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欢迎收听FIC聚焦，彭博情报、固定收益、信贷货币和大宗商品策略师及分析师将在此探讨他们对债务市场和发行人的短期与长期观点。
Welcome to FIC Focus, where Bloomberg Intelligence, fixed income, credit currency, and commodities strategists and analysts discuss their short and long term views on debt markets and issuers.
现在有请彭博情报FICC研究团队。
Now here's the Bloomberg Intelligence FICC research team.
女士们、先生们，欢迎收听新一期的《信贷紧缩》播客，这是FICC聚焦播客系列的一部分。
Welcome, ladies and gentlemen, to the next episode of the Credit Crunch podcast, part of the FICC focused podcast umbrella.
我是彭博情报全球信贷策略主管马赫什·比马林甘，一如既往担任本期主持人。
This is Mahesh Bhimalingam, global head of credit strategy at Bloomberg Intelligence, your host as always.
彭博情报是彭博社的研究部门，堪称华尔街最大的研究机构，最重要的是——正如诸位所知——通过彭博终端可获取其无偏见、无障碍的研究成果。
Bloomberg Intelligence is the research arm of Bloomberg LLP, arguably the largest research franchise on the street and most importantly unbiased and unhindered access on Bloomberg terminal as most of you are well aware.
节目开始前照例提醒：BISTRTE是所有宏观信贷数据的门户，也是终端上的仪表盘平台。请访问BISTRTE获取研究资料及独家数据需求，这些数据在华尔街其他渠道甚至终端上都无法获取。
And before we kick off as always I would like to remind about BISTRTE home of all macro credit data our dashboard on the terminal so please visit BISTRTE for all your research as well as proprietary data needs, data which you can't get anywhere else on the street or even on the terminal actually.
因此本年度倒数第二期播客将有些特别。
So this podcast, the last but one of the year is going to be a bit different.
过去一个半月里，欧洲发生了两起重大信贷事件。
We have had two major credit events in Europe last month month and a half or so.
一起在米兰，另一起在马德里。
One in Milan and one in Madrid.
10月9日的米兰信贷开胃酒会，以及11月6日的马德里信贷研讨会。
Credit apertivo Milano on ninth October and Desa Unundo Credito on November 6.
请原谅我的西班牙语发音。
Please excuse my Spanish.
这两起重大信贷事件后，11月27日伦敦还将举行后续活动。
But two major credit events and there is a follow-up on November 27 in London.
请参加伦敦的活动。
Please attend the London event.
活动将在伦敦彭博办公室线下举行。
It is in person in Bloomberg London office.
我们预计会有相当多的参与者，希望听完这期播客后，伦敦及周边地区的投资者和听众都能到场。
We expect a pretty large turnout and after listening to this podcast, hopefully all London and nearby investors and listeners would actually turn up.
那么，让我们回顾一下米兰和马德里活动的关键要点。
So, let's run through what are the key takeaways of Milan and Madrid.
米兰的活动是在10月9日举行的。
So Milan happened on ninth October.
记得当时的主要热点事件之一就是法国危机。
Remember at that time one of the key stories going on is France crisis episode.
首先讨论的话题是巨大的边缘波动性，
So the first topic that came was this massive fringe volatility, how
有
has
主权债券表现如何以及信用债表现如何。
the sovereign done and how has credit done.
所有这些信用事件都有标准格式。
All these credit events have a standard format.
首先由我进行信用展望，概述我们的观点和对信用市场的判断，接着是投资者和风险承担小组讨论（通常由三位投资者和一位主持人组成），最后是我们的个股分析师展示推荐和回避的标的。
There is me giving a credit outlook at the start of it, giving an overview of what we think and where we think credit is, followed by an investor and risk taking panel, typically three investors and a moderator, followed by our single name analysts showing picks and pans.
因此，我明确强调了在那场危机中，信用俱乐部如何大幅跑赢了主权债券。
So, I clearly highlighted how that credit club, how credit has massively outperformed rates of the sovereign in that crisis.
无论你关注企业还是银行，任何领域都是如此。
Whichever shade you look at whether you look at corporates or banks.
所以那曾是一场重大辩论。
So that was a major debate.
当时信贷利率仍高于法国利率，但争论焦点是信贷何时或是否会低于该水平。
At that time, credit was still trading over French rates but the debate was when or if will credit trade under.
顺便说一句，这并非未知领域。
This is not an unforeseen territory by the way.
这种情况在意大利时期就发生过。
This happened during Italian times.
所以那是第一个主要议题。
So that was one major topic.
第二个议题是信贷变得过于紧缩。
The second topic was credit was getting too tight.
法国危机似乎并未阻止信贷发展。
The French crisis didn't seem to deter credit.
所有人都认为信贷正在收紧。
Everybody thought credit is tight.
我们该怎么做？
Where do we do?
我们该何去何从？
Where do we go from here?
信贷还有进一步上升空间吗？
Any further upside in credit?
关于质量存在争议。
There is debate on quality.
我们通过BASTRTE债券指数基础数据和我们持有的指数质量指标，展示了信贷基本面如何保持良好。
We showcased how credit fundamentals held up very well using our bond index fundamentals on BASTRTE and the index quality metrics that we have.
曾就周期性与非周期性展开辩论。
There was debate on cyclicals versus non cyclicals.
人们是否应该采取防御策略？
Should people go defensive?
高收益债与投资级债该如何选择？
Should high yield versus investment grade?
质量下滑是否已过于极端？
Has the step down in quality got too extreme?
然后是收益率曲线。
Then curve.
我们预计利率曲线会进一步陡峭化多少，从而对信贷曲线产生何种影响。
How much more steepening do we expect in rates curve and as a result impact on the credit curve.
而最大的争议是私募与公募之争。
And the big debate was private versus public.
显然我和我的单M分析师们都在研究公开市场。
Obviously me and my single m analysts are all covering public stuff.
但私募市场那边情况如何？
But on the private stuff, what is going on?
能见度有限，记得当时是在10月，10月9日。
Limited visibility and at that time remember this was at the October, ninth October.
十月事件尚未发生。
The October hasn't happened.
等我们到马德里时我会详细说明。
I will cover that when we get to Madrid.
所以存在这样的疑问，你知道所有的私人基础数据和公共基础数据，无论是信用指标还是违约率等，看起来都很不错，因为这些数据都进入了私人领域，我们无法看到。
So there was questions of you know all your private fundamental public fundamentals whether it is credit metrics or defaults etc are all looking great because stuff is going into private and we can't see.
而且反馈非常好。
And there was great feedback.
我们邀请了所有意大利主要机构参加。
We had all the big Italian players attend.
你知道的，意大利联合圣保罗银行、忠利保险、Hercel、Keyros、Mediobanca。
You know Intesa, Generali, Hercel, Keyros, Mediobanca.
毫不夸张地说，意大利信贷界的重量级人物都出席了。
Literally the who is who of credit in Italy attended.
118人注册，57人出席。
118 sign ups and 57 attendees.
出席率非常高。
Very high strike rate.
接着我们转战马德里。
Then we move on to Madrid.
马德里安排在清晨的早餐会，因为我们得在西班牙人午休前完成，这次由于是11月6日，经历了十月的市场波动。
Madrid was a breakfast early in the morning because we had to get the Spanish out before they go to their siestas and this time because it was on November 6, had the October wobble.
我们掌握了美国的私人违约数据。
We had the private defaults in The US.
所以第一个讨论点是，私募信贷是否在隐藏问题？
So the first discussion was, is private credit hiding?
将所有的隐患从公开信贷中隐藏起来。
Hiding all the skeletons in the cupboard from public credit.
问题在于，是否会出现连锁反应？
The question is, will there be a contagion?
实际上在我演讲时有人问我，会不会出现连锁反应？
People actually asked me during my talk, will there be a contagion?
于是我们向他们展示了最坏情况的违约率，列出了所有公开的潜在违约对象，即使它们全部违约，结合过去十二个月的历史数据，最终违约率也仅有4.5%。
So we showed them worst case default rates, showed them all public candidates of default even if all of them default along with the historical last twelve months you are going to end up with a default rate of only 4.5%.
因此公开市场的风险是可控的。
So public risk is contained.
而私募市场的风险我们不得而知。
Private risk we don't know.
这就是第一个主要争议点。
So that was one major debate.
第二个争议点是：鉴于利差比米兰会议期间更加紧缩，我们是否真应该降低信用评级门槛。
The second debate is given that spreads are even more tighter compared to what they were in during Milan, should we really go down the rating spectrum.
人们一直在挤占他们的BB级交易。
People have been crowding out their BB trade.
投资级债券投资者允许配置BB级债券。
BBs are allowed by the IG guys.
高收益债券投资者也允许配置BB级债券。
BBs are allowed by the high yield guys.
相对于单B级债券，它们的利差已经大幅收窄。
They have tightened quite a bit relative to single B.
所以，高收益债券投资者在考虑是否应该涉足单B级债券。
So, the high yield guys are asking the question should we dabble in single B.
投资级债券投资者则在思考，鉴于双B级债券相对于三B级或投资级的利差收窄过多，坚持投资更高质量债券可能并不会损失太多收益。
The IG guys are asking, given that double Bs have tightened too much relative to triple B or IG, we may not be giving up that much by sticking to higher quality.
这是其中一个主要讨论点。
So that was one major discussion.
接下来的讨论是关于普通评级债券、普通优先无担保债券等常规品种。
The next discussion is okay, so that's in plain rating stuff, plain senior unsecured and so on.
如果我们转向次级债券会怎样？次级债券的表现与普通债券相比如何？
What if we go down to subordinated and how is subordinated debt doing relative to vanilla?
显然，历史数据表明今年次级债券表现非常出色。
Obviously, historical answer is it has done very well this year.
现在的问题是，在利差已经大幅收窄后，还有多少上行空间？
The question is now that they have tightened a lot, how much more upside is left?
关键问题在于次级债券存在多少期限延长风险和非赎回风险。
The big question was how much extension risk in the subordinated debt and how much non call risk.
因此针对公司混合资本工具展开了大量讨论。
So there was a massive discussion on corporate hybrids.
如果债券未被赎回会发生什么情况？
What happens in case there is no call?
它们在评级机构获得的权益优惠会有什么变化？
What happens to their equity benefit that they get at the rating agency.
记住公司混合债券是主流指数的一部分，与80系列不同，后者虽也是次级债但具有合同减记条款，这使得它们不符合主流债券指数的资格。
Remember corporate hybrids are part of the mainstream indices unlike 80 one's who are also subordinated debt but 80 one's have contractual write down which makes them ineligible for the mainstream bond indices.
所以这些问题就出现了。
So there were these questions.
人们目前还不担心减记，但主要关注点是延期风险。
People are not worried about write downs yet but the big story was extension risk.
如果他们不赎回怎么办？
What if they don't call?
特别是考虑到当前利率水平，如果利率再小幅上升——这不是信用问题而是收益率问题。
Particularly with rates being where they are and if they do zoom up a bit more which is not a credit issue but an yield issue.
存在多大的延期风险？我们该如何评估？
How much extension risk is there and how do we think about it.
对此有大量讨论。
There is big discussion on that.
当然，也有关于高收益债与投资级债的讨论。
Of course, was discussion on high yield versus IG.
我提到过这点。
I mentioned that.
在策略讨论中，我们展示了资金流向数据。
In the strategy talk, we showed fund flows.
高收益债市场当前资金流动非常活跃。
Fund flows are rampant in high yield right now.
投资级债券的资金流入情况也很不错。
IG is getting good flows as well.
我们确实展示了信贷问题存在于信贷之外。
We did show that problem in credit is outside credit.
它并不在信贷领域内。
It is not in credit.
我想我在之前的播客中已经多次提到过这一点。
I think I have mentioned this many times in my previous podcast.
问题在于利率，或者举例来说，如果你是英镑投资者，问题就出在外汇上。
The problem is in rates or if you are a sterling investor for example, problem is in FX.
这与信贷无关。
It is not in credit.
信贷表现稳健，这从利差上就能看出来。
Credit is holding up well and that is showing in spreads.
问题是当这种外部性随着利差收得过紧而转化为内部性时会发生什么。
The issue is when does that externality become an internality as spreads are getting too tight.
我们今天将讨论这个问题。
We will discuss that today.
最后，这种私募信贷的不透明性是个大问题。
And lastly, this private credit opacity is a huge issue.
美国那两起信贷违约事件引发了巨大震荡，虽然我们已经恢复，但这是否意味着还会有更多？
Those two US credit defaults have caused a big wobble as we recovered but are we looking at more.
当然，请务必参加11月27日的伦敦活动。
Now, of course please attend the London event on November 27.
但今天我们将解答大部分这些问题，特别是次级债问题，因为我们现场有一位次级债专家。
But today we are going to answer most of these questions, particularly the subordinated one because we have got a subordinated specialist in our room.
欢迎塞缪尔·西巴尼，他是我在巴克莱银行工作时期的同事。
So welcome to Samuel Sibany, an ex colleague of mine during my Barclays life.
塞缪尔在加入代数资本之前，曾在巴克莱银行旗下的儿童投资基金工作。
Samuel has been in Barclays, the children's investment fund, before joining Algebras.
正如你们多数人所知，特别是在欧洲，代数资本在次级债务领域尤为专业，尤其擅长金融和企业债。
And as most of you have heard, particularly in Europe, Algebras are specialists in subordinated debt particularly financial and also the corporates.
他们以持有相对较大规模的次级债务而闻名。
They are well known for their relatively large holdings in subordinated debt.
塞缪尔是全球信用机会基金的投资组合经理。
Samuel is a portfolio manager in the global credit opportunities fund.
欢迎山姆。
Welcome Sam.
早上好，马赫什。
Good morning Mahesh.
那么，我们就直接进入正题吧。
So, we are going to hit the ground running.
各位目前如何看待次级债务的风险？
How are you guys thinking about subordinated debt risk now?
稍后我们会讨论差异化问题。
We will come to differentiation later on.
但考虑到当前利差水平以及优先债与次级债之间的利差压缩，你们现在如何看待次级债务？
But given where spreads are and given the compression between senior and sub, how are you guys thinking about sub debt now?
我认为从宏观层面看信用利差，所有迹象都表明市场处于紧缩且估值过高的状态。
I think when you look at credit spreads from a macro level, everything points to the market being tight and expensive.
所以这确实无法避免。
So there's really no way around that.
对吧？
Right?
总体来看，市场行情紧张。
Overall, the market is tight.
不过在这个领域里，结合你提到的几点，仍存在相对低估甚至绝对低估的局部机会。
However, within that world and some of these points you've mentioned, there are pocket pockets of relative cheapness and even some absolute cheapness.
就金融领域的相对低估而言，AT1债券显然被归入次级债范畴。
In terms of relative cheapness in the financial space, AT1 is obviously, you know, lumped in the subordinate space.
但在AT1债券领域，你获得的主要是3P评级风险，却能收获高收益回报。
But in the AT1 space, you're getting, you know, mostly triple p triple p rated type of risk and getting high yield returns.
可以说AT1债券的利差处于历史低位，但相比其他品种仍显便宜。
So you can say that AT one risk is at historical tights in terms of spreads, yet they remain cheap relative to everything else.
因此我们继续持有这些债券，并且看好它们的结构设计。
So, you know, we continue to own those bonds, and we like the structure of these bonds.
我们认可底层银行的信用资质，这点稍后可以再讨论。
We like the the credit worthiness of the underlying banks, and we can come back to that.
但AT1债券相比其他品种确实仍显便宜。
But AT1's definitely continues to see to be cheap relative to everything else.
那么整体高收益债市场呢？企业高收益债情况如何？
Now what about high yield in general, corporate high yield?
你也提到BB级债券利差非常紧张，这点我完全同意。
Again, you mentioned that double B risk is very tight and, you know, I agree with that.
但在单B和CCC级债券领域，我们全年都看到了相当多的机会。
But in the single B and also triple C space, we've seen a fair amount of opportunities all along this year.
我不会说机会遍地都是，整个市场并不便宜，而且这个市场确实出现过意外。
I wouldn't say there was a sea of opportunities, and the whole market wasn't cheap, and there have been definitely accidents in that market.
但在单B或CCC级领域内，我们确实发现了一些机会。
But within the single b or triple c space, we've seen opportunities.
比如在技术面上我们看到过机会，例如一支发行不顺利的单B级债券。
We've seen opportunities in, for example, technicals, for example, a single B bond that wasn't placed well.
对吧？
Right?
当时很容易做空，后来也确实被抛售了。
And it was easy to short and it's sold off.
现在我们觉得其中某些债券已经显现出价值。
And now we think there's some value in some of these names.
还有一些进入或退出重组的债券，它们缺乏天然的归属领域。
Or names entering or exiting restructurings, where, you know, the natural it doesn't have a really natural home.
所以这些债券我们也看到了价值。
So, we've also seen value in those.
总的来说市场行情紧张，但我们仍在次级债领域持续发现个别机会。
So, you know, overall, the market is tight, but we continue to see some individual opportunities in the subordinate space.
不过这些机会确实稀少且分散。
But it's, you know, few and far between, I would say.
好的。
Okay.
那么让我们深入探讨一下你刚才提到的一些观点。
So let's dig into some of the statements you just said.
首先是，你说80开头的股票现在看起来仍然很便宜。
So the first one is, you said 80 one's still looking cheap right now.
是因为——我这个问题可能有点冒昧——是因为你们有一只81基金所以必须买入80开头的股票，还是说你们的整体基金也持有80开头的股票？
Is it because, I am going to cheeky in this question, is it because you guys have an 81 fund and you have to buy 80 one's in it or are you holding 80 one's your overall fund as well?
而且你们在81上是超配的。
And there you are overweight 81.
我们这么说吧。
Let's put it that way.
是的。
Yeah.
显然我们在金融基金中持有80开头的股票，但在我共同管理的全球信贷机会基金里，我们也持有80开头的股票，因为我们觉得它们相对便宜。
So, we obviously own 80 one's in our financial funds, but in the Global Credit Opportunities Fund that I co manage, we also own 80 one's because we think, you know, they are relative cheap.
对吧？
Right?
我宁愿持有GSAFI的AT1债券。
I'd rather be in an AT one of a GSAFI.
对吧？
Right?
比如法国巴黎银行、桑坦德银行这样的大型银行，而不是那些利润率被挤压的工业公司发行的双B级债券。
Of a BNP, of a of a large you know, of Santander, rather than be in, you know, in a double b of a industrial company where margins are getting squeezed.
而且我甚至不确定——我不确定未来两年会发生什么，那些公司的盈利能力在未来两年将非常难以预测。
And I'm not even sure what I'm not sure what, you know, what's gonna happen over the next two years and where profitability is very difficult to model over the next two years.
所以它们不仅在价差方面相对便宜，我认为从公司的基础质量来看也是如此。
So not only are they cheap in the, you know, in relative value in terms of spread, but also, I think, in terms of underlying quality of of the companies.
要知道，如果你仔细思考2025年，我们都知道2025年的危机实际上还未结束。
You know, if you if you just think through 2025, we know we've had, you know, the crisis of twenty twenty five isn't really done yet.
对吧？
Right?
关税问题才刚刚开始显现影响。
The tariff issues were really just starting to feel it.
对吧？
Right?
因为大部分关税实际上是在夏季开始实施的。
Because most of the tariffs really entered over the summer.
其中一些仍在谈判中。
Some of them are still up for negotiation.
如果你观察某个行业，比如汽车或汽车供应商领域。
And if you see, you know, a sector, for example, autos or the auto supplier space.
对吧？
Right?
这些公司的EBIT利润率只有个位数。
These are companies that have, you know, low single digit EBIT margins.
对吧？
Right?
所以稍有风吹草动它们就可能开始出现问题。
So it doesn't take much for them to start having issues.
到目前为止，他们确实表现得相当不错。
So so far, they've actually done quite well.
是的。
Yep.
而且，你知道，他们表现良好，但要预测他们在未来一两年内的表现非常困难。
And and, you know, they've they've they've performed well, but it's very hard to model how they're gonna do over the next, you know, one, two years.
关税问题，以及更多中国公司进入欧洲带来的竞争。
The issue of tariffs, more competition from Chinese companies coming into Europe.
我的意思是，有一大堆原因使得建模非常困难，相比之下，像GCFE这样的银行，你获得的回报更高，比如以法国巴黎银行为例，你能清楚知道它未来五年的收益会怎样。
I mean, there's a whole bunch of issues why it's very difficult to model, and versus a GCFE bank, right, where you're getting paid more, and where, you know, I'm just taking one with BNP, you know, what's gonna be BNP's earnings over the next five years?
你对这个有相当清晰的预期。
You have a pretty good idea of it.
对吧？
Right?
我只是在想，不具体点名，但任何大型GCFE机构都是如此，因为这些机构资本充足。
And I'm just thinking that not name, but any big GCFE name, because these names are well capitalized.
不良贷款非常少。
Very few NPLs.
对吧？
Right?
你可以，你知道，我们可以一直讨论不良贷款的问题，但目前确实非常少。
You can, you know, we could play around NPLs and talk about NPLs all we want, but they're very few right now.
因此，我们认为这是一个相对较好的价值选择。
And so we, you know, we think it's a good relative relative value.
所以如果你愿意，我们宁愿做自己的长期贝塔。
So we'd rather be own long beta if you want.
通过这些80档的贝塔风险，然后挑选，对吧，单个单个的信用。
Beta risk through these 80 ones and then pick, right, single single credits.
所以如果你没问题的话。
So if you okay.
既然你提到了贝塔的一种看法，我正想问这个问题，就是81档与优先档的比例。
One way of looking at beta now that you mentioned it, I was about to ask this question anyway, which is the 81 to senior ratio.
你相信吗？
Do you believe that?
我是说显然优先档本身已经压缩了。
I mean obviously senior itself has compressed.
所以，不要认为这个比例处于历史最紧水平，但即便如此，尽管优先档压缩，我认为这个比例一直在下降。
So, don't think the ratio is at some all time tights but even nevertheless, despite senior compression, I think the ratio has been going down.
你同意吗？
Do you agree?
而且你认为即使在这些水平上，这个机会仍然有吸引力吗？
And do you believe that even at these levels, the opportunity is still compelling?
是的。
Yeah.
听着，显然金融市场是一个非常大且深的市场。
Look, so obviously the financial is a very large and deep market.
对吧？
Right?
因此我们的投资覆盖整个资本结构。
So we we invest across the whole cap capital structure.
我想说，我们讨论过AT1领域总体上是有趣的，但显然，这完全取决于具体的债券选择。
I would say that, you know, we talked about AT1 space being overall interesting, but obviously, it's all down to also bond specific bond picking.
对吧？
Right?
和其他人一样，我们青睐那些来自高盈利性、资本充足银行的AT1债券，特别是那些具有高重置利率的个券。
So, like everybody else, we like, you know, the bonds, AT ones of of banks that are that that have a high profitability, that have a a lot of capital, that have and then individual bonds that have a high reset.
对吗？
Right?
但在结构较差的AT1与交易价差较大的优先债之间，我们更倾向于优先债。
But between a, you know, a less well structured 81 versus a senior that's trading wide, you know, we like seniors.
没错。
Right.
所以我们本质上并不固守资本结构的任何特定部分。
So we're not, you know, we're not fundamentally married to any one part of the cap stack.
资本结构内部的相对价值才是关键。
Relative value within the Capsac is important.
因此，如果优先债价格低廉，我们就会投资优先债。
So, if a senior is cheap, we will invest in senior.
总的来说，虽然你们看好AT1，但这仍是需要逐家银行、逐个结构具体分析的情况。
So, overall, yes, you like 81, but it is still a bank by bank story and a structured by structured story.
这完全是个券层面的分析。
It's very much a bond by bond story.
是的。
Yeah.
好的，这引出了下一个问题。
Okay, now that brings us to the next question.
现在对于81号资产类别来说，竞争对手自然是银行优先债，这点我们已经讨论过了。
Now the competing asset class for 81, of course it is Bank Senior, we have addressed that.
就是公司混合债，而你们在这方面也是主要参与者。
Is corporate hybrid and you guys are pretty big players in that too.
你们如何看待AT1债券和公司混合债的利差收窄现象？
Now how are you guys seeing AT1s have compressed, corporate hybrids have compressed.
AT1相对于优先债，公司混合债相对于公司优先债，AT1相对于银行优先债。
AT1 to senior and corporate hybrid to corporate senior, AT1 to bank senior.
如果观察这些相对比率等因素，你们如何看待这两个竞争性资产类别？
If you look at that relative ratios and so on, how are you seeing those two competing asset classes?
作为一个类别，你们更倾向
And as a class, which one do
现在偏好哪一种？
you prefer now?
今年公司混合债市场增长显著。
So the corporate hybrid market has grown a lot this year.
没错。
Yeah.
需要强调的是，欧洲和美国市场都是如此。
Both in Europe and in The US, it's important to say.
从某种程度上说，美国的公司混合市场才刚开始两三年，对吧，因为最新的评级机构报告及其处理方式。
And in a way, the corporate hybrid market in The US has only started two, three years ago, right, because of the latest ratings agency reports and how they treat it.
是啊。
Yeah.
所以这个市场增长得很快。
So that's been growing a lot.
不像欧洲，我们已经有段时间了。
Unlike Europe where we had it for some time.
确实很长一段时间了。
Really long, some time.
所以这是个非常值得投资的有趣市场。
So that's been a very interesting market to invest in.
我们在欧洲和美国都看到令人鼓舞的现象，绝大多数进入该市场的公司都是应该进入这个市场的企业。
And we've been encouraged in Europe and in The US that the vast majority of people, of companies tapping that market have been companies that should be tapping their market.
具体来说就是公用事业公司、电力公司、大型工业企业，这与我们在欧洲有时看到的情况不同——那里的小型德国中型企业会一次性进入市场后就再也不回来，最后违约。
So specifically utilities, power companies, very large industrials, as opposed to what we've seen in Europe sometimes, where small Mittelstand German companies were tapping that market one off, and then never again, and then defaulted.
我们在美国和欧洲看到的是，很多供给都来自有正当需求的公司，它们有非常具体的目的，对吧，为了获取权益内容，而不是非常投机地一次性操作。
What we're seeing is in The US and in Europe, think a lot of the supply has been coming from proper companies that need it for a very specific reason, right, to get the equity content and not being very opportunistic and one and done.
就像过去的好日子一样。
Like good old days here.
正是如此。
Exactly.
那时这个市场才有真正的发行。
Then we had proper issuance in that market.
是的。
Yeah.
所以这挺好的。
So that's been good.
现在，你看，那个市场已经大幅收紧。
Now, look, again, that market has tightened a lot.
对。
Yeah.
要知道，我认为目前企业混合型市场的吸引力对我们来说已经有所减弱。
You know, I think it's come to a level where, you know, we're slightly less we have a slightly less appetite for that for the for the for the corporate hybrid market right now.
再次强调，发行方的资质我认为是好的，但这些发行方也需经历一些周期性波动。
You know, again, the quality of the issuers, I think, is good, but these are issuers also that are to go through some cyclicality.
对吧？
Right?
公用事业领域的许多发行方正因电气化、人工智能等原因大规模投资资本支出，我们都知道其中存在的风险。
A lot of these issuers in the utility space are investing massively in CapEx for obvious reasons to do with electrification, AI, etcetera, and we all know the risks are around it.
对吗？
Right?
所有这些资本支出都是必需的吗？
Will all that CapEx be needed?
所有这些资本支出都能正确投入吗？
Will all that CapEx be invested correctly?
所以并非没有风险。
So it's not without risk.
这并非没有风险。
It's not without risk.
所以目前他们显然正在利用市场机会，你知道，因为他们有能力也应该这么做。
And so right now, they're obviously tapping the market and you know, because they can and they should.
但让我们看看它实际执行起来会如何发展。
But let's see how it actually executes over time.
所有项目都能成功吗？
Will all the projects work?
他们的交易对手会到位吗？
Will their counterparties be there?
我们对在当前水平买入持略微谨慎态度，但总体而言，发行质量让我们感到非常惊喜。
We're slightly more wary about buying at current levels, but again, overall, we've been very pleasantly surprised by the quality of the issuance.
没错。
Right.
那么显然，就当前世界形势来看，次级金融债比次级公司债更受青睐？
So clearly, it looks like a subordinated financial, given the state of the world, is a better preference than a subordinated corporate?
我认为目前确实如此。
I think today, yes.
是的。
Yeah.
目前是。
Today.
好的。
Okay.
我明白。
I get that.
是的。
Yeah.
现在的问题是，除了公司自身风险外，还存在其他风险，即两者的延期风险。
Now the question is, there is other risks other than the company risk itself, which are extension risks in both of them.
现在与其说是信用问题，不如说是利率问题？
Now is less a credit issue but more of a rates issue?
然而，与当初发行这些AT1或混合资本工具时相比，当前基础收益率已大幅提高。
Nevertheless, the fact that underlying yields are so much higher now compared to when quite a few of these have been issued either AT1 or corporate hybrid.
考虑到这不仅关乎声誉，你们如何看待这两个领域的延期风险？
How are you guys seeing extension risk in both given that it is not just reputation, isn't it?
因为除了声誉因素，还存在实际丧失股权处理等问题。
Because there is reputation aspect but there is actual loss of equity treatment and so on and so forth.
那么你们如何看待这两个领域的交换和风险？
So how are you guys looking at exchange and risk in both these sectors?
这非常有趣，因为我们正在讨论美国混合资本市场的诞生，美国投资者和发行者更多是从经济角度看待它。
It is very interesting because we were talking about the birth of The US corporate hybrid market and The US investors and US issuers look at it much more on economic basis.
对吧？
Right?
这更多不是声誉问题。
It's less of a question of reputation.
是的。
Yeah.
投资者理解这一点，发行人也理解这一点。
And investors understand it, issuers understand it.
是的。
Yeah.
所以我认为，如果你最终选择展期或不赎回，那种所谓的耻辱标记会少一些。
And so I I think there's less that, you know, red, you know, mark of shame if you end up extending or not calling.
对吧？
Right?
因此，这是一种略有不同的策略，而且显然这是一个巨大的市场。
So so there, it it's it's a slightly different approach, and it's obviously a massive market.
我们该如何看待这个问题？
How do we think about it?
我认为在这个市场中，我们必须保持谦逊，不要自以为能预知未来五年会发生什么。
I think again, I think we in in this market, you really have to be humble and try to, you not think you know what's going to happen over the next five years.
因此，单只债券的选择很重要。
And so single bond choice is important.
对吧？
Right?
选择正确的结构。
Getting the right structures.
今年美国混合市场的一些案例证明，债券结构的好坏直接决定了其交易表现的优劣。
And it's worked out, you know, in a number of there's been a number of issues this year in The US hybrid markets where, you know, the structure of the bond made all the difference between the ones that trade well and the ones that didn't trade well.
那么我是否担心展期风险呢？
So am I worried about extension risk?
我是说，这就是购买这些东西时我们要承担的风险。
I mean, that's the risk we're taking when you're buying these.
但作为一名投资者，你真的需要知道在什么时候该喊停，知道在什么情况下结构不再合理，并选择那些结构能为你提供保护的债券。
But as an investor, you really need to, you know, know at what point to say stop and just to invest in, you know, at what point does the structures not make sense anymore and to choose the bonds where the structure you're protecting against it.
对吧？
Right?
而且我认为，这里还存在一个界限，当你按面值购买时，你会希望它在面值附近交易，这时候像阶梯利率这样的结构就非常重要。
And I think in in you know, also, there's the kind of the no man's line between when you're buying stuff at par, you know, you kind of hope it trades around par and the structure is very important around, you know, step ups.
但你也知道，我们显然也会折价购买。
But there's also you know, we also obviously buy stuff at a discount.
对吧？
Right?
是的。
Yes.
所以当债券折价足够大时，我非常乐意购买欧洲的，比如欧洲房地产方面的债券。
And so when the bond is discounted enough, I'm very happy to buy European for example, in European real estate side.
对吧？
Right?
我们看到混合债券试图折价。
We saw hybrids that try to discount.
在那里，你可以购买永续收益率达到10%的混合债券。
There, you could buy hybrids where your yield to perpetuity was 10%.
是啊。
Yeah.
你知道吗？
And there, you know what?
我不在乎，从没给我打过电话。
I don't care, never called me.
知道吗？
You know?
我对这个资产基础感到非常满意。
I was very comfortable with the asset base.
所以你看，哪里还能买到这样的债券——虽然无担保，但有合理的贷款价值比，还能永远以10%复利增长。
And so, you know, where else can you buy a bond where you actually, you know, are not secured, but you have acceptable LTV and you can compound it 10% forever.
是啊。
Yeah.
但这是次级债券。
But it's a subordinated bond though.
所以，没错。
So, yeah.
本质上问题在于，你要在那些保持面值的债券中做选择，并认为它们会维持在面值附近。
So, essentially, the way the issue is you pick your choice between the bonds that are stay at par and you think they stay around par.
但同时也要抓住机会，当它们暴跌到一定程度时，你就不再考虑赎回收益率，而是看永续收益率，而且永续收益率依然诱人。
And then, but also be opportunistic when they actually crash enough and where you stop looking them at yield to call and start looking them at yield to perp, and they still attractive on yield to perp.
说到这个，我认为你们需要分析的关键问题是判断它是否具有持续经营能力。
And and there, I think your big question would be you guys would analyze and see if it is going to be a going concern.
没错。
Correct.
这才是重点。
That's that's the main thing.
对吧？
Right?
正确。
Correct.
是的。
Yes.
我们解决了延期风险。
We address the extension risk.
你们对延期风险怎么看？
How do you guys think about deferral risk as well?
因为这和延期风险略有不同，因为在两种结构中，理论上都可能存在利息延期支付的情况？
Because that's slightly different from extension risk because in both structures, there could theoretically be coupon deferrals?
是的。
Yeah.
听着。
Look.
我认为延期风险更多是市场强制或市场驱动的。
I I think whereas extension risk can be more kind of market imposed or market driven.
正确。
Correct.
对吧？
Right?
这可以作为一个选择。
This can be a choice.
我认为，你知道，票息风险归根结底就是信用风险。
I think I think, you know, coupon risk is really down to credit risk.
是的。
Yes.
对吧？
Right?
没错。
Yeah.
所以在那里，它更像是...它较少受宏观或市场驱动，因此你需要做好功课。
And so there, it's more of a kind of a it's less of a macro or market driven, and so you need to do your work.
对吧？
Right?
显然这是我们投资时会考虑的问题，以确保我们不会投资那些我们认为会跳票的公司，但这其实是个体化的微观分析。
It's obviously something we think about when we invest to make sure that we don't invest in companies we think are gonna skip a coupon, but but that's really individual, you know, micro analysis.
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对吧？
Right?
而不是仅仅押注在NASA等级上。
As opposed to just call on the NASA class.
对。
Right.
那么关键要点。
So key takeaway.
票息递延风险主要是信用风险，而延期风险在当前利率环境下可能成为宏观市场风险。
Coupon deferral risk is heavily credit risk while extension risk could be, I mean in this sort of environment particularly could be a macromarket risk given where rates are.
因此我认为我们已经相当深入地探讨了混合市场。
So I think we have addressed the hybrid markets in reasonable depth.
在这些混合领域中，您是否有任何地区偏好？
Do you have any regional preferences in both these hybrid sectors?
有没有需要避开的具体国家结构或信用？
Any country with specific structures or credits to avoid?
我的意思是，我不想具体点名，那样可能过于细致了。
I mean, I don't want to get a single name because it might be too too detailed.
没有。
No.
没有。
No.
我...你知道，我认为这是个流动性很强的市场。
I I you know, I think it's a very fluid market.
对吧？
Right?
在这一年过程中，美国市场非常有趣，欧洲也出现了一些很有意思的发行。
So over the over the course of the year, you know, The US market has been very interesting, and then there's been some very interesting issues in Europe.
此外我们还遇到过反向扬基债券的情况。
So and then we've had reverse Yankees.
对吧？
Right?
我们在欧洲发行美元债券。
We have US issuing in Europe.
这也是一系列机遇中的机会。
That's also been an opportunity a set of opportunity an opportunity set.
这是一个深度大市场，机会组合会随时间变化，但我们并不特别绑定任何一方。
So, it's a deep market, it's a large market, and the opportunity set will change over time, but we're not married to anyone in particular.
对。
Right.
为听众做个重要对比：AT1市场仍以美元为主。
One important contrast for the benefit of our listeners is the AT1 market is still majority dollars.
尽管近期美国企业混合债兴起，但企业混合债市场仍以欧元为主导，尤其是这些反向扬基债等。
But the corporate hybrid market despite the advent of The US corporate hybrids recently is still reasonably Euro dominated particularly with these reverse Yankees and so on.
但关键在于，随着越来越多美国大发行方进入美元企业混合债市场，很可能会超越欧元市场。
But the point is I think that might change with more and more large US issuers issuing in the dollar corporate hybrid market, there is every chance that it might cross Euros.
不过在81领域绝对是美元主导的市场。
But in eighty one's it is definitely a dollar heavy market.
这就引出了下一个问题：高收益债与IGN的评级分级问题。
So that brings us to the next question which is this high yield versus IGN which rating bucket question.
我们的观点是，近期由于BB级交易在市场上过于拥挤，导致单B级债券相比BB级开始显得便宜。
Our opinion is that recently given this BB crowded trade in the market, it has led to a bit of a dislocation that the single B bucket is starting to look cheap to BBs.
CCC级债券虽然便宜但有其原因。
CCCs are cheap but they are for a reason.
显然这需要大量的信用分析工作。
Obviously that requires a lot of credit work.
但单B级债券开始显得便宜，而三B级相对于单A级和双B级来说极其紧张。
But single Bs are starting to look cheap and triple Bs are extremely tight relative relative to to single a and relative to double b.
这正是推动投资级投资者转向双B级的原因，使得双B级相对于单B级显得溢价。
That is what is pushing IG guys into double b, causing double b's to look rich relative to single b's.
你同意吗？
Do you agree?
是的。
Yeah.
所以我们不太关注评级。
So so we we we don't look so much on on the ratings.
我们不是特别受评级驱动的。
We're not very ratings driven.
所以我得承认，我没把所有时间花在那上面。
So I I have to admit, I I don't spend all my time on that.
可能在单B级方面，我可能稍微不太同意你的观点。
Maybe on the single b on the single b front, maybe I would, you know, agree maybe a bit less with you.
我认为单B级当然非常信用敏感。
I think the single b front is very credit Of course.
当然。
Of course.
我想你还是在买入一篮子单B级债券。
I think you're still, you know, buying just a basket of single b.
这不是我们会采取的做法。
It's not something we would, you know, we would do.
我认为你真的需要在这些方面下功夫，因为它们有的表现良好，有的涨幅很大，有的可能很快就会下跌。
I think you really need to do your work in those because some of them are doing well, some of them are way up, and some could be on their way down pretty quickly.
所以也许，你知道，也许是你的观点。
So maybe, you know, maybe your view.
我认为关于这个BBB/BB评级的争论中，有趣的是对于那些评级驱动的、在某种意义上，你知道我们一直关注的是CLO分层的部分。
I think what's interesting on on on this triple b double b debate is for those that are, you know, ratings driven and and in in some sense, you know, you know, we always keep an eye on that is what about CLO tranches.
对吧？
Right?
CLO分层的成本比那些都要低得多。
CLO tranches are much cheaper to any of those.
对吧？
Right?
所以现在BBB评级的CLO分层在初级市场上大约是3.10美元，可以这么说，新发行的。
So triple b triple b CLO tranches today in your primary are around $3.10, call it, new issue.
是的。
Yeah.
是的。
Yeah.
是的。
Yeah.
这超级便宜。
That's super cheap.
这一点毫无争议。
The there's no debate about that.
唯一的问题是，我去参加会议时，现在我们有一位证券化策略师。
Well, the only problem is I when I go to meetings, I mean, now we have a securitization strategist.
我们的前巴克莱同事丽塔·贝克曼，他现在和我们一起工作。
Rita Backman, our ex Barclays colleague, he's with us.
他的研究范围包括CLO、ABS和担保债券。
CLO, ABS, covered bonds is his coverage.
所以当我去参加会议或活动时，我会谈论这就是CLO的世界。
So when I go to meetings or events and I talk about that this is the CLO world.
AAA级CLO仍然能给你120到130的回报，具体取决于情况。
AAA CLO still pays you 120 five-one 130 depends.
哪种AAA级产品能给你这样的回报？
Which AAA pays you that?
没错。
Correct.
对吧？
Right?
但大多数人无法投资这些产品。
But most people can't invest in them.
他们的投资授权不允许低评级产品，如果要投资这些产品还需要单独的监管规定等等。
Their mandates don't allow for low product, they need to have its own separate regulation if you need to invest in them and so on.
他们大多数都不能投资。
Most of them can't.
能投资的机构都是全力以赴的。
The ones that can are full on.
他们确实没有做其他事情，因为何必呢？
They they don't they don't do anything else because why would you?
从评级表现来看，CLO市场确实轻松胜过其他所有选择。
On a on a ratings real well basis, the CLO market beats everything else hands down.
是的。
Yeah.
而且我认为，如果你看看全球那些大型信贷机会基金，会发现其中很多都在账面上持有相当比例的CLO风险。
And and I and I think that if you look at the large credit opportunities fund of this world, right, you'll find that a lot of them have a fair amount of CLO risk in their books.
没错。
Correct.
正是出于这个原因。
Exactly for that reason.
考虑到企业债领域双B/三B级与CLO领域的相对价值严重失衡——如果你必须做宏观评级判断，只要条件允许，就应该通过CLO领域来实现。
Think that the relative value, double b, triple b within the corporate world versus CLO land is so out of whack that if you have to take a macro call and ratings, if you can, if you can, do it through the through the through the through CLO space.
不。
No.
那个...那个结构性产品特指CLO。
That that that structured product specifically CLO.
嗯。
Mhmm.
我不会对ABS等其他产品下同样结论，因为它们利差太窄了。
I I won't say the same about ABS and so on because those are too tight.
我的意思是，如果你从事信贷业务且能操作CLO，我认为CLO的三A级产品始终是风险调整后收益最佳的信贷产品，只是人们无法操作罢了。
I mean, if you are in in credit and you can do CLO, I said, the triple A CLO in my opinion has been best risk adjusted return credit product of all time, but people can't do it.
昨天我有个客户，我们在讨论这件事，那个人当时在瑞士银行。
So yesterday I had a client and we were discussing that and that man was in a Swiss bank.
他是瑞士客户，当时正在处理银行持有的贷款和CLO资产。
He is a Swiss client and he was in a work through of the loan and CLO holdings that the bank had.
那时候是2009年，AAA级CLO的市场价格大概是85左右。
At that time, this is 2009, see AAA CLOs, the market prices were like 85 and so on.
人们都在担心会发生什么？
People are worried that what will happen?
这些钱都没问题。
All of them money good.
所以，别想资本利得了，Euribor加135个基点。
So, forget capital gain, Euribor plus 135.
谁会付钱给你？
Who pays you there?
没有其他资产类别了。
There is no other asset class.
但我想我们说的是市场上那些不能投资CLO的普通投资者。
But I think we are talking about all the vanilla players in the market who can't invest in CLO.
于是我做了个投资者调查。
So I conduct an investor survey.
我逼着塞缪尔填了问卷。
I forced Samuel to fill it.
调查结果显示，因为参与者多是实钱投资者，有个评级问题：你喜欢哪个评级区间？
The answer in that, because it is heavily real money guys, there is a rating question Which rating bucket do you like?
超配，非常超配，超配，中性，低配，非常低配，而答案显然是压倒性的BB级。
Overweight, very overweight, overweight, neutral, underweight, very underweight and the answer there is overwhelming BB.
我认为这清楚地证明了BB级交易有多么拥挤。
And I think that clearly proves how much of a crowded trade the BB trade is.
这个答案没有改变。
That answer hasn't changed.
BB级长期处于大幅超配状态。
It has been big time BB overweight for quite some time.
即使在2022年普京时期利差扩大时，人们基本上也在想，嘿，BB级能给我300基点以上的收益。
Even Putin period in 2022 when we had wider spreads, then people were essentially thinking, hey, BBs pay me 300 plus.
那为什么不选BB级呢？
So why not BB?
现在他们说，可能有些情况发生，所以即使BB级不支付，我还是想坚持BB级。
Now they are saying, there might be things going on So even though double Bs don't pay, I want to stick to double Bs.
因此，根据调查结果和信贷俱乐部人士的说法，这是一个被大量竞购的交易。
So given the survey result and given what the credit club's people said, it is a heavily bid trade.
这就引出了资产类别选择的议题。
That brings us to the asset class call.
高收益债 versus 投资级债。
High yield versus investment grade.
我知道你们其实并不在意。
I know you really don't care.
各位只在乎哪里有阿尔法收益，对吧？
You guys are wherever there is alpha, right?
但就你的资产配置和思考过程而言，考虑到当前利差水平，也许我该为听众们整理些数据。
But in terms of your allocation and your thought process, given where spreads are, Maybe I should reel up some stats for the benefit of my listeners.
那么，投资级债券，我们目前处于什么位置？
So, investment grade, where are we?
十月底的数据是77个基点。
End of the month October, 77 basis points.
利差3%，收益率4.5%，久期4.5年，标准化基础上我们处于1.37个标准差的高估区间。
Spread, 3% yield, 4.5 duration and on normalized basis we are 1.37 standard deviations rich.
所以基本上是负值。
So, minus basically.
高收益债券273个基点，收益率4.85%，久期2.8年——记得投资级债券久期是4.5年——处于负一个标准差，一个标准差的范围。
High yield, two seventy three basis points, 4.85% yield, 2.8 duration, remember investment grade 4.5 duration and minus one standard deviation, one standard deviation reach.
杠杆贷款，既然提到了高收益债券，杠杆贷款的折扣边际是471个基点。
Leveraged loans, because we mentioned high yield, leveraged loans, 471 basis points discount margin.
嗯。
Mhmm.
收益率6.9%。
6.9% yield.
久期大概是五到六个——五到五个半。
The the duration is probably about five and a half six, five and half.
不对。
No.
这个数值非常低。
It's very low.
对吧？
Right?
浮动利率。
A a floating rate.
对吧？
Right?
不对。
No.
不对。
No.
不对。
No.
我说的不是利率久期。
I'm not talking rate duration.
我说的是利差久期。
Spread duration.
我说对了。
I was right.
抱歉。
I'm sorry.
是的。
Yeah.
利差久期。
Spread duration.
最重要的是，便宜了1.26个标准差。
And most importantly, 1.26 standard deviations cheap.
特别是考虑到美国私人部门的爆雷及其对杠杆贷款市场的影响。
Because of especially given The US private blow up and the impact it had on the leveraged loan market.
那么选择哪类资产呢？
So which asset class?
顺便问一下，你们做贷款业务吗？
Do you guys do loans, by the way?
不做。
No.
我们管理的是USITS基金，而USITS基金按规定不能投资贷款。
We we manage USITS funds and USITS funds are not allowed to invest in loans.
所以还是聚焦在我们被允许投资的资产类别上。
So focusing on the on the asset class, we are allowed to invest.
我仍然会投票支持非投资级债券。
I would still vote in favor of non investment grade Yeah.
高收益债。
High yield.
这样选择的理由是，如果你纵观高收益债市场的整体质量，我认为它显然仍保持着相对较高的品质。
And the reason for that is if you look at the quality of the high yield market overall, it's obviously I think it's still relatively high quality.
对吧？
Right?
未来12到18个月内可能出现的违约情况，我认为大部分都已经被充分预警了。
All the defaults that will come over the next twelve, eighteen months, I think largely well flagged.
如果你想要的话，我们总会有一些惊喜的。
We'll always have one if you wanted to, you know, surprises.
但总的来说，我们都知道哪些是正确的。
But overall, we all know which ones Correct.
这些将会是默认选项。
Are are gonna default.
其中一些已经按此定价。
Some of them are priced to that.
有些可能太贵，但总体而言，我们知道违约率会是多少。
Some of them may be too expensive, but overall, we know what the default rate is gonna be.
是的。
Yeah.
或者我们知道提取交换的来源会是哪里。
Or we know where the extraction exchange is gonna come from.
因此我认为我们可以相当放心，明年的违约率可能在2%到3%之间。
And so I think we can save a fair amount of comfort that default rate may 2%, 3% next year.
正如你所说，在最坏的情况下，可能达到4%。
And as you said, maybe in worse, worst case scenario, 4%.
到目前为止，回收情况其实还不错。
Recoveries have actually been okay up to now.
所以祈祷吧，高收益债券相比投资级看起来仍然不错，我认为。
So fingers crossed, the high yield still looks okay versus IG, I would say.
是的。
Yeah.
为了让听众们了解，我们采用非常保守的模型来追踪违约数据，这是针对关注我们默认数据指数的用户。
So for the benefit of our listeners, people who follow our default data index, We track defaults with a very conservative model.
这实际上是一个模型，因为它遵循如何计算违约的特定规则。
It is actually a model because it follows a rule in terms of how to count defaults.
我们会立即将每只评级为D或SD的债券记为违约，因为我们不会等到它退出指数——因为到那时投资组合经理已经遭受损失。
We count every bond that has been rated a D or an SD immediately as a default because we don't wait for it to exit the index because by the time the PM has been burnt.
即使采用如此保守的标准，当前违约率是多少？
So even going that conservative, where is the default rate now?
过去十二个月的违约率约为2%。
Default rate is around 2% trailing twelve month.
潜在的违约风险在哪里？
Where are potential defaults?
可以从两个角度来看。
Two ways to look at it.
一种方法是观察定价。
One way is look at pricing.
如果看定价的话，存在很多困境债券吗？
And if you look at pricing, much distress?
困境债券占比不到2%。
Distress is under 2%.
困境债券加上压力债券共占4.5%。
Distress plus stress is at 4.5%.
如果通过债券质量来判断违约风险，可以看CCC-至C评级的债券。
If you look at quality to determine defaults, bonds rated CCC- to single C.
因为一旦达到CCC级及以上，违约概率就微乎其微了。
Because once you get to triple C and ahead the default probabilities are tiny.
所以，CCC-级及以下的债券全部加起来也只有2.5%的违约率。
So, triple C minus and below add all of them up they are 2.5%.
这是前瞻性数据。
This is forward.
如果把2.5%和2%相加（回溯数据），假设它们今天全部违约——正如我之前提到的——就是4.5%。
If you add the 2.5% to the 2%, backward looking, assume all of them default today as I mentioned already, 4.5.
因此，我很难预见明年高收益债会出现任何大规模的违约潮。
So, I struggle to see any sort of major default cycle in high yield next year.
我的意思是，除非发生真正的宏观经济危机才可能出现这种情况。
I mean we really need a proper macroeconomic crisis for that to happen.
所以没错，违约数字将会保持在低位。
So yeah, the default numbers are going to be low.
因此明年和今年一样，在利率条件允许的情况下，高收益债的表现应该会优于投资级债券。
So next year also, like this year, you should expect high yield to do the number on investment grade subject to.
不过有个区别——这取决于利率走势。
There is one difference though, subject to rates.
记住，77个基点的投资级债券正日益成为利率敏感型产品。
So remember, IG at 77 is increasingly becoming a rates product.
是的。
Yes.
这是个严重问题，因为利率已达2.6%-2.7%。
It is a huge problem because the is at 2.6%, 2.7.
IG债券的收益率是3%。
Ig yield is 3%.
在这3%中，只有77%是利差。
Out of the 3% only 77% is spread.
剩下的2.3%、2.4%才是实际收益率。
The remaining 2.3%, 2.4% is yield.
所以当收益率变动时，你现在对利率市场的波动实际上要敏感得多。
So, yields move, you are actually a lot more sensitive to what's happening in the rates market now.
是的，但过去两年我们确实看到大量资金流入信用基金，包括投资级和非投资级的。
Yeah, but I we've seen a lot of inflows to obviously credit funds, IG, non IG over the last two years.
对吧？
Right?
而且这种趋势似乎永无止境。
And it seems to be never ending.
不过我理解。
But I understand.
我非常理解散户投资者的心态。
I I absolutely understand retail.
近十年来，他们一直只能获得0%的收益。
For almost ten years, they were getting 0%.
储蓄账户的收益率是0%。
0% on their savings.
现在你给他们3%、4%甚至4.5%的收益，他们当然会为此高兴——这也是应该的，毕竟他们之前只能拿到零收益甚至负收益。
So now you give them 3%, 4%, four and a half percent, you know, they're happy for they're happy to get that, which they should because they were getting zero or even negative.
是的。
Yeah.
所以如果他们有钱存着，还能从哪里，还能从哪里获得那种，你知道的，获得那种收益呢？
So so if they have money aside, where else are gonna where else can they get that, you know, get that get that yield?
对吧？
Right?
你知道，信贷仍然是我们实际上可以，你知道的，通过储蓄赚些钱的方式。
You know, credit remains a way we can actually, you know, make some money on your savings.
没错。
Correct.
所以我们看到所有这些资金流入是完全自然的，而且，显然，利率和信用利差之间的区别是我们作为市场专业人士所理解的。
So it's it's completely natural that we're seeing all these inflows, and and and, you know, obviously, the split between rates and credit spread is something that we understand as market professionals.
但我认为，你知道，大多数人只看利率，你知道的，总体收益率，而这仍然很有吸引力。
But I think, you know, most people just see what the rate, you know, overall yield, and it remains attractive.
是的。
Yes.
而且而且而且，你知道的，零售投资者在这方面的看法是对的。
And and and and, you know, and retail is right in that sense.
我认为机构投资者也是对的。
I think institutional is right as well.
如果你看看，我们已经讨论了其中的利差部分，但还有期限部分。
If you look at so we have addressed the carry part of it, but then there is the wall part of it.
所以，如果你看疫情后时期，利率总回报与信用超额回报的比较，因为那才是纯粹的信用部分。
So, if you look at post pandemic, rates total return versus credit excess return because that is the pure credit part of it.
利率总回报墙的波动性已增至三到四倍，具体取决于所考察的时期。
Rates total return wall has been three to four times more volatile depending on which period.
平均约三点五倍，目前约为三倍。
On average three and a half times, currently it is about three.
在某些糟糕时期，甚至达到四倍。
During some bad times, it has been like 4x.
顺便说一句，波动性高出四倍的产品反而支付更少收益，持续加杠杆的同时回报递减。
Four times more volatile product pays you less by the way, pays you less and continuously levers up.
这算哪门子信贷？
What sort of a credit is that?
因此，若您作为信贷投资者将利率视为信贷产品（这确实可行，毕竟它本质就是信贷产品），这些就是持续加杠杆的信贷。
So, if you are a credit investor looking at rates as a credit product, which you can by the way because it is a credit product at the end of the day, Those are credits that continuously lever up.
这些是持续产生亏损的信贷。
Those are credits that continuously make a loss.
考虑到这类信贷指标，您甚至没理由不投资正规信贷，
I mean, given that sort of credit metrics, why wouldn't you be in proper credit, even
所以你提出的这个辩论很有意思，我之前也和同事讨论过。
So so it's an interesting debate you put up here, which I had with some of my colleagues.
最近谷歌上市时，他们显然发行了整个收益率曲线，对吧？
When Google came to market very recently, right, they were issuing, obviously, the whole curve.
对。
Yeah.
而且他们显然是以欧元发行的。
And they were issuing in euros, obviously.
如你所知，他们大约做了150亿欧元。
As you know, they did about €15,000,000,000.
你可以购买，所以谷歌评级为AA或AA-。
And you could buy and so Google rated double a or double a minus.
对吧？
Right?
我们的发行范围比大多数主权国家都要广。
We're issuing wider than most sovereigns.
比所有欧洲主权国家都要广。
Most than all European sovereigns.
没错。
Correct.
对吧？
Right?
是的。
Yeah.
问题是，所以我与同事有过一场辩论。
The question was, so I had a debate with my colleague.
他说，我宁愿持有谷歌，因为他们能产生大量现金流——
Said, well, I'd rather own Google Than Because they generate a lot of cash-
是的。
Yeah.
而且至少在短期内具有可见性。
And have visibility, at least for a little while.
他们没有财政赤字。
They don't run a deficit.
这怎么说？
How about that?
比如说意大利的情况。
Versus Italy, for example.
对吧？
Right?
而他的论点是，意大利已经存在了几百年。
And his argument his argument was, yeah, well, Italy has been around for, you know, hundreds of years.
我不确定谷歌能否存在几百年。
I'm not sure Google will be here for hundreds of years.
而且，我觉得两种论点在某种程度上都是正确的，但有趣的是谷歌的定价范围竟然比那些评级较低的主权债券要宽泛得多
And, you know, I guess both arguments in a way are are are correct, but it it was interesting that Google was I I thought was was priced so so much wider
没错。
Correct.
在掉期交易中，其定价甚至优于一些评级较低的主权债券。
In swaps terms than less well rated sovereigns.
是的。
Yes.
人们反对我信用观点的一个常见理由是：为什么要借钱给持续亏损的公司？答案是它们可以印钞。
The one argument that people tend to have against my credit story, why would you lend to a company that continuously makes deficits is they can print.
这一点对美国来说确实成立。
Now that is true of The United States.
这在英国某种程度上也是成立的，尽管英镑并非结算货币。
That is true of The United Kingdom to a lesser extent even though it is not the result currency.
欧洲国家的情况并非如此。
Not true of the European countries.
我们已经有一个现成的案例。
We have had one case already.
希腊。
Greece.
顺便说一句，我刚去希腊度了个假。
I have just been to Greece on a holiday by the way.
不得不说那里经历了巨大的收入调整。
I have to say there has been a huge income adjustment.
中位数收入已经下降。
The median incomes have dropped.
这就是为什么你能看到大规模移民外流的现象。
That is why large scale immigration out of the country you can see.
所以没错，他们确实很好地走出了危机。
So yes, they have come out of the crisis well.
增长势头良好，但经历了结构性调整。
Growth is good but there has been a structural adjustment.
现在的问题是，欧洲国家无法印钞。
Now the question is, the European countries can't print.
欧洲央行将面临实施货币宽松和进一步量化宽松等政策的巨大压力。
There will be massive pressure on the ECB to do monetary easing and further QE etc.
等等。
Etc.
未经消毒。
Without sterilizing.
所以问题是，你现在借钱给意大利是可以的，那我们就别管意大利了。
So the question is, you lend to Italy right now is okay, so let's leave Italy.
你会借钱给法国还是借钱给谷歌？
Would you lend to France or would you lend to Google?
我认为答案很可能是谷歌，即使你去问一个利率专家。
I think the answer probably even if you ask a rates guy is probably Google.
你同意吗？
Do you agree?
听着，我是那一派的。
Look, I'm in that camp.
就我所承担的风险回报而言，我站在谷歌这边。
I'm on the Google camp for the kind of risk return I'm taking.
是的。
Yeah.
我们确实在第一次危机期间发布了一份关于法国的报告，结果非常惊人。
We did publish a deck on France during the first crisis and the answers are spectacular.
信贷在亏损期间表现优于利率，因为信贷、利率和股票在那次贝鲁特危机中都遭受了损失。
Credit, beat rates during the loss because credit, rates, equity all three lost during that Beirut crisis.
信贷的损失是利率的三分之一或四分之一，股票的十分之一。
Credit lost a third or a fourth of rates and a tenth of equity.
这是第一点。
That's the first thing.
第二点是边缘企业，是的，这些可怜的家伙表现逊于欧洲企业，无论是优先级还是次级债，但差距仅有八九个基点。
Second thing, fringe corporates, yes poor guys they underperformed European corporates both senior, no subordinated but only by eight-nine bips.
法国企业债表现远超法国国债，这个交易趋势已经持续了一年半到两年左右。
French corporates outperformed French guvy massively and that trade has been going on for like a year and a half two years already.
那么，为什么你不应该投资信用债呢？
So, why would not you be in credit?
现在补充一个问题：既然说的是企业债，那银行债表现如何？
Now, the addendum to that question is, hey that is corporates, how about banks?
法国银行债在最后阶段确实受到主权债的些许传染效应影响，但在此之前，法国银行优先级债相较欧洲银行优先级债实际上利差更窄，随后出现小幅落后，可能损失了约15-20个基点——其实不算多。但法国银行债对比法国国债，就像企业债一样呈现出同样的两年期交易趋势，表现大幅领先。
French banks in the last leg there was a bit of a contagion from the sovereign but before that French bank senior versus European bank senior they were actually trading tight then a little bit of underperformance they probably lost about fifteen-twenty basis points real well not much but French bank versus French sovereign The same two year trade as you saw in the corporates, massive outperformance.
我认为在企业债方面，市场已经意识到许多发行主体是大型跨国公司。
I think I think on the corporate side, I think the market has realized that a lot of these issuers are, you know, large international companies.
对吧？
Right?
正是如此。
Exactly.
这些公司虽然总部在法国，但业务遍布全球。
That are you know, that have a base in France, but they do business all over.
而且它们的生产基地遍布各地，能够灵活调整业务模式来适应变化。
And so and and, you know, they have manufacturing all over, and they have ability to rotate and to adapt their business model to that.
所以我不确定——虽然彭博终端上法国企业的代码标注着法国——
And so I'm not sure, you know, French corporates, whilst on the Bloomberg ticker, says France on it.
对吧？
Right?
他们真的是法国的吗？
Are they really French?
对吧？
Right?
他们与法国政府或法国预算的实际关联度有多高？
How much tied are they really to the French government or French budget?
没错。
Correct.
我的意思是，当我提到法国企业和法国银行时，我们采用的是风险国家标准，即他们的大部分收入来自法国，但并非100%。
I mean we go by, when I said French corporates and French banks, is by country of risk, which means a plurality of their revenue is from France, not 100%.
甚至算不上多数，对吧？
It is not even a majority, right?
但事实是，一是由于多元化，二是由于结构性控制。
But the fact remains, one due to diversification, two due to structural controls.
企业不能无节制借贷并造成结构性赤字。
Companies can't go on a borrowing binge and run structural deficits.
这是第二点。
That is two.
第三，他们会自然调节供应。
Three, they naturally calibrate supply.
你看看高收益市场的情况，特别是2022、2023、2024年，甚至今年——顺便说今年稍好一些——我们一直处于净供应为负的状态。
You look at what happened in the high yield market particularly 2022, 2023, 2024 and even this year by the way, this year is slightly better, we have run negative net supply.
因为在困难时期他们根本不会发行。
Because in difficult times they just don't issue.
当收益率差距过大时，他们就不会发行。
When yields are too wide, they just don't issue.
政府可不会这样。
Governments are not like that.
即使收益率上升，他们仍会发行。
If yields are up, they still issue.
结果就是，你的借贷成本，即偿还债务的利息支出，现在占了你预算的很大一部分。
And as a result, your borrowing cost, the interest cost of paying your debt is now a substantial portion of your budget.
对吧？
Right?
企业尤其是低评级企业不会出现这种情况，因为他们根本不会发行。
That doesn't happen with corporates, particularly the lower end because they just won't issue.
不。
No.
不。
No.
不。
No.
不。
No.
我们说过这些公司的质量，你知道的，从业务地域多样性到收入来源都很优质，而且法国信贷还有来自法国资产管理公司的真实技术性买盘。
We said the quality of these companies are, you know you know, they're high quality in terms of diversity of of where they're where where they do business, of their revenue flows, but also there's a real technical bid for French credits, right, from the from from French asset managers also.
我认为还存在一个结构性买盘。
I think there's I think there's also just a structural bid Yeah.
来自法国对法国信贷的需求，法国发行方因此受益，这对他们来说是好事。
From France for French credit, which, you know, French issuers benefit from and, you know, good for them.
是的。
Yeah.
但问题在于，法国投资组合经理对OAT债券等利率产品的买盘力度有多强。
But then the question is, how strong is the bid from French portfolio managers in rates for the OATs and so on.
不过我认为这个买盘也很强劲，因为根据监管规定，银行或保险公司需要在其投资组合中持有大量利率产品。
But I think that is pretty strong too because thanks to regulation, banks or insurers need to hold a load of rates in their portfolio.
同意吗？
Agree?
否则的话，OAT债券利差应该会大得多。
Otherwise, would suspect the OAT bond spread would be a lot wider.
所以我认为目前OAT债券利差已经相当大了。
So I think the OAT bond spread is quite wide now.
对吧？
Right?
我们现在的利差是70到80个基点，这已经相当大了。
Think we're we're the seventy, eighty bibs, so that's quite you know, that's quite wide.
我在这方面不是专家，但根据过去几年的传闻和讨论，我认为法国机构内部一直存在尽量少持有法国国债的倾向。
I'm not an expert in that, but I would say that over the last couple of years from hearsay, from discussions, I think that within the French establishment, there's been a desire to own less French government bonds as much as you could.
对吧？
Right?
是的。
Yeah.
知道有一天法国政府会拍拍你的肩膀说，嘿，伙计们，该买了。
Knowing that one day the French government would tap on your shoulder and say and say, hey, guys, time to buy.
所以当那一刻到来时，我认为法国的资产管理公司乃至整个机构宁愿...
And so when that tap arrives, I think French asset managers would rather, and institution in general
保留
Keep
有些人宁愿留些备用资金。
some would rather have some dry powder.
保留一部分。
Keep some part.
再次声明，这并不是我掌握了确切数据——我确信有人能拿出这些数字来证明，也许这可以成为你们下期播客用实际数据讨论的话题。
And again, this is not I have the I'm sure someone has those numbers to show it, maybe that's a topic for conversation with actual numbers for your next podcast.
但这只是我从讨论中得出的个人感觉。
But that's just my feeling from discussion.
是啊。
Yeah.
在我们结束主权危机及其影响的话题前，你的直觉是什么？
So before we close that sovereign crisis and impact, what's your gut feel?
法国会走上意大利的老路吗？就是经历重组然后...你知道意大利后来成了成功案例。
Is France going the Italy way in terms of getting restructured and then, you know, Italy has been a great success story.
对吧？
Yeah?
你知道的，法国在我心中有特殊地位，虽然你可能不知道，但我是法国人。
You know, I you know, France is close to my heart as as you may not know, but I'm French.
对吧？
Right?
所以在某种程度上，法国成了新的意大利。
So France is a new Italy in a way.
对吧？
Right?
几十年来，法国人一直嘲笑意大利政府每半年或每年就更迭一次。
For for many year for many decades, the French were mocking Italians for having, you know, governments fall every six months, every year.
你看看那些人。
You know, look at those.
他们根本管理不好政府。
They can't, you know, they can't manage them with governments.
简直一团糟。
It's a mess.
议会也是一团糟。
The parliament's a mess.
他们根本不知道自己在做什么。
They don't know what they're doing.
是啊。
Yeah.
显然，现在新总理马洛尼上任后，带来了秩序感和稳定感。
Obviously, now with the the new prime minister, Maloney, she has brought a sense of order, stability.
她似乎正在做出正确的决策，市场对此表示赞赏并给予了积极回应。
She seems to be doing the right making the right decisions, and the market is appreciating it and, you know, is responding to it.
在法国，遗憾的是，我感觉房间里没有成年人（指缺乏成熟的政治家）。
In France, unfortunately, I feel there there are no adults in the room.
如果你纵观整个政党和议会的分布情况，这算是我的一个小爱好，不仅是出于职业原因，也是出于了解不同政党的好奇心。
If you look at the whole if you look at the the whole spread of of the parties and the parliament and, you know, it's a little bit of a hobby of mine, not only for professional reasons, but, you know, just curiosity to understand the different parties,
正如亚历克西斯所说，他在上一期播客中暗示了一种博弈论，认为法国政客正在等待局面彻底崩溃。
how they really Alexis said the same sort of he hinted at a game theory in the last podcast that the French politicians are waiting for it to become an absolute unholy mess.
只有到那时他们才会进行改革。
Only then they will do reform.
不不不，那样也不行。
But but but then no.
我的意思是，我其实很想赞同他们的观点。
I mean I mean, for for I mean, I like to I like to agree with them.
我认为实际上根本没有人说对的话。
I think there's just no one there's actually no one saying the right thing.
对吧？
Right?
在大多数国家，总会有人站出来说：好吧。
In most countries, you have you have someone who come and say, okay.
让我们...稍微像个成年人的样子。
Let's, you know, let's be half an adult.
这种预算赤字是不可接受的。
This budgetary deficit is not acceptable.
我们需要削减开支，你知道，我们得削减某些方面。
We need to cut, you know, we need to cut something.
是啊。
Yeah.
你知道，我们的债务已经不可持续了。
You know, our debt is not sustainable.
我们必须为此采取行动。
We need to do something towards it.
在我看来，法国目前没有任何有影响力的人具备这种意识。
There's In my sense, there is no one with any type of traction in France that has that.
纵观整个政治光谱，极左派显然没有这种想法。
If you look across the space, right, extreme left, obviously, no.
社会党也没有。
The socialists, no.
有趣的是，极右翼国民阵线在夏天时曾试图传达他们可能是房间里最成熟的政党，关心财政赤字问题。
Extreme right, interestingly, national front, over the summer, they they made I think they were trying to communicate that, you know, they were maybe they they were the adult in the room, that they cared about deficits.
但几周后，他们现在明确表示如果当选，其政策本质上是社会主义的。
But a few weeks later, now they say, essentially, their their policies, if they're elected, they've been very clear, is socialist.
那还剩下谁？
So who's left?
对吧？
Right?
马克龙派，你知道的，他们搞得一团糟。
The Macronis, you know, they've been a mess.
对吧？
Right?
他们尚未证明自己具备治理国家的能力。
They haven't proved to be to be good to to to know how to govern the country.
所以我对法国非常悲观，因为连说正确话的人都没有，更别提有参选资格的人了。
So I'm I'm very, you know, I'm I'm very pessimistic about France because there's just no one who even is saying the right things, let alone is in a in a position to be elected.
所以在我看来，法国在总统大选前不会有任何变化，我们拭目以待。
So, you know, for me, France, nothing's gonna happen before the presidential elections, and let's see.
你要知道，政治领域里的两年可能像几个世纪那么漫长。
You know, two years in the political spaces, you know, can be centuries.
因此我期待在两年后的2027年大选中，能有某个新政党提出合理的政策纲领，在预算和债务问题上拿出切实可行的方案。
So I'm hopeful that in two years' time, for the twenty twenty seven elections, you know, one of the parties, a new party, whoever it is, comes up with a proper platform that, you know, makes sense in terms of budget issues, in terms of debt issues.
但目前为止，我还没看到这样的迹象。
But so far, I'm not seeing that.
听起来你其实还挺乐观的。
You're sounding quite hopeful, actually.
我比你更怀疑，因为法国的选举制度会通过筛选机制选出总统，但随后的议会选举又会陷入混乱——选票分散导致没有任何政党能获得绝对多数，其他党派只会不断争吵。
I am even more skeptical than you because thanks to the election system in in France, you will get a president obviously because of the filtering that they do but then when they have that parliamentary election this is the same mess because the vote is splintered and you are not going to get any party having near majority and all the other parties will bicker.
我认为整个西欧都面临这个问题。
I think Western Europe in general we have a problem.
没人敢公开宣称要削减你的转移支付，无论是养老金、福利、医疗还是特殊教育需求等方面的拨款。
Nobody is going to contest on the fact that oh I am going to cut your transfer paycheck that is coming whether it is a pension, whether it is a benefit, whether it is healthcare or whether it is a special education need or so.
没人会这么说。
Nobody is going to say that.
正因为没人会说出来，这事就办不成。
And because nobody is going to say that, it won't get done.
看。
Look.
我觉得马克龙，你知道，他刚进入政坛就迅速成功组建了自己的政党并赢得了选举，对吧，就在不久前。
I I think Macron, you know, when he he entered and he was very successful very quickly in building his own party and winning those elections, right, a while ago.
所以需要有人迅速站出来，既要赢得选举，又要赢得多数席位或组建联盟的能力，从而在议会中真正获得多数席位。
So someone needs to show up pretty quickly to be able to both win the elections and win a majority or ability to put a coalition together to actually have a majority in parliament.
所以，你知道，我...我...希望国家能好。
So, you know, I'm I I you know, I hope for the country.
我不会说我认为这事不会发生，但我希望...
I wouldn't say I'm I think it won't happen, but I would like
对此保持希望。
to stay hopeful about it.
我站在亚历克斯那边。
I am in Alex's camp.
我认为这会变成一场彻底的混乱，然后会有一些重组发生。
I think it will become an absolute unholy mess and then some restructuring will happen.
否则，政客们就会出手干预。
Otherwise, politician is going to do that.
现在这让我们意识到法国并非唯一的问题。
Now that brings us to France not being the only problem.
你我正在伦敦的录音室里录制节目，而11月26日这里将迎来秋季预算案。
You and me are recording in a studio in London and we have the autumn budget here on November 26.
那么我们就以此作为结束吧。
So let's close with that actually.
这也不是一个令人愉快的结论。
That is also not a cheerful note.
英国面临同样问题，理论上他们可以印钞，但印钞会导致通货膨胀等后果。
Same problem in The UK except that they can theoretically print but if you print you know what will happen inflation and so on.
所以在英国我们遇到了同样的问题。
So in The UK we have the same issue.
他们不愿意削减开支。
They don't want to cut.
他们拥有多数席位。
They have a majority.
与法国政府没有多数席位不同，英国政府拥有多数席位。
Unlike in France where the government doesn't have a majority, the government has a majority.
即便如此他们也没有采取行动。
Even then they are not doing.
因为他们不愿意削减。
Because they are not willing to cut.
这意味着最终可能会通过一些增税措施。
Which means you are going to end up with some tax raises and so on which probably will get passed through.
所以你可能不会有同样庞大的预算赤字问题，但会面临增长问题。
So you may not have the same massive budget deficit issue but then you will have growth issue.
你将面临一个结构性高税收的经济体。
You will have structural high taxation economy.
我 我 我觉得欧洲大部分就像泰坦尼克号，你知道，每个人都是自己的泰坦尼克。
I I I think most of Europe is just a Titanic, and it's you know, everyone is it everyone is his own Titanic.
是一个又一个，你知道，看谁比谁沉得更快。
Is one and and and it's you know, which one is drowning, you know, quicker than the other.
对吧？
Right?
英国也是一艘泰坦尼克。
UK also is a titanic.
对吧？
Right?
保守党，你知道，我非常，你知道，失望的是保守党十二年来毫无作为。
The the the the conservatives have you know, I'm very, you know, disappointed that conservatives did nothing for twelve years.
他们掌权。
They're in power.
十四。
Fourteen.
到头来。
The end of day.
十四年。
Fourteen years.
抱歉。
Sorry.
而且，你知道，工党就是工党。
And, you know, labor labor are labor.
对吧？
Right?
我是说，他们不会...你看，他们似乎把每件能搞错的事情都搞错了，他们似乎
I mean, they're not gonna you know, they they they seem to be every every single thing they could be doing wrong, they seem to
都在犯错。
be doing wrong.
所以哦，他们还没做完呢。
So Oh, they haven't done yet.
你已经...等等
You've you've wait
因为...我实在看不到当前预算或短期内有什么希望。
for I I just don't I just don't see any silver lining at this point on on the current budget or, you know, in in in the short term.
所以我...我站在你这边，Mahesh。
So I'm I'm in I'm in your cam Mahesh there.
记住，和法国不同，英国政府拥有绝对多数席位，压倒性多数。
So and remember, unlike the French, the UK government has a majority, stonking huge majority.
顺便说一句，连特朗普都没有这种优势。
Even Trump doesn't have it, by the way.
他只有勉强过半的多数。
He has a bare minimum majority.
在英国，政府拥有巨大优势，却没有任何结构性改革能推进。
In The UK, the government has a massive majority, yet nothing no structural reform will get done.
英国有件事似乎是真的：党派政治绝对凌驾于国家利益之上。
One thing that seems to be true in The UK is party politics is definitely over country politics.
哦，是的。
Oh, yeah.
所以，你知道的，工党内部的小斗争，就像保守党、特朗普那样，你知道的，不，不是那样的。
And so, you know, the the you know, the little wars within the labor party, just like they were for the conservative party, Trump, you know, with no No.
我特朗普，你知道的，不管国家应该做什么。
I Trump, you know, whatever the country should be doing.
我们现在从信用话题偏离到人口统计上了。
We are digressing from credit into demographics now.
但这是因为西欧已经习惯了这种社会契约，认为你会得到照顾等等。
But this is because Western Europe has gotten used to this social contract that you will get taken care of and so on.
当国家大多数人在工作，只有少数福利申领者，无论是养老金领取者还是弱势群体和残疾人等等时，这一切都行得通。
All that works when majority of the country is working and there are only a few benefit claimants whether it is pensioners or the weak and the disabled and so on.
但现在人们已经习惯了这一点。
But now people have gotten used to that.
国家已经老龄化。
Countries have aged.
他们不想要任何移民，这意味着谁来贡献呢？
They don't want any immigration, which means who is going to contribute?
这就是问题所在。
That's the problem.
我想大家都同意这个诊断。
I think everyone agrees with the diagnostic.
问题在于英国，就像在法国一样，没人愿意做出削减。
The the the issue is in The UK, just like in France, no one wants to make the cuts.
所以在情况改变之前，是的。
So until that changes Yeah.
你知道，泰坦尼克号将继续
It's you know, the Titanic will continue to
是的。
Yeah.
至少法国人还能同情，因为他们没有多数党政府。
The French, sympathize at least because they don't have a majority government.
英国，你没法同情。
The UK, you can't sympathize.
他们有多数党政府。
They have a majority government.
他们有央行可以印钞，却什么事都办不成。
They have a central bank which can print, yet nothing will get done.
顺便说一句，结束前我想提一下，即使在英国，信贷也是黑暗中的一线曙光。
By the way, before we close, I want to mention that even in The UK, credit is a silver lining.
所以在我们经历英国历届政府危机期间，信贷表现一直大幅领先。
So all through every government crisis that we have had in The UK, credit massive outperformer.
那么，英镑信贷现在处于什么位置？83个基点？
So, where does sterling credit stand right now 83 basis points?
它能给你5%的收益率，六年期，虽然和欧元一样贵，但国债4.5%，信贷5%。
It pays you 5% yield, six duration and it is as rich as Euros but gilt at 4.5, credit at five.
波动性小得多。
Much less volatile.
每当危机来临，信贷总是表现优异。
Whenever there is a crisis, credit outperforms.
所以，如果你必须留在英国，还是选择信贷。
So, if you have to stay in The UK, credit again.
我想我们就此结束吧。
I think with that, we close.
谢谢你，萨姆。
Thank you Sam.
这次谈话非常愉快。
It has been a great talk.
谢谢你邀请我，马赫什。
Thank you Mahesh for having me.
这是我们的荣幸。
Our pleasure.
请务必参加感恩节当周周四的伦敦信贷俱乐部活动。
Please attend the London Credit Club on Thanksgiving week on the Thursday actually.
11月27日，请记得访问BISTRTE获取所有研究数据需求。我们将在12月的年终全球信贷展望播客前再次见面。
November 27 and please obviously go to BISTRTE for all your research and data needs and I will see you again in December before we all go on holidays for the end of the year podcast which will be around the world global credit outlook.
谢谢大家。
Thank you all.
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