美国年中展望：地缘政治冲击、美联储新时代与经济增长

随着新任美联储主席上任、通胀数据出人意料地温和，以及地缘政治紧张局势持续，这对美国的通胀、经济增长和美联储政策意味着什么？

With a newly installed Fed chairman, a surprisingly soft inflation print, and persistent geopolitical tensions, what are the implications for US inflation, growth, and Fed policy ahead?

我是艾莉森·纳撒恩，欢迎收看高盛交流会。

I'm Allison Nathan, and this is Goldman Sachs Exchanges.

今天为我们详细解读的是高盛研究部的同事大卫·梅里克，我们的首席美国经济学家。

Here to break it all down is my colleague from Goldman Sachs Research, David Mericle, our chief US economist.

大卫，欢迎再次做客《高盛交流会》。

David, welcome back to Exchanges.

谢谢，艾莉森。

Thanks, Alison.

大卫，你已经有段时间没上节目了，很高兴你今天能来。

It's been a little while since I've had you on the show, David, so thanks for joining.

正因如此，我想先从大方向聊起。

And I just do, for that reason, really want to start wide.

现在是七月了。

So here we are in July.

回顾今年这一路走来的种种起伏，你觉得美国经济的表现有哪一点是完全符合预期的吗？

If we think about the many twists and turns that we've had so far this year, maybe just start us out with what about the performance of The US economy has gone just as you expected?

更有趣的是，哪件事最让你感到意外？

And maybe more interestingly, what has surprised you the most?

好的。

Sure.

要说完全符合预期的，我倒想不出什么，但说到意外，我可以分享一个积极的，一个消极的。

I don't know that anything's gone just as we expected, but on the surprises, let me give you a good one and a not so good one.

积极的一面是，去年大半年就业几乎没什么增长，可就在战争爆发、油价飙升之后，奇怪的是，过去四个月就业反而大幅回升了。

On the good side, I would say maybe a big surprise was after we barely created any jobs for the better part of a year, all of a sudden, in the aftermath, somewhat puzzlingly, of a war breaking out and oil prices spiking, job growth has picked up a lot over the course of the last four months.

现在的劳动力市场，跟年初我们看到的已经很不一样了。

The labor market now looks fairly different than it did to us at the beginning of the year.

我们之前确实有点担心这个问题，但现在至少暂时不用再为此操心了。

That was something we had been a little bit worried about, and now that concern, at least for now, has taken off the table.

至于消极的一面，最大的意外是，年初我们以为通胀会好转，理由很简单——关税问题已经过去了。

On the negative side, I would say the biggest surprise has been that whereas we started the year thinking inflation will get better for the very simple reason that the tariffs are behind us.

这些项目会从同比通胀计算中剔除。

They will drop out of the year on year inflation calculation.

不幸的是，由于战争影响和人工智能需求的推动，再加上统计中的测量误差被放大，现在看来通胀将趋于平稳，更接近3%而不是2%。

We've unfortunately seen that because of the effects of the war and because of the effects of AI demand, which have been amplified in the price statistics by mismeasurement, now it looks like inflation will go more sideways, stay closer to 3% than to 2%.

我们还是继续谈通胀吧。

Let's stick with inflation.

当然，这现在是大家最关注的问题。

Of course, that is tremendously in focus.

不过上周的通胀数据其实比预期要弱。

We actually did, though, have a pretty weak inflation print last week.

六月的消费者价格指数低于预期。

The June CPI came in weaker than expected.

你怎么看这个情况？

What do you make of that?

这在多大程度上说明通胀真的出现了转折点，还是说这只是暂时的机械性变化——毕竟汽油价格我们知道跌过，现在又开始回升了？

How much does that actually suggest to you an inflection point in inflation as you've been expecting, or is this just a mechanical shift that's gonna reverse because gasoline prices, as we all know, went down and now they're headed up again?

我觉得那次数据可能是个别异常值，还不足以改变我们对通胀走势的整体判断，但综合几方面原因，我们确实认为这标志着未来一段时间的通胀数据将比过去六个月更温和。

I think that probably was a bit of an outlier print, and I wouldn't say it greatly changed our view on the inflation path, but for a number of reasons, we do think that is the start of what will be a run of softer inflation data than we saw, say, over the prior six months.

一个原因是，关税带来的影响在今后的月度数据中似乎已经微不足道了。

One issue is that the tariff effects now seem pretty negligible on a go forward monthly basis.

另一个问题是，尽管最近伊朗局势升级、油价上涨，但相比四月底五月初的高点，油价仍大幅回落，因此战争对价格的最大冲击很可能已经发生在第二季度，今年后两个季度的逐月影响会更小。此外，关于PCE指数中被高估的AI需求影响，虽然还没完全消退，但接下来几个月的环比压力应该也会比过去半年有所缓解。

Another issue is that while there has been reescalation recently in the war with Iran and higher oil prices, they are still down quite a bit from those late AprilMay peaks that we saw, and so it looks there too like the biggest effects of the war on prices probably occurred in Q2, and in the third and fourth quarters of this year, the sequential impact should be smaller, and then the third big inflation theme, these mismeasured, exaggerated effects of AI demand in the PCE index, there too, I would say not entirely behind us, but probably sequentially softer in the coming months than they've been over the course of the last half year.

综合这些因素，再加上经济本身并没有推高通胀，真正让通胀居高不下的，是这些外部因素，所以我们预计未来每月的通胀数据会继续走低。

So for all of those reasons, coupled with the fact that the economy itself is not creating an inflation problem, it's these other factors that have kept inflation higher for longer, we think we will see softer monthly inflation going forward.

六月的数据我认为是这一趋势的开端，但可能把好消息夸大了一点。

And June, I think, is the start of that, but probably exaggerates the good news a bit.

不过我想就局势再度升级的问题多问一句。

But let me just dig in for one moment there on the re escalation of the war.

你并不担心这会带来通胀风险？

You're not concerned about the inflation risks.

如果油价维持在当前水平，我们还是会预期未来的月度通胀会继续温和下行。

I think if oil prices stay where they are, then we would continue to expect softer monthly sequential inflation.

不过，这确实是通胀上行风险中最关键的一个。

Absolutely, though, that is the key upside risk to inflation.

撇开关税、战争和AI这些影响来看，实际上通胀率这段时间一直挺接近2%的。

I would say net of the effects of tariffs, the war, and these AI effects, actually inflation's been reasonably close to 2% for a while at this point.

CPI数据要是剔除掉关税的影响，核心通胀率也基本在2%附近运行。

The CPI, certainly, if you take out even just tariff effects, is running close to 2% on a core basis.

至于PCE指数里的这些影响，我觉得加起来大概超过了一个百分点。

These effects on PCE, I would say, are worth a little bit more than a percentage point.

所以同样地，要是没有这些因素，我们早就接近2%的目标了。

So there, too, I would say, if it weren't for these factors, we'd be reasonably close to 2%.

在我看来，未来最大的不确定因素，绝对是战争。

The one that seems to me like the biggest wild card going forward is absolutely the war.

下周我们有个美联储会议，备受关注。

So we do have a Fed meeting next week, very much in focus.

这将是新任美联储主席凯文·沃什主持的第二次会议。

It'll be the second meeting for new Fed chairman Kevin Warsh.

尽管通胀数据有所放缓，而且我们预计今年下半年通胀还会继续降温，但他最近的国会证词语气依然相当谨慎。

And despite this softer inflation data and at least our expectation that inflation is going to continue to soften for the second half of the year, he has a pretty cautious tone right now, at least in terms of his congressional testimony last week.

此外，其他美联储官员的表态，有些人认为比预期更偏鹰派。

And then you've seen other members of the Fed coming out what some would characterize as hawkish relative to expectations.

那么，投资者该怎么解读这一切呢？

So what should investors make of all this?

当然。

Sure.

我认为，六月的CPI数据及其对PCE通胀的影响，已经足够温和，足以让美联储在七月会议上维持利率不变。

I think the June CPI data and their implications for the PCE inflation numbers probably soft enough to keep the Fed on hold at the July meeting.

这一点看起来相当明确。

That much seems pretty clear.

至于后续会议，从美联储会议纪要传达的信息来看，从现在开始，他们已经不再争论通胀的具体成因，也不再纠结于是否应该忽略那些推高通胀的因素。

In terms of subsequent meetings, the message that we get from the FOMC, from the Fed minutes, for example, is from this point forward, they're done litigating what exactly is causing inflation, asking the question of whether or not it's appropriate to look through the different factors causing high inflation.

如果我们继续看到通胀居高不下，很多人认为，现在必须采取行动了，因为这种情况持续得太久。大家普遍认同，即使这些冲击只是暂时的供应中断，长期下去也会变得危险。

If we continue to see high inflation, many of them feel like at this point we really need to respond to that because this has just gone on for too long, and I think everyone agrees that at some point, in principle, even if this is a long series of one time supply shocks, it would become dangerous.

这会让人们对高通胀变得太习以为常，甚至可能让它自己持续下去。

It would risk making people a little bit too accustomed to high inflation and make it potentially take on a life of its own.

通常来说，关税可能只是一次性提价，战争导致的油价飙升你也该忽略过去，但如果是某个价格指数的统计误差引发的通胀，你就不能当真了——我原本也是这么想的。

So whereas normally you might say tariffs are a one time price level increase, you're supposed to look through an oil price spike caused by a war, you're probably not supposed to take inflation caused by mismeasurement in one price index at face value, and that would normally be how I would think about it too.

但在这个背景下，他们的意思似乎是，过去对高通胀的各种成因太过轻描淡写了，不管原因是什么，现在他们已经没多少耐心了。

In this context, the message seems to be that they have downplayed different reasons for high inflation for too long, and whatever the source, they would not have a lot of further patience for it.

所以，我们预计今年剩下的时间核心PCE通胀会维持在20个基点左右，或略高一点，这个水平足够让美联储安心继续按兵不动，但眼下已经没什么容错空间了。

So I think the inflation path that we are expecting for the remainder of the year, where core PCE inflation stays at about 20 basis points or a touch higher, that would be soft enough to keep the Fed comfortable looking through this, staying on hold, but there's not a lot of margin for error at this point.

所以简单说一句，我们预计美联储今年会维持利率不变，下一次动作可能要到2027年才会是降息。

So just to clarify, we expect the Fed, at least our mainline expectation is for the Fed to remain on hold this year and potentially the next move being a cut in 2027.

没错。

That's right.

这正是我们的预测。

That is our forecast.

至于2027年，等这些冲击都过去了，通胀也回到2%了，那时候该怎么做，那是另一个完全不同的问题了。

I would say the debate about what we do at a 2027 horizon when these shocks are behind us and inflation's back to 2%, that's an entirely separate discussion.

我想强调的是，今年美联储维持利率不变，是因为我们认为当前的通胀问题并不是由宏观经济过热引起的。

What I would emphasize is for this year, we have the Fed on hold on the thought that the inflation problem we have is not a problem of macroeconomic overheating.

没有充分的理由因为这个而降息，我们觉得通胀数据会明显改善，让美联储有底气忽略这些波动。

There's not really a strong case for cutting in response, and we think the inflation data will improve enough that they'll feel comfortable looking through this.

目前市场预期来回摇摆，但眼下还是普遍认为美联储今年会再次加息。

Now the market expectations, they've swung a bit back and forth, but right now they are still expecting the next move to be a hike and a hike later this year.

在你看来，这难道不是定价错误吗？

So does that just look mispriced to you?

我觉得情况没这么非黑即白。

I would say it's a little bit less black and white than that.

我觉得市场定价的加息幅度大约是一次半，相当于对加息两次或三次的概率各占五成左右。

I would view market pricing of, call it, a hike and a half as maybe something like a fiftyfifty chance of two or three hikes.

我们自己的判断是，加息的可能性低于五成，大概在四分之一左右，但这个分歧并不像‘加息’和‘不加息’那样截然对立。

Our own view is that the probability of hikes is less than 50%, more like 25%, but it's perhaps not quite as black and white of a difference of opinion as hike versus no hike.

让我花一点时间谈谈资产负债表的问题。

Let me spend one moment on the balance sheet.

这曾经是个重要问题，因为沃什主席的观点在某种程度上和前任们不太一样。

That was a big issue potentially where Chairman Warsh had different views than his predecessors to some extent.

你认为这一点会对未来几个月乃至几年的美联储政策产生什么影响？

How do you see that factoring into Fed policy in the months and years ahead?

关于这个问题，沃什主席已经成立了一个特别小组来研究，实际上这里涉及两个方面。

This is one of the questions on which Chairman Worsch has commissioned a task force to take a look, and there are basically two issues here.

一个是美联储资产负债表的规模，这和美联储目前使用的充裕准备金框架密切相关；另一个则是美联储资产负债表上所持资产的构成。

There's the size of the Fed's balance sheet, which is bound up with the ample reserves framework that the Fed uses, but then there's also the composition of the assets that the Fed is holding on its balance sheet.

关于第一个问题，我的感觉是，美联储内部根本不想回到过去的货币政策实施方式，因此，我认为资产负债表大幅缩减的空间非常有限。

On the first issue, my impression is that there's really no interest within the Federal Reserve in reverting back to the old system of monetary policy implementation, and consequently, I don't think that there's very much room for shrinking the balance sheet.

也许通过一些监管和监督方面的调整，还能有一点点空间，但不会太多。

Maybe a little bit of room through regulatory and supervisory changes, but not much.

至于第二个问题——美联储该持有怎样的资产——从会议纪要来看，这仍然是一个开放性的问题，各方观点可能都容易被说服，支持任一立场。

On the other question, though, of what assets the Fed should be holding on its balance sheet, my impression from the minutes is that is one where it's really still more of an open question, and probably people could be talked into supporting either approach.

这里主要有两种观点。

There are two arguments here.

一种观点是，选择政府债务的构成并不是我们的职责。

So one argument is it's not our job to choose the composition of government debt.

那是财政部的事，所以美联储应该按照财政部发行的比例来购买。

That's the Treasury's role, and so the Fed should just buy in proportion to what the Treasury issues.

另一种观点认为，美联储应该主要持有短期国债，以便让资产和负债的期限相匹配，减少利润波动，避免因某年盈利、次年亏损而引起国会关注，从而被政治化。

Argument, the other position you could take is the Fed should hold mostly bills in order to match the duration of its assets and liabilities and reduce the volatility of its profits to avoid becoming politicized if, say, Congress took notice of the fact that one year you have profits, the next year maybe you have losses.

我觉得这两种说法都有道理。

I think both of those are coherent.

我觉得这其实没那么重要，因为无论美联储选择哪种方式，财政部都会随之调整，最终对公众可获得的债务构成，以及利率，都不会有实质性影响。

I guess I would say it doesn't matter very much because whatever the option the Fed chooses, I would expect the Treasury to adapt to that, and in the end it wouldn't really have any impact on the composition of the debt that's ultimately available to the public and therefore ultimately on interest rates.

所以我不觉得这有多大影响，但这种情况确实有可能导致政策调整。

So I don't know that it matters a ton, but that's one where I could see them making changes.

另一个受到广泛关注、可能产生重大影响的变动，是美联储政策沟通方式的改变。

The other change that seems to be quite in focus that could potentially have a big impact is a change in communication of Fed policy.

你听到这方面的什么说法了吗？

What are you hearing about that?

当然。

Sure.

我觉得这里有几个问题。

I think there are a few issues here.

首先，沃尔什长期以来一直反对前瞻性指引。

One, of course, is Worsch's kind of longstanding opposition to forward guidance.

在货币政策的学术讨论中，有一个重要区别，我认为：一种是带有承诺的前瞻性指引，也就是明确说‘我们一定会这么做’，必须遵守，但美联储没人觉得除了在零利率下限约束下，这种做法合适；另一种是更温和的形式，意思是‘这是我们对经济的最佳预测’，这会对货币政策产生影响。

Now, in the academic discussion of monetary policy, a distinction is drawn, an important one, I think, between forward guidance with commitment, where you say this is what we're definitely going to do, and you have to stick to that, which nobody at the Fed thinks they ought to be using outside of times when they're constrained by the zero lower bound, versus softer form of forward guidance where you say, look, this is our best forecast for the economy, and that would have implications for monetary policy.

只要你开始谈论对经济的看法——比如更担心通胀风险还是就业风险——你就暗示了货币政策的倾向，透露出你更可能加息还是降息；一旦你开始谈你对中性利率的判断，市场就会自然理解你长期政策目标的方向。

I think as soon as you start talking about your view on the economy, whether you're more worried about risk to inflation or more worried about risk to employment, you hint at some lean for monetary policy, for whether you're more likely to raise or lower the funds rate, and as soon as you start talking about your best guess of the neutral rate, you convey to markets an impression of where you're trying to get to in the long run.

所以，只要你在谈论对经济的判断，某种温和、非承诺性的前瞻性指引就是不可避免的。

So some level of soft, noncommittal forward guidance I think is inevitable if you talk about your impressions of the economy.

目前有争议的是，委员会——也就是FOMC作为一个整体——该在多大程度上提供前瞻性指引。

What seems to be up for grabs is to what degree the committee, the FOMC as a committee, should be giving forward guidance.

也许个别成员说‘我更担心通胀’，大家就能推断出这个人更可能支持加息而非降息，但FOMC本身该不该主动给出前瞻性指引呢？

Maybe participants say, I'm more nervous about inflation, and we all infer from that participant is more likely to support rate hikes than rate cuts, but should the FOMC be giving forward guidance?

当然，他们已经从FOMC声明中删掉了这种温和的前瞻性指引，以前那种说法暗示降息比加息更有可能，因为他们觉得当前利率已经高于中性水平。

Now, of course, they've taken that out of the FOMC statement, that kind of soft forward guidance that suggested that going lower is more likely than going higher because they think we're above the neutral rate.

他们可以做的一件事，我觉得FOMC成员们也不会太反对，就是采纳前副主席唐·科恩的建议，不再公布SEP中的中位数预测。

One thing that they could do that I don't think would bother people on the FOMC too much is to adopt former Vice Chairman Don Cohen's proposal that they eliminate, that they stop publishing the medians in the SEP, the median projections.

当然，大多数投资者，包括你的彭博终端，即使美联储不公布中位数，可能还是会继续自己算出来，但确实有人认为，这样一来，就不会让人觉得委员会整体在背书某个特定的预测或政策路径了。

Now, of course, most investors, and your Bloomberg terminal would probably go on publishing the median for us even if the Fed doesn't tell us what the median is, but at least some people argue that way it wouldn't seem like the committee as a committee is giving its blessing to a particular forecast and a particular monetary policy path.

所以我觉得这只是一个相对较小的调整。

So I would view that as a relatively minor change.

我不确定这对投资者会有多大影响，但我觉得他们有可能会这么做。

I don't know that would have major implications for investors, but that's something I could see them changing.

如果完全取消经济预测摘要，我觉得这会对大多数FOMC成员来说，都意味着在政策透明度上退了一大步，我很难想象他们会愿意接受这种倒退。

Dispensing with the summary of economic projections entirely would seem to me, and I think to most FOMC participants, like a big step away from monetary policy transparency, and I would be surprised if there was comfort taking a step away from transparency.

这正是市场所担心的，对吧？

And that is the market concern, right?

因为如果市场完全得不到任何关于美联储可能行动的线索，就更容易被意外打个措手不及，从而引发剧烈波动。

Because if markets don't have any indication or guidance of what they think the Fed might do, it's much more vulnerable to surprises, and that can create a lot of volatility.

我觉得没错。

I think that's right.

如果让市场自己去解读，它可能会过度解读政策变动，跑在美联储想传达的信息前面。只要美联储目前不打算加息或降息，这大概没什么大问题。

If you leave it to the market to form its own story, it might infer too much from policy moves, might run ahead of what the Fed intends to convey, and as long as we're in an environment where the Fed's not moving in either direction, that's probably not a huge deal.

但在一次可能要调整政策，尤其是加息的会议上，如果美联储对经济前景和合适的货币政策毫无暗示，市场很可能出现超出预期的剧烈反应。

But at a meeting where they were to make a policy change, especially a rate hike, without giving us any sense of how they're thinking about the economy, let alone appropriate monetary policy, I think there is a risk that markets could move more than they might want.

也许我们在沃瑟尔首次主持的六月会议就看到过一点这样的情况。

And perhaps we saw a little bit of that at Worcester's first meeting, the June meeting.

希望这只是个偶然，不代表未来会怎样，咱们走着瞧吧。

Already, hopefully not a sign of what's more to come, but we will see.

我再回过头来，大卫，说说你一开始提到的那点。

Let me go back, David, to what you started with.

我想再深入聊聊一个让我意外的现象——劳动力市场的韧性。

One of the surprises that I want to unpack a little bit more, which is this resilience in the labor market.

在这一点上，我们还没怎么讨论过经济增长。

We haven't really talked about growth at all in that context.

劳动力市场比预期更坚韧，这是否意味着经济增速比我们想的要好？你怎么看？

Is the fact that we have a more resilient labor market than we expected a sign that growth is holding up better, or what do you make of it?

我觉得这两方面都成立。

I think both are true.

我不太明白，为什么最近几个月就业增长突然加速，偏偏选在了这么不太可能的时机。

I don't know what exactly to make of job growth abruptly picking up over the last several months at a seemingly pretty unlikely time.

过去的经验是，油价上涨时，非必需消费领域的就业通常会下降。

Historically, what we found is that when oil prices go up, usually employment tends to decline in discretionary spending sectors.

逻辑是，如果你在汽油上花得更多，去餐厅吃饭的钱就少了，餐厅自然就少雇几个服务员。

The thinking being that if I'm spending more on my tank of gasoline, I'm spending less at a restaurant, and so restaurants hire, say, fewer waiters.

但这次我们看到的恰恰相反。

Instead, we've seen the opposite.

战争一爆发、油价一涨，就业增长反而显著上升，现在已经超过了我们常说的‘平衡点’——也就是维持失业率稳定所需的岗位数量。

We've seen just as the war breaks out and oil prices rise, pretty impressive pickup in job growth to a point where we are now somewhat above what we would think of as what we call the break breakeven rate, the number of jobs that we need to keep the unemployment rate stable.

在移民减少的环境下，我们每个月只需要五万到六万个新增岗位就够了，但实际数字一直高于这个水平。

We think in an environment of diminished immigration, we only need 50,000 to 60,000 jobs a month, and we've been running above that.

那我再回头聊聊增长前景吧。

So let me just go back to the growth view then.

劳动力市场挺坚韧，通胀也在回落。

It seems as though we have a resilient labor market, inflation coming down.

所以你是觉得增长能维持住吗？美国整体的增长前景接下来会怎样？

So are your expectations that growth holds up, or where do we go from here on the overall growth picture in The US?

我们的增长预测略低于潜在水平，但已经很接近了。

So our growth forecast is, I would call it, a hair below potential, but pretty close.

年初的时候，我们的预测比潜在增长率2.5%略高一点。

Coming into the year, we were a little bit above our estimate of potential growth at 2.5%.

主要考虑的是，虽然油价上涨到现在还没明显压低消费，但未来收入增长乏力、储蓄率本来就低，退税也差不多到头了。

The main thinking is that while we have not seen much of an impact of higher oil prices on consumer spending yet, at this point, you're looking at an outlook of mediocre real income growth, an already low saving rate, and tax refund payments that have probably run their course.

所以今年下半年，我们预计消费增长会比汽油涨价后那几个月稍微弱一些。

And so in the back half of the year, we're expecting to see somewhat softer consumption growth than we've seen over the last few months since gasoline prices first rose.

加上房地产和政府支出疲软，但企业投资异常强劲，这些因素综合起来，构成了我们对GDP增长的整体判断。

Coupled with weakness in the housing sector, weakness in government spending, but outsized strength in business investment, we think all of that adds up to a picture for GDP growth.

大概在2%左右，这不算差，但要是没有油价和汽油价格上涨，情况本会更好一些。

Around 2%, not bad by any means, but somewhat worse than we would have had without the increase in oil and gasoline prices.

股市倒是涨了。

And the stock market has been up.

那这个因素怎么影响你的判断呢？

So how does that factor into those views?

是的，股市上涨通过财富效应提升了消费者支出。

Yeah, the increase in the stock market boosts consumer spending through what we call a wealth effect.

我们估计，过去一年里这一效应贡献了大约百分之零点三到零点四，未来一年也会有类似的影响。

We estimate that's been worth about three to fourten of a percentage point over the last year and will be worth about the same over the coming year.

这并不是推动消费增长的主要动力，但最近确实起到了积极作用。

This is not the main thing driving consumer spending growth, but it has been a positive recently.

我们来整体梳理一下吧，大卫。

So let's just put it all together, David.

核心通胀目前相对温和，我们预计通胀形势还会继续好转。

Again, we have relatively soft core inflation, and we expect the inflation picture to continue to improve.

这位新任美联储主席，我们还得看看他接下来会有什么动作，还有中东局势的升级。

This new Fed chairman, we'll see what more comes from him, and this Middle East escalation.

你目前最关注的风险是什么？

What are the risks you're most focused on here?

我认为对我们来说，最大的风险还是战争，它可能推高通胀，而通胀上升又会影响货币政策，最终对金融市场构成威胁。

I think the biggest risk, at least for what we focus on, is probably still the war, its potential impact on inflation, the potential impact of somewhat higher inflation on monetary policy, and the risk that all of that would pose to financial markets.

非常感谢你再次参与对话，大卫。

Thanks so much, David, for joining me again.

谢谢您，艾莉森。

Thank you very much, Allison.

本集《高盛对话》录制于2026年7月20日，星期一。

This episode of Goldman Sachs Exchanges was recorded on Monday, 07/20/2026.

如果你喜欢这档节目，欢迎在苹果播客、Spotify，或者你常用的播客平台订阅我们，并留下评分和评论。

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我是艾莉森·纳森。

I'm Allison Nathan.

感谢收听。

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