斯坦利·唐（DoorDash）——规模化不可规模之事

欢迎来到创业思想领袖研讨会。这是斯坦福大学为有抱负的创业者举办的研讨会，简称ETL。ETL由斯坦福科技创业项目(STVP)、斯坦福工程创业中心和斯坦福创业学生商业协会(BASIS)共同呈现。我是Ravi Balani，管理科学与工程系讲师，同时也是企业初创公司加速器Alchemist的主任。今天我非常激动能与我们自己人之一——Stan Lee Tang一起开启春季ETL的第一讲。

Welcome to the entrepreneurial thought leader seminar. It's the Stanford Seminar for Aspiring Entrepreneurs or ETL. ETL is brought to you by STVP, the Stanford Engineering Entrepreneurship Center and BASIS, the Business Association of Stanford Entrepreneurial Students. I am Ravi Balani, a lecturer in the Management Science and Engineering Department and the Director of Alchemist and Accelerator for Enterprise Startups. And I am so excited today to kick off ETL for the spring with one of our own, Stan Lee Tang.

Stan Lee是DoorDash的联合创始人、首席产品官兼实验室负责人。有多少人用过DoorDash？好的。其实无需多做介绍，但对于不了解的人来说，DoorDash如今已成为一家估值约800亿美元的公司，致力于彻底革新最后一英里配送服务，它确实是一家非凡的物流公司，改变了世界对物流的认知。但Stanley最让我欣赏的是，他不仅正在成为创业精神的象征，骨子里更始终保持着对创业的学习热情。

Stan Lee is the co founder, chief product officer and head of labs for DoorDash. How many people have used DoorDash? Okay. So it really needs no introduction but for those who don't know, DoorDash is now I think an $80,000,000,000 company focused on really revolutionizing last mile delivery and it's really a phenomenal logistics company that has really transformed how the world thinks about logistics. But what's especially great for me about Stanley is that he's not only becoming an icon of entrepreneurship, but he's also really in his heart also a student of entrepreneurship.

确切地说，十年前他就坐在你们现在的位置上，作为斯坦福计算机科学专业的本科生参加ETL课程。他在斯坦福主修计算机科学毕业后创立了DoorDash。但更令人印象深刻的是，早在他香港读高中时，就编纂过一本互联网创业者访谈集。这正是一个学生蜕变为导师的圆满时刻，今天Stanley将与我们分享他创业历程中的智慧结晶。闲话少叙，让我们有请Stanley Tang登场ETL讲台。

Quite literally, he was in your literally, he was in your seat a decade ago in the same class attending ETL when he was a Stanford undergrad studying computer science. And he started DoorDash after Stanford, after he majored in computer science. But even more impressive is before that when he was a high school student growing up in Hong Kong, he actually authored an anthology of interviews of of Internet entrepreneurs when he was in high school. So this is a real full circle moment where the student has become the teacher and Stanley today is going to share with us some pearls of wisdom and insight from his own entrepreneurial journey. So without further ado, please join me in welcoming Stanley Tang to ETL.

谢谢大家。重回斯坦福让我无比激动。我先讲个小故事：2013年9月，斯坦福主场橄榄球赛开赛日。

Well, thank you all. It's I'm super excited to be back here at Stanford. I'm going to start off with a quick story. It's September 2013. It's the first home football game here at Stanford.

当时我和几个同学经营着一个小型食品配送服务，刚运营几个月。整个业务挤在帕罗奥图一间用胶带勉强维持的两居室里。突然暴雨倾盆，紧接着我们的电话开始疯狂响铃——订单如潮水般源源不断涌来。

I'm running a tiny, scrappy food delivery service with a couple of my classmates here. It's only been around for a couple months. The entire thing was run out of a two bedroom house in Palo Alto held together by duct tape. All of a sudden it starts pouring rain and soon after our phones started exploding. Orders were flooding were coming in, flooding in nonstop.

比赛夜所有人都想点外卖。我们以为这就是期待已久的转折点，人们终于开始知道我们的配送服务了。

Everyone wanted to order delivery for game night. We thought this is it. This is our big moment that we've been waiting for. It's our breakthrough. Finally people are starting to hear about our food delivery service.

这感觉就像是产品市场契合的时刻——然而并不是。这完全是一场灾难。我们被订单彻底压垮，司机数量严重不足。

This is what product market fit feels like. Except it isn't. It was a complete disaster. We were completely overwhelmed with orders. We didn't have enough drivers.

最糟糕的是我们当时甚至无法关闭网站，还没开发紧急停止功能。订单持续涌入，所有成员——无论是创始人、工程师还是销售——全都外出送货，办公室空无一人。尽管我们拼尽全力，仍无济于事：每单都严重延误，有的晚一两小时，现场完全失控。

And the worst part of it all is that we didn't actually have the ability to shut down the website. We haven't built the kill switch feature yet. So orders kept flooding in, all of us went out and did deliveries whether you were the founder, the engineer, the salesperson, everyone was out doing deliveries, no one was back at the office. But despite that, even with all our heroic efforts, there was nothing we do. Every single order was late, some by an hour, some by two hours and it was just utter chaos.

夜深时我们面对的是全面崩盘。顺便说，当时我们离资金链断裂只剩三周。在灾难面前我们自问：该怎么办？这个『该怎么办』正是今天想探讨的主题，因为当背水一战时——

And by the end of the night we were just staring at a complete meltdown. By the way, did I mention we're three weeks away from running out of cash? So in that moment, staring at this disaster, we ourselves the question, What do we do? And that question, What do we do? Is really the topic I want to address today because it's really in those moments where everything is on the line, your back is against the wall.

这种时刻会在创业路上反复出现。Robby说得对，不久前我还坐在你们现在的位置，在这个NVIDIA礼堂上ETL课程。当年听那些杰出创业者演讲时，总觉得他们事事都游刃有余，每个决策都充满目的性、韧性和确定性。但经过十年创业历程后我明白：绝大多数人最初都不是这样的。

These are the moments you're going to find yourself facing over and over again during your journey as an entrepreneur. And I feel like it's an especially relevant topic to talk to you all today because like Robby said, it wasn't that long ago when I was literally in your shoes in this very auditorium, NVIDIA Auditorium where I was taking this class, Stanford ETL. And whenever I came to these classes, these talks where I would hear from these amazing speakers and founders and entrepreneurs, it always felt like like they had everything figured out. Everything about them seemed so purposeful, so resilient, so certain. And what I've come to realize from a decade in having gone through the journey as an entrepreneur myself is that most people didn't start out that way.

那种笃定感是后来才逐渐形成的。对大多数人而言，韧性并非与生俱来——我当然也不例外。韧性是在烈火中淬炼而成的，通过那些关键的人生时刻。它源于逆境，诞生于磨难，当你直面失败并自问'我该怎么办？'时，它便开始生长。

That certainty comes much later. For most people resilience is not something you're born with. Certainly I was not born with that. Resilience is something that's forged in the fire through these pivotal moments. It's built through adversity, it's built through hardship, it's built by staring failure in the face and asking yourself the question, What am I going to do?

正是那个抉择的瞬间，那个特殊的时刻，韧性由此萌芽。今天我想分享DoorDash创业历程中几个这样的关键节点，它们如何塑造了公司，更重要的是如何塑造了我作为创始人的成长。让我们回到2012年，那时我还是斯坦福大学的大三学生。我和同学Andy、Tony组队，原本只是为了完成课堂项目。

And it's that decision point, that moment, that's when resilience is born. And today I want to share some of these pivotal moments from my journey through DoorDash and how it shaped our company, but most importantly who I am as a founder. So I want to take you back to the 2012. It's my junior year at Stanford. I got together with a few of my classmates, Andy and Tony, because we wanted to work on a class project together.

我们完全没有创业的打算，当时研究的项目也与餐饮外卖毫无关联。我们的初衷是为本地商户开发技术解决方案，这只是斯坦福的一门课程作业。作为毫无商业经验的大学生，我们走访了帕罗奥图、圣马特奥和山景城的多家商户，与店主们深入交流，试图了解他们的日常经营痛点。记得有次走进帕罗奥图的Chantal Guillaume马卡龙店，店长Chloe向我们倾诉经营难题时，我们第一次萌生了配送服务的想法。

We had no intention of starting a company and the project, the idea we were working on actually had nothing to do with food or delivery. It was actually because we wanted to figure out and build technology solutions for local businesses and we did it as part of a class here at Stanford. So as part of that exercise since we were three college students we knew nothing about local businesses. We did some research, we went out and interviewed a bunch of local businesses around the area Palo Alto, San Mateo, Mountain View and spoke to as many business owners as we can just really trying to learn about their day to day lives, what were the struggles they were facing and see if there was anything we can build to help them. And I remember one day we walked into this macaroon store in Palo Alto called Chantal Guillaume and I remember Chloe who was the store manager at the time greeted me and we started talking about some of her challenges, what it was like to run a macaroon store, and that was really the first time when we came across this idea for delivery.

她向我展示了一本厚厚的订单簿，里面全是附近公司和家庭活动预订马卡龙配送的请求。但绝大多数订单她都不得不拒绝——并非出于本意，而是根本没有配送能力。圣马特奥的咖啡店、花店、家具店乃至餐厅都面临同样困境。要知道在当时，虽然外卖服务如今已司空见惯，但那时完整的配送体系根本不存在。

I remember she handed me this really thick booklet and she started showing me page and pages of delivery requests you got for the past month from a lot of offices nearby, homes nearby that wanted macarons delivered for their parties. Except she had to turn away the vast majority of these orders, not because she wanted to turn it away, but because she had no capacity to have actually fulfilled them. She didn't have any drivers on staff. And we heard the same thing from a coffee shop in San Mateo, we heard the same thing from a flower shop, A furniture store and of course restaurants too. And keep in mind back then, delivery I know food delivery has been around for over a decade now, so it might seem like an obvious idea, but back then this infrastructure didn't actually exist.

商户若想提供配送服务，唯一选择就是自聘专职司机，这对大多数商家来说根本不经济。我们的灵感闪现：与其让每家商户都雇佣司机，何不建立共享配送网络？通过软件技术搭建平台，让所有商户都能按需调用配送资源——这才是技术应该发力的方向。听起来很完美，对吧？

If you wanted to offer delivery to your customers, your only choice was to hire a full time delivery driver on staff, which for most businesses that just didn't really make economic sense. So the light bulb moment for us really was, well what if instead of every single one of these business owners having to hire their own delivery driver, what if we pulled together and created a shared network of delivery drivers that any of these businesses can tap into whenever they had delivery. They'll call us up and this entire thing can be powered by software and technology. Maybe that's where we should apply the technology towards. Brilliant idea, right?

但有个致命问题：我们三个穷学生既没有配送公司，也没有资金、司机、软件、基础设施，更毫无物流经验。

Well, except there's one problem. We don't actually own a delivery service. We're three college students. We had no money. We had no delivery drivers, no software, no infrastructure, zero logistics experience.

这成了我们的第一个关键转折点：如何启动？我们没有撰写50页商业计划书，而是决定做个简单实验。我们搭建了一个极其简陋的网站——

Are we going to get started on this? And this was really our first pivotal moment. How do we get going? So instead of spending time sitting down writing a 50 page business plan, writing out the software, getting drivers, we thought, you know what, why don't we start with a simple experiment? And the experiment was basically for the experiment what we did was we built a very simple website.

这个单页HTML网站只挂了八家帕罗奥图餐厅的PDF菜单（都是不提供外卖的），底部留了个谷歌语音号码。网站宣称：想订这八家餐厅的外卖就打这个电话。实际上这个号码会转接到所有创始人的手机。没有花哨的订餐程序，没有物流系统，就是个名为pawaltodelivery.com的简陋页面。

It's a one page static HTML website consisting of eight PDF menus of restaurants in Palo Alto we liked that didn't offer delivery. And then we put a Google Voice number at the bottom and all the website said was, If you want to order delivery from these eight restaurants, call this phone number. And it was basically a number that ran the cell phones of all the founders. That was it. There was no fancy ordering app, no logistics, nothing, it was just a simple website and we called it pawaltodelivery.com and this is what it looked like.

这个网站本质是数据收集实验。我们想测试：如果把这个网站推出去，会有人打电话吗？如果有足够多来电，或许说明外卖需求真实存在，我们就能据此与餐厅洽谈。说实话我们没想得更远，单纯想统计来电数量。

And that was it. The idea behind this website wasn't to actually start a delivery service, it was more of a data collection exercise. We wanted to see if we put this website out there, got it in front of people, will people start calling this phone number? And if enough people started calling this phone number then maybe there's consumer demand for delivery and we could take this idea back and figure something out with the restaurant. Honestly we didn't really think much farther beyond that.

整个网站我只花了两小时搭建，可能是我做过最丑的网页——现在有AI工具你们肯定能做得更好。发布后我们就回宿舍了，几乎忘了这事。约一个半小时后，电话突然响了。

We literally just wanted to see how many phone calls we would get. So this we put this whole thing together in about maybe it took me like two hours to make and this is probably one of the ugliest websites I've ever built in my life. I'm sure you guys can build much better websites especially with all the AI tools these days. But this is what we built back then, put it out there and we sort of went about our day, kind of forgot about it, went back to our dorm rooms. And I think maybe about an hour, an hour and a half later we got a phone call.

我们接到了一个电话，是那个Google Voice号码打来的。接起电话后发现有人发现了paloaltodelivery.com。完全不知道他们是怎么找到的，但对方确实打来了。我清楚记得他的订单——他想从帕罗奥图一家叫曼谷厨房的餐厅点虾仁泰式炒面和春卷。要知道这一切完全在意料之外。

We picked up a phone, it was that Google Voice number calling. We picked up the phone and it turns out someone came across paloaltodelivery.com. No idea how they found out but he called in. I remember his exact order, he wanted shrimp pad thai and egg rolls from this restaurant called Bangkok Cuisine in Palo Alto. And keep in mind this was unexpected.

原本我们应该按照剧本告诉来电者：'这不是真正的送餐服务，我们只是一群做研究项目的大学生，感谢来电'。但当时电话那头的人听起来真的非常非常饿，没人忍心告诉他真相。我也不想当那个泼冷水的人，就看向联合创始人问：'你要告诉他吗？'结果他也开不了口。于是我们决定：'周六晚上反正也没事，作业又不想写，不如就接下这单，正好了解下送餐物流的实际运作？'

The original script that we were supposed to stick to was to tell people whenever they called in, Hey, this is not actually a real delivery service, we're just a bunch of college students doing a research project, thanks for calling in. But I think in that moment this person just sounded really, really hungry and no one really had the guts to tell this person this is not a real delivery service. I was not going to be the one to tell this person that and so I looked at my co founder and said, Are you going to do it? And they didn't have the guts to tell this person either so we decided, You know what? It's a Saturday evening, we don't have much better to do, I don't really want to do homework, why don't we just go take this delivery and actually just learn about how delivery and logistics work?

我们接下订单后立刻打电话给餐厅订了外卖，开车取餐完成了首单配送。那天是1月1233号（我永远记得这个日期）。第二天又来了电话，我们继续接单。接着是两个、三个、五个、十个、二十个...转眼间整个斯坦福校园和帕罗奥图地区的人都在用paloaltodelivery.com了。

So we took the order, we immediately called the restaurant, we placed a takeout order and we drove, got in our cars, drove to the restaurant, picked up the food and that was our first ever delivery. It was January I'll never forget the date, it was January 1233. And then the next day we got another phone call. We decided, Okay, we'll take that, we'll do the delivery. And then it became two phone calls and then 3 and 5 and 10 and 20 and next thing you knew everyone on Stanford campus in Palo Alto was using paloalotodelivery.com.

这逐渐发展成了完整的送餐服务，再次强调——完全超出预期。我们决定顺势而为，即兴发挥保持势头。这让我学到在Palo Alto Delivery早期至关重要的经验：做那些无法规模化的事。初创时期的所有操作都是不可复制的。

It started to become a full blown delivery service And again, this was completely unexpected. This was not the plan. But we decided to go with the flow, we decided to improvise, decided to keep the momentum going. Which leads me to one of the crucial lessons I learned early on in my time at Palo Alto Delivery which is this idea of doing things that don't scale. Everything in the beginning for Palo Alto Delivery was unscalable.

我们临时拼凑解决方案：没有司机就自己当配送员，边接电话边送餐。每天下课后从5点送到9点，有时甚至在课堂上接单。记得就在这个NVIDIA礼堂上计算机课时，我坐在后排接了个订餐电话，不得不中途溜出去送餐。

We hacked things together, we didn't have any drivers so we were the initial delivery drivers, we would be taking phone calls and doing the deliveries. Every day after class we'd get in our cars every single day from 5PM to pm when we're doing deliveries. Sometimes we'll take calls during lecture. Actually I remember taking a call in this exact lecture hall right there in the back row over there during a CS class here at this NVIDIA Auditorium, got a phone call, someone wanted food. I had to leave halfway through lecture and go do the delivery.

这就是让Palo Alto Delivery运转的代价——零技术支持，只有简陋网站和电话号码。我们用Google Sheets管理订单，让全员下载iPhone的'查找朋友'来定位调度。接到订单就互发短信，用Square刷卡器收款，整个系统都是临时拼凑的。

But that's what it took to make political delivery happen. I mean there was zero technology. It was just a simple website and a phone number. The way we took orders and managed orders was through we used Google Sheets for that to track everything. We had everyone download Find My Friends on their iPhone so we can track everyone's location and do dispatching.

关于'不可规模化'最经典的例子是餐厅支付问题：初期我们用自己的信用卡垫付外卖费用，但招募同学当配送员后就不能让他们自掏腰包了——一周二三十单的累积金额谁都负担不起。

We'll text each other the order whenever we got a phone call. And the way we did payment processing was we used these square dongles, we had those lying around us and we used that for payment processing. The entire thing was just hacked together and I think my favorite anecdote when it comes to doing things that don't scale is when it came to the payment issue for the restaurant. So keep in mind back then the way it worked was we would place a takeout order, someone would show up, pay for the food at the counter as if it's just a takeout order and then we would do the delivery, which is fine when initially the founders were doing it, we'd just be using our own credit cards, no one would get paid back later by the customer. But once we started onboarding our friends as Dashers, Stanford students, other folks as Dashers, it's not you can't expect them to pay for the food out of their own pocket, especially maybe one order is fine but once it starts adding up like two, three, five, ten, twenty, thirty orders throughout the week asking them to pay out their own pockets, it just wasn't a realistic thing.

解决方案是去Walgreens买可充值借记卡。有趣的是买借记卡必须用现金，所以我们每天从ATM取几千美元现金，冲到帕罗奥图大学大道的Walgreens扫空货架上的借记卡，周而复始。

We had to figure out a solution. So the solution we came up with was we found out you can actually buy these debit cards from Walgreens, load it up with money and essentially it just became a credit card. That's what we did, we would buy up these debit cards, hand it out to our dashers every week, the next week they come along we'll give them a new batch of these debit cards. And the funny thing I found out was that you actually can't use a credit card to buy a debit card, you actually have to use cash to do that. So every day what we would do is we'd go to the ATM machine, withdraw thousands of dollars of cash, roll up to the Walgreens on University Avenue in Palo Alto and buy up all the debit cards off the shelf and we did that every single day.

想象下药店员工天天看着一群大学生用现金狂买借记卡的场景。但这种'笨办法'恰恰是初创公司最有力的武器——亲力亲为让我们深入理解了每个运营细节：调度逻辑、厨房运作、高峰时段、停车技巧，甚至披萨和汉堡配送的不同门道。

Just imagine the Walgreens staff seeing a bunch of college students coming in day in and day out buying up all the debit cards with cash. I'm sure it raised a couple eyebrows, but that's what it took. And honestly doing things that don't scale is probably one of the most powerful things you could do as a startup because by doing everything ourselves we really began to understand every facet of our operations. We became experts in our business. We started to understand how dispatching works, we started to understand kitchen operations, when peak demand are, where are the parking spots, knowing that pizza delivers differently than burgers and fries, really just the nuances, nitty gritties of how food delivery actually works.

正因为亲身经历过这些痛点，后来才能通过软件产品解决它们。如果不深刻理解问题，就不知道自动化什么。几个月后我们进入Y Combinator，更名为DoorDash，开始了艰难的种子轮融资。

And because we experienced those pain points firsthand, that's how we were able to later address them through software and products. You're not going to know what to automate if you don't understand the problem deeply. Do things that don't scale. Fast forward a few months, we went through Y Combinator, we rebranded as DoorDash, we're no longer Palo Alto delivery anymore, and it was time to raise our seed round. And to be honest, it was a difficult seed round to raise.

请记住那是2013年。当时一家科技初创公司涉足实体业务的概念对硅谷人来说还很陌生。那时大家都习惯了纯软件公司。我记得曾与一位知名投资人会面——顺带一提他后来投资了DoorDash——他对我说：‘你们是一群聪明的斯坦福学生，完全可以去打造下一个谷歌。’

Keep in mind this was 2013. This whole idea of a company, a tech startup that was doing things in the physical world was a foreign concept to people in Silicon Valley. Everyone back then were used to pure software companies. So I remember I met with a prominent investor who said to me and by the way this investor ended up investing in DoorDash, I remember he said to me, You guys are a bunch of smart Stanford students. You guys could be working on the next Google.

为什么要做送餐服务？在接连被拒后，我们开始自我怀疑。距离资金耗尽只剩三周时，我想起在斯坦福提到的那个开场故事：橄榄球赛之夜一片混乱，我们实际是在帕罗奥图一栋两居室里运营。凌晨1点完成最后一单后，创始团队回到那里，浑身湿透精疲力竭地面面相觑：‘到底发生了什么？所有订单都延迟了！’

Why are you doing food delivery? So just hearing these constant no's we really started to doubt ourselves and we're three weeks away from running out of money, which brings me back to that opening story I mentioned at Stanford, night of that Stanford football game where everything is a disaster, it's complete chaos and this was the house we were actually running our operations out of in Palo Alto, a two bedroom house. And I remember when 1AM rolled around, it was the after we'd done our last delivery of the night, we got back to this house, we regrouped as a founding team. We were all exhausted, we were soaking wet and completely devastated and we all looked at each other and went, What the hell just happened? Every single one of these orders were late.

这感觉就像是末日。我们彻底失去了客户信任，让顾客失望，让餐厅合作伙伴失望，最重要的是让自己失望。大家都在想：这要怎么挽回？再没人会用DoorDash了。这又是个关键抉择时刻——接下来该怎么办？

It really felt like this was the end. We've completely lost the trust of our customers, we've disappointed our customers, we've disappointed our restaurants, partners and most importantly we disappoint ourselves. No one how are we going to recover from this? No one is ever going use DoorDash ever again. And this was another pivotal moment, like what are you going to do?

对多数人而言，明智的商业决策本该是尽量节省资金：群发道歉邮件，提供未来配送优惠券。但对我们而言，真正重要的是为客户做正确的事——必须全额退款，特别是当晚受影响订单。要知道我们退款时不仅要退还配送费，还要自掏腰包承担餐费（这部分餐厅不会返还）。

I think for most people the smart business decision would have been well let's try to conserve as much of the cash as we can. Maybe we send out a generic mass apology email, offer people some credits for future deliveries but we're about to run out of money, we ought to keep as much of the cash as we can. But for some reason that just didn't really sit right with us. For us, we truly wanted to build a company that was about doing the right thing for the customer, the only right decision there was to do was we have to refund everybody's orders, especially those that were impacted and were late from that night. And keep in mind when we refund a delivery or refund an order, we're refunding the full cost of the meal whereas DoorDash only keeps the delivery fees but when we refund, we're not only refunding delivery fees but the full cost of the meal and the food as well, which we're not getting back from the restaurants.

这笔退款金额巨大，核算后发现将消耗我们40%的资金。对濒临破产的初创公司来说这很可怕。但我们只犹豫了十五秒就点击了退款按钮。那晚我们通宵烤制饼干，手写道歉信，亲自送到每位延迟客户手中。这是我们表达歉意的方式：'我们搞砸了，但珍视您的信任'。后来我们完成了种子轮融资，但那个痛苦夜晚真正奠定了'客户至上'的核心价值观。

So this was a huge number, huge dollar amount and when we crunched the numbers and did the math we realized actually if we were to refund everyone's order that night it's going to cost us 40% of our bank account. For us, as a startup that's about to run out of money, was a terrifying thought. We took maybe about fifteen seconds to make the decision and hit the refund button. And on top of that we spent all night baking cookies, we wrote personal handwritten apology notes to everybody that was impacted and we spent the entire evening delivering to every single customer who was late personally with those cookies and handwritten note and it was really our way of saying we're sorry, we let you down, we messed up, We really value your service. Eventually they get the seed round done but I think that night as painful as it was really actually cemented, went out to cement one of our core values which is customer love and customer obsession.

这件事为公司所有人建立了共同基础，明确了DoorDash的运营理念，更重要的是强化了文化内涵。对我而言，文化不是PPT上的华丽口号，而是经历关键挫折时形成的、刻入公司DNA的印记。这是我们的重要转折点。现在快进到两年后——

And for me what it allowed was it created a shared foundation among everyone in the company for us to when it came to how we want to run and build DoorDash moving forward and most importantly it kind of reinforced what culture meant. For me culture is not a fancy slogan that's written on a slide deck. Culture is forged through these pivotal moments where you go through these experiences, these failures and that gets etched into the company DNA forever. And that was a really important moment for us. I'll fast forward two years.

2015年11月，DoorDash高速发展期。我们刚搬进旧金山崭新的现代化办公室（让我试试这个设备是否正常），一切看似顺利。

It's November 2015. By then DoorDash was growing rapidly. We just moved into a brand new slick office in San Francisco. Just let me see if this works. Things were going well.

我们快速扩张，入驻新办公室，DoorDash开始成为家喻户晓的品牌。表面风光时，我们决定启动C轮融资，当时信心满满以为会轻而易举。

We were growing fast. We're in a brand new office, DoorDash was starting to become a household name. From the outside everything looked great and this was also the moment we decided, okay, was time to kick off our Series C fundraising process. And were really confident about it. We thought this was going be a walk in the park.

毕竟A轮B轮都在一周内完成，我们以为C轮也不例外。但这次市场突然转向：外卖行业被质疑经济模型不成立、盈利困难、运营复杂、利润微薄，加上Uber Eats几周前刚上线成为强劲对手。

After all, while our C round was difficult, our Series A and Series B, we both got those done in less than a week so our thinking was well the Series C is not going be any different, right? Well except it was. As we kicked off our fundraisers this happened to be the exact moment the market turned on us when it came to the food delivery industry. All of a sudden the narrative for food delivery became well the unit economics are never going to work, you guys aren't profitable, this is operation complex, it's low margin and by the way it's a brutally competitive industry. And it didn't help the fact that Uber Eats just launched a couple weeks prior and they were starting to emerge as a formidable competitor.

没想到这开启了DoorDash长达三年的艰难时期。记得某个加班夜，我和首席会计在办公室沙发闲聊时，他突然说：‘Stanley，你应该知道了——我们只剩两个月资金了，C轮差不多完成了吧？’那一刻我震惊得说不出话。

Little did we know this was going to be the start of three very, very difficult years for DoorDash. I remember one night we were, it was after work hours when everyone has left the office, it was just me and one of our lead accountants left, We're just chatting by one of those couches at our office, shooting breeze, chitchatting. And I remember in the middle of our conversation he casually just dropped, Hey Stanley, I'm sure you already know this, you have this taken care of, but just to let you know, have about two months of runway left. I'm assuming the Series C is almost done, right? That was the moment when my jaws dropped.

你在说什么，两个月的运营资金？我们银行账户里不是有2000万美元吗？要知道那时我才22岁，刚毕业一年左右，是个应届毕业生，软件工程师出身，对财务、会计或资产负债表一窍不通。所以我们的会计不得不向我解释我们的财务状况。是的，登录银行门户时显示有2000万美元，但那并非实际可用资金，因为其中700万是代餐厅保管的款项，下周就必须支付出去。

What are you talking about, two months of runway? Don't we have $20,000,000 within our bank account? Well keep in mind at the time I was 22 years old, I was maybe a year out of school, I was a new grad, was a software engineer, I didn't know anything about finance or accounting or what a balance sheet was. So our accounting actually had to explain to me how our finances work. Yes, when you log into our bank portal it says $20,000,000 but that's actually not how much money we have because $7,000,000 of that actually wasn't ours, it was money we were holding on behalf of the restaurant, so we have to pay those out in the very next week.

还有400万被房地产租赁的信用证占用，所以我们实际可支配的只有约8900万美元。顺便说一句，当时我们每月烧钱约500万美元。简单计算就知道，我们距离资金枯竭只剩60天，而C轮融资还遥遥无期。这又是一个关键转折点。

Another 4,000,000 was tied up in letter of credits for real estate leases, so really we only had about $89,000,000 left in our bank account that we can actually use. And by the way, in case you didn't know, we're burning about $5,000,000 a month back then. So you can do the math. We're about sixty days from running out of cash and the Series C was nowhere near complete. This was another pivotal moment.

该怎么办？我要故作镇定吗？硬撑过去？不能让大家恐慌，觉得公司要破产了。那时我们已有253名员工依靠我们，与当年在帕洛阿尔托用斯坦福橄榄球之夜做校园送餐的草创时期截然不同了。

What do you do? Do I try to keep it cool? Do I try to ride it out? You don't want to freak people out that, Hey, is how to go bankrupt. And by then we had about two this is a little bit different than the Palo Alto delivery days with our Stanford football night where it was just a scrappy campus food delivery service.

我们服务着数十万家餐厅和数百万顾客。最不该做的就是引发恐慌导致大规模离职，只能祈祷C轮融资成功。或者直面现实，迎难而上？

By then we had about two fifty-three 100 employees that were all counting on us. We had hundreds of thousands of restaurants, millions of customers. What are we going to do? The last thing we needed to do was freak people out and then cause us some mass exodus and let's just pray we get our series C done. Or do we face reality and address it head on?

与会计谈话后，我立即发信息给联合创始人Annie和Tony说明情况。次日早上8点我们召开了紧急会议。当时连管理团队都没有，只能召集五位最资深的骨干。我们在会议室直言不讳：资金即将耗尽，C轮融资短期内无望，现在需要大家的帮助。

Right after the conversation with our accountant I immediately texted my co founders, Annie and Tony, to let them know about the situation and the very next morning at 8AM we called an emergency meeting. Back then we didn't even have a management team so we simply just what we did was we grabbed five of the most senior leaders at the company who we thought were the most competent, we got them in a room at 8AM and we told them the cold hard truth. We laid it bare, zero sugarcoating. Hey guys, we're about to run out of money. The seriously fundraise is not getting done anytime soon and we need your help now.

接下来24小时，这个小团队把自己关在会议室里头脑风暴，寻找延长资金跑道的方法。关键是不能影响业务增长。我们审查了每项开支、每笔营销费用、每份合同、每个招聘岗位。一周后成功将月烧钱率减半，赢得了宝贵的两个月缓冲期。最终我们勉强完成了C轮融资。

And over the next twenty four hours that small group locked ourselves in that conference room and brainstormed every possible way we could extend runway and explored every possible solution. And most importantly it was solutions that also couldn't hurt our top line growth, we had to keep growing. So we tore through every single line item, we looked at every single expense, every single marketing dollar, contract, every single hire, there was no stones left unturned. And by the end of the week we were able to slash our burn rate by half and that bought us two valuable precious months. And eventually we did get our Series C done but barely.

2016年3月完成的C轮融资距离危机正好四个月，每一周都至关重要。这次濒死体验是我重要的觉醒时刻，让我决心深入学习财务知识：商业模式、单位经济学、财务报表分析等。

We got our Series C done in March 2016, exactly four months later. So we needed every single week mattered. And for me that was really a that near death experience was like a very important moment for me because it was a huge wake up call, it made us realize holy cow, we need to get our stuff together, get our act together. I made it my personal goal to learn everything I could about finance from that point forward. I learned about how our business model worked, I learned about unit economics, learned about finance and accounting, how to read a profit and loss statement, cash statement, everything.

我发誓绝不让这种情况重演。人们常问DoorDash如何成为运营标杆？我们并非天生如此，正是这类危机塑造了我们。C轮危机反而是公司最好的礼物，它教会了我们财务纪律——那些削减措施本该更早实施。

And for us I vowed to myself that we were never going to let this happen ever again or ever get this close to a near death experience without knowing. People often ask me how did DoorDash develop the reputation of being world class operators, world class in execution and operational excellence? Well I can definitely tell you we weren't born that way, we woke up one day and magically became great operators. It was through moments like these I think because it turns out that the Series C crisis was probably one of the best things that could have ever happened to the company because it taught us a super valuable lesson which is financial discipline. Those cuts we found a couple months prior or those cuts we found during the C, well honestly we should have done those months ago.

公司积累了大量冗余和低效，前几年完全是在财务盲飞。刚完成C轮融资，又传来坏消息：优步宣布30亿美元融资（当时科技初创公司最大规模），并全力进军外卖市场。我们融资刚超1亿，如何与资金实力30倍于我们的对手竞争？

By then there was so much blow and inefficiency that had been built up in the company, honestly for the first few years we were just flying financially blind. So that was really a wake up moment. And right after that, right after we raised our Series more bad news happened. Uber decided to announce their $3,000,000,000 funding round which at the time was the largest funding round ever for a tech startup and they've also announced they were going to go all in on Uber Eats. Keep in mind that for us we probably had a little over $100,000,000 raised at the time so we were how are you going to compete with Uber when they are out when they have outgunned you 30 to one in capital?

我们无法在烧钱或补贴上取胜，唯一选择是打造更高效的本质优势。正如所言，限制催生创造力。接下来两年考验着我们的韧性，正因为无法用资金碾压对手，我们被迫变得更聪明。

We're definitely not going to able to outspend them and we're certainly not going to outsubsidize them or subsidize our way to growth. So we really only had one option which is we have to build a fundamentally better and more efficient business. As they say, constraints breed creativity. And the next two years it really tested our resilience. It was a period of resilience, it was a period where because we couldn't outspend our competitors we had to get smarter.

我们最初将全部精力集中在业务上，关注单位经济效益、商业模式和成本结构。我们深入最细微的环节，不仅从整体层面，更细化到邮政编码区域乃至每次配送层面理解业务。我们将调度优化精确到每一秒。那段艰难时期真正锻造了我们的韧性——正是在学会如何构建更优质、更高效业务的过程中。此外在运营层面，我们做了一个相当重要的战略决策，这个逆势而为的赌注在当时可能显得格格不入。

We became iniacally focused on our business, on our unit economics, on our business model and our cost structure. We dove to the lowest level details and we understood our business not just at an aggregate level but down to the zip code level, down to the delivery level. We optimized our dispatch down to every single second. That period really forged our resilience, the lean period really forged our resilience when it came to actually figuring out how to actually build a better business and more efficient business. So when and I think the other thing operationally I think something we did was we made a pretty important strategic bet that was probably against or a contrarian bet that was probably against the grain at the time.

当时食品配送领域竞争者众多，但他们都盯着旧金山、纽约这类光鲜的都市区。而当我们基于第一性原理分析数据时，发现主要需求并非来自市中心。我们注意到郊区才是需求主力——那里居住着家庭用户，人们更依赖汽车，最近的餐厅可能要开车二十分钟。对这些郊区居民而言，配送不仅是便利，更是刚需。

Back then we had a lot of competitors in the food delivery space but they were all going after the sexy urban cities like San Francisco and New York City. But what we found was when we actually looked at our data and actually looked at things from first principles, it wasn't the urban downtown areas where most of the demand was coming from. We noticed that it was actually the suburbs where a lot of the demand came from. It's where the families lived, it's where people were much more reliant on cars, it's the nearest restaurant is probably a twenty minute drive away. So for them being in the suburbs, delivery wasn't just a convenience, it was a necessity.

当其他玩家在拥挤的都市核心区厮杀时，我们正悄然在郊区建立优势。传统认知认为必须进驻城市——那里有人流、有餐厅、有支撑经济效益的密度。但我们发现郊区同样能实现相当甚至更高的运营效率：虽然地域分散，但餐厅高度集中。以帕罗奥多为例，所有餐厅基本集中在大学大道；山景城的餐厅则全在卡斯特罗街——整个郊区都围绕着几条主干道运转。

While everyone else was battling it out in these dense urban cores, we were slowly and quietly building up our position in the suburb. I mean the thinking was like and I think the other thing we noticed was like people thought you have to be in the cities because that's where people are, that's where the restaurants are, that's where you get the density to make the economics work. Well what we found was that in the suburbs you can actually get pretty much the same density, same efficiency if not more because actually looked at how sub maybe we actually looked at what a suburb looks like on a map, you would start noticing that yes while it's spread out, the suburbs are spread out, the restaurants are actually very concentrated. Like typically, just take Palo Alto for example, all the restaurants are typically located on University Avenue and Mountain View they're all located in Castro Street. So everything is revolving around these main streets.

实际上郊区天然形成了配送密度网络，通过枢纽辐射模式能达到与城区相当的配送效率。这个洞见改变了游戏规则。如今DoorDash的根基正是在2016至2018年间奠定——被迫精打细算的岁月里，我们打磨战略、提升执行，到2018年完成Z轮融资时已准备就绪：产品更优、客户留存率更高、下单频率更快，所有指标都昭示着我们建立了更高效的商业模式。

So in effect you kind of have these natural delivery densities and you can operate this hub and spoke model where you can actually achieve the same efficiency in suburbs when it comes to delivery as the urban cores. So that was a huge insight for us. So by the time So in a way, the DoorDash you see today was really built between 2016 to 2018 where we were forced to be disciplined, where we sharpened our strategy, we got our act together so by the time 2018 rolled around when we were finally able to raise our Series Z round and actually had the capital to invest, we were ready. By then we had a more superior product, We had a better customer retention, better customer order frequency. All of our metrics were better, we just had a much better business that was more efficient.

当资本终于涌入时，我们每投入一美元产生的效益都远超竞争对手。DoorDash成为市场领导者只是时间问题。最初看似劣势的资本短缺，最终反成为最大优势——它迫使我们打造出更高效的业务。我们没有让限制束缚手脚，而是让这些限制定义了企业的基因。下一个关键转折点...好的，请翻下一页。

So when the money did come and it was time to pour the plow of capital in, every dollar that was invested into our business just went so much further than our competitors. So by then it was just a matter of time that DoorDash reached our market leader position. And so what seemed like a big disadvantage initially, our lack of capital, turns out that's what that actually turned out to be one of our greatest strengths, that's what forced us to build a more efficient business. We didn't let constraints limit us, Instead those constraints defined who we are as a company. The next pivotal moment yeah, next slide.

是的，有时候会出现一些关键转折点，其不可预测性让全世界都始料未及。整个天地仿佛瞬间颠倒——我说的当然是2020年新冠疫情爆发时。对于一家致力于开发技术、连接人与人、连接实体商业的公司来说，新冠疫情确实令人恐惧，简直是场噩梦。这场公共卫生危机迅速演变为经济危机，餐厅堂食纷纷关闭，顾客们囤积 groceries 后停止点外卖，整个经济就像悬在细线上摇摇欲坠。人们还会继续点外卖吗？

Yeah, well sometimes there are pivotal moments that are so unpredictable that nobody in the world can predict. The entire world flips upside down and of course I'm talking about 2020 when COVID happens. For a company that's about building technology and connecting people and connecting businesses in the physical world, COVID was honestly scary, it was terrifying. A public health crisis was quickly becoming an economic crisis, restaurant dining rooms were closing down, customers stopped ordering delivery as they stocked up on groceries and the entire economy just felt like it was teetering on a thread. Would people still order delivery?

餐厅能撑下去吗？我们能撑下去吗？然后几乎一夜之间，局势完全逆转。所有人都被困在家中，意识到外卖成了餐厅连接顾客的唯一渠道。需求开始回升，突然激增，外卖不再仅仅是便利服务，而成了众多餐厅的生命线。

Are restaurants going to survive? Are we going to survive? And then almost overnight everything flipped. Everyone was stuck at home and realized the only way restaurants to reach their customers was through delivery. Demand started picking back up, started spiking and all of a sudden delivery wasn't just a convenience, it was a lifeline to a lot of these restaurants.

这是这些餐厅维系生存、触达顾客的唯一方式，形势瞬息万变。说实话，我们真切感受到了对社区沉甸甸的责任。我们必须快速行动。疫情期间全员上阵，某种程度上仿佛又回到了创业初期——每周工作七天，从早十点到凌晨两点，每天多次全员会议，充满未知。

It was the only way for these restaurants to stay around and reach their customers and things were changing quickly and with you know, really came with this huge sense of responsibility that we had for our community. So we had to move quickly. During COVID it was all hands on deck. And in a way it really felt like it was back to our early startup days again. It was seven days a week, 10AM to 2AM, multiple all hands company meetings a day, it was total uncertainty.

但奇怪的是，在这种危机时刻，我发现反而是经营企业最得心应手的时候，因为整个公司空前团结。该做什么变得异常清晰。我们迅速聚焦三件事：首先，用不到四天时间就在应用上线了无接触配送；其次是安全防护。

But in a way it felt like during those times of crisis that I found it's the easiest to operate the business because the company was just so united. It became really clear what needs to get done. So we quickly worked on three things. First, we were able to ship contactless delivery on our app in less than four days. Second, safety.

在全球供应链极度紧张的时期，我们必须为所有配送员采购数千万件个人防护装备。最后也是最关键的，是支持合作伙伴。我们的餐厅正经历生死存亡的考验，我们必须与他们共渡难关。为此我们决定疫情期间将佣金率直接减半——至今我们仍是全球唯一这样做的平台，这直接让我们损失了1亿美元。虽然现在看DoorDash的规模会觉得这不算什么，但在当时可是重大决定。

We had to source tens of millions of PPE for all of our dashers during a time when this global supply chain was very scarce. And finally, and most importantly, supporting our partners. Our restaurants were going through a time of existential crisis and it was important that we were there for them. And so we made the decision to actually cut our commission rates by half during COVID and to this day I think we're the only platform in the world to actually do that and this costed us $100,000,000 directly to our bottom line. While this might sound trivial if you're looking at DoorDash today, but back then this was a big deal.

当时DoorDash尚未盈利，同时我们正处于IPO进程中。因此这本质上不是常规情境下会优先考虑的决策。但真正让我轻松做出决定的是反复自问：你想打造怎样的企业？是只为IPO优化的公司，还是致力于构建更宏大、更持久、能赋能全球各地本土商业生态的伟业？对我而言，这不是一年、五年甚至十年的任务，而是值得毕生追求的使命。

DoorDash wasn't profitable back then and also we were in the middle of going through an IPO. So basically not a decision, the first decision you'll make during that situation. But for me what really made this decision easy was really asking myself the question What's the company that you're trying to build here? Are you just building a company to optimize towards an IPO or are you actually trying to build something much bigger here, something much longer lasting, something that hopefully would empower every local business in every local economies around the world. And for me that's a mission that's not a one year mission or a two year mission or a five year mission or a ten year mission, that is probably a forever internal mission.

当从这个维度思考时，眼前的困境不过是宏大蓝图中的微小插曲。所以核心启示是：最艰难的决策往往最简单。危机时刻，要以价值观为指南针，专注长期价值。下一张幻灯片。我要谈的最后一个转折点，正是2025年当下我们正在经历的——AI与自动化时代。

And when I thought about it from that perspective, this was really a drop in the bucket in the grand scheme of things. So the takeaway here is sometimes the most difficult decisions are actually the simplest. In times of crisis, lead with your values and focus on the long term. Next slide. So the last pivot moment I want to talk about is actually something that we're going through right now, today, in 2025, the age of AI and autonomy.

我们正经历本世代最重大的技术范式转移，其深远程度堪比互联网革命。DoorDash此刻应对这场变革的方式，将决定公司下一篇章乃至生存命运。研究商业颠覆史会发现，企业衰败从来不是因为竞争对手做了改良版产品。比如百视达并非被做出更好租赁服务的Netflix打败，而是被彻底改变娱乐消费方式的流媒体颠覆。

We're going through one of the biggest technological paradigm shifts of our generation, arguably as profound as the internet. And what DoorDash is going to do in this very moment to cope and navigate through this change is going to define the next chapter of our company and maybe even our survival. Because if you think about it and actually study history of how disruption works, companies don't get disrupted because someone else comes along, builds the exact same thing as you but then maybe slightly better. For example like Blockbuster, they didn't get disrupted by Netflix because Netflix built a better blockbuster. They were disrupted because streaming fundamentally changed the way entertainment is consumed.

西尔斯百货的没落也非因亚马逊做了升级版百货，而是电子商务重构了零售业。同理，DoorDash的威胁不会来自某个配送更精准、时效略优的竞品，而是来自AI、自动驾驶配送和无人机等技术对末端物流规则的重构。关键问题是：我们要被动等待变革降临，还是主动引领这场物流革命？

Sears wasn't disrupted by Amazon because Amazon built a slightly better Sears. E commerce fundamentally changed retail. And likewise, DoorDash is not going get disrupted because someone else comes on and builds a slightly slicker delivery app with slightly better dispatch, slightly better delivery times. No, it's because someone's going to come along and things like AI, autonomous deliveries and drones is going to fundamentally rewrite the rules of last mile logistics. And for us, is DoorDash going to wait for this change to happen to us or are we going to embrace the change and lead this disruption and lead this revolution?

这正是我现在倾注最多精力的课题，也是让我持续兴奋的原因。我领导的DoorDash实验室汇聚了机器人、AI、软硬件领域的顶尖人才，我们正在重塑配送的未来——与其被颠覆，不如自我革命。这种感觉就像二次创业，宛如新的创始时刻。我深刻意识到：要打造世代传承的伟业，就必须经历多次这样的创始时刻。

And that's honestly what I'm spending most of my time these days at DoorDash and what still keeps me excited is answering this question. So these days I get to lead a team called DoorDash Labs where I get to work with some of the most brilliant minds in robotics, AI, hardware, software where we're actually thinking about the future of delivery because if we're going get disrupted we'd rather let us be the ones that disrupt ourselves. And in a way it feels very much like doing another startup all over again. Very It much feels like another founding moment. And here's the thing I've come to realize is that if you want to build something that's generational, that's long lasting, you're going to go through multiple founding moments.

企业建设不只有最初那个创始瞬间。每个新的创始时刻都是重新定义自我、重燃初心的机遇。总结来说，DoorDash的经历并非特例。所有志在长青的企业和领导者都会经历类似旅程。我想告诉大家：你们都会在学业、创业、职业或人生中遭遇决定性时刻——计划失败时、压力爆表时、背水一战时，必须自问：我当如何？

Company building is not just about that one founding moment in pilot delivery. You're going have multiple of these founding moments and every one of these founding moments is your opportunity to redefine who you are and reignite that spark. So in conclusion, the journey that I shared with DoorDash is not unique to us. Every company, every leader who is committed to building something long lasting is going to go through their own version of this journey. So my takeaway to all of you is this: Each of you will go through your own pivotal moments whether it's in school, in your startup, in your careers, in your life, there are going to be moments where your plans fail, there are going to be moments where you're going to feel overwhelmed, where everything is on the line, your back is against the wall and you have to ask yourself the question, What am I going to do?

这些时刻不应逃避，而是定义自我的机遇。正是在这些至暗时刻，你才能发掘自己真正的潜力与底色。这些经历锻造了你。我想说：不要仅仅迎接挑战，更要拥抱这些时刻。记住，每个关键节点都是锻造韧性的机会。我无比期待见证各位将要创造的未来。谢谢大家。

And these are not moments to shy away from, instead these are moments that are going to define, these are moments for definition, these are opportunities. It's in those moments where you have to dig deep down where you're going to find out what you're truly capable of and what you're made of. You are forged through these moments and what I have to say is don't embrace the challenge, embrace these moments and whenever you encounter these moments just keep in mind this is your opportunity to choose to build resilience one pivotal moment at a time. I can't wait to see what you all are going to build. Thank you so much.

感谢Stanley的精彩分享。时间临近结束，考虑到议程安排，我们将把178教室的互动问答环节延后进行。请允许我行使主持特权，用最后一分钟提个经典问题——来自Tina Selig的ETL提问：在已分享诸多建议后，如果现场坐着20岁的你，还有什么未曾传达的忠告？

Thank you Stanley. That was fantastic. We're almost near the end of time and I know this so we may defer the questions for all those that are in 178 afterwards for interactive Q and A just to make a cognizant of time. I'm just gonna exercise my prerogative and just ask one question in the final minute that we have Stanley here, which is the classic ETL question from Tina Selig, which is what advice I know you've already shared a lot of advice. Mhmm.

是否有某条建议是你想对现场这位假设中的20岁自己说的，且尚未提及的？

But is there any piece of advice that you would want to give your 20 year old self that, let's say, is sitting in the audience right now that you haven't already relayed?

我想说：要相信自己有应对挑战的潜力。19岁进入斯坦福时的我羞涩懵懂，缺乏韧性，充满不安。但你们每个人都蕴藏着在关键时刻挺身而出的潜能，最重要的是付诸行动——这才是最根本的。

I think just knowing that you have the potential to step up to the occasion and that I was a shy 19, 20 year old entering Stanford. I didn't know anything. Wasn't resilient. I was a very uncertain person but it's really about knowing that each and one of you have that potential within you to step up to the occasion and really just doing the work. I think that's the most important thing.

你会惊讶于通过实际工作能多么迅速地成为专家。我们最初对物流和配送也并非行家，是通过亲力亲为——亲自处理配送、真正投入工作——才逐渐掌握的。很快你就会发现，自己成为专家的速度远超想象。

You'll be surprised how quickly you'll become an expert by just doing the work. We weren't experts in logistics, we weren't experts in delivery, we figured it out because we did the work ourselves, we did the deliveries and really just like put in the work and you'll quickly find out that you'll become an expert at a much quicker time frame than you would think.

太棒了，这真是太棒了。那么在此，我们将结束春季的首届ETL活动。谢谢斯坦利，也感谢大家。

That's fantastic. That's fantastic. So on that note, we're gonna end the inaugural ETL for the spring. So thank you, Stanley. Thank you all.