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我认为，不管你喜欢与否，世界正朝着区域化发展。
I think, like, the world is going into spheres, whether you like it or not.
我们正在回归到自然资源至关重要的时代。
We're going back to, like, natural resources matter.
这是一个切实可行的故事。
It's, a tangible story.
我不知道下一任总统是谁，但如果是共和党人，我认为未来四年又会是门罗主义的天下。
I don't know who the next president is, but if it's a Republican, I think it'll be Donroe Doctrine for another four years.
卖美国，我从来不太认同；但买美洲，我却非常认同。
Sell America, I never really bought into, but buy the Americas, I really buy into.
我认为，中国并不真正与我们平等，或者说不具备相同的地缘经济影响力。
I don't think, like, China is our equal, so to speak, or has the same geoeconomic leverage.
我认为委内瑞拉和伊朗已经清楚地证明，它们并不具备与我们同等的影响力。
I think Venezuela and Iran proved they clearly don't have the same leverage as us.
我认为市场对伊朗的情况其实并不真正了解。
I think markets don't really know what they're doing in terms of Iran.
最终，我们并没有认真对待地理上的差异，而这带来了大量机遇。
Ultimately, we're not taking to heart, like, the geographical discrepancies, and that leads to a lot of opportunity.
在开始之前，提醒一下，Blockworks的顶级机构会议——数字资产峰会，今年三月将重返纽约。
Before we get started, a quick reminder that Blockworks' premier institutional conference, the Digital Asset Summit, is returning to New York City this March.
今年，与会管理资产超过4.2万亿美元，共有150位演讲者和750家机构参与。
This year represents more than $4,200,000,000,000 in assets under management with a 150 speakers and 750 institutions attending.
演讲者包括SEC主席保罗·阿特金斯、CFTC主席迈克尔·塞利格、美联储理事史蒂文·莫兰、Tether首席执行官保罗·阿多尼奥，以及无数其他高管、资产管理人、监管者和塑造行业的核心加密基础设施建设者。
Speakers include SEC Chair Paul Atkins, CFTC Chair Michael Selig, Fed Governor Steven Moran, and Tether CEO Paolo Ardonio, alongside countless other executives, asset managers, regulators, and the core crypto infrastructure builders shaping the industry.
如果你想了解2026年数字资产的严肃机构视角，数字资产峰会就是发生这一切的地方。
If you want serious institutional grade view of digital assets in 2026, Digital Asset Summit is where it happens.
使用代码forward200可享受200美元优惠，详情请访问blockworks.co/events。
Use code forward 200 for $200 off and head to blockworks.co/events for more details.
关于前瞻性指引的任何陈述均不构成购买或出售任何投资或产品的建议。
Nothing said on forward guidance is a recommendation to buy or sell any investments or products.
本播客仅用于信息目的，节目中任何人的观点均为其个人意见，而非财务建议，也不一定代表Blockworks的立场。
This podcast is for informational purposes only, and the views expressed by anyone on the show are solely their opinions, not financial advice, or necessarily the views of Blockworks.
我们的主持人、嘉宾和Blockworks团队可能持有所讨论公司基金或项目的头寸。
Our hosts, guests, and the Blockworks team may hold positions in the company's funds or projects discussed.
一如既往，投资区块链技术涉及风险，条款和条件适用。
As always, investments in blockchain technology involve risk, terms, conditions apply.
请自行进行研究。
Do your own research.
好了，各位。
Alright, everybody.
欢迎回到《Forward Guidance》的又一期节目。
Welcome back to another episode of Forward Guidance.
今天和我一起的是克洛克塔尔集团的首席宏观策略师埃里克·瓦勒斯坦。
And joining me today is Eric Wallerstein, chief macro strategist at the Clocktower Group.
埃里克，自从我们上次交谈以来，你经历了一段不寻常的旅程。
And Eric, you've been on a bit of a bit of an adventure since the last time that we last spoke.
你上次做客节目时还在丹尼那里，之后你去担任了经济顾问委员会的顾问，而当时斯蒂芬·莫兰就在那里。
You were at you are Danny the last time you're on the show, and then you went off and you're the adviser to, the CA, the Council of Economic Advisors where Stephen Moran was at.
然后你还在美联储，当时斯蒂芬·莫兰也调到了美联储。
And then you're also at the Federal Reserve, also with Stephen Moran there when he moved over to the Fed.
所以过去一年，你接触了非常多不同的地方，我想这么说。
So you've been seeing seeing a lot of different sites, I would say, the last year.
因此，我非常期待你回到节目中，听听你从白宫、美联储，再到如今担任Clocktower集团首席宏观策略师这一系列经历中获得的见解。
And so I'm super excited to get you back on the show to hear a bit about some of those insights that you derive from being both at the White House and then also at the Federal Reserve, and then now your new position as, chief macro strategist at Clocktower Group.
很高兴你回到节目，Eric。
So great to have you back on the show, Eric.
是的。
Yeah.
谢谢你邀请我，Felix。
Thank you for having me, Felix.
对我而言，对所有人来说，这一年确实非常不平凡。
It certainly has been quite a year, for me and and for all of us, really.
但能回到这里真的很棒，我也很期待分享一些我的想法。
But it's great to be back here, and I'm looking looking forward to, you know, sharing some of my thoughts.
是的。
Yeah.
对。
Yeah.
当然。
Absolutely.
是的。
Yeah.
所以，给我讲讲过去这一年吧。
So walk me through the last year.
你当时在经济顾问委员会工作。
You were you're, again, at the Council of Economic Advisors.
你在那儿与斯蒂芬·莫兰密切合作，向白宫和特朗普政府提供不同的政策建议，最近几个月你还重返了美联储。
You're you're pretty closely tied to Stephen Moran there and giving different policy recommendations to the White House and the Trump administration, and then also spent recent months at the Federal Reserve where you returned to.
在此之前，你也在纽约联邦储备银行的那个交易台上工作过。
And before that, you were also at the Federal Reserve, the Bank of, at the Federal Reserve in New York as well on that desk.
所以，是的，你这里有三条非常有趣的内容值得深入探讨。
So yeah, you have a lot of interesting three lines here to dig into.
所以，我非常想听听过去一年里，经济政策方面出现了许多不同的做法。
So I'd just love to hear about like, over the past year, obviously there's been a lot of different approaches to policy, economic policy.
我们正在颠覆许多长期以来关于关税使用和美元霸权的观念。
We've been uprooting a lot of what felt like long standing notions of like tariff usage and, you know, US dollar hegemony.
我们正逐渐进入一个新世界，有人谈到全球主义正在演变，你最近写了一篇文章，称之为‘验证’，这也被称为‘唐罗主义’。
We're moving more so into this world of, you know, there's been talk of evolving globalism towards, you know, you wrote a recent piece, you call this verification and just this also been called like the Donroe Doctrine.
所以，我很想听听你的高层面看法——你曾身处这些会议中，并提供经济政策建议。
So I just love to hear like high level, you've been in those rooms, you've been providing economic policy recommendations.
总的来说，你觉得过去一年的进展如何？
Like what's your read on how the last year has been going overall?
是的。
Yeah.
对。
Yeah.
不。
No.
我是在解放日后的几周加入经济顾问委员会的。
So I joined CEA a couple weeks after Liberation Day.
那时白宫、市场和经济顾问委员会都处于非常繁忙的状态。
So a very hectic time in the White House, in the markets, and in CEA as well.
所以我身处前厅，担任主席的高级顾问，这个角色介于常驻的经济学家——他们通常是大学教授或其他机构的经济学家——和主席、另外两位委员会成员、幕僚长之间，既要做一些经济分析，也要负责框架构建和沟通，还要思考我们团队在白宫内部及跨机构动态中的定位。
And so kind of I was in the front office, so I was a senior adviser to the chairman, which is kind of an an in between between, like, the economists on staff who are frequently professors at universities or economists at other agencies, and then, like, the chairman, the two other council members, the chief of staff, and you're kind of doing, you know, half economic analysis and, like, you know, framing and communication and also just, like, internal White House interagency dynamics, thinking about, like, where you guys are fit.
这更像是一种宫廷权谋类的事情。
It's it's a little more like palace intrigue type things.
但非常有趣。
But it was super interesting.
我一直是个注重政策的人，但从不涉足政治。
You know, I'd always been kind of a policy person, but never, like, a political.
我从未想过自己会进入白宫，所以史蒂夫带我进来真是一个绝佳的机会。
I'd never really imagined myself in the White House, so, Steve bringing me along was really an amazing opportunity.
我认为这对我也非常有启发，尤其是在如何将两者结合起来方面，好吧。
And I think it was really instructive for me as well in terms of marrying, like, okay.
我通常倾向于从宏观经济基本面和约束条件出发，来理解政策走向。
What are I tend to be someone who prefers looking at, like, macroeconomic fundamentals and constraints to understand where the direction of policy is going.
当然，你也必须将这一点与个性因素结合起来。
Naturally, you have to also marry that with, like, the personality aspect.
比如，一个人的目标是什么？最终，他们在结果和公众认知上更偏好什么？
Like, what is someone's goals and, like, ultimately, like, what do they prefer, in terms of outcomes and public perception?
我认为，这两者之间的关联让很多人感到意外。
And, like, those two things, I think, have caught people off guard in terms of how they've been intertwined.
比如，MAGA‘美国优先’运动表面上是孤立主义的，人们预期美国会完全退出多边机构，这确实发生了，但这并不一定意味着美国会从世界舞台上撤退，减少对全球海上防御的投入以及降低干预主义倾向。
Like, I think the MAGA America First movement was putatively isolationist, and people were expecting this complete withdraw from multilateral institutions, which has happened, but that hasn't necessarily equated with, like, a pullback from the world and the provision of, like, global maritime defense and less interventionism.
恰恰相反，过去一年里，这种趋势反而加速了。
If anything, that's accelerated over the past year.
因此，我认为这对我而言非常有趣且富有启发性。
So I think that's been really interesting and instructive for me.
然后，是的，我和史蒂夫一起去了美联储，那真的很棒。
And then, yeah, I was able to go to the Fed with Steve, which was pretty awesome.
我真的感觉像是从疫情前我在交易台上的时候被直接拉了起来，那时量化紧缩刚开始在回购市场引发各种问题，然后时隔六七年，我又被直接扔进了同样的情境中。
It really felt like I was picked up from when I was on the desk, like, before COVID and during COVID when, like, QT was starting to cause all these issues in the repo market and then quite literally dropped into the same situation, like, six or seven years later.
就像你正在面对同样的问题。
It's like you're having the same issues.
所以，我的意思是，我觉得我在那里提供了很多价值。
So that was really I mean, like, I felt like I was providing a lot of value there.
而且，我认为我们做了很多出色的工作。
And, I think we did a lot of really good work.
理事迈伦发表了大量演讲。
Governor Myron gave a ton of speeches.
我觉得很多人轻视或否定了他对通胀、增长、放松监管及其影响的看法。
Like, I think a lot of people, like, discredited or maybe, like, cast out on his, like, views regarding inflation growth, whatever dereg the deregulatory regime and what the implications were.
但如今，越来越多的人开始认同他的观点，并给予这些观点更多重视，因为事实证明，他的判断比人们当初认为的要准确得多。
And I think a lot more people have come in his direction and given a lot more credence to those views because they've been, honestly, looking much better than people gave him credit for.
所以，是的。
So, yeah.
不。
No.
那真是艰难的一年。
It it was a hell of a year.
而且，你知道，我那时是个策略师。
And really, like, you know, I was a strategist.
我干了一年策略师。
I did that for a year.
现在我又成了策略师，感觉完全蜕变了。
Now I'm a strategist again, and I feel, like, completely evolved.
所以，能重新回到这个位置，真是太好了。
So, it's great to be back in the seat, so to speak.
对。
Yeah.
是的。
Yeah.
我我我无法理解，这真是一个非常独特的视角。
I I I can't that's just a wild perspective.
而且我同意。
And I agree.
你知道，很多人一开始就完全否定了莫兰。
You know, a lot of I think a lot of folks really discredited Moran off off the off the bat.
而且你知道，他提出了一些非常不同于主流的观点。
And, you know, he's you know, gives some pretty out of consensus views.
但没错，我认为从整体来看，他身上确实有不少值得学习的经验，比如他可能比普通人更务实、更注重数据。
But, yeah, I would say that there's probably some some pretty good lessons learned there overall in terms of, you know, he was probably, I'd say, more pragmatic and data driven than the average person.
你可以质疑他所依据的数据前提，但至少他有数据支撑和逻辑推理。
You know, you can debate the warrants of the data that he was deriving it from, but at least there's data to back it up and reasoning.
所以我确实很尊重这一点。
So I definitely respect that.
所以让我们聊聊你是在解放日之后不久加入经济顾问委员会的。
So let's talk a little bit about you joined the CEA right after Liberation Day.
从那时起直到最近几个月，当我思考全球优先事项以及整个关税问题和当时试图实现的目标时，感觉他们试图改变的有两个关键方向。
And from then until basically the last few months has been, you know, when I think about global priorities and the whole tariff thing and what was trying to be achieved there, it felt like there was, there's two key vectors that they're trying to change.
其中一个方向是通过关税来调整贸易的国际收支平衡。
And one of them was the balance of payments in terms of trade via the use of tariffs.
另一个方向是美元的角色是什么？
And then the other one was, what is the role of the US dollar?
我们如何看待它的估值？
How do we perceive its valuation?
它是否被高估了？
Is it overvalued?
这对国内利率与世界其他地区的利率有何影响？
And what does that do for domestic interest versus rest of world interest?
所以我很想听听你的看法：从解放日到现在，回顾这段历程，你是如何评估这两项举措的进展的？如今你又是如何看待它们的？
So I'd just love to hear your perspective on when you think about where we came from from liberation to today, how are you tracking progress on those two initiatives, and how are you thinking about them as we stand today?
是的。
Yeah.
关于第一点，我认为关税的目标多种多样，最终取决于你的偏好。
So on the first, I mean, I think there were myriad goals, with tariffs and ultimately, like, depending on what your preference is.
我认为政府内部不同的人可能有不同的目标。
I think different people within the administration probably had different things they were looking towards.
可能是减少赤字。
It might have been deficit reduction.
也可能是改变贸易逆差和国际收支平衡。
It might have been, you know, altering the trade deficit and balance of payments.
也可能是在某个时候遏制中国，提高全球其他国家与除中国外的其他国家之间的边际关税率，以抵消部分重商主义行为，以及我们迄今为止所见过的相对于全球增长的最大顺差。
It might have been countering China at some point, and raising, like, the marginal, you know, tariff rate between the rest of the world and then the rest of the world ex China and China to offset some of that mercantilism and what is basically, like, the biggest surplus relative to global growth we've ever seen.
所以，问题是，孤立地评估关税是一回事，而将其置于政治和地缘经济交叉影响的背景下评估则非常困难。
So, you know, I I the issue with tariffs is, like, evaluating them in a vacuum is one thing, and then evaluating them relative to the confluence of political and geoeconomic crosscurrents is also pretty tough.
我想，如果你在十月问一位欧洲财政部长或任何其他人，他们一定会感到震惊，甚至有点垂头丧气，因为他们真的认为美国赢了，所谓的在全球范围内消除了大量非关税壁垒。
I think if you would have asked someone in October, like a European finance minister or whom whomever, they would have been completely shocked and, like, a little tail between their legs because they really felt like The US, like, won, quote, unquote, extracted a ton of, you know, taking non tariff barriers down across the world.
我们显然将关税提高了10%到15%，甚至20%。
We obviously raised tariffs 10 to 15% or or 20.
除去例外情况，实际税率根据合作伙伴不同，大约在10%到15%之间。
Minus exceptions, it was more like 10 to 15 depending on the partner.
所以，老实说，这看起来很不错。
So, yeah, honestly, that looked great.
而中国则达到了30%到35%。
And then China was 30 to 35%.
无论你是否支持关税，我认为很多人都开始认同其中一些可能的积极影响或好处，或者至少是针对中国的遏制措施。
And, like, whether you were pro tariff or anti tariff, I think, like, a lot of people kind of came around to some of the possible, you know, positive ramifications or benefits there or just countering China.
也许你认同了这一点，或者出于国家安全等原因，不管怎样。
Maybe you got on board with that or national security reasons, whatever.
但归根结底，这些措施不可能孤立存在，我认为在中方利用稀土作为筹码之后，要评估这些政策就变得相当困难了。
But, ultimately, like, these things don't exist in a vacuum, and I think it's been pretty tough to you know, post China using rare earths as as leverage.
我认为美国在着手解决这个问题方面已经取得了长足进展。
I think The US has come a long way in terms of, like, starting to address this issue.
我们今天的情况和一年前相比完全是两回事，我认为我们的前景非常美好。
And where we are today versus a year ago is two completely different things, and I think our trajectory looks fantastic.
最终，这个问题迟早都会出现。
And, ultimately, this was an issue that was gonna come about at some point.
所以，说实话，我感觉非常好。
So, frankly, I'm great.
我很高兴我们及时遏制了这个问题，开始着手重建这里的供应链以及近邻地区的供应链，出于国家安全等原因，或者只是因为那种杠杆点——也许当时人们并没有真正意识到它有多重要。
I'm glad that we nipped it in the bud now, so to speak, and we're starting to work towards that and kind of rebuilding supply chains here and in the near abroad for national security reasons or whatever, you know, that just that point of leverage, maybe it wasn't really realized how significant it was.
这是一个强大的杠杆点。
And that's a strong point of leverage.
我不认为中国能和我们相提并论，或者说拥有相同的地缘经济杠杆。
I don't think, like, China is our equal, so to speak, or has the same geoeconomic leverage.
我认为委内瑞拉和伊朗的情况清楚地表明，它们并不具备和我们同等的杠杆能力。
I think Venezuela and Iran prove they clearly don't have the same leverage as us.
但我觉得，在这个背景下，如果即将与习近平的峰会仍能举行，它会在一定程度上重新定义关税问题的语境。
But I think in the context of that, in this upcoming summit with Xi, if it still happens, you know, it it kind of recontextualizes the the tariff story a little bit.
话虽如此，我认为在可预见的未来，甚至在2028年之后，全球其他地区仍将维持15%的关税。
That said, I mean, I think, like, we're gonna have 15% tariffs in the rest of the world, like, for the foreseeable future, even post 2028.
我认为民主党也会保留这些关税。
I think a Democrat will keep them.
我认为这再次体现了世界的‘分层化’，即高度重视供应链韧性与国家安全。
I think it's kind of the new, again, spherification of the world and, putting a premium on supply chain resilience and, you know, national security.
嗯。
Mhmm.
说得非常好。
That's that's well articulated.
另外，我也很好奇，在这种分层化和变革的背景下，你对美元角色的看法是什么？
And, yeah, just also curious your thoughts on the role of the dollar within that context of the spherification and and and changes.
还有，无论是国内还是相对估值，美元的价值主张究竟如何？
And, yeah, both domestically, what is, you know, what is the value proposition of the US dollar versus its its relative valuation?
以及，世界其他地区的情况也是如此。
And then, yeah, just the rest of the world as well.
是的
Yeah.
我的意思是，我认为所谓的政府美元政策被夸大了，仿佛真有什么针对性的政策似的。
I mean, I think, like, the dollar policy, quote, unquote, of the administration was a little overblown as if there was, like, a targeted policy.
对吧？
Right?
很多人会提到梅耶 governor 在从政前写的一篇论文，里面谈到了海湖庄园协议之类的。
And a lot of people, you know, point into governor Meyer in this paper that he wrote before he was in politics, talks about the Mar A Lago Accord, whatever.
我的意思是，我认为并没有任何政策旨在削弱美元的实际储备货币地位，虽然有些人可能会就关税问题跟我争论，但那也没关系。
I mean, just on I don't think there's any policies to, like, degrade, you know, the the de facto reserve currency status, and then some people might, like, yell at me about tariffs, but that's fine.
客观来看，如果你观察美元的实际汇率，它曾经非常高。
You know, like, objectively, if you looked at the real exchange rate of the dollar, it was really, really high.
它高得离谱。
It was super lofty.
如果你看看国外的货币，比如我们的盟友东亚国家——韩国、台湾、日本，它们的货币其实并没有真实反映宏观经济基本面。
And if you looked at, you know, currencies abroad, like, even East Asian, like, our allies, South Korea, Taiwan, Japan, like, their currency doesn't really reflect mac reflect macroeconomic fundamentals.
对吧？
Right?
也就是说，来自世界这一侧的下行压力很大。
Like, there's just a lot of downward pressure from that side of the world.
我的意思是，中国显然规模更大，也更严重地滥用这些政策。
I mean, China is obviously, you know, much bigger and a much bigger kind of abuser of these policies.
但我觉得，理解这些动态是第一步，要指出来，而不是忽视美元，好像它无关紧要似的——事实上，美联储是少数几个几乎不将汇率纳入政策指引的央行之一。
But I don't I think, like, understanding those dynamics was the first step and to call them out as opposed to leaving the dollar as if it, like, it didn't matter, which, like, the Fed is one of the few central banks that almost doesn't incorporate FX into its its policy directive.
对吧？
Right?
它当然在预测中会考虑汇率，也清楚其对通胀的影响，但并没有真正重视这一点。
Like, it obviously includes it in its forecast, it's aware of what the impact for inflation is, but it doesn't really think about it as much.
坦白说，我认为政策制定者更关注美元价值是好事，因为你可以通过关税来抵消这种影响，或者采取措施帮助缓解压力，促进可贸易部门的发展。
And I think it's good, frankly, that policymakers are thinking more about the value of the dollar because you can either offset that through tariffs or, like, you can do things to help alleviate it and help generate your tradable sector.
但归根结底，并不存在所谓的弱势美元政策。
But, ultimately, like, there's no weak dollar policy.
你知道的。
You know?
根本没有一个全面的战略。
There's no, like, overarching strategy.
我认为，即使在政府的其他部门，人们也过于重视所谓的国家安全战略。
And I think people put even in other parts of the admin, people put too much weight on, like, the national security strategy.
而且，读完那份庞大的文件，它可能只是一两个人写的，这些人级别很高，可能是高级官员或副职。
And, like, reading through that, like, enormous document, which is probably, like, one or two people who are, like, probably pretty senior and and maybe principals or or, you know, just a level below, deputies.
也许他们的优先事项是这样，也许确实很明智，但我不确定这是否反映了实际情况，毕竟有不同的人，有不同的个性。
Maybe that's their priorities, and maybe it's really smart, but I don't know if that's reflected by, like you know, there's different personalities and there's different people.
我认为，当这个政府采取行动时，通常是因为总统本人将其列为重大优先事项，或者是一两位高级官员达成共识，推动某项举措，然后上报给总统，最终成为政策。
And I think when action happens in this admin, it tends to be when either it's it's POTUS and it's a big priority of his, or it's, like, one or two principals who kind of coalesce to something that they wanna do, and then that goes up to POTUS, and then it becomes a policy.
但说实话，未来几年美元将反映宏观经济基本面，人们却试图为某种宏大的战略布局。
But, yeah, I don't like, the dollar is gonna reflect macroeconomic fundamentals for the next couple years and people trying to position for some sort of grand strategy.
我想，我会站在他们那一边交易。
Like, I'll be on their side of the trade, I guess.
是的
Yeah.
好的
Okay.
所以这些背景信息对理解当前的局势非常有帮助，我们今天录制时的地缘政治现状是2024年3月9日，星期一。
So that's that's really good context leading into the current situation at hand today, the geopolitical situation we're recording here, Monday, March 9.
油价昨晚一度涨至每桶100美元，但最近又回落了一些。
Oil hit a $100 overnight, retraced back a bit recently.
我们经历了伊朗的空袭。
We've had the Iran Strikes.
而在那之前，自然是委内瑞拉发生的事情。
And the lead up before that was, of course, what happened in Venezuela.
因此，我非常希望借助你对这一流程的见解，更好地理解你对当前地缘政治局势的看法。
And so I I'd love to just leverage some of those insights you have in terms of the process here to better understand how you're viewing the geopolitical situation at hand.
你一直在Clocktower撰写出色的研报，深入剖析你当前的地缘政治框架。
You've been writing some great research at Clocktower, digging into your geopolitical framework right now.
我真的很想听听你如何分析我们接下来的走向，当前的背景是什么，或许可以结合你对特朗普政府时期这些大玩家行为的理解，谈谈你对当前伊朗局势的看法。
And I just would love to hear you unpack how you're thinking about where we go from here, what's the context, and perhaps leaning on a little bit of what you understood from how those big players were playing within the Trump administration to how you think they're thinking about this current situation in Iran right now.
是的。
Yeah.
你知道，当伊朗事件发生时，正好紧接在人工智能和劳动力市场担忧之后。
You know, I think the really interesting thing about when Iran happened, it was kind of right on the back of the AI labor market fear story.
我的意思是，就在袭击发生前的那个周五，利率市场已经在定价全球范围内的战争降息了。
And, I mean, rates mark like, even just a Friday before the strikes, like, rates markets were pricing in war cuts across the world.
私人信贷的担忧。
Private credit fear.
当时就是私人信贷加人工智能。
It was like private credit AI.
说实话，我认为特里尼写出了过去几年最具影响力的宏观研究文章，这太了不起了，因为那篇文章只是发在Substack上，更像一个叙事驱动的故事。
Like, I honestly think that Trini wrote, like, the most influential piece of, like, macro research of the last few years, which is incredible because it was, like, on Substack and, like, more of a narrative driven story.
但我认为所有这些因素综合在一起，让我们担心人工智能不再是一个切实的、物理的、现实世界的工业建设了。
But I think that all kind of combined, and we were we were worried that AI was no longer this, like, tangible, physical, real world industrial build out.
这现在变成了一个真实、具体、可感知的劳动力市场冲击，将导致失业。
It was now a real, physical, tangible labor market shock that was gonna foster unemployment.
现在我认为，市场并没有真正意识到，你担心的是失业缺口，而不仅仅是失业本身。
Now I think, like, the market didn't really take the fact that you're you're worried about the unemployment output gap and not necessarily just unemployment on its own.
事实上，我认为蒂芙，即美联储主席，在公开演讲中很好地阐述了这一点，即刺激一个无法承受的产出缺口，与在失业率远高于潜在水平时刺激失业，两者之间存在巨大差异。
I actually think TIFF, the BTC governor, has done a great job of, in his public speeches, talking about that and, like, what the difference of stimulating, you know, an an output gap that can't take it is versus stimulating unemployment when it's much higher, than it really could be at potential.
但最终，我们在全球范围内进行了大规模的重新定价，却没有考虑到各国或各地区劳动力市场的差异、经济运行方式的差异、服务业占比高低的差异。
But, ultimately, we had this huge repricing across the world not taking into account, the country by country differences or region by region differences, with their labor markets, how their economies function, whose service is heavy, who's not.
然后伊朗事件发生了，我们对所有央行——欧洲央行、英国央行、美联储——都重新定价为加息。
And then Iran happened, we repriced for hikes across the board, like ECB, BOE, Fed, everyone.
有趣的是，日本和韩国并没有出现同样的情况，因为我认为它们意识到这些央行并不像其他央行那样愿意在增长和失业同时出现时采取如此鹰派的立场。
And it's funny because, like, Japan and and, like, South Korea, they're not seeing the same thing because I think they realize those central banks are, like, not of the same they're not willing to go be as hawkish maybe when, you know, growth and and unemployment are are both in the picture.
但我只是想理清这两者之间的关系，理解一下，好吧。
But I I just think both I was trying to make sense of both of those and understand, like, okay.
究竟是什么因素能导致如此剧烈的、多重标准差级别的市场波动？因为伊朗的军事行动和劳动力市场的通缩冲击，完全是两回事。
What could possibly drive such a dramatic, like, multiple sigma move on either side when, like, kinetic action in Iran and a labor market disinflationary shock are two completely different things.
所以我把它们描述为，因为这些都是非常具体、真实的叙事，它们推动的是跨资产相关性上升，全球资产都在同向波动。
And so the way I framed them was, like, because these are very tangible physical narratives, what they're driving is, you know, cross asset correlation's higher, but just assets across the world are co moving.
因此，全球的期限结构都发生了变动，几乎不受国界影响。
So duration moved across the world, kind of irrespective of borders.
你只是经历了一次大规模抛售。
You just had a big sell off.
利率调整，短期利率重新定价。
Rates marked front end rates reprice.
你几乎看到地区差异逐渐消退，资产普遍抛售，或者某些大宗商品出现溢价，这就是冲击的体现。
You kind of had, like, regional discrepancies kind of faded and just assets were selling off or, you know, there was a premium for certain commodities, and and that was just the shock.
我也以同样的方式看待人工智能这件事。
And that was kind of how I viewed the AI thing as well.
有趣的是，这两件事几乎在同一时间或相继发生。
So it's interesting those two things were happening just right around the same time or in sequence.
所以，最终当类似这样的冲击发生时，会驱动所有资产普遍变动。
So, ultimately, when when something that like that happens, a shock drives assets across the board.
你应该寻找地区间的差异。
You wanna look for, like, geo discrepancies.
比如，好吧。
Like, okay.
如果你对英国、欧盟、东亚或美国有基本面判断，而所有资产却一起同向波动，那显然还有一些赢家和输家尚未被定价。
If you had a fundamental story for England or for The EU or for East Asia or for The US, and then everything just co moved together, clearly, there's some winners and losers that aren't being priced in yet.
所以，我真的不认同欧洲央行加息的观点。
So, like, I don't I don't really buy the ECB rate hiking story.
而且，坦白说，如果他们真的加息，你应该做空。
And, frankly, if they do, like, you should just be short.
无论他们是否加息，你都应该做空欧洲股市，我认为这就是为什么欧元无论从降息到加息的全面重定价过程中都在被大幅打压的原因。
Like, you should just be short European equities in the case that they don't hike or in the case that they do hike, and I think that's why the euro is getting pounded regardless of a complete repricing, from rate cuts to rate hikes.
所以我不确定。
So I don't know.
我觉得市场对人工智能的看法是错的。
I think, like, I think the markets are wrong on AI.
我认为市场对伊朗的情况根本不清楚自己在做什么。
I think markets don't really know what they're doing terms of Iran.
我们所有人都坐在那里，手足无措，盯着屏幕发呆。
Like, we're kind of all sitting on our hands right now, like, freaking out, staring at the screens.
但归根结底，我们并没有真正重视地理上的差异，而这恰恰带来了许多机会。
But, ultimately, we're not taking to heart, like, the geographical discrepancies, and that leads to a lot of opportunities.
所以在新兴市场内部，出现了大规模抛售。
So, like, within EM, you have a huge sell off.
但归根结底，巴西和印度是两个完全不同的国家。
But, ultimately, like, Brazil and India are two different are two diff like, completely different comp like, countries.
所以长期债券在抛售，但其中一个国家是完全的受益者，另一个则会彻底受损。
So you have the long end selling off, yet, like, one's a complete beneficiary and one's totally gonna lose off this.
是的。
Mhmm.
在欧盟内部，挪威和法国的久期都在抛售，意大利的久期也是，但这些经济体的状况截然不同。
Within the EU, like, Norwegian duration selling off as is French duration, but, like, those are also two or an Italian duration, but those are two very different economies.
这就像在经历这种重大的实际冲击后，寻找那些跨板块的机会。
It's just like it's kind of finding where those interblock opportunities are after a big tangible shock like this.
所以，我一直都是这样看待这个问题的。
So that's the way I've been viewing it.
当然，这场冲突的持续时间尚不确定，但我认为这类分散交易无论冲突持续多久，都能让你保持优势。
You know, obviously, the duration of this conflict is still open ended, but I think those kind of, like, dispersion trades, can keep you on sides regardless of the duration of the conflict.
嗯。
Mhmm.
我的意思是，我觉得像石油供应冲击这样的事件之所以难以应对，是因为市场不知道该如何消化它——因为短期影响是能源价格会大幅上涨。
I mean, I think that's what's so hard about something like an oil supply shock is for how the market should digest that because you have the you have the short term impact, which is that, okay, energy prices are gonna go way higher.
加油站的价格也会大幅上涨。
Prices at the pump are gonna go way higher.
这种短期的、其他短期的通胀压力。
That short term and the other short term inflationary dynamic.
但另一方面，你还会面临与之相关的负面增长冲击，因为当这种影响逐步渗透到经济中时，就会带来负面的增长预期，这确实让市场很难消化。
But then on the other side of things is you have the the negative growth impulse associated with that where, you know, as that works its way through the economy, you then have the the negative growth outlook associated with And that just feels like something really difficult for markets to try to digest.
你说得对，现在当你观察全球短期利率市场时，就像你提到的欧洲，他们正在定价加息，这很疯狂，因为如果能源价格真的像可能在欧洲那样急剧飙升，那实际上将是一个非常负面的增长冲击。
And you're right that right now, when you look at when you look at the short term interest rate markets across the world, and like you said, Europe, you know, they're, they're pricing in hikes, which is crazy when you consider the fact that, okay, if energy was really going to really, really spike like it, like it could well in Europe, that would actually be a very negative growth impulse.
因此，我们现在看到定价加息，感觉很奇怪。
Therefore, it feels weird that we have hikes priced right now.
所以，我只是很好奇。
So yeah, I'm just curious.
你的具体框架是什么，用来理解这种张力点——即何时会转向负面增长冲击这一部分？
Like, what's your what's your specific framework for understanding that tension point about when it flips towards the the negative growth impulse component?
是的。
Yeah.
我的意思是，我认为无论如何这都应该是负面的增长冲击。
I mean, I think it should be a negative growth impulse anyway.
我觉得这就是关键所在。
Like, I think that's the story.
如果你的结论是，产能因为基础设施停摆和遭受冲击而下降，而且你认为能源供应在中期内将受到限制，那么你可能会觉得，好吧。
If your takeaway is that, like, capacity like, because infrastructure is turning off and being hit, and if your your thing is that energy supply is now constrained for the inner intermediate term, you might think that, like, okay.
价格将在更长时间内保持高位，这是一种通胀压力。
There's gonna be higher prices for longer, and that's an inflationary impulse.
最终，我认为，好吧。
Ultimately, I think, like okay.
假设你是克里斯蒂娜·拉加德。
Like, let's say you're Christina Lagarde.
我是克里斯蒂娜·拉加德。
I'm Christina Lagarde.
我有很多围巾。
I have a lot of scarves.
今年，欧元的实际有效汇率目前非常高。
The year like, the euro's real effective exchange rate is super high right now.
如果你有一个通胀压力，它只会推高你的实际有效汇率。
If you have an inflationary impulse that just boosts your your your real effective rate.
因此，他们的货币在贸易方面变得更加强势。
So now their currency is even stronger in terms of, like, you know, trade.
他们的贸易条件正在恶化，因为一方面，进口价格上升了，比如德国制造业的投入成本现在更高了。
Their terms of trade are decreasing because on one hand, you have higher import prices, like the German manufacturing sector now has higher inputs.
但他们的出口价格将会受到压制。
But then their export prices are gonna be crimped.
对吧？
Right?
因为随着油价上涨，假设没有大规模的财政刺激，人们在服务上的支出就会减少。
Because as oil rises, assuming there's not, like, a huge fiscal impulse, you can't spend as much on services.
你的实际购买力下降了，因为必需品的成本上涨了。
Like, you're just your your real purchasing power has decreased because the cost of essentials has gone up.
所以现在你面临贸易条件的负面冲击。
So now you have a terms of trade negative hit.
欧盟的实际经济增长相当疲软，低于1.5%。
You have growth is pretty lackluster, sub one and a half percent in real terms in the EU.
失业率虽然很低，但可能正在加速上升，因为工资一直在下降。
Unemployment's low, but probably accelerating because wages have been falling.
所以，我觉得可能已经触底了，现在显然会开始上升。
So, like, I think it probably just troughed, and now is obviously gonna be going higher.
然后你又和最大的出口市场打起了贸易战。
And then you're in a trade war with your biggest export market.
因此，你从中国进口的通缩压力比以前更大了。
So you're importing deflation from China more than you used to.
你和美国陷入了贸易战，因为你受到最高法院裁决的鼓舞，而且你拒绝征收数字服务税并取消这些税项——虽然这并不是什么重要的收入来源，但也没关系。
You're in a trade war with The US because you felt emboldened by the Supreme Court ruling and because, like, you refused to to to do digital service taxes and get rid of those, which is, I don't know, not a huge, like, revenue raiser, but that's fine.
在什么情况下，你会加息，让这个问题变得更糟？
In what world does, like, do you hike and make this issue worse?
在什么情况下，你会惩罚你的可贸易部门呢？嗯。
And what, like, in what world do you make your tradable do you punish your tradable sector Mhmm.
为了这个吗？
For this?
所以我觉得完全没有可能加息，我认为，相反，他们可能会降息。
And so I think there's no chance, I think, if anything, they cut.
所以我完全不看好这个。
So I completely fade this.
而且你可以把这个和SOFR相比，我认为，因为美国实际加息的可能性要小得多。
And you could, like, do this relative to SOFR, I think, because it's it's much less likely that The US actually hikes.
在这种情况下，我怀疑他们根本不会这么做。
I doubt they would ever do that in this scenario.
他们根本没必要这么做。
They just wouldn't need to.
所以你可以把这个和那个相比。
So you can do that relative to that.
我认为英国利率已经重新定价了。
I think UK rates have repriced.
加拿大利率也已经重新定价了。
Canadian rates have repriced.
我并不太认同这一点。
I don't really buy it.
但最终，受损的将是欧洲的周期性板块，比如汽车和工业股。
But, ultimately, like, who loses is European cyclicals, like autos, industrials.
无论他们是否加息，它们都会受到冲击，这是一次增长冲击。
They're gonna get hit whether they hike, whether they don't hike, and this is, a growth shock.
欧元将会受到打击。
Like, the euro's gonna get hit.
你能想象吗？先定价两次降息，然后又转向定价一次或两次加息，但你的货币还是下跌？
And, like, could you imagine pricing in, like, two cuts or, like, one or two cuts and then going to pricing in one or two hikes and your currency still falls?
这根本就不是个好局面。
Like, it's it's just not a good situation.
所以
So
是的。
Yeah.
我们什么时候才能从全球债券抛售转向全球债券上涨？
When do we go from bonds globally selling off to bonds globally rallying?
我认为，当这种情况发生转变时，可能更像是一种无形冲击。
I think when you flip is you're probably it's probably gonna be more of an intangible shock.
所以，这是我的分析框架的一部分。
And so this is part of my framework.
当它更多地表现为一种非实体的、监管性质的冲击时，
When it's more of like a infant nonphysical, it's regulatory.
比如财政或货币政策制裁，而不是像军事行动、气候事件或影响劳动力市场的物理性事件时，你会看到各国之间的表现出现分化。
It's like fiscal or monetary policy sanctions, something that isn't like kinetic action or like a physical, you know, climate event, something like that, or affects the labor market, is when you're gonna see that, like, country by country dispersion.
因此，资产不再全球同步波动，而是美国资产朝一个方向移动，欧洲资产朝另一个方向移动，或者彼此更紧密地相关。
And so instead of assets, like, moving globally, co moving together, you're gonna see, like, US assets move in one direction, European assets move in one direction, or be more tightly correlated.
新兴市场资产则会更加紧密地联动。
EM assets will be more tightly correlated.
那时，你就能挑选出你感兴趣的资产了。
And then that's when you can kind of pick out the assets that you like.
所以，我不确定。
So, I don't know.
我觉得我们都在努力弄清楚发生了什么。
I think we're all trying to figure out what's going on.
而最终，当这种转变发生时，你就可以开始根据国家或地区来评估赢家和输家了。
And ultimately, when that flips is when you can start pricing in, like, the winners and losers on, like, a country by country basis or, like, region by region.
不错。
Nice.
这个框架非常好。
That's great framing.
好的。
Okay.
我想从更宏观的角度来看，这场冲突如何融入特朗普政府地缘政治优先事项的整体背景中。
I wanna zoom out to how this conflict sits within the rest of the context of of some of the geopolitical priorities of of the Trump administration.
所以你之前提到，好吧。
So you mentioned earlier that, okay.
看。
Look.
他们在今年秋天发布了一份国家战略性利益文件，而你说人们可能对这份文件的关注有些过度了。
There is this national strategic interest document strategy that they put out in the fall, and you're saying that people are probably over indexing a little bit towards that a bit too much.
但无论如何，你还是能看到这样一个模式：好吧。
But still, you know, you you have this pattern of, okay.
这里到底发生了什么？
What's going on here?
我们有委内瑞拉计划。
We have the Venezuela initiative.
现在又有了伊朗。
We have Iran now.
我们还听到了关于门罗主义的讨论，他们试图在美国周边建立一个势力范围，这意味着古巴可能会成为接下来棋盘上的一步棋。
We have talk about a Donroe Doctrine where they're trying to create this sphere of influence within the America landscape, which means potentially Cuba is going to be the next piece on the chessboard here.
把这些都放在一起，人们猜测这实际上完全是针对中国——也就是说，我们一方面要建立你提到的势力范围，另一方面，如果我们打击委内瑞拉的石油，而它正是向中国出口石油的关键国家之一。
When you put those all together, people speculate that this is really quote unquote all about China, which is that, okay, we need to get our sphere of the, spherification that you mentioned at the same time as, okay, if we go after Venezuela oil, that's one of the key exporters to China of oil.
而如今伊朗和台湾的贸易也是如此，它们也是向中国出口石油的大国。
And then now also Iran and the trade of Formuse, you know, they're a huge exporter to China of oil as well.
这些举措确实都似乎指向了对中国聚焦的方向。
It does feel like all these pieces move towards this focus on China.
我只是想知道，你对这种框架有多大程度的认可？
And I'm just wondering how much credence do you give to that framework?
我不认为这一切都只是为了中国，但我认为中国是一个影响因素。
So I don't think it's all about China, but I think it is an input.
对吧？
Right?
至于伊朗，我不觉得它和中国有什么关系，但你可能会预期，比如说，
So Iran, I don't think it had anything to do with China, but you might be expecting, like, okay.
这对东亚的冲击比对我们大十倍。
This is 10 times worse for East Asia than it is for us.
如果非要说的话，我们可能反而会略微受益，而欧洲则在较小程度上受损。
If anything, we might benefit on the margin, and it's, to a lesser extent, bad for Europe.
委内瑞拉的情况，对中国的伤害也很大。
Venezuela, also bad for China.
我不认为这是去那里的核心动机。
I don't think that's the core impulse for for going there.
你知道，比如，为海峡的战争提供保险，是反华还是亲华的行为？
You know, like, it doesn't like, is the provision of insurance to the straight of war moves an anti China thing or a pro China thing?
这有助于中国的油轮。
Like, that helps Chinese tankers.
对吧？
Right?
这有助于他们获取能源。
That helps them get energy.
所以我不认为这是他们考量的一部分。
So I I don't think that's it's part of the calculus.
我不认为这是核心因素。
I don't think it's, like, the core thing.
我的意思是，如果他们去古巴的话，我觉得他们会去。
I mean, if they go to I think Cuba, like I think they're gonna go.
最终，伊朗在诸多方面比委内瑞拉要难处理得多。
Ultimately, like, Iran has proven to be much more challenging, so to speak, than Venezuela for myriad reasons.
但古巴也会带来它自己的挑战，不是那种他们会拥有大量我们无法应对的军事和防御力量的问题。
But Cuba's gonna also be present its own challenges, not in terms of, like, oh, they're gonna have all these military and defense forces that we can't handle.
那不是问题。
That's not an issue.
我认为古巴的问题在于，它其实没有太多像样的机构。
I think the issue with Cuba is there's not really a huge, like they don't really have institutions.
你明白我的意思吗？
You know what I mean?
他们的公共部门虽然能做些令人耳目一新的事。
Like, their public sector is pretty it can do refreshing.
但做不了太多其他事情。
It can't do a lot of other stuff.
他们有大量的微型和小型企业，这些企业基本上成了他们经济的新增长来源——无论那增长有多微小。
They have a ton of, like, micro and small businesses that basically are the new source of growth for their economy, whatever growth that is.
他们有着巨大的赤字。
They run a huge deficit.
他们没有可贸易的产业。
They don't have a tradable sector.
他们的出口产品无非是雪茄、糖和烟草。
Their export is like cigars, sugar, tobacco.
根本没有什么能用来积累储备。
Like, there there's nothing there to build reserves.
所以，最终你不得不亲自介入并管理这个国家。
So, ultimately, you have to go in and, like, run the country.
你不能只是说：‘德尔西·罗德里格斯，请你来管理这个国家，给我们一些石油吧。’
Like, the vice president, you can't just be like, Delsy Rodriguez, please run this country and, like, give us some of the oil.
给我们一些雪茄，这根本无济于事。
Like, give us some of the cigars doesn't do a lot.
所以我认为，实际上这是一个巨大的挑战，我认为在过去一年里，鲁比奥在公众形象方面表现得相当不错。
So I think it's actually a huge like, I think Rubio has, in terms of public perception, done pretty well the past year.
我觉得人们真的非常支持他。
Like, I think people are really on board, like, with him.
但归根结底，如果我们介入并不得不接管这个国家，或者对它的未来负起重大责任，那将是一个巨大的政治风险。
But, like, ultimately, if we go there and we have to, like, run the country or we're really responsible for its path from there, that's a huge political risk.
你知道的。
You know?
在未来两三年里，我们真的要管理一个几乎濒临崩溃的国家吗？
Like, for the next two, three years, like, are we gonna be running a nearly failed state?
我觉得这会非常、非常困难。
I think it's gonna be really, really difficult.
所以，你知道，伊朗、委内瑞拉、古巴，如果你想把这变成一个中国故事，当然可以。
So, you know, Iran, Venezuela, Cuba, like, if you wanna make it a China story, sure.
这并没有造成伤害，但我认为这并不是决策的核心部分。
It didn't hurt, but I don't think that was the core part of the calculus.
门罗主义的其余部分以及拉美地区，我认为仍有生命力。
The rest of Donroe Doctrine and, like, LatAm, I think has legs.
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我认为这会是未来几年乃至更久以后的一个话题。
I think it'll it'll be a story for the next few years and even past that.
我觉得，不管你喜欢与否，世界正走向不同的势力范围。
I think, like, the world is going into spheres, whether you like it or not.
坦白说，作为投资者，当地缘战略和地缘经济处于十字路口时，拉美拥有诸多优势。
And, frankly, like, as an investor, LatAm has so many advantages, when, like, geostrategic and geoeconomic kind of things are are in a crossroads.
你知道，它位于西半球。
You know, it's it's positioned in on the in the Western Hemisphere.
它靠近美国的后院。
It's near abroad to The US.
一般来说，当地人口受过良好教育。
Educated populations, generally.
他们并没有把大规模移民当作一个问题来应对。
They're not dealing with, like, mass mass immigration as an issue.
我的意思是，他们确实有一些移民流向美国，但那更多是中美洲的问题，而不是南美洲大多数国家的问题，除了委内瑞拉可能是个例外。
I mean, they have some immigration to The US, but, like, that's kind of Central America more than, a lot of South American countries outside of Venezuela maybe.
发电、电力传输，一切都很好。
Power gen, power transmission, all looks good.
丰富的自然资源。
Ton of natural resources.
许多国家能够自行实现经常账户盈余并积累外汇储备。
A lot of them can generate current account surpluses on their own and build FX reserves.
这真是个绝佳的故事。
It's just a great story.
我觉得这是下一个可能的增长热点，我认为那里的金融科技可能会起到帮助作用。
I think it's a great like, it's the next probably place for growth, and I think fintech there can probably help.
那里的人力发展水平很高，但收入普遍较低。
There's a ton of, like, human development there, but, like, low incomes.
对吧？
Right?
也许墨西哥正处于中等收入国家之列。
And, like, maybe Mexico is in the middle income world.
但大多数国家的收入水平，相对于其国家发展程度和制度实力来说，仍然偏低。
But, like, most of them are kind of, like, lower income relative to how, quote, unquote, developed their country is and how many and their the strength of their institutions.
所以，如果你能借助强大的金融科技推动力，从低收入国家快速跃升为中等或中上等收入国家，跳过传统银行业务并深化信贷服务，那么你不仅能推动可贸易部门的发展，还能带动消费增长。
So if you can accelerate from, like, a low income to, like, a middle to upper middle income country because you have this huge fintech impulse and, like, you can skip traditional banking services and deepen credit there, you know, you can actually not even just do the tradable sector stuff, but you can have actually consumption accelerate as well.
你不会只有一个单一的增长点。
And you can have, like, not, like, a one kind of, I don't know, one node of growth.
你可以有两个。
You can have two.
所以我认为这是一个巨大、巨大、巨大、巨大的机会。
So I think it's a huge, huge, huge, huge opportunity.
最终，我认为它们是伊朗冲突的地缘政治赢家之一。
Ultimately, I think they're one of the geographical winners of the Iran conflict.
中东、欧洲、亚洲都因此受到了影响。
Like, The Middle East, Europe, Asia, all kind of hurt by this.
拉丁美洲的能源自主性将大大增强。
Like, a lot more energy independency in Latin America.
他们没有受到这些政权的任何影响。
They're not exposed to, like, any of these regimes.
海上航线，他们也没有受到影响。
Maritime routes, they're not exposed.
对吧？
Right?
比如，你仍然可以从东亚或欧洲等地到达那里。
Like, you can still get there from East Asia or from Europe or whatever.
所以对我来说，这看起来像是一个赢家，我真的很喜欢关注这些国家。
So for me, it seems like a winner, and, like, I really like looking at some of these countries.
比如，巴西很明显，人们已经用雷亚尔做套利交易很久了。
Like, Brazil's obvious, and people have been doing carry trades with the real for however long.
但我是说，巴西、哥伦比亚、墨西哥，阿根廷又是另一回事。
But, I mean, like, Brazil, Colombia, Mexico, Argentina is its own thing.
但像秘鲁、智利这样的国家，我们又回到了自然资源很重要的时代。
But, like, Peru, Chile, you know, it's kind of we're going back to, like, natural resources matter.
这简直是一个真实可信的故事。
It's, like, a tangible story.
最终，我认为这些国家将是人们将要关注的。
And, ultimately, I think, like, these are the countries that people are gonna go through.
所以当新兴市场普遍抛售、信贷利差重新定价时，你希望找到那些你真正看好的地区和国家，以便与你不看好的国家进行对冲。
So when EM is selling off broadly and, like, credit spreads are repricing, you wanna find the regions and kind of countries that you actually like so that you can kind of, you know, pair those against the ones you don't like.
而且我非常看好。
And, I'm a huge fan.
我觉得不管下一任总统是谁，我不确定他们的名字是否符合门罗主义的风格。
Like, I think there's gonna be I don't know who the next president is, but, like, if I don't know if their name will fit with Donroe Doctrine as well.
但如果是一位共和党人，我认为门罗主义还会再持续四年，并且会继续推进下去。
But if it's a Republican, I think it'll be Donroe Doctrine for another four years, and, like, it'll just keep running regardless.
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我认为这里有一个重要的细微差别：当你听到人们对拉美或新兴市场极度看涨时，通常会被表述为‘抛售美国，买入世界其他地区’的想法。
I think an important nuance there is that oftentimes when you hear people being super bullish on LATAM or EM or what have you, it's it's framed as this idea of sell America and buy rest of world.
但我认为你并不是在说对美国持看跌态度。
But I don't think you're necessarily saying you're bearish on US.
这比那要更复杂一些。
It's a bit more nuanced than that.
对吗？
Is that correct?
是的。
Yeah.
我的意思是，这几乎是美国增长和美国以外增长的衍生品。
I mean, it's almost a derivative of US growth and then also ex US growth.
不。
No.
我的意思是，卖空美国，我从来就不认同，但买入美洲，我非常认同。
I mean, like, sell America, I never really bought into, but buy The Americas, I really buy into.
我觉得是这样，如果我不能在美国制造，那拉美就有很大的优势，比如劳动力成本更低，而且不像东南亚或中国那样存在劳工问题。
I think it's so, like, if I'm doing if I can't manufacture in The US, like, LatAm has so much like, you have a cheaper cost of labor, and it's not, you know, like, it's not questionable labor, like, places in Southeast Asia or China.
那里的劳工状况并不受压制。
Like, it's not repressed.
对吧？
Right?
可能只是成本更低。
It might just be, like, lower cost.
但他们有工程师。
But they have engineers.
比如，他们有大学之类的。
Like, they have, you know, universities, whatever.
有一个受过良好教育的基础人群。
Like, there's a well educated base.
所以你可以进行制造。
So you can do manufacturing.
你可以做先进制造，等等。
You do advanced manufacturing, whatever.
所以，最终，如果有一些增长从美国渗透出来，资本流动、外商直接投资流向世界其他地区，我认为这些会流向拉美，无论是政府、企业还是公私合营。
So, ultimately, like, if you have some growth coming like, permeating from The US, like, to be capital flows going to like, FDI going to other parts of the world, I think that'll be going to LatAm, government or corporate or public private.
而且，我认为还有一个向上延伸的渠道。
And then, also, I think you have a funnel up.
所以，像加密货币和新银行，以前在华盛顿的政策制定者眼中只是些边缘概念。
So, like, neobanks and crypto used to be, like, personas on grata for policymakers in DC.
对吧？
Right?
但现在我觉得发生了一个巨大的反转，彻底的体制转变——比如EraBor，还有其他一些我就不点名了，但你知道的，它们现在正从货币监理署获得特许执照。
And now I think you have a huge flip, complete regime change, where, like, EraBor, all these other side I guess I shouldn't mention, like, specific things, but, like, that's a you know, they're kind of getting charters from the OCC.
你甚至看到Kraken之类的公司获得了美联储主账户，对吧？
You're getting, like, Fed Master account, I think, for Kraken, or who was it?
是的。
Yeah.
所以我认为，你正看到一种变化：以前连窄银行都不被接受，而现在，你看到他们变得更加开放。
So I think you're seeing a change where, like, they used to not even be okay with a narrow bank, and now, like, you're seeing more openness.
因此，我认为金融科技和拉美地区一个真正非常有趣的机会是，你们实际上可以进入美国市场。
So I think what the what a really, really interesting opportunity for fintech and LatAm is you can actually expand into The US market.
比如，墨西哥的用户和跨境用户之间本身就存在天然的重叠。
Like, there's just a natural overlap between, like, consumers in next like, you know, people you bank in Mexico and then people you bank across the border.
我认为这将成为一个巨大的增长来源，而欧洲、中东或亚洲的一些金融科技公司可能更难进入美国市场，因为那里存在某种壁垒。
And I think that will be kind of a huge source of growth, whereas, like, some of the fintechs in Europe or The Middle East or Asia might have a harder time penetrating The US because there's not there's, like, a a barrier there, so to speak.
所以我认为，这同样是一个非常有趣的机会——不是资金从美国外流，而是向美国流入。
So I think that's also a really interesting opportunity, for not growth funneling out of The US, but funneling up.
我认为，如果有外国直接投资流入，拉美货币就会升值。
And I think, ultimately, like, if you have FDI going, you'll have currency appreciation in LatAm.
但最终，投资组合资金会寻求某种地理多元化。
But then ultimately, portfolio flows will seek some geographic diversification.
我认为其中一部分资金会流向那里。
I think some of that's gonna go there.
你会获得外国直接投资，同时也会有股权投资，比如如果局势更稳定之类的。
You'll get FDI, but you also get, like, equity investment, you know, like, if there's more stability, whatever.
所以，我的意思是，未来五到十五年，这个地区可能会迎来一场真正的复兴。
So, I mean, like, it could be the next five, ten, fifteen years where, like, it's, like, a renaissance for this region, really.
很有趣。
Fascinating.
好的。
Alright.
我想稍微换个话题，聊聊你在美联储最近的经历，以及你是如何思考这些问题的。
I wanna shift gears a little bit to your most recent experience at the Fed and leaning on that and how you're thinking about it.
所以，是的，我记得你直到今年一月都是美联储的顾问。
So, yeah, you're you're advisor at the Fed up until the January, I believe.
所以非常新近。
So pretty fresh.
而且，你之前在节目中提到，上一次你参与美联储的工作是在2018年，当时你在纽约联储，深度参与了量化紧缩的进程。
And, yeah, you mentioned early in the show that the last time you're involved with the Fed was in 2018 at at the at the New York Fed, and you're highly involved with quantitative tightening happening there.
而如今，我们又回到了美联储，正好处于准备金从充裕 regime 向试探稀缺 regime 过渡的时期。
And then here we are again at the Fed right around the time where reserves are starting to move from that ample regime to starting to test the waters of scarce regime.
在那段时间里，我们见证了量化紧缩的彻底逆转，随后美联储开始开展公开的准备金管理操作。
And during that time, we saw the complete reversal of of QT, and then the Fed started to to do open reserve management operations.
所以我们很想听听，首先，让我们稍微深入探讨一下资产负债表的现状，以及你今天对它的看法。
So we'd just love to hear, first off, let's nerd out a little bit about the state of the balance sheet and how you're thinking about it, how you think about it today.
是的。
Yeah.
我认为结束量化紧缩并重启储备管理操作的决定是明智且必要的。
So, I mean, I think the decision to end QT and then restart reserve management operations was prudent and necessary.
我觉得，说实话，11月份相当可怕，因为你知道，回购利率已经远远偏离了目标区间。
Like, I think I think honestly that, like, the month of November was quite scary because, you know, repo is trading pretty far outside the target range.
虽然你并不是直接针对回购利率，但我觉得我们险些遭遇了一次显著的回购利率飙升，那可能会引发主流媒体的广泛关注。
Not that you're targeting repo, but I think, like, we kind of narrowly avoided a spike in repo rates that would have been significant and, like, would have caught mainstream media headlines.
而且，普通人也会开始谈论融资市场的压力，这从来都不是一个好迹象。
And, you know, people, like regular people would have been talking about, like, funding market stress, which is never a good sign.
但我们挺过来了。
But we got through it.
看起来在结束量化紧缩后启动储备管理操作时，似乎缺乏充分的规划，但这些措施可能是必要的。
There was kind of a lack of planning, it seems like, with ending QT and then starting RMOs, but they were probably necessary.
但归根结底，我认为他们只是在掩盖一个结构性问题。
But, ultimately, I think they were just papering over a structural issue.
自2018年或2019年以来，根本没有任何问题得到解决。
Like, nothing's been solved from 2019 or 2018.
你只是不断看到对冲基金或主要交易公司把回购利率的分布推得更高。
You just continuously have, basically, hedge funds or primary trading firms pull the distribution of repo rates much higher.
银行的资产负债表仍然受到很大限制，你只是重复着同样的循环：SOFR基于价差交易定价，然后当外国银行因无利可图而退出融资市场时，你就会震惊，事情很快就会失控。
Bank balance sheets are still quite constrained, and you just have the same cycle where, like, SOFR prices off basis trades, and then you're shocked when foreign banks pull out of funding markets because there's no more arbitrage for them, and, things go to shit pretty quickly.
你可以看到这种迹象持续一两个月甚至三个月，但并不是一夜之间发生的。
Like, it's it just you can see it for, like, a month or two or three months, and, like, it's not like it happens overnight.
你只是观察到它，然后突然间非线性地加速了。
You just see it, and then nonlinearly, it just accelerates.
然后你就陷入困境，不得不注入流动性。
And then you're in a bind, and you have to add liquidity.
所以是的。
So Yeah.
在我看来，这相当愚蠢。
It's pretty stupid in my opinion.
我认为，你知道，凯文会来，并且他对美联储的工作机制有很好的理解。
I think, you know, Kevin will come in and I think has a great, like, perception of how the Fed works.
而且，希望像负责监管的副主席米基·鲍曼这样的人，过去一两年已经开始着手这件事了。
And, hopefully, like, I think also vice chair super for supervision, Mickey Bowman, has already been starting on this for the past year or two.
我觉得放宽资本要求非常好。
Like, I think easing up on capital requirements is great.
他们将开始放宽流动性要求。
They'll start easing up on liquidity requirements.
这很好。
That's great.
这甚至都不是放宽。
And it's not even easing up.
我是真的在意。
Like, I actually care.
我认为我最首要的担忧始终是金融稳定，我觉得政策的钟摆可能在金融危机前过于宽松，之后又摆到了过于严格的一端，这本身也带来了不少问题。
I think first my first and foremost worry is always financial stability, and I just think, like, the pendulum went from too loose probably before the GFC to, like, way too tight, and it's caused its own issues.
所以我们现在更像是在调整和重新校准我们所处的监管框架。
So we're more so tailor like, retailoring and rightsizing where we are in the regulatory regime.
所以我认为，如果你担心缩减资产负债表，那可能是方向错了。
So I think, like, if you're worried about shrinking the balance sheet, that's probably misplaced.
坦白说，从先后顺序来看，你必须先放松银行监管，这不仅能帮助吸收国债，还能让更多的资金流入市场。
And frankly, from a sequencing perspective, you have to, like, loosen bank regulation first, which a, helps with the absorption of treasury debt, but b, just, like, helps get more money out there.
囤积准备金和高质量流动性资产会阻碍流动性向实体经济的传导。
Like, hoarding reserves and HQLA prevents the transmission of, like, liquidity to the real economy.
因此，我认为这实际上是一种名义增长的刺激，但这并不是大多数人看待缩减资产负债表和量化紧缩的方式。
And so I think, honestly, it's a bit of a nominal growth impulse, which is not the way most people think about shrinking the balance sheet and QT.
但归根结底，如果你通过缓解银行资产负债表压力、赋予纽约联储交易台真正管理日常和月度储备波动的能力来实现这一点，你就能减少频繁出现的资金市场压力和波动。
But, ultimately, if you do it by helping alleviate bank balance sheets, empowering the desk in New York to actually manage day to day swings and month to month month to month swings and reserves, you'll just allow more you won't get so much funding market stress and volatility all the time.
这样你就能更容易地管理它，从而让整体准备金水平下降，真正让银行回归银行的本质。
You'll be able to manage it much much easier and therefore allow aggregate reserve levels to drop and just, like, free banks up to, like, be banks.
你明白我的意思吧？
You know what I mean?
是的。
Yeah.
所以我认为我对变革持乐观态度。
So I think I'm optimistic about change.
当然，事情可能会失控。
Like, sure, things can blow up.
你看，去年第四季度时事情差点就崩了，而那时我们还有充足的储备。
Well, like, things nearly blew up in q four, and that was when we had ample reserves.
所以我非常乐观。
So, I'm super optimistic.
我认为银行在一年半前，尤其是大约一年前，已经从过度监管转向了正确的方向。
I think banks turned a corner a year and a half ago, and especially a year ago, like, from overregulation to moving in the right direction.
而且，我认为有一位新的美联储主席只会加速这一进程。
And, you know, I think having a new Fed chair will only help that accelerate.
所以我对这一点非常乐观。
So I'm super optimistic about that.
不错。
Nice.
是的。
Yeah.
我一会儿想聊聊沃什的事情，但先问一个澄清的问题。
I wanna get into the Warsh thing in a minute, but just one clarifying question.
你之前提到过，你觉得最近秋季的这次波动与2019年相比，其实没有任何根本性的改善。
You mentioned there earlier about how you feel like there's nothing that's been really fixed from that recent, fall spike versus 2019.
人们可能会看到像常设回购便利这样的机制，然后说：嘿。
People will look at something like the standing repo facility and say, hey.
看。
Look.
我们只是临时补了一下。
We patched it over.
我们有了这个新的常设回购便利工具。
We have this new standing repo facility.
一切似乎都很好，但听起来你对SRF没那么有信心。
All is well, but sounds like you're not as convinced about the SRF.
我的意思是，SRF很不错。
I mean, SRF is great.
不过我认为它并没有奏效。
I don't think it's been effective, though.
很好。
Great.
理论上它很棒。
It's great in theory.
只是它并没有奏效，而且我们太急于放弃，说‘哦，有污名化问题’。
It's just, it hasn't been effective, and I think we're too quick to throw up our hands and say, oh, well, there's stigma.
那我们该怎么办？
What are we gonna do?
我们如何消除这种污名化？
How do we get rid of stigma?
这原本是贴现窗口的问题，但我们 somehow 让污名化蔓延到了 SRF。
Which was a discount window thing, and somehow we allowed stigma to arrive at the SRF.
他们现在有两次操作，一次在上午，一次在下午。
They have now two operations, one in the morning, one in the afternoon.
但这依然没有解决银行并不需要资金的问题。
Again, it doesn't address the fact that banks don't need the funding.
对吧？
Right?
归根结底，资金需求来自对冲基金。
Like, it's ultimately the funding needs to get the hedge funds.
正是这些对冲基金推高了 SOFR 的分布。
Those are who pull SOFR up in the distribution.
比如 TGCR，或者 GC 回购交易的价格，相对于 SOFR 上限被推高的水平要低得多。
Like, TGCR or, like, where GC repo trades is is much lower relative to, like, where the upper band of SOFR is being pushed.
你有一些交易的利差超出了区间50个基点。
You have trades like 50 bps outside of the range.
这太疯狂了。
Like, that's crazy.
再搞一次回购操作，或者提高SRF的限额，根本解决不了这个问题，因为归根结底，资金根本没到达正确的人手里。
And another repo operation or, like, a bigger, a larger cap at the SRF is just not gonna fix that because, ultimately, like, this is not it's not getting to the right people.
我觉得一个很好的举措是实行中央清算。
I mean, I think a great step would be to do central clear.
我觉得中国人民银行实际上正在朝这个方向推进，那就是对SRF实行中央清算，这本来就是证监会推动、行业已经开始转向的做法。
I think the BOC is actually moving towards this, but, would be to do central clearing for the SRF, which is an SEC thing that industry already started moving to.
我想说，目前有一半的回购交易已经是中央清算的了。
I wanna say, like, half of repo is is centrally cleared anyway.
但基本上，这能让银行将两笔回购交易进行净额结算。
But, basically, what it allows banks to do is net two repo trades.
也就是说，资产负债表一侧的回购交易和另一侧的交易，可以净额抵扣保证金，从而避免资产负债表过度扩张。
Like, basically, the repo trade on one side of their balance sheet and the other one, you can, like, net the margin and basically not allow your balance sheet to expand so much.
你并不会因为监管要求而受到惩罚。
You just don't get punished by requirements.
你不会因为监管而受损，这很荒谬，因为表面上这些监管是为了支持金融稳定，但实际上却阻止了银行在回购市场放贷，而本该放贷的正是银行，而不是美联储。
Like, you're not getting hurt by regulations, which is crazy because, like, ostensibly, those regulations are there to support financial stability, and then they physically disallow banks from lending in repo markets, which is who should be lending, not the Fed.
所以他们宁愿不去找美联储，因为那样会算进他们的流动性要求里。
So then they go to like, they're and they're not gonna go to the Fed if they're then counting against their liquidity requirements.
所以，这看起来很反直觉，我认为过去十五年银行监管与货币政策的割裂是非常愚蠢的。
So, like, it's counterintuitive, and I think this siloing of bank supervision regulation from monetary policy for the past fifteen years has been pretty stupid.
而且我认为，终于，米隆行长就这个问题发表了一篇精彩的演讲，我们开始思考这两者之间的交集，以及它如何真正影响货币政策的实施。
And I think finally, and governor Myron gave a fantastic speech about this, we're thinking about the intersection of those two and how it actually affects monetary policy implementation.
因为，是的，这并不是量化宽松，但归根结底，每月增加四千亿美元的储备确实会影响货币政策——这本身就是货币政策。
Because, like, yes, it is not QE, but ultimately, like, adding $40,000,000,000 of reserves a month does affect monetary like, that is monetary policy.
对吧？
Right?
你不应该这么做，因为基差交易是个问题。
You don't wanna be doing that because, like, the basis trade is an issue.
所以我认为，终于，终于，终于，将这两个问题结合起来思考它们的交汇点，将有助于从结构上修复这些问题。
So I think finally, finally, finally, thinking about these two issues in unison and how they intersect will help, you know, structurally repair these issues.
嗯。
Mhmm.
所以，好吧。
So okay.
这自然引出了凯文·沃什出任新的美联储主席，因为基于他过去的一些言论和观点，已经引发了很多恐慌，毕竟他多年来一直是最直言不讳的量化宽松批评者之一。
That leads in nicely to Kevin Warsh coming in as a new Fed chair because there's been a a lot of hysteria baked in based on some of his previous articulations and views where, you know, he's been one of the most, you know, outspoken critics of quantitative easing over the years.
当然，他在伯南克于2008年左右启动量化宽松时就在任。
Of course, he was there right around where it began with Bernanke back in '8, etcetera.
人们似乎非常担心他希望大幅缩减资产负债表、重返2008年之前的准备金制度之类的想法。
People seem very concerned about this idea that he wants to bring the balance sheet much lower, reenter a pre eight reserve regime and that sort of thing.
听起来你的看法要更加细致一些。
And it sounds like you're a bit more nuanced in your perspective of it.
所以我非常希望你能为我们梳理一下，你如何看待未来资产负债表制度可能的发展方向，以及你认为沃什会如何思考这个问题。
So I'd love for you to just walk us through how you're thinking about where we're likely to go in terms of that balance sheet regime and how you think Warsh might be thinking about it.
是的
Yeah.
我的意思是，这很有趣，因为我觉得街上的几乎每个人或金融界的人都同意，量化宽松带来了大量非预期的后果，而且最近一轮在疫情期间更是过头了。
I mean, it's it's funny because I feel like almost everyone on the street or in finance also agrees that QE had tons of unintended consequences, and also this latest round in during COVID was too much.
我们已经扩展到了资产配置，比如在拍卖时或二楼购买公司债券。
We've expanded into asset allocation, buying corporate bond issuance at auction or on the 2nd Floor.
我们真的已经超越了核心职责，而且大家都认同这一点。
Like, we've really, like, gotten and passed the core mandate, and everyone has that belief.
然后，一个即将成为政策制定者的人也表达了同样的观点。
And then someone who is gonna go be a policymaker echoes it.
他们持有同样的看法。
They have the same view.
他们多年来一直这么认为，而我们却因此感到恐慌。
They've had it for years, and then we get scared.
你知道吗？
You know?
这对我来说真的很奇怪。
Like, that's that's very odd to me.
我看不出那里有什么问题。
I don't see the concern there.
我认为，只要再次做好银行监管，理解谁在吸收国债以及这背后的机制，缩减资产负债表是没问题的。
I think ultimately shrinking the balance sheet is fine as long as you, again, do bank dereg, retailer that, understand, like, who is absorbing treasuries and how that works.
所以我不太担心这个。
So I'm not that worried about it.
我认为他非常适合这个职位。
So I think he's a great fit for the job.
我不明白人们到底期望什么。
Like, I don't know what people wanted.
那他们的希望是什么？
Like, what was what was the hope?
显然，他非常有资格。
I think he's super qualified, obviously.
我觉得他提出了很多很好的观点。
I think he makes a lot of great points.
而且，在2008年之前，一切都没问题。
And, like, pre o eight, it worked just fine.
是的，2008年确实发生了，但同时新冠疫情也来了，当时出现了大规模的现金抢购。
Like, yes, o eight happened, but also, like, COVID happened, and there was a huge dash for cash.
而且，回购市场再次崩溃了。
And, again, the repo market broke.
所以，我们并没有在流动性紧张和流动性充裕之间真正解决回购市场的问题。
So it's not like we solved the repo market in between scarce reserves and abundant.
他会转向流动性紧张的状态吗？
Is he gonna go to scarce reserves?
我不确定。
I'm not sure.
我觉得这需要一些时间。
I think that would take some time.
那个水平在哪里？
Where is that level?
找到那个水平也需要一些时间。
That would also take some time to find.
但最终，如果你放松对银行的限制，比如，储备金之所以刚刚低于3万亿美元，是因为银行持有它们是为了满足监管要求。
But, ultimately, if, like, you ease up on bet like, the reason there's just under $3,000,000,000,000 of reserves is because banks hold them to meet regulatory requirements.
所以，如果你放松这些要求，同时也在银行监管上调整——比如，监管机构原本更倾向于要求银行持有储备金而非其他类似的高质量流动性资产（HQLA），如果你撤回这种偏好，随着时间推移，银行会开始调整。
So if you ease up on those and also on bank supervision where they basically tell banks we prefer reserves over other other, like, otherwise comparable forms of HQLA, if you pull back on that, over time, banks start to adjust.
我认为压力测试的做法也很棒，基本上就是说，好吧。
I think the stress testing thing was also great, giving basically, okay.
你做一次压力测试。
You do a stress test.
你现在有两年时间来规划，而不是一年。
You now have two years to plan as opposed to one.
我认为他们可以做很多事情，但我不觉得仅仅因为储备金是3万亿还是3.5万亿，或者2.8万亿美元，就有什么本质区别，除非说，哦，不。
I think there's a lot of things they can do, but I don't it just doesn't like, if if there is no difference between 3 and 3 and a half or 3 and $2,800,000,000,000 of reserves other than, oh, no.
回购利率可能会开始上升。
Repo rates might start to creep up.
这真的重要吗？
Does it really matter?
我觉得，你知道，过去十五年货币流通速度一直受到严重压制。
Like, I I don't think you know, money velocity has been so crimped for the past fifteen years.
我觉得银行并不想靠持有一千亿或五千亿的储备来赚取超额准备金利率。
Like, I don't think banks wanna earn IORB on, like, a $100,000,000,000 or $500,000,000,000 of reserves.
它们更想做真正的银行，通过放贷赚更多的钱。
Like, they wanna go be banks and make money doing that and make more money.
所以，是的，我认为最终你应该做的是鼓励货币流通速度回升，而不是一味放水M2却看着货币流通速度下降。
So, yeah, I think, like, ultimately, what you wanna do is encourage money velocity to pick up as opposed to just pumping m two and watching money velocity fall.
如果你看这张图表，从金融危机以来，M2与货币流通速度的关系，简直就像供需曲线，但它们看起来完全呈反向相关。
And if you look at that chart, like, two versus money velocity, since the GFC, it's been it's been, like, literally, like, supply and demand curve, but they look like they're totally inversely correlated.
而且，他也不是一个外人说这些话。
Also, it's not like he's an outsider saying this stuff.
他懂这其中的运作原理。
Like, he knows how it works.
你明白我的意思吧？
You know what I mean?
他在危机期间就在现场，因此对破坏融资市场可能引发的问题非常敏感。
And he was there during the crisis, so he's very attuned to the worry like, the issues with if you break funding markets.
对吧？
Right?
嗯哼。
Mhmm.
是的。
Yeah.
我觉得，不管谁坐上这个位置，人们都会抱怨。
Just, like, I think people are gonna complain no matter who gets in the seat.
每个人隔三差五就抱怨一波鲍威尔。
Like, everyone complains about Powell every other day.
但如果你问别人，他是个称职的央行行长吗？
Yet if you ask someone, like, was he a good central banker?
很多人会说，是的。
Like, a lot of people will say, like, yeah.
他做得还不错。
He was fine.
你明白我的意思吗？
You know what I mean?
我不知道我能不能做得更好。
I don't know if I would have done better.
所以归根结底，我认为他可能会明智地处理事情。
So at the end of the day, like, I think he's hopefully gonna do things smartly.
或许需要几年时间才能逐步缩减资产负债表，但这总比直接说‘量化紧缩’要好得多。
It'll maybe take a couple years to, like, actually drain the balance sheet a bit, but it's much better than just saying, let's do QT.
储备金没有下降，因为逆回购协议在两年内吸收了这些资金。
Reserves don't fall because the RRP just absorbed it for, like, two years.
嗯。
Mhmm.
储备金开始下降，持续了大约三个月，你就慌了，然后选择放弃。
Reserves start to fall for, like, three months, and you panic, and you and you you call it quits.
实际上，这里需要一些周密的规划，我觉得这是我们值得期待的。
You know, like, some actual planning here would be nice, and I think that's something we can look forward to.
是的。
Yeah.
完全同意。
Fully agreed.
我认为，M2和货币流通速度之间的那个关系，是我最近一直在深入思考的问题。
I think that, yeah, that x between m two and velocity, it's it's something I've been thinking about a lot.
我想提出一个观点，谈谈我到目前为止对这个问题的思考。
I'm gonna throw a thesis about how I've been thinking about this so far.
我很感兴趣。
I'm curious.
嗯，告诉我一声。
Like, yeah, let me know.
挑挑毛病吧。
Poke some holes on it.
但话说回来，好吧。
But it's like, okay.
沃什想加入。
Warsh wants to come in.
他相信人工智能能提升生产力。
He's a believer of AI productivity.
他认为我们可能应该比当前市场预期更大幅度地降息。
He thinks that we should probably cut the Fed funds more than what's priced right now.
同时，我们还想放松对银行的监管，比如SLR、风险加权资本比率之类的，让商业银行重新开始放贷，与此同时减少美联储作为唯一玩家的垄断地位。
And then at the same time, we want to, you know, deregulate the banks, SLR, risk weight weighted capital ratios, that sort of thing, get commercial banks to start lending again at the same time that we we remove the Fed from being the only game in town.
在这个过程中，如果联邦基金利率下降，你真的觉得银行会开始重新放贷吗？
And during that process, if Fed funds comes down, do you really like banks, you know, start to get them lending again?
我们可能会看到收益率曲线变陡，这也有利于银行放贷并更积极地开展贷款业务。
We we might see a steepening of the yield curve, which makes it also accretive for banks to to lend out and and be more active with their loans.
把这些都综合起来看，似乎你能达成这样一个目标——虽然有点走钢丝，但感觉你可以实现一种局面：商业银行重新开始放贷，成为这一领域活动的主要推动者，同时让美联储退出，还能为经济带来积极的增长动力。
Putting that all together, it seems like you can get to this, you know, it's a bit of a tightrope, but it feels like you can get to this regime where we get commercial banks lending again, we get them to be the marginal uptake of activity in that respect, pull the Fed out while seeing, you know, a positive growth impulse for the economy.
你怎么看待这个观点？
How do you think about that thesis?
听起来不错。
Sounds great.
我们应该为美联储做一下沟通。
We should do comms for the Fed.
那说得很好。
That was was good.
不。
No.
听我说。
Listen.
我认为这是可能的。
I think it's possible.
这 definitely 是一条路径。
It's definitely a path.
是的。
Yeah.
这有点像一条极乐之路。
It's a little bit of a nirvana path.
是的。
Yeah.
很多事情都在朝着好的方向发展，但我认为这才是目标。
A lot of things going right, but I think that's the goal.
对吧？
Right?
而且，你最终可以有一个北极星，然后在途中灵活调整。
And, you can ultimately have a North Star and then bob and leave along the way.
人工智能会带来大量的生产力增长吗？
Will AI generate a ton of productivity growth?
也许吧。
Maybe.
也许不会。
Maybe not.
它本身就能直接推动生产力提升。
It can also just inherently drive productivity.
所以，就像，你知道的，不仅仅是劳动力。
So, like, you know, as opposed to just labor.
对吧？
Right?
如果你的劳动力与资本关系在改善，你的生产力就会提高。
If your labor capital relationship is improving, you're gonna get better productivity.
对吧？
Right?
数据中心运行得更好、用更少的资源做更多的事，这也是一种生产力。
And, like, data centers doing better or operating, doing more with less is a form of productivity.
企业对招聘不太积极，但依然能提高产出、增加利润，这也是一种生产力。
Companies being less enthusiastic about hiring but continuing to do out like, get more output and grow earnings is a form of productivity.
所以，看起来生产力正在加速提升。
So, like, it looks like productivity is accelerating.
它似乎已经触底，现在正在上升。
Like, it's it looks like it bottomed and it's going up.
是的。
Mhmm.
如果你有更多的供给侧因素，比如资本深化，如果银行再次开始放贷，比如企业贷款之类的，这些都是好事。
If you have more, like, you know, supply side, capital deepening, if banks are lending again and c and I loans and whatever, that's all good.
这对生产力都有好处。
That's all good for productivity.
过去二十年里，我们其实没怎么建设什么重要的东西。
And, we haven't really built anything important for the past twenty years.
你明白我的意思吧？
You know what I mean?
就像
Like
嗯。
Mhmm.
这一直是一个由SaaS和消费者驱动的经济。
It's been a really SaaS, consumer driven economy.
最终，我有点同意。
Ultimately, I kind of agree.
而且，我觉得整个AI这件事，你知道，今年早些时候或者甚至三周前我们所担心的那些，对我来说其实没道理，因为最终，如果你有这种生产力增长，你就是在改善我们面临的这个巨大的财政问题。
And, like, I think, like, the whole AI thing, you know, the the fears that we had earlier this year or, like, literally three weeks ago, it didn't really make sense to me because, ultimately, if you have that kind of productivity growth, like, you're improving this massive, massive fiscal issue that we have.
债务占GDP的比例实际上会下降。
Like, debt to GDP actually falls.
你某种程度上抵消了它。
You you kind of offset it.
你能在单位劳动力成本不上涨的情况下实现真实增长，同时实现实际工资增长。
You get real growth without unit labor costs rising, and you have real wage growth.
而且，坦白说，美国的企业税基会从中受益。
And then, frankly, like, The US has it would benefit our corporate tax base.
对吧？
Right?
我们会看到这些收益流入财政部。
Like, we would we would see those accrue to to Treasury.
因此，你有了更多空间来实施，比如，自动稳定器或刺激措施，以帮助那些人。
So you have more space for, like, you know, basically automatic stabilizers or stimulus to help help those people.
但你需要这种生产率增长。
But, like, you need that productivity growth.
我们都担心社会保障、医疗保险和医疗补助。
We're all worried about Social Security, Medicare, Medicaid.
我们担心债务与GDP之比会过高，利息支出会占据主导。
We're worried that debt to GDP is gonna be too high and that interest expense is gonna take over.
这就是解决这个问题的关键。
This is the kind of thing that solves that.
我们的人口结构，就像东亚一样，非常糟糕且呈倒金字塔状。
We have, like our demographic picture, just like East Asia, is really bad and inverted.
欧洲的情况也一样。
Same same with Europe.
如果你不依赖移民，那就需要生产力来抵消抚养比的上升，否则劳动力状况会持续恶化。
If you don't have immigration, like, you kind of need productivity to offset dependency ratios, keep work you know, continues to deteriorate.
所以，我认为，如果我们能在‘AI毫无用处’和‘AI像互联网泡沫’以及‘AGI解决一切’这三种观点之间找到平衡点，那就太棒了。
So, you know, I think if we find that middle ground between AI is a dud and it's like the .com bubble and, like, AGI solves the universe, It's it's fantastic.
这实际上就是美国例外主义还能再延续四十年的故事。
And it's, like, how it's it's honestly the story of how US exceptionalism just continues for, like, forty more years.
我们只是能更久地避开财政悬崖，你知道的。
And we just, like, avoid the fiscal cliff, you know, for for longer.
所以，就美联储而言，某种程度上，这确实提高了中性利率。
So in terms of what it means for the Fed, like, you know, in some ways, it does raise the neutral rate.
另一方面，它又会压低中性利率。
In other ways, it, like, depresses the neutral rate.
比如，这在基础设施建设与去通胀型产品、生产性增长之间如何平衡，我不太确定。
Like, where that balances out between the build out and between, like, disinflationary product like, productive growth, not entirely sure.
但说实话，我不确定这是否重要。
But frankly, I'm I don't I don't know if it matters.
我觉得利率上下浮动50个基点根本无关紧要。
Like, I don't think 50 bps in either direction matters.
我认为更重要的是能让银行放贷，让供给侧冲击或资本深化之类的问题得到解决。
I think it way more matters that we can get banks lending and get, like, the supply side, you know, shock or capital deepening, whatever.
最终，这会有帮助。
And, ultimately, like, that will help.
如果你——我觉得这是一个更宏观的观点——越能避免冲击和像新冠疫情、全球金融危机这样的黑天鹅事件，长期增长就会越好。
If you I think if you avoid this is a more of a holistic point, but the more you avoid shocks and, like, unforeseen black swans, like COVID, GFC, whatever, the better growth is for the long run.
对吧？
Right?
波动越小越好。
The less volatility, the better it is.
如果你的供给侧得到改善，并且出于国家安全或供应链等广泛原因而更具韧性，能够更好地抵御压力，那么从长期来看，你会表现得更好，也不那么容易受到这些问题的影响。
So if you have, like, a improved supply side and you have, like, for national security or supply chain supply chain reasons broadly and it's more insulated from pressure, you should just be better off longer term, less susceptible to these issues.
所以我不确定。
So I don't know.
我持谨慎乐观的态度，但这并不是我的基本预期。
I'm, like, cautiously optimistic, which is not my baseline.
你知道，如果他们降息75个基点，那就太好了。
You know, if they get 75 bps of cuts, great.
如果他们加息25个基点，那也很好。
If they hike by 25 bps, great.
我觉得这并不重要。
I don't think it matters.
谁在乎呢？
Like, who cares?
我认为，最终在未来五到十年，随着银行贷款更多地流向消费和信贷贷款，以及更多实实在在的物理基础设施建设，货币政策的传导机制将会增强。
I do think, ultimately, the next five to ten years, as you get more bank lending to, you know, like, c and I loans and you get more, like, hard, tangible, physical infrastructure, monetary policy will transmission will pick up.
所以，相比之下，这次加息造成的损害较小，一方面，因为我们所有人都重新融资了。
So, like, whereas the hikes this time around did less damage because, a, like, we all refinanced.
另一方面，企业并没有那么高的债务负担。
B, like, companies just weren't that debt heavy.
像SaaS主导的经济不太容易受到利率上升的影响，我认为，五年后如果再次进入加息周期，情况可能会大不相同。
Like, a SaaS heavy economy isn't gonna be susceptible to, like, rising interest rates, I think, ultimately, like, you have a hiking cycle in five years, that might be much different.
比如，一次真正的150到200个基点、甚至300个基点的加息周期，我认为才会真正引发人们这次预期的那种衰退性动态。
Like, a real 150 to 200 bips, 300 bips hiking cycle, I think that actually causes, the, like, recessionary, dynamics that people expected this time around.
所以。
So
是的。
Yeah.
经济在变化，但仍有乐观的理由。
Economy's changing, but, you know, reasons for optimism.
太棒了。
Love it.
好的。
K.
最后一个关于货币政策的枯燥问题。
Last nerdy monetary policy question.
但在过去几个月，大约六个月左右，我们看到大量讨论，无论是美联储的演讲、会议纪要中的细微暗示，还是某些学术论文，都围绕着这样一个想法：试图调整美联储资产负债表的期限，使其与未偿还国债的加权平均期限相匹配。
But in the last few months, six months or so, we've seen a lot of talk either in Fed speeches or little hints in the minutes or even some academic papers coming out around this idea of trying to rebalance the Fed balance sheet in terms of its duration to match that of the weighted average maturity of Treasury debt outstanding.
是的。
Yeah.
而且，我一直在思考，为什么最近关于这个话题的讨论突然增多了？
And yeah, I just, I've been trying to figure out what's the premise for more of this talk coming about?
你认为这对美联储来说有多重要？
How much of a priority do you think it is for the Fed?
因为实际上，看起来把美联储资产负债表的期限与国债期限对齐，回归到2008年之前的美联储资产负债表期限结构，似乎一切都很好。
Because in reality, like it all, it seems all well and good to try to match the duration of the Fed balance sheet to the Treasury and and and, you know, return to this pre o eight duration profile of the Fed balance sheet.
但你知道，一旦发生危机。
But, you know, you get one crisis.
比如现在，哪怕是石油冲击之类的事情，就会导致经济衰退，然后量化宽松立刻又被提上议程。
One one, you know, even right now, like an oil shock or what have you, and that leads to a recession, then suddenly, QE's back on the table.
所以我只是好奇，第一，你对这个框架有多大信心？
So I'm just curious, one, how much credence do you give to that framework?
你认为它有多重要？
How important do you think it is?
它实际被执行的可能性有多大？
And how likely it is it is it to actually be executed on?
是的。
Yeah.
我的意思是，我觉得这事会发生。
I mean, I think it's going to happen.
会是被动进行的。
It'll be passive.
它会处于幕后。
It'll be in the background.
我觉得这不一定特别重要，但还是有其重要性的。
I think it's I don't know if it's overly important, but it's important.
所以我们现在正在用短期国债替代抵押贷款支持证券。
So, like, we're replacing MBS with bills right now.
问题是，短期国债只占美联储资产负债表的5%。
The issue is, like, bills are, like, 5% of the Fed's balance sheet.
这太低了。
That's just too low.
你可以从理论上论证，它们应该占100%，以更好地匹配以隔夜为主的负债。
You know, you could make theoretical arguments they should be a 100% to better match the liabilities, which are overnight.
所以我认为它会被动增长到接近20%。
So I think it'll grow passively closer to 20%.
我认为有理由认为，它应该接近一半是短期国债，同时理解未来冲击可能会降低这一比例。
I think there's an argument to be made that it should be, like, closer to half bills with the understanding that future shocks would, like, then lower that ratio.
但如果你在匹配资产和负债，持有短期资产是有道理的。
But, you know, like, if you're matching assets and liabilities, it makes sense to have shorter term assets.
你可以采用两端策略。
You could kind of barbell it.
所以你可能会有长期限资产，比如在危机期间进行量化宽松时持有的资产，然后主要是短期国债，再在中间找到一个介于两者之间的平衡点，更接近于国债的未偿债务。
So you have long duration stuff probably from a crisis where you're doing QE and then mostly bills, and then you're finding a wham that's kind of in the middle there closer towards treasuries, you know, outstanding debt.
但如果你想摆脱对资产配置和向经济提供信贷的决策，以及决定资金投向的问题，你就应该尽量保持中立。
But if you wanna get away from, like, allocation decision like, allocation and and credit provision to the economy and deciding where that goes, you should try to be as neutral as possible.
所以我认为这中间存在一个错误，他们只是会把MBS逐步转为短期国债，并找到这个平衡点。
So I think there's an error to it, and they'll just run MBS into bills and find that balance.
我建议不要陷入关于全面转向短期国债的阴谋论。
I'd I would caution against, like, conspiracy theories about moving towards all bills.
我们不应该基本上照搬财政部债务管理办公室的做法。
We just shouldn't be, you know, basically doing what DMO does at Treasury.
发行策略应该是他们的职责，我们应当关注其影响以及资产负债表带来的效应，但最终，他们应该能够掌控这一点。
Like, that should be the issuance strategy should be theirs, And we should be mindful of it and the the effects that the balance sheet has, but, ultimately, they should be able to control that.
这更多是一个政治决策。
It's a little more of a political decision.
所以，坦率地说，这是在远离政治化，而不是走向政治化，但人们并不会为此给予他们认可。
So, frankly, it's moving away from politicization as opposed to moving towards it, But, you know, they don't get credit for that.
你知道的。
You know?
只是那些登上头条的其他事情。
Just the other stuff that makes headlines.
是的。
Yeah.
你对沃什发表过一些演讲的所谓‘财政部-美联储协定2.0’这个前提怎么看？
What do you think about this premise of the the, you know, Treasury Fed Accord two point o that Warsh has made some speeches about.
比如，是的。
Like yeah.
你怎么看待这个观点？
How do you think about that?
我觉得这被夸大了。
I think it's overblown.
你知道，如果你担心财政主导，那其实发生在我们每次当基差交易出问题时就增加流动性的时候。
You know, I think if you were worried about fiscal dominance, like, that happened when we started adding liquidity every time the basis trade got screwed up.
因为没错。
Because Right.
坦白说，基差交易和负互换利差是赤字和发行量的结果。
Frankly, the basis trade and, like, negative swap spreads are a function of the deficit and issuance.
所以这并不是完全与财政部和美联储无关。
So it's not exactly like it has nothing to do with the Treasury and the Fed.
只是债务的问题。
Just a function of the debt.
所以如果你现在担心的是这个，那可能已经太晚了。
So I think you're probably too late to the game if that's what you're worried now.
我也认为，无论美联储的资产负债表决策如何，财政部总能进行对冲。
I also think that whatever the Fed's balance sheet decisions are, Treasury can always offset.
所以，我不太明白接下来会发生什么。
So, like, I don't I don't see where the what's gonna happen.
我们实际上会吸收我们的发行量。
Like, we, like, absorb our issuance.
市场会重新定价。
Like, markets would be repriced.
我们已经某种程度上需要通过向系统注入流动性来为债务融资，以便对冲基金能够将债券转换为国库券或隔夜资产。
We already kind of do have, like, an implicit need to fund debt by, like, pushing liquidity into the system so hedge funds can, like, do maturity transformation from bonds to bills or overnight stuff.
这有点蠢。
It's kinda stupid.
我不确定。
I don't know.
如果他们达成新协议，那也没关系。
If they have a new accord, fine.
但我不清楚实际上会有什么变化。
But, like, I don't know what functionally changes.
所以，是的，我不确定。
So, yeah, I don't know.
这又吸引了大量点击，但其实没什么实质内容。
It's again, gets a lot of clicks, but it doesn't there's no, like, meat on the bone there.
嗯。
Mhmm.
嗯。
Mhmm.
这很有帮助。
That's helpful.
我的意思是，是的，过去一小时的描述确实很有帮助，那就是如今金融市场上充斥着大量夸张言论和宏大的阴谋论或想法。
I mean, yeah, that's just it's a helpful characterization over over past hour here, which is that there's a lot of hyperbole these days around financial markets and these grand, grand conspiracies or ideas.
而能获得一些冷静但依然有充分依据的分析，确实很有帮助。
And it's just helpful to really get some level headed, but still, you know, well backed analysis.
所以，真的很感谢你来参加节目，埃里克。
So, yeah, really appreciate you coming on the show, Eric.
而且，确实这一个小时非常有价值。
And, yeah, super valuable hour.
我觉得人们会非常喜欢这个内容。
I think people will enjoy it a lot.
是的。
Yeah.
谢谢你，费利克斯。
Thanks, Felix.
如果你什么时候来洛杉矶，记得告诉我。
And let me know if you're ever in LA.
我们让你来办公室坐坐。
We'll have you at the office.
听起来不错。
Sounds good.
听起来像是个不错的安排，埃里克。
Sounds like a plan of things, Eric.
好的。
Alright.
保重。
Take it easy.
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