帕特里克·科里森——为何硅谷最有才华的人应该离开

不过说实话，像Fast Grants这种项目，真到关键时刻，我也说不准。

But, yeah, I feel like something like Fast Grants, like, when the time comes down to it, like, I I don't know.

你应该找那种在多个领域都有深厚专业背景、又备受尊重的顶尖人物来牵头。

You, it it should be like, you know, you feel like the one of the top people you could think of in terms of having expertise and respect in a wide range of domains and competency as a leader.

我真的不知道。

I I don't know.

你就当个背景音放在心里吧，或者现在这么深入转型了，干脆就放在心中央好了。

Just, like, keep in the back of your mind or maybe in the middle of your mind given how far we are into the transition.

其实Fast Grants就是三个穿着风衣的可爱松鼠——哦不对，我算其中一个。

Well, Fast Grants was was was three beloved squirrels in a in a trench coat, or I guess well, I was one of the squirrels.

所以别把我当什么了不起的人物。

So don't I'll self thought of it.

但还有Tyler Cowen，他是个特别棒的人，也是我的好朋友，再加上我老婆，她还是Arc的联合创始人之一。

But it was also a Tyler Cohen, who's who's an amazing person and a great friend, and then my wife, who's also one of one of Arc's cofounders.

所以Fast Grants根本不是什么庞大威严的机构，压根不配让我沾什么光。

And so, you know, Fast Grants was not this, like, giant, you know, impressive edifice that would would qualify me for for anything at all.

但不一定非得搞成庞然大物，才能产生这种更大的影响吧？

But it doesn't have to be giant, right, to have that kind of bigger impact?

是的。

I yeah.

客观来说，确实如此。

I I guess as a as an objective matter, that's true.

我的意思是，约翰和我一直很清楚自己专业能力的边界——这些边界其实离我们很近。

I mean, look, I I John and I try to be very self aware of the limits of our expertise, which are which are, you know, which are very proximate to us.

如果真有这种需求，我相信他们肯定会找人来干，你看看‘曲速行动’就明白了。

And I'm sure if if, you know, something like that was necessary, they'd be I mean, look at Operation Warp Speed.

他们请了个在那个领域特别在行的专家来牵头。

They chose a super effective domain expert, to run that.

结果简直大获成功，真的。

And it was just, like, monstrously successful, Yeah.

太了不起了。

Like, truly remarkable.

我不确定谁是那个‘蒙塞夫·斯卢吉’，这得看具体是什么问题，但我的建议是，先搞清楚蒙塞夫是谁，然后直接把他挖过来。

And I don't know who the Monsef Sloughi of I guess it would depend whatever the problem in question is, but I think my recommendation would be, like, figure out who Monsef is and, like, go hire Monsef.

我觉得这可能性极低。

And I I I think it's extremely unlikely.

要是有人觉得我是这事的‘曼塞夫’，那他肯定是搞错了。

I think anybody who deemed me the MANCEF of that thing, you know, is is probably mistaken.

我觉得你太谦虚了。

I I think you're being too humble.

不过你看Fast Grants，现在我们回头一看，就能清楚看到，那些拿到Fast Grants的人，效果比NIH或者NSF发的其他资助项目强多了。

But but just seeing on Fast Grants, you you know, now we have the retrospective of how effective the Fast Grants recipients were compared to the other grants that were given out by, let's say, the NIH or NSF.

据你所知，这些机构对Fast Grants和传统资助之间在速度和效果上的巨大差距，有什么反应吗？

To your knowledge, what has been the reaction of these institutions to, the discrepancy between, the speed and effectiveness of Fast Grants?

他们有没有重新审视自己的流程？有没有复盘过疫情期间到底发生了什么？

Have they, like, analyzed their protocols and, like, what happened during COVID?

他们自己有没有做过什么事后总结？

Is there any sort of retrospective there on their part?

据我所知没有，但别误会，我不是在指责他们。

Not to my knowledge, but but I I don't want that to sound like an indictment.

也许他们早就反思过了，只是我压根儿不知道而已。

Like, maybe they've done a lot of reflection, and and, you know, I just don't know about it.

就算真发生了，我估计也根本不会知道。

Like, I I don't think I would know about it even if it had happened.

所以我也说不准。

So I don't know.

说实话，我对CDC、FDA、NIH、NSF这些机构，或者它们的国际同类机构的反应，完全一无所知。

I mean, look, most well, I don't know anything about the response at CDC or FDA or NIH or NSF or any of the relevant organizations or their international equivalents.

所以我刚才说的这些，可不是在批评他们，连点评都算不上。

And so none of what I'm saying, should be taken as, like, specifically not not only not critical of them, but but not even a comment to them.

我就是真不知道他们干了啥。

I just, like, don't know what they did.

不过一般来说，机构嘛，自我反思这事儿，真不太在行。

But but in general, organizations are are, you know, not awesome at, at self reflection.

我觉得，我们一开始讨论的那些现象，很可能根源就在于此——那些创办这些机构的人，现在一个都不在了。

And I I I think I I assume as a default prior that some of the dynamics we discussed at the beginning of this are rooted there, where none of the people who started those organizations are there today.

那这些领导人的动力到底是什么呢？

And so, you know, what exactly are the incentives of those leaders?

说实话，我也没太去想过这个问题。

And, you know, you know, I haven't yeah.

我不清楚，谁会愿意真正客观、坦诚地自我反思，好好盘点一下哪些事做对了、哪些事搞砸了。

It's not clear to me who would have the incentive to really take stock in a fully objective and self critical way to figure out you know, what what was done well and what was done poorly.

我保证不会对AI太狭隘，但还有一个问题。

I promise not to be too myopic about AI, but one more question.

长期来看，我们没法预测，中期可能也预测不了。

Long term, we can't forecast, maybe even medium term, we can't.

但短期来看，我们可能会看到一些像AI代理的东西，它们甚至可能需要进行交易。

But near term, it looks like, you know, we might have things that look like AI agents, and they might need to trade.

那AI代理的金融基础设施会是什么样子？

What is the financial infrastructure for AI agents look like?

是的

Yeah.

我觉得这是个特别有意思的问题。

I think that's a really interesting question.

我觉得自动化或者说是自主的交易——

And I think I I think automated or, I don't know, autonomous transactions.

我的意思是，现在其实已经存在一定程度了。

I mean, they they already exist in to some extent today.

你看，很多服务都是按使用量收费的，对吧？

I mean, you know, lots of lots of services have usage based billing.

没错。

Right?

而且很多开销都是自动产生的，根本没人手动操作。

And a lot of the expenses being incurred are are, you know, autonomously incurred.

比如Stripe做大部分事情的时候，根本没人点按钮，它在云服务上产生的那些费用，都是自动算出来的。

Like, no no human is pushing a button when Stripe does most of what it does, you know, with cloud computing and incurs, you know, some some some costs with some cloud service.

所以现在其实已经在以一种非常原始的方式发生了。

So it's it's in some kind of extremely primitive way happening today.

我猜未来会沿着一条渐进的路径发展，这些决策要么直接、要么间接地由大模型或类似的东西来做出，反正就是这么回事。

And and I assume it will follow some gradient where some of those some of those decisions are either directly or indirectly being made by an LLM or some LLM equivalent or, you know, whatever.

我觉得会有一个几乎察觉不到的平滑过渡，慢慢达到相当高的自主程度。

And I I think there'll be some, yeah, some some almost unnoticeably smooth continuum up to, you know, very considerable degrees of autonomy.

但不会是某个月一觉醒来，突然发现：天哪！

But it's not that we're gonna, like, wake up some month and be like, oh my god.

机器人一下子全跑出来了。

You know, suddenly, the the the bots have been unleashed.

我觉得这背后会引出一些有意思的问题——当然，接下来我说的可能听起来有点狭隘，甚至太具体了。

And I think there'll be interesting questions there around I mean, this this will now sound very kind of parochial and and kind of and maybe getting excessively tactical or something.

但我觉得我们得认真想想这些行为的法律地位：比如，责任该算在谁头上？是主人负责，还是系统能获得某种程度的独立性？

But I think we have very interesting questions around the legality of those in terms of, like, are these are these treated as, the responsibility of the of the owner, or is there is there any degree of kind of independence granted?

责任到底怎么界定？

How does liability work?

那到底哪些系统最适合呢？

How, yeah, which which rails are best suited?

我们说的是什么样的交易频率？

What kind of transaction velocities are we talking about here?

如果是每秒十亿笔交易，那系统的设计肯定跟每天只有一笔大额交易完全不同。

Because if it's, you know, a billion transactions a second, then the properties of that system should look very different to, is it, you know, one giant tiering transaction every day?

再比如那些按使用量计费的服务，它们的费用都是一点点累积的，但月底才一次性结算账单。

And again, we just use the analogy of the the usage based services, those tend to incur liabilities, in in in in kind of tiny increments, but then to kind of to settle, like, on a monthly basis when you pay your bill.

所以这些智能代理的交易，可能也会有类似的特性。

So maybe these agent transactions will have will have that will have that character.

我觉得这里头有太多实际应用层面的问题了，抱歉，但你说的这些自主交易可能成为一个关键维度，这确实非常真实，也是未来十年经济可能发生有趣变化和扩张的一种方式。

So I think there are there are a lot, excuse me, a lot of practical applied questions, but but I think what you're saying around these autonomous transactions conceivably being an important dimension is is very true and real and is, you know, one of the ways in which the the one of the interesting ways in which the economy, you know, might change and expand over the next decade.

而且我觉得加密货币在这里面可能也扮演某种角色，比如说——

And and I think it's possible that the crypto plays some role here where, you know, it's if yeah.

我们对人类的实名认证和反洗钱要求非常严格，必须清楚每一笔金融活动背后是谁在操作。

We we take KYC and AML very seriously for humans, and we wanna know the human that is associated with some particular financial activity.

显然，在AI代理的背景下，这个问题就更模糊了。

Obviously, that's a murkier question in the context of some AI agent.

如果我们从某种模糊的角度来看，加密货币本质上就是设计上绕开了反洗钱监管，那它确实可能扮演某种角色。

And if we, in some blurry sense, look at crypto as the part of financial services that is de facto exempt from AML by design, then, yeah, maybe that plays a role.

你觉得在Stripe成立之前，像Stripe这样的产品最早什么时候能被发明出来？

How long before Stripe was founded do you think a product like Stripe could have been invented?

这是个好问题。

That's a good question.

这要看你怎么定义Stripe了，但我觉得几十年前就有可能出现了——毕竟，PayPal某种程度上也算是一种Stripe。

Well, in, you know, depending on what exactly you define Stripe as being, I think conceivably decades earlier in that I mean, on some level, PayPal is a kind of Stripe.

在PayPal之前，早就有很多支付公司了。

And, you know, there are many payments companies before PayPal.

你甚至可以追溯到更早，比如收银机之类的。

And, you know, you could go all the way back to, you know, cash registers or something.

对吧？

Right?

所以这取决于这些定义上的问题，没错。

So so it depends on on on, yeah, the these definitional questions.

我的意思是，我们受益的那些长期趋势——比如应用商店的兴起、按需经济的崛起，还有YC和金融危机之后的创业热潮——这些因素都是独一无二、专属于Stripe的。

I mean, the particular secular tailwinds that we benefited from around the rise of app stores and, you know, the on demand economy and maybe the startup boom post, you know, YC and after the financial crisis, you know, those those particular tailwinds were, yeah, idiosyncratic and specific to Stripe.

金融危机是2008到2009年，而Stripe是2010年成立的。

And I guess, you know, the the GFC was, 08/2009, and, Stripe was founded in 2010.

所以，如果你把这些因素看作核心条件，那 Stripe 也不可能早太多出现。

And so, you know, and as much as you define those as being, core, then not not that much earlier.

但总的来说，我对Stripe的理解更多是市场效率低下，我也一直在想，为什么这些事没早点发生呢？

But, but mostly my story of Stripe is one of is one of market inefficiency, and, I do wonder, yeah, why why much of this didn't happen sooner.

对。

Yeah.

我总觉得特别有意思，有时候根本不是‘本来可以早点做’的问题，而是压根没人去做。

I I always find it really interesting when there's these cases where, it wasn't even the case that, like, oh, it could have been started sooner, but there was nobody in the market.

市场上其实有很多人，但都不是随便什么人。

There were, like, many people in the market, and they weren't just, like, random people.

旧金山那儿可有不少科技公司，没错。

There were technology companies headquartered in San Francisco Yes.

它们也都扎在市场里。

Who were in the market.

你有没有想过，为啥它们就没想到这一点呢？

Did you have some explanation for why it didn't occur to them?

我不太敢随便下结论，毕竟我这经验就一两个案例，太容易过度推论了。

I'm hesitant to generalize too much because, well, I I only have maybe, you know, n equals one experience, and so I think it's it's dangerous to over extrapolate from that.

要是算上Arc的话，现在算是两个吧，虽然它跟Stripe完全不是一类公司，但好歹也算个组织。

Maybe n equals two now with Arc as a I mean, a very different kind of organization, but but an organization nonetheless.

要是把Stripe的所有功能都算上，那差不多有十个了。

Or if you include all the features of Stripe, n equals, like, ten,

二十来个吧。

twenty something.

明白了。

Okay.

对，没错。

So so so so yes.

这得看你怎么定义了，也许还真有一些例子存在。

Depend on your definition, maybe maybe there's some kind of samples out there.

我觉得，大多数产品和企业其实都能做得好得多。

I guess my general view is most products and most businesses, like, things can just be done much better.

我觉得所谓的护城河，通常都被高估了。

And I think I think moats are are typically kind of overrated.

就拿支付行业来说，按理说应该有很多护城河才对——比如用户网络效应、反欺诈的数据规模效应，等等。

And, I mean, the payments are a great example of a domain where on a logical basis, you would say that there are, you know, so many sources of defensibility, where there's there's, you know, the network effect of the account holders, and there's the data network effect slash economy of scale, you know, for fraud and and so forth.

还有监管壁垒啊，各种限制啊，你说是吧？

And there are regulatory moats and barriers, you know, and and and.

可事实呢？不仅Stripe崛起了，整个金融科技生态现在都繁荣得很。

You know?

还有好多别的玩家呢，整个行业早就不是一家独大了。

And yet, know, not not only does Stripe exist, but there are lots of other I mean, there's a whole fintech ecosystem today.

对吧？

Right?

所以，我觉得这其实牵扯到一些更深层的问题，比如世界上到底能有多少真正有效的组织？在任何一个行业里，为什么公司数量就是这么多，而不是翻倍？

So, yeah, I I I think it gets down to, you know, kind of deep questions of, you know, what are the what's the binding constraint on just the number of effective organizations that exist in the world and, you know, for any given sector, why is it that number of companies, you know, rather than twice that number of companies and so on?

我觉得关键还是在于动力、想法，还有人们愿意并决心去组织人才这些因素。

I think it's about, I don't know, motivation and ideas and people's, you know, willingness and determination to organize talent and so forth.

但这些更多是社会文化层面的解释，不像汉密尔顿·海尔默那样，他是研究企业护城河来源的权威学者。

But but but these kinds of more sociocultural explanations rather than I mean, Hamilton Helmer is probably the leading scholar of some of the the sources of defensibility for businesses.

是的。

Yeah.

他写过一本小众但业内非常有名的书，叫《七种权力》。

He has this, you know, kind of niche but very well known in the niche book called Seven Powers.

这本书试图把市场上各种形式的权力来源一一拆解清楚。

And it it it kind of attempts to disaggregate all the various sources of of market power in this respect.

我觉得他说得没错，也挺重要，至少在他说的那些方面是对的。

And, you know, I think that is true and important, insofar as it goes.

但说真的，我觉得挺奇怪的，居然在Stripe之前没人做过这样的事。

But none nonetheless, it's kind of, yeah, strange to me that nobody had done Stripe before Stripe.

当你想到大多数东西都被高估了，而真正动手去做反而被低估了，那在这样的背景下，Stripe的模式到底是什么？

When you think about the, the fact that most are overrated and just, like, doing the thing is underrated, Does that like, what is Stripe's mode in that context?

这会不会让你对Stripe的模式有不一样的看法？

Does that make you, you know, think differently about Stripe's mode?

是的。

I yes.

第一点。

One.

我觉得组织和文化确实能形成护城河。

And I guess I I guess I do think that that one can have organizational and cultural moats.

这可能跟刚才说的有点矛盾，但也可能是一回事——毕竟这也是一种文化层面的解释。

And maybe maybe this contradicts what was just saying, maybe it's consistent with it in the sense that it's a kind of cultural explanation.

我觉得如果我们真有什么护城河，那是因为我们对这个领域有极深的理解，有一群真正关心解决问题的人，他们时刻警惕着自己会不会漏掉什么关键的东西，而不是光想着怎么超越Stripe，而是优先去构建那些可能颠覆我们的东西。

And I think that in as much as we have a moat, it's because we have a very good understanding of our domain and a set of people who actually care about solving the problems and who are continually paranoid at the prospect that we might be forgetting something important instead of trying to figure out what the important thing that could supplant to Stripe's approaches is and making sure that we build those first and so forth.

我觉得有些组织啊，你知道的，你肯定听说过征服法则，尤其是第三条，说那些受伤的组织，就像被一帮死对头在暗中操控一样。

I I think organizations that are I mean, there's you you're familiar with conquest laws, and there's conquests third law, I guess, which is that wounded model organizations as if they are run by a cabal of their enemies.

对。

Right.

没错。

Right.

当然啦，这明显是句玩笑话。

And, you know, obviously, it's or presumably, it's tongue in cheek.

但挺有意思的是，我们不妨想想，这话里到底有几分真道理？为什么会出现这种情况？

But, you know, it's interesting to try to think about, like, well, kind of what is the kernel of truth in that, and why would it be there?

我觉得根本原因在于，大多数组织刚成立的时候，其实真是在努力实现它们宣称的目标。

And I think what's going on is that I think most organizations, when they start out, are actually trying to achieve their stated goals.

有人创办这个组织，肯定是有原因的，而且大概率就是冲着那个公开说出来的目标来的。

Like, somebody started the organization for a reason, and and probably it was for the stated reason.

但随着时间推移，当初那些人慢慢走了，换上了一拨新人接手。

But then over time, you know, that person and that, you know, set of people who initially populate the organization depart, and some set of new people come to, you know, take their place.

这种现象其实有好几种表现形式。

And there's there's, you know, multiple versions of that.

代际更替一直在持续发生。

There's generational turnover on a on a continuous basis.

比如说到了第五代，他们到底为什么还在那儿？

But say for the fifth generation, like, why are they there?

他们的个人利益，到底有多大程度上和组织最初宣称的目标一致？

And to what degree do kind of their particular specific local incentives align with the nominal originally stated goals of the organization?

我觉得这里头经常会出现严重脱节——他们只是在走自己的路，甚至组织的领导者也未必有意为之，毕竟人都是有自己私心的。

And I I think there can be a lot of misalignment there, right, where they're following a a local path and conceivably even the leader of the organization, not even through any, like, fault of their own per se necessarily, just that they they were human and they have their own incentives.

而组织最初那套根本性的激励机制，可能早就变了样。

And, again, the original kind of constitutional incentives of the of the organization might be quite different.

所以我觉得，这种现象其实就是现实的一部分。

And so I I think this I think this phenomenon is is kind of a fact of life.

对我来说，这类解释更能帮我们搞清楚：为什么有些事会发生，有些事却不会。

And and I think these kinds of explanations for me are are much more explanatory in trying to figure out sort of why some of these things either happen or don't.

说到你的问题，Stripe的护城河到底是什么？

And to your question, like, in as much as Stripe has a moat, what is it?

我觉得是这样，当然别人可以去判断这在实际中到底体现得有多深、多真实。

I think it's that I mean, others can judge to what degree it's actually manifested and rooted in practice.

我觉得确实是这样。

I think it is.

不过呢，我这人有偏见，看问题难免带滤镜。

But, know, I'm a biased observer.

我觉得关键在于，Stripe的员工真的在乎我们说自己要解决的那些问题。

But I think it would be that people at Stripe really care about solving the problems that we say we are trying to solve.

对。

Mhmm.

是的。

Yeah.

你提到的代际或时间久了之后出现的偏差，这个观点挺有意思的。

I the the the the point about the misalignment over generations or over time is interesting.

实际上，你有没有见过哪些机构，几十年甚至几百年来，不仅坚持了最初的使命，还保持了组织能力？

And actually, do you have examples of of institutions which have, for decades or hundreds of years, managed to keep their original, not only mission statement, but the organizational, competence?

你看科技公司，就算最老牌的科技企业，也没存在那么久吧。

Because you think of tech companies, they're even the oldest tech companies have not been around that long.

对吧？

Right?

这些公司明明是全球最大的科技企业，但它们的组织韧性，说白了，其实很低。

And they're some of the biggest tech companies in the world, and the media nature of the corporations, like, famously low.

那有没有什么好例子呢？

What is a good examples here?

我觉得有人分析过股东资本主义的影响，说这种模式确实会左右企业的激励机制，进而影响它们的长期命运。

I think some of the explanations around the, the effects of shareholder capitalism and sort of the idea that shareholder capitalism as a mechanism does, in fact, have have you know, has some consequence with respect to the incentives or of organizations and their long term fates.

这些观点挺有道理的，我觉得股东资本主义很可能缩短了企业的寿命。

I think those theories have some credibility, and I think it is very plausible that shareholder capitalism even attenuates the the the durations of these organizations.

我不是说这绝对成立，但说实话，我觉得这个说法挺有说服力的。

I'm not saying that's definitively true, but I I find it, you know, incredible the the idea that it is.

即使真是这样，我也不觉得这一定就是坏事。

It's not clear to me that that's necessarily bad even if it is true.

对吧？

Right?

我们到底是站在人类这一边，还是站在全球创新这个大趋势这一边，抑或是站在这些公司——这些法律拟制的实体——这一边呢？

And that are we on the side of the humans or of the kind of aggregate innovation in the world or on the side of, like, the corporations, you know, quad legal entities?

说实话，我也不确定答案该是什么。

And, you know, yeah, it's not it's not clear to me the answer.

我觉得答案应该是第三个。

It should be the third.

与此同时，或者更准确地说，与此一致的是，你看看欧洲，或者像丹麦这样的地方，由于税制的原因，很多机构要么由非营利基金会控制，要么被它们大量持股。

At the same time, or maybe, in fact, consistent with that, you know, if if you look at, say, Europe or, you know, some other places like, you know, in in Denmark, there's a for for reasons related to the the tax code there, a lot of organizations are either controlled by or, you know, very substantially held by by nonprofit foundations.

比如诺和诺德，就是那个做GLP-1的公司，还有马士基航运，还有乐高，我觉得也是。

And so Novo Nordisk, for example, you know, the the the GLP company, but but Maersk, the shipping company, I believe also LEGO.

很多这类大公司都是由基金会控制的，而且它们的大部分股份也通常掌握在基金会手里。

A lot of these corporations are are are controlled by and, again, usually have a lot of their stock held by foundations.

在很多情况下，这还会带来一个附带效果：他们会在具有法律效力的章程里明确写入自己的使命。

That has the secondary effect in many cases where they actually do embed in a legally binding constitution their mission.

我不是诺和诺德的专家，但感恩节那会儿我刚好拿到一本关于他们的书。

And so, you know, I'm not an expert on Novo Nordisk, but I was I was I happened to get a book about it over Thanksgiving.

其实还有一本关于丹麦工业基金会的书，里面提到，他们的章程明确规定必须以极低的价格——至少在斯堪的纳维亚国家——广泛提供胰岛素，其他地方则可以按市场价卖。

And my and, actually, there's also a book on the Danish Industrial Foundations, but it's enshrined in their constitution that they have to make insulin, you know, broadly available really cheaply or at least cheaply in Scandinavian countries, and then I think they're allowed to charge market prices elsewhere.

而且，他们剩下的利润也必须依法重新投入研发。

And and I think that and then the the, you know, the the rest of their of their profits, they have to they're they're, again, legally obligated to reinvest in r and d.

你说，这会不会就是他们能做出过去二十年最了不起的药物突破——GLP-1受体激动剂——的直接原因？

You know, is that somehow causal in the fact that they then invented, you know, one of the most remarkable pharmacological discoveries of the last twenty years, in these, in these, you know, GLP one, agonists?

我的意思是，这事儿挺说得通的。

I mean, you know, plausibly.

所以我觉得，没错。

And and so I think, yeah.

我觉得，像组织和企业平均寿命为什么是现在这样，这类问题确实特别有意思。

I I think I think these questions around, you know, the the you know, why it is that the median age of organizations, you know, and corporations is what it is are are definitely interesting.

我觉得，这在很大程度上是我们如今在美国组织大型企业的一种偶然方式。

And, I I suspect it's a somewhat contingent aspect of how we've chosen to organize large corporations, you know, in The US today.

你提到的这家公司，跟亚洲那种出口导向型增长模式挺像的。

The the thing you're mentioning about, this firm seems very similar to the export led growth in Asian

完全对。

Totally.

你说得对？

Do say?

对吧？

Right?

比如，你们有关税？

Like, you have tariffs?

就拿这家公司来说，你负责造车，那你必须把车造好。

I mean, this one company, you're tasked with making the cars, but you better make the cars good.

你没竞争对手，但你得发明出全世界最好的车。

You you have no competition, but you had to invent the best car in the world.

对。

Yes.

没错。

Yes.

确实。

Yes.

我觉得吧，咱们其实都挺推崇亚当·斯密、李嘉图这些人的，对吧？

And I think, I mean, you know, we are all fans of, you know, Smith and Ricardo and, you know, all these characters.

就连他们本人，我觉得也没像现在有些人解读的那样，死守自由贸易这一套。

And and, you know, even they, I think, are are sort of less dogmatically attached to free trade than perhaps, you know, people today interpret them as being.

但像弗里德里希·李斯特那些人，虽然不算完全同时代的，但相比之下，反而被低估了。

But but I think people like, you know, Friedrich List and, you know, those other not quite contemporaries, you quasi contemporaries, you know, are are maybe on a relative basis underrated.

如果你真觉得那些社会文化层面的默契、人与人之间的那种无形契合很重要——我不是说AI那种对齐，就是日常交往里那种心照不宣的配合——那你就不得不去想想你刚才提到的那些事儿。

And I do think mean, I you know, as much as you believe the kind of sociological cultural skill, whatever, even vague alignment, not in the AI sense, but in the just in the in the more kind of interpersonal sense, in as much as you think these are are important and explanatory, then then, yeah, I think, you you end up thinking about some of the things the things you just raised.

你这么说真有意思，因为你要看Stripe的使命，它不就是想打通全球贸易，让印度的小公司也能跟尼日利亚的公司掰手腕嘛。

That that's really interesting to hear you say that because if you think about Stripe's mission, right, it's to facilitate global trade to make sure that some firm from India can compete with any firm in Nigeria or whatever.

所以，有了Stripe，你跟全球竞争对手比起来，慢慢上手、效率低下的那段缓冲期就该短多了。

So, like, the the the room for you to, like, have this sort of learning curve where you're less efficient than the global competition should be less if Stripe exists.

对吧？

Right?

是的。

Yes.

Stripe难道不是反李斯特的公司吗？

Isn't Stripe the anti, list company?

这得看你说的是哪个版本的李斯特。

Well, depends which which version of list.

而且说清楚啊，我并不是特别支持那些关税和贸易壁垒。

And, you know, I mean and to be clear, I'm not sort of specifically endorsing these these, you know, tariffs and and trade barriers.

历史上这些做法嘛，评价可不怎么样。

I think the the the history associated with them is is checkered Sure.

顶多算勉强吧。

At best.

听我说。

Look.

我觉得，如果某个行业目标明确，而且有靠谱的路径能实现相当程度的成功，再加上一些配套措施，那或许确实值得采取一些积极的贸易政策。

I I think it's possible that if you have a, like, a specific sector where you have where you have, you know, clear goals and a credible path to actually achieving some substantial degree of success there, you know, and and and probably with some more kind of conjoined propositions, then maybe, some degree of, of, of activist, trade policy, you know, might be, on that the the beneficial thing to do.

但我认为，大多数国家的大多数行业，大多数时候都不符合这种情况。

I don't think that, that describes most sectors in most countries at most times.

而且。

And

对。

yeah.

这真有意思。

That's so interesting.

我在想，这其实跟Stripe Climate有关系——你相当于在补贴那些东亚国家曾经为本国企业扶持过的学习曲线。

Is, I'm trying to I think there's an interesting thread here in how it relates to Stripe Climate in that you're, I don't know, like subsidizing these learning curves that these, East Asian countries did for their own internal companies.

你没指定哪家公司一定能成为碳封存的关键，但你是怎么看待这个问题的？

I mean, I mean, you haven't picked out, like, a specific company that's gonna necessarily be the key of, carbon sequestration, but, yeah, how do you think about this?

也许可以把这两个观点统一起来，我稍后再谈Stripe Climate，我觉得这其实有点像萨伊定律，关于需求的。

Well, maybe a way to unify, the the the the two points, and I'll speak about Stripe Time in a second, is that I think, I guess it's, it's Say's Law, about, you know, demand Right.

创造供给。

Creating supply.

既然Stripe汇聚了越来越多的全球需求，我想，某种程度上——我也说不准。

And in as much as Stripe aggregates more and more global demand, I guess, part of the I don't know.

说这是‘Stripe理论’听起来有点自吹自擂，但Stripe背后隐约有个想法：需求的集中，可能会对后续的供给产生重要的扩张效应。

It seems too self aggrandizing to call it, you know, the the theory of Stripe, but, know, some some vague hunch in Stripe, is that that that that that aggregation of demand can have important, expansionary effects with respect to the ensuing supply.

没错，Stripe Climate其实就是这个假设的缩小版，虽然规模比Stripe整体小得多，但确实真实存在，至于效果嘛，咱们走着瞧。

And, yes, Stripe Climate is is some version of this, you know, hypothesis applied on a much smaller scale than Stripe itself, but but but still, you know, real and and well, we'll see.

说不定还挺重要的。

Maybe important.

对吧。

Right.

简单说一下这个核心想法，假设你们大多数听众还不太了解。

And the the the basic idea just for for folks who aren't familiar, which I assume is most of your audience.

我们2018年就注意到，大家普遍认为碳去除会非常重要。

So we we observed in 2018, I guess, that that everyone seems to agree that carbon removal will be very important.

就算我们能按最乐观的预测尽快实现经济脱碳，仍然会积累大量二氧化碳，这依然是个大问题。

And, you know, even if we decarbonize the economy and the kind of time scale that optimistic people, you know, on the most optimistic time frames, they'll still be, you know, an accumulated stock of carbon that, you know, is a problem.

听起来有点离谱。

It sounded pretty weird.

2018年的时候，全世界几乎没有任何专门做碳去除的公司。

There were there were virtually no carbon removal companies in the world in 2018.

可能就两三家吧，寥寥无几。

Maybe there were, you know, two or three or something.

从来没有任何公司从碳去除企业买过服务。

No companies had ever purchased from a carbon removal company.

这些项目本质上都只是科研实验。

These were these were really sort of science projects.

所以我们想，总得有人先迈出第一步，与其单纯捐点钱，不如顺便给这个领域背个书，增加点可信度。

And so we thought, well, you know, somebody's gotta start, and it might be valuable to, you know, not only transfer some dollars, but to kind of confer some credibility on this sector.

Stripe当然不是世界上最有公信力的公司，但总比没有强。

Not that Stripe is the world's most credible company, but, you know, it's better than nothing.

于是我们开始跟一些碳去除公司签合同。

And so we started contracting with some of these carbon removal companies.

效果还不错，他们看起来也挺感激我们的。

That went pretty well, and and and they seemed kind of appreciative of us.

之后我们就更认真地考虑这件事了。

And so we we thought somewhat more about this.

到了2021年，我们推出了Frontier，一个先进市场承诺机制。

And we then in 2021 formed Frontier, which is an AMC, an advanced market commitment.

这个想法源自最早的AMC案例——提前承诺采购疫苗，给那些发展中国家，用于治疗一些 Pharma 公司根本不愿碰的疾病，要么是因为市场失灵，要么就是利润太低，根本撑不起研发。

So inspired by the the first in AMC, which was a pre commitment to purchase vaccines for developing world countries for diseases that I mean, well, either were kind of market failures where pharma companies hadn't pursued the vaccines or or were just like the profits were insufficient to to pay for the program.

所以我们觉得，碳去除这事也得这么干。

So we had to do this for carbon removal.

我们筹了十亿美元。

We raised a billion dollars.

Stripe 是第一个出手的投资者。

Stripe was the, you know, the the the first investor.

我们其实不是在投资。

We're not actually investing.

我们只是在买东西。

We're just buying.

所以第一个做出承诺的公司就是我们。

So the the the first company to commit.

后来 Shopify、Alphabet、Meta、摩根大通，还有好几家其他公司也加入了。

But then we're joined by Shopify and Alphabet and Meta and JPMorgan and a bunch of other companies.

现在碳去除领域已经形成一个挺活跃的生态圈了。

And now there's now there's, like, a fairly active sector of carbon removal companies.

Frontier 到现在已经跟四五十家公司签了约，其中绝大多数，我们刚开始做这事的时候根本还不存在。

There are I think Frontier has contracted with 40 between forty and fifty companies, the overwhelming majority of which didn't exist when we start start out with this.

其实去年年底，我们还做了一次匿名调查。

Actually, we we ran an anonymous survey back at the end of last year.

我们问了他们，Frontier 的存在在多大程度上促使他们决定创办这家公司。

And, you know, we asked them to what degree was was the existence of Frontier, you know, somewhat causal in, you know, their starting the company in the first place.

还是那个匿名调查，大概有 74% 的公司表示，Frontier 对他们创办公司起到了关键作用。

Again, there's an anonymous survey, and I think it was 7074% of the companies said that Frontier, you know, played a causal role in their starting the company.

所以，我觉得这类激励效应真的可能非常显著。

So, yeah, I think I think this these inducement effects can be can be pretty significant.

对。

Yeah.

这太惊人了。

That that's that's huge.

那你还见过哪些其他例子，说明 AMC 能有效推动技术发展？

Well, what are other ideas you've come across where an AMC would be effective instrument of moving forward with the tech?

这是个好问题。

That's good question.

其实我们内部也一直在讨论这类事情。

But we've we've actually been having some of that discussion internally.

我们不一定打算自己动手，但就是想知道，有没有哪些人我们该把技术分享给他们？

Just it's not that we plan on doing it ourselves necessarily, but just wondering, are there are there are there people we should share our technology with?

倒不是说非得是技术本身，而是分享我们的经验之类的，帮上一把。

Not that it's even technology per se, but but share our experience with or something and and try to help along.

我觉得生物医学领域还有很多东西可做。

I mean, there's still I think there's still a lot of stuff in in in the biomedical fields.

专利嘛，当然有用，但能覆盖的范围有限，很多对社会很有益的创新，根本没法靠专利来收回成本。

And, I mean, patents are, you know, patents are are pretty useful insofar as they go, but, you know, they they there's a lot of there's a lot of innovation that seems like it would be, you know, socially beneficial that patents don't provide a way to cover the cost of.

几年前大家对甘露糖还挺兴奋的，那是一种糖。

And so, you know, there there was some excitement a few years ago about mannose, which is a it's a sugar.

有那么一两篇论文——我记不清具体几篇了——说肿瘤细胞可能会优先吸收甘露糖而不是葡萄糖，但又没法正常代谢它，最后就自己饿死了。

And there's one paper that or maybe a few papers, I I can't remember, that that suggests that maybe maybe tumors will selectively take up mannose rather than glucose, but they can't actually metabolize it properly until they they just die.

所以，这说不定能成为某种抗癌疗法。

And so, you know, maybe this could be an effective, you know, onco treatment of of some sort.

但甘露糖这东西，其实就是个普通糖，谁都能搞到。

But mannose is is like it's a it's a it's a generic sugar.

这东西其实一百多年前就被人知道了，关键是，你根本没法申请专利。

It's been, you know, understood for, I I guess, more than a century, and you couldn't patent it, importantly.

所以，到底谁有动力去投资做实验，验证这玩意儿在实际中到底有没有用，现在还不清楚。

And so it's not clear who has the incentive to even, you know, fund the work to test, you know, whether or not this would actually work in practice.

这可不是在给甘露糖站台，只是说，类似的情况还有很多——明明能看到某个东西可能大有裨益，但市场现有的经济结构却压根儿没法让它落地。

And, you know, this is not an endorsement of, of Manos, which is there there there are things of this shape, where there's something where you can clearly see, wow, that that might be very beneficial, but it's not totally clear how kind of economic structure of the market can can make it possible.

我觉得，在生物医学领域，这样的例子还多着呢。

So I think there are still a lot of those across the biomedical landscape.

你看啊。

I mean, look.

其实还有很多疫苗，理论上完全能做出来，但就是没有。

There are still a lot of vaccines that, you know, could in principle exist that that don't.

比如莱姆病，以前有过一针疫苗，后来因为一些我觉得根本站不住脚的安全顾虑给撤了，可到现在，还是没新疫苗。

I mean, Lyme disease, you know, there's no there's there's one vaccine that that was withdrawn from the market over some safety concerns that I I I think were misplaced, but, you know, but it's still no vaccine.

这事儿本身也没被彻底搞明白。

It's not even that well understood.

对吧？

Right?

很多人得了慢性莱姆病。

Like, people have chronic Lyme disease.

我们也不知道这到底是不是真的。

We don't know, like, if it's legit or not.

没错。

Exactly.

是的。

Yes.

对。

Yes.

没错。

Yes.

但这个问题确实很好。

And but it's it's it's a good question.

我的意思是，说不定咱们的听众里有人知道，哪些领域特别需要AMC，他们可能有想法。

I mean, look, maybe some of your listeners will know, yeah, will have ideas for for fields where, you know, we we we sorely need an AMC.

对。

Mhmm.

是的。

Yeah.

我先想再聊聊Stripe的事。

I wanna go back to Stripe for a second.

你一向很看重工艺和美感，同时也明白规模和增长的力量。

So you're famously, you know, appreciative of craft and beauty, but also you appreciate the power of scale and growth.

那有没有一种……还有速度。

Is there a type of And speed.

有意思。

Oh, interesting.

明白了。

Okay.

是的

Yeah.

对

Yep.

没错

Yep.

但有没有那种工艺，就是根本没法提速、扩张或者规模化？

But but is there a type of craft, that is just not amenable to speed, growth, scale?

比如日本厨师，光是学煮米饭就得练上十年，之后才能碰寿司之类的东西。

If you think like a Japanese chef, he's, like, learning to cook rice for, you know, a decade, and then he can move on to the sushi or something.

这种做法，在现代社会里还竞争得过别人吗？

Is that just not competitive in the modern world?

工艺、规模和速度，我不确定它们在每种情况下都必然对立，但确实经常是冲突的。

Craft, scale, and and speed, I don't know they're strictly necessarily intention in every case, but they're definitely frequently intentioned.

所以，简单说，是的，我觉得这就是个直接答案。

So just yes, I think is is kind of one short answer to to that.

但与此同时，很多最成功的企业，恰恰是因为它们特别懂得欣赏并精通工艺与美感才脱颖而出的。

At the same time, a lot of the most successful companies are those that I think are distinguished by the extent to which they they exhibit appreciation for and, like, skill in realizing craft and and beauty.

比如LVMH，这些全球最大的公司，说白了，它们的生意就是干这个的。

And so LVMH, some of the largest companies in the world, and, like, that's literally their business.

我觉得特斯拉在这方面也做得不错。

I mean, I think Tesla is pretty good at this.

它们擅长的事很多，但这一点也包括在内。

I mean, they're good at many things, but, you know, including this.

苹果当然也是典型例子。

Obviously, there's Apple.

台积电也算一种——虽然不是你刚才说的日本寿司师傅，但它们就是芯片界的寿司大师，对吧。

I mean, TSMC is a kind of, you know, it's not the the Japanese sushi chef you you you mentioned, but it is the it's the TSMC chip sushi chef Yeah.

是的。

Yeah.

在台湾。

In in in Taiwan.

而且，还有大量那种心照不宣的、很难传递的技能。

And and so much, again, tacit knowledge and, you know, difficult to to to transfer skills.

所以我觉得，手艺本身以及对它的追求，可能比以往任何时候都更重要。

So I I I think it might be the case that that craft, and the pursuit of it is is as important as as it's ever been.

尤其是随着Stripe不断壮大，我们自己也越来越坚信这一点。我觉得这些美学特质有趣的地方在于，它们通常没法量化。

And and certainly as as Stripe has gotten larger, I think we ourselves have come to greater conviction in this where I I think part of what's interesting about the these aesthetic qualities is they're, generally speaking, unquantifiable.

我不确定它们是不是本质上就无法量化。

I don't if they're intrinsically unquantifiable.

也许未来能训练出一个模型来做到这一点，谁知道呢。

Like, maybe you could, like, train a model to do so or or something.

但至少现在，它们普遍是没法量化的。

But today, they're they're, broadly speaking, unquantifiable.

可它们确实能以非常实际的方式影响人。

And yet they are actually you know, they they influence people in significant ways.

人们真的非常在意美感。

People very demonstrably care about aesthetics.

如果是一家公司，他们也会在意自己产品那些美学上的特质。

And they care about you if they're a company, they care about the aesthetic characteristics of the products that, you know, they produce.

直觉上，大家都知道这是对的。

Just like on intuitive p level, people know that that's true.

但说实话，要在组织层面管理这种东西很难，因为它跟盈亏没有直接挂钩。

But, you know, yeah, it's it's it's difficult to manage that at at an organizational level where there isn't a a p and l associated with it.

如果你搞砸了，也不会看到一个清晰的、持续下滑的数据曲线。

And if you're screwing it up, you you don't see a neat time series decline.

不过在Stripe这十四年里，我们通过不断观察——哪些做法效果好，哪些不太行，客户对什么反应积极——越来越清楚地意识到，即使我们主要面向企业客户，这种东西也真的至关重要。

But over the fourteen years of Stripe, you know, we have, I guess, through a kind of not exactly trial and error, but just by studying cases where things worked well at Stripe and cases where things worked less well and what customers responded well to and so on, it really seems clear to us that even in a domain like ours, where we are selling primarily to businesses, that this is something that's that's truly important.

而且，就像我们之前聊的，如果社会学和文化层面的护城河确实存在，那么顶尖人才往往都会把自己当成这一行的匠人。

And also that in as much as, you know, getting back to what we were discussing previously, you want in as much as the the sociology and the kind of cultural explanations of defensibility are real, the best people, you know, consider themselves craftspeople in their domain.

他们最看重的，几乎就是能和最优秀的人一起工作。

And they really, above almost all else, want to work with the best other people.

所以我觉得，哪怕从客户角度看，匠人精神在市场上并不被重视，你可能还是该把组织建设得极度重视这一点，因为你就是想留住最好的人，就冲这个理由。

And so I think it's it it may almost be true that even if from a customer facing standpoint, craft was not valued by the market, you actually might still want to build an organization that indexes very heavily on this because you you just want the best people for other reasons.

是的

Mhmm.

而事实上，客户确实看重这一点。

And now as it happens, I think customers do in fact value it.

我觉得证据也普遍支持这一点。

I think the evidence is is broadly consistent with that.

对

Mhmm.

但说实话，如果你不认真对待工作的本质，几乎不可能聚集起最优秀的人才。

But but, yeah, I think, I think it's very hard to assemble groups of the best people if you don't take the practice of the work super seriously.

对

Mhmm.

哪种美、工艺或简洁更重要？

What kind of beauty or craft or simplicity is more important?

是界面重要，还是实现更重要？

Interface or implementation?

我常说的是，Unix之所以成功，是因为它的实现简单，而不是界面简单。

There's famously that I say that Unix is successful because the implementation is simple and not the interface.

是的。

Yeah.

界面看着是挺简单的，但其实背后一堆注意事项、前提条件，还有各种边缘情况，Unix压根儿不帮你处理。

The I guess the interface is kind of simple, but it there's a lot of, like, asterisks and caveats and, you know, edge cases that that, yeah, I guess, Unix doesn't handle for you.

但Stripe会帮你处理。

But Stripe does.

对吧？

Right?

说到底，这得看你到底在做什么东西。

And look, presumably, depends what you're what you're building.

对吧？

Right?

比如TikTok，他们的界面简单可能更重要。

For for TikTok, it's probably more important that their interface is simple.

而且呢，如果他们的底层实现一团乱，那其实也无所谓。

And, you know, if their implementation is a mess, you know, that's that's probably okay.

根本无所谓。

Nothing it is.

我真不知道。

I have no idea.

但对Stripe来说，用户某种程度上是在买我们的架构，买我们能让他们轻松做到哪些事，而不是其他那些做不到的事——这一切都取决于我们的架构设计。

Whereas for Stripe, yeah, people are people are on some level purchasing our architecture or, you know, purchasing their ability to do certain things and some set of rather than some different set of things, you know, be because of what our architecture makes easy and what and and makes possible.

现在，如果说‘界面’指的是那种视觉上的图形界面，那或许我们还能分得清一点。

Now, I don't think I mean, if by interface, mean the the visual, you know, GUI interface, then, you know, maybe we can draw some separation there.

但说实话，我们平时根本不会这么区分。

But I guess we we don't really draw that distinction.

在我们眼里，Stripe的‘界面’就是它的架构本身。

Like, we think of the interface to Stripe as being the architecture.

对。

Right.

我们在卖的，虽然没人同意我这观点，但我老觉得Stripe跟Mathematica挺像的——我们提供的是一个完整的、自成一体的世界，让你能按自己的需求去建模任何你关心的东西。

We're we're selling you know, no one else seems to agree with me, but I often think of Stripe in the as similar to Mathematica, where we're selling kind of a self contained universe to model whatever it is is of interest to you and that you care about.

我们还提供了一些基础组件、接口和工具，帮你更好地做建模。

And we're providing some primitives and some, yes, interfaces and tools and so forth to enable your modeling.

但说到底，我们是帮你用你自己的方式去完成事情。

But fundamentally, we're helping you do something in your own terms.

从这个角度来说，我觉得架构和接口根本分不开。

And in that sense, I don't think the architecture and the interface are necessarily that separable.

这个比喻真有意思。

That's a really interesting analogy.

不过你要说Mathematica，它给你的入口，其实就是数学里那些纯粹的、理想化的对象。

Although, if you think of Mathematica, the entry that that's giving you to the is, you know, just like the platonic objects of math.

对。

Right.

但你们呢，入口却是像Visa的错误码这种东西。

Whereas for you guys, it's like the entry is that to like Visa error codes.

对。

Right.

没错。

Right.

就是这样。

Right.

说白了，最终的那个东西并不是什么抽象的数学理念。

Like, the the end object is not the, the, you know, the platonic

这话说得对。

That's that's that's true, though.

这两种情况其实都差不多，我觉得是的。

In in in both cases, yeah, I think yes.

不过这个比喻在几个方面其实站不住脚。

So so the analogy falls down in in a few respects.

但你听我说。

But, but, look.

我的意思是，交易这个概念非常基础，差不多跟二次方程一样古老。

I mean, the idea of a transaction is pretty fundamental, and is, you know, roughly as old as, you know, the the quadratic equation, or something.

我觉得交易可能还更早一些。

I I guess the transaction's older.

还有，Mathematica，尤其是现在——抱歉。

And, and Mathematica, especially today excuse me.

现在它支持各种各样的东西，简直厉害得不行，连特别冷门古怪的功能都支持。

Today now supports all kinds of I mean, to a very impressive extent, supports all kinds of, like, crazy arcane stuff.

你要是翻翻 Mathematica 里那些冷门的包，肯定能找到一些东西，比签证错误代码还少人用、还少人懂。

Like, if you go through the more obscure packages in Mathematica, you can definitely find things that are, I think, much less broadly employed and and understood even than than visa error codes or something.

不过，话又说回来。

So but but, yes, look.

这些根本不是一回事。

These are not the same.

我只是觉得，它提供了一种挺有意思的直觉参考。

It's more just that I I I find it to be a kind of an interesting source of intuition.

我觉得沃尔夫勒姆在Mathematica上做的事儿真太厉害了。

I think what what Wolfram has done with Mathematica is pretty amazing.

是的。

Yeah.

我还想好奇地问问，你是怎么看待这一点的？

Another, way in which I'm curious, how you think about this.

Mathematica要是得改点啥，那可就不是小事了，得有人重新学新语法。

One way in which, Mathematica might be differs is if they had to make a change in Mathematica, like, big deal, somebody has to learn new syntax.

你要是改了，那可是几十亿美元的交易都得泡汤。

If you make a change, you know, it's like billions of dollars of Yep.

交易就黄了。

Transactions don't happen.

对啊。

Right.

那这种事，会不会让你重新考虑当初的架构设计，还有背后的风险？

Like, what how does that change the way you think about the initial architecture and just the stakes?

对的。

Yeah.

这个问题提得很好。

It's a good question.

其实呢，我先聊聊架构设计这块的考量，之后再回答你的这个问题。

Well, actually, first of all, then just beauty with respect to architecture, then I'll I'll answer that that that one.

顺带一提，我觉得整个API设计的发展历程还挺有意思的。

So just as as a side note, I guess, I think it's interesting that API design in general Mhmm.

不管是从理论研究还是实际落地层面，这种事都没有更多可探讨的空间了。

Doesn't get more study as a discipline and as a practice.

我觉得这对平台的发展走向影响很大，甚至能起到决定性作用。

I think it I think it plays a significant role in the fate of platforms or can.

但它也不会永远是唯一的决定因素。

Nothing is always the determinative thing.

要是架构做对了，就能产生持续的正向复利效应；反过来，要是做错了，后果也不堪设想。

And if you get it right, I you know, there can be compounding positive benefits and the converse.

我觉得特别有意思的是，就拿移动应用开发来说，过去十到十五年里最活跃、变化最快的生态之一，但iOS开发里很多类和对象还是带着NS前缀——虽然现在用Swift之后没那么多了，但在iPhone的大部分历史里都是这样。

And I think it's really striking that with, say, mobile app development, which was one of the most dynamic and fast moving ecosystems of the past ten or fifteen years, that so many of the objects in the classes, say, in iOS development are prefixed with NS, less so now with Swift, but for much of the iPhone's history.

NS当然源自上世纪九十年代的NeXT公司，是NeXTSTEP系统的遗留。

And the NS, of course, refers to Next Step, back from Next in the nineties.

但当你把API设计和架构做对了，它就能稳稳撑住几十年，根本不用大改。

But then when you get API design and architecture right, it can be so enduring over literally multiple decades.

哪怕周围的一切都在飞速迭代、天翻地覆，它依然能扛得住。

And, you know, even in the face of what are otherwise kind of frenzied evolutions in everything around it.

Unix就是另一个典型例子——没错，它毛病一堆，但它的架构基本从半个世纪前一直用到现在，都没垮。

And Unix, of course, is kind of another example of this where, yes, Unix has tons of shortcomings, but, like, the the architecture has basically worked for now, you know, more than, I guess, around half a century.

所以我们也在Stripe不断跟人强调：要重视能撑几十年的抽象设计。

And and so, you know, we we talk we're we're also trying to impress upon people at Stripe the importance of multi decadal abstractions.

有些人一听就觉得，这不就是扯淡吗？太不切实际了，太理想化了。

And I I think people sometimes respond to that thinking that that's some insanely lofty kind of implausibly ambitious, I don't know, hyperbola.

但其实不是，当你真把这事做对了，自然就会变成这样。

But no, I I think that's actually just what happens when you when you get this stuff right.

而且如果你真做到了，你的平台上的开发者就能长期享受到这些巨大的好处。

And and and if in fact you get a rise, you you you can just reap these really, the people building on your platform can reap these incredible benefits for for a very long time.

说到Mathematica，我知道他们对向后兼容性特别重视，二十年前写的程序，今天不改一行代码照样能跑。

To the Mathematica points, they, I know, take backwards compatibility really seriously, where you can run programs, you know, written twenty years ago, unchanged in today's Mathematica.

这自然让API设计的门槛变得更高了。

That really raises the stakes in API design for sort of obvious reasons.

我们自己也面临同样的问题：每当我们想加新功能时，不仅要问它能不能解决当下的需求，还得想——我们敢不敢保证，到2044年它还能站得住脚？

And we have that same problem ourselves where when we think about introducing something new, it's not just does this, like, exigently address the particular needs that's motivating it today, but, you know, do we think we can stand behind this, you know, in in 2044?

是的。

And Yeah.

我们还得琢磨，未来世界会怎么变，才能让这一切始终自洽？

And how do we think the world might evolve around us such that it all remains coherent?

当然，我们也不是每次都做对，但这就是我们努力的方向。

And we certainly don't always get that right, but that's that's on some of what we're trying to do.

VisaNet算不算一个这样的例子？

Is VisaNet an example of this?

而且有人可能会说，能用一个系统几十年，哪怕它自己能维持、生态也平衡了，但如果你因为用户习惯和利益结构根本改不动它，反而可能被困在一个本可以更好的糟糕状态里。

And one might even say that one of the downsides of being able to use implementation for many decades in the future is even if it's it's self sustainable and you have this ecosystem and equilibrium set around it, if you, you know, can't modify it just because of people's locates and incentives, you get stuck in this equilibrium that's worse than it could be otherwise.

我明白。

I see.

明白了。

I see.

我觉得像Visa和万事达这样的支付网络，整体上已经达到了一个不错的平衡。今天看，2024年的世界里它们运作得挺顺，但你得想想它们刚起步时的世界是什么样，当时解决的是什么具体问题。

I think the card networks generally, Visa and Mastercard, are, you know, are are pretty good equilibrium, where it it's easy to judge today with, you know, the world as it exists in 2024, but I think you have to look at the world as it was when they started out and the particular problems that they're solving.

拿美国和西方的金融环境跟其他地方比，我真不觉得美国被坑了，或者真被锁死在什么糟糕的模式里。

I think when you compare the, I don't know, financial landscape in in The US or in the Western world to those in other places, it's certainly not clear to me that The US has has gotten, you know, a bad hand, so to speak, or is is somehow stuck in any meaningful way.

所以，支付网络其实干了挺多事。

So, you know, the Card Networks do a couple of things.

它们最初的设计，其实是想取代商店赊账，说白了，最早就是信用卡，不是借记卡。

They they originally, they you know, they were they were designed to to replace a store credit and to and, I mean, for for the act I mean, it was a credit card originally, not a debit card.

对吧？

Right?

这一点很重要。

And and that was important.

而且，我觉得有组织的消费信贷其实是个大事，好处很多，尤其对低收入人群来说特别有帮助。

And, you know, the the availability of structured consumer credit, I think, is actually a a pretty big deal and and pretty beneficial and especially beneficial typically for for lower income people.

后来，随着喷气式旅行和大众旅游兴起，它们还推出了旅行支票，替代了那种随身揣着一大包现金的麻烦做法。

And then, you know, with the advent, I guess, of of jet travel and, you know, mass market tourism and so forth, then, you know, it it they helped supply travelers' checks and and, you know, various worst alternatives like carrying, you know, cash around in your little bag.

再后来，互联网来了，它们在推动在线交易方面也起了关键作用。

And and then with the Internet, you know, they they were substantially involved in enabling online transactions.

我觉得最厉害的是，它们的架构设计得这么到位，居然能支撑这么多不同的使用场景，真的非常了不起。

And, you know, I think that they the fact that they got the architecture so right that so much of this, you know, so many of these different use cases were able to be addressed by their core design is just really impressive.

设计这一切的那个人，DHOC，真是个了不起的人物。

And, like, the guy who designed all this, DHOC, I think is is I mean, he was just he was a remarkable person.

当然，现在很多人抱怨手续费的问题，这没错。

And even I mean, people complain about interchange and Right.

不过别让我听起来像在替信用卡系统辩护，说实话，这事儿得看你怎么看，比如Stripe就是个例子。

Mean, lest I sound like a defender of, you know, the the card ecosystem, I mean, it's like Stripe is on the well, it depends you you look at multiple ways.

但很多人觉得，从某种角度来说，Stripe 在分润机制上其实是吃亏的，因为我们把本该属于自己的分润收入让给了其他公司。

But, like, many people would consider Stripe to be on the wrong side of the of the interchange cost equation in a sense that, you know, we are we are giving away the interchange revenue to to other companies.

所以我觉得我自己在分润这件事上并没有结构性的偏袒。

And so I don't think I'm structurally biased in favor of interchange.

没错，我觉得分润机制真正厉害的地方在于，它本质上是个渠道激励费——你付钱给其他公司，让他们去拉客户、说服他们办卡、维持用卡、月底按时还款，所有这些活儿都外包出去了。

And yes, I will say, I think it's pretty interesting what interchange made possible where it's it's a it's a distribution incentive fee where you're paying other entities to go and, like, do the work of recruiting these customers and convincing them to get a card and, you know, getting them to maintain the card and to pay it off at the end of the month and, like, all this stuff.

你本质上就是在为这种纯粹的渠道推广买单。

So you're you're paying for that, just the pure distribution.

就像你在飞机上，空乘人员走过来跟你说：‘来，办张联合航空的信用卡吧。’

Like, there's a person at the end of the flight telling you, hey, sign up for the United credit card or whatever.

但你知道的，这其实就是……

But, like, you know, that's that's what

我们干的就是这个。

we're do.

这只是一个例子而已。

That's just a case.

这事儿真让我挺烦的。

That kinda annoys me.

咱们先别急，一会儿再聊反事实情况。

Well, we'll we'll we'll we'll get to the counterfactuals in a second.

这一点确实存在。

So there's there's that.

还有就是，为发卡本身付的钱。

There's, you know, paying for the actual credit issuance itself.

再就是客户支持，还有纠纷处理之类的各种附加服务。

And then there's, you know, the customer support and, you know, all the ancillary things around the the the dispute handling and so forth.

我觉得挺有意思的是，看看那些因为各种偶然原因，信用卡网络根本没发展起来的国家。

And then I I think it is interesting to look at the cases where, for whatever contingent reason, you know, the card networks didn't arise.

德国就是个典型的例子。

So Germany is, you know, one of the the the classic ones.

从我们的角度看，德国的线上经济跟美国比起来，简直差远了。

And, like, dealing with the I mean, from our vantage point, at dealing with the online economy in Germany as compared to The US is so much worse.

要是Stripe能按个按钮，让德国和美国一样普遍用上信用卡，我们肯定立马狂按这个按钮。

Like, if if Stripe could push a button and have, you know, really broadly adopted cards in Germany, ally The US, we would, like, push the hell out of that button.

对吧？

Right?

你看看中国，那边确实有支付宝、微信支付，简直无处不在。

You can look at China, which on the one hand does have does have, you know, Alipay and Wepay or, you know, WeChat payments are are really ubiquitous.

从交易角度看，他们确实特别数字化。

And so in that sense, they're they're very digitally enabled from a transactional standpoint.

但这些支付工具在消费信贷方面就没那么高级了。

But those products don't tend to be as sophisticated with with consumer credit.

所以，像转账这种你本来就有钱的交易，手续费确实低到离谱。

And so, yes, the kind of the the transaction fees for transferring money that you, in fact, already have are you know, that's super cheap.

但你得从整体来看——那要是想先借钱买东西呢？信用卡能帮你搞定这个，可这成本你算过吗？

But I think you need to look at it on kind of a fully loaded basis where, okay, but what about the cost of actually getting the credit to make the purchase in the first place, you know, as a credit card would enable?

再想想其他地方的这些替代方案，你就会觉得，咱们现在这个体系其实挺幸运的。

And I think as you look at these other other counterfactuals in other places, one feels a kind of, you know, gratitude for Right.

当然。

Sure.

就是DHOC、Visa、Mastercard这些卡组织所促成的事情。

What it is that DHOC and, you know, and Visa and and Mastercard and the card networks made possible.

我不是说它们完美无缺，但我最关心的是那些批评意见。

And look, I am not saying they're perfect or anything, but I think that I'm I'm most interested in critiques.

我不是说这些东西没法做出来，但我更想听听那些真正研究过其他国家支付生态的人怎么说。

I'm not saying, again, that one can't make them, but just I'm most interested in critiques from people who've really studied the ecosystems of other countries Yeah.

因为我觉得我们很容易低估了这些系统发明所带来的价值。

Because I think it's easy to, underestimate what we, what we, what we got in their invention.

对。

Mhmm.

是的。

Yeah.

也许这里头其实有个测试和成本的问题。

Maybe there's a sort of test and expense kind of thing, here going on here.

要是现在从头开始重新设计支付体系，你觉得这些环节——承担信用风险、防范欺诈、处理纠纷仲裁——加起来每笔交易要抽走2%到3%的手续费，这合理吗？

If you had to design payments from First Rim Souls now, does it make sense that, you know, all these things you mentioned, taking on credit risk, the chance of fraud, disputed adjudication, should that cost, like, two or 3% of each transaction that happens in the economy?

也就是说，如果完全从基础逻辑出发重新搭建支付体系，它会是什么样子？

Like, from, what would payments look like if you had to design that from first principles?

其实现在我们已经能看到这场试验的实况了，好些国家的央行都开始主动牵头设计本国的支付体系，这是这么多年来头一回发生这种事。

Well, we're we're seeing a a live version of this experiment play out for the for the first time in, you know, many years in in a number of countries today where central banks are becoming more active in designing national payment schemes.

就比如巴西的PIX，我记得是2020年底上线的。

And so PIX in Brazil launched in late twenty twenty, I think.

不过啊，我猜你肯定听说过UPI，就是印度央行推出的那个支付系统。

But it's it's a it's I mean, I'm sure you've heard of, you know, UPI, the central bank.

UPI就是印度的央行支付系统，算是整个这事的起点。

The the UPI was kind of the the the instigator here where it's the central bank payment system in India.

而且它还和印度的国家身份识别系统Aadhaar做了对接，还有其他一系列配套措施。

And it was tied up with Aadhaar and their national identity system and so on.

但这套模式后来启发了好多其他国家的央行，都纷纷学着打造自己国家的UPI系统。

But that inspired a lot of central bankers in other countries to go and build their own UPIs.

所以，巴西的PIX系统是2020年上线的。

And so, yeah, PIX in Brazil launched in 2020.

现在，绝大多数巴西成年人都在每周使用PIX。

And now a significant majority of all Brazilian adults are, like, weekly active users of Pix.

你看，它2020年才推出，但普及速度简直快得惊人。

Again, even though it launched in 2020, so it just had this incredibly rapid adoption curve.

瑞典有Swish。

You have Swish in Sweden.

还有东亚的日本、泰国，甚至瑞士，各国央行都在纷纷跟进，心想：我们也该搞个类似的系统。

You've you know, there's I mean, across East Asia, Japan, Thailand, Switzerland, you know, central bank after central bank are deciding, hey.

咱们也该有自己的版本。

You know, we should have our version of this.

这其实是在从零开始重新设计整个支付体系。

And so this is a kind of reinvention of the of the payment system from scratch.

说来有点难懂，但通常只要一加上客服、消费者保护、反欺诈、反洗钱，还有信贷这些功能，不知为啥，成本就稳稳地卡在2%到3%左右。

For kind of hard to understand reasons, yeah, things typically seem like, once you layer in the customer support and the consumer protection and the fraud prevention and the anti money laundering controls and the credit, you know, the thing just for some weird reason seemed to asymptote at around, you know, two or 3%.

还有一点很重要，那两三个百分点的盈余，除了覆盖成本之外，很多其实都以奖励的形式返还给了消费者——不是每个国家都这样，但很多国家确实如此。

It's important to also note that a lot of the two or 3%, you know, beyond just covering the costs, much of the surplus ends up getting getting remitted to consumers in the form of rewards, not in every country, but in many countries.

如果你看看美国各大银行的公开财报，比如它们的跨行手续费收入，每笔交易都赚得盆满钵满，但正如你所说，很大一部分其实又直接回流到消费者手里了。

And and if you look at the the the public reports from, you know, various banks in The US, like, their interchange revenue, they're getting these delicious fees on every transaction, as you put it, like a lot of that is going straight back out the door to the consumers themselves and so on.

所以从经济角度看，如果这些钱最终又回到了消费者手里，那这到底算不算一种交易税？还是说这只是一种奇怪的循环关系？

So it's not clear how exactly, once you think about the economics, like if going it's back to the consumer, should you include that as a transaction tax, or is it just like a weird sort of a weird circular relationship?

我还没看到任何证据表明，这2%左右的费率在整体体系里有多低效。

I've not seen any evidence to suggest that the that the 2% or thereabouts is massively inefficient in the in the scheme of things.

我不是说这是最理想的水平。

Not saying it's the optimal level.

也许1%更好，但一到三个百分点之间，大概率是合理的。

Maybe 1% would be better, but, you know, within some range of one to 3%, it's it's it's probably reasonable.

说到这些按比例收取的费用和相关数据，我觉得眼下更值得关注、也更值得我们深思的，其实是全球税收体系正在发生的变化——过去一个世纪，税收领域其实有不少创新，比如所得税一度很高，后来又出现了增值税之类的。

The I mean, as as as we think about some of these these ad valorem fees and, you know, figures, the I think the place where there's, even more change at the moment that I that we find ourselves thinking more about is actually the changing structure of global tax, where, you know, the the idea of you know, the the there's been a reasonable amount of innovation, I guess, in the in the tax domain over the last, you know, century where, you know, income taxes got pretty high, then we do value added taxes and so on.

现在的新趋势，至少在在线经济里，是各地政府开始向那些在当地根本没有实体的商家征收销售税。

Like, the new thing, at least, you know, in the online context, is jurisdictions remitting or excuse me, imposing sales taxes on businesses that don't have any kind of locus in the jurisdiction in question.

所以你是个在湾区做播客的，对吧？那你的Dwarvesh周边店得注意了——瑞典乌普萨拉市可能对棒球帽征收特别税。

So you're a, you know, you're a podcaster in the Bay Area, and, you know, the the the Dwarvesh merch store, you know, will have to pay you know, the the town of Uppsala in Sweden will have a special a special tax on baseball caps.

你得了解乌普萨拉对棒球帽的这项税，尤其是你卖给他们当地人的那些帽子。

And, you know, you will need to know about that particular tax on baseball caps and any baseball caps that you are selling to the Uppsalans.

你得从买家那儿收这笔钱，向乌普萨拉报税，最后还得想办法把钱转过去。

You know, you'll have to collect that amount from the buyer, report to Uppsala, and then eventually figure out how you're going to, like, get that money to Uppsala.

这简直就是个组合难题：买家在哪儿、卖的是啥货、还得往各个不同的地方缴税。

And obviously, it's this, like, combinatoric problem of, you know, buyer jurisdictions and and, product types and then all the different jurisdictions that you have to remit the money to.

这可不是什么零点几个基点的小数目。

And those amounts, we're not talking three basis points.

这些税通常是5%、10%，甚至更高。

Taxes in question are often 5% or 10% or something.

所以这事儿真不简单。

So it's not trivial.

当我想到互联网上的资金流动和它正在发生的种种变化时，我觉得税法的变革，其实比交易本身的经济问题重要得多。

And so just as I think about sort of the funds flows on the internet and how all that's evolving and unfolding, I think changes in tax law are actually a much bigger deal than anything about the transactional economics.

是的，没错。

Yeah, yeah.

对了，这可不是《Wirecast》播客。

By the way, it's not the Wirecast podcast.

我们是叫《Lunar Society Podcast LLC》，在Serve Atlas注册的。

It's Lunar Society podcast LLC registered on Serve Atlas.

所以以后我卖任何周边商品，都由Stripe来处理。

So any any any merchandise I sell in the future at all, Stripe will take care

这些事儿都归它管。

of that.

对。

Yes.

好的。

Okay.

要是以后Stripe那边有什么问题，我们——算了，不会的。

Well, if there's ever any Stripe complaints, we No.

太棒了。

It's great.

说实话，特别管用。

It's been super useful, honestly.

要是没有它，做生意肯定难多了。

Like, it it would have been a much bit more difficult to get business

把现有的业务搭上我们的轨道。

get the existing GDP onto our rails.

说白了，就是我们能在哪儿稍微推动一点原本不会发生的经济活动。

It's sort of, you know, where on the margin can we can we cause there to be economic activity that isn't already occurring.

你确实是在注册公司之前就开播了，但咱们在卖周边这些东西上，真有啥实质关联吗？

So, yeah, like, you I I you did, in fact, start the start the podcast, you know, before before incorporating, but, know, were were we in, you know, causal in any fashion in, like, the merch or any anything, of that nature?

要说的话，要不是Substack收钱太不方便，我压根不会走这一步。

I I I like, to the extent that, like, Substack would not be, like, a convenient place to get payments from Yeah.

一开始就是这样。

To begin with.

这确实就是全部了。

That's, like, definitely everything.

而且你知道的，

And also, you know,

要是Substack没做得这么方便，我根本不会为通讯付费。

if I knew You wouldn't charge for the newsletter if Substack hadn't made it super easy.

是的。

Yeah.

而且要是我做广告什么的，要不是早就注册了LLC，我连怎么收钱都搞不定。

And also, if I do, like, an ad or something, it's just like I wouldn't even know how to begin with, getting the money if I didn't already have an LLC Right.

通过Stripe，

Through Stripe that

对。

Yeah.

有个关联的银行账户，钱才能进得来。

With an associate banking account that I can get money through.