本集简介
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嘿,大家好。
Hey, everyone.
我是科里。
Corey here.
感谢收听《与模特约会》的另一期节目。
Thanks for tuning into another episode of flirting with models.
如果你喜欢这个节目,我非常希望你能花点时间评分、评论,最重要的是,推荐给朋友。
If you're enjoying the show, I'd greatly appreciate it if you take a moment to rate, review, and most importantly, with a friend.
口碑传播是这个播客成长的方式。
Word-of-mouth is how this podcast grows.
如果你想了解更多关于Newfound的收益叠加型共同基金、ETF和模型投资组合平台,请访问returnstacks.com。
And if you'd like to learn more about Newfound's platform of return stacked mutual funds, ETFs, and model portfolios, head over to returnstacks.com.
现在,继续我们的节目。
Now on with the show.
好的,克里斯。
Okay, Chris.
你准备好了吗?
Are you ready?
当然准备好了。
Absolutely.
好的。
Alright.
三、二、一。
Three, two, one.
让我们开始吧。
Let's jam.
大家好,欢迎各位。
Hello, and welcome, everyone.
我是科里·霍夫斯坦,这里是《与模型调情》,这档播客将揭开面纱,探索量化策略背后的人性因素。
I'm Corey Hofstein, and this is flirting with models, the podcast that pulls back the curtain to discover the human factor behind the quantitative strategy.
科里·霍夫斯坦是Newfound Research的联合创始人兼首席投资官。
Corey Hofstein is the cofounder and chief investment officer of Newfound Research.
由于行业监管规定,他不会在本播客中讨论Newfound Research的任何基金。
Due to industry regulations, he will not discuss any of Newfound Research's funds on this podcast.
播客参与者表达的所有观点均为其个人意见,不代表Newfound Research的观点。
All opinions expressed by podcast participants are solely their own opinion and do not reflect the opinion of Newfound Research.
本播客仅用于信息目的,不应作为投资决策的依据。
This podcast is for informational purposes only and should not be relied upon as a basis for investment decisions.
Newfound Research的客户可能持有本播客中讨论的证券。
Clients of Newfound Research may maintain positions and securities discussed in this podcast.
如需更多信息,请访问thinknewfound.com。
For more information, visit thinknewfound.com.
本期嘉宾是Moon Tower AI的联合创始人克里斯·阿卜杜勒马赛约。
My guest in this episode is Chris Abdulmaseyo, cofounder of Moon Tower AI.
克里斯的职业生涯始于SIG,曾在那里多个期权交易池担任做市商,之后前往Parallax,负责管理相对价值商品波动率投资组合。
Chris began his career at SIG where he worked as a market maker in several different option pits before moving to Parallax where he ran a relative value commodities volatility book.
过去五年,克里斯一直在他的博客《Party at the Moon Tower》上撰文,这是我最喜爱的阅读内容之一,主题涵盖概率、收益空间、期权策略以及通过波动率视角看待世界。
For the last five years, Chris has been writing on his blog Party at the Moon Tower, which is one of my favorite reads for all things probability, payoff space, trading optionality, and seeing the world through a volatility lens.
克里斯是一位充满热情的教育者,因此在这整个节目中,学习是一个贯穿始终的关键主题,这并不令人意外。
Chris is a passionate educator, so it should come as no surprise that learning is a key thread throughout this entire episode.
克里斯讨论了在期权交易池中学习是如何加速的,以及我们如何在电子环境中复制这种学习方式。
Chris discusses how learning is accelerated in the option pits and how we can think about replicating that in electronic space.
他谈到了从做市商转向相对价值交易时,自己必须摒弃和重新学习的内容。
He discusses what he had to unlearn and relearn in his move from market making to relative value trading.
克里斯分享了他对公司背景如何影响你学习交易市场方式的看法。
And Chris shares his thoughts about how firm lineage influences how you learn to trade markets.
最后,我们讨论了克里斯最新的创业项目——Moon Tower AI,该项目旨在为有明确观点的交易者提供一个波动率视角,帮助他们更好地在期权市场中表达自己的观点。
Finally, we discussed Chris's newest venture, Moon Tower AI, which seeks to provide a volatility lens to opinionated traders to help them better express their bets in option space.
这一期节目蕴含了丰富的经验值得深入探讨。
There is a lot of experience to unpack in this one.
我希望你们喜欢我与克里斯·阿卜杜勒马西娅的对话。
I hope you enjoy my conversation with Chris Abdelmasiya.
克里斯,欢迎来到本节目。
Chris, welcome to the show.
先生
Mr.
月亮塔元宇宙本人,长期关注您的博客和通讯。
Moon Tower Meta himself, longtime fan of the blog and the newsletter.
我认为这可能是我推荐最多的通讯。
I think it might be my most recommended newsletter.
我刚才在查我推荐过您写的文章有多少次,数量很多。
I was looking earlier as to how many times I've recommended articles you've written and it's a lot.
非常多。
It's a lot.
您不断产出关于概率和投资的精彩文章,尤其是在期权领域。
You are constantly churning out great think pieces on probability and investing, particularly in the option space.
今天非常高兴能邀请您来到这里。
So very excited to have you here with me today.
感谢您加入我的节目。
Thank you for joining me.
能来到这里是一种莫大的荣幸。
It is beyond a privilege to be here.
我非常崇拜你,你待人接物的方式、你的坦诚,以及你平衡轻松与严肃的能力。
I'm such a fan of you, the way you carry yourself, your honesty, the way you balance being lighthearted but serious.
你的写作对我自己的写作产生了巨大的启发。
Your writing was massively inspirational to my own writing.
你对交易和投资的思考方式非常罕见,也与我志同道合。
And the way you think about trading and investing is just rare and very kindred.
你是我想成为的一切的更聪明版本,我非常喜爱你的播客。
You're the smarter version of everything I wanna be, and I'm a huge fan of the podcast.
有趣的是,我几乎觉得今天就像我们暂停了与那些天才嘉宾的常规对话,转而请出一个骑独轮车的猴子。
It's funny, I almost feel like today is like, we're taking a break from our regular episodes with all these geniuses to have to bring out a monkey on a unicycle.
但我真的非常兴奋能来到这里。
But I'm just so stoked to be here.
所以非常感谢你。
So thank you.
嗯,我觉得我得删掉大部分这些话,但我很感谢你的美言。
Well, feel like I'm gonna have to edit most of that out, but I appreciate the kind words.
而且我认为,本集结束时,没人会把你当成骑独轮车的猴子,当然,读过你文章的人更不会这么想。
And I think at the end of this episode nobody will be thinking of you as a monkey on a unicycle and certainly nobody who's read your writing would think of you that way.
但对于那些没读过你文章、可能不常关注FinTwit、不了解你的人来说。
But for those who haven't read your writing, for those who maybe aren't as active on FinTwit, don't know who you are.
你能先给我们讲讲你的背景吗?
Can you start us off with the background?
因为你的职业生涯确实经历了一段不寻常的轨迹。
Because you have had a bit of a trajectory to your career.
你一直停留在波动率领域,但对波动率的理解有过几次不同的转变。
You've stayed within the vol space but had a couple different cuts of how you've thought about vol.
所以也许我们可以从你最初在交易大厅的经历开始,带你一路回顾到今天。
So maybe we can start at the beginning, your time on the floor and take us forward to where you are today.
好的,我会简要介绍一下我的职业经历。
Yeah, so I'll give a brief career bio.
我算是传统方式进入这个行业的。
I was kind of a traditional entry into the business.
我也是康奈尔大学的校友。
I'm also a Cornell alum.
我本来想进入金融行业,特别是交易领域,但当时我在职业展会上闲逛,看到一个摊位,有个家伙手里拿着骰子和一副扑克牌,而没人去那里,因为所有人都穿着不合身的西装,围在银行家的摊位前,都想成为弗兰克·夸特龙之类的人。
I had an idea that I wanted to go into finance and trading specifically, but I was walking around a career fair and there was a booth with a guy that had some dice and a deck of cards, and there was nobody at the booth because everybody in their ill fitting suits was all surrounding the bankers, everybody wanted to be, I don't know, Frank Quatrone or whatever.
那是1999年。
It's 1999.
这个家伙看到我像只迷路的小鹿一样四处张望,就对我说:嘿。
And this guy just kinda looked at me wandering around like a lost fawn and said, hey.
你喜欢游戏吗?
Do you like games?
当时那个摊位没人,也没人知道Sig是谁。
And there was nobody else at the booth, and nobody knew who Sig was.
于是我走过去,参加了一个小面试,表现得不太理想。
So I went over there, did a little interview, didn't do so great.
然后我问他:我觉得自己面试表现不太好,但我很喜欢你问我的这些问题,也很喜欢这类东西。
And then I asked him, I said, I don't feel like I did very good in this interview, but I like these questions that you asked me, and I like this stuff.
我该怎么才能提高呢?
What can I do to get better at this?
他推荐我一本叫《战胜市场》的书,作者是大卫·斯克拉恩斯基。我当然去买了这本书并读了,令我惊讶的是,我后来收到了第二轮面试的回音,所有问题都直接出自这本书的开头部分。
And he recommended a book to me called Getting the Best of It by David Sklansky, and of course I went and got it and read it, and I, to my surprise, got a callback for a second interview, and all the questions were straight out of the beginning of that book.
所以我想,他喜欢我,是因为他希望我能通过。
So I guess he liked me because he wanted me to get through.
于是我最终加入了SIG,参加了他们的培训项目。
So I end up at SIG, got into their trainer program.
我一开始在美国运通部门工作。
I started on the AmEx.
我花了六到九个月的时间在各个交易池做助理,也在SPIDERS ETFs中担任助理。
I spent six to nine months clerking for various pits, clerking in a SPIDERS ETFs.
当时,ETF还是一个相对较新的产品。
ETFs were in relatively new product at the time.
ETF之王雷吉·布朗是我的老板,我是他的助手。
The king of ETFs, Reggie Brown, was my boss, and so I was his clerk.
我就是在那儿学会的Excel。
That's where I learned Excel.
我的意思是,我连Excel都不懂。
I mean, I didn't even know Excel.
所以我当时在做SPIDERS的助手,之后又做了指数期权、股票期权之类的。
So I was clerking in spiders, and then I did index options, equity options, all that.
我当过助手,做过各种事情。
I had clerk and all that.
我参加了他们的培训项目,在宾夕法尼亚州的巴尔基诺伍德住了三个月,学习模拟交易理论等等。
Went through their training program, lived in Ballikenwood, Pennsylvania for three months, mock trading theory, all this stuff.
老实说,我所写的内容很多都深受我们所学基础知识的启发。
Honestly, a lot of the stuff that I write about was super inspired by what we learned, all those basics.
之后,我在纽约证券交易所的股票期权交易大厅做了几年做市商。
And then after that, was a market maker on the AmEx floor in equity options for a couple years.
然后我去了纽约证券交易所。
Then I was on a New York Stock Exchange.
我当了一年的经纪人,之后又做了近一年的ETF专家。
I was a broker for a year, and then I was a specialist in ETFs for almost a year.
之后,有人请我去为SIG在纽约商品交易所开创石油期权交易业务。
And then after that, I was asked to go start the oil options trading business on the NYMEX for SIG.
如果我没记错的话,他们之前已经失败过两次。
And if I remember correctly, they had failed twice before.
所以他们的提议是:去那边看看能不能找到办法,尽量别亏太多钱。
So it was the proposition was like, hey, go over there, see if we can figure it out, try not to lose too much money.
这真是个绝佳的安排,我觉得是高回报、低风险的情况。
So it's a great setup for, I was like, high upside, low downside situation.
于是我去了那里,花了大约六个月才搞明白。
So went over there, took us about six months to figure it out.
这次我们最终非常成功,这其中也有运气的成分。
This time, we ended up being very successful, and there's a luck component to it.
我们去那里时,正值市场从传统交易方式向电子化过渡的时期。当我进入交易场时,我们还在用手势交易,通过比划来对冲期货交易。
We were going there right at the transition of the markets going from you know, when I stepped into the pit, we was, as we say, trading on fingers, flashing our hedges to the futures pit.
当时市场还不是很电子化。
Markets were not very electronic at the time.
当时有一种叫什么Access之类的电子系统。
There was a thing called I think it was called access or something.
夜间有电子市场,但白天仍是公开喊价和手势交易。
There was, like, electronic markets at night, but it was open outcry, hand signals and all that.
但我们来自一个习惯电子交易的世界,因此我们成了那里最早采用技术的人,建立了这项业务,交易进行得很顺利。三年后,我离开了,转去做交易。
But we were coming from a world where we were used to trading electronically, so basically, we were early adopters of using technology over there, and built that business, that went well, traded, and then after three years of doing that, I left, and I went over to trading.
我在芝加哥得到了一位投资人的支持,于是投入了自己的一些资金,几乎四年时间里,我建立了一个小型做市业务。我稍后会详细讲,但那四年我们学习了交易大量不同的商品产品、期货和期权。之后,我去了Parallax——一家位于旧金山的大型对冲基金,他们的传统业务是相对价值股票波动率交易,也带有SIG的背景。他们邀请我搬到加利福尼亚,为他们建立商品期权交易业务。
I got backed by a backer in Chicago, so basically, like, put up some of my own money, and then for almost four years, built my own little market making operation, and I'll talk more about that later, but that we did spend four years learning to trade a lot of different commodity products, futures options, and then I went to, after that, Parallax, which is a big hedge fund in San Francisco, their traditional business is relative value equity vol trading, also has a bit of a SIG lineage, and they asked me if I'd move out to California and build a commodity options trading business for them.
于是我去了那里,在Parallax待了将近十年,直到2021年决定退出日常的忙碌生活。从那时起,我开始写作,其实五年前就开始了。
So went out there, I spent almost a decade with Parallax, and then in 2021 decided to leave the daily grind, and since then, I started writing about five years ago.
我是在Parallax工作时开始在线写作的,到2021年,我决定不再整天坐在屏幕前了。
So I was at Parallax when I had started writing online, and then by 2021 decided that I didn't wanna sit in front of a screen all day anymore.
所以我离开了,现在我写作、教学,我最新的项目是一款几个月前推出的期权交易软件。
So I left, now I write, I teach, and my newest project is an options trading software that we launched a couple months ago.
任何读过你文章的人都能清楚地看出,你非常关注思考本身,也极其重视学习。
I think it's clear to anyone who has read your writing that you think a lot about thinking and you think a lot about learning.
在我们之前的通话中,你提到交易大厅提供了一个能极大加速你学习速度的环境。
And one of the things you mentioned to me in our pre call is that you thought the trading floor provided an environment where your learning rate can really be accelerated.
你对市场的学习速度、对交易的学习速度,这些可能在我们全面转向纯电子化世界的过程中正在丧失。
You're learning rate about the market, you're learning rate about trading and something that potentially has been lost as we move into a more pure electronic world.
我想知道,为什么你觉得在交易大厅的学习速度如此之快?而当我们全面电子化时,究竟失去了什么?
I'm curious why you think that that learning rate was so accelerated in the floor and what exactly is getting lost as we all go electronic?
这对我来说是个有趣的话题,因为我非常喜爱交易大厅,因为它非常契合我的学习方式——而大厅里与今天最不同的关键在于‘人’。
This is a fun topic for me because I was very fond of the floor because it was very well suited to how I learned, which is the key thing on the floor that feels very different than today is the who.
当你在交易大厅时,你与所有竞争对手以及自己公司的同事混在一起,形成一种亦敌亦友的关系:你每天上班都能看到对手在做什么,但他们此刻是竞争对手,明天却可能成为你的同事,或者你可能需要向他们求职。
Because when you are on the floor, you are mixed in there with all these competing firms as well as all the people from your own firm, and there's a sort of frenemy dynamic where you show up to work every day and you can see what your competitors are doing, but they're competitors right now, but tomorrow they might be employees or you might be asking them for a job.
因此,这是一个同时兼具合作与竞争的生态系统。
So it is a very cooperative but combative ecosystem at the same time.
这种方式非常独特。
It's very unique in that way.
想象一下,今天所有人都坐在楼上,透过屏幕交易。
Imagine everybody sitting upstairs today on their screens trading.
想象一下,如果所有人都聚在一个房间里交易,那种氛围会是什么样子。
Imagine if you just all got in a room and were trading, what that dynamic could feel like.
所以在交易大厅里,你的学习速度会非常快,因为你有机会去尝试逆向分析别人在做什么。
So on the floor, your learning rate would be very high because you had this amazing and unique opportunity to try to reverse engineer what people were doing.
比如,一个经纪人来到交易池,假设一个期权价值5美元,经纪人走进交易池说:‘我卖100个,4.95美元。’
So for example, a broker might come to the pit, let's say an option's worth $5, and a broker comes into the pit and says, hey, I'll sell a 100 of these at $4.95.
交易池里的所有人都会立刻抢购,抢购,抢购。
And everybody in the pit's gonna go buy them, buy them, buy them.
但这就没什么意思了。
So that's not interesting.
但如果那个经纪人走进交易池说:‘我卖5美元’,只有一个做市商接了单,会发生什么?
But what happens if that broker comes into the pit and says, I'll sell these at $5, and one market maker lifts it?
然后那个做市商说:‘我想再多买一些。’
And then that market maker says, I'll buy more there.
于是你就得到了这条新信息。
So what you have is this new piece of information.
为什么这个做市商想要买入这些期权?
Why does this one market maker wanna buy these options?
但关键是,你见过这个做市商,你知道他供职于哪家公司。
But the thing is, you've seen this market maker, you know what firm he works for.
他戴着耳机。
He's got a headset on.
场内大多数人可能没有戴耳机,但这个人却戴着耳机。
Most of the people on the pit, maybe they don't have a headset, but this guy has a headset on.
换句话说,他看到了你没看到的信息。
So in other words, like, he's seeing something that you're not.
所以,可能三分钟后,你突然发现市场上出现了大量买入报价。
So what'll happen is maybe three minutes later, all of a sudden, you see that there's all these bids.
所以发生的情况是,这个做市商有一个楼上交易员,他看到了某些成交信息,知道波动率更高了,但其他人并没有看到这些信息。
So what happened is that market maker had an upstairs trader that saw something trade away that knows that vol's higher, but not everybody else got to see that.
因此,你在潜意识中根据这些参与者的决策来评估他们的可信度,并以此指导自己的决策过程。
So what you're doing is you're weighting the credibility of the actors, like subconsciously, as they make decisions, and from there, that is guiding your own decision process.
还有其他类似的例子。
So there's other examples of this.
比如,你可能会观察人们如何影响市场。
Like you might see you watching how people lean markets.
所以你可能认为这个期权值5美元,但一个反应迅速的大做市商第一个喊出报价,这个做市商报出了495美元。
So you might think that option's worth $5, but a big market maker who's fast is the first person to yell out, that order gets quoted and that market maker goes $495.
这个做市商强烈押注这笔订单来自卖家。
That market maker is heavily betting that that order is a seller.
因此,通过观察那些聪明的做市商,或者你熟知的、经常活跃的做市商,你可以推断出:他们一定对另一方的身份有很好的判断,他们正在追踪市场动态,而你也会逐渐学会这样做。
So by watching smart market makers or market makers that work for firms that you know see a lot, you can figure out, oh, they must have a good feeling for who this other side is, they're tracking what's going on, and you learn to do that as well.
另一个例子是,你经过一个看似毫无交易量的交易池,查了一下,发现这个交易池的期权成交量确实很少,冷清得像荒漠,但里面却站着一位非常聪明的交易员。
So another example is you're walking by a pit that seems to do no volume, you look it up, there doesn't seem to be a whole lot of options volume in that pit, it's tumbleweed, but there's a very smart trader standing in that pit.
所以你会想,那边肯定有资金。
So you're like, there must be money over there.
如果那个交易池真的是个荒地,为什么那家公司会派一个厉害的交易员去那里?
So why would that firm put a strong trader in that pit if it really was a wasteland?
所以你只要在交易大厅里走一走,多留意,就能大致判断出哪些交易台值得参与。
So you can kind of figure out which tables you wanna play at just from walking around the floor and paying attention.
这其中有很大的扑克牌成分,还有就是当你身处现场时,信息是如何流动的。
So there's a large poker aspect to it, and also just the way information flows when you're down there.
某样东西可能正在急剧上涨,这是一次空头挤压吗?
Something could be ripping much higher, and is it a short squeeze?
还是不是?
Is it not?
你可以去跟经纪人聊聊。
Well, you can talk to brokers.
你也可以和其他交易员交流。
You can talk to other traders.
而且,你会根据你认为他们可信的程度来权衡每个人的建议。
And, you're weighting everybody's input by how credible you think they are.
而这种非正式的可信度评分,是通过长期反复观察这些人互动逐渐建立起来的。
And that credibility score, that informal credibility score you have is built up over watching repeated interactions with these people all the time.
所以这是一个非常独特的环境,能让人快速学习。
So super unique environment for learning very quickly.
作为一个极度热衷于学习和教学的人,你认为在电子时代如何才能重新获得这种学习速度?
As someone who is super passionate about learning and teaching, how do you think that learning rate can be reclaimed in an electronic era?
首先,我想稍微退一步说,我说有些东西丢失了,是因为我自己的技能特点——我是一个有血有肉的人类。
So first of all, I wanna back up for a second and just say that I'm saying that something is lost, but that's because of my own skill set, where I'm a flesh and blood humanoid.
我想看到人们的眼睛。
I wanna see people's eyes.
我想听到他们如何出价和报价,所以对我来说,感觉有些东西丢失了。
I wanna hear how they bid and how they offer, and so for me, something feels like it's lost.
但这对每个人来说可能并不成立。
That might not be true for everybody.
当我思考这个问题时,电子市场为人们提供了隐藏订单的方式,你可以将订单拆分。
When I think about it, electronic markets offer people ways to disguise their order, you can slice it up.
现在发生的情况是,你从大量非常小的交易中获取了大量信息,这就是大数据。
What's happening is you are getting a lot of information from lots of very, very small transactions, and it's big data.
所以,这种技能集几乎与大型科技公司进行广告定向的技能集融合了。
So it's almost like the skill set is converged with sort of like big tech doing ad targeting.
就像,这是同一种技能集。
Like, it's the same kind of skill set.
这并不是我交易生涯中成长起来的世界。
It was not the world I grew up in in trading.
所以我认为,如果有人能够适应当今的这些方法,他们仍然可以拥有很高的学习速率。
So I think that there are people that can have a very high learning rate if they are attuned to those methods today.
但就重新获得学习速率而言,我认为你可以通过培养像推特这样的平台来实现,它非常棒。
But as far as reclaiming the learning rate, I think you can do that by cultivating like, Twitter's amazing.
你可以上网,如果你有良好的品味,并能培养出辨别真正高手与装模作样者的判断力,你就能找出可以向谁学习。
You can go online, and if you have good taste and develop taste into who's a real g versus who's a LARPer, you can figure out who you can learn from.
尽管你不在交易大厅,也没有机会与身边的人偶然相遇,但你必须付出更多努力,我认为交易员可以通过更主动地参与来重新获得一部分学习速率。
And even though you're not on the floor and you have all these opportunities for serendipitous meetings with other people because they just happen to be right next to you, you have to put more effort into it, and I think traders can reclaim some of that learning rate by putting themselves out there more.
我认为,作为交易员,应该比普通交易员更积极地向外展示自己,这是个好主意。
I think it's a good idea to sort of like live outwardly as a trader more so than the typical trader believes.
交易吸引人的地方之一是那种独来独往的内向性格,我过去也某种程度上是这样,但随着时间推移,我逐渐变得更加开放。
There's a bit of a lone wolf introversion that does attract people to trading, and I was like that too, to some degree, and over time have sort of like opened up more.
我发现,随着年龄增长,许多交易员都告诉我同样的事:通过更加开放,他们能更好地适应并更快地学习。
And I found that traders, as they've gotten older, have told me the same thing, that by opening up more, it helped them to adapt and learn quicker.
所以我认为,重新获得这种学习速率的方法就是稍微更外向一点。
So I think that that's the way you reclaim it, is just sort of being a little bit more outward.
这始终是一场‘付出才能获得’的游戏,但显然没人愿意把自己最核心的交易信息轻易透露出去。
And it's just always this game of like, you gotta give to get, but obviously nobody wants to give information that's super valuable to what they're doing.
因此这其中存在一种博弈,你必须学会玩这个游戏。
So there's a bit of a game there and you gotta play that game.
但我认为,这才是重新获得学习速率的方式。
But I think that's the way you reclaim that learning rate.
在SIG之后,你如你所说,去了Parallax,从做市商转变为负责商品领域的相对价值交易组合。
After SIG, you moved to parallax, as you mentioned, where you went from being a market maker to running this relative value book in the commodity space.
你能谈谈做市和管理相对价值组合之间的相似之处和不同之处吗?
Can you talk a little bit about the similarities and the differences between market making and running a relative value book?
哪些技能是可迁移的,哪些不是?对你来说,提升过程中最陡峭的部分是什么?
What skills translate, what don't, and maybe what was sort of the steepest part of the uptake curve for you?
当然可以。
Yeah, absolutely.
我们先谈谈不同之处。
Let's start with the differences first.
首先,你对一笔好交易的定义会变化。
So the first thing is your definition of what's a good trade evolves.
我记得在SIG培训时,有一位老师非常简洁地定义了一笔好交易:如果你买进某物,之后有人出价买入,那就是一笔好交易。
So I remember in training distinctly, one of the teachers at SIG had very succinctly defined a good trade as if you buy something and it's bid there after you bought it, that's a good trade.
这句话的潜台词是,你拥有一个无风险的获利机会。
And what's native to that statement is that you have a free roll.
我买了一样东西,如果我不喜欢,我可以免费再看一下。
I bought something, if I don't like it, I get a free look.
如果我不喜欢,我可以转身把它卖给旁边的人撤掉这笔交易。
If I don't like it, I can scratch it by turning around and selling it to the person next to me.
但这只有在你足够快的情况下才成立,所以你必须知道自己在优先级中的位置,必须反应迅速,还要意识到:我是否能比别人更早察觉到这笔交易会变糟?
Now, that is true if you're fast, so you have to know where you are in the pecking order, you have to be fast, and you also have to be aware of am I in a situation where I'm going to know that this trade is gonna go south before other people do?
如果所有人都同时发现,那你可能就倒霉了。
So if everybody finds out at the same time, well, you're probably out of luck.
所以在这种情况下,你更像是个短线交易者。
So you're more of a flipper in this case.
这就是做市商的情况,但当你不再是做市商时,你就失去了速度优势,也失去了在交易大厅时的时间和位置优势,因此你会更倾向于长期持有以获取价值。
So that's what happens as a market maker, but when you are not a market maker, you don't have that speed advantage, you don't have time place advantage like you did on the floor, so you're gonna be holding things more for value.
所以你不是因为觉得一小时内能把波动率从20卖到20.5而买入,而是因为相信长期持有后,波动率会从20涨到24。
So instead of buying something for 20 vol because you think you're gonna flip it for 20 and a half vol in an hour, you're buying something for 20 vol because you think that if you hold this over time, it's gonna be 24 vol.
这就是第一个重大区别。
So that's the first big difference.
这是一种更偏向夏普比率的做法,这引出了第二个重大区别:你在规模与边缘的连续体上滑动。
And that's a lower Sharps thing to do, which brings me to the second big difference, which is that you are sliding across the scale versus edge continuum.
当你成为一名相对价值交易员时,你不再仅仅进行套利交易。
So when you're a relative value trader, you're no longer just doing arbitrage trades.
你必须进行可扩展的交易,那些你认为存在风险溢价的交易,你需要思考背后的原因,并承担风险。
You have to do scalable trades, trades that you believe there's a risk premium to, you're thinking about what the reason for that is, and you are warehousing risk.
在我转型的过程中,这对我来说是最困难的部分,因为我更像一个勤勉的交易者。
In my transition, that was the harder part for me because I'm more of a grinder.
我的倾向更偏向于低估投注,而不是其他。
My bias is more of an underbetting bias than anything.
所以我是个稳扎稳打的人。
So I'm steady hands.
你不会在报纸上看到我爆仓的消息,但代价是你可能总是低估投注。
You're not gonna find me in a newspaper having blown up, but the cost of that is that you might be underbetting.
这对我来说很难,因为当你升到更偏向相对价值交易员的位置时,你总会担心自己漏掉了什么。
And that was hard for me because when you move upstairs to more of a relative value trader, you are always paranoid that I'm missing something.
交易员本质上是管理流动性的人。
What is a trader ultimately is somebody that manages liquidity.
这就是这份工作的核心本质。
That is the core essence of the job.
所以,如果我建立这个头寸,我能持有多少而不对价格造成太大影响?
So if I put this position on, how much can I have on without affecting the price too much?
我能持有多少,同时还能在某个时候顺利平仓?
How much can I have on while still being able to exit it at some point?
所有这些考量最终决定了你愿意交易的规模大小。
So all of those considerations end up halting basically like how big you're willing to trade.
这对我来说是更难的部分。
So that was the harder part for me.
我之前已经有一些持有头寸的心态经验,原因有几个:我在交易大厅遇到的很多人并不是纯粹的做市商,而是那些以价值交易为导向的人。
I had some experience already being with this warehousing mindset because it was a couple reasons, just a lot of the people that I met on the floor were less market maker types, and they were people that were oriented towards, I'm doing this because this is a value trade.
比如,我持有这种敞口,我相信长期来看我会盈利。
Like, I hold this exposure, I'm gonna win to this over time.
甚至早在刚开始交易的时候,比如我交易生涯的第一或第二年,我还记得当时在交易Quest Communications,那是上世纪2000年代初的事了,我当时在交易AIG和Quest。
Or even early on, even like my first or second year trading ever, I remember I was trading Quest Communications, and this was if you remember, like, back in the early two thousands, I was trading AIG, Quest.
当时出现了不少会计丑闻,引起了广泛关注。
There was, like, these accounting scandals, and there was all this interest.
人们纷纷购买这些公司的信用违约互换(CDS),而那些擅长结构化产品的交易员会出去卖CDS,同时买入那些行权价极低、几乎不可能被执行的微小看跌期权。
People were buying these CDS on these names, and the CDS, sort of a cap structure art people, would go out there and they might sell CDS, and then they would buy these really way out of the money teeny puts.
当Quest卷入这场风波时,我也在交易它。
And I was trading Quest when Quest kinda got into that mix.
我当时做的交易是,卖出了大量这些行权价极低、但价格却高得离谱的看跌期权。
And the trade I had put on there was I had basically sold a bunch of these way out of the money puts that were just super fat.
当时一个行权价2.5的期权,价格竟然卖到1.25美元,这价格简直荒谬。
It was like a 2 and a half put trading for like a buck and a quarter, and that's just a ridiculous price.
你只需大幅做空,过度对冲delta,而Quest的股价就会缓慢下跌。
And you would just lean super short into it, like over hedge the delta, and Quest would just grind down.
这笔交易让我赚了一大笔钱。
And that was a trade that made a bunch of money.
所以我看到一位同事在施乐上做了同样的交易,金额是我当年的十倍,一两年后,你是在囤积这笔交易,只是把它挂在那里,说我要围绕它做些短线操作,但其实我是打算长期持有这个头寸。
So I watched a colleague do the same trade in Xerox for 10 x the amount of money, like, a year or two later, you're warehousing that trade, you're just putting that thing on and saying like, I'm gonna kinda trade around this, but really, I'm gonna hold this sucker.
所以这对我来说并不完全陌生,但要准确判断该下多大赌注,以达到我们真正需要的盈利目标,仍然很难。
So it wasn't completely foreign to me, but it was still hard to bet the right amount for the amount of money that we really needed to make to move the needle.
随着时间的推移,我在这方面变得越来越熟练,但这个转变花了好几年时间。
So I got better at that over time, but that transition took a couple years.
从这段经历中可以借鉴的相似之处,其实就是了解交易游戏的运作方式,了解做市商是如何思考的,以及他们如何根据市场流向来设置报价界面。
And similarities about what you can use from that experience, it's really just the idea of knowing how the transaction game is played, knowing how a market maker thinks, knowing how are they gonna set the screens up based upon the flow.
我知道我的对手在想什么,我知道为什么报价界面会被设计成这样。
It's like, I know what my adversary is thinking, I know why the screens are framed a certain way.
所以,所有这种暗中博弈的技巧——比如我该如何切入这笔交易——都已经成为我的本能,我认为如果你是从买方开始的,这种直觉可能不会那么自然,因为你不是在为那些频繁与你交易的人设置市场,你只是一个被动的接受者。
So it's like all the cloak and dagger stuff of like, how do I wanna try to get into this trade is part of your DNA, which I think if you'd started on the buy side, that's probably less native to you, because you're not setting the table for the people that are gonna come trade with you all the time, you're a taker.
因此,以这个例子来说,我认为波动率应该是24,但现在只交易在20,我今天进场,查看所有市场,发现我认为被低估的波动率今天表现疲软,很多东西都在下跌,而这些标的跌得更厉害。
So in that regard, like, let's say in that example, I think vols should be 24, it's trading for 20, I come in today, I look at all the markets, and I see that that vol that I think is cheap is underperforming today, like lots of things are down, these things are down even more.
所以今天是我进场的好时机。
So this is a great day for me to get in there.
所以我正在盯盘,运行算法去外面买入,同时也在查看经纪商市场,想知道是哪个经纪商在压低这个品种的价格。
So I'm working screens, I'm running algos to be out there buying, and then I'm scouring the broker markets and saying like, which broker is knocking this thing down?
让我试着去和他们谈谈,确保我的买价是最优的。
Let me try to go talk to them and make sure I'm best bid.
你知道,我想在这里对大额交易报出中间价。
You know, I wanna be mid market bid for size here.
所以也许那天我买入了5万单位的Vega,而第二天,这个品种的表现优于其他品种和波动率,波动率可能升到了22。
And so maybe that day I buy 50,000 Vega in that name, and then tomorrow, maybe that name is outperforming the vols and all the other names, so maybe that vols up to 22.
我觉得它仍然便宜。
I still think it's cheap.
我认为这个波动率应该是24,但今天我会在当前价位卖出1.5万单位。
I think that vol is 24, but I say today, I'm gonna sell 15,000 out at these levels.
我只是想围绕这个头寸进行交易,而随着时间推移,你是在为价值交易,同时通过这种方式逐步降低你的平均成本,因为你在此期间锁定了交易利润。
I'm just trying to trade around the position, and then what's happening is over time, you are trading for value, but you are trading around it in a way where you're sort of like lowering your average price, because you're booking trading profits in the meantime.
所以我认为,这种‘即使我觉得它便宜,也会在某个价格点上部分了结’的心态,源自于我作为高频交易员的背景。
And so I think that that mentality of, hey, there's a price at which I will let some of this go, even if I think it's cheap, comes from just being a high volume trader.
所以我认为这部分非常容易理解。
So I think that that part really translates pretty well.
它改善了你的执行效果。
It improves your execution.
你曾告诉我,在你刚加入Parallax初期,有一位导师问你:你是想每天优化你的损益,还是其他什么?
You mentioned to me that early in your transition into Parallax, you had a mentor who said to you, do you want to optimize your P and L on a daily basis or something else?
这个问题对你来说真的起到了启发作用。
And that this question really unlocked something for you.
我想直接从你这里了解。
And I wanted to get from you directly.
这个问题对你意味着什么?它最终如何影响了你在新岗位上的行为?
What did this question mean to you and how did it ultimately impact your behavior in your new seat?
这对我来说是一个非常深刻的领悟。
This was a sort of a profound one for me.
这是我需要听到的话。
It was something I needed to hear.
所以这里的背景是,这大概是我进入Parallax的第一或第二年,当时我正试图调整原油中的现货波动率相关性参数,不过我不打算深入太多细节,因为你的现货波动率相关性参数会对模型的德尔塔产生重大影响。
So the context here was, this is my, probably, I mean, first or second year of parallax, and the context here was that I was trying to dial in my spot ball correlation parameter in oil, and without getting too far into the weeds in that, your spot vol correlation parameter will have a large impact on your model deltas.
例如,如果你将现货波动率相关性参数设为1%、100%或-100%,你实际上是在说:每当现货上涨1%,我就认为波动率会下降1%,这在我看来是一种恒定跨式期权的行情。
So for example, if you run a spot vol correlation parameter of say 1% or a 100, or negative a 100, what you're saying is every time spot goes up 1%, I think vol comes in 1%, which is what I would say is that's a constant straddle regime.
这意味着,每次现货上涨,波动率就相应下降1%,跨式期权的价格基本保持不变,或者说剔除Theta影响后大致稳定。
That's saying every time, okay, so I believe that the straddle is always around the same price, or sort of like net of theta.
所以股价上涨,波动率下降1%,跨式期权价格恒定。
So stocks up, balls down, 1%, constant straddle.
当然,这只是一个局部的斜率,非常局部的斜率。
Now, obviously, that's a slope, and that's a very local slope.
如果股价翻倍,我并不认为波动率会减半。
If the stock doubles, I don't think vol halves.
因此很明显,这不可能是一个恒定参数。
So it's clear that that's not a constant parameter.
但我当时非常关注局部情况,原因是我非常在意每日的P&L,这种习惯是我做市商那几年养成的不良习惯。
But I was being very locally minded, and the reason was I was very concerned with my daily p and l, which was a bad habit I sort of picked up from spending those couple years as a market maker.
所以你真的不应该对你的现货波动率相关性过于教条,因为它确实会变化,因此你的导师是在鼓励你放宽视野,思考现货波动率相关性的期望值,而不是过度依赖近期的观察结果。
So you really don't wanna be too dogmatic about your spot vol correlation because it does change, and so what the mentor was doing is he was encouraging me to zoom out and think about the expected value of the spot ball correlation rather than overweighting it to the recent observations.
这个道理对我来说并不新鲜,我只是因为过去几年作为交易员的经历而需要被提醒一下。
So this lesson, it wasn't new to me, I just needed the reminder because of those years that I had spent as a grinder.
所以我写了这篇帖子,一篇题为《如果你每天都在赚钱,那你并没有最大化收益》的长文。
So I wrote this post, this kind of this big post called If You Make Money Every Day, You're Not Maximizing.
这句话或这个观点是我从SIG那里学到的。
And that is a line or an idea that I picked up at SIG.
这句话的背景是,对冲和降低风险是有成本的。
The context of the expression is that hedging and reducing risk is a cost.
因此,你的目标应该是,在给定的收益或机会下,承担你能容忍的最高风险。
So really your goal should be to run the highest tolerable risk for a given amount of edge or opportunity.
你不应该对冲超过必要的程度。
You don't wanna hedge more than you need to.
而你需要对冲多少,我们暂时把它称为一个黑箱。
And what is how much you need to, that is a We'll call that a black box for now.
我的意思是,这取决于你的资金规模、你的职责范围、你在状态不佳时的情绪稳定性,以及你与薪酬方案的激励一致性等等。
I mean, that is a function of your bankroll, your mandate, your emotional balance when you're running bad, your alignment or incentives with your compensation scheme and so forth.
但你不需要对冲超过必要的程度。
But you don't wanna hedge more than you need to.
顺便说一下,你经常会看到这种情况,比如在那些资本不雄厚的本地交易员身上。
And you would see this all the time, by the way, like on the floor with the locals that were not super well capitalized.
比如一个期权值一美元。
It's like an option's worth a dollar.
他们以90美分买进,一分钟之后就以95美分卖出。
They buy it for 90¢, and then they're selling it for 95¢ a minute later.
如果你是SIG的交易员,这种行为是足以被开除的,千万别这么做。
And this is like a fireable offense if you're a sig trader, like, don't do that.
你的目标是承受波动,并尽可能多地获得回报。
You are there to tolerate variance and to try to get paid as much as you can.
所以我的导师只是在帮助我消除那些我之前积累的错误思维。
So my mentor was just helping me undo the, like, brain damage I had picked up.
当然,这并不是对那些本地交易员的冒犯,他们资金不足,对他们来说,那样做可能是正确的。
And no offense to those locals, they were undercapitalized and that was probably the right thing for them to do.
但我已经不再处于那种境地,我需要承担更多的风险。
But I was no longer in that situation and I needed to be taking a lot of risk.
我知道你经常低估自己对数学的了解,但我认为你所做的很多工作都是定量的,但不一定是有系统的。
I know you often downplay your knowledge of mathematics, but I would argue a lot of what you do is quantitative, but not necessarily systematic.
过去你曾说过,你认为主观交易和系统交易的区别在于——这是你的原话:主观交易并不是因为数据是非结构化的就忽视它。
And in the past you've said you believe what separates discretionary from systematic is that, and this is a quote from you, discretionary trading is not ignoring data just because it's unstructured.
我想把话题交给你。
I wanna turn over to you.
你当时是什么意思?
What did you mean by that?
你能给我们一些例子,说明哪些非结构化数据会影响你对价值的看法吗?
And can you give us some ideas of the unstructured data that would influence your view of value?
首先,在数据高度结构化的领域,竞争会非常激烈。
So first of all, in areas where data is highly structured, it's going to be very competitive.
所以你需要有很强的自我认知,始终清楚自己在这个游戏的等级体系中处于什么位置。
So you need to have a lot of self awareness of, like, again, like, where are you in the pecking order always of the way this game is being played?
我认为,当缺乏大量历史数据参考时,事情才最有趣,而这也是主观交易能够脱颖而出的地方。
So I think that things are most interesting when they don't have a lot of large data precedence, and that's where discretionary trading will sort of shine.
另一种说法是,每个人都在信息匮乏的状态中。
And another way to phrase it is that everybody's in a low info state.
那么,你如何在信息匮乏的状态中相对占优呢?
So how are you relatively in a low info state?
而这正是我认为我们当时感到有优势的地方。
And this was sort of where I think we felt strong.
对我来说,我更希望我们进行这种模拟交易游戏——把所有人聚在一个房间里,完全没有任何先例,看看谁最后带着最多的钱走出来。
Like, for me, I would rather we do these mock trading games, like, let's throw everybody in a room, and we'll just have no precedent at all, and just see who walks out of the room with the most money.
这几乎就像我们当初的训练方式。
It was almost like the way our training sort of was.
所以我们喜欢这种环境,而在那种可以靠数据堆砌到极致的环境中,我不是强项,因此我不太想在那个领域里大举投入。
So we like that environment, and in an environment where you can sort of, like, data hack things to death, that's not my strong suit, so that is not an area where I necessarily wanna be big.
我来举个例子。
So I'll give an example.
正如我所说,当数据稀少时,情况会变得特别有趣。
Like I said, like, I think that these cases where the data is sparse are where things get really interesting.
当然,这并不一定具有可扩展性。
And granted, that's not necessarily that scalable.
这也是它面临的另一个问题。
That's sort of the other problem with it.
但我想回到这个故事,我很喜欢这个案例。
But I wanna go back I like this story.
这个案例非常能说明我所讲的内容。
It's very instructive of what I'm talking about.
如果你回溯到2020年,当时油价跌至负值,我当时在交易石油期权。
If you go back to 2020 when oil went below zero, so I was trading oil options.
那时我也是USO的大额交易者,我们基本认为USO的波动率被高估了。
I was also a large trader in USO at the time, and we basically thought that USO vol was a sale.
我的意思是,波动率确实很高,但我并不认为这是个卖出机会,因为它只是表面上看起来高。
I mean, the vol was very high, but I didn't think it was a sale because it was optically high.
事实上,我确实买入了大量期货期权的波动率,其倍数超过了我过去支付过的最高波动率。
As a matter of fact, I actually bought a bunch of futures options vol at multiples of the highest vol I had ever paid in the past.
所以并不是说,哦,数字高了,就卖出。
So it wasn't that I'm like, oh, number's high, sell it.
事实上,我在期货期权上买入了,而USO的波动率才是该卖出的。
As a matter of fact, I was buying it in futures options, it was a sale in USO.
而它之所以是卖出机会,是因为它错了。
And it was a sale because it was wrong.
那么,为什么它是错的呢?
So why was it wrong?
它错了有三个原因,主要源于USO不再代表一桶原油这一事实。
There were three reasons why it was wrong, mostly stemming from the fact that USO was no longer a barrel of oil.
它实际上是对一桶原油的期权。
It was an option on a barrel of oil.
所以想象一下你做空原油期货,同时做多USO。
So imagine your short oil futures and your long USO.
在上涨区间,即高于零时,你的盈亏是相互抵消的。
On the upside, above zero, your p and l is offset.
但在低于零时,你在USO这一端不会再亏损,而你仍然做空原油期货,这就形成了一个完美的看跌期权盈亏图。
But below zero, you can't lose any more on your USO leg, and you're just short oil futures, so that's a perfect put hockey stick diagram.
因此,USO已经变成了一种看跌期权。
So USO had turned into a put option.
这一点的线索在于,它开始以高于其净资产价值(NAV)的价格交易。
Now, the clue to this was that it started trading at a premium to its NAV.
如果你天真地看待这一点,你会认为是一大群散户在试图抄底原油,因为油价大幅下跌,他们正在买入ETF。
Now, if you're naive, you look at that and you say, oh, there's a bunch of retail donkeys that are trying to buy the bounce back in oil because the price went down a lot and they're buying the ETF.
但如果你深入思考,就会意识到USO本质上是一种期权,而这个高于NAV的溢价实际上是期权的外在价值。
But if you think harder about it, you realize that USO is an option, and that premium to NAV is actually extrinsic.
因此,这种外在价值实际上是可以被转化的。
So that extrinsic can actually be converted.
这有点混乱,我们之前表述得也不够精确,但它实际上可以转化为隐含波动率。
It's a bit messy and we were imprecise about it, but it can actually be converted to an implied vol.
我们根据当时期货期权的波动率水平,对这个溢价应该有多少形成了明确的看法。
We had an opinion of exactly how much that premium should be based upon where the futures options vols were trading at the time.
所以我们回过头来思考一下,为什么USO的波动率是一个卖出机会。
So what we did was, well, let's go back to why USO vol was a sale.
我只是想澄清一下。
I just wanna clarify.
这是因为ETF的公司结构使得投资者的责任是有限的。
This is because of the corporate structure around the ETF that it is limited liability to the investors.
没错。
Correct.
他们亏损不会超过投资金额,而期货合约则不同,你可能会亏损更多。
That they cannot lose more than they invest versus with the futures contract, you could.
完全正确。
Absolutely.
没人会打电话给奶奶说,因为USO跌至负值,你欠我们钱。
Nobody's gonna call up grandma and say, you owe us money because USO went below zero.
对吧?
Right?
所以这就是我们认为它应该做空的原因。
So here was our thinking as why it was a sale.
因此,尽管可能性很小,但USO仍有可能跌至零。
So on the off chance, it is a material but low chance that USO could go to zero.
一旦USO跌至零,所有这些外在时间溢价和长期期权都将归零。
In the event that it goes to zero, all this extrinsic time premium and these long dated options is going to zero.
零是一个吸收屏障,就像股票被现金收购一样。
Zero is absorbing barrier, so it's like a cash takeover in a stock.
所以第一点是,如果USO真的跌至零,这些期权应该有一定的折扣。
So number one, it's like there should be some discount to these options on the event that USO does go to zero.
这就是第一点。
So that's point one.
这可能是最不重要的考虑因素,但并不是零。
That's like, that's probably the least of the considerations, but it's not a zero.
所以这是第一个原因。
So that's one reason.
第二个原因是,如果你买入USO,你不仅获得了石油期货,还获得了内置的看跌期权。
The second reason is that if you buy USO, you're getting oil futures, but you're also getting that embedded put.
那么,哪个更波动?
Now what's more volatile?
是带有看跌期权的石油投资组合,还是单纯的石油?
A portfolio of oil with a put or oil?
因此,USO这个投资组合在本质上波动性更低。
So that portfolio that is USO is fundamentally less volatile.
如果从每日表现来看,它的表现方式是:当价格接近零时,其相对于净资产值的溢价会达到最大。
And the way it manifests, if you're just looking at it on a daily basis, is that when you are near zero, its premium to NAV will be sort of maximized.
当石油价格从零反弹并上涨时,相对于净资产值的溢价会下降,这意味着ETF的价格上涨速度不会那么快。
And as oil rallies off of zero and it goes up, the premium to the NAV is gonna decline, which means that the ETF price is not gonna go up as fast.
同样,在下行方面,当油价接近零时,净资产值会扩大。
Likewise, on the downside, as oil approaches zero, the NAV expands.
因此,当原油期货下跌时,USO的跌幅不会那么快,这就是你在日常中实际看到的表现。
So as the oil future goes down, USO does not go down as fast, and that's how you will actually see it manifest on a daily basis.
所以这个被称为USO的投资组合,或者说USO本身就是一个投资组合,它的波动性低于原油期货。
So this portfolio that is called USO, or that's the thing, like, USO is a portfolio, and that portfolio is less volatile than an oil future.
这就是第二个原因,解释了为什么我们理解USO的波动性相对于期货期权应该更低。
So that's the second reason why we understood that vol should be lower in USO relative to the futures options.
第三个原因,这有点像扑克策略。
The third reason, and this is like a bit of a poker reason.
如果你还记得基金经理们,他们正面临生存风险。
So if you remember the fund managers, they're facing existential risk.
他们担心,我们的资产可能会归零。
They're worried, like, our asset could go to zero.
我们这个产品的整个业务都可能归零。
Our whole business could go to zero on this product.
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那么他们怎么做呢?
So what do they do?
他们将合约滚动到下个月。
They roll to the next month.
现在他们将期货合约滚动到下个月。
Now they roll futures to the next month.
理解期货的第一个要点是,远期商品期货的波动性低于近期期货。
Like the first thing about understanding what futures is that deferred commodity futures are less volatile than the prompt future.
它们相对于近期期货的贝塔值低于1。
They have a lower beta than one to the prompt future.
另一点是,当商品的波动率变得非常高时,通常会出现远期月份的贝塔值相对于近期月份下降的情况。
And then the other thing is, is when vol gets very, very high in a commodity, that'll tend to happen in a way where the betas of the back months decline relative to the front month.
这其中一部分是相关性,但大部分是波动率比率。
And part of that is correlation, but most of it is the vol ratio.
因此,如果一年期期货的波动率是近期期货的60%,在波动率全面飙升的突破行情中,十二个月期期货的波动率可能低至近期期货的30%。
So if a one year future moves at 60% of the vol of the front month future, in a breakout situation where the vols have all exploded, that twelve month future might trade as low as 30% of the vol of the front month future.
所以,顾问正在调整投资组合的构成,持有波动性更低的期货。
So what happens is the advisor is changing the composition of the portfolio to hold less volatile futures.
现在他们滚动到M2,我们说,如果他们要滚动到M2,那么他们有可能会滚动到更多的期货上。
Now they roll out to M2, and we said, well, if they're gonna roll to M2, there's a non zero chance that they're gonna roll out into more futures.
比如,他们可能会滚动到一篮子期货,而不是单一合约,而这正是他们所做的。
Like, maybe they'll roll out to like a strip of futures instead of that, and that's exactly what they did.
因此,我们在卖出期权时,认为这个投资组合的波动性可能会进一步降低。
So we were selling the options thinking there's a chance that this portfolio is gonna get even less volatile.
所以我们对这个问题的思考是,有三种方式或三种力量共同作用,表明USO的波动率会更低。
So the way we're thinking about it is we have three ways to win or three forces that all conspire to say USO vol is lower.
另外,我们后来得到了证实,因为当你去尝试卖出USOVOL时,语音市场根本没有买方流动性。
And the other thing is then we got confirmation, because when you went out and tried to sell USOVOL, there was no bid side liquidity in the voice market.
所以你基本上只能一点一点地在屏幕上报价,这让我意识到,我们并不是唯一理解这一点的人。
So you basically had to chip away at the screens, which told me that we were not the only people that understood this.
但我们最初的信心从何而来?是因为我们在开盘前十分钟就彻底搞清楚了这一切。
But where did we get conviction in the very first place was that we figured it all out ten minutes to the open.
我记得,我和我的合伙人当时打开了一份电子表格,往里面输入各种数据,我们必须修改期权模型,以适应期货期权,因为我们需要切换到一种允许标的物价格低于零的模型,所有计算都是靠估算完成的。
I remember, like, me and my partner, we had, a spreadsheet open, and we were throwing numbers in there, we had to change our option model in for the futures options because we had to switch to a model where the underlying can go below zero, and we're just all back of the envelope calculations.
我们花了十分钟就搞定了,然后说,好吧。
And, like, we did it all in, ten minutes and, like, said, okay.
这就是我们认为的净资产价值,或者净资产溢价应该值多少。
This is what we think the NAV is worth or the premiums in NAV should be worth.
这就是我们认为USO波动率应该是什么水平。
This is what we think USO vol should be.
我们想,也许其他人能更快做到,但我们愿意赌一把,在这种信息匮乏的情况下,我们的反应速度比所有人都快。
And we're like, look, maybe some other people could have done it faster, but we were willing to bet that in this low info situation that we were faster than everybody else.
我讨厌让任何人对新技术进行推测,因为我知道这往往是失败预测的坟场,感觉有点不公平,但我知道你一直关注大型语言模型的演变及其处理非结构化数据的能力。
I hate to ask anyone to speculate about new technology because I'm sure that's just a graveyard of failed predictions and it feels a little bit unfair, but I know you've been keeping up with the evolution of large language models and their capacity to deal with unstructured data.
我想知道,你认为这将如何影响主观交易员?
I'm curious what your thoughts are on how that will influence discretionary traders.
随着时间推移,这种工具是否会逐渐拉近主观交易和系统化交易之间的距离?
Will that potentially over time as a tool nudge discretionary and systematic closer and closer together?
我认为如果我说不,那我就是个傻瓜。
I think I would be a fool to say no.
我认为趋势会朝这个方向发展。
I think the trend would be in that direction.
我同意这一点。
I would agree with that.
我的意思是,市场在数据结构化方面正变得越来越好。
I mean, the tendency is the market is getting better and better at structuring data.
在结构化数据方面有利可图。
There's money to be made in structuring data.
这里存在激励因素。
There's an incentive there.
所以我认为这就是趋势。
So I think that that is the trend.
但我还认为,这一过程的瓶颈仍然在于数据采集,而其中一些问题非常棘手。
Now I also think that the bottleneck to that is still in the data capture, and some of those problems are really hard.
首先,让我们来思考一下经纪商的互动。
So first of all, like, let's just think about broker interactions.
一方面,你可以做一些事情。
So on the one side, you can do things.
比如,有一个完整的交易成本分析(TCA)领域,每次我与这个经纪商交易时,你都会有一整套流程来评估:我交易的波动率,这个经纪商的交易对手是否具备波动率敏感性?
Like, there's a whole TCA world where you're saying, every time I trade with this broker, you have this whole process for saying, I benchmark the vol that I traded, is this broker's counterparties, are they vol smart?
他们是否具备德尔塔敏感性?
Are they delta smart?
他们是如何超越我的?
How are they beating me?
这些是好的交易对手吗?
Are these good counterparties?
这些是差的交易对手吗?
Are these bad counterparties?
所有这些都已经很完善了,这属于结构化数据的范畴,人们一直在研究这个问题。
Like, that's all fleshed out, and that is a structured data situation, and people are working on that problem all the time.
现在,更困难的问题是反事实情况。
Now, what's a harder problem is the counterfactual.
所以,经纪人给我展示了这个订单,我选择了放弃。
So it's the broker showed me this order, I passed.
那么,对于我放弃而实际上并未参与的交易,我是否要记录该交易后续的发展情况?
Now, am I gonna log what evolves on that trade on a trade that I passed on that I actually didn't participate on?
我该如何记录这一点?
And then how do I record that?
如果我交易了,就会对价格产生影响。
Like, if I traded it, I would have affected the price.
所以我觉得这是一个非常棘手的问题,数据采集也是一个极其困难的问题。
So I just think it's a pretty diabolical problem, and the data capture's a diabolical problem.
你是否在记录每一次电话通话,并监听对方说‘放弃’的时刻?
It's like, are you recording every phone call and listening to when the person says pass?
交易员现在是否必须手动标注他们为何选择放弃?
Does the trader now have to go label why they passed?
你可能不交易的原因有很多,这些原因甚至与你是否觉得自己被逆向选择无关,原因多种多样。
There's tons of reasons why you might pass on a trade that don't even have to do with, like, you think you're being adversely selected on or whatever, there's lots of reasons.
所以你现在会想,我是不是得让交易员在一天中间停下来,为每一笔交易做标注?
So you're now like, do I have to tell my traders to stop in the middle of their day and like label every trade?
我的意思是,你每天要处理数百笔交易,这在目前看来是不可行的,至少以我现在的看法是这样。
I mean, you're doing hundreds of trades a day, it's not a feasible thing to do, at least today, the way I see it.
那么,我们有一天能达到这个目标吗?
Now, are we gonna get there one day?
我们很可能最终会做到,而我们并不打算与技术进步背道而驰,对吧?
We probably will, and that's just, like, not in the business of betting against technology, right?
但这种数据采集的瓶颈,我认为依然存在,而且仍然有机会去理解这些数据,因为你知道其他人很可能还没有理清这些信息,其他人几乎不可能已经弄明白了这些内容。
But but that data capture, that bottleneck, I think, is still there, and there's still opportunity to try to make sense of that stuff because you know that other people haven't that it's very unlikely that other people have made sense of that stuff.
这就是我对这个问题的看法。
So that's my thought on that one.
我听过你提到的一个想法,我觉得非常有趣,那就是公司背景会影响不同交易员的思维方式。
One of the ideas I've heard you talk about that I think is really interesting is this idea of firm lineage having an influence on how different traders think.
我希望你能进一步阐述这个概念,你当时指的是什么。
And I was hoping you could expand on that concept, what you meant by it.
然后,如果可以的话,作为补充问题,它如何影响了你过去在公司中与不同交易员合作或招聘不同交易员的方式?
And maybe then as an addendum, as a secondary question, if I can, how does it influence how you thought about working with different traders at your firm or hiring different traders over time?
我认为,思考交易公司及其传承的一个有用方式是:它们是‘倒手者’还是‘威瑞豪瑟’?
I think a useful way to think about trading firms and lineages is are they a flipper or a Weyerhaeuser?
我想我不至于冒犯太多人,说Virtu这样的公司是‘倒手者’,它们的优势在于速度,它们的目标就是:我以27美分买入,然后以28美分卖出,或者甚至利润更小,只有几分钱的价差。
So I think I'm not stepping on too many toes to say that a firm like Virtu is a flipper, and their edge is in speed, and that's what they're trying to do, like, I'm gonna buy something for 27¢ because I'm gonna sell it for 28 or maybe the edge is even less than that, fractions of pennies.
它们的目标是当天结束时保持持仓中性——在如此大规模的业务中尽可能做到这一点;而威瑞豪瑟则致力于建立头寸,这正是SIG的模式。
They are in the business of being flat at the end of the day, insofar as you can running such a large business, versus a Weyerhaeuser who is seeking to put on positions, which is very much the way SIG was.
我已经很久没在SIG工作了,所以今天我不想多谈他们,但它们确实属于这种模式。
I haven't been at SIG in a long time, so I don't wanna talk about them today, but they were in that model.
还有一种第三种模式,就是高度系统化的模式,比如Timberhill就让人想到这一点。
And then there was a sort of like a third model, which is the super systematic model, Timberhill comes to mind.
Timberhill的交易员非常超前,这简直有点疯狂。
So Timberhill traders, this is kinda wild, but like, they were really ahead of their time.
他们是交易大厅里的交易员。
They're traders on the floor.
他们有一台计算机,基本上接收所有数据。
They had this computer that was basically just fed all the values.
这就像一个主算法,能计算出所有期权的合理价值。
It was like a master algorithm that said this is what all the options are just worth.
他们通过分析所有市场的数据来实现这一点,并对每项资产都有一个公允价值,但他们并不是追求最大化利润的人。
They were doing this by doing sort of like data analysis across all markets, and they had a fair value for everything, but they were not maximizers.
比如,如果你在人群中遇到一位Timberhill交易员,他可能会以糟糕的价格给你流动性,因为系统显示这是个好买点。
Like, you could, for example, if you had a Timberhill trader in your crowd, he might give you liquidity at a terrible price because the box said that that was a good buy.
与此同时,交易池里的其他做市商都在抢这个买价,明明是个好买点,为什么不提高你的买价来获得更好的价格呢?
Meanwhile, like, every other market maker in the pit is hitting this bid, and it's like, even if it's a good buy, why not back your bid up and get a better price?
你本可以这么做,但他们并没有把大量资本投入到分散决策和培训中,而是把所有资本都投入到了构建这个主模型上。
Like, you could have done that, but they were not putting, investing so much capital into the decentralized decision making and training, and they were putting all their capital into building this master model.
因此,Timberhill代表了一种独特的市场运作方式。
So Timberhill was kind of its own sort of way of approaching the market.
因此,你有这些套利者、仓库,随着交易台的发展,如果你观察某家X、Y、Z公司,并且他们聘请了一位具有特定背景的交易员,你就能推测出他们构建业务和交易台的方式。
So you have these flippers, warehouses, and as desks evolve, if you're looking at firm x y z, and they go out and hire a trader with a specific lineage, you can guess the way that they are building their business and their desk.
现在这是一个相当有趣的时期,因为我了解一些传统上以套利者著称的公司,但套利模式的问题在于其可扩展性。
Right now, it's kinda interesting time because I'm aware of some of the firms that have traditionally been The problem with the flipper thing is the scalability of it.
我的意思是,这有点像高频交易领域,你最终会遇到可扩展性的瓶颈。
I mean, that's sort of like the HFT realm, and you're just gonna run into limits on scalability on that.
因此,如果你想要增长,最终你必须成为威瑞豪瑟公司,而威瑞豪瑟的思维方式是完全不同的。
So what'll happen is that you eventually, if you wanna grow, you need to become a Weyerhaeuser, and the Weyerhaeuser's way of thinking is a different way of thinking.
因此,我知道一些这样的套利者现在正在招聘那些来自威瑞豪瑟背景的人,因为成为威瑞豪瑟模式的业务夏普比率更低,但运营支出也低得多,因为你不需要每年投入一亿美元或五千万美元的技术预算,对吧?
So I'm aware of situations where some of these flippers are now interviewing people that have come and that's a lower Sharpe's business to be a Weyerhaeuser, but the OpEx is much lower because you don't have a $100,000,000, $50,000,000 a year sort of like technology budget, right?
所以这是完全不同的商业模式,因此套利者最终会饱和他们的市场,然后试图转型为仓库模式。
So it is a different business, and so it tends to be that the flippers will eventually try to, they'll saturate their market and they'll try to become more warehouses.
至于人力资本方面,也就是招聘人员,另一个来源就是银行。
As far as the human capital part, like hiring people, the other one there is banks.
银行的背景传承非常重要,因为有些银行拥有非常强大的交易员。
And lineages are very important with banks because some banks are very strong traders.
它们会将大量交易流内部化,而一些银行则完全专注于代理业务,它们拥有大量委托账户,客户会来找它们,让它们处理一万份Facebook看涨期权,然后银行出去找波动率基金和其他交易员,说:嘿,我们卖出了大量这些看涨期权,你们能以这个水平买回去吗?
They are going to internalize a lot of their flow, and some banks are very much just in the agency business, and they have a bunch of layoff accounts where their client comes to them and sticks them into 10,000 Facebook calls, and they're going out to the street and farming it out to the vol funds and the other traders and saying, hey, we sold a bunch of these calls, will you guys sell these back to us at this level?
我们认为这个价位不错,但它们不想承担所有这些风险。
We think it's a good level, but they don't wanna warehouse all that risk.
然后,就像我说的,有些银行实力非常强。
And then, like I said, some banks are really strong.
在招聘时,曾经有过很难的情况,比如面试银行交易员,因为一些人确实有出色的客户业务,但这掩盖了他们糟糕的交易习惯;或者你问他们:好吧,你来这儿后没有客户,我们会给你一台电脑和一部电话,你得靠这个赚钱,你打算怎么做?
When you're hiring, there have been times when it's been difficult, like interviewing a bank trader, because some of them have really good client businesses, and that masks bad trading habits, or just, you ask them like, okay, when you come here, don't have any clients, so we're gonna give you a computer and a phone, you gotta make money come out of that thing, like how are you gonna do that?
他们回答:我觉得当波动率走低时,我会买入,当波动率上升时……这种想法太天真了,行不通。
And they're like, well, I think when this vol gets low, I'm gonna buy and this vol gets like, it's a bit naive, it's not gonna work.
因为一直以来都有大量客户交易流的掩盖,他们这方面的技能并不强。
So that muscle isn't that strong for them because it's been covered up by the fact that they've had all this client flow.
这并不是对银行交易员的普遍性评价。
And this is not a broad statement about bank traders.
我只是说,我以前见过这种情况。
I'm just saying that I have seen that before.
因此,它提醒你,一个人的背景将决定他们如何看待市场中的优势。
And so it reminds you that the lineage of where somebody comes from is gonna dictate how they view edge in the marketplaces.
在过去大约五年里,你发表了很多文章。
You have published a lot of writing over the last, I guess, five years now.
顺便恭喜你,五周年快乐!在你的《Moon Tower》博客上,其中很多内容都聚焦于永恒的投资和交易理念。
Congratulations on five years, by the way, on your party at the Moon Tower blog, a lot of which is focused on evergreen investment and trading concepts.
这正是我经常向别人推荐它的原因——你五年前写的文章,和今天写的同样相关和切中要害。
That's one of the reasons I end up recommending it so much to people is because the articles you wrote five years ago are just as relevant and pertinent to the ones you wrote today.
但今年早些时候,你推出了一项新项目,名为 moontower.ai。
But earlier this year, you launched a new project called moontower.ai.
它是什么?
What is it?
它从何而来?
Where did it come from?
是的。
Yeah.
首先,用一句话来说。
Well, first of all, in a phrase.
我的联合创始人是艾米·加尔。
So my co founder on it is Emmy Gal.
用一句话说,我们开发这款软件是为了帮助用户做出更好的期权交易。
And in a phrase, we launched this software to help users make better option trades.
就是这么简单。
It's that simple.
那么,从技术上讲,它是什么?
Now mechanically, what is it?
它是一组仪表板,模拟了波动率交易员在识别潜在机会时所经历的步骤。
It's a set of dashboards that step through a progression that a vol trader would step through to identify possible opportunities.
它与现有众多期权工具的区别在于这些步骤的结构方式,以及它的强烈倾向性。
Now, what distinguishes it from any number of existing sort of option tools is how that progression is structured, and really, like, how opinionated it is.
这是我对世界的看法。
It is my way of seeing the world.
这听起来真的很自大,所以我得退一步解释一下我们是怎么走到这一步的,因为这个项目的根源其实非常深厚,尽管它是个新产品。
That sounds really arrogant, so I'm gonna back up and explain how we got here, because the roots of the project are actually pretty deep, even though it's a new product.
我认为这里的思维方式对专业的期权交易员来说会很熟悉。
I think it's gonna be familiar to professional options traders, like the thinking here.
我最初从事股票期权交易,但正如我提到的,在SIG任职期间的中途,我开始在纽约商品交易所开展原油期权业务,涵盖原油、取暖油、汽油及其各种衍生品。
So I started in equity options, but like I mentioned, like halfway through my tenure at SIG, I started the crude oil options business on an NYMEX that included crude oil, heating oil, gasoline, and various derivative types on them.
但当我离开SIG成为个体经营者时,我转而交易天然气,因为我的竞业禁止协议禁止我接触石油产品。
But when I left SIG to be a sole prop, I actually switched to natural gas because my non compete forbid me from touching petroleum products.
所以我交易了几年天然气,几年后,页岩气的影响开始摧毁天然气的波动率市场,这意味着市场上为这种商品提供做市服务的容量过剩了。
So I was trading natural gas for a couple years, and after a few years of that, the impact of shale started killing the vol market in natural gas, which meant it was, really what had happened was there was too much market making capacity for the name.
所以竞争者太多,而机会太少,市场上已经没有优势可言了。
So just too many predators, not enough prey, there was no edge in the market.
但与此同时,我转向了金属交易,因为当时白银价格正在飙升,即将冲向50美元,而COMEX上的贵金属电子市场仍处于早期阶段。
So at the same time though, I pivoted to metals because this was right when silver was ripping higher, it was headed on its way to $50, and electronic markets were still nascent in the precious metals market on the COMEX.
因此竞争并不激烈,于是我们将所有从天然气市场转移过来的流式基础设施都转向了金属市场。
So there wasn't a ton of competition, so we just pointed all of our streaming infrastructure from natural gas to metals.
我实际上去COMEX参加了考试,获得了会员资格,然后冲进交易池,以便能够对冲经纪商的交易流,这样我们就能同时覆盖楼上和楼下的交易。
I actually went, took the test on the COMEX, got a membership, and I ran into the pit so that I could trade against broker flow, so we can cover it from upstairs and downstairs.
在白银行情结束后,棉花开始活跃起来,它在Nymex或ICE交易,而那个交易池就在我们楼下。
After that silver rip, that was dying down, and then cotton, which was trading on the Nibot or the ice, that was the floor below us in that building.
那个品种出现了大规模的逼空行情,于是我去了ICE,获得了会员资格,在那个交易池里交易了几个月,那是个相当疯狂的故事,也许改天再讲,那段时间确实很有趣。
There was a big short squeeze in that product, and so I went, got a secured a membership on the ice, I ran to that pit for a few months, and then that's kind of crazy story, probably maybe for another time, it was a kind of interesting time there.
棉花热潮平息后,咖啡交易池开始升温,而那个交易池离我站的地方只有十英尺远。
And then after the cotton craze kind of died down, the coffee pit started getting hot, and that was 10 feet from where I was standing down there.
于是我去了咖啡交易池,待了六个月。
So then I went and spent six months in coffee.
所有这些在短时间内积累的经验,某种程度上催生了一个想法。
All of this experience in a short period of time was sort of the start of an idea.
我记得,我那时有种创伤后应激障碍,因为我在天然气市场交易了三年,眼看着市场逐渐消亡,被迫去寻找其他交易品种,并快速掌握这些新市场。
I remember, I'm like, I have some PTSD from the natural gas market, which I had been trading for three years, sort of dying, and then being sort of forced to figure out other things to trade, and getting up to speed on these new markets.
所以我们萌生的想法是:创建一个商品市场的横截面视角,专注于任何正在火热的品种。
So the idea that we had is, let's create a cross sectional view of commodity markets where we could just focus on whatever was hot.
因此,我们会使用一组标准的成交量指标来在不同市场间进行标准化,然后根据需要灵活调整,以适应这些资产的特定性质。
So we'd use a standard set of volumetrics to normalize across the markets, and then we would use our discretion to adjust them as we needed to, to accommodate for sort of the specific nature of those assets.
但我们并不是程序员,听起来可能很荒谬,但我们雇了一名聪明的高中生,仅仅因为他和我们共享办公室的其中一位同事是邻居。
Now, we weren't coders, so it sounds ridiculous, but we hired a smart senior in high school literally because he was neighbors with one of the guys in the office that we shared office space with.
这孩子懂Java,我们就说:好吧,我们买些数据,你帮我们建一个数据库,我们可以从中查询图表,虽然非常原始,但这正是我后来在基金里构建、并在转到买方后交易时所采用的原型概念。
The kid knew Java, and we were like, okay, we'll buy some data, you make a database that we could query charts from, it was super primitive, but this was the proto concept of what I would later build at the fund and how I would trade when I went to the buy side.
所以,如果我们跳过基金这些年的发展——我花了近十年时间构建和交易这个框架——当我2021年离开时,我真的彻底停止了交易的思考,我大量旅行,参与多个教育项目,写了很多东西,但其中一个教育项目就是我和你之前的嘉宾Tina以及我们以前的同事Skye Steiner一起举办的免费模拟交易研讨会。
So if we fast forward through the years of the fund, where I got to build and trade that framework for nearly a decade, when I left in 2021, I really shut down thinking about trading, I was traveling a ton, I was doing several education projects and writing a lot, but one of those education projects were these free mock trading seminars that I was doing with your former guest, Tina, and a former colleague of ours, Skye Steiner.
我当时在纽约和Tina一起举办这个活动,实际上是在她的办公室,就是在那儿我认识了Emmy。
So I was doing this event in New York with Tina, actually at her office, and I meet Emmy there.
Emmy参加了那次活动,几个月后,他请我指导他交易加密货币期权。
And Emmy, he came to that event, and then a few months after that, he asked me to coach him on trading crypto options.
他一直在交易加密货币期权,但他意识到自己对所做的事情根本没有一套清晰的流程。
He had been trading crypto options, and he recognized that he really didn't have much of a process for what he was doing.
所以,在那次见面后,他问我:你介意帮我理清一下思路吗?
So after meeting me there, said, you know, would you mind helping me out think through this?
所以我答应了,之后我们在每周进行两次两小时的辅导。
So I agreed to it, and then as I was coaching him, we would do two hours a week.
这是我第一次将我所做的事系统性地写成流程。
This is the first time I had ever sort of taken what I was doing and methodically written it down in a flow.
于是我向他详细讲解了我的思路进展,但由于他是软件开发者,他会把这些想法转化为带界面的代码,这真的让我大吃一惊。
So I walked through my progressions with him, but because he's a software developer, he would turn the ideas around in code with a UI, which honestly blew my mind.
我告诉他一些东西,两天后他就会给我一个实际的示例。
I would tell him something like two days later, he'd turn around an example of it.
于是我开始想,等等,我其实一直渴望重新拥有我的仪表盘,以前总觉得没有巨额投入根本不可能实现,但你可以帮我一起构建它,我们可以一起完成。
So I started thinking, well, wait a minute, I've been dying to have my dashboards back, I never really thought it was possible without it costing a ton of money, but you can help me build this, and we can do it together.
于是我们开始搭建这个系统,这最初只是为了我们自己。
So we started building that, and this was, it was for us.
然后去年夏天,他通过WhatsApp发给我一个着陆页,他买下了moontower.ai这个域名,并把页面发给我,说:‘如果我们觉得这个东西有价值,也许其他人也会想要。’
And then what happened was he WhatsApp ed me last summer with a landing page, and he had bought the moontower.ai domain, and he sends me this landing page, and he says, hey, if we want this, maybe other people are gonna want it too.
我思考了一阵子,意识到这里的主要挑战在于如何教育人们如何使用它、如何以这种方式思考,但我也觉得这正是我一直以来所做工作的完整体现。
I thought about it for a bit, said, I recognize the challenge here was gonna be educating people on how to use this and how to think in this way, but I also thought it was the full expression of what I had already been doing.
我本来就在教这些东西,但现在你可以实际练习,可以真正去做一些事情,而不仅仅是阅读。
I was already teaching this stuff, but now you could actually practice it, you could actually do something instead of just reading.
而且我可以重新戴上我的Volgoggles了。
And I get to get my volgoggles back on.
所以这基本上就是它的由来。
So that was basically how it came about.
如果让我现在直接向你推销,就像你是投资者一样,给我一个电梯演讲,Moon Tower AI 解决了什么问题,又是如何解决的?
So if I can put you on the spot, sort of like you're pitching me as an investor and you give me the elevator pitch, what problem does Moon Tower AI try to solve and how does it go about doing so?
那么,目标用户是谁?
So who's it for?
它是给那些已经在使用期权的人准备的。
It's for people that are already using options.
如果你完全新手,还没准备好交易期权——大多数人都是这样,而且大多数人也确实不应该交易期权——我们提供免费会员,可以让你访问大量免费学习资源。
If you're totally raw and not ready to trade options, which is most people and probably should be most people, we have a free membership, which basically just gives you access to a ton of free learning resources.
所以我会说,这个产品主要是面向那些已经在以某种方式交易期权的人。
So I would say that this is for people that are already trading options in some way.
他们使用期权来表达自己的投资观点。
They're using options to express their investing ideas.
这涵盖了非常广泛的群体。
That's a very wide swath.
我们在这里做的是,用VolTrader的视角来分析选择交易哪些期权以及如何管理它们。
What we're doing here is bringing a VolTrader lens to the act of choosing which options to trade and how to manage that.
所以这可能适用于任何人。
So this could be for anybody.
我的意思是,无论你是对冲、投机,还是卖出备兑看涨期权——这其实也是一种波动率交易——我们都希望对如何思考这些策略有更细致的理解。
I mean, if you're hedging, if you're speculating, or you're selling covered calls, which is a vol trade, we like to have a lot of nuance about how we think about that.
但你知道我,我非常反对那种‘卖出看涨期权是为了获得收入’的说法。
But you know me, I'm very against this framing of you're selling calls for income.
我的意思是,如果一个期权有50%的概率价值5美元,50%的概率价值为零,那它的价值就是2.5美元。
I mean, if an option's 50% to be worth $5 and 50% to be worth zero, it's worth 2 and a half.
如果你以2美元的价格卖出它,没错,现金会进入你的账户,但你并没有获得任何收入。
If you sell it for $2, like, yeah, cash goes into your account, but you have not made any income.
回到这个核心观点,我们整个节目中一直绕着一个关键问题:了解你的优势在哪里。
Going back to this core idea, something we sort of danced around this entire episode of knowing where your edge lies.
你曾告诉我,你并不认为任何人,或者大多数人,在边缘情况下真的能成为居家的波动率交易员,这实际上更像是一种机构化的过程。
You've said to me that you don't actually believe that anybody or maybe most people leave it open in the edge case can really be an at home vol trader, that it really is more of an institutionalized process.
为什么不行?
Why not?
你为什么不相信有人能真正成为一名成功的居家波动率交易员?
Why don't you believe someone can really be a successful at home vol trader?
让我对此稍作细化。
I'll put some nuance in this.
当我这么说时,我的意思并不是指我曾经是一名波动率交易员,或者当我想到机构化的波动率交易时,主要原因在于,作为一名专业波动率交易员,你交易的合约数量极其庞大,而利润空间却非常微小。
When I say that, I mean it not in the way that I was a vol trader or that when I think of institutional vol trading, and the main reason for that is because you're just trading so many contracts when you are a professional vol trader for small edges.
举个例子,我每天交易的期权合约量相当于10万份股票期权,这只是我的持仓规模。
To give you an idea, I was trading the equivalent of a 100,000 equity options a day, as just my book.
而你的优势往往只有几分钱的水平。
And your edge is measured in like, sort of like the penny ballpark.
所以随着时间推移,单笔交易中你可能觉得自己获得了更大的优势,但经过逆向选择等因素后,你实际实现的收益最终平均下来,每份合约大概就只有一分钱左右。
So over time, I mean, on any one trade, might think you're getting more edge, but like your realized edge over time after you get adversely selected and all that, it works out to something that looks like a penny per contract.
如果你是零售交易者,成本结构又不占优势,那迟早会被榨干。
So if you have a retail cost structure, you're just gonna get chiseled to death.
你根本不可能在家做这种生意。
Like, you can't run that business from home.
公平地说,也许有少数例外,但这些人都是特例。
And to be fair, there are a few exceptions to this perhaps, but these are exceptional people.
你之前的嘉宾达伦就是其中之一。
Your former guest, Darren, is one of them.
他确实开辟了自己的利基市场,但他的情况比大多数真正的专业波动率交易员还要特殊,所以我不认为你应该从达伦这样的经历中得出普遍结论。
He has carved out a niche, but just more special than probably most people that were actually professional ball traders, so, like, I don't think that you wanna extrapolate from the experience of somebody like Darren.
即使你看看大多数离开行业的专业期权交易员,他们也不会回家尝试做家庭做市商。
And even if you look at most professional option traders who leave the business, they don't go home and try to be at home market makers.
他们通常更倾向于寻找一些有明确优势的套利机会,比如封闭式基金,或者并购中发生的零散股比例招标之类的机会。
I mean, they tend to gravitate more towards sort of defined edge arbitrage y type stuff, like closed end funds or these odd lot prorated tenders that happen with mergers.
他们寻找的更像是二元投注类型的机会,而不是单纯想做多头交易。
Like, they're looking for things that look more like binary style bets than they are trying to be like, I'm just bull traders.
对吧?
Right?
我可以举一个具体的零售交易者劣势的例子。
I can actually give a specific example of like a retail disadvantage.
如果他们想当真正的多头交易者,想象一下你买入一份一年期平价看涨期权,然后你的计划是:我要对冲这个期权的德尔塔风险。
So if they're trying to be like a real bull trader, if you imagine buying a one year at the money call option, and then your plan is I'm gonna delta hedge this thing.
假设这只股票稍微难以借到,而且一年期利率是5%。
Well, let's say this stock is slightly hard to borrow, and let's say one year interest rates are 5%.
假设你的借款利率是6%,也就是说你得支付6%的融资成本,而你的放贷利率是零,没有任何回扣,明白吗?
So let's say your long rate is 6%, like you gotta pay 6% to fund, and your short rate is zero, you get no rebate back, okay?
所以你的融资利差高达600个基点。
So you have a 600 basis point wide funding spread.
而在市场上,这个看涨期权的价格会基于做市商群体普遍的融资利差来定价。
Now in the market, that call option is gonna be priced using the consensus of like sort of market makers funding spreads.
假设利率是5%,做市商的融资利差在这一点上下80个基点,也就是4.6%到5.4%之间。
So let's say that it's 5% and maybe the market makers funding spreads are 80 basis points around that, so four sixty, five forty, around the 5%.
假设你买入了一个以5%利率定价的看涨期权,但你的融资成本是零。
So let's say you buy that call that's priced with a 5% interest rate, but your interest rate on your short is zero.
如果你买入这个期权,你实际上支付了更高的隐含波动率,因为如果实际利率为零,这个期权的价值会低得多。
Now, if you buy that call, you are paying a much higher implied vol, because if interest rates are actually zero, that option's worth a lot less.
因此,你在持有这个头寸时支付的隐含波动率远高于你自以为买入的水平。
So you are paying a much higher implied vol on warehousing this position than you think you're buying.
而如果你卖出这个看涨期权,这也不是解决方案,因为你现在融资成本是6%。
And then if you sell the call, that's not a solution either, right, because now you're funding at 6%.
情况没那么糟,你只比市场利率低了100个基点,但你卖出的波动率低于屏幕上看到的隐含买价。
It's not as bad, you're only a 100 basis points off the market rate, but you're selling that vol lower than the implied bid that you see on the screen.
因此,作为散户交易员,仅因融资利差,你就很难维持一个delta中性的波动率交易组合。
So it's it's gonna be very difficult to run this, like, delta neutral vol book as a retail trader just because of your funding spreads.
但如果你交易期权是为了方向性投机,这就不是问题了,因为你的delta盈亏会完全掩盖这些影响。
Now this isn't a concern if you're trading options for directional reasons, because your delta p and l is gonna completely swamp any of these effects anyway.
只有当你进入这种Delta中性世界时,这些成本才真正开始变得重要。
It's only when you get into this delta neutral world that those costs really start to matter.
所以,让我们稍微放宽视角。
So so let's zoom out a bit.
实际上,对于波动率交易员来说,波动率指标本身就是交易的核心逻辑。
Realistically speaking, for vol traders, the vol metrics themselves are the thesis for the trade.
这只是投资领域中的一个微小角落。
This is a tiny corner of the investment landscape.
就像是有100个脑损伤的人用这种方式来操作市场。
It's like a 100 brain damaged people that are approaching markets this way.
大多数人交易时都有方向性观点或目标配置。
Most people have a directional view or a target allocation that they're trading for.
他们实际上是在管理某些资产,进行投资。
They're actually managing some assets, they're investing.
所以,如果你考虑一个波动率交易员,他们对波动率有自己的看法,但对标的股票的实际价值持中立态度。
So if you think about a vol trader, they have an opinion on the vol, but they're agnostic about the value of the underlying stock.
对他们来说,他们只是说:股市是公平的。
To them, they just say, well, the stock market, it's fair.
就像股市,如果它正常运作,底层资产就是公平的,而我的工作只是精准地击中目标。
Like the stock market, if it's doing its job, the underlying is fair, and my job is to just have a pin out of the ball.
其他人则处于相反的情况,他们认为:我对底层资产有观点,但我假设波动率是公平的。
Everyone else is in the opposite situation, where they're saying, I've got a view on the underlying and I assume that the vol is fair.
对这样的人来说,他们所有的工作都是在期权表达之前完成的。
So to that person, all the work that they do in deciding what the trade is upstream of the options expression.
他们所做的全部工作,比如听《All In》播客,或者决定要买入这个、卖出那个,这些都发生在期权表达之前,然后他们只是假设期权价格是公平的。
It's all the work that told, you know, I don't know what they do, they listen to the all in podcast, or they come up with like, I'm gonna buy this, or I'm gonna sell that, so they do that work upstream of the expression, and then they just assume that the options are sort of fair.
而我们所做的,是给你提供一个Voltrator视角来融合这两者。
And what we're doing is we're saying, hey, we're gonna give you the Voltrator lens to marry that.
你仍然要做所有这些工作来决定你想持有什么方向的头寸,但我们能用Voltrator视角告诉你,哪些期权最适合表达你的观点。
Like, you're gonna do all that work to figure out what directions you wanna have on, but we can give you the Voltrator lens to tell you what's the best options to sort of pick to express your bet.
关于期权的一个非常重要的一点是,它们的价格是针对具体情境定价的。
And a very, very important point about options is that they are priced for specificity.
它们有到期日。
They have expirations.
它们就像小小的组合投注。
They're like little parlays.
你要么高度押对,要么高度押错。
You're highly levered to being right or wrong.
因此,从某种意义上说,它们相当不宽容,迫使你对自己的真实观点保持高度严谨。
So in a sense, they're sort of unforgiving, and they make you be very rigorous about what it is you are actually saying.
你不是单纯看涨,而是带着约束的看涨,你是在说:我认为这件事会因为这个原因在这个时间发生。
You're not just bullish, you're bullish with constraint, you're saying like, I think that this is going to happen because of this at this time.
因此,使用期权的行为实际上非常有用,因为它迫使你的思维保持这种纪律性。
So the act of using an option is actually very useful because it forces this discipline on your thinking.
我认为这是期权最美妙的一点之一,它就像一辆绝佳的思维自行车,让你因为必须做出这些选择而变得更能交易。
I think this is one of the most beautiful things about options, is that it's this amazing mind bicycle thing where you're like, I can get better at trading because I'm forced to have to make these choices.
所以你是想买一个看涨期权,还是想买五个更远虚值的看涨期权价差?
So do you wanna buy one call, or do you wanna buy five further out of the money call spreads?
要分析这样的决策,你首先需要意识到,表达这一赌注的方式有多种,而这种认知会迫使你更严谨地思考。
To parse a decision like that, you need to first recognize that you have so many ways to express the bet, and that knowledge forces you to tighten up your thinking.
因此,你基本上面对的是一个工具自助餐,可以精准地决定你投资组合的风险结构,而我们的目标是帮助你理解期权,以便做出这些决策,并选择最适合你的工具。
So you basically have a buffet of tools, and you can surgically decide what you want your risk in your portfolio to look like, but we are trying to help you understand options so you can make those decisions, and pick which tool is the right one for you.
简而言之,我们可以帮助你将对波动率的看法与对股票的看法结合起来,从而以符合你投资逻辑的方式表达你的观点。
In short, we can help you have a vol opinion to go with your stock opinion so that you can express the bet in the way that aligns with your thesis.
我认为,这一切并不需要你成为一个所谓的波动率交易员。
And I don't think any of that requires you to have to be a quote unquote vol trader.
你在上一个回答中稍微提到了这一点,但我希望你能举几个例子,说明某人可能持有某种观点,却并不需要直接交易波动率,但通过波动率的视角,仍能更高效地表达这一观点。
You started to allude to it a little bit in your last answer, but I was hoping maybe you could walk me through an example or a couple of examples where someone might have an opinion, yet they shouldn't be trading volatility explicitly, but a volatility lens could still be helpful in letting them express that opinion more efficiently.
是的。
Yeah.
让我们通过一个例子来逐步分析。
Let's step through an example.
首先,软件的发展,从抽象角度看,只是通过识别出我们真正关心的四个主要维度,来压缩决策空间。
So first of all, like, software's progression, what it's doing abstractly is it's just compressing the decision space by recognizing that there are really four main dimensions that we care about.
有跨式期权,它反映了隐含波动率与实际波动率之间的关系。
There are straddles, which represent the relationship between the implied vol and the realized vol.
有垂直价差,它反映了偏度。
There are vertical spreads, which represent the skew.
有宽跨式期权,它关注尾部风险。
There is a strangle, which is concerned with the tails.
然后是时间价差,它关注期限结构或远期波动率。
And then there's the time spread, which is concerned with the term structure or the forward vol.
所以有这么多行权价和各种产品,但归根结底,我们真正关心的其实只有这四个维度。
So there's all these strikes and all these products, but at the end of the day, there's really like these four dimensions that we care about.
让我们举个例子,比如今天,市场接近历史高点,你可能感到谨慎,想从部分持仓中减仓。
So let's just take an example, like today, markets are near their all time highs, you might be feeling cautious, maybe you wanna rebalance out of some of your length.
因此,你有很多方式可以表达这种观点。
So you have a lot of ways you could express this.
你可以卖出股票,可以买入看跌期权,可以卖出看涨期权,也可以卖出股票并买入看涨期权。
You could sell stock, you could buy puts, you could sell calls, you could sell the stock and buy calls.
所以,你可以用很多种方式来表达这种谨慎并想减仓的想法。
So there's a lot of ways that you can sort of express this idea of I'm cautious and I want to cut.
因此,我们的分析从一个问题开始:在给定的波动率水平下,近期或远期期权是偏低还是偏高?
So our progression starts by answering the question, are the near or far dated options low or high for a given vol level?
例如,目前隐含波动率可能较低,但期限结构可能很陡峭,这其实是预期之中的情况。
For example, right now the IVs might be low, but the term structures can be steep, which is sort of expected.
当标普500波动率为8时,说一年期波动率应该远高于8,这几乎没什么意义,因为这种均值回归的预期本来就是合理的,对吧?
It's almost not meaningful to say that, like when S and P vol is eight, you expect the one year vol to be much higher than eight, because this meaner version is expected, right?
因此,我们将所有这些资产绘制在截面图上,就可以看出,相对于某些流动性极强的资产,波动率的期限结构是什么样的?
So what we do is by throwing all these assets onto a cross sectional diagram, we can say, how does the vol term structure look benchmarked to some very liquid assets?
假设现在你对科技股超配,想要兑现部分利润。
So let's say right now you are overweight tech, and you wanna take some money off the table.
于是你发现,XLK的波动率较低,而SPY的期限结构呈上升且陡峭态势,但XLK的期限结构相对于SPY可能相对平坦。
So you look and you find that XLK vol is low, but while SPY term structure is ascending and steep, maybe XLK vol term structure is relatively flat compared to SPY.
因此,当你观察到这一点时,你会想:有意思,也许我该在这里买入XLK的长期看跌期权。
So when you look at that, you say, okay, interesting, maybe I wanna buy puts, long dated puts on XLK here.
我们先暂时搁置这个想法。
Now we'll hold that thought for a second.
正如我们所说,第一点是,长期还是短期,我更喜欢长期,而且因为波动率很低,我倾向于买入,没问题。
That's the first thing as we said, okay, long versus short, I like the long dated better, and I like buying because the vols are low, fine.
目前隐含波动率与实际波动率相比如何?
How's the IV price compared to the realized vol now?
这是进阶的下一步,我们已经有了对期限结构的看法,但现在隐含波动率与实际波动率相比如何?
Now it's the next step in the progression, like we have an idea of the term structure, but now how is the IV versus the RV, the realized?
因此你观察后会发现,当波动率变得非常低时,隐含波动率往往会相对于实际波动率存在溢价。
So you look at that and you see, well, I expect that when vols get really low, that there will be a premium of the IV to the realized.
如果标普500波动率为6,市场并不会以6的水平提供波动率。
If S and P vol is six, the market's not giving you vol at six.
比如,它可能以8的水平提供给你。
Like, maybe it's giving you to you at eight.
那里会存在一个溢价。
There's gonna be a premium there.
这个溢价占波动率的百分比会随着波动率越低而变得越大。
And that premium as a percentage of the vol gets fatter the lower the vol is.
但当我们观察XLK时,发现其相对于实际波动率的溢价与你在其他股票中看到的溢价相似。
But when we look at XLK and we find that the premium to RV is expected, It's a similar premium to what you're seeing in other names.
换句话说,从买方的角度来看,我注意到存在溢价,但我本就预期会有这样的溢价,而且这个溢价与许多其他流动性良好的股票相比相同或更小。
So in other words, it's hey, okay, I was looking at this from the buy side, there's a premium to it, but I would expect there to be a premium to it, and that premium is the same or smaller than a lot of other liquid names.
通过。
Check mark.
好的,我们还没有排除买入XLK波动率的可能性。
Okay, we haven't ruled out buying XLK vol yet.
看起来这可能是个不错的选择。
It looks like that could be decent.
所以现在我从这里看到了两个选择。
So now I see two choices from here.
我们可以选择买入长期限波动率,但我是想买入看跌期权(下行期权),还是想买入看涨期权(上行期权)?
We can say, I'm gonna buy long dated vol, but do I wanna buy the puts, the downside options, or do I wanna buy the upside option?
或者干脆买平值期权,所以可能是三种选择。
Or maybe just the at the money option, so maybe three choices.
你看看这个,现在你想到要看看偏度。
So you look at that, now you say I wanna look at the skew.
于是你仔细一看,发现这些看跌期权的波动率相对于平值期权波动率处于高位百分位。
So you look at it and you realize, oh, you know what, those downside puts are in a high percentile relative to the at the money vol.
所以从波动率的角度来看,市场并不支持你买入看跌期权。
So the vol market, that vol lens is not giving me the puts.
所以我今天早上本来想买入这些看跌期权,但市场却在说:你可能不该这么做。
So I woke up today wanting to buy these puts, but the market's saying, yeah, you probably don't wanna do that.
所以现在我们把选择缩小到了两种。
So now we've reduced this to two choices.
我可以说:记得我觉得波动率很低,所以我可以买入平值期权,同时相对卖出这些看跌期权,也就是买入看跌价差,从而获得看跌敞口。
I can say, remember, I think the vol's low, so what I can do is I can buy at the monies and sell those puts relatively, so I can buy put spread, which would give me that bearish exposure.
另一种选择是,你注意到:哇,看看这些虚值看涨期权,它们实际上非常便宜,从绝对水平来看。
The other thing you can do is, oh, you notice, woah, look at these out of the money calls, they're actually really cheap, like, on an absolute level.
比如说,它们处于第五十百分位。
Like, let's say that they are in their fiftieth percentile.
但当波动率变得非常低时,你通常会预期SKU会变陡,因为期权价格具有黏性,不会变得那么便宜。
But you would expect that when vol got really low, SKUs tend to steepen when vols get very low, because option prices are sticky, like they're just not gonna get that cheap.
所以这些看涨期权可能仍处于相对于平值期权的长期相对关系水平,但绝对波动率水平很低,而这些看涨期权相对于绝对波动率水平来说是折价的。
So those calls might be sort of like at their long term relative relationship to the at the money, but the absolute vol level is low, and those calls are a discount to the absolute vol level.
因此,从绝对角度来看,这些看涨期权显得非常便宜。
So these calls on an absolute basis look very cheap.
所以你现在会想,买进看涨期权并卖出股票,这就是我表达这种观点的方式。
So now you're saying, let me buy the calls and sell the stock, and that's the way I will express this bet.
关键在于,无论你的方向性观点是什么,你都要找到最匹配的期权策略来表达它。
So the key to this is that whatever your directional axes, you are finding the best option expression to match it.
你会注意到,看涨-看跌平价关系已经深深嵌入到思维中。
What you would notice is that put call parity is so embedded in the thinking.
波动率视角建议买入看涨期权,即使你看跌,因为波动率曲面在这里最便宜。
The vol lens says to buy calls even though you're bearish, because that's where the vol surface is cheap.
你只需卖出股票来建立你想要的实际头寸。
You just sell the stock to create the actual position that you want.
注意,这完全违背了人们的本能反应。
And notice how this is completely the opposite impulse that people have.
人们会说,想落袋为安,于是他们会买入XLK并卖出看涨期权。
People would say, wanna take money off the table and they're gonna go into XLK and they're gonna sell calls.
我说不,你不想卖出它们,你想要买入看涨期权。
I'm like, no, you don't wanna sell them, you wanna buy the calls.
你对冲掉delta。
You hedge the delta.
如果没有波动率视角,你就不会意识到自己犯了这个错误。
So without the vol lens, you would not realize that mistake that you're making.
事实上,正因为很多人可能都在犯这个错误,这些看涨期权才显得便宜——正是人们缺乏波动率视角,才导致看涨期权价格偏低。
As a matter of fact, because so many people might be making that mistake, those calls are cheap, that's what's making the calls cheap, is that people are not having a VaLens.
你也不指望大多数人会有波动率视角,因为大多数人根本不是这样思考的。
And you don't expect most people to have a VaLens, because that's not how most people think.
所以我们正在做的是,把这个理念带给每个人。
So that's what we're doing, is we're taking that idea and we're bringing it to everybody.
简而言之,你先从对股票的看法出发,再叠加波动率观点来构建交易结构。
So in short, you start with a stock opinion, you layer in the vol opinion to structure the trade expression.
记住,想法本身不会赚钱,下注才会。
Remember, ideas don't make money, bets do.
如果你打算更主动地管理你的资金,就必须根据你的观点正确地构建交易。
If you're gonna take a more hands on approach to managing your money, you have to structure your trades to match your thesis properly.
如果你的交易涉及期权,我们希望帮助你找到最佳的结构方式,或者至少让你避开那些你以为是好交易、但从相对角度看其实并不好的期权。
If your trade expressions involve options, we wanna help you find the best way to structure them, or at least keep you away from options that you would have thought were a good trade that really aren't when you look on a relative basis.
当我刚开始指导艾米时,我们最初的很多对话都是他说:我想卖出这些看涨期权。
When I first started coaching Emmy, a lot of our first conversations would look like he would say, I wanna sell these calls.
我会说,如果你喜欢卖出这些,那你一定会更喜欢卖出这些——这其实是在说,你想卖出的那些看涨期权,我来买下来。
And I would say, if you like selling those, you're gonna love selling these, which is another way of me saying, those calls you wanna sell, I'll buy them from you.
这种思维方式,如果没有一个能以这种相对方式整合所有信息的工具,是很难做到的。
And that kind of thinking is very, very difficult to do without having a tool that pulls together everything in this very relative way.
这就是我创建这个的原因,我一直都是这样想的,我只是觉得,如果这对我有用,也许对其他人也有用。
That's why I created this is always how I thought, and I just figured, hey, if this works for me, maybe it's gonna work for other people too.
是的,这就是我们走到今天的原因。
And, yeah, that's how we got here.
我不会为这些通话录制视频,但如果我要录这段视频,人们会看到你身后整面书架上摆满了游戏。
I don't record video for these calls, but if I were to record this video, what people would see behind you is an entire bookshelf filled with games.
你是个狂热的游戏爱好者。
You are an avid gamer.
我很好奇,我有两个关于游戏的问题。
I'm curious, I've got two questions related to games.
第一,我非常想知道你最喜欢的游戏是什么,或者最近玩得最开心的游戏。
One, I would love to know just what your favorite game is or maybe the game you're enjoying the most lately.
我要澄清一下,这里说的都是桌游,朋友们。
And I'm talking board games here, people, just to be clear.
第二,我知道你热衷于用游戏来进行教学。
And then two, I know you are someone who's passionate about using games for teaching.
我对那些想要进入交易领域的人的想法很好奇。
And I'm curious as to your thoughts for folks who do want to get into trading.
你有没有推荐的游戏,可以帮助他们培养交易者的心态?
Are there any games that you would recommend they play to create that trader mindset?
是的,我会回答一下我现在比较喜欢的游戏。
Yeah, so I'll answer the question about games that I'm kinda into now.
我现在玩的游戏比十年前或十五年前轻快多了,这主要是因为时间少了,没空花四个小时玩一局游戏。
So I would say right now, I play lighter games than I probably did like ten, fifteen years ago, and that's just because I'm shorter on time, I don't have four hours to play a game.
而且现在更偏向社交类游戏,我目前特别喜欢的一些游戏包括,比如非常流行的《词云》和《解密密码》,这些都是很棒的文字游戏,能让你深入理解其他玩家的思维。
And it also tends to be more social, so some games that I really like right now are, well, of all, there's a very popular ones that really are great, like Codenames and Decrypto, which are amazing word games that really require you to get into the mind of the other people you're playing with.
这很有趣。
So that's fun.
这就像一种共同知识类游戏。
It's like this sort of common knowledge game.
《词云》已经好几次差点让我和我妻子离婚了。
Codenames has almost led to my divorce with my wife on a number of occasions.
你以为你了解你的伴侣,直到你玩了《字里行间》。
You think you know your partner until you play Codenames.
是啊,某种程度上,这就像新婚游戏,对吧?
Yeah, it's the new newlywed game in some sense, right?
《字里行间》和《Decrypto》很相似,但又有些不同。
So Codenames, the crypto, the crypto is similar to Codenames, but it's a little bit different.
我还特别喜欢一款叫《收购》的游戏。
Another game that I really like a lot is I like Acquire a lot.
《收购》是一款七十年代的游戏,玩家要建造酒店连锁,并涉及并购机制。
Acquire is a game from the seventies where you're building hotel chains and there's a merger aspect to them.
所以这个游戏的玩法非常有趣。
So the way the game works is really neat.
你手里的棋子就像《拼字游戏》里的字母,但被一个小框架遮住,然后有一个网格,像Excel表格一样有行列,你把酒店棋子放在上面,你知道自己手里有哪些棋子,也知道它们在棋盘上的位置。
You have like tiles like you do in Scrabble, and they're hidden behind a little frame, and then there's a grid, it's like an Excel grid, columns and rows, and you place your hotel chain pieces down, and what happens is you know what tiles you're holding, and you know where they go on the board.
所以当你放置一个棋子时,你可以宣布它是一个酒店,并声称自己是该酒店的主要拥有者,然后其他人可以购买你酒店的股份,而由于你私底下知道自己的棋子,你可以买入那些与你手中棋子相邻的酒店股份。
So what happens is when you place a tile, you can name that a hotel, and be like, this is a hotel that I'm the primary owner of, and then people, they can buy shares in your hotel, but what you'll do is, because you have this private knowledge of like what tiles you have, you can buy up the shares of the hotel that you have the tiles that will adjoin on the board.
所以你会开始买入这些股份,然后把那些棋子放下去。
So you start buying up those shares, and then you place those tiles down.
当然,每个人都在看别人在买哪些股份?
So of course, everybody's looking at what shares are other people buying?
所以这是一个非常棒的市场模拟游戏,当两个连锁在棋盘上相遇时,较大的连锁会收购较小的连锁,并且会获得一笔收购奖金;这个过程很有趣,因为你可以说:‘我持有这家收购公司的股份,但我可以选择不卖出,因为如果之后又建了新的连锁,这些股份会被回收利用。',
So it's this really cool market simulation, and then when two chains kinda hit each other on the board, the larger chain acquires the lower chain, and then there's a payout bonus for that, and it's interesting, this tender process where you can say, oh, I own these shares in the acquisition company, but I can choose not to tender them because in the event that a later chain gets built and that's because there's a limited number of chains that they get recycled.
所以如果帝国酒店重新开张,我就要持有它的股份。
So if the Imperial Hotel opens again, I'm gonna own shares in that one.
这个游戏的特别之处在于,八岁的孩子也能玩。
And the thing is with that game is you can play it with eight year olds.
听起来有点不可思议,但它其实非常简单,而且经受住了时间的考验。
Like, it sounds kinda crazy, it's really simple, and it's really stood the test of time.
它已经有五十多年的历史了。
It's over 50 years old.
所以我强烈推荐《Acquire》这款游戏。
So I highly recommend Acquire.
所以我们最喜欢玩的就是这个,另一个是《潜艇指挥官》,我就不详细描述这个游戏了,你们应该去看个关于它的YouTube视频,但这款游戏就是所有《潜艇战》游戏都渴望成为的样子。
So that's the one we like to play a lot, and then another one is Captain Sonar, which is I won't really go into the description of that one, you should watch a YouTube video about it, but it is everything Battleship ever wanted to be, is what this game is.
它简直太棒了。
It's absolutely amazing.
游戏节奏紧张,充满疯狂的沟通与推理,是一款四对四的游戏。
It's frantic, wild communication, and deduction, and it's a four on four game.
所以《潜艇指挥官》就是我今天要推荐的另一款游戏。
So Captain Sonar, that's my other plug for today.
在用游戏学习方面,扑克是经典例子,它是一种信息不完全的游戏,这很经典,但有时也会有点枯燥。
On using games for learning, poker is the classic one, it's a game of sort of incomplete information, that's kinda classic, but it can be a drag also.
所以如果你想要更轻松一点的游戏,我其实很喜欢引擎构建类游戏。
So if you want something lighter type of games, I actually like engine builder games.
引擎构建类游戏是这样的:你有一副牌,你的目标是获取新的卡牌。
So what an engine builder game is like, you kinda have a deck of cards, and what you're doing is you're acquiring new cards.
在引擎构建类游戏中,稀缺的资源是回合数。
So the scarce resource in an engine builder is turns.
就是你能行动的次数。
It's how many moves you get.
因此,为了创造新资源,你希望用尽可能少的行动来获得该资源,以便在你的回合中更加高效。
So in order to create a new resource, you want to have as few moves as you need to get that resource so that you can be very efficient on your turn.
所以你在构建这些牌组时,试图寻找这些协同效应,而有趣的是,这些游戏中复合感和我所说的‘期权希腊值’的感觉非常强烈,因为你的思维方式是:好吧,如果我买了这张牌并把它加入手牌,它对我的手牌产生的影响会随着这张牌的加入而发生相应变化。
So you're building these decks where you're trying to find these synergies, and what's cool about it is the feeling of compounding and the feeling of what I would describe as option Greeks is very strong in those games because the way you're thinking is like, okay, if I buy this card and I put this to my hand, it's gonna lower, like my hand's delta to having this card in here is changing by this much as I add it.
你不必非得用这些术语来思考,但这种感觉会自然浮现,而且非常令人满足。
And you don't have to think in those terms, but it organically emerges, and it's a very satisfying sort of feeling.
在很多方面,这些游戏让我觉得有点像交易。
In a lot of ways, these things kind of feel like trading to me in a way.
所以引擎构建类游戏,我最近和孩子们玩的是《奇妙工厂》,你们只是在构建一个工厂牌阵。
So engine builders and the one that I'm playing these days with the kids, the kids like a lot to, is called Fantastic Factories, and you're just building a tableau of factories.
太棒了。
Awesome.
我这个赛季问每个人的最后一个问题:今天你最热衷的是什么?
And the last question I am asking everyone this season is, what are you most passionate about today?
可能是一本书,可能是一部剧,可能是一个话题,也可能是一个游戏。
It could be a book, it could be a show, it could be a topic, it could be a game.
什么真正吸引了你的注意?
What's really caught your attention?
你目前最热衷的是什么?
What are you most passionate about?
很多人对这个问题给出完全荒谬的答案。
Many give a completely silly answer to this.
是喜剧演员内特·巴尔加特兹。
It's the comedian Nate Bargatze.
他是一位完全干净的喜剧演员,比我小一岁,我最近才发现他。
He is a completely clean comedian, he's like a year younger than me, and I just discovered him.
我看了他在YouTube上所有的作品,我的孩子八岁,大儿子这个星期六就十一岁了,这太疯狂了。
I've watched every single thing he's done on YouTube, and my kids are eight and my eldest will be 11 on Saturday, and it's ridiculous.
我们经常引用他节目里的台词。
We just quote lines from it.
孩子们因为内容干净而和我一起看,我们整天引用里面的台词,还会用纳特·巴加兹的脱口秀段子互相问答,这真的很有趣。
Like, kids watch it with me because it's clean, and we just quote lines from it all, but we answer each other in Nate Bargatsee lines from his standup, and that is a really fun thing.
当你有了孩子时,你根本想不到自己竟然会因此交到朋友。
You don't foresee that when you have kids that you've actually created your friends.
如果我要认真回答这个问题,那确实所有这些与Moon Tower AI相关的事情对我来说都是全新的。
If I had to give a serious answer to the question, it's very much all of this stuff with Moon Tower AI is really new to me.
它涉及开发、销售,以及尝试教会人们如何使用它。
It's building, it's selling, it's trying to figure out, educating people on how to use it.
这些内容对我来说并不完全陌生,但这种产品形态是新的,而且我需要提升的地方太多了,所以我特别享受作为新手的这种感觉。
That's not totally foreign to me, but the sort of form factor is, and there's just so much I need to get better at, And so I love being a beginner at this.
所以,我的主要兴趣就是这些。
So, I mean, my main jams are that.
另外,写作和实践之间存在着一种协同效应,我觉得提升自己的写作水平也是我非常感兴趣的一件事。
And then the other thing is there's this synergy between writing and doing that, and I feel like upping my game on the writing has also been something I'm very interested in doing.
就像你所说,我之前做的很多内容都是长尾的,但如今有了对市场的洞察,我就能减少做长尾内容,转而做更多其他类型的内容——比如几周前我做了一笔GameStop的交易,并写了相关文章,如果没有这个视角,我根本不会想到这个点子。
Like you said, a lot of the content that I've done is evergreen, but having a view into the market now is gonna allow me to do less evergreen stuff and more, you know, I sort of I did a GameStop trade a couple weeks back, and I wrote about it, and without having this lens that I never would have stumbled upon that kind of idea.
如果不是因为这个,我根本不会每天关注期权。
Like, I would never would have been looking at options every day if it wasn't for that.
所以某种程度上,这有点像回到我过去一直做的事,但同时也试图在这些新领域成长。
So in a sense, there's a little bit of, like, going back to what I always did, but also trying to grow in these new ways.
克里斯,很高兴你能来参加。
Chris, it's been wonderful having you on.
我很高兴我们终于能促成这次对话。
I'm glad we were finally able to make this happen.
非常感谢你加入我们。
Thank you so much for joining me.
真是太有趣了,老兄。
So much fun, man.
谢谢。
Thank you.
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