伊朗冲突：会持续多久？有多严重？

随着伊朗冲突进入第四周，其持续时间及对能源供应造成的干扰所带来的不确定性依然很高，因为新闻头条在缓和与升级之间反复波动。

With the Iran conflict now in its fourth week, uncertainty around its duration and associated disruptions to energy supplies remains high amid continued swings between deescalatory and escalatory headlines.

那么这场冲突可能会持续多久？

So how long could this conflict last?

对关键参与者而言，什么是利害攸关的？

What's at stake for the key players?

要恢复全球能源供应，需要哪些条件？

And what will it take to restore global energy flows?

我是艾莉森·纳森，欢迎收听高盛交流会。

I'm Allison Nathan, and this is Goldman Sachs Exchanges.

每个月，我都会与投资者、政策制定者和学者讨论当前最紧迫的市场驱动议题，带来高盛研究的前沿报告。

Each month, I speak with investors, policymakers, and academics about the most pressing market moving issues for a top of mind report from Goldman Sachs Research.

本月，我与查塔姆研究所中东与北非项目主任萨纳姆·瓦基尔、曾担任五届美国政府中东顾问的丹尼斯·罗斯大使，以及美国海军第五舰队前指挥官凯文·多尼根中将进行了对话。

This month, I spoke with Sanam Vakil, director of The Middle East and North Africa program at Chatham House, ambassador Dennis Ross, who served as a Middle East advisor in five US administrations, and vice admiral Kevin Donegan, former commander of the US Navy's fifth fleet.

我首先问萨纳姆，这场冲突对伊朗来说意味着什么。

I started by asking Sanam what this conflict is about for Iran.

对伊朗而言，这场战争被视为一场政权更迭战争，目标是以重大方式推翻或 destabilize 伊斯兰共和国。

For Iran, this is seen to be a regime change war with objectives of overthrowing or destabilizing the Islamic Republic in a significant way.

因此，该体系或其残存部分正在为生存而战，旨在将战争成本横向并尽可能广泛地分摊，以便当停火契机出现时，这场战争对所有人而言都代价高昂，从而让伊朗或许能获得保证，确保未来六个月、一年或几年内，当外部势力认为时机成熟时，不会再次对伊斯兰共和国发动新一轮攻击。

So the system or what remains of it is fighting for its very survival with the aim to spread the cost of the war horizontally and as widely as possible so that when off ramps do appear that this war is so costly for everyone that Iran could perhaps obtain guarantees that it will not be repeated again in six months or a year or in a few years when external powers might think that the time is right to revisit another round with the Islamic Republic.

因此，伊朗将此视为一种生存威胁。

So Iran is viewing this as an existential risk.

对吗？

Right?

是的。

Yeah.

这不仅仅是威胁。

More than a risk.

他们并未为这场战争做好准备。

They weren't prepared for this war.

他们在去年夏天那场为期十二天的战争后就知道，以色列的空袭和报复行动会产生反噬效应，因为战争中没有任何一方真正取得了全面胜利。

They knew after last summer's war, the twelve day war, that there would be a boomerang effect from the Israeli strikes and the tree because no side in the war really achieved full victory.

这场战争向以色列表明，对伊朗发动打击是可行的，以色列具备造成破坏的能力。

The war showed for Israel that strikes on Iran were possible and that Israel had the capability of inflicting damage.

以色列非常希望继续战争，但特朗普总统在B-52轰炸伊朗核设施后叫停了这场战争。

The Israelis very much wanted to continue the war, but president Trump called time on the war after the b 52 struck at Iran's nuclear facilities.

战争结束后，伊朗也计算出自己过早地接受了停火。

And Iran, also after the war ended, calculated that it conceded to the ceasefire too early.

因此，外界认为伊朗软弱，这助长了一种想法：既然伊朗软弱，现在正是发动新一轮打击的绝佳时机。

And so there were perceptions that Iran was weak, and that opened the door to this thinking that because Iran was weak, this was the perfect opportunity to go for another round.

对。

Right.

所以他们正在对抗这种负面印象。

So they're fighting against that perception.

但从一开始，特朗普总统就希望将这场战争描绘成一场短期冲突。

But from the beginning, president Trump has wanted to portray this war as a short term conflict.

这场冲突很快结束的可能性有多大？

How realistic is it that the conflict resolves soon?

自战争开始以来，特朗普总统已经多次改变了这场战争的目标、宗旨和时间表。

President Trump has shifted the aims and objectives and timelines of this war since it began.

他最初表示这场战争会迅速而轻松，并计划在战争的第四或第五天暂停。

He first indicated that this was gonna be quick and easy and that they would pause on day four or five of the war.

从那以后，政府的立场一直摇摆不定。

And since then, the administration has been all over the place.

他们很快意识到，伊朗在2月28日就已经为这场战争做好了准备。

And they quickly understood that Iran came ready for this war on February 28.

从那以后，他们一直在追赶局势。

And since then, they've been playing catch up.

这场战争的成本已经显著扩大，不仅体现在对海湾国家的空袭，还体现在能源市场的冲击上。

The costs of this war have spread quite significantly, not just through strikes across the Gulf States, but we've seen market impact on the energy side.

霍尔木兹海峡虽然没有正式关闭，但实际上已经停摆。

The Strait Of Hormuz, while not formally closed, has been shut down.

总统实际上已被困在这场冲突中，他希望宣称胜利，但却尚未取得足以宣称胜利的成果。

And the president is in effect locked in to a conflict that he'd like to claim victory on, but he hasn't quite delivered an outcome that he can claim victory for.

但是，萨纳姆，让我问你一个问题。

But, Sanam, let me ask you.

到目前为止，这场战争何时结束，真的由美国说了算吗？

Is it even up to The US on when this war ends at this point?

我希望没这么简单。

I wish it was that easy.

但伊朗人从去年夏天那场持续十二天的战争中学到的是，这场战争也必须以一种有利于伊斯兰共和国或其残存部分的方式彻底结束。

But what the Iranians learned from last summer's twelve day war is that this war also has to end in a conclusive way that benefits the Islamic Republic or what's left of it.

他们究竟想实现什么？

What are they trying to achieve?

他们想生存下去，并希望通过某种协议来保障自身的长期生存，防止再次爆发冲突。

They're trying to survive, and they're trying to guarantee their longer term survival through some kind of agreement that will prevent another round of conflict from emerging.

与此同时，他们目前确实提出了一些极端的零和要求，但最终，他们真正需要的是制裁解除。

And in tandem to that, of course, they have right now some very extreme zero sum demands, But, ultimately, what they really need is sanctions relief.

而这需要某种谈判，让美国和伊斯兰共和国就战前一直在讨论的同一问题做出让步。

And that is gonna require some sort of negotiation where both The United States and the Islamic Republic make concessions over the same issues that were being discussed prior to the war.

因此，需要解决核计划及其剩余部分，并进一步展开关于地区安全的广泛讨论。

So nuclear program and what's left of it needs to be addressed and then a broader discussion on regional security.

只有通过这种谈判，我们才能设想解除制裁。

And only through that negotiation can we imagine sanctions relief.

但伊朗在这场冲突中也承受着巨大的代价。

But Iran is also bearing a tremendous cost in this conflict.

那么，它还能持续多久呢？

So how long can it continue to do so?

这里涉及一些军事计算。

There is a bit of military math going on here.

如果从常规军事角度来看，美国和以色列是这场战争中的强大军事力量。

If you look at it in terms of conventional math, The United States and Israel are the formidable military players in this war.

他们将成功摧毁或削弱伊朗的弹道导弹能力、国防工业体系，并清除伊朗核计划的剩余部分。

They will succeed in destroying or degrading Iran's ballistic missile capabilities, its defense industrial complex, and take out what's left of Iran's nuclear program.

因此，从军事角度来看，美国无疑能够宣布胜利，但伊朗在这场战争中拥有非对称优势。

So from a military perspective, there's no doubt that The US will be able to declare victory, but Iran has asymmetry asymmetry in this war.

因此，它可以使用低成本的无人机来造成破坏，尽管以色列和美国在常规军事上取得了成功，伊朗仍在持续这样做。

So it can use drones that are low cost in order to inflict damage, and it continues to do so despite the conventional military successes that Israel and The United States are making.

让我展望一下这一切最终会如何收场。

Let me look forward to how this all ends.

当这场冲突刚开始时，特朗普政府似乎抱有希望，认为伊朗国内动荡加剧，伊朗民众会起来反抗政权，而这将成为解决这场冲突的一部分。

There seemed to be hope from the Trump administration when this all started that given the domestic unrest in Iran heading into the war, the Iranian public itself would rise up against the regime and that that's going to be part of the resolution of this.

至少，这是特朗普总统似乎所期望的。

At least that's what president Trump seemed to be hoping.

从这个角度来看，我们能合理期待什么？

What's realistic to expect from this perspective?

对伊斯兰共和国而言，继续这场战争也有国内动机。

For the Islamic Republic, continuing this war also has domestic motivation.

这场战争使得全国范围内的安全得到加强。

The war allows for enhanced security across the country.

有必要提醒大家，今年一月曾爆发过大规模抗议活动，而这些抗议被极其残酷地镇压了。

It's important to remind everyone that there were serious protests seen in January, and those protests were brutally repressed in a very serious way.

实际上，这个体系正在试图应对一场生存性的外部危机，同时防止一场生存性的内部危机。

Effectively, the system is trying to manage a existential external crisis and prevent an existential internal crisis.

因此，继续战争也有助于在国内营造一种更高强度的安全环境。

So continuing the war allows for a heightened security environment internally as well.

但话说回来，考虑到伊斯兰共和国在战争结束后将从军事上严重削弱，我仍然认为，截至今天，它依然根深蒂固，并具备能力镇压任何可能出现的内部异议。

But having said that, and also being conscious that the Islamic Republic is going to be severely weakened from a military perspective after this war, I still see them as of today as deeply entrenched and having the capability to repress internal dissent should it emerge.

而这必须与伊朗国内外的反对派形成对比——他们完全分裂，毫无准备，无法提出所谓‘政权更迭后’的替代方案。

And that has to be juxtaposed to the Iranian opposition, both internally and externally that is wholly divided and very unprepared to present a so called day after alternative to an entrenched regime.

因此，我确实预见更多抗议活动，但革命很难建立，它需要动员、团结和规划。

So I certainly see more protests, but a revolution is very hard to build, and it requires mobilization, unity, and planning.

而在当前战争进行的背景下，革命条件看起来并不有利。

And in the context of a war underway, it doesn't look favorable for revolutionary conditions.

所以，你并不认为国内动荡会加速战争的结束？

So you don't see a scenario where domestic unrest hastens the end of the war?

不。

No.

那么，萨纳姆，你最关注哪些迹象，以判断这场冲突何时以及如何结束？

So, Sanam, what are you watching most closely to see when and how this could all end?

我认为我们必须关注伊朗进一步升级的意愿。

I think we have to be watching Iran's appetite for further escalation.

目前，伊朗仍在继续回应并阻碍海湾地区的经济活动。

Right now, Iran continues to respond and obstruct particularly Gulf economic activity.

霍尔木兹海峡至今仍未被‘开放’。

The Strait Of Hormuz still has not yet been, you know, quote unquote opened.

因此，这是我最关注的方面。

And so that's what I'm most watching for.

我还在关注是否有迹象表明伊朗有意寻求退出途径，但关键不在于声明本身，而在于伊朗所传达的条件和前提。

I'm also watching for statements indicating that there is an interest in an off ramp, and it's not the statements themselves, but the terms and conditions that the Iranians are messaging.

目前，他们的要求如此离谱，显然他们并不打算尽快结束这场战争。

Right now, the demands are so out of left field that it's very clear they're not interested in ending this war anytime soon.

我最希望的是能告诉你，这场战争很快就会以某种协议告终。

I would like nothing more than to tell you that this war will end with some kind of deal soon.

我的直觉告诉我，每次我讲话时，我都意识到这场战争可能会持续更久。

My instincts and every time I hear myself talk, I know that I think this war is gonna last much longer.

接下来，他们转向了大使丹尼斯·罗斯，问他需要什么条件才能结束这场冲突。

Next, they turned to ambassador Dennis Ross and asked him what it will take to end the conflict.

我认为关键在于以下几点。

I think the key is the following.

关键在于霍尔木兹海峡。

It's on the Strait Of Hormuz.

总统如果完全按自己的判断行事，很可能会宣布我们已经获胜。

The president left his own devices, would quite probably have declared we've won.

即使伊朗方面说，‘我们不同意，我们依然在这里’，他也可以声称成功，并说：看，这是我们摧毁的所有目标。

And even if the Iranian said, well, we don't agree, and we're still here, he could claim success and say, look at here's all the targets we took out.

看，他们重返核武器进程或计划的能力已经被严重削弱。

Here's how much they can't go back to the nuclear weapon the process, or program.

他们的弹道导弹能力也已大幅受挫。

Their ballistic missiles have been set back dramatically.

无人机也是同样的情况。

The same with the drones.

他们在至少五年内都无法对邻国构成常规威胁，所以我们赢了。

They can't pose a conventional threat to to their neighbors for at least five years, so we've won.

但如果他们仍然控制着霍尔木兹海峡的进出交通，他就不能这么说。

But he can't say that if they still control the traffic in and out of the Strait Of Hormuz.

因此，他无法在他们仍占据这种态势的情况下结束这场战争。

So he can't end this war with them in that position.

目前，伊朗的威胁能力并未消失，但已大幅削弱。

Right now, the Iranian's capacity to threaten hasn't disappeared, but it's been dramatically reduced.

如果我们能够建立通过霍尔木兹海峡的护航船队，就能让伊朗陷入无法控制进出人员和物资的境地。

And if we are able to establish convoys through the Strait Of Hormuz, we put the Iranians in a position where they can no longer control who's coming in and going out.

到那时，特朗普就可以宣布战争结束。

And at that point, Trump could declare an end to the war.

伊朗可能会说他们不认同，但那时他们将几乎没有其他选择。

The Iranians might say we're not agreeing, but they won't have a lot of different alternatives then.

但是，丹尼斯，就我们现在坐在这里的情况来看，美国还没有建立护航船队，霍尔木兹海峡仍处于伊朗控制之下。

But, Dennis, as we sit here, The US hasn't established convoys and the Strait Of Hormuz is still under Iranian control.

如果这种情况持续下去，这场战争能迅速结束吗？

If that remains the case, is a quick end to this war possible?

我认为，只有在有有效调解的情况下，才可能很快解决。

I think then it only resolves soon if there's an effective mediation.

我认为，在伊朗对霍尔木兹海峡拥有完全控制权的情况下，他不可能单方面结束战争。

I don't think he can end unilaterally in a circumstance where Iran has this complete leverage over the Strait Of Hormuz.

所以我认为，只有调解才能更快地促成结果。

So I think a mediation is the only thing that would produce it more quickly.

即便如此，我认为特朗普仍需证明我们在霍尔木兹海峡的现实状况已经改变，因为如果他做不到这一点，看起来就像是他在找借口退出。

Even then, I still think that Trump needs to show we've changed the reality in the Strait Of Hormuz, because if he doesn't, if he can't show that, then it looks like he's the one looking for a way out.

调解结果的另一个问题是，阿里·拉伦贾尼被杀。

The other problem with a mediated outcome is that Ali Larenjani was killed.

如果真有一个人能代表领导层，那也不是霍梅尼。

If there was one person who embodied the leadership, it's not Mogtada Khamenei.

那是拉伦贾尼。

It was Larenjani.

拉伦贾尼是那个与所有不同派系，包括革命卫队，都有关系的人。

Larenjani is the one who had a relationship with all the different factions, including Revolutionary Guard.

如果有人能策划通过调解结束战争，那一定是拉伦贾尼。

If anyone was gonna be able to orchestrate a move to end the war through mediation, it would have been Laren Johnny.

扎斯金没有同样的渠道接触所有不同派系，也没有同样的权威或信誉，而且几乎没有其他人能与他相提并论。

The Zaskin doesn't have the same kind of access to all the different factions, doesn't have the same kind of authority or credibility, and there isn't really anybody else equivalent of that.

也许议会发言人戈卢博夫可以，但目前权威归属尚不明确。

Maybe Golubov, who's the speaker of the parliament, but right now, there is uncertainty in terms of where the authority lies.

所以，丹尼斯，你正在关注什么，以判断这场战争能否很快结束？

So, Dennis, what are you watching to gauge whether this can resolve anytime soon?

我认为关键在于俄罗斯和中国。

I think it comes down to both the Russians and the Chinese.

俄罗斯可以在立即发挥作用方面扮演重要角色。

The Russians can play a major role in terms of being immediate.

不过，中国可以对伊朗施加更大的压力。

The Chinese, though, can put more pressure on the Iranians.

伊朗的立场一直认为，如果我们不能出口，那谁也不能出口。

The Iranian position has always been if we can't export, nobody can export.

但现在他们说，我们可以出口，而且由我们来决定谁还能出口。

But right now, they're saying we can export, and we'll determine who else can export.

一旦美国说，如果我们或我们的朋友不能从那里出口，你们就不能出口。

The minute The US would say, if we can't export out of there or our friends can't export out of there, you're not gonna export.

这会极大地促使中国说：等等。

That would create huge incentives for the Chinese to say, hold the phone.

现在你们在伤害我们。

Now you're hurting us.

而且他们对中东石油有很强的依赖性。

And they they have a heavy dependency on Middle East oil.

所以我会关注俄罗斯和中国会怎么做。

So I'll be looking to see what do the Russians and the Chinese do.

我还会关注我们能多快采取更多措施，限制伊朗在威胁霍尔木兹海峡通行权方面的能力。

I'll also be looking to see how soon we are able to do more to limit what the Iranians can do in terms of threatening, who can move in and out of the Strait Of Hormuz.

对我来说，这确实是一个关键转折点。

That really, for me, is a pivot point.

所以显然，霍尔木兹海峡是这里的关键。

So clearly, the Strait Of Hormuz is key here.

我问过凯文·多根中将，美国及其盟友是否有能力打通霍尔木兹海峡。

I asked vice admiral Kevin Donegan whether The US and its allies have the capability to open the Strait.

我们能通过吗？

Can we get through it?

能。

Yes.

我可以很有把握地说这一点，让我告诉你为什么。

And I can say this with some confidence, and let me tell you why.

我们花了很多时间，与其他国家一起制定应急计划，以防伊朗过去曾宣布关闭海峡，我们早已规划好如何让船只通过。

We spend a lot of time planning for a contingency along with other nations on if Iran in the past had declared the straits closed, we had built plans to then get ships through there.

这个应急计划我们已经制定很久了。

We've had this contingency for a long time.

在我担任中央司令部作战主任之前，甚至在我担任第五舰队司令之前，我们就经常演练其中的某些环节。

Before I was director of operations CENTCOM, well before I was fifth fleet commander, and we would rehearse elements of it quite often.

对吧？

Right?

最近一次是在去年，有30个国家齐聚一堂，第五舰队司令清楚地知道每个国家能做什么。

Most recently, was last year where we had 30 nations come together and the fifth fleet commander knows exactly what each nation can do.

由于我们过去十五年来每年都演练这一演习，我们现在确切知道每个国家真正能做什么。

Because of the fact that we've rehearsed this exercise each year for the past fifteen years, we now know what each nation can really do.

而那些贡献较大的国家，如果参与的话，将发挥关键作用。

And the higher end contributors are going to be if they were to participate.

法国拥有同样具备能力的舰船。

France has ships that are equally capable.

澳大利亚的舰船也具备同等能力——当我这么说时，可能在质量、训练和经验上不如美国，但法国非常有经验，因为他们一直在与胡塞武装作战。

Australia has ships that are equally when I say equally capable, maybe not the same quality and training and experience that The US has, but France is very experienced because of their fight against the Houthis.

希腊人由于胡塞武装的原因，接受了大量的训练。

The Greeks have gotten tremendous training because of the Houthis in particular.

所以，是的，法国、英国、希腊，如果土耳其参与，他们也可以。

So, yes, France, UK, Greece, if Turkey were to participate, they can as well.

埃及则属于下一层级。

Egypt as a tier below that.

澳大利亚，当然可以。

Australia, absolutely.

日本，当然可以。

Japan, absolutely.

韩国，当然可以。

The Koreans, absolutely.

其他国家也可以提供贡献，比如派遣军官参与团队，负责排班等工作。

Others can contribute, officers to staff, the team that's doing the scheduling, etcetera, etcetera, etcetera.

如果你能设想出一个随护航船队移动的安全庇护区，它不仅穿越海峡，还从海湾北部的集结地一直延伸到整个航程。

If you can think about creating a moving sanctuary of security that moves with the convoys that sails through The Straits, and not just through The Straits, but from the Northern Part Of The Gulf, wherever they assemble all the way through.

这并不难，尤其是如果在本次行动结束后再按顺序实施，因为现在所有部署在那里的资源都可以集中于这项任务。

Not hard to do, especially if it's sequenced after this operation is over, because now all those assets that are there can be focused on this mission.

第二点，我们现在对伊朗海岸拥有完全的空中优势。

And the second thing, we have now complete air superiority over the Iranian coast.

而根据我之前描述的计划，我们从未拥有过这种优势。

And with our plan that I described before, we never had that.

对吧？

Right?

因为我们之前没有对伊朗发动过攻击，来为制定这项计划铺路。

Because we didn't have attacks on Iran that preceded us building a plan to be able to do this.

但如果你设想一个多层次的防御计划，包括在海岸线上空的无人机、自由飞行的飞机、近距离支援的直升机、舰船、卫星资产、情报和网络战，所有这些都用于保护护航船队通过，而伊朗如今已没有雷达，只能依赖其他方式来定位目标资产。

But if you think about a layered defensive plan that includes drones overhead to the coastline, airplanes flying at will, helicopters in close, ships, satellite assets, intelligence, cyber warfare, and you think of all of that to protect the convoy as it's going through with an Iran that has no radar anymore, is gonna have to use other queuing methods to find the right assets.

这并不难，因为他们知道自己的目的地在哪里。

Not hard to do because they know where they're gonna end up.

对吧？

Right?

所以它们可以集中在某些区域。

So they can focus in certain places.

那里会有视觉观察员。

They'll have visual observers out there.

但相比之前，我们将对允许其他小船在水中活动采取更低的容忍度。

But we're gonna have a lower tolerance for allowing other little boats out in the water than we did before.

在我们之前制定这个计划时，我们假设所有在水域中的DAO都在向伊朗报告我们的确切位置。

When we built this plan before, we assumed all the DAOs that were out there in the waters were there reporting back to Iran exactly where we were.

我们可能对容忍这些船只的存在持极低的态度。

We'll probably have little tolerance for accepting those there.

但是，凯文，即使护航船队允许一些船只通过海峡，这真的能解决问题吗？

But, Kevin, even if convoys could allow some ships to pass through the Strait, is that really a solution here?

坦白说，这样的措施绝不可能取代通过海峡的石油运输。

To be frank, something like this would never be to replace the flow of oil out The Straits.

这是做不到的。

It can't be done.

你每天需要有大量的船只通过海峡，而护航编队不仅得护送出去。

You need a good number through The Straits a day, and convoys don't just have to get escorted out.

它们还得被护送回来。

They have to get escorted back in.

那么你能得到什么呢？

So what are you gonna get?

也许只有正常流量的20%。

Maybe 20% of the normal flow.

这真的取决于伊朗人在第一艘船之后会采取什么行动。

It really depends on what the Iranians start doing after the first one.

情况发展到这种地步：战争不会在周二突然结束，然后石油在周三就恢复流动。

It goes to the point that there won't be an on off switch that the war stops on Tuesday, oil flows on Wednesday.

我根本不认为这种情况会发生。

I don't see that scenario happening at all.

我认为航运公司、保险公司、油轮公司和液化天然气公司都需要时间来理清实际情况和真正的威胁。

I think the shipping companies, the insurance companies, the tankering companies, the LNG companies, they're gonna need lag time to sort out what's really happening, what's the threat.

伊朗说不，但他们真的这么想吗？

Iran said no, but did they really mean it?

由于伊朗迄今为止的行为，各方对它的信任度将是一个关键因素。

There's gonna be a trust component relative to Iran because of what they've been doing thus far.

因此，在开始承诺通航之前，他们需要观察事态如何发展。

So they're gonna have to see how that plays out before they start committing to passage.

所以，要让石油流量恢复正常，伊朗必须停止威胁船只。

So it sounds like for oil flows to return to normal, Iran is going to have to stop threatening ships.

但目前它有动力这么做吗？

But is it motivated to do so at this point?

最终，他们必须转向内部，开始解决自己的问题。

Eventually, they have to turn inward here and start getting after their own problems.

现在的问题是，伊斯兰革命卫队对局势的控制程度有多高？

Right now, it's a question of how much is the IRGC controlling this?

像这里这样清除领导层的一个问题是，这些被清除的人虽然属于强硬派，但比伊斯兰革命卫队更有长期战略眼光；而革命卫队可能只关注自己被赋予的任务。

One of the problems with taking out leadership like was done here is that is where the folks that, even though they're hardliners, are much more seasoned in the longer term look than the IRGC, which may just be focused on what they know their task is.

这些人一直都在，但一直以来也都有那些更有经验的人，他们希望伊朗这个实体能够继续前进，不仅在他们的掌控之下，而且也明白必须更好地照顾自己的人民。

Those people are always there, but there's always also been the seasoned folk that want Iran as an entity to still move on, not only with them in control, but they also know they have to do better at taking care of their people.

但从政权生存这个角度来看待这个问题。

But think about it through the lens that their number one thing is regime survival.

不是关闭海峡，而是政权生存。

It's not closing the Strait, it's regime survival.

最终，他们也知道，当这一切结束时，他们的经济已经崩溃。

Then in the end, they also know that when this is over, they have an economy that's in collapse.

他们将面临民众问题，需要资金，而制裁并未解除。

They have people problem they're gonna have to deal with, and they're gonna need cash, and sanctions have not gone away.

这才是他们的问题。

That's their issue.

美国在这场博弈中也有可以出的牌。

There are cards that The US could play in this too.

伊朗知道，美国扣押着霍尔木兹岛。

Iran knows that The US holds Karg Island hostage.

如果没有卡格岛的通道，他们什么都过不去。

And without Karg Island flow, they can't get anything through.

伊朗知道，如果我们愿意，我们随时可以阻止这一点。

Iran knows that we could stop that in a second if we chose to.

我们也可以停止在海湾两侧运输伊朗石油的影子船队。

We could also just stop the shadow fleet carriers on either side of the Gulf that are moving Iranian oil.

我从这一切得出的结论是，这场冲突及其引发的能源动荡需要很长时间才能结束。

My conclusion from all of this is that it's going to take time for this conflict and the energy disruptions it's caused to end.

但正如任何涉及政治的事件一样，任何事情都有可能发生。

But as with any event that involves politics, anything is possible.

因此，我们会密切关注此事。

So we'll keep watching this closely.

我们就说到这里。

Let's leave it there.

感谢萨纳姆·瓦基尔、丹尼斯·罗斯大使和凯文·多根中将。

My thanks to Sanam Vakil, ambassador Dennis Ross, and vice admiral Kevin Donegan.

感谢您收听本期高盛交流节目。

And thank you for listening to this episode of Goldman Sachs exchanges.

我是艾莉森·纳撒恩。

I'm Allison Nathan.

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