"美洲优先"外交政策的影响

特朗普政府以一项更加强硬的外交政策开启了2026年。

The Trump administration kicked off 2026 with a new, more forceful foreign policy.

推动这一政策的是所谓的“唐纳罗主义”，即特朗普总统对门罗主义的诠释——门罗主义是19世纪美国外交政策的基石，旨在扩大美国在西半球的影响力和控制力。

Driving this is the so called Donro Doctrine, President Trump's take on the Monroe Doctrine, a cornerstone nineteenth century US foreign policy that aimed to expand US influence and control in the Western Hemisphere.

那么，这最终可能对美国意味着什么？

So what could this ultimately mean for The U.

美国。

S.

接下来在拉丁美洲和更广泛的西半球会采取哪些行动？

Next moves in Latin America and the Western Hemisphere more broadly?

这对中美俄各自追求其外交政策目标的策略计算有何影响？

How does it impact the calculus for China and Russia as they each pursue their own foreign policy goals?

投资者最应关注哪些风险？

And what risks should investors be most focused on?

我是艾莉森·内森，这里是高盛交流会。

I'm Alison Nathan, and this is Goldman Sachs Exchanges.

每个月，我都会与投资者、政策制定者和学者讨论我们高盛研究团队最关注的、对市场影响重大的议题。

Each month, I speak with investors, policymakers and academics about the most pressing market moving issues for our top of mind report from Goldman Sachs Research.

我最近与约翰斯·霍普金斯大学高级国际研究学院的全球事务教授哈尔·布兰德斯，以及特朗普总统前拉丁美洲特别代表、拉丁美洲实物资产机会基金管理合伙人莫里西奥·克拉瓦卡罗内进行了对话。

I recently spoke with Hal Brands, professor of global affairs at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies, and with Mauricio Clavacarone, President Trump's former special envoy for Latin America and managing partner of the Latin America Real Assets Opportunity Fund.

我首先向他们两人请教了更多关于‘唐纳路线’政策的见解，先从哈尔开始。

I first asked them both for more insight into the Don Road doctrine, starting with Hal.

你在2024年就已经很有远见了。

You were pretty prescient in 2024.

你当时就提出，特朗普的第二个任期将带来门罗主义的复兴。

You argued that a second Trump presidency would feature a revitalized Monroe Doctrine.

你认为是什么根本因素促使美国在西半球采取了更加强势的姿态？

What do you see as the underlying factors that motivated this more forceful posture in the Western Hemisphere?

一个因素是结构性的，另一个是个人层面的。

One factor is structural, and the other is personal.

结构性因素在于，美国由于其在全球的地位，通常会在世界其他地区陷入混乱时，努力巩固其在西半球的主导地位。

The factor that is structural is that The United States, because of its position in the world, typically tries to consolidate its position in the Western Hemisphere when the rest of the world is falling apart.

因此，在第一次世界大战、第二次世界大战和冷战期间，美国都竭尽全力确保其在西半球的主导地位。

And so during World War one, during World War two, during the Cold War, The United States worked very hard to try to ensure its dominance in the Western Hemisphere.

当我们进入一个大国竞争的新时代时，美国采取同样的做法也就不足为奇了。

And it's not surprising that The US is doing the same thing as we enter a new era of great power rivalry.

个人因素则与总统本人有关。

The personal issue has to do with the president.

回想起特朗普的第一个任期，他和他的顾问们曾讨论过复兴门罗主义。

Thinking back to Trump's first term, he and his advisers talked about renewing the Monroe Doctrine.

特朗普本人对此极为关注，因为他希望从西半球获取多种利益，包括控制更多资源和领土——他曾提及要从巴拿马、加拿大和格陵兰获取领土。

Trump himself is very focused on this because he seeks a variety of benefits in the Western Hemisphere from control of additional resources to control of additional territory, which he has talked about taking from Panama, Canada, and Greenland.

我还应该补充一点，总统最关注的是对美国主权和安全的切实威胁，这使他特别留意毒品贩运和移民等问题，而这些问题的根源也来自西半球。

And I should add that the president is most intensely focused on tangible threats to American sovereignty and security, which tends to make him look very hard at issues like drug trafficking and migration, which have their roots in the Western Hemisphere as well.

因此，当把这些因素综合起来看时，这个政府将重点放在重新巩固西半球的主导地位上也就不足为奇了。

So when you put all those things together, it's not surprising that this administration has really put the focus on reconsolidating the opposition to Western Hemisphere.

更令人惊讶的是，这个政府的行动竟如此积极有力。

If anything, what's surprising is how energetic the administration has been.

对委内瑞拉的干预引起了大量关注，但这只是更大、更广泛运动的顶点，该运动包括对哥伦比亚和巴拿马等国施加外交压力，向阿根廷的马来政府等地区盟友提供经济支持，与萨尔瓦多的布皮勒政府及其他意识形态上的同路人建立伙伴关系，以及一系列军事、外交和经济举措。

The intervention in Venezuela has gotten a lot of attention, but that's just the capstone of a much bigger and broader campaign that has featured diplomatic pressure on countries like Colombia and Panama, economic support to regional allies like the Malay government in Argentina, partnerships with the Bupile government in El Salvador and other ideological fellow travelers, and a whole array of initiatives, military, diplomatic, economic.

关于委内瑞拉局势的初期报道和讨论似乎都集中在石油上。

A lot of the initial reports and discussion around the developments in Venezuela seem to really focus on oil.

所以为了澄清一下，你认为这跟石油有关吗？

So just to clarify, you think this is about oil?

我认为特朗普非常关注对资源的控制，并且他将国家实力与对资源的控制紧密联系在一起，这种程度非同寻常。

I think Trump focuses very intently on control of resources, and he associates national power with control of resources to a remarkable degree.

他长期以来一直说，美国入侵伊拉克时最大的错误就是没有夺取石油。

He has long said that the primary mistake in the American invasion of Iraq was not taking the oil.

因此，对特朗普而言，我认为这在他的决策中处于最前沿。

And so for Trump, I think this is at the forefront of his calculus.

如果你回顾一下自1月3日以来特朗普对美国在委内瑞拉目标的描述，他会很少提及民主和良政，反而似乎非常乐意与马杜罗政府的残余势力合作。

And if you think about the way that Trump has described US aims in Venezuela since January 3, he says very little about democracy and good governance and seems perfectly happy to work with the remnants of the Maduro government there.

他实际上对毒品走私问题说得相当少。

He's actually said relatively little about drug trafficking.

他多次提到美国希望加强对委内瑞拉石油在市场上的分配和销售的控制，并希望委内瑞拉石油行业更加开放，允许美国大型企业参与。

He has said a lot about The United States exerting greater control over the disposition and sale of Venezuelan oil on the market and the desire for greater openness of the Venezuelan oil industry to the participation of US majors.

因此，我认为这一届政府中不同的人对特朗普版的门罗主义所看重的方面各不相同。

And so I think different people in this administration value different things in this Trump corollary to the Monroe Doctrine.

但对于特朗普本人而言，核心问题本质上是经济利益以及一种新重商主义的国际经济观。

But for Trump himself, the primary issues are essentially about economic gain and sort of a neo mercantilist approach to international economics.

那么，这是否真正区分了‘唐罗主义’与门罗主义？

So is that really what differentiates the Donroe doctrine from the Monroe doctrine?

门罗主义在其发展过程中，含义已经发生了变化。

The Monroe doctrine has evolved over time in terms of what it means.

在十九世纪，它最初是为了防止欧洲列强重新实施殖民统治。

In the nineteenth century, it was initially about preventing the reimposition of colonial control by European powers.

在二十世纪，它实际上变成了阻止法西斯和共产主义政权进入西半球。

During the twentieth century, it became really about keeping fascist and communist regimes out of the hemisphere.

我认为，‘唐罗主义’在某种程度上是一种回归到更早期的外交风格，对控制较弱国家资源的意图不再那么遮遮掩掩。

I think the Donroe doctrine, in some way, that's a reversion to an earlier style of statecraft, much less apologetic about the desire to control the resources of weaker countries.

更愿意谈论直接吞并领土或其他似乎随着帝国主义时代结束而过时的做法。

Much more willing to talk about outright acquisition of territory or other things that seem to have gone out of style with the end of the age of imperialism.

因此，有时有人说特朗普正试图复兴十九世纪风格的外交政策。

So it's sometimes said that Trump is trying to revive a nineteenth century style of foreign policy.

我认为，如果特朗普主持十九世纪末和二十世纪初美国在拉丁美洲的一些干预行动，他会感到非常自在。

I think Trump would feel quite at home if he were presiding over some of The US interventions in Latin America in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.

这是毛里西奥对多诺罗主义的看法。

And this was Mauricio's take on the Donro doctrine.

总统的看法是，如果你首先不是最强大的区域强国，就不可能成为最卓越的全球强国。

The way the president sees it, you can't be the preeminent global power if you're not, first and foremost, the preeminent regional power.

大家似乎都误解了，这其实是总统本人的想法。

And what everybody seems to misunderstand is that this was the president's thinking himself.

并不是顾问们影响了他，让他首先关注区域事务，以此作为成为区域主导力量进而影响全球的手段。

He wasn't advisers influencing him on the need to focus first and foremost on the region as a way of being a preeminent regional power, therefore, then being able to reflect that globally.

这完全是他的想法。

It was him.

因为他不仅熟悉这个地区，而且一生和职业生涯中都走遍了整个地区。

Because not only did he know the region, he's been throughout the region throughout his life and his career.

他是个来自纽约的开发商。

He's a developer from New York.

对吧？

Right?

他非常倾向于以建设社区的思路来思考问题。

And he very much thinks in building neighborhoods.

总统的观点始终是：听好了。

The president's view is always, listen.

世界上没有任何一个地区比拉丁美洲和加勒比地区更每日直接影响美国，无论从安全角度、毒品走私，甚至可能的恐怖主义跨境渗透来看，这一直是他的理念。

There's not a region in the world that impacts The United States more on a daily basis than Latin America and The Caribbean, Whether it's from a security perspective, from the transit of drugs and even potentially terrorism, etcetera, that can cross through the borders, then that was always his philosophy.

我多次亲眼目睹，即使在第一任期期间阿富汗、叙利亚等地发生冲突时，总统在动用军事力量时也会说：天啊，我们多么急切、多么轻易地就派兵去阿富汗或叙利亚打仗。

And what I saw firsthand many times over, and even when there was conflicts in Afghanistan, Syria, etcetera, during the first term, whereby the president, even in the use of military force, he would say, wow, we're so eager and so easily we send troops to fight in Afghanistan or Syria even, etcetera.

但当2019年委内瑞拉局势逐渐升级时，我们却对在西半球——也就是我们自己的家园——部署任何存在都如此恐惧。

But then yet, as things were in 2019 building up in Venezuela, we're so scared to have any type of presence here in the Western Hemisphere, which is where we live.

我记得在那段时期，尤其是委内瑞拉局势急剧恶化的时刻，他曾问过：‘我们能不能派一艘船过去，至少让他们知道我们就在那里？’

And I remember at one point, particularly during that whole time and situation when things were really dramatically increasing in regards to Venezuela, at one point he asked, Hey, can we send a ship to basically be present so that they know at least we're there?

他被告知，加勒比海附近根本没有海军舰艇。

And he was notified that there weren't no navy ships in the vicinity of the Caribbean.

这简直令人难以置信。

It was just mind blowing.

它们都去哪儿了？

How is it that Where are they all?

它们全都在波斯湾、南亚和地中海。

They're all in the Persian Gulf, South Asia, in the Mediterranean.

那这里呢？

Well, what about right here?

这些就是当时那些鲜明的体验。

And so that was these stark experiences.

但当然，第一任期的团队当时极度专注于中东和亚洲。

But of course, the team at the time in the first term was so focused on the Middle East and Asia.

因此，第一任期主要聚焦于如何通过软实力建立框架，以实现对中国的战略调整。

And so the first term was very much about how do we set frameworks to, mostly through soft power, be able to pivot from China?

因为过去二十年的故事一直是中国的地区影响力日益增强，而美国的地区影响力逐渐衰退。

Because the story of the last two decades has been China's growing influence in the region, and The United States' waning influence in the region.

第二任期则是落实总统愿景的阶段。

The second term is the implementation of what the president's vision is.

他在第二任期就职时，明确地表达了这一点。

When he was inaugurated in the second term, he made it extraordinarily clear.

他回溯到麦金莱总统的时代。

He harkened back to President McKinley.

他回溯到美国影响力的黄金时代。

He harkened back to the golden era of American influence.

那正是美国影响力通过实体建设与实际影响力投射的黄金时代——不仅通过门罗主义及其罗斯福修正案确立了我们在该地区的主导地位，还通过巴拿马运河等具体举措体现出来。

And that was the golden era of American influence that was projected through bricks and mortars and through actual influence, through not only the concept of the Monroe Doctrine then with the Roosevelt corollary whereby we had primacy in the region, but also in the sense of the Panama Canal and that type of influence.

而第二次任期与第一次最大的不同，也在于团队本身。

And the big difference the second time around is also the team.

不存在竞争利益。

There's no competing interest.

所以，显然，你有一位国务卿，现在还有国家安全顾问马可·卢比奥，他了解、关心并熟悉这个地区，也理解总统的想法。

So, obviously, you have a secretary of state and now national security adviser as well, Marco Rubio, who understands and cares and knows the region and understands the president's thinking.

你有斯蒂芬·米勒，他处理过这些问题，并且在移民问题上也有全面的观点。

You have Stephen Miller who has worked on these issues and also has a holistic view on immigration.

你还有一位同样同意的国防部长。

You have a secretary of defense that also agrees.

这是最大的问题之一。

That was part of the biggest problem.

在第一届政府期间，国防部长甚至不相信国防部应该参与禁毒工作。

In the first administration, the secretary of defense didn't even believe that the DOD should be involved in counter narcotics.

我听到你谈论在该地区的影响力。

I hear you talk about this influence in the region.

拥有这种影响力的真正目标是什么？

What really is the goal of having that influence?

安全涵盖从毒品到恐怖主义的方方面面，无论是意识形态驱动的恐怖主义还是毒品相关的恐怖主义。

Security crosses the gamut from narcotics to terrorism, whether it's ideological or narcotics based terrorism.

能源安全也是安全的重要组成部分。

Energy security is also an important part of security.

正如乌戈·查韦斯很久以前就意识到的，以及菲德尔·卡斯特罗一直清楚的——正因如此，他才扶持了查韦斯，并将委内瑞拉视为自己直到去世前的瑰宝——加勒比地区尤其脆弱的软肋就是能源。

The Achilles heel, as Hugo Chavez learned a long time ago and as Fidel Castro's always known, which is why he created Hugo Chavez and why Venezuela was ultimately his golden crown until he passed away, the Achilles heel of The Caribbean particularly is is energy.

这些国家对能源有着迫切的需求。

Those countries have a pressing need for energy.

顺便说一句，中美洲也是如此。

And by the way, so does Central America.

坦白讲，中美洲地区移民潮的主要驱动力之一就是能源价格高昂。

One of the biggest drivers, frankly, of migration even throughout Central America has been the high cost of energy.

因此，能源安全直接关联到移民带来的安全问题，这些因素彼此交织，所以这一切都至关重要。

So energy security, which then leads to, obviously, the security issues with migration, those all come hand in hand, which is why all of that is important.

你看。

And look.

现实是，我认为从本届政府上任第一天起，你就已经看到了这一点，无论是在中美洲设定的优先事项、与墨西哥建立的关系、在中期选举前对阿根廷危机提供的支持，还是如今对委内瑞拉的立场。

Here's the reality, and I think you've seen it across the board from day one of this administration, whether it's in the priorities that we've we've set forth and laid in Central America, the relation we created with Mexico, the support we gave to Argentina during its time of crisis prior to the midterm elections, to obviously now Venezuela.

所有这些都首先基于美国的安全。

All of this is based on, first and foremost, US security.

而且这与特朗普总统对能源的思路也非常一致。

And by the it's very also consistent with president Trump and his thinking on energy.

美国本身就是一个能源强国。

The US is an energy powerhouse in its own.

他常说：为什么我们不在国内勘探和生产更多能源呢？

He's like, well, why aren't we exploring and producing more here?

归根结底，为了降低能源价格，对我们而言，这将使我们保持并巩固自身作为全球强国的地位。

And and at the end of the day, to help with energy prices and for us, you know, that's gonna make us and keep us as a global powerhouse in its own.

拉丁美洲也是如此，首先是委内瑞拉，然后是墨西哥、巴西、阿根廷、哥伦比亚，还有玻利维亚各自的情况。

And that's also the case with Latin America, like Venezuela, first and foremost, with Mexico, Brazil, Argentina, Colombia, Bolivia in its own right.

这些国家都是能源强国，或者本可以成为能源强国；之所以墨西哥、阿根廷、委内瑞拉，坦率地说，还有巴西，未能像美国、沙特阿拉伯甚至俄罗斯那样成为真正的能源巨头，原因就在于管理不善。

These are energy powerhouses or could be the only reason why Mexico and Argentina and Venezuela, frankly, and Brazil to a degree, aren't energy powerhouses per se to the scale of The United States or Saudi Arabia or even Russia, to be quite honest, is because of poor management.

我的意思是，看看委内瑞拉隔壁的圭亚那。

I mean, just look right next door to Venezuela and Guyana.

圭亚那现在的情况，随着委内瑞拉管理方式的改善，可能会发生变化。

Guyana is now, you know, probably will change now with more proper management in in Venezuela.

但圭亚那目前的日均石油产量已经超过了委内瑞拉。

But Guyana's now producing more oil, more barrels per day than Venezuela.

这主要是因为美国公司与圭亚那政府密切合作。

That's because there mostly has been American companies working closely with the Guyana government.

我认为圭亚那这样的国家就是一个很好的例子，说明当美国公司从一开始就与政府携手制定良好政策时，有望摒弃过去二十世纪遗留下来的民族主义和意识形态包袱——这些包袱曾由当时的各类革命深植于民众的意识中。

And I think that countries like Guyana are a great example that, you know, when American companies work hand in hand with the government to develop good policies from the get go and hopefully leaving behind a lot of the nationalist twentieth century strains, ideological strains that at the time, the different revolutions embedded into the psyche of the populations.

我听到了这些说法，但特朗普总统是打着‘美国优先’的口号当选的。

I hear all that, but President Trump was elected on an America first platform.

那么，扩大美国在拉丁美洲的影响力是否与这一口号相冲突？

So does expanding US influence in Latin America conflict with that platform?

不会。

No.

随着‘美国优先’运动的推进，自然而然地延伸出了‘美洲优先’的理念。

As the America first movement propagated, it was natural that the next extension was gonna be the Americas first.

我们从‘美国优先’转向了‘美洲的优先’，旨在回应华盛顿智库专家们早已预测的观点——即二十一世纪将是中国的世纪，而二十世纪是美国的世纪。

We were going from America first to America's first in the sense of countering what was the notion of, you know, every expert in DC think tank had already been prognosticating that the twenty first century would be the Chinese century, while the twentieth century was the American century.

总统在就职演说中明确表示：绝对不是这样。

And the president was saying his inauguration, absolutely not.

二十一世纪将是另一个美国的世纪，甚至可能是最伟大的美国世纪，而且这与任何纠缠无关。

Twenty first century is gonna be another American century, if not the greatest American century, and there is no entanglement.

我们在委内瑞拉没有派驻地面部队。

We don't have boots on the ground in Venezuela.

归根结底，这根本不是国家建设，我认为这才是人们混淆的地方。

At the end of the day, it's just not nation building, and I think that's where people confuse.

这些合作是国家之间的务实伙伴关系，无论左右翼都适用。

These are about partnerships, practical partnerships between nations because it's with the left and the right.

比如现在，我们正与委内瑞拉的临时左翼政府合作，同时也与阿根廷的保守派政府合作。

Like, right now, we're working with the interim government of the left in Venezuela, and we're working with the conservative government in Argentina.

我们正在与倾向左翼的墨西哥政府以及倾向右翼的萨尔瓦多、哥斯达黎加，或现在的智利等国合作。

We're working with the left leaning government of Mexico and the right leaning government of El Salvador, Costa Rica, or now Chile, etcetera.

这些是务实的关系。

So these are practical relationships.

这些是以商业为导向的关系，因为整个地区的人们所追求的，是能够生活在安全国家、取得良好发展、实现繁荣、拥有经济增长和商业机会的务实商业合作。

These are business oriented relationships because what people are aspiring to throughout the region are practical business relationships where people can live in secure countries and do well and be able to thrive and be able to have growing economies and be able to have business opportunities.

而这正是这些国家的共同心态。

And that's the psyche of all of these countries.

因此，我认为那里正在发生一种动态的社会转变。

And so I think there's a dynamic social shift there.

那么，美国在拉丁美洲接下来可能会采取什么行动呢？

So what might be next then for US action in Latin America?

哥伦比亚和巴西现在正在举行选举，这将非常重要。

You have elections now in Colombia and Brazil, which are gonna be very important.

这些选举也将起到标杆作用，特别是如果这些国家的中间偏右、更保守的势力获胜的话。

Those elections will also kinda set the marker, and particularly if the center right, more conservatives win in those countries.

你几乎第一次看到该地区在意识形态上的统一。

You pretty much have, like, for the first time, an ideological consolidation of the region.

但再次强调，让我遵循自己的建议，不要用意识形态的角度来讨论这个问题。

But, again, let me take my own advice and not discuss it in ideological terms.

如果新领导人首先将美国视为合作伙伴，至少你能在整个地区实现伙伴关系的统一，这将为巩固这些盟友提供绝佳机会。

If new leaders choose The United States first and foremost as partners, at least you'll have a consolidation of partnerships throughout the region, which will be quite an opportunity to then consolidate those allies.

那么，这种表现形式会是什么样子呢？

Now what does the expression of that look like?

我们已经与其中一些国家达成了某些商业协议，至少在关税等方面确实如此。

We've already done some of these commercial deals with some of them, at least definitely from a tariff perspective, etcetera.

但我认为，我们有必要现代化与这些国家的商业关系和合作关系，这或许可以从今年墨西哥和美墨加协定的重新谈判开始。

But I think a modernization of our business relationships and commercial partnerships, all those countries, is in order that might be start with Mexico and the USMCA renegotiation this year.

这是总统选择的道路，看起来确实如此，这也是他目前的立场。

And that's the path the president chooses, which it seems like that's the case, and that's where he's at right now.

但现在，我们与该地区的朋友和盟友有机会真正重新构想这些伙伴关系和关系的形态，将重点从单纯贸易转向以美国投资、股权、彰显存在感为核心，推动在该地区建立确保美国在能源基础设施等领域战略存在的伙伴关系与协议，希望到本届任期结束时，再也不会有人提起‘哦，是的’。

But there's an opportunity now with our friends and allies throughout the region to really reconfigure what those partnerships look like and what those relationships look like and modernizing those from very focused on trade and to move beyond that to one focused on US investment, equity, putting the flag, making partnerships and deals in the region that ensure strategic presence by The United States in these energy infrastructure sectors, etcetera, that hopefully by the end of this term, no one again will be talking about, oh, yeah.

中国正在获得这个港口，购买这个电网或矿产权益等，这将毫无疑问地使美国成为拉丁美洲和加勒比地区首选的合作伙伴。

The Chinese are getting this port, and the Chinese are buying this grid or this mineral rights, etcetera, that it'll be unquestionable that The United States is the partner of choice for Latin America and The Caribbean.

然后我转回去问哈尔，他认为唐·罗伊学说对西半球及其他国家意味着什么。

I then turned back to Hal for his take on what the Don Roe doctrine could mean for other countries in the Western Hemisphere and the world more broadly.

如果你想想最近的这些发展，你认为这对其他拉丁美洲国家会有什么影响？

If you think about, you know, these recent developments, what do you think will be the implications for other Latin American countries?

我认为这已经发出明确信号：如果存在对美国持敌对态度、且与中国和俄罗斯进行战略暧昧的政权，它们可能会面临更大的压力。

I think it has served notice that if there are vulnerable anti American regimes that are playing strategic footsie with China and Russia, they are probably going to come in for greater pressure.

古巴可能是这方面最典型的例子。

Cuba might be the best example of this.

不过，我怀疑我们会看到美国大规模军事干预古巴。

That said, I am skeptical that we're gonna see large scale US military intervention in Cuba.

我也不确定美国政府是否希望古巴政权垮台，因为这可能导致大量难民涌向美国。

I'm not actually sure that the administration wants the Cuban regime to collapse because that might produce a flood of refugees headed for The United States.

从哥伦比亚到墨西哥的所有国家，结果都将感受到在打击毒品贩运相关问题上采取更紧迫行动的压力。

For countries from Colombia all the way up to Mexico, the result is going to be a sense of pressure to act with greater urgency on issues related to narco trafficking.

而且，我相信你已经看到，美国和墨西哥似乎正在讨论让美军在打击活跃于墨西哥的贩毒集团中发挥核心作用。

And, certainly, I think you're already seeing that with the discussions The US and Mexico appear to be having about a central role for the US military in going after cartels that operate in Mexico.

你也能从特朗普总统对哥伦比亚的一些评论中看到这一点。

You're seeing it with some of president Trump's comments about Colombia.

俄罗斯和中国对委内瑞拉以及更广泛的拉丁美洲有着重大利益。

Russia and China have significant interest in Venezuela and Latin America more broadly.

你认为他们从美国最近的行动中学到了什么或得出了什么结论？

What do you think they are learning or taking away from The US's recent actions?

在某种程度上，莫斯科和北京已经切实感受到了美国在西半球的硬实力。

To some degree, Moscow and Beijing have run up forward against the reality of US hard power in the Western Hemisphere.

无论是美国海军和海岸警卫队扣押影子船队的油轮，还是美国强行推翻马杜罗，或是五角大楼在加勒比海击毁贩毒船只，莫斯科和北京实际上都无力挑战美国在西半球运用军事力量的方式。

And whether it is the US Navy and Coast Guard seizing shadow fleet tankers or The United States forcibly deposing Maduro or Pentagon shooting up drug boats in The Caribbean, There's just really not much either Moscow or Beijing can do to contest the application of American military power in the Western Hemisphere.

不过，如果你特别关注中国，那么中国在西半球的影响力已经相当根深蒂固。

That said, if you are thinking about China in particular, Chinese influence in the Western Hemisphere is relatively deeply embedded.

这种影响力深深植根于贸易关系之中。

It is embedded in trade relationships.

它还体现在技术的扩散中。

It's embedded in the diffusion of technology.

它深植于物理和数字基础设施中，而这些都将持续存在。

It is embedded in both physical and digital infrastructure, and all of these things are going to persist.

我认为北京将采取长远策略。

And I think Beijing is going to play the long game.

它将努力继续发展经济关系、政治关系，在某些情况下还会建立低调的安全关系，这些关系更侧重于警察和内部安全，而非传统的军事职能。

It's going to try to continue developing economic relationships, political relationships, in some cases, low profile security relationships that will focus more on police and internal security than traditional military functions.

因此，我认为北京将继续致力于长期赢得西半球的影响力，即使他们认识到在某些领域根本无法与美国竞争。

And so I I think Beijing is going to persist in its efforts to win influence in the Western Hemisphere over time even though they recognize that there are areas where they're just not going to be able to compete with The United States.

事实上，这仅仅告诉我们，我们正进入该地区影响力竞争更加激烈的阶段。

If anything, this simply tells us that we're entering a more intense phase of the competition for influence in the region.

让我们谈谈格陵兰。

Let's talk a little bit about Greenland.

美国在格陵兰的行动如何真正改变了我们对北约、全球力量平衡以及美国在更广泛半球所追求目标的看法？

How does the administration's actions in Greenland really shift how we should be thinking about NATO, the global balance of power, what The US is really trying to achieve in the broader hemisphere?

格陵兰既是地区性问题，也是全球性问题。

Greenland is both a hemispheric issue and a global issue.

从地区角度看，特朗普及其身边的人将巩固美国对格陵兰的控制视为复兴门罗主义的更大努力的一部分，他们可以援引历史先例，比如罗斯福总统在二战爆发前，为实施地区防御战略而加强美国在格陵兰的影响力。

It's a hemispheric issue in the sense that Trump and people around him see consolidating US control of Greenland as part of this larger effort to revive the Monroe Doctrine, and they can point to historical examples in which The United States has increased influence in Greenland as part of a strategy of hemispheric defense as as president Roosevelt did in the run up to US entry into World War two.

但它之所以是全球性问题，主要有两个原因。

It's a global issue, though, for two reasons.

首先，因为它对北约和跨大西洋共同体的未来产生深远影响。

First, because it so powerfully affects the fate of NATO and the Transatlantic community.

我认为，加拿大和许多欧洲国家对美国企图收购格陵兰感到极度不安，这种担忧程度怎么强调都不为过。

And I think it is hard to over state the degree of outright alarm that Canada and many European countries feel as a result of US desires to acquire GreenLend.

但其次，它也是检验美国是否真会走上通过改变世界领土现状来实现目标的关键试金石。

But, also, number two, it's the best test of whether The United States is actually going to go down the route of seeking changes at the territorial status quo in the world.

这个问题之所以如此敏感，是因为这与中国在南海和喜马拉雅地区的做法、俄罗斯在乌克兰的行动如出一辙。

And the reason that's such an explosive issue is that this is like what China is doing in the South China Sea and in the Himalayas, what Russia is doing in Ukraine.

因此，如果美国也试图通过胁迫甚至武力重新划定边界，那么世界上三个最强大的国家都将通过暴力或胁迫手段破坏现有的领土秩序。

And so if you have a situation which The US is also seeking to redraw borders through coercion or perhaps the use of force, you have a world in which the three most powerful countries are all violently or coercively disrupting the territorial status quo.

这种情况自20世纪30年代以来就未曾出现过，可能会严重侵蚀自1945年以来一直主导的国际秩序。

That's something we haven't seen since the nineteen thirties, and that could be deeply corrosive to the international order that has prevailed since 1945.

那么，您是否认为最近的美国行动在某种程度上助长了中国和俄罗斯的野心？

So would you say that recent US actions have helped further China and Russia's ambitions in some ways?

我认为几件事情可以同时成立。

I think a few things can be true at once.

首先，马杜罗的倒台对北京和莫斯科来说都是损失，因为它们都在这段关系上投入了资源。

First, the loss of Maduro is a loss for both Beijing and Moscow because they have both invested in this relationship.

而且，北京和莫斯科一向不喜欢看到美国以我们在今年1月初加拉加斯所见的那种冷酷高效方式使用军事力量。

And, also, Beijing and Moscow never like it when they see The US use military power with the sort of ruthless efficiency we saw in Caracas in early January.

但第二，这并不意味着莫斯科和北京完全处于不利境地。

But two, that doesn't mean that this is entirely a bad news story for Moscow and Beijing.

因为如果我们正进入一个国际法和国际规范变得不那么重要的世界，进入一个大国可以自由在其周边地区为所欲为的世界，那正是中国和俄罗斯领导人所适应并乐见的世界。

Because if we are entering a world where international law and international norms matter less, if we are entering a world in which great powers are free to do as they like in their immediate surroundings, that's exactly the sort of world that Chinese and Russian leaders would be comfortable in.

事实上，这正是他们正在努力打造的世界，无论是在东欧还是西太平洋。

And in fact, exactly the sort of world that they're trying to bring about, whether it's in Eastern Europe or the Western Pacific.

此外，如果我们看到美国在西半球的军事活动正在加剧，从而将资源从其他地区抽离，那么这对俄罗斯和中国来说也可能是个好消息。

Moreover, if we're seeing an intensification of US military activity in the Western Hemisphere that is going to pull resources away from other regions, then that's potentially a good news story for Russia and China as well.

值得注意的是，去年11月从地中海重新部署到加勒比海的航空母舰，原本是为了覆盖中东和欧洲地区。

It's worth noting that the aircraft carrier that traveled redeployed from the Mediterranean to the Caribbean in November was meant to cover the Middle East and Europe.

因此，如果你考虑世界其他地区，目前美国正处在一种资源紧张的状态，这对美国的其他对手来说未必是坏事。

And so if you think about other regions of the world, The US is operating in a bit of a resource deficit at the moment, and that's not the worst thing for other US adversaries.

伊朗似乎并不完全符合唐·罗伊学说。

Iran doesn't really seem to fit into the Don Roe doctrine.

显然，情况远不止于此。

Obviously, it goes beyond.

那么，这该如何融入这一框架呢？

So how does that fit into this?

伊朗正是我们应当对‘世界正迅速转向势力范围格局’这一观点持怀疑态度的关键原因之一。

Iran is one of the key reasons why we should be skeptical of the idea that the world is rapidly transitioning into a spheres of influence arrangement.

是的。

Yes.

特朗普希望在美国的西半球建立一个势力范围，但当他觉得这对自身有利时，他也喜欢在全球范围内保持无拘无束的行动自由。

Trump wants an American sphere of influence in the Western Hemisphere, but he also likes to maintain unhindered freedom of action globally when he thinks that is advantageous to him.

因此，如果你看看政府发布的国家安全战略，里面大量提及了美国在西半球实现主导地位的必要性。

And so if you look at the national security strategy that the administration put out, there's a lot of talk about the need for American dominance in the Western Hemisphere.

此外，还大量讨论了总统在试图调解阿塞拜疆与亚美尼亚、柬埔寨与泰国，以及其他全球多个国家之间和平所扮演的角色。

There's also a lot of talk about the role the president has played in trying to broker peace between, Azerbaijan and Armenia or Cambodia and Thailand and a bunch of other countries around the world.

因此，特朗普总统希望在国内拥有主导权，在国外则享有行动自由。

And so president Trump wants dominance at home, and he wants freedom to row abroad.

这对企业和投资者意味着什么？

So what does this all mean for companies and investors?

以下是哈尔的看法。

Here's what Hal had to say.

我的看法是，我们长期以来生活在一个由相对善意且负责任的美国领导所塑造的国际体系中，以至于我们根本无法想象，一旦这种领导力消失，世界会变成什么样子。

The way I would put this is that I think we have lived for so long in an international system that is conditioned by mostly benign, mostly responsible US leadership that we just can't even conceive of what the world will look like if and when that leadership goes away.

1945年后的国际秩序以严厉禁止武力征服、强力保障航行自由为特征，而航行自由本质上是国际经济的基石。

The post 1945 international order has featured very strong prohibitions on forcible conquest, very strong protections for freedom of navigation, which is essentially the foundation of the international economy.

自由贸易和全球化是在美国力量保障和稳定的世界中推进的。

Free trade and globalization have proceeded in a world that is secured and stabilized by US power.

民主和人权的传播范围比以往任何时候都更广，部分得益于美国的影响。

Democracy and human rights have spread more widely than ever before in part thanks to US influence.

因此，我所担心的巨大风险是，如果美国决定在世界上扮演一种根本不同的角色，世界秩序将发生根本性变化。

And so the the mega risk that I have in mind is that if United States ever decides that it wants to play a fundamentally different role in the world, the world order is gonna change fundamentally.

我们将看到更多国家寻求发展核武器。

We're gonna see more countries pursue nuclear weapon.

我们将看到世界各地的民主价值观出现倒退。

We are gonna see a retreat of democratic values in regions around the world.

我们将看到公海上的混乱加剧，这将对全球贸易产生影响，而美元的主导地位也将面临更大挑战。

We're going to see much greater disorder on the high seas, which will have implications for global trade, and dollar dominance is going to come in for a greater challenge.

因此，我持续关注的巨大风险，本质上是美国全球政策方式的根本性转变，因为我认为这将从根本上改变世界在多个方面的运行方式。

And so the the mega risk that I keep my eye on is basically a fundamental shift in The US approach to global policy because I think that will fundamentally shift the way that the world works in a number of different respects.

三十年前，我会说这种情况发生的可能性微乎其微。

Thirty years ago, I would have said there's very little chance of this happening.

十五年前，我会说美国外交政策辩论中正出现日益明显的收缩倾向。

Fifteen years ago, I would have said there were growing retrenchment minded inclinations in The US foreign policy debate.

我们现在有一位总统，他经常谈论希望彻底改变美国的国际行事方式，尽管他实际推行的政策有时比这更传统一些。

We now have a president who often talks like he wants a fundamental change in the way The US does business internationally even though the policies he pursues are sometimes a little bit more conventional than that.

因此，美国外交政策发生根本性转变的可能性，如今比过去七十年中的任何时候都更加现实。

And so the prospect of a fundamental shift in US foreign policy is more real now than it has been at at any time, I think, in the last seventy years.

我们就说到这里吧。

Let's leave it there.

有很多事情值得关注。

Lots to watch.

感谢哈尔·布兰德斯和莫里西奥·克拉瓦卡罗内，也感谢您收听高盛交流会这一期节目。

My thanks to Hal Brands and Mauricio Clavacarone, and thank you for listening to this episode of Goldman Sachs Exchanges.

我是艾莉森·纳撒恩。

I'm Allison Nathan.

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