公司始终认识到,这里最重要的任务、唯一的信仰,就是为客户提供解决方案。
A lot of what I'm trying to do is building as many reinforcing and repetitive mechanisms and motions, including things that I do individually, that will allow this company to always recognize that the number one job and the only religion at this company is to solve problems for customers.
当数据和轶事发生冲突时,你会怎么做?
What do you do when the data and the anecdotes conflict?
这确实是个难题。
It's a tough one.
我认为,客户所说的话通常都包含一定的真实性。
I think that usually there's always an element of truth in what customers are saying.
而这通常会演变为不同团队之间的权衡讨论。
And it usually becomes a trade off discussion for different teams.
这个决定之所以困难,是因为人们总是很容易偏向数据一边。
The reason why it's a tough decision is because it is so easy to always just veer on the side of the data.
因为几乎总是这样,当客户注意到某些问题,或者出现某个轶事——可能是个边缘案例——它通常都处于分布曲线的尾部。
Because almost always, when a customer notices something that is wrong, or there's an anecdote that may be a edge case, it's usually at some tail of a distribution.
客户支持等待时间的分布、我们接电话时友好程度的分布、我们准时或延误的分布、准确性的分布,或者你关心的特定生菜品类中各类SKU的数量。
A distribution of the wait times for customer support, a distribution of how friendly we were when we actually took the call, a distribution of how on time we were or how late we were or how accurate we were, or what are the number of items of the types of SKUs you care about in a particular category of lettuce.
只是生菜,不是其他蔬菜,就是生菜,对吧?
Just lettuce, not vegetables, but just lettuce, right?
所以这总是某个尾部的案例。
So it's always some tail example.
因此,在优先级讨论中,数据几乎总是会占上风。
And so the data is probably always going to win when it comes to some sort of a prioritization discussion.
但当你真正思考如何改进产品时,几乎总是需要从改善边缘情况入手——这正是我个人喜欢花大量时间与我们的核心用户相处的原因,无论是下单最频繁的骑手、消费者,还是与我们长期合作的商家,也包括新用户。
But when you actually think about how to make a product better, it's going to almost always by definition be in improving the edges, That's why a lot of times what I like to do personally is I love to spend time with a lot of our power users, whether it's the top dashers or the consumers who order the most often or the merchants who we've been doing business with for a very long period of time, and also the new users.
他们在几乎所有结果的分布中都处于尾部。
They're at the tails of the distribution of almost every outcome.
一个从未使用过DoorDash的新用户,即使我们已经运营了十三年,也一定会告诉我们,首次下单是容易还是困难,而那些与我们长期共同成长、已经熟悉所有功能的用户则早已习惯了这些设计。
A new user who's never touched DoorDash before for the thirteen years that we've been around will absolutely tell us about how easy or difficult it is to place their first order in a way that someone who's been used to all the things that we've been training together with customers on have figured out.
核心用户也同样能看到所有问题,因为他们经历的现实世界突发状况最多,而这些是我们无法在系统中捕捉到的。
A power user also sees all the issues too, because they have the most shots on goal for some chaotic event to happen in the real world that we couldn't capture.
分布的边缘通常是最有价值的轶事所在,你必须给予最多的关注,因为它们几乎总是与数据相矛盾,而这些轶事在改进产品方面可能最有价值。
Those edges of the distribution are almost always where the anecdotes are that are the most valuable that you have to pay the most attention to, because they almost always will disagree with the data, and they are probably worth the most in terms of improving your product.
假设你在日常客户服务中发现了这样一个边缘案例,你的下一步是什么?
Let's say you find one of these edge cases as you're doing customer support every day, what's your next step?
我最喜欢的是那些特别长的案例。
The ones I love the most are actually the really long ones, actually.
那些充满宝藏的案例。
The ones where there's a lot of gold.
这大概就像你对创始人所做的研究,越长越好,因为你能够研究这些分布。
It's probably like the research you do on founders, which is the longer almost the better because you get to study the distributions.
当一封邮件只是简短地提及你已经了解的事情时,其中可能并没有太多有趣的内容。
When it's a short email about something you already know about, there's not as much perhaps interesting material in it.
我特别喜欢2000字的邮件,尤其是来自闪送员的,他们会详细说明物流算法在哪些地方对他们造成了问题。
I love the 2,000 word emails, especially from Dashers who will give many use cases of why the logistics algorithm broke for them.
这几乎变成了一种调试过程,既要分析现实中发生的状况,也要排查我们系统可能存在的故障,以及我们的产品在物理世界与系统之间交互不足的问题。
It becomes almost like a debugging exercise of both physical world things that have occurred, things about our systems that probably broke, and things in our products that couldn't interface well enough between the physical world and our systems.
然后我会进入我们的调试工具,实际追踪订单的整个流程。
Then I go into our debugging tools, and I actually literally track the order.
每一个步骤我都会仔细观察,你是亲自做这些吗?
And every single step, I'm watching and You're doing this personally?
是的。
Yeah.
我会开始推测可能出错的环节,然后根据最有效的沟通方式,联系跑腿员或消费者,生成假设并进行询问,以确认是否存在有价值的洞察,帮助我们真正改进产品。
I start figuring out potentially where the sources of error are, I'll either generate the hypothesis and call the dasher or email the dasher, depending on the best way to reach them or the consumer, and then actually find out whether or not there's a nugget of insight there of something we actually could improve.
换个说法,我们能否聚焦于一个能提升产品的轶事?
Put a different way, can we put a spotlight on an anecdote that improves the product?
这正是我所寻找的机会。
That's the opportunity I'm looking for.
我听你把这描述为一种永恒的使命,对吧?
I've heard you describe this as like this eternal mission, right?
对。
Yes.
你如何描述达达的永恒使命?
How would you describe what the eternal mission of DoorDash is?
是的。
Yeah.
达达的永恒使命是推动并赋能本地经济。
Well, the eternal mission of DoorDash is to grow and empower local economies.
我们经常这么说。
We say this a lot.
它的永恒性在于,我认为这是一场值得永远为之奋斗的斗争或事业——让城市中的小型、中型和大型企业成功,是提升城市GDP、幸福感和安全性的最佳方式。
The reason why it's eternal is because I think it's a fight worth fighting for or a cause worth fighting for forever, which is the best way to grow the GDP or the happiness or the safety of a city is by making the small, medium and large businesses in that city successful.
这些企业创造了经济中绝大部分的就业机会和消费支出,也为警察局、消防局、公园、学校和医院等提供了资金。
They produce the vast majority of jobs and consumption dollars for the economy and monies for the police department, the fire department, the parks, the schools, etc, the hospitals.
那么问题来了,你究竟如何让它们取得成功?
The question is like, well, how do you actually make them successful?
这一使命之所以可能非常富有成果,其中一个积极的推动因素是,物理世界始终在变化。
One of the most positive tailwinds of why this could be a very fruitful eternal mission is because the physical world is always changing.
很难只是简单地抓取这些信息。
It's hard to just scrape it.
而这正是我最喜欢它的一点。
And it's one of the things I love the most about it.
很难只是抓取所有这些信息,说订单完成了,然后扔给某个大语言模型处理。
It's hard to just scrape all that information, say job is finished, and then put it through some LLM or something.
首先,这些数据总是在变化。
Well, A, that data is always changing.
其次,这些数据完全没有任何组织结构。
B, it's not organized at all.
而且,这不像文字编辑器和用户之间的那种关系。
And C, it's not like some relationship between a text editor and a person.
我的意思是,DoorDash的每一笔订单至少涉及三个人。
I mean, There are three people involved on every single order at DoorDash, at least.
有消费者,有配送员,还有商家。
There is a consumer, there's a dasher, there's a merchant.
至少三个人。
At least three people.
现在,由于我们做的更复杂的事情,有时人还会更多。
Now, given that we do more complicated things, there's even more sometimes.
对这些人来说,这关乎他们的身份,正如我之前所说的小企业主,他们相信自己所从事的并非一份办公室工作,也不是仅仅为了赚钱去消费的手段。
For those people, this could be their identity back to what I was saying about small business owners and how they believe that what they do, it's not an office job or something that they just use to earn money so that they could spend consumption dollars or something else.
这是他们的生计。
This is like their livelihood.
这就是他们本身。
This is like who they are.
当我想到这样的人时,我希望他们能成功。
When I think about those kinds of people, I want those people to win.
如果我们必须不断寻找分布的边缘来持续改进产品,当然我们会这么做。
If we have to eternally always look for the edges of the distribution to keep improving the product, Of course, we will.
如果我们能做到这一点,并帮助他们取得成功,那么他们将让我们的城市和社区持续保持可持续性和繁荣。
If we can do that and we can make them successful, then they're going to make many things about the cities and the neighborhoods that we live in continue to be sustainable and very, very thriving.
另一种选择令人恐惧。
The alternative is terrifying.
你只有一两个大玩家。
You have one or two big players.
是的,我都不想考虑另一种可能性。
Yeah, I don't even want to think about the alternative.
你完全正确。
You're totally right.
另一种情况是,这是一个非常机械的世界,也许我们只能通过一两种方式或从一两个地方购买东西。
The alternative is it's a very robotic world where maybe we buy things in one or two ways or from one or two places.
这并不是一个能促进这些城市GDP增长的世界。
That's not a world in which you're going to grow the GDP of these cities.
实际上,这是一个可能剥夺某些社区身份的世界,我认为是这样。
Actually, that's a world in which you may take away some of the identity, I would argue, of some of the neighborhoods.
想想人们喜爱某些社区或偏爱某些社区的原因之一,是因为它们具有独特的个性。
Think one of the reasons why people love neighborhoods or that there are certain neighborhoods that they may preference is because there's a personality to it.
城市的个性很大程度上来自于那些商家,因此你和你的朋友们除了在家之外,也愿意去这些地方光顾和消磨时光。
So much of the personality is given by who the businesses are, and therefore, you and your friends want to go frequent and go hang out in those places in addition to your homes and things like that.
这就是让一切运转起来的关键。
That's what makes it tick.
这才是让一个地方、一座城市感觉棒极了的原因。
That's what makes a place feel awesome, a city feel awesome.
我认为这是一项值得为之奋斗的永恒使命。
I think that's an eternal mission worth fighting for.
是的,因为这不是你能在一年、五年内完成的事情,它一直在持续变化。
Yeah, because this is not something that you can accomplish in a year, five years, It's 10 constantly changing.
那你如何处理你们收集到的这些数据呢?
What do you do with all this data that you're collecting?
首先,我们必须对它进行结构化。
Well, the first is we have to structure it.
我认为谷歌做得特别出色的一点是,他们整理了互联网上的大量信息,并让所有人都能搜索到。
One of the things that I think Google so brilliantly did was they did organize a lot of the information on the internet, and they made it searchable to everybody.
目前,我们正在做的第一件事仍然是收集大量信息。
Right now, the first thing we're doing is we're still collecting lots of information.
然后现在,我们正试图用这些数据做两件事。
And then right now, we're trying to do two things with it.
第一件事是,我们确实希望通过我们的应用程序让你能够搜索他们的商品,从而为商家带来额外的业务。
The first thing is we're certainly trying to grow a merchant's business by allowing you to search for their stuff through our app, and we'll bring them incremental business that way.
另一种方式是我们真正试图让这些数据对他们有用。
The other way is we're actually trying to make it useful for them.
我们正在把数据反馈给他们,告诉他们什么时候
We're giving data back to them, telling them when
关于他们自己的业务的数据。
Data about their own business.
是的,比如当你某些商品缺货时,或者你是否知道你的某个菜单项定价低于市场水平,或者我们认为你作为零售商可以通过捆绑某些商品、在菜单或商品目录中新增某些商品来提升实际业务。
Yeah, like when you're out of stock of certain items, or that did you know that you are underpriced in this particular menu item versus what you could be pricing at, or that there's an opportunity to bundle certain or to create certain SKUs or new items on your menu or in your catalog if you're a retailer that we think would grow your actual business.
就像贝佐斯说过关于亚马逊Prime的那句话。
Is like Bezos said that line about Amazon Prime.
他说,要让这个服务变得如此有价值,你不成为会员就太不负责任了。
He's like, want to make it so valuable, irresponsible if you're not a member.
简直不可思议。
Like, it's just insane.
所以,如果你能为小企业、中型企业,甚至大型企业提供他们之前不知道的数据,比如这个定价问题就让我很感兴趣——你正在为这盘鸡肉收15美元,但我们看到,假设你们从平台上其他商家那里获取了数据,其实人们愿意为这道菜支付25美元。
So if you can have data for small businesses, medium businesses, even large businesses that they didn't know, like, that pricing thing is interesting to me, where it's like, well, you're charging, you know, dollars 15 for this plate of chicken where we see all these other I assume you're getting the data from all the other merchants on your platform, it's like could be people are willing to pay $25 for that thing.
本质上,如果你拥有这些数据,不与你们合作才是不负责任的,如果我们能获得所有这些
Essentially, it'd be irresponsible not to partner with you We if you have all these
我们也可以采用我们为自己构建的科学方法,从那些无法规模化的小实验,逐步为你实现规模化落地。
can also take the same approach that we've built for ourselves, the scientific process from doing things that don't scale to shipping things at scale on your behalf.
作为商家,你也可以自己做实验。
You as a merchant can be running experiments too.
当然,也许你做不到,因为你只是一个人。
Now, maybe you can't because you're a single person.
就像我跟你说过的那位面包师,正是他启发了我们对配送服务的发现,他一个人根本没能力运行这些复杂操作,但为什么我们不能替你来做这些呢?
You're literally one person like the baker that I was telling you about that inspired a lot of our discovery of delivery, who doesn't have all the capabilities to run all these, but why can't we do those things for you?
我们为什么不能,比如说,替你做这些呢?
Why can't we, for instance What do mean do them for me?
我们可以从简单的事情谈到更复杂的事情。
We can talk about simple things to more difficult things.
简单的事情,比如我们可以替你调整菜单价格。
The simple things, we can change menu prices on your behalf.
我们可以根据你希望达成的回报阈值,为你购买不同的促销活动。
We can buy different promotions for you based on what return thresholds you want to achieve.
我们也可以谈谈更复杂的事情。
We can talk about more complicated things.
例如,有些商家确实希望实现巨大的增长。
For example, there are certain merchants who want to actually grow tremendously.
为什么不行呢?
Why not?
他们希望自己的品牌、自己的心血项目能被更多人看到。
They want their identity, their passion project to be exposed to as many people as possible.
这些企业中的一些,比如,很难从一家店扩展到两家店,再进一步扩展到两千家店。
Some of those businesses, for example, find it very hard though to grow from one store to two stores to then somehow 2,000 stores.
举个例子,如果你烤饼干,希望每个人都能吃到你的饼干,为什么我们不能把你产品与那些不卖你产品的商家匹配起来,建立一条供应链,让你
Imagine if you baked cookies as an example, and you wanted everyone to have your cookies, why can't we match your products with businesses that don't sell your product and actually create a supply chain in which you
可以
can
在更多地方销售这些产品呢?
actually sell those products in more places?
而且,你完全可以实现多方共赢。
And you can literally make everyone win.
现在销售你产品的新兴商家,就多了一款名为‘饼干’的新菜品。
The new business who's selling your product now has a new menu item called a cookie.
你能最大限度地提升品牌曝光度。
You get to maximally increase your exposure.
如果我们了解你的目标,就能利用这些信息做很多事,让它们产生实际价值。
There's a range of things in which we can do with the information and make it productive if we knew what your goals were.
我们与许多企业合作的核心在于规模化:如何最大限度地提升你的曝光度、品牌认知度,并实现你可能拥有的任何目标?
A lot of what we're doing with a lot of businesses is at scale, how do we maximally increase your exposure, your identity and achieve whatever goal you may have?
这适用于餐厅。
That's with restaurants.
给我讲讲一些具体的做法。
Tell me some of the stuff.
或者零售商。
Or retailers.
是的,当你把范围扩展到所有实体企业时,事情就变得非常有趣了。
Yeah, this gets really interesting when you expand out to every physical business.
当我想到餐厅老板和零售商时,在我看来,他们和我并没有区别,他们都是创业者,都想创造一些东西。
When I think about restaurateurs, retailers, to me, they are no different from me in the sense that they are entrepreneurs, they want create something.
他们希望把自己拥有的某种想法或热情,推向更广阔的世界。
They want something that they have, an idea they may have, a passion they may have, and they want it to be exposed into the world.
这能以多种方式给他们带来满足感。
That gives them fulfillment of a variety of ways.
好吧,假设你想制作T恤并销售T恤。
Okay, so let's say that you wanna to make T shirts and sell T shirts.
这是你的一个热情项目。
That's a passion project of yours.
你完全没有理由不能现在就利用我们现有的受众群体、仓储和物流库存,快速在我们服务或运营的数以万计的不同社区或城市中测试这个想法,看看你是否真的有潜力,然后再花大笔资金去开一家店之类的。
There should be no reason why you can't do that today from testing that idea with the audiences that we have, with the warehousing and logistics inventory that we have, with the ability very quickly to test in any neighborhood, any city in the tens of thousands of different neighborhoods that we serve or cities that we serve and operate in and see whether or not you may have something before you actually go out and try to spend a lot of money to open up a store or something like that.
我们完全没有理由不能成为你未来任何创意的商业伙伴。
There's no reason why we can't be your business partner for any future creation.
天啊,这让我大开眼界,因为我一直只把DoorDash当成点餐的工具。
Dude, is blowing my mind because I just think about DoorDash as a way to get food.
是的。
Yeah.
我喜欢这个想法背后的理念。
I love the idea behind this.
这全部
It's all
关于你从哪里开始,以及如何持续下去,对吧?
about where you start and how you keep going, right?
顺便说一下,很多这些想法都是来自我们的客户。
And by the way, a lot of these ideas came to us from our customers.
你知道,回到你问的为什么我要做客户服务这个问题。
You know, back to your question about why do I do customer support?
我也学到了很多东西。
I learn a ton, too.
是的,当然,我了解了配送的所有边缘细节。
Yeah, of course, I learn about all the edges of the distribution.
客户都问过哪些具体的事情?
What are some examples of things that customers have asked?
2014年有一位客户,我永远忘不了,他是一位经营着加利福尼亚州最大农场之一的农民。
One customer in 2014, I'll never forget, was a farmer who runs one of the largest farms in the state of California.
他们每天有数百辆卡车在加利福尼亚州内往返,将他们的农产品、肉类和其他产品配送给各种杂货店、餐厅、酒店等。
And they run hundreds of trucks every day up and down the state of California, distributing their produce and their meats and other products to a variety of grocers, restaurants, hotels, etc.
他们家族已经三代人一直在做这件事。
And they've been doing this for three generations as a family.
他们最初创办农场并不是为了开一大堆卡车。
They did not start their farm to drive a bunch of trucks.
这并不是他们想要从事或热衷的事业。
That is not the business that they aspire to be in or passionate about.
就在我们运营的第二年,他们给我打了电话,或者实际上是发了信息,然后我们通过电话聊了聊他们感兴趣的内容。
Literally, in our second year of operation, they called me or they wrote in actually, and then we had a conversation on the phone about what they were interested in.
他们好奇我们是否能为他们解决这个问题。
They were curious whether we could solve that problem for them.
真不可思议,他们居然会向你提出这个问题。
That's wild they even asked you that.
那是我们创业的第二年。
This was the second year of the business.
我当时说,还做不到。
I said not yet at the time.
也许我甚至觉得我欠他一个电话。
Perhaps I should I almost feel like I owe him the call.
这次对话是一个很好的提醒。
This conversation is a good reminder.
我们的目标是,随着时间推移,成为任何企业、任何问题的首选联系对象。
Our goal over time is to be the first phone call for any business, for any issue.
是的,如今我们接到的最多电话是关于配送的。
Yes, today, the number one calls we get about are about delivery.
我完全理解。
Totally get it.
完全明白。
Totally understood.
越来越多的电话开始涉及其他问题。
Increasingly, they've been about other things.
你们真的能帮我们开发这款应用吗?
Can you actually help us build our app?
你们能帮我们获取客户吗?
Can you help us acquire customers?
你们能帮我们分析客户、留住客户、提供客户服务吗?
Can you help us analyze customers, retain customers, customer support customers?
你们能帮我们管理库存吗?
Can you help us store inventory?
所以这些问题正越来越多地被提出来。
So those questions are more and more coming inbound.
这就是为什么我们在DoorDash推出了这么多产品。
And that's why we've shipped a lot of the products that we have at DoorDash.
但我认为,如果做得好,DoorDash可以成为你启动任何业务时的首选联系方式。
But I think if done right, DoorDash can be your first phone call to start any business.
我的意思是,这正是我们真正想要的。
I mean, that's really what we wanted.
而且我们可以以非常低成本的方式实现,即使你不希望扩展,也不必强制扩展。
And we can do it in a way that is very low cost, that doesn't have to scale if you don't want it to.
有些人对一两个地点就非常满意。
Some people are very happy with one or two locations.
或者如果你想要成为下一个麦当劳,或者想要成为下一个沃尔玛。
Or if you want to become the next McDonald's or you want to become the next Walmart.
我最喜爱的名言之一来自《从零到一》这本书。
One of my all time favorite quotes is from the book Zero to One.
书中说:我注意到的最强大的模式是,成功的人能在意想不到的地方发现价值,他们通过从第一性原理而非公式出发思考商业来做到这一点。
It says, The single most powerful pattern I have noticed is that successful people find value in unexpected places, and they do this by thinking about business from first principles instead of formulas.
AppLovin正是以这种方式打造了他们的新广告平台Axon。
This is exactly what AppLovin has done with their new advertising platform, Axon.
Axon是这一代最强大的广告平台。
Axon is the most powerful advertising platform in a generation.
Axon让你能够捕捉到完全专注的注意力。
Axon allows you to capture undivided attention.
Axon广告是全屏视频,平均观看时长达到三十五秒,留存率远超其他广告平台。
Axon ads are full screen videos that are watched for an average of thirty five seconds, retention that blows other ad platforms out of the water.
你可以在几分钟内上线。
And you can launch in minutes.
你设定目标,Axon 会帮你实现。
You set the goal and Axon achieves it.
无需复杂设置,也不需要专业知识。
No complex setup, no expertise needed.
Axon 能快速扩展。
And Axon scales quickly.
他们可以让你的广告触达十亿潜在客户。
They can put your ads in front of over a billion potential customers.
其他企业已经看到了立竿见影的效果,每日广告支出高达数十万美元,并将收入提升了数百万。
Other businesses have seen immediate results, scaled to hundreds of thousands of dollars of spend per day and increased their revenue by millions.
大多数广告主甚至还没想到这个渠道。
And most advertisers aren't even thinking about this channel yet.
不到1%的广告主能访问 Axon,所以你得赶紧开始。
Less than 1% of advertisers have access to Axon, so you want to get started quickly.
你可以通过访问 axon.ai/senra 来实现这一点。
And you can do that by going to axon.ai/senra.
就是 axon.ai/senra。
That is axon.ai/senra.
我想把你的故事和贝索斯做个对比,因为每次听你讲话,我都能听到很多贝索斯的影子。
Something that, again, I wanna compare your story to Bezos, because I just think every time I hear you speak, I hear a lot of Bezos.
他在亚马逊初期确实亲自做了大量客户服务。
He obviously did a ton of customer support at the very beginning of Amazon.
他公开了自己的邮箱,就像把 email@time 这样的邮箱公之于众。
He publicized his email and like made it public, like email mail at time.
他在一本书中讲过一个精彩的故事,说当他意识到他们当时销售的只是书籍、CD,可能还有DVD时。
And one he tells this great story in one of the books that when he realized, you know, they were selling, think at the time, I think, just books, CDs and like VH maybe DVDs.
好的。
Okay.
有人会说,他每天会给大约一千名客户发邮件之类的。
And somebody's like he would ask I think he would send an email to like 1,000 customers a day or something like that.
他问:‘你还想买什么别的?’
And he's like, What else would you buy?
有个人说:‘你们能卖我雨刷器吗?’
And one guy's like, Will you sell me windshield wipers?
好的。
Okay.
巴塞尔说:‘天啊,这样的话,我们什么都能卖了。’
And Basil was like, Oh my god, we're going be able to sell anything or everything in that case.
所以,是的,我喜欢这个想法。
So yeah, I love that idea.
你们还在开发哪些其他产品?
What are these other products that you're building?
好吧,我们现在得给你补补课了,因为首先,你需要多做些播客——我已经听完了你所有的播客,但有些你现在告诉我的事情我之前根本不知道。
Okay, we have to educate me now because I've heard first of all, you need to do more podcasts because I've listened to all of them, and I didn't know some of the stuff you're telling me right now.
但我知道你在过去六个月左右推出了一系列不同的产品。
But I know you've launched a bunch of different products during the last six or months.
告诉我一个你特别感兴趣的。
Tell me about one that you're
真的很让人兴奋。
really excited about.
我们正在努力做的一件事是,显然要完成城市内的所有配送。
Well, one of the things that we're trying to do is we're trying to obviously deliver everything inside the city.
好的。
Okay.
为了给你一些背景,城市里有数千万件物品是可以被配送的。
In order to and just to put some context behind it, there are tens of millions of items inside of a city that you could deliver.
DoorDash 目前只配送了其中一小部分。
DoorDash delivers a fraction of those items to
你们今天配送的比例是多少?
What fraction do you deliver today?
非常小的一部分。
A very small fraction.
非常非常小的比例。
Very, very small fraction.
需要配送的东西数量远超我们目前提供的范围。
There are many times the amount of things to deliver than what we currently offer.
但这些配送工作面临不少挑战,对吧?
But there are challenges in making these deliveries, right?
例如,你如何了解每个城市的商品目录是什么样子?
For instance, how do you actually know what the catalog looks like for each city?
你如何确认商品目录的准确性?
How do you know if the catalog is actually accurate?
如果商品在门店缺货,但远在其他仓库有货怎么办?
What if the items are not available in store but are available in a warehouse somewhere far, far away?
要实现向城市内所有地方配送,必须先解决这些大量问题。
There are a lot of these challenges in order to actually address before you can actually do something like deliver everything inside of a city.
我们推出的一个举措是
One of the things that we launched
你们内部会讨论这种事吗?
Do you talk about like that internally?
我们要实现一个城市内所有商品的配送?
We're going to deliver everything in a city?
是的。
Yeah.
但去年秋天,我们推出了一项举措,实际上是在九月,我们发布了仪表板履约解决方案,为像克罗格或CVS这样的公司,我们会代为储存他们的商品,你可以直接从我们的网站订购他们的商品。
But one of the things that we launched last fall, it was actually in September, we announced Dashboard fulfillment solutions where for companies like a Kroger or companies like a CVS, we'll actually carry their items and you can order their items directly from our site.
但有时这些商品实际上会从我们代为运营的仓库发出。
But sometimes they'll actually come from a warehouse that we're operating on their behalf.
这是一个仓储、库存管理和物流解决方案的典型案例,我们提供前所未有的精准度和快速配送,而零售商目前没有这样的能力。
That is an example of a product of a warehousing and inventory management and a logistics solution in which we are offering perfect accuracy, fast delivery in a way that retailers don't have access to or the capabilities to do so today.
这就是你如何通过整合并把库存更靠近居民居住地,来实现整个城市的全面配送。
That's part of how you can deliver all of a city by actually bringing and aggregating and making closer some of the inventory to where someone lives.
我们正在研发自动驾驶车辆。
We're building autonomous vehicles.
这是我们去年宣布的另一件事,那真是一段充满挑战的旅程——坦白说,大部分是痛苦和煎熬,但这段旅程中最重要的是认识到,你必须打造一款专为最后一公里配送设计的、有明确目的的产品,其方式与机器人出租车或运送人类截然不同。
That's something else that we announced last year, where actually, it was a fascinating journey where, candidly, mostly pain and suffering, but most of the journey was recognizing that you actually have to build a purpose built or intentional product to do last mile delivery in a way that's very different from, say, robotaxis or delivering humans.
你必须解决如何让商品进出车辆的问题,而这些是物品自己无法完成的,但乘客在机器人出租车里却能自然地做到。
You have to solve problems of getting products, for example, inside and out from the vehicle in a way that passengers naturally can do in a robotaxi that items cannot do on their own.
你必须思考,对于短途配送、长途配送、重货与轻包裹,可能需要哪些不同类型的车辆。
You have to think about what types of vehicles you may need for shorter distance deliveries versus longer distance deliveries, heavier deliveries versus lighter packages.
当我想到这些产品时,这一切都属于我们的一项使命:努力将一切送到城市内部,让每一家企业都有机会成功。
When I think about some of those products, for example, that's all part of this mission of trying to bring you everything inside the city and giving every business a chance to win.
你们是自己制造硬件吗?
Are you making the hardware yourself?
是的。
Yeah.
在某些情况下,我们确实如此。
In some of the cases, we are.
我们唯一真正信奉的准则,就是让客户取得成功。
Don't have again, the only religion we really subscribe to is making customers win.
我们并不执着于必须自己开发产品还是让别人来开发。
We don't have a religion about whether or not we have to build the product or someone else has to build the product.
实际上,当我们刚开始自动驾驶项目时,我们最初相信并不需要自己制造车辆。
Actually, when we started the autonomous project, the autonomous vehicle project, we started with the belief that we did not have to build the vehicles.
在与许多不同公司合作后,我们最终意识到,没有人真正愿意打造我们想要的产品。
In partnering with a lot of different companies, we ultimately realized that nobody actually wanted to build what we wanted to build.
这最终促使我们在2019年决定启动自己的项目,并于去年交付了产品。
That's ultimately why we decided to start our own project in 2019 and shipped it last year.
这花了大约六年,快七年的时间来开发。
That's what, six years, almost seven years of development.
花了六年时间才达到
Six years to get to
他们为什么不愿意开发呢?
Why did they not want to build?
他们就是不想做你们想要的东西吗?
They just didn't want to build what you wanted?
是的,如果你仔细想想,在自动驾驶汽车领域,大量的项目、资本和关注都集中在机器人出租车上。
Yeah, well, if you think about it, in the world of autonomous vehicles, you have a lot of the projects and a lot of the capital and a lot of the attention are going towards robo taxi.
在我们看来,这与最后一公里配送所需的技术方案和形态截然不同。
And that's just a very different solution and form factor, in our opinion, than what you need for last mile delivery.
举个例子,当你想把一辆机器人出租车开进密集的商户区——无论是商场还是主街——并自己找到停车位、独立取货,这真的非常困难。
You know, when you're It's very hard, for example, to drive a robotaxi into a crowded hub of merchants, whether it's a mall or a main street and actually somehow find parking and actually get access to the products by itself somehow.
我认为完成这样的任务非常具有挑战性。
I think that's a difficult endeavor to accomplish.
我们实际上开发了DoorDash Dot,它确实能在道路上行驶,但也能在人行道和自行车道上通行。
We built actually DoorDash Dot, which actually will, yes, it will travel on the road, but it also can travel on the sidewalk and in the bike lanes.
它的体积要小得多。
It's a much smaller form factor.
它的速度不快,但能够真正解决最后一公里配送的最后十英尺问题——这本质上就是最后十英尺的问题。
It doesn't go as fast, but it has the ability to actually get to the last 10 feet of actually solving the problem of last mile delivery, which really is the last 10 feet problem.
这个设备现在是实时运行的吗?
Is this live, like right now?
它在亚利桑那州。
It's in Arizona.
它在凤凰城和斯科茨代尔地区。
It's in the Phoenix, Scottsdale area.
我听说你们和Waymo合作来解决车门关闭的问题,这是真的吗?
Is it true I heard that Waymo, you guys have partnered with Waymo to close the doors of is that true?
我们确实与Waymo合作,并且一起做了很多事。
We do partner with Waymo, and we do lots of things together.
是因为人们从Waymo下车时就不关门吗?
Is it people just not shutting the door when they get out of a Waymo?
这是真的吗?
Is that true?
我认为,像Waymo或DoorDash这样的公司需要解决的问题中,总有一些现实中难以预测的有趣边缘案例。
One of the things that I think is fascinating about the problems that a company like a Waymo or a company like DoorDash has to solve is there's always these funny edge cases in the real world that are very hard to predict.
关车门可能就是其中一个例子,对吧?
Shutting doors may be one of those examples, Right?
但你实际上只有在仔细阅读这些客户对话记录的日志时,才会发现这种情况。
But you actually wouldn't know about that until literally you read the logs of these customer transcripts of, you know, these things.
听我说,我认为随着时间推移,我们有很多可以合作的事情。
Look, I think there's going to be lots of things that we could do together over time.
但我认为这首先要从打下基础开始。
But I think it starts with just building the foundation.
我认为,要在物理世界中打造一家这样的公司,所需的基础与数字世界截然不同。
I think the foundations you need to build one of these companies for the physical world are just very, very different from the digital world.
这正是DoorDash这项工作的有趣之处。
That's the fun part of the exercise at DoorDash.
让我们谈谈实现你所描述的所有这些工作所需的人才。
Let's talk about the talent needed to do all the things that you're describing.
我听说你在招聘时,会寻找像罗德学者那样优秀、同时具备海豹突击队素质的人。
I heard you say that when you were recruiting, you looked for Rhodes Scholars that meet Navy SEALs.
这到底是什么意思?
What does that mean?
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