315. 从太空猿到Supercell再到多邻国：西蒙·黑德的旅程

这非常可靠。

That is very solid.

这是一个永恒的教训，我认为很多工作室至今仍未能真正做好，因为要转变到这种思维方式确实很困难。

And that's an evergreen lesson that I think a lot of studios still don't really do well because it's certainly it's hard to transition into that way of thinking.

但我仍然坚持认为这是游戏开发的一种好方法。

But yeah, I still stand by that as being like a good approach for games.

嗯。

Yeah.

有道理。

That makes sense.

那那那真的很聪明。

That that that's really smart.

所以关键的学习点就是：没错。

So essentially the key learning from that is yes.

要构建所有能让团队以更精益方式运行的工具，这意味着你可以将部分构建工作移交给更初级的团队。

Do build all the tools that allow the team to be run-in a more lean way, meaning that you can move some of the builders away and give it to a more junior team.

但关键在于，在过渡这些人时，要把他们安排到能基于过往经验、失败教训和从中学习的项目上，而不是从零开始，因为从零开始总是感觉

But then the key point there is as you transition these people, put them into a project where they can build on the past experiences, the failures and the learnings from it, rather than starting from the, from zero, because starting something new is always feels

容易得多。

much easier.

团队对早期投资者如此有吸引力的原因在于，你可以假设他们已经经历了一些事情并共同学习过。

The reason teams are so attractive to, like, early stage investors is because you can presume that they've gone through some stuff and learned together.

而且，我认为同理适用于当你完成比如三款建造对战类游戏后，你下一款建造对战游戏的成功几率会比你做竞技场射击MOBA或卡丁车赛车游戏更高。

And, yeah, I think the same goes when you finish like, you've made three building battle games, chances are your next build and battle games are gonna be more successful than your arena shooter MOBA or kart racing game.

所以，好吧。

So, okay.

你解锁了建造者，这让你能在五年间涉足五个不同品类，发行了25款游戏。

You unlocked builders and that unlocked you to build in five different genres during five nine different genres during the five years shipping 25 games.

是什么让你做出这种疯狂之举？

What led you to this craziness?

首先，当时对市场有一个错误假设——那时手机上根本没有射击游戏。

First of all, there was an assumption about the market that was wrong, which is at the time, there were no shooters on mobile.

当时手机上根本没有这类游戏。

There were no mobiles on mobile.

当时手机上连钓鱼游戏都没有。

There were no there's no fishing game on mobile.

如果你回顾过去三十年的热门游戏发展史，会发现很多游戏品类本应拥有受众群体。

There's, like, there's all these categories which if you look through the kind of archaeology of hit games the last thirty years, you're like, there's no reason why there shouldn't be an audience for this thing.

所以我们当时的想法是：总存在未被开发的游戏类型。

So the thinking was there's always unexplored genres.

我们应该开拓这些新领域，这比在《部落冲突》占据统治地位的品类里抢市场机会更大。

We should go after them, and that will be a bigger opportunity than milking this genre where, like, Clash of Clans had this dominant position.

当然，我并不是说我们真能成为《部落冲突》的竞争对手。

Like, I'm not suggesting that we would ever have been a serious competitor for Clash.

但这样做或许能培养一些技能——毕竟解谜RPG和混合休闲外汇游戏都很热门。

But what it would have done is maybe developed some skills that could be, you know, because puzzle RPGs are big, a lot of hybrid casual Forex.

我们擅长的许多技能后来都赶上了市场潮流。

A lot of these things built on skills that we were quite good at and the market caught up.

因此我们当时有个市场假设，认为价值将来自新事物，所以我们就全力投入了。

So there was a market assumption that that the value is gonna come from new stuff and so therefore we leaned in.

你也知道，Supercell有着非常了不起的自主权和去中心化文化。

There's also a you know, Supercell has this really amazing culture of autonomy and decentralization.

公司名称就源于这个概念，我们真正将其内化了。

The company's named after this concept, and we really internalized that.

于是我们组建了所有这些团队，给予人们高度自主权。

And we spun up all these teams and gave people a lot of autonomy.

每个团队只有三四个资源，比如一名开发或一名美术。

And each of those people had like three resources, you know, three one developer or one artist.

结果就是好点子得不到关注，而糟糕的点子却持续太久——因为当这种去中心化的孵化模式运转良好时，本该是一个团队取得进展，另一个团队遇到瓶颈。

And as a result, good ideas just didn't get the traction and bad ideas continued longer than they should because when that sort of decentralized kind of incubator approach is working well, what should happen is one game team gets traction, Another one's hitting a wall.

遇到瓶颈的团队就该立即弃船，转投那个进展顺利的项目。

The one that's hitting a wall just like abandoned ship and goes and jumps on the other thing that's working.

没人会纠结谁该当主设计师或谁该负责什么。

And no one worries about who's going to be the lead designer or who's going to do this.

但人性并非如此运作。

And just like human nature doesn't work like that.

所以存在这种终止项目的惯性，加上每个人都资源不足，最终那个时期我们一无所获。

So there's this inertia to kill stuff and everyone was under resourced and and as a result, we nothing came out of that that period.

直到我们精简方向，决定专注于音乐领域，情况才真正改变。

And it wasn't really until we we trimmed that down and said, we're going go after music.

我们要进军竞技场领域。

We're going to go after arena.

我们非常明确地选择了这些将要深耕的类型。

We made very intentional choices that these are going go through these genres.

这需要对公司文化进行相当重大的调整——集中精力做更少的事。

It took a fairly serious kind of change to the culture, just focus on fewer things.

我不知道如果我们提前三年这么做，也许就不会有披萨项目了。

And I don't know whether, if we'd done that three years earlier, maybe we wouldn't have come up with pizza.

我不确定。

I don't know.

比如，我们确实本可以在10款游戏后就意识到这点，而不是等到25款。

Like, it's certainly that was like, we probably could have realized that after 10 games instead of 25.

让我试着准确理解这一点。

So let me try to understand this correctly.

我。

Me.

你们被Supercell收购，因为现在能为新游戏投入更多资源。

You get acquired by Supercell because you are now able to put more resources in new games.

你们拥有相似的DNA，成为了Supercell的市场侦察兵，尝试不同事物并探索多元方向。

You have the similar type of a DNA and that you're become like a scout of the market for Supercell, just trying different things and looking different.

好的。

Okay.

然后你们基本上加倍强化了这种文化。

And then you basically double down on that culture.

这导致团队人手不足，因为新项目太多，每个团队都需要太长时间才能从失败中恢复。

What it leads to is the teams become understaffed because there's so many new starts and it takes too long for each team to ravel in their failure.

所以基本上进展不够快，没有获得足够的关注度，但他们并没有停止游戏开发，因为

So basically not moving fast enough, not getting the traction, but they're not stopping their game development because

还有就是，没有人真正认为他们是因为外部原因而失败的。

Also too, like no one really like they're failing because of external reasons.

是的。

Yeah.

就像一个开发者有很好的游戏创意，但只有一个美术师，他完全有理由说：我失败是因为你们没有给我再配一个美术师。

Like it is very legit for a developer, like, who had a good game idea that only had one one artist to say, I'm failing because you're not giving me another artist.

所以他们需要太长时间才能意识到项目失败了，或者是的。

So it takes too long for them to realize that it's failing or Yeah.

或者或者或者他们并没有失败。

Or or or they don't fail.

他们只是变成了僵尸项目，因为无法获得资源支持。

They just become zombies because they can't unlock the resources.

是的。

Yeah.

因为没有集中决策机制，你给了自主权，却没给资源。

Because there's no central decision making because you've given autonomy, but you haven't given the resources.

我是说，这简直就是

I mean, is a caricature of

实际情况的夸张写照。

what was actually happening.

就像，我和约翰对团队的干预其实多得多，与超级细胞的神话形象完全不同。

Like, we we John and I were, like, way more interventionist in teams and I guess the sort of the supercell mythology.

不过，从根本上说，情况就是这样。

But, yeah, fundamentally, that's what it was.

我们战线拉得太长，项目关停耗时太久，而且什么都没学到——因为按照惯例，当一个游戏被砍掉时，人们会直接转向另一个完全不同的创意，而不是重新迭代。

We're doing too spread too thin, took too long to kill stuff and didn't learn anything because when a game got killed, people went onto another completely different idea instead of rerolling as a general rule.

我要深入探讨这一点并试图理解它，因为Supercell的运营手册并不是秘密。

I'm double clicking on this and trying to understand it because Supercell Playbook is not a secret.

大家都知道他们每年都会公开这份手册，但尽管如此，即使分享了这份手册，也没有人能像他们那样成功。

Everybody knows that they publish it every year, but nevertheless, despite sharing this playbook, nobody is able to succeed like they are.

所以听你讲述这些非常有趣，你是最接近这个游戏规则手册的人，并且你尝试以类似的方式遵循它。

And so it's very interesting to hear from you of like, you had, you were the closest to the playbook and you attempted to follow it in a similar way.

而这些就是你在尝试按照同一套规则手册运作时遇到的挑战。

And these are the challenges that you encountered when trying to play under the same playbook.

我认为，是的，我认为危险在于把这些东西当作一本游戏规则手册。

I think, yeah, I think the danger is like thinking of these things as a playbook.

这是一种哲学。

It's a philosophy.

你必须在正确的时间让正确的人做正确的事。

You've got to really have the right combination of people at the right time doing the right things.

要把所有这些因素协调好确实很棘手。

And it's it's just tricky to align all that.

尽管如此，Supercell拥有如此独特的人才密度，这使得这套体系能够运作。

Nevertheless, Supercell had such a unique talent density where it works.

你认为你们遇到的挑战是否与人才密度有关？是否也涉及人才储备的深度问题？

Do you think your challenges were with the talent similar type of a talent density and as well as depth of the bench?

我们当时确实有非常优秀的人才，但整个业务架构所处的时代背景已经不同了。

We had really good people and just the entire structure of what we were doing is just it was a different time.

那时的市场需求截然不同。

The market needed different things.

比如现在推出一款解谜游戏，光做好游戏本身已经不够了，对吧？

Launching a puzzle game, for example, now it's not enough to just make a good game, right?

你还需要匹配巨额营销预算，制定可接受的商业策略——比如接受极低的利润率，毕竟你在追逐其他目标。

You also need to align with a massive marketing budget, you need to have a corporate strategy that is acceptable, like really low margins, you know, because you're chasing something else.

所有这些环节都必须协调一致，很难单打独斗完成。

And so, so that all needs to align and you can't really do that in isolation.

我们当时做的很多事情都需要更多资源支撑。

So a lot of the things we were doing just needed more.

并不是说五个人就绝对做不成这件事。

It wasn't five people couldn't go and do it.

如果他们能做到，初创公司没理由不能做得更好。

If they could do it, there's no reason why a startup couldn't do it better.

所以我不认为这是对人员或才能的反映。

And so I don't think it was like a reflection of the people or the talent.

所以基本上市场已经成熟到整个公司专业化分工的程度，而不仅仅是游戏团队能够完成某些工作。

So basically the market matured to a point where there's a specialization of entire companies rather than even game teams that they're able to do certain things.

而且我不知道《大富翁》开发了多久，他们花了多少钱

And I don't know how long monopoly goes in development, how much money they spend

在过去，

over the past,

很多，不管具体是多少。

a lot, whatever it was.

而那成为了新的行业标准。

And that's that that became the benchmark.

现在就像制作好莱坞大片一样。

It's making Hollywood blockbusters now.

现在如果你想登上排行榜榜首，你需要制作一款能赚5000万或500万美元的游戏，那是完全不同的商业模式。

That's that if you want to be at the top of the charts now, you'd want to make a game that makes $50,000,000 or $5,000,000, that's a different model.

当你们从这种理念转向更结构化的方式时，对文化产生了什么影响？你说你和联合创始人变得更积极，并选择了你们想要专注的特定游戏类型？

What was the impact on the culture when you shifted away from this philosophy to a more structured, you said you and your co founder got more active and you chose essentially the genres you want, you need to, to focus on?

有些人不喜欢这样，但绝大多数人感到松了一口气，因为人们虽然想要自主权，但有时也需要明确的边界。

Some people didn't like it, but overwhelmingly is more sense of relief because like people want autonomy, but also sometimes they just want guardrails.

所以拥有完全自由创作的能力其实会带来很大压力。

So having like the ability to work on anything is very stressful.

没有香槟庆祝吗？

No champagne?

我们没有开香槟，但我们认真对待，通常这种情况下人们会感到宽慰，因为虽然想要自主权，但有时也需要明确的边界。

We didn't do champagne, but we did, we took our post mortem seriously, but usually it was relief because by the time we intervened, it was obvious that we should intervene.

我在那个时期学到的一点是：要更早相信自己的直觉去做困难的事情。

Like one of my learnings from that period is like, trust my gut earlier to do harder things.

但确实，当我们决定整合资源聚焦更少项目时，这个决定并不令人意外。

But like, yeah, we didn't, it was obvious when we did it, then we should consolidate around fewer things.

这并不存在争议。

Was not controversial.

我能多问些关于超级细胞的事吗？

Can I ask more about supercell stuff?

当然可以。

Sure.

我保证会回答。

I promise to answer it.

不，不，只是我很好奇，因为我们最喜欢的名言其实并非出自我们。

No, no, it's just, I'm very curious because there's this, our favorite quote are not ours.

我最喜欢的名言是迈克尔·刘易斯在《救赎游戏》中说的。

My favorite quote is from Michael Lewis from redemption games.

向迈克尔·维茨致敬。

Shout out to Michael Witz.

他做得非常出色。

He's done phenomenally well.

这并非要贬低任何人。

This is not like knocking anybody down.

他对此也一笑置之。

He laughs about this as well.

我们讨论过这件事。

We've talked about it.

所以他多年前的引述是：获得Supercell的投资就像在幽暗森林中遇见甘道夫，并让他同意加入你的冒险。

So his quote many years ago was having an investment from Supercell is like meeting Gandalf in the dark woods and having him agree to join your quest.

虽然胜算依然渺茫，但身边有魔法相助总是极好的。

The odds are still against you, but it's sure great to have some magic on your side.

你认同这个说法吗？

Would you agree with this quote?

确实能感同身受。

Definitely can relate to it.

就像他们曾是我们都仰望的一家公司（现在依然是）。

Like they were a company or they are a company that we all look up to.

是的。

Yes.

这确实是件大事。

And it was a big deal.

我们感觉那一刻真的成功了。

Like we felt like we'd really arrived at that point.

这会让你们得意忘形吗？

Did that get into your heads?

是的，有一点。

Yeah, a little bit.

我觉得这给了我们一种自信，你知道，他们选择了我们，但我认为这并不是导致...不。

Like, I think it also gave us swagger that, you know, chose us, you know, and I think that I don't I certainly it's that is not the cause of sort of No.

这也不是在贬低Supercell。

It's a knock on supercell either.

恰恰相反。

It's it's on the contrary.

就像是他们选择了你们。

It's like they chose you.

他们给了我们很大的自主权、充分的信任和大量的资金支持，我们可能对自己的能力过于自信了，想着既然能做到那样，那我们也能做出一款射击游戏。

And and they gave us a lot of autonomy, lot of trust, a lot of financial backing, and we maybe got overconfident in our ability like to, well, if we can do that, then we can make a shooter.

我们能行。

We can do this.

我们能做到。

We can do that.

当然，有信心是好事。

And definitely confidence is good.

在游戏开发过程中，自我欺骗有时确实很有帮助，但同样也可能适得其反。

Self delusion is very helpful at at at at times in game development, but, yeah, also can flip over.

所以我认为，是的，我确实变得有点过于自信了。

And so I think, yeah, certainly I got a little overconfident.

这确实给了你很大的信心，感觉很好。

It it does give you a lot of confidence and it feels good.

而且，你知道

And I you know

这总比长期处于低谷要好

Which is better than like big chronically

感觉你好像有所领悟

It feels like you've something.

是啊

Yeah.

就像如果他们信任我 没错

It's like if they believe in me Yeah.

对

Yeah.

既然他们是最棒的 那我肯定也不差

And they are the best, then I must be good.

但这绝对比相反的情况要好

But which is definitely better than the opposite.

确实

Yeah.

是啊。

Yeah.

当然。

Of course.

相反的情况会很糟糕，不过谦逊确实也是他们文化的一部分。

The opposite is far with, but yeah, being humble is also part of their culture too.

没错。

Exactly.

而且我确信这确实起了作用

And yeah, that I'm sure that played a role

让你能放下手头的一切，因为你相信无论做什么，你都有能力，因为业内最优秀的人都信任你。

in just abandoning everything you were doing because you believe that whatever you do, you have the capabilities because the best in the business believe in you.

我们确实很优秀。

And we were good.

这并非完全没有根据。

Like it wasn't, it wasn't completely unfounded.

是的。

Yeah.

不过确实，我认为那绝对是一个重要因素。

But yeah, think that was, that definitely, that definitely was a factor.

游戏舞蹈

Game dance

在Heroic Labs，我们深知玩家热爱的是出色的游戏玩法。

Here at Heroic Labs, we know that great gameplay is what players love.

但整合诸如挑战、进度和奖励等元游戏功能，对于用户留存和变现至关重要。

But integrating meta game features like challenges, progression, and rewards is crucial for retention and monetization.

然而编写这些功能代码是个枯燥且耗时的过程。

But coding them is a tedious and time consuming process.

这就是为什么顶级工作室都选择了Heroic Labs的Hero平台。

That's why top studios have turned to Hero from Heroic Labs.

Hero提供了一套经过实战检验的完整元游戏功能套件，能快速部署，让您将更多时间专注于核心游戏体验。

Hero provides a complete suite of battle tested meta game features that are quick to implement, letting you spend more time on the core gameplay experience.

准备好发布功能齐全的精彩游戏了吗？

Ready to ship fully featured engaging games?

立即访问heroiclabs.com了解Hero。

Check out Hero today at heroiclabs.com.

你认为Space Ape是成功还是失败？

Would you consider Space Ape success or a failure?

对我来说，成功就是当你在采访某人时问‘被Space Ape收购是什么感觉？’

Success to me would be if you're interviewing someone about, so what was it like to get bought by space ape?

你知道，就像，就像，是的，有个马克说过。

Know, like, like, it was like, yeah, there's this mark.

我记得这是马克·平卡斯说的。

I think it was a Mark Pincus quote.

连续创业者其实就是‘创业失败者’的代号。

The serial entrepreneur is this code word for failed entrepreneur.

我心想，有时候我确实能感同身受。

I was like, I can relate to that sometimes.

是啊，所以最终我们没能做成一家独立的大企业。

And yeah, so in the end we did not make a big standalone business.

这是个很棒的结果。

It was a great result.

我们取得了许多成就。

We achieved a lot.

我想我们创造了5亿的收入。

I think generated half 1,000,000,000 in revenue.

所以我会这样看

So I'll do like

比99.5%的企业强，至少99.5%

better than 99.5, at least 99.5

的公司。

companies.

所以从任何客观标准来看都是成功的，虽然与我们创业时的初衷相比...

So by any objective measure success by the measure against like, this is what we set out to do in starting a company.

是的。

Yeah.

所以这不是原计划。

So it wasn't the plan.

对吧？

Right?

那里有很多优秀的人才。

So there's like a lot of great people there.

我们创造的遗产将在Supercell内外继续传承。

The legacy of what we created will continue both within Supercell and outside of Supercell.

但归根结底，我们没能开发出一款对Supercell具有商业意义的游戏——而这正是我们试图做到的。

But, yeah, at the end of the day, we did not make a game that that was meaningful to Supercell commercially, which is what we're trying to do.

嗯。

Yeah.

我之所以用成败来提问，是因为你又创办了新公司。

I'm asking this because and putting it into the format of success or failure because you started another company.

是的。

Yes.

所以我试图理解，你是否觉得本可以做得更多？

So And I'm trying to understand, was it like that you felt like you could have done so much more?

是的。

Yeah.

这就是你创办新公司的原因。

And that's why you started a new company.

没错。

Yeah.

我们创办它是因为看到了一个机会，可以将我们在Space Apes（实为Supercell）旗下开发的《Beatstar》和《Countrystar》等游戏，置于一个能让它们发展成严肃重要业务的环境中，并衍生出一系列能利用我们在音乐行业积累势能的应用程序和游戏。

We started it because we saw an opportunity to take these games that we'd made under Space Apes, Beatstar and Countrystar, made under Supercell rather, and put them in an environment where they could become serious, significant businesses and spawn this sort of slate of apps and games that sort of capitalize on this momentum we had with the music industry.

但在这个过程中，我们发现了一些让这个计划变得不稳定的因素。

But along the way, we discovered a few things that made that plan creaky.

然后，就在那个关键时刻，猫头鹰出现了。

And then, and then the owl came along just at the right time.

但没错，原计划是将这些游戏拆分出来。

But yeah, the plan was to take those games, spin them out.

Supercell当时非常支持我们。

Supercell was very supportive.

我们有一支实力雄厚的团队。

We had like a solid team.

我们完成了相当大规模的VC轮融资，万事俱备。

We had a fair a very significant VC round and we're all set to go.

然后呢，六个月后，我穿着匹兹堡T恤全情投入这里——但这确实不在原计划中。

And then, yeah, six months later, we're I'm I'm wearing my Pittsburgh t shirt and I'm all in here, but, yeah, wasn't the plan.

好的。

Alright.

让我们深入探讨下一个重点。

Let me let let's dive in into next beat.

所以你接手了Beatstar这款大作。

So You take Beatstar big game.

是啊。

Yeah.

然后你接手乡村音乐明星这款小游戏，虽然更好，

And you take country country star smaller game, but better,

虽然更好。

but better.

没错。

Yes.

绝对如此。

Categorically.

你现在还在玩乡村音乐游戏吗？

Are you still in the country music?

是啊。

Yeah.

你已经转战其他游戏了吗？

Have you moved on?

你的品味进化了吗？还是依然沉迷于此？

Have your tastes evolved or are you still hitting

我在那个前50榜单里。

I'm in that top 50.

是啊。

Yeah.

这其实是我的健身音乐。

It's actually my gym music.

我超爱它。

I love it.

没错。

Yeah.

但你要知道，B级乡村明星。

But so you take the, B star country star.

你带领着一个约20人的团队。

You take a team of about 20 people.

是啊。

Yeah.

25个。

25.

25个人搬进了伦敦某个超级卖家的住处。

25 people move into some seller in London, super seller.

地下室。

Basement.

对。

Yeah.

梦想地下室。

Basement of dreams.

梦想地下室，也就是超级卖家的住处。

Basement of dreams, aka super seller.

这是怎么发生的？

How did that come about?

所以我们能够开发出优秀的游戏。

So we were able to make good games.

比如，《Beatstar》的营收达到了，我不知道，大概几亿吧。

Like, Beatstar grossed, I don't know, a couple 100,000,000.

是的。

Yeah.

《Crone Valley》在首年，我想，达到了50万。

Crone Valley had did, I think, 50 in his first year.

所以，在其他任何情况下，这些事情都是成功的。

So, like, in any other scenario, these things are successful.

但就我们试图实现的目标而言，它们并未达到预期。

In the context of what we were trying to achieve, though, they were not meeting the goal.

很明显，以我们现有的架构，我们无法开发出一款达到Supercell规模的游戏。

So it became very obvious that we were not going to succeed in making a Supercell scale game with the structure that we had.

而团队在帮助Supercell扩大规模方面将产生更大影响，因为我不知道当时Supercell的收入对应多少员工，但就像其他

And the team's gonna have a lot more impact helping Supercell scale because I don't know how many people the revenue of Supercell was at the time, but like other

假设是15亿吧。

Say 1,500,000,000.0.

无论具体数字是多少，其他游戏公司若达到相同收入规模，员工数量会是我们的十倍。

Whatever it is, another company, any other games company with the same revenue has 10 times as many people.

对吧？

Right?

这并不是说Supercell错过了什么机会。

Now that's not to say Supercell's missing a trick.

他们本不该有十倍的人力，但他们确实可以——或许应该适当扩充团队规模。

They shouldn't have 10 times many people, but they could, they could probably have more.

因此他们看到了增强团队实力的机会，既能深耕现有游戏，又遇到了一批文化高度契合、彼此熟悉的优秀人才。

And so they saw an opportunity to sort of like bulk up teams, just do more with the existing games and saw a bunch of talented people who were like very closely culturally aligned, very familiar.

这对他们而言就像是解决规模化挑战的方案。

So that was like a solution to the scaling challenge for them.

但当时不明确的是，我们这些已经做出过好游戏的团队该何去何从。

But what was not obvious is what do you do with you know, we'd made some good games.

嗯。

Mhmm.

我们有一群对这些游戏充满热情的人。

We had a bunch of people that were really passionate about those games.

解谜游戏，音乐游戏。

Puzzle games, music games.

Crone Valley、Beatstar和变形金刚。

Crone Valley, Beatstar, and Transformers.

其中有些专家，你知道，当时并不明显他们也能为SuperSoul做出贡献。

And there were some specialists in there, and that, you know, that wasn't obvious that they would also be able to contribute to SuperSoul.

所以我们遇到了这类问题。

So we had this sort of problem.

于是，这个想法就是我们把那些对音乐游戏充满热情的人分出来，与Supercell合作成立一家新公司。

And, yeah, the idea was we take these people that are really passionate about the music games and spin it out to a new company in partnership with Supercell.

他们投资了这个项目，希望它能成功。

They were they were invested in this thing being successful.

他们支持这个项目，而且这个项目对每个人来说都意义非凡。

They'd supported the project and very, very close to everyone's heart.

将其独立出来成立新公司，摆脱原有期望的束缚后，我们就能推出摇滚和金属音乐版本等新尝试。

Spin it up, put it in a new company, and being freed of the weight of that expectations, we could do things like launch a rock and metal SKU.

我们可以开发一款基于音乐的健康应用。

We could launch a wellness app that's based on music.

这些举措在Supercell体系或品牌下可能不太合适，但正是产品应该发展的方向。

Can do all these things that wouldn't necessarily make sense within the supercell umbrella, supercell brand, but that was where we should take the product.

因此我们的构想是：成立独立公司，重新融资，调整与音乐行业的合作模式，让他们更深度参与新产品开发——这就是我们的计划。

And so the thinking was we do that, we have a separate company, recapitalize, raise some new money, reorientate our position with the music industry so they're more invested in new product development, and that was the plan.

在《变形金刚》游戏方面，我们与中国发行商Yoda One达成协议，由他们接手；同时《皇冠谷》也作为独立公司分拆运营。

And with the Transformers game, we did a deal with China publisher, Yoda One, for them to take it, Crown Valley spun out as well as an independent company.

这确实是解决该问题的巧妙方式。

So it was kind of a nice way of solving this problem.

将其独立成公司后，就能全力进军音乐领域，充分利用我们现有的用户基础、版权资源和专业知识优势

Take it, make it an independent company and really go after that music category, leveraging the fact that we had users and licenses and all this know

怎么

how.

是啊

Yeah.

没错，那就是我们的计划。

Yeah, that was the plan.

音乐游戏类别。

Can you talk about the the business of music games?

我对音乐游戏业务特别感兴趣，尤其是授权部分，听起来很棘手。

I'm especially interested in the licensing part because it sounds like a nightmare.

是的。

Yeah.

这有点像BeatStars。

It's a bit like BeatStars.

如果你想象一下，你与第三方IP合作的情况。

If you imagine if you had an IP go, like you work with a third party IP.

你有，

You had,

是的，你有孩之宝、网飞、迪士尼、魔兽世界和使命召唤。

yeah, you had Hasbro, Netflix, Disney, World of Warcraft, and Call of Duty.

他们都得合作开发一款游戏，并就相同条款达成一致。

And they all had to collaborate on one game and agree on the same terms.

而且，你知道，这这这太复杂了。

And, you know, it's it's it's so complicated.

所以我们才促成了这些，可以说是具有里程碑意义的交易。

So we'd stitch together these, like, really defining deals.

游戏史上从未有人做成过这样的事。

And no one in the history of gaming had done something like this.

最接近的可能是很早以前的吉他英雄，但那不是免费的，是付费游戏。

Like closest really would be Guitar Hero way back, but that wasn't free that was premium.

对吧？

Right?

所以我们采用了这种免费游玩的模式，整个行业都跟随我们的步伐，这非常复杂。

So we had this sort of free to play model, the whole industry had aligned behind us, super complicated.

这并不便宜。

It wasn't cheap.

我们选择了这条路：有一种处理音乐的方式是尽可能少花钱。

We took this road of there's a way of doing music where you try and pay as little as possible.

你可以找个翻唱乐队模仿原版，或者用AI音乐，你知道的，总有办法避开热门内容。

You get some cover band in to try and sound like the originals or you use AI music or you you you know, there's ways of doing that try to avoid engaging with the popular stuff.

而我们的立场是希望与音乐行业合作。

And our position, we want to partner with the music industry.

我们想建立一个需要他们投资我们成功的计划，因为我们在为他们解决问题。

We we want to like build a a slate that's gonna need them invested in our success because we're solving a problem for them.

因此我们承担了所有这些额外成本，但这些成本也带来了挑战。

And so we took on all that overhead, but that overhead has challenges.

所以如果你在融资或试图出售公司时，需要你的发行商同意，现在你就得把无法控制的第三方牵扯进来。

So if you're, raising money or trying to sell a company and you need your publisher to agree to it, like that now you've got some third party that you can't control that you've got to include in the mix.

如果你拥有第三方授权，这些授权协议通常包含控制权变更保护条款，防止你将游戏随意转让给可能滥用IP的劣质团队。

If you've got a third party license, often those licenses have change of control protections so that you can't just transfer the game to some scrub team that will do bad things with the IP.

所以当你进行这类IP整合时，会有大量控制措施，而且涉及巨额资金。

So so there's like a lot of controls when you have these sort of IP integrations and and there's a lot of money tied up in all that.

总之情况非常复杂。

So it's just super complicated.

当我们拆分Visa时，需要面对72个外部利益相关方。

So when we were spinning out Visa, we had 72 external stakeholders.

哇。

Wow.

包括出版商、唱片公司和独立管理公司等等。

Between the publishers and labels and independent management companies, that sort of thing.

这轮融资中我们有两家风投机构和一群天使投资人。

We had two VCs and a bunch of angels in the round.

显然我们做了大量说服工作，因为必须确保交易条款让他们感到放心。

We had obviously super sell because we needed to do it on terms that they were comfortable with.

然后我们还有25名员工。

And then we had the 25 employees.

整个体系中利益相关者的数量、单点故障点简直多到离谱。

Like the number of stakeholders, single points of failure in this whole setup was insane.

而我当时非常乐观。

And I was very optimistic.

我们当时正在积极推进这件事。

We were pushing forward with that.

更不用说，还得同时开发游戏。

Plus, not to mention, had to make a game.

我们既要运营现有游戏，又要开发新游戏，还要做新应用。

We had to like operate the live games, make new games, make new apps.

所有这些事情本身也都有风险。

Like we had all of that stuff that you also is risky.

事实上，我对这部分倒是非常有信心。

And actually, like, that I was very confident on that.

比如说，我们曾经考虑过应该把《Beatstar》续作里的摇滚和金属音乐设计开源出来。

Like, we've got a at some point, we should, like, just open source our rock and metal designs for the sequel for Beatstar.

那感觉，简直太棒了。

Was, like, it was amazing.

它解决了《Beatstar》所有的问题。

It solved all of the problems of Beatstar.

当时非常令人振奋。

It was very exciting.

我们合作了几个大牌艺人IP，还开发了一个很酷的健康冥想项目。

We had a couple of big artist IPs that we were working with, and we had a really cool wellness meditation thing.

所以我们手上有这套堪称王炸的产品组合。

So we had this like killer slate, absolute kill slate.

但后来情况恶化到每周我都要处理新暴露的问题。

And it just got to the point where every week I was coming in and discovering a new problem.

而且

And

这与开发游戏无关。

That's not related to building a game.

不。

No.

虽然那既紧张又困难，但并非生死攸关。

Nothing to That's a stressful and difficult as well, but that wasn't existential.

于是我们到了这样一个地步，没有哪一件事让我觉得这事成不了。

And so we just got to the point where, like, there wasn't one thing that kind of made me feel that it wasn't gonna happen.

或者说会很困难。

Or was going to be difficult.

就是每周我都感觉像是...

It was just every week I just kind of like

千刀万剐般的折磨。

Death by a thousand paper cuts.

对，正是如此。

Yeah, exactly.

与此同时，我们正与多邻国进行这些对话，因为他们有个音乐产品。

And meanwhile we were having these conversations with Duolingo because they have this music product.

多邻国以语言学习闻名，这是显而易见的。

So Duolingo is famous for language learning, obviously.

我听说过它。

I've heard about it.

是的。

Yeah.

你也听说过。

You heard about it.

我们多年前就与他们有过对话，比如分享知识、讨论如何在音乐行业工作、如何解决设计问题，因为他们在应用里有个音乐课程。

We were having conversations with them from years ago, like just sharing knowledge, sharing about how to work in the music industry, how to think through design issues because they had this music course in the app.

有段时间我们在想，他们是否会投资我们？

And at one point we think maybe would they invest in us?

我们与他们谈得越多，这个选项就变得越有趣，同时我们在商业实务方面也遭遇了更多'千刀万剐'般的挫折。

The more we talked to them, the more interesting that option became, the more kind of the more paper cuts we got in the, like the business practicalities.

就在那一刻，我意识到如果我们不认真考虑他们的提议，团队就会开始出现问题。

It just came a point where I realized that if we didn't take their option seriously, then I'd start having team issues.

对吧？

Right?

因为创业本身就是风险与回报的平衡，当时风险越来越大，而与多邻国合作的机会却越来越具体。

Because like, it gets to a point where, like, starting a company is a risk reward balance, and it was getting riskier and the opportunity with Duolingo was getting more concrete.

直到某个时刻，我觉得我们必须认真对待这件事。

And there just came a point where I thought, we've got to take this seriously.

我们至少应该探索这个可能性。

We've got to we've to at least explore it.

而当我们开始探索时，我列出了一系列认为这是个坏主意的理由。

And, yeah, and then as we started exploring it, like, I had this sort of checklist of reasons why it would be a bad idea.

它是个单一应用的公司。

It's a single app company.

是啊。

Yeah.

数百人。

Hundreds of people.

我习惯于同时进行五个项目，这样能获得很多自主权之类的。

I'm used to like having five projects going at once, which gives a lot of autonomy and that sort of thing.

或者说是在学习。

And or it's learning.

我们试图开发游戏，你知道的，就是想看看能不能做些有趣的事情。

We're trying to we're trying to make games, you know, so so, like, you know, can we do fun stuff?

我有点说服自己这是个坏主意。

I'd kinda convince myself that it'd be a bad idea.

然后随着我们深入接触，飞了几次匹兹堡。

And then as we engaged, flew to Pittsburgh a few times.

我们见了许多团队成员。

We met a lot of team.

他们也来过我们这边。

They came over.

我们意识到，虽然从表面看可能如此，但当我深入了解他们的目标、使命、组织架构和运作方式后，这显然是个无需犹豫的决定。

We realized that actually, like, that from the outside, it might seem like that, but once I got inside and really understood what they were trying to do, the mission was, how they're structured and how it would work, it just became like a real no brainer.

当你有一款热门游戏或进展顺利的项目时，整个宇宙似乎都会为你让路，一切都会加速前进。

When you've a hit game or a thing that's going well, the universe seems to align and everything kind of accelerates.

有时情况恰恰相反。

Sometimes it's the opposite.

每周都有新状况，感觉就像在水泥中跋涉，完全无法加速。

Every week something is going on, it's feeling like you weren't walking through that cement and we were not accelerating.

所以在某个时刻，我们直接告诉风投机构我们无法接受这笔投资。

So yeah, at some point, we just told the VCs we couldn't take the money.

我们告诉Suicide团队，我们认为这事成不了。

We told the told Suicide, oh, we don't think this is gonna work.

我们开始与音乐合作伙伴接触，是的。

We started engaging with the music partners and and, yeah.

于是我们迅速转向，全力追逐这个机会。

And we we pivoted to to chase this opportunity.

是的，毫不后悔，因为这太棒了。

Yeah, no regrets because it's amazing.

我们正在做一些很棒的事情，并且有机会谈论它。

We're doing some great stuff and having to talk about it.

是的。

Yeah.

那就是接下来一周的旅程。

That was the next week journey.

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多邻国收购Nextbeat的核心论点是什么？

What was the thesis for Duolingo to acquire Nextbeat?

因为他们有个音乐课程，而我们与他们有着长期合作关系。

So they had this music course, and we had a long standing relationship with them.

多邻国非常擅长认清自己的知识盲区。

Duoling is really good at knowing when they know don't know something.

所以他们有个项目，会四处找人交流学习。

And so they have this program of like going and talking to people around.

比如昨天我们刚和几个游戏开发者开了会，他们正在学习实时运营，进行了大量知识分享。

Like, we just we had some meetings with some game developers yesterday where they were learning about live ops and a lot of knowledge sharing.

所以我们参与了这个循环，时不时交流，并就如何与音乐行业接轨、设计思路等方面提供反馈。

So we were in that loop, like chatting every now and then and giving some feedback on how to engage with the music industry, how to think about the design.

我们有着长期合作关系，他们推出的音乐课程非常出色，教学效果很好，但他们意识到如果加入些游戏基因可能会更好——让课程更有趣，思考发展方向，如何与音乐行业互动，获取更优质音乐资源等等。

And so we had this long standing relationship and they'd launched the music course and it's a really good course, does a really good job of teaching, but they grokked that actually, like it could probably benefit from having some sort of games DNA to come in and make it a bit more fun, think about where to take it, how to engage with the music industry, get better quality music and that kind of thing.

所以这次收购的论点是人才引进，把这个团队整合到现有音乐团队中，我们会带来游戏化的思维方式，与他们已经完善的教育板块形成互补，然后共同开发课程。

So the thesis of the deal was talent acquisition, bring this team in, graph them onto the current music team, and then we'd bring a sort of gamey way of approaching it, which would complement the educational, like, stuff they've got nailed down, and then we'd just build out the course that way.

所以，这就是我们正在做的事情。

So, that's what we're doing.

已经上线了吗？

Is that live?

我们正在开发的内容目前还未上线。

So the stuff we've been working on, not live yet.

我们有一些即将推出的改动

We've got some changes that will be

但是音乐相关的。

But music stuff.

音乐课程上线了吗？

Is music live?

音乐课程已经上线了。

The music course is live.

这是音乐、国际象棋和数学的课程。

This is music, chess, and math.

国际象棋课程几个月前就上线了。

The chess course went live a few months ago.

有PVP对战功能。

There's PVP.

就像，它表现非常好，音乐课程上线有一段时间了，是的，我们正在对它做一些调整，好的，回头见。

It's like, it's doing really well and music's been live for a while and yeah, we're making some changes to it and yeah, see you soon.

多邻国对现代用户的理解，是大多数团队公司所不具备的？

What is Duolingo understand about modern users that most team companies don't?

我认为有一点让我印象深刻，当我实地跟随那里的员工观察了几天后，他们对微观优化细节的执着追求让我震惊。

I think there's one thing that really struck me when I I just went and shadowed a bunch of people there for a few days and the relentless attention to detail for micro optimizations was mind blowing to me.

即便在SpaceX，如果有人过来说，嘿，我觉得这个功能每天能给我们带来5美元收益。

Even at SpaceX, if someone came along and said, hey, I think we have this feature that will make us like $5 a day.

我们会说，不，不，我们年收入5000万美元呢。

We're like, no, no, we're making 50,000,000 a year.

我们为什么要为这种事情费心？

Why would we bother with stuff like that?

或者说我们，我认为我们根本没花时间真正优化推送通知。

Or we, I don't think we spend any time really optimizing our push notifications.

所有这些小事，

All those little things,

那些小组件，

the widgets,

小组件，就像...多邻国团队就像一台运转极其精良的机器。

the widget, like the, the duo team is just like this extremely well oiled operational machine.

这些年来我意识到，所有这些小事，单看可能都不是颠覆性的改变（虽然偶尔会有），但它们会产生复利效应。

Over the years I've recognized that all these little things, like any individual thing might not be a game changer, if rarely they are, but they compound.

所以如果你现在做出改变，它会不断叠加，下一个改变会带来更多回报。

So if you make a change now, that's just going to compound, the next one's going come back.

他们现在5000万日活的增长——我记得不久前才1000万。

And a lot of their growth, 50,000,000 DAU right now, again, I think there were 10 not that long ago.

其中很大部分要归功于他们这种持续优化、注重细节的运作机制。

And a big part of that is down to this sort of machine that they have for relentless optimization, attention to detail, that sort of thing.

所以我认为很多游戏开发者并不真正重视这一点，因为在过去十年里，人们普遍认为如果你不致力于下一个大项目、下一个重要功能或下一款新游戏，那你到底在做什么？

So that that is something that I think a lot of game developers don't really value because for the last decade, there's been this presumption that if you're not working on the next thing, the next big feature, the next new game, then like, what are you doing?

对吧？

Right?

而且我们计算的是几乎每项单独任务的投资回报率，而不是所有这些生活质量改进带来的复合投资回报率。

And we calculate ROI for individual almost tasks rather than what is the compound ROI on all these quality of life improvements.

是的。

Yeah.

当然并非所有人都这样，但相比单一应用公司，这种情况更为普遍。

And that's not true of everyone again, but it's more true than say in a single app company.

对吧？

Right?

而现在市场风向已经转变为真正奖励那些深耕经典IP的行为。嗯。

And and now the market shifted to like really reward digging in on legacy IP Mhmm.

远比开发新产品更受青睐。

Way more than new product.

因此我认为这种思维方式——如果你有一款运营了五年或十年的游戏，Duo公司在这方面做得非常出色——游戏行业可以从中学习很多。

And so I think that way of thinking, if you've got a five year old game or a ten year old game, that way of thinking that Duo's really good at, I think could be I think the games industry could learn a lot for that.

对于这类情况，如果你正在开发新游戏，可能从Dual公司学不到太多东西。

For those sorts of like, I don't think if you're making a new game, you probably haven't got a lot to learn from from Dual.

也许你应该考虑将应用游戏化，但我觉得...确实如此。

Maybe you should be gamifying an app, but but but I think that's a yeah.

那种不懈的优化精神令人印象深刻，因为这对我来说太陌生了。

That relentless optimization is really impressive to see because I it's so foreign to me.

我完全无法想象这一切是如何运作的。

Like I couldn't imagine how it could all work.

我也无法想象团队在这个世界里如何保持自主性。

And I also couldn't imagine how a team could have autonomy within this world.

因为这种模式的代价是高度组织化和精确化，但真正颠覆我认知的是...

Because the trade off of that is it's very, very organized, very precise, but what really flipped the whole narrative for me, like, understood that.

这确实令人惊叹，但我有朝一日也希望能达到这种运营水平。

Like, this is really impressive, but I aspire one day to be able to do this and operate like this.

我不明白，我们在这里能做些什么？

I don't see what like, what can we do here?

是啊。

Yeah.

我们参加了这次国际象棋功能的产品评审会，然后

And we sat in on this product review for the chess feature, and a

几个

couple

资深人员去做了这件事。

of senior people went off and made this thing.

对。

Right.

这是我第一次看到高层领导团队评审这个产品，它已经相当成熟了。

And I was seeing really the first time the senior leadership team had reviewed it and the product was pretty well baked.

我们不是在讨论立项会议。

We weren't looking at green lighting meetings.

当时的情况就像是，嘿，我们要推出这个东西了。

It was like, hey, we're going to launch this thing.

你觉得怎么样？

What do you think?

你知道，就是那种氛围。

You know, of kind of vibe.

他们当时在讨论各种实现PVP方式的利弊。

And they were talking about all the pros and cons of different ways to do PVP.

而我意识到，尽管有这套庞大的机器在无情地优化核心产品，但团队其实拥有自主权，有很大的创意空间，实际上和游戏团队运作方式并没有太大不同。

And what I realized is actually like, although there's this massive machinery that's relentlessly optimizing the core product, teams have autonomy, a lot of scope for creativity, and actually not that dissimilar to the way a game team might operate.

这就是我看到我们可以融入的地方。

And that was where I saw how we could fit in.

所以我们正在接入这个音乐课程，来自伦敦，总部设在伦敦，

So we're plugging in the music course, of London, based out of London,

输出到

out to

伦敦，世界上最安全的城市。

London, safest city in the world.

Corning团队正在启动。

Corning team is kick off.

是的，正是这一点打动了我——看到公司以这样的方式架构，让功能模块能够拥有所有权，就像开发新游戏时你会拥有它的所有权一样。

And yeah, it's, that was what flipped it to me, like seeing that, that the company's structured in a way that features can have ownership in the way that if you're making a new game, you'd have ownership of it.

显然这其中涉及许多不同的流程和思考方式。

So obviously there's a lot of different processes and different ways of thinking about it.

显然他们非常以使命为导向，因此即便包含游戏元素，也都是为了服务'让十亿人学到有用知识'的目标，这是一种不同的思维方式。

Obviously they're very mission driven, so so to the extent there's gaming elements in there, it's all in the service of getting a billion people learning something useful, and so the so that's a different way of thinking.

但确实，不必担心分发渠道，也不用操心盈利模式。

But, yeah, don't have to worry about distribution, Don't worry about monetization.

我只需要创造有趣的内容。

I just need to make something that's fun.

能在这里大展拳脚的人。

People that would thrive in this.

是啊。

Yeah.

也许有人对不得不硬着头皮应付CPI和LTV衰减感到有点幻灭。

And maybe one's a bit, bit disillusioned with having to like grind out the c heap CPI LTV decay.

没错。

Yeah.

比如，做

Like, make the

每次都要做同期群LTV分析，对。

LTV cohorted every time, every Yeah.

就想做些有趣的东西。

Just wanna make some fun stuff.

好吧。

Alright.

在一个我对游戏行业完全没有意见的环境里，用户基数庞大，但它确实在做有意义的事，比如教人们知识，这很棒。

In an environment where I've got no problem with the games industry at all, big user, but like it's also doing real good, like teaching people stuff, like not a thing.

坏事倒没有。

Bad Not thing.

是的，正是这一点改变了局面。

Yeah, that's what flipped it.

那里有非常令人兴奋的氛围，聚集了真正聪明且积极的人。

It was just really exciting, really smart people, really motivated.

而且我了解所有这些，但我不知道我们能在那个体系内获得真正的自主权。

And I knew all that, but what I didn't know is that we could get like real autonomy within that machinery.

团队是如何接受这个的？

How did the team buy this?

我们中有几个人是领头羊，比团队其他人早一个月意识到这一点。

There were few of us that were leading the charge and we realized it maybe a month before the team.

我们有过一个尴尬的时刻，我看到了这个现象，但我无法描述它。

We had this awkward moment where like, I'd seen this thing and like, I just couldn't describe it.

而且，是的，这会奏效的。

And like, yeah, this will work.

相信我。

Trust me.

他们像我们，但又不同，确实不同。

They're like us, but but different, but different.

但这会成功的。

And but it's going to work.

相信我。

Trust me.

团队有些怀疑，经历了一些反复和失望。

And the team's a bit skeptical and there was a bit of whiplash, bit of disappointment.

但我们当时所做的就是暂停现有项目，说：'嘿，我们来完成这个任务吧。'

But then what we did is we just stopped the line on existing projects and said, Hey, let's do this task.

让我们做个设计，做个原型，展示如果我们负责音乐剧会怎么做。

Let's make a design, make a prototype of what we would do if we were running the musicals.

嗯。

Mhmm.

于是我们花了一个月时间做这件事，暂停了日常业务，并告知风投我们正在推进。

And so we spent a month doing that, stopping the business as usual, told the VCs we're doing it.

这就像是一个不归点，因为你不能说

That was like a point of no return because you can't say

他们接受得不错。

And they took it well.

他们接受得不错。

They took it well.

他们对此持开放态度，而且接受良好，但他们也有自己的职责要履行。

They're good for it, but but they took it well, but they have a job to do.

他们是在调配别人的资金。

They're deploying people's money.

是的。

Yeah.

而当你告诉风投你实际上在考虑出售时。

And the second you tell your VC, actually, I'm entertaining, like, selling.

我没法跟这些人说，嘿。

I couldn't go to these guys and say, hey.

关键是出售。

The thing is selling.

顺便说一句，如果那行不通，那我们就只能拿50美元了。

By the way, if that doesn't work, then yeah, we're going be $50.

你们是我们的次优选择。

You're our second best option.

只是让你知道。

Just so you know.

我们从技术层面从未真正烧毁筹码。

We never like technically burnt the chips.

我相信我们本可以想出办法，但事实上我们确实这么做了。

I'm sure we could have figured something out, but for all intents and purposes we did.

所以团队就埋头干了起来。

So the team just dug into it.

好的。

Okay.

想象一下如果我们拥有这个东西，我们会怎么做？

Imagine if we own this thing, what would we do?

不。

No.

他们真的投入其中，因为审视那个课程并尝试让它更有趣、融入游戏机制的过程，正是他们惯于解决的经典问题。

And they really got into it because the process of looking at that course and trying to make it more fun and bring game mechanics into it, that's a classic problem they're used to solving.

只不过不是让新角色跳出来，而是利用现有角色；不是新建奖杯之路，而是必须使用已有的路径，你知道的，

It's just instead of little characters popping in, were like using the characters that existed instead of building a trophy road, you had to use the path that's already, you know,

传奇地图。

Saga map.

对。

Yeah.

所以他们有了护栏——回到之前关于实时运营的讨论——实际上设置护栏后，很多时候反而能释放压力，在限制中找到创意。

So they had the guardrails and back to the live ops comment earlier, actually when you put guardrails in a lot of the times that takes a pressure off, you find creativity within that.

在这个产品测试过程结束时，所有人都全心投入，以至于如果交易没有达成，实际上很难再切换回下一个重大思维模式。

And by the end of that process of doing this product test, everyone was all in to the point where if the deal hadn't happened, it actually would have been quite hard to sort of like shift back into the next big mindset.

所以我们就这样踏上旅程，从外部完全看不出有任何契合的可能性。

So so we just went on this journey where it just was not obvious from the outside at all that there could be a fit.

我理解对他们所取得的成就怀有极大敬意，连胜纪录令人惊叹，各项数据都很惊人，但对一个小型游戏团队来说很难想象——我该如何融入其中？

Like, I understand there's tremendous respect to what they've achieved and the streak thing's amazing and the numbers are all amazing, but it's very hard for a small games team to like, how would I plug into that?

我带来了。

I bring.

但到了项目结束时，我们看到了曙光。

But, yeah, by the end of the project, we saw it.

他们认可我们的方案。

They liked our take.

虽然我们在某些方面有所偏差，但他们觉得——没错，这个方案确实可行。

Like we missed the mark on a few things, but they were like, actually, yeah, this is, this could work.

我们可以给你需要的创作空间，来解决那些创意难题。

We could give you the scope that you need to like scratch those creative issues.

然后就是处理文书工作和

Then it was just a case of paperwork and

尽职调查那些无聊的事情。

Due diligences and all that boring stuff.

就是尽职调查。

Was due due diligence.

这是一次人才收购。

It's a talent acquisition.

尽职调查就是会见团队成员，考察工作成果，判断能否合作共事。

Due diligence is meeting the people, seeing the work, deciding that you can work with them.

而且确实，这比审核72份授权合同要直接得多。

And, yeah, which is more straightforward than than reviewing 72 licensing contracts.

你提到转向应用开发的吸引力时说，这确实是让用户受益的事情。

You mentioned the allure of moving to apps by saying that this is something that actually feels beneficial to users.

我懂你的意思。

I know what you mean.