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今年市场经历了一段动荡时期,风险资产在二月表现强劲,但随着油价因伊朗冲突飙升而大幅回吐此前涨幅。
It's been a wild year for markets, with risky assets performing strongly through February but reversing much of their gains as oil prices spiked in response to the Iran conflict.
那么,市场接下来将走向何方?
So where do markets go from here?
我是艾莉森·内森,欢迎收看高盛交流会。
I'm Alison Nathan, and this is Goldman Sachs Exchanges.
今天在伦敦与我一同出席的是卡玛克沙亚·特里维迪,高盛研究部的首席外汇与新兴市场策略师。
Joining me here in London is Kamakshya Trivedi, Chief Foreign Exchange and Emerging Markets Strategist in Goldman Sachs Research.
卡玛克沙亚,欢迎再次做客我们的节目。
Kamakshya, welcome back to the program.
谢谢,艾莉森。
Thank you, Allison.
很高兴能再次回来。
It's a pleasure to be back.
显然,当前市场充满不确定性,我们有很多话题要讨论。
Obviously, it's a very uncertain time for markets, so we have a lot to talk about.
首先,让我们了解一下市场是如何消化中东局势发展的。
First, just get us up to speed on how markets are digesting the developments in The Middle East.
这是一个非常不确定的时期,很多事情正在发生。
It is a very uncertain time and lots going on.
我想提出三个宏观层面的观察。
I would make three high level observations.
首先,我认为市场正在对因冲突导致的能源价格飙升做出反应,定价了更高的通胀冲击。
First, I think the market is pricing in a higher inflation shock in response to the spike in energy prices that you've seen as a result of the conflict.
你可以从利率曲线的变动中看到这一点,原本预期会降息的地区,央行原本被预期会降息。
You see that in the way rates curves have moved up, generally places that were pricing cuts, central banks that were priced to cut rates.
这些降息预期已被撤销,原本预期保持观望的地区。
You've seen those cuts come out, places that were priced to be on hold.
你看到这些地区被定价为将加息。
You've seen more hikes and priced into those places.
因此,在英国和美国,我们原本预期会降息,但市场现在定价的降息次数更少,整体通胀预期更高。
So The UK, The US, where we were expecting to see cuts, the market is pricing fewer cuts there, it's pricing higher inflation overall.
我认为过去几周另一个显著的现象是,人们作为投资组合对冲工具的那些资产,总体上并未奏效。
I think the second thing that is quite striking through these last couple of weeks is that things that people had on as hedges for portfolios, has broadly speaking not worked.
比如长期限资产,人们持有利率多头,我认为这并没有表现良好。
So long duration, people being long interest rates, I think that hasn't really performed.
人们还对黄金多头头寸感到安心。
People got comfortable with long gold positions.
但这些也没有表现得很好。
Those haven't really performed.
瑞士法郎是另一个受欢迎的地缘政治对冲工具,但也未能奏效。
The Swiss franc was another popular geopolitical hedge that didn't really perform.
因此,总体而言,这段时间对投资组合来说相当痛苦,部分原因就是这些对冲工具失效了。
And so generally it's been quite a painful period for portfolios in part because those hedges haven't worked.
我想说的第三点也是最后一点是,尽管股票整体下跌,但这种下跌并没有呈现出明显的周期性增长倾向。
And then the third and final thing I would say is that while equities broadly have moved lower, there hasn't really been a very clear cyclical growthy tilt to that move.
通常在增长承压时表现不佳的资产,比如澳元、铜价、股市中周期性与防御性板块的轮动,都没有出现显著的下行。
Assets that you would typically think underperform when growth is under pressure, things like the Australian dollar, copper prices, cyclical versus defensive rotations in equity markets, that hasn't really gone down in a meaningful way.
因此,我认为总结来说,这是一场市场在各类资产中定价的通胀冲击。
And so I think to sum up, it's been an inflation shock that the market has priced across assets.
这实际上并不是一场被定价的增长冲击。
It hasn't really been a growth shock that's been priced.
剩下的靴子还没落地。
That's the shoe that's left to drop.
如果冲突持续更长时间,我认为这才是我最担心的领域。
If the conflict sustains for longer, I think that's the area that I would be most concerned about.
那么,为什么这些对冲策略不起作用呢?
So why aren't those hedges working?
我认为有多个原因。
I think it's a number of things.
我认为仓位配置是其中一个重要因素。
I think positioning is a big part of it.
我认为你看到大量投资者转向了像黄金这样高度集中的小众市场。
I think you saw really a kind of quite a large amount of people rotate into very concentrated small markets like gold.
你已经在其他一些地方看到过类似的情况。
You've seen something similar happen in some of these other places.
就期限或美国利率而言,通胀冲击实际上从利率角度抵消了部分影响。
In the case of duration or US interest rates, you've got a shock in terms of inflation that actually pushes against some of that from a rate standpoint.
因此,我认为在瑞士法郎的情况下,有几种不同的原因:人们记得过去在类似冲击发生时,央行会干预以阻止货币升值。
And so I think there's a few different reasons in the case of the Swiss franc, there were comments and past experience that people remember that at times of such shocks, the central bank can intervene to stop the currency from appreciating.
因此,由于各种原因——无论是与头寸有关,还是与政策行动有关——这些对冲工具并没有像人们预期的那样发挥作用。
So for a variety of different reasons, whether some to do with positioning, some to do with policy actions, you didn't quite see those hedges function in the way that people were expecting them to.
有趣的是,你说还有一只靴子要落地,因为目前市场并没有为增长冲击定价。
And it's interesting that you say that there is another shoe to drop because the market really isn't pricing a growth shock at this point.
这是否只是因为市场处于观望状态,我们需要看到更多进展才会有所反应?
Is that just because the market is in wait and see mode and we just need to see more developments before it would?
我认为确实有一部分是这样。
I think there is some of that.
我认为在某种程度上,这是相当理性的。
I think at some level, it's pretty rational.
我认为,就这场冲突的演变而言,我们目前仍处于早期阶段,这么说吧,市场正在努力评估能源价格上涨的全部幅度,以反映这一通胀冲击。
I think what is happening here in the sense we are still early, let's put it this way, in this evolution of this conflict, and I think markets are trying to get a sense of the full extent of the energy price increase to kind of price that inflation shock.
这种上涨会有多大?
How big is it going to be?
政策制定者需要多大程度上通过紧缩政策来应对这一冲击?
To what extent are policymakers going to have to respond to that with tighter policy?
我认为,一旦他们能对这一通胀冲击的规模设定一些界限,市场通常就会转向定价,并评估增长受损的程度。
I think once they can put some limits around the size of that inflation shock, I think typically you move on to pricing and what the growth damage is going to be.
所以,你所看到的这种先后顺序,与以往类似冲击中出现的情况并没有太大不同。
So I think that sequencing that you're seeing is not completely unlike what you have seen in prior shocks of this kind.
我认为,如果我们在未来几天内看不到局势稳定或至少缓和,那么很快就会成为一个焦点的问题是:某些地方是否真的出现了实物短缺。
I do think that one of the things that is going to come into focus very quickly if we don't see this settle or at least deescalate in the next few days, is whether there are actual physical shortages in places.
而一旦出现这种情况,将导致增长受损,其速度可能远快于价格机制本身带来的影响。
And then that's going to create growth damage that might be much quicker than just what the price mechanisms might bring about.
因此,在这一切背景下,美元已经走强。
So the dollar has strengthened amid all of this.
它在这里扮演了什么角色?
What role is it playing here?
你看,正如你所说,美元在这段时间里走强了。
Look, I think the dollar, as you said, it's been stronger in this period.
如果你退一步来看,确实,美元与风险资产之间的相关性出现了一些变化。
If you step back and think about it, yes, there have been some shifts in the correlation of the dollar with risk assets.
但我认为,我们所经历的这种冲击是一种全球性风险事件,而该事件发生在美国外部,并导致了巨大的能源价格冲击;在这种情况下,美国处于贸易条件的有利一侧——能源价格上涨对你的进口价格和出口价格产生了影响。
But I think the kind of shock we've seen where it's a global risk event, that risk event is occurring or emanating from somewhere outside The US, and it's one where it's led to a big energy price shock, where The US is on the right side of the terms of trade divide that move the higher energy prices, what that means for your import prices versus your export prices.
美国正处于这一侧的有利位置。
The US is on the right side of that.
因此,全球性风险事件叠加美国处于这一有利位置,我认为这两者共同推动了美元走强。
So, a global risk of shock and The US being on the right side of that divide, I think both of them lends itself to a stronger dollar.
我们在多种货币上都看到了这种情况。
That's what we have seen across a whole range of currencies.
但我要说,纵观全球外汇市场,实际的反应相当有序。
But I would say when you look across global FX, actually the reaction has been fairly orderly.
最初,这完全是风险规避和风险平仓,这是解释不同货币对走势的最主要因素。
Initially, it was very much a risk off, a risk unwind that was the biggest explanatory factor of what's driving different currency pairs.
人们在这一事件前做空美元,而美元则回补了部分空头头寸。
And people came into this event being short dollars, and the dollar unwound some of that.
但随着危机持续,能源价格保持高位,你实际上看到的是第二个分化维度——贸易条件。
But as the crisis has gone on, as energy prices have stayed high, what you're actually seeing is that second axis of differentiation, terms of trade.
谁是能源出口国,谁是能源进口国?
Who is an energy exporter, and who is an energy importer?
这一基本面维度已成为全球货币对差异的更大决定因素。
That fundamental axis has become a bigger differentiator of global currency pairs.
美元处于这一维度的有利一方。
The US dollar is in the right side of that.
只要能源价格的上行压力持续,我认为美元将继续得到有力支撑。
As long as that pressure on the energy prices remains to the upside, I think the dollar will remain well supported.
我想更深入地探讨一下新兴市场方面的这一问题。
I want to dig into that a bit more on the emerging market side in particular.
显然,在冲突开始之前,许多新兴市场资产,尤其是股票,已经经历了非常强劲的一年。
Obviously, a lot of emerging market assets, equities in particular, have had a very strong year prior to the start of the conflict.
那么,目前新兴市场方面的这一叙事是否发生了根本性变化?
So, has that narrative on the emerging market side fundamentally changed at this point?
我不认为它发生了根本性变化,但毫无疑问,此前的强劲势头因当前局势而受到了显著干扰。
I wouldn't say it's fundamentally changed, but definitely that strong momentum has been interrupted quite meaningfully by what has happened.
同样,在新兴市场内部,你看到的是一些与我在全球市场中提到的相同动态在发挥作用。
Again, within emerging markets, you're seeing some of the same dynamics at play that I mentioned that was true of global markets.
因此,这两个维度,一是累积头寸的平仓,这有助于解释为何表现最差的地区正是那些在冲突前几个月表现最好的地方。
So those two dimensions, one, an unwind of accumulated positioning, that was a good way of seeing where you saw the biggest underperformance, places that had done the best in the months leading up to it.
新兴市场本身就是这一资产类别的例子,但即使在新兴市场内部,你也看到像韩国这样的市场——在冲突前表现极为出色——却因这场危机成为表现最差的市场之一。
Both emerging markets were an example of that asset class, but even within emerging markets, you saw that in places like Korea, a market that had done phenomenally going into it, was one of the biggest underperformers as a result of the crisis.
因此,头寸调整确实起到了作用,但第二点仍是贸易条件冲击。
And so positioning did play a role, but the second thing is again the terms of trade shock.
许多新兴市场,尤其是亚洲以及部分中东欧地区,都是能源进口国。
A lot of emerging markets, particularly in Asia, also parts of Central Eastern Europe, are energy importers.
因此,它们面临着能源价格上涨直接导致的进口支出增加和国际收支压力,长远来看还可能遭遇增长冲击。
And so they face the direct hit to their import bills, to their balance of payments as a result of higher energy prices, and down the road potentially a growth shock as well.
因此,这两种因素都打断了新兴市场此前强劲的表现。
And so you've seen both of those interrupt that very strong performance of emerging markets.
我认为,如果这场冲突像商品市场所定价的那样是短期的,那么它并不会从根本上改变这一叙事。
I don't think it fundamentally changes the narrative if the conflict is short lived like commodity markets are pricing it.
在期货曲线最近的月份中,能源价格的最高点表明,市场预期这场冲突将持续数周而非数月。
The highest point in energy prices at the very front month of the futures curve, the market is pricing this to be a relatively short duration conflict lasting weeks rather than months.
如果真是这样,我认为这并不会从根本上改变这一叙事。
If that's the case, then I don't think it fundamentally changes the narrative.
当然,如果冲突持续更长时间,我认为这将让我们对预期的经济增长数据产生质疑。
Obviously, if it lasts a lot longer, I think it puts into question some of those growth estimates that we expect.
例如,关于韩国的这种叙事更多与人工智能主题相关,而我们普遍认为这一主题将持续存在,对吧?
And some of that narrative for Korea, for example, is tied more to the AI theme, which we generally think is going to endure, correct?
所以,如果抛开战争不谈,假设能源供应没有长期中断,我们对这些市场有何预期?
So if you think beyond the war, if it doesn't turn into a prolonged disruption in energy, what are we expecting for some of these markets?
我认为这完全正确。
I think that's absolutely right.
所以,如果我从更宏观的角度来看新兴市场股票,例如,我们预计从当前水平来看还有10%到12%的上涨空间。
So if I think about start with the bigger picture on emerging market equities, for example, we are expecting something like 10 to 12% upside from current levels.
这其中很大一部分,甚至是几乎全部,都来自于盈利增长。
A big part of that, or almost all of that, is coming from earnings growth.
我们预计新兴市场整体将实现非常强劲的盈利增长。
We expect very strong earnings growth through the emerging market universe.
韩国正是这种盈利增长的典范。
Korea is the poster child of that earnings growth.
为什么它能实现如此强劲的盈利增长?
Why is it having that very strong earnings growth?
这是因为人工智能主题。
It's the AI theme.
韩国、台湾等一些北亚市场为人工智能供应链提供了至关重要的芯片和半导体,而这些企业所面临的市场需求和定价能力堪称无与伦比。
It's the fact that Korea, Taiwan, some of these North Asian markets supply the all important chips, semiconductors into this kind of AI supply chain, and the demand for that, and the pricing power that these firms have is second to none.
在没有全球性衰退的情况下,这种趋势不会很快消失,而我们目前并不预期会出现这种衰退。
That's not going away anytime soon, absent the kind of global recession, not something that we expect at this stage.
因此,当你忽略由冲突带来的这一短期干扰时,我认为部分盈利动力依然稳固。
And so, as you look past this interruption as a result of the conflict, I think some of that earnings power is very much in place.
我认为,随着投资者重新回归,以及仓位从目前略显中性的水平调整,这些盈利增长预期将为这些市场带来显著提振。
I think some of the upside that we expect from that earnings, from people coming back into that, from now somewhat more neutral positioning levels, I think should also be quite a big boost to those markets.
然而,当我们从整体上审视新兴市场时,我们认为有必要将韩国、台湾、中国等更具数字AI属性的敞口,与其他宏观因素进行平衡。
We do, however, think it makes sense, as you look at emerging markets broadly, to balance some of those more digital AI exposures in places like Korea, like Taiwan, like China, with other macro factors.
比如南非这样的地区。
So, places like South Africa.
巴西就是一个很好的例子,它作为能源出口国,因风险回撤而受到冲击。
Brazil is a good example of a place which is an energy exporter that has got hit as a result of the risk unwind.
因此,你有一个国内市场的能源出口国,处于贸易条件的有利一侧,应该能在这种冲击下表现良好,但显然,当全球风险情绪普遍下降时,它也受到了影响。
So you have a kind of domestic market that's an energy exporter that's on the right side of the terms of trade divide that should do well with the kind of shock that you've seen, but has obviously gotten hit as risk has been taken down everywhere.
如果局势平息、冲突缓和,我预计像南非、巴西这样的其他商品出口市场将再次企稳并表现更好。
As the dust settles, if the conflict deescalates, I would expect to see some of these other commodity exporting markets like South Africa, like Brazil, to once again consolidate and do better.
如果我们超越周期性因素,考虑一些结构性驱动因素,这些因素是否也在支持新兴市场?
And if we think about beyond the cyclical story, and really some of the structural drivers, are those also supporting emerging markets?
如果你退一步来看,你怎么看待这个问题?
How do you think about this if you take a step back?
是的,我认为是的。
Yeah, I think they are.
我想指出三个结构性驱动因素,对吧?
And I would point to three structural drivers, right?
我们先从美元说起。
Let's start with the dollar.
我们之前提到过,在当前这场危机中,美元因能源冲击而得到有力支撑。
We talked a little bit about the fact that here and now in this crisis, the dollar is well supported on the back of this energy shock.
然而,从更长期的角度来看,美元仍然是一个被高估的资产。
However, when you think about the dollar in a longer term perspective, it's still an overvalued asset.
我们认为,随着未来几个月和几年宏观与市场表现不再那么突出,美元的估值溢价将逐渐消退。
And we think that valuation premium in the dollar is going to erode as the macro and market performance looks less exceptional in coming months and years.
美元走势稍弱通常会对新兴市场形成巨大推动,带来强劲的顺风。
That slightly weaker dollar trajectory is generally a big lift, a big tailwind to emerging markets.
我们认为,一旦这场冲突缓和,这一点将持续存在并重新发挥作用。
We think that's one of the things that is going to persist and come back into play once this conflict deescalates.
我认为,在新兴市场方面,宏观因素依然相当稳健。
I think on the emerging market side, the macro factors are still pretty resilient.
经济增长良好,通胀状况改善,已从疫情后的飙升中回落;在此次冲击之前,财政赤字和经常账户状况也更为健康,总体而言,政策框架已发展到一个程度,使得新兴市场资产比人们记忆中的要坚韧得多。
Growth is good, inflation is in a better place, it's come down after the pandemic surge, fiscal deficits in current accounts before this shock were again in a healthier place, and generally policy frameworks have evolved to a point where I think emerging market assets are much more resilient than I think people's memories of them suggest.
这是一个风险较低的资产类别。
It's a less racy asset class.
这是一个更可靠的资产类别。
It's a more reliable asset class.
我认为,即使在经历此次冲击的过程中,人们也会发现这一点。
I think that's what people are gonna discover, even as we go through this shock.
最后一点是配置问题。
And then the final point is allocations.
我认为人们在新兴市场资产上的配置仍然偏低。
I think people are still somewhat underweight emerging market assets.
如果你从全球配置的角度来看,新兴市场约占整体基准的12%。
If you think about it in a global allocation, EMs are roughly 12% of the overall benchmark.
根据我们的估算,全球股票基金中的配置比例约为10%。
On our estimates, people's allocations in global equity funds are about 10%.
因此,即使新兴市场在2025年经历了强劲上涨,即使在2026年前几个月也表现不俗,资产配置者仍对这一资产类别配置不足。
So emerging markets, even after the strong run they had in 2025, even after the strong run they had in the first couple of months of 2026, asset allocators are underweight this asset class.
即使在最近两周出现表现落后的情况下,新兴市场股票仍显著跑赢了新兴市场债券和美国股票。
And even after the underperformance that we have seen in the last two weeks, EM equities are comfortably outperforming EM equities and US equities.
因此,向多元化配置、将新增资金投入新兴市场和全球资产的总体趋势,我认为将继续并进一步深化。
So the broader trend towards diversification, towards allocating the marginal dollar into emerging markets, into global assets, I think that's the trend that's going to continue and extend further.
所以,这是我认会提供支持的第三点。
So that's the third thing that I think will be supportive.
我觉得你提出的这一点很有趣,卡玛克夏,尤其是在我们面临供应冲击的此刻。
I think it's an interesting point you make, Kamakshya, especially at moments like this where we have a supply shock.
人们常常认为新兴市场正处于风口浪尖。
People often think that emerging markets are in the crosshairs.
但很多事情已经改变,情况未必如此。
But much has changed, and that's not necessarily the case.
我认为这是对的。
I think that's right.
我认为它们会感受到冲击,会像其他人一样感受到痛苦。
I think that they are going to feel the shock, they are going to feel the pain like everyone else has.
这是一场严重的危机,如果持续时间更长,我认为我们会看到一些增长影响,就像我之前提到的,这些影响会波及全球。
This is a serious crisis, and if it lasts longer, I think we will have some growth impacts, like I mentioned, that will ripple across the world.
但许多国家和市场的起点比以往更健康,我认为这将使它们受益。
But the starting point for a lot of these countries, a lot of these markets is healthier than it used to be, and I think that is going to stand them in good stead.
非常感谢你加入我们,Kamakshya,为我们提供了对这段混乱而动荡时期的深刻见解。
Thanks so much for joining us, Kamakshya, and providing some insight into this pretty confusing and volatile time.
谢谢你,Allison。
Thank you, Allison.
本集《高盛交流》录制于2026年3月12日星期四。
This episode of Goldman Sachs Exchanges was recorded on Thursday, 03/12/2026.
我是艾莉森·纳撒恩。
I'm Allison Nathan.
感谢收听。
Thanks for listening.
本文所表达的观点和看法截至发布日期,可能随时更改,且不一定反映高盛或其关联机构的立场。
The opinions and views expressed herein are as of the date of publication subject to change without notice and may not necessarily reflect the institutional views of Goldman Sachs or its affiliates.
本材料仅用于信息参考目的,不构成任何投资建议,不构成高盛任何实体对采取特定行动的推荐,也不构成购买或出售任何证券或金融产品的要约或邀请。
The material provided is intended for informational purpose only and does not constitute investment advice, a recommendation from any Goldman Sachs entity to take any particular action, or an offer or solicitation to purchase or sell any securities or financial products.
本材料可能包含前瞻性陈述。
This material may contain forward looking statements.
过往表现不代表未来结果。
Past performance is not indicative of future results.
高盛及其任何关联机构均不对本文所含陈述或信息的准确性或完整性作出任何明示或暗示的声明,并对基于此类信息所作的任何依赖一概不承担任何责任。
Neither Goldman Sachs nor any of its affiliates make any representations or warranties expressed or implied as to the accuracy or completeness of the statements or information contained herein and disclaim any liability whatsoever for reliance on such information for any purpose.
文中提及的任何第三方组织名称均为相关公司的财产,此处仅用于信息和识别目的,不意味着任何此类公司与高盛之间存在所有权或许可关系。
Each name of a third party organization mentioned is the property of the company to which it relates, is used here strictly for informational and identification purposes only, and is not used to imply any ownership or license rights between any such company and Goldman Sachs.
为方便起见,此处提供文字稿,但可能与原始视频或音频内容存在差异。
A transcript is provided for convenience and may differ from the original video or audio.
高盛不对文字稿中的任何错误负责。
Goldman Sachs is not responsible for any errors in the transcript.
未经高盛明确书面同意,任何接收方不得复制、分发、发布、全文或部分重现本材料,或向任何其他人士披露。
This material should not be copied, distributed, published, reproduced in whole or in part or disclosed by any recipient to any other person without the express written consent of Goldman Sachs.
有关本材料中提及的研究的适用披露信息,可通过您的高盛代表或访问 www.gs.com/research/hedge.html 获取。
Disclosures applicable to research with respect to if any mentioned herein are available through your Goldman Sachs representative or at www.gs.com/research/hedge.html.
高盛不支持任何候选人或任何政党。
Goldman Sachs does not endorse any candidate or any political party.
版权所有 2026 年。
Copyright 2026.
高盛。
Goldman Sachs.
保留所有权利。
All rights reserved.
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