困住美联储的增长策略 | 达里厄斯·戴尔

前瞻指引中说的任何内容都不构成买卖任何投资或产品的建议。

Nothing said on Forward Guidance is a recommendation to buy or sell any investments or products.

好的。

Alright.

大家最近怎么样？

What's going on, everybody?

欢迎回到前瞻指引的又一期节目，今天很高兴能再次邀请到我们的老朋友，42 Macro的创始人达里厄斯·戴尔。

Welcome back to another episode of Forward Guidance, and excited to be joined today by repeat guest, Darius Dale, founder of 42 Macro.

达里厄斯，距离我们上次上节目已经太久了。

Darius, it's been far too long since the last time we got on the show.

最近怎么样？

What's going on?

兄弟，能回来真是太高兴了，菲利克斯。

Dude, it's a it's a real real pleasure to be back, Felix, man.

见到你真好。

It's great to see you.

很高兴你过得不错。

Glad you're doing well.

我看到你们在Blockworks那边动作不少，收购方面也有进展。

You got to see you guys are making moves over at Blockworks and the acquisition side of things.

祝你们一切顺利。

So best of luck with that.

我这边挺好的，兄弟。

Things are good, man.

你知道的，生意蒸蒸日上。

We're you know, business is booming.

生活也蒸蒸日上。

Life is booming.

我有个两岁的孩子，还是那么调皮。

I had a two year old who's, as crazy as ever.

一切都好，兄弟。

Things are good, man.

上帝是好的。

God is good.

我很受祝福。

I'm I'm blessed.

太棒了。

Amazing.

对。

Yeah.

很高兴听到这些，兄弟。

Glad to hear that, dude.

那太棒了。

That's awesome.

今年夏天新闻可不少。

No shortage of news this summer.

我觉得，你知道，有时候我们会遇到一些比较平淡的夏天，市场波动不大，就是慢慢涨或者怎么样，新闻也少。

I thought, you know, sometimes we get these summers where it's a bit dull and you just kinda get this low vol, you know, grind up or or what have you in little news.

今年夏天感觉完全相反，尤其是最近几周。

Feels like the complete opposite this summer, especially in recent weeks.

想先了解一下，你现在是从什么宏观视角来看待市场的？

Wanna just start off by understanding, like, what is what is the broad regime that you're viewing macro through right now?

显然，最近有一些相当引人注目的头条新闻，尤其是来自财政当局方面的，以及斯科特·贝森部长在忙些什么。

Like, obviously, there's been some pretty interesting headlines coming, especially from the fiscal authority side of things and what secretary Scott Besson has been up to.

还有日元干预，我相信这是几十年来首次协调干预，然后还有一些有趣的优先级转变和期限调整，比如我们优先发行长期债券还是短期债券，以及这对宏观有什么影响。

There's been this Yen intervention, the first, coordinated intervention in decades, I believe, and then some interesting priority shifts and, you know, term changes in terms of what is it looking like in terms of do we prioritize issuing on the long end versus the short end and what are the macro implications of that?

所以，是的，就是想跟你聊聊，你怎么看待这些不同的框架在实际运作中的情况。

So, yeah, just want to, you know, catch up on how you're thinking about all these different frameworks in operation.

好，好，好，你这个问题问得非常好，我同意。

Great, great, great way to set it up, I agree.

那在我们深入细节之前，让我先退一步。

So let me take a step back before we kind of get into the nitty gritty.

我觉得从风险角度来看，整体情况一直还不错。

I would say things have been broadly fine from risk standpoint.

回想一下，从去年四月开始，我们就处于这种范式C的牛市里，范式C指的是政府选择让经济过热运行。

Recall that we've been in this Paradigm C bull market since April of last year, paradigm C being the administration's choice to run the economy hot.

这是我们基本面研究流程在2025年4月就捕捉到的。

That's something that our fundamental research process picked up on in April 2025.

所以我们一直在指导我们的全球投资者群体，让他们预期这类动态，也就是今天市场上看到的这些情况。

And so we've been coaching our global investor community to anticipate these kinds of dynamics, the kinds of dynamics that we're seeing on the tape today.

股市出现泡沫般的状况，利率上升，长期国债被抛售，因为它们无法与让经济过热运行所带来的名义GDP预期相竞争。

Bubble like conditions in equity markets, interest rates, bonds selling off on the long end of the curve because they can't compete with the nominal GDP expectations that are associated with running the economy hot.

显然，我们一直处于这种环境中，我们称之为地缘政治驱动的国债市场供需失衡。

Obviously, we've been in this environment, what we've been terming as a geopolitical driven supply demand imbalance in the treasury bond market.

这是我们自2023年夏天以来的核心研究论点。

That's been our core research thesis since the summer of twenty twenty three.

这个核心研究论点的一部分是，美国这个主权国家在应对这个问题、应对供需失衡时，可选择的手段很有限。

And part of that core research thesis is a limited menu of options that the sovereign here in The US can choose to deal with that issue, deal with that disequilibrium in their supply demand imbalance.

所以我们注意到，政府在2025年冬末春初选择了我们所谓的范式B，也就是削减赤字。

And so we noticed the administration's choice to go with what we call paradigm B, which is cut the deficit back in the spring of twenty twenty five or winter, late winter, early spring of twenty twenty five.

所以我们当时对那次崩盘做了充分的准备。

And so we were appropriately positioned for that crash.

但我们马上注意到，你知道，回到去年四月，嘿。

But we immediately noticed, you know, going back to April of last year that, hey.

他们实际上从范式B转向了范式C，也就是让经济过热运行。

They were actually pivoting from paradigm b to paradigm c, which is running the economy hot.

然后他们在十二月又加了一点范式D，当时美联储启动了储备管理购买计划。

Then they layered on a sprinkling of paradigm d, in December when the Fed launched its reserve management purchase program.

所以现在，在2026年，我们处于范式C，也就是让经济过热运行，再加上一点范式D，也就是印钱来稍微抵消债券市场的问题，并解决这种失衡。

So right now, here in 2026, we have paradigm c, which is running the economy hot with the sprinkling of paradigm d, which is printing to to to kinda counteract the the issues in the in the bond market and and and and and and addresses this equilibrium.

所以最终，我们一直预期并指导我们的全球投资者社区预期的是股市中的泡沫状况。

And so ultimately, what we've been expecting and coaching our global investor community to expect are bubble like conditions in the equity market.

所以最终，债券市场会出现一些问题，与所有这些额外的名义GDP增长相关。

And so and ultimately, some issues in the bond market associated with all that extra nominal GDP growth.

所以今天我们在这里，我们的财政部长斯科特·贝森，我以前的一个客户，你知道，正在做出一些选择，来逐步解决这种不利的失衡。

And so here we are today with our treasury secretary, Scott Besson, a former client of mine, you know, make take you know, making choices to kinda, incrementally address this this unfavorable disequilibrium.

而且，最终我们认为，这种不利的失衡状态暂时会被控制住。

And, ultimately, it's our view that that, unfavorable disequilibrium, will be, you know, set at bay for now.

这一点事前很难判断。

That's hard to determine ex ante.

所以我们得依靠一些东西。

And so we have to kind of rely.

我们必须站在巨人的肩膀上，就像我们的市场体制实时预测过程，以及我们的宏观经济天气模型，用来解读宏观经济信号，最终把这些信号转化为可操作的、前瞻性的市场风险信号。

We have to stand on the shoulders of giants as it relates to our market regime now casting process, our macro weather model in terms of interpreting signals from the macro economy until ultimately converting those signals into actionable forward looking market risk signals.

所以，当你把这两者结合起来，一切都会好起来，也应该会好起来。

And so ultimately, when you put those two things together, things are fine and they should be fine.

我们先从宏观和市场体制实时预测过程开始。

We'll start with the macro with the market regime now casting process.

我们用全球宏观风险矩阵来实时预测市场体制。

So we use our global macro risk matrix to now cast the market regime.

如果你想避免错失恐惧症，投资者必须根据市场体制来调整仓位。

Investors must position for the market regime if you want to avoid FOMO or FOMO.

FOMO或者FOMO，可以说是投资者能感受到的最糟糕的两种情绪了。

FOMO or FOMO are arguably the two worst emotions you can feel as an investor.

害怕错过，会让你在周期顶部买入；害怕更多亏损，会让你在周期底部卖出，或者说，在周期低点卖出。

Fear of missing out, causes you to buy cycle tops, fear of more losses, causes you to invest cycle lows and so sales cycle lows, rather.

所以最终，这个市场状态实时判断过程基本上是在说，前方一片坦途。

And so ultimately, this market regime now casting process is essentially saying the coast is clear.

我们基本上是在实时判断波动性，也就是全球42个最重要资产市场敞口的动量信号状况。

We are essentially now casting the volatility, just a momentum signal condition across the 42 most important asset market exposures in the world.

而现在，这个实时判断过程基本上是在说，我们处于一个风险偏好回升、再通胀的市场状态。

And right now, that now casting process is essentially saying we're in a risk on reflation market regime.

它有最高的确认市场占比。

It's got the highest on end share of confirming markets.

它的信号强度也相当高，你知道，达到了71%。

It's got a reasonably high strength of signal of, you know, at 71%.

所以最终，如果我们能保持在这个风险偏好回升、再通胀的市场状态——让我先退一步说。

And so ultimately, if we can stay in this risk on reflation marker so let me take a step back.

从中期来看，我们继续处于这种风险偏好回升的市场环境中的概率相当高，尤其是再加上我们宏观天气模型的信号。

The probability of us staying in this risk on reflation market regime over the medium term is reasonably high when you layer on the signals from our macro weather model.

我在这里先停一下，但宏观天气模型基本上是在说，股票、黄金、比特币和大宗商品的短期到中期前景很好，但美元和债券就没那么好了。

And I'll pause after this, but the macro weather model is essentially saying, you know, it's a great short to medium term outlook for stocks, gold, Bitcoin, and commodities, not so much for the dollar and bonds.

所以最终，这和我们处于再通胀市场环境是非常一致的。

And so ultimately, that's, you know, very consistent with being in a reflation market regime.

这正是你在全球资本市场上，在再通胀市场环境下，会预期看到的交易环境和风险环境。

This is exactly the kind of trading environment, risk environment you would expect to see in global capital markets associated with a reflation market regime.

所以这基本上是在说，从自上而下的角度看市场，如果你看机构资金流，也就是我们的波动率动量信号设计用来追踪的东西，基于我在全球华尔街建立模型的所有经验，以及让许多顶级买方机构进行压力测试，我们建立了那个模型。

And so what that's essentially saying is that the markets from a top down perspective, if you look at the institutional flows, which is what our just volatility momentum signal is designed to track based on all my experience on global Wall Street building models and having model stress test by as many of the top buy side institutions, we built that model.

我们校准那个VAM信号，基本上是为了提前捕捉机构资金流的大变化。

We calibrate that VAM signal in order to essentially front run big changes in flows, institutional flows.

所以它最终是在说，从自上而下的信号角度看，那些机构资金流表明我们处于再通胀市场环境。

And so what it's ultimately saying is those institutional flows from a top down signaling perspective are saying we're in a reflation market regime.

然后经济本身，当你通过六个关键宏观周期来看，增长、通胀、货币政策、财政政策、流动性和净头寸，也都在发出再通胀的信号。

Then the economy itself, when you look at it through the lens of the six key macro cycles, growth, inflation, monetary policy, fiscal policy, liquidity positioning on a net basis are signaling reflation as well.

听你这么说挺有意思的，就是通过你的模型来看，一切都很正常，而且看起来会继续正常下去。

It's interesting to hear this dynamic of, like, when you look through your your model there, things are things are fine and it looks like it'll it'll continue to be fine.

而且，不管是财政部门还是货币当局，他们都把这些问题处理得很好。

And the, you know, whether it's the fiscal authorities or the monetary authorities, they're well on top of these things.

就像你提到的，有些问题先出现，然后落到货币政策那边去解决。

As you mentioned, like, there's the the RMO side of things that happen then fall on the monetary side of things.

但你知道，他们就像在玩打地鼠游戏，而且玩得很熟练。

But so, you know, there's there's they're they're they're playing the whack a mole game, and they're very good at it.

但在市场里，每天的感觉并不是这样。

But it doesn't really feel like that in the market day in, day out.

尤其是这个夏天，市场里出现了巨大的分化。

Like, there's just been huge amounts of dispersion in markets, especially this recent summer.

那些大的波动事件，你知道，还有大的板块轮动。

These these big vol events, you know, big rotations.

所以我很好奇你的看法，就是你怎么把这个宏观上“一切安好”的想法，和实际每天经历时感觉并不安好，但几个月后回头看又觉得“哦，其实我们挺过来了”这种感受结合起来。

And so I'm just curious on your perspective of, yeah, how do you how do you translate this top down idea of things are okay, but when you're actually going through it on a day to day basis, like, it doesn't really feel okay even though when you look back a couple months later, you're like, oh, we actually came out of that okay.

我不知道这样说是否清楚，但就是那种，从上往下看，感觉他们能掌控局面。

Like, I don't if that makes sense, but it's just this, you know, top down, it feels like, yeah, they're on top of it.

但当你真正作为投资者去操作和配置资产时，事情并没有看起来那么简单。

But when you're going through the motions and allocating as an investor, it's it's not as easy as it seems.

对。

Yeah.

不。

No.

我得回答这个问题，顺便说一句，这个问题问得非常好。

I got to answer that question, and and that's a phenomenal question, by the way.

是的。

Yeah.

因为它是隐形的。

Because it's it's stealth.

对吧？

Right?

你是在承认，在再通胀环境下，这个游戏实际上比平时感觉要难，这点我同意。

You it's acknowledging that the game is actually harder than it normally would feel like in a reflation regime, which I agree with.

你知道，这可不是你爷爷那辈的再通胀环境。

You know, it's this is not your grandfather's reflation regime.

我们这代人，菲利克斯，已经习惯了那种超低波动率的牛市，知道美联储会给我们撑腰。

Like, we're so used to we got folks our age, Felix, have gotten so used to these, like, super low volatility, you know, bull markets where we know the Fed has our back.

美联储的看跌期权，行权价离大盘的现价其实很近。

The Fed put is relatively at a strike price that's relatively close to the the at the money, price on the mark on the on the broad markets.

所以最终，你就会有那种持续很久的上升趋势，就像人们放在桌上的那个小鸟玩具，它们会这样。

And so, ultimately, you have just these, you know, kind of, you know, long lasting sustained uptrends whereby, you know, those you know, with those that little bird thing people put on their desk, they do like this.

你懂吧？

You know?

但有一种

But one

那种小玩意儿能在那种小市场里赚钱。

of those things can make money in one of those little markets.

对吧？

Right?

你知道吗？

You know?

像我们这代人，已经习惯了这种投资方式能赚钱。

Like, people our age have gotten so conditioned to you know, this type of investing would make money.

但实际上，从金融市场的长期历史来看，这并不符合实际情况。

But the reality is it's actually not physically with the the long term history of financial markets.

实际上，赚钱比我们在危机后时代所经历的要难得多。

It's actually a lot harder to make money than what we've experienced in the post crisis era.

我觉得我们已经回到了一个更正常的环境，利率水平合理，收益率曲线陡峭。

I think we've returned back to what is a much normal much more normal environment in terms of having, you know, reasonable reasonable level of interest rates, you know, steeply stoked steeply sloped, you know, yield curve riding.

我不会说利差很宽，当然相对于历史来说不算宽，但期限溢价相对较高，肯定比我们职业生涯中大部分时间看到的负期限溢价要高。

You know, I wouldn't say wide, certainly not relative to history, but relatively wide term premium, certainly relative to the negative term premium that we saw for most of our career.

所以最终，随着资本稀缺性的增加，游戏变得难多了。

And so ultimately, you know, the game has just gotten much harder as the scarcity of capital has increased.

你知道，我们现在资本稀缺，而且显然对资本的需求也很大，想想AI资本开支的泡沫就知道了。

You know, we have a scarcity of capital, and we also obviously have a massive demand for capital if you think about the AI CapEx bubble.

再看看大多数发达国家和主要经济体正在经历的财政挥霍。

You think about the fiscal profligacy that we're seeing across most developed and major economies.

所以归根结底，判断增量资本应该投向哪里的工作变得困难多了。

And so ultimately, the job of ascertaining where should the incremental unit of capital go is just much harder.

在我们看来，考虑到一些地缘政治力量正在撕裂市场，这种困难会持续很长一段时间。

It's it's going to be much harder for an extended period of time in our opinion, in the context of some of the, you know, kind of geopolitical forces that are pulling apart, the the charging market at the seams.

所以，希望这能作为一个提醒，告诉投资者这个游戏不像我们很多人习惯的那么容易。

And so, you know, hopefully, that's a, you know, kind of a public service announcement to remind investors that this game is not as easy as a lot of us got used to.

这没关系。

And that's okay.

完全没关系。

It's totally okay.

你知道，你只需要提升你的投资流程，提升你的风险管理流程，这样才能在我们所说的一切背景下，站在市场风险的正确一边。

You know, it's just you gotta just elevate your investment process, elevate your risk management process in order to kinda stay on the right side of market risk in the context of everything we're saying.

具体回答你的问题，这就是我大致的看法。

Answering your question specifically, so that was the general take on.

是的。

Yes.

我有点同意你的观点。

I kind of agree with your sentiment.

具体回答你的问题，当你处于这种再通胀的市场环境，不是所有因素都在上涨，你会看到更多负贝塔的因子，你知道，在资产市场里有更多负贝塔的因子。

Answering your question specifically, when you're kind of in this reflation market regime whereby not all factors are winning, you have a lot more negatively beta negative beta play you know, negative beta factors in in asset markets.

所以，你知道，我们明白，在任何市场环境下，总有可以做多或做空的东西。

And so, you know, we know that, you know, not you know, when you're in a any market regime, there's always something to be long or short.

你知道，当处于金发女孩市场环境时，那是风险偏好，带有通缩倾向。

You know, when you're in a Goldilocks market regime, that's risk on with the disinflationary bias.

你知道，再通胀市场环境，那是风险偏好，带有通胀倾向。

You know, reflation market regime, that's risk on with an inflationary bias.

通胀就是风险规避，带有通胀倾向，而通缩就是风险规避，带有通缩倾向。

Inflation be risk off with an inflationary bias and then deflation will be risk off with the disinflationary bias.

所以单看再通胀这个情况，顺着这个思路往下走，你总体的倾向应该是做多风险资产、做空防御性资产。

So just kind of isolating reflation and going down the the list here, you know, your general bias is you want to be long risk assets and short defensive assets.

对。

Okay.

没错。

Check.

现在确实是这个情况。

That's happening.

但现实是，风险资产和防御性资产之间的差距，也就是离散度，比历史上至少过去二十年或者十五年左右的平均水平要宽得多。

But the reality is is the spread, the dispersion between risk assets and defensive assets, it's wider than it historically has been at least, you know, over the last, you know, couple of decades or the last fifteen years or so.

所以最终感觉更难做了。

And so, ultimately, it feels harder.

对吧？

Right?

就是说，贝塔更难赚了。

Like, beta is harder.

对吧？

Right?

比如说，如果你只是大致分散投资于各类资产，你会感觉市场波动更大、更不稳定，而如果你只持有风险资产、避开防御性资产，情况就会好很多。

Like, if you, you know, if you're just kinda broadly allocated to assets, you know, it's gonna feel a lot more choppy and volatile than if you were only in risk assets and and out of defensive assets.

所以，基本上我想说的是，阿尔法策略今年以来的表现其实比贝塔策略要好，而且这种趋势长期来看应该会持续。

So, basically, what I'm essentially saying is alpha strategies are actually having a better time than beta strategies, you know, on the in a year to date basis, and that's something that should continue over the long term.

在再通胀环境下，高贝塔资产往往跑赢低贝塔资产。

So high beta tends to outperform low beta in a reflation regime.

你会看到更大的分化。

You're gonna have more dispersion.

高贝塔和低贝塔因子之间的分化会更明显。

You have more dispersion between high beta and low beta factors.

在再通胀环境下，周期性行业往往跑赢防御性行业。

Cyclicals tend to outperform defensives in a reflation regime.

周期性行业和防御性行业之间的分化也会更大。

You have more dispersion between cyclicals and offensives.

成长股往往跑赢价值股。

Growth tends to outperform value.

成长股和价值股之间的分化会更明显。

You have more dispersion between growth and value.

中小盘股和大盘股之间也是类似的情况。

Same with small and mid caps relative to large caps.

国际市场和美股之间，以及新兴市场和发达市场之间，也都是这样。

Same with international relative to US and with the developed emerging markets relative to developed markets.

利差产品，比如信用债、抵押贷款支持证券，相对于国债市场，也有类似表现。

Spread products with their credit, you know, credit and and mortgage rates or more MBS in treasury market.

短期利率往往跑赢中期利率，而中期利率又往往跑赢长期利率。

Short rates tend to outperform the belly, which tend to outperform long rates.

高收益债往往跑赢投资级债券。

You know, high yield tends to outperform investment grade.

工业大宗商品往往跑赢能源大宗商品，而能源大宗商品又往往跑赢农产品大宗商品。

Industrial commodities tend to outperform energy commodities, which tend to outperform ad commodities.

然后你往往会看到黄金的表现优于外汇和美元。

And then you tend to have gold tend outperforming foreign currencies in the dollar.

所以并不是所有这些情况都在发生。

So not all of this is happening.

显然，我们在黄金上并没有看到那个信号。

We obviously don't have that signal in gold.

在小盘股和中盘股上，我们目前也不一定看到这个信号。

We don't necessarily have it in small and mid caps yet.

实际上，不，我觉得如果我们只看最近三四个月的话，我们确实有点看到了。

Actually, no, we we I would argue we kind of do if you kind of isolate it over the last kind of three to four months.

所以真正发生的是，总的来说，资产价格的上涨潮水会托起所有的船，尤其是在风险偏好较高的市场环境下。

And so really what's happening is, generally speaking, rising tide of asset prices lifts all boats, particularly when you're in a risk on market regime.

但在最近大约六个月的几次风险偏好较高的市场环境中，情况是，上涨的潮水不再托起所有的船了。

But what's happening in these, you know, the most recent risk on market regimes over the last kind of six months or so is that rising tide is no longer lifting all boats.

那么，我们来谈谈为什么上涨的潮水不再托起所有的船了。

So let's talk about why the rising tide is no longer, lifting all boats.

我先说，r star 在上升。

I'll start by saying r star is rising.

可能有人不熟悉 r star 这个概念，r star 就是政策利率的实际水平，它能让经济在通胀和就业方面既不加速也不减速。

So those may not be familiar with the concept of r star, r star is the, the level the real level of the policy rate that allows the economy to neither accelerate nor decelerate from the perspective of inflation and employment.

基本上就像是在考虑通胀调整后，政策利率的“刚刚好”水平。

It's essentially like what's the Goldilocks level of the policy rate when adjusting for inflation.

中性利率是同样的概念，但不做通胀调整。

Neutral would be the same concept, but but not adjusting for inflation.

所以你看我们的 r star 模型，过去三四个月里，它大概上升了 50 到 75 个基点。

And so when you look at our star, our model, our model of our star has it up by about, you know, let's call it two to you know, 50 to 75 basis points over the past, you know, kind of three to four months.

所以现在的情况是，我们的 r star 略高于联邦基金利率。

And so now we are in a situation where our star is narrowly above the Fed funds rate.

在美国，r star 的区间是 1.47% 到 1.78%。

We got it in a range of 1.47% to 1.78% here in The US.

而实际的有效联邦基金利率是 1.21%。

That compares to an effective real Fed funds rate of 1.21%.

所以很明显，市场现在对r星的定价已经高于政策利率了。

So obviously, the market is pricing our star now higher than the policy rate.

这就会带来一些影响。

So there are implications for that.

具体是什么影响呢？

What are the implications?

第一个影响就是，r星上升说明全球资本的供需平衡正在发生变化，这种变化对资本本身有利，但对资本提供方不太有利，对资本需求方也不太有利。

The input the first implication is that our star rising tells you that the supply demand balance for the global capital is deteriorating in a way that is favorable for capital and less favorable for, for capital, providers and less favorable for capital demanders.

对吧？

Right?

如果你需要钱，那借钱的价格基本上就在上涨。

If you need money, the price of money is going up, basically.

如果你是放贷的，那资金价格上涨就是好事。

If you are lending money, the price of money is going up, which is a desirable outcome.

但如果你是需要钱的一方，那就不是什么好事了。

It's not a desirable outcome if you need the money.

所以，从我们的角度来看，这传递了一个信号，就是全球投资者群体的资产负债表容量正在收窄，尤其是在这些大规模资本需求的背景下。

And so that's that's that's a signal from our perspective that the, you know, the kind of the balance sheet capacity across the global investor community is narrowing in the context of all these very large demands for capital.

所以，在我看来，这就是为什么在风险偏好较高的环境下，我们看到股票、信贷、固定收益和外汇等领域中，负贝塔板块和因子明显增多的首要原因。

And so that's in my opinion, this is the number one reason why we're seeing a lot more negative beta sectors and factors within the equity and credit and fixed income and currency etcetera, in the context of being in a risk on regime.

现在想随便扔个飞镖就能赚钱，难度大多了，因为全球资本供应正在减少。

It's just a lot harder to throw a dart against the wall and make money because the supply of capital globally is dwindling.

第二个要点是，既然我们的star利率已经高于实际有效联邦基金利率，这最终向债券市场传递了一个信号，即美联储还没有跟上形势。

The second takeaway here is that now that our star is being priced above the real effective funds rate, it's ultimately sending a signal to the back to the bond market that a Federal Reserve has not caught up to the to me yet.

因此，投资者不应该再增加对国债的配置，哪怕是一美元。

Therefore, investors shouldn't be allocating incrementally dot you know, incremental dollar of capital to treasury bonds.

你应该把新增的每一美元资本配置到收益高于国债的资产上，因为美联储现在正在温和地推高名义增长、通胀和就业。

You should be allocating incremental dollar of capital to things that yield more than treasury bonds because the Fed is now modestly applying upward pressure on nominal growth, upward pressure on inflation, and an upward pressure on employment.

所以，最终这预示着，在美联储真正通过收紧货币政策来跟上之前，实体经济的预期回报会高于原本的水平，而美联储可能不会这么做，这又回到了我们对话开始时的话题。

And so, ultimately, that's it signaled that the ex ante returns from the real economy will be higher than they otherwise would be until the Fed actually catches up by tightening monetary policy, which they may not going back to where we started the conversation.

对。

Mhmm.

对。

Yeah.

我想深入了解一下你对利率预期的看法，因为最近确实挺有意思的。

I wanted to double click on your perspective on the rate expectation situation because it it's it's it's been quite interesting, of course.

比如，七月份的联邦公开市场委员会会议，现在我们进入这些会议时，市场预期不再完全定价在单一结果上，不像以前那样，大家都觉得会暂停，然后我们就按暂停来定价。

Like, we had the July FOMC meeting where, you know, for the first time, we're going into these meetings now under the wars regime where the expectation isn't fully priced into a single you know, it's not like, okay.

大家都觉得会暂停，然后我们就按暂停来定价。

Everybody thinks there's gonna be a pause, and we're gonna price it as a pause.

我觉得加息和暂停的概率大概是六比四，感觉九月份可能又会这样。

Like, I think it was sixty, forty odds in terms of hike versus pause, and it's feels like that's gonna happen again in September.

我很好奇，你从这中间读到了什么信号？这对我们当前所处的市场环境和资产配置有什么影响？

And I'm curious, yeah, what is the signal you're getting from that, and what does that mean for the context of the regime that we're in and the asset allocation perspective?

因为如果你预期加息，也许是因为我们实际上没有看到加息落地，但假设加息真的发生了，比如九月份，很多人可能会认为这对风险资产是利空的。

Because if if you were expecting rate hikes and perhaps it's because, you know, we didn't actually get them delivered, but assuming they got delivered, say, that happens in September, many would view that as perhaps bearish for risky assets.

但你知道，我们一直处于牛市中，总体来看是这样。

But, you know, we've been we've been we're in a bull market, all things considered.

是的。

Yes.

市场波动挺大的，但事实是，标普500这周刚创了历史新高。

There's been some aggressive whips on dispersion, but the fact of the matter is, like, you know, the S and P just hit an all time high just this week.

所以，是的，我很好奇你从这些情况中读到了什么信号？

So, yeah, curious what's what's signal that you're reading from all of that?

不。

No.

问得好。

Excellent question.

问得好。

Excellent question.

首先我要说的是，这可能会对风险资产不利，原因有几个。

The first thing I would say is it probably would be bearish for risky assets for a couple of reasons.

主要原因是，当我们看我们的美联储决策树模型时，我们评估美联储是应该收紧还是放松货币政策，无论是从即将收紧或放松的角度，还是从未来一年长期收紧或放松的角度来看。

The primary reason why it would be bearish is because when we look at our our Fed decision tree model, which we evaluate the Fed's decision tree on whether they should tighten or ease monetary tighten hold or ease monetary policy, both from a spectrum of imminent tightening and or easing and or imminent or tightening over the long term over the next year.

当我们评估这个模型中的12个维度时，总体来看，它们基本上是在说美联储应该保持按兵不动。

When we evaluate the 12 dimensions that we feature in this model, on net, they're essentially saying the Fed should remain on hold.

所以，从经济角度来看，美联储，当你观察实体经济以及通胀预期时，这些都是传统美联储官员会评估的因素，以决定他们是否应该朝着货币政策目标的方向逐步调整，总体来看。

And so a Federal Reserve, like just from an economic standpoint, when you're looking at the real economy and looking at inflation expectations, things that the kind of traditional Fed official would be evaluating to determine whether or not they should be moving incrementally in one direction or another from the objective of monetary policy, on net.

也就是说，我们的模型基本上是在说，情况应该保持不变。

That's, you know, our model is essentially saying things should be on hold.

不过，确实有一些因素表明美联储应该收紧，比如联邦赤字支出。

Now, there are some things that suggest the Fed should tighten federal deficit spending.

也就是说，美联储现在就应该收紧，并在中期内继续收紧。

It's just the Fed should tighten now and continue tightening over the medium term.

如果你看看当前美联储对公共债务货币化的速度，他们应该收紧。

If you look at the rate of current rate of Fed public debt monetization, they should tighten.

然后停止，并在中期内保持。

I stop that and then hold over the medium term.

如果你看看泰勒规则，美联储的政策利率相对于泰勒规则来说，是深度负值的。

If you look at where we are in the Taylor rule, the Fed is policy rate is deeply negative relative to the Taylor rule.

所以他们可能应该收紧政策，来缓解这种失衡。比如看NAIRU，如果你把NAIRU和失业率相比，模型基本上就是说美联储现在应该收紧，中期内也要继续收紧。

So they should probably tighten and ameliorate that that that that that imbalance NARU, if you look at Nate where NARU's price relative to the unemployment rate, the the models are just saying the Fed should tighten now and over the medium term.

所以经济中确实有一些信号，某些美联储官员会盯着这些信号说，对，我们应该行动了。

And so there are some signals from the economy where certain Federal Reserve officials will be kind of anchored on and say, yeah, we should move.

我们应该收紧。

We should tighten.

显然，最近FOMC会议上的三位反对者就是基于这类信号。

Obviously, the three dissenters we got in the most recent, FOMC would be anchoring on these types of signals.

但总的来说，实体经济基本上就是说美联储现在这样挺好。

But by and large, you know, the real economy is essentially saying the Fed is fine here.

应该按兵不动。

You should be on hold.

所以如果美联储真的收紧货币政策，那对主流的美联储观察者来说会是个意外，可能会给资产市场带来麻烦。

So if the Fed does tighten monetary policy, that would be a shock to kind of the median, you know, kind of Fed watcher in a way that could cause some problems for asset markets.

这就是为什么我们认为这种情况发生的概率在下降。

The reason why we think the probability of this outcome is going down.

让我先退一步说。

So let me take a step back.

回到六月初，我们第一次提出“假动作传球”来为“跑动”策略做铺垫的时候，我们的核心观点就是美联储会收紧货币政策。

Going back to the beginning of June, when we first outline our play action pass to set up the run thesis, we've had this theme that the Federal Reserve was going to tighten monetary policy.

这个“假动作传球”的反转就是周期性收紧来为“跑动”做铺垫——这里用了个橄榄球的比喻——而结构性上则是宽松。

That's what the play action pass inversion of that was tightening cyclically to set up the run, which is a football reference, easing structurally.

你知道，我们最终相信，五个工作组的结果，净效应会是偏鸽派的。

You know, we ultimately believe that the outcome, the net result of the five task forces will be dovish on a net basis.

不是所有工作组都会偏鸽，但当你把它们放在一起，看它们在今年年底或明年年初会提出的政策建议，那就会是明确偏鸽的，而这一点并没有完全反映在远期利率曲线上。

Not all of them will be dovish, but when you put them all together and the and the policy recommendations that they're gonna have either at the end of this year or at the beginning of next year, it's going to be explicitly dovish, which is not fully priced into the forward rates curve.

所以在我们看来，我们认为在接下来的大概三到六个月，或者可能六到八个月，不管这些工作组需要多久才能提交他们的结论，国家市场都会迎来一个出人意料的偏鸽结果。

And so in our opinion, we think there's a surprisingly dovish outcome heading for for national markets at some point in the next call three to six months, you know, maybe six to six to eight months, you know, however long it takes for those task forces to deliver their findings.

如果真是这样，我们就绕回了这个“假动作传球”为“跑动”做铺垫的主题，这最终承认了一个事实：我们的星正在升起，中性利率在上升，而如果美联储不通过收紧货币政策来应对，那就会让债券市场面临风险。

And so if that is true, we backed our way into this kind of play action passes at the run theme, which ultimately acknowledged the fact that our star was rising, the neutral rate was rising, and a Federal Reserve that does not respond to that with tight monetary policy, tighter monetary policy is risking the bond market.

在收益率曲线已经存在供需失衡的情况下，你就要牺牲债券市场了。

You're going to sacrifice the bond market in a context where we already have a supply demand imbalance along in a curve.

这种供需失衡，再加上数万亿美元的AI资本支出，情况就更严重了。

That supply demand imbalance is being exacerbated by, you know, trillions of dollars of AI CapEx.

而且，六个月后，你还会回来告诉同一个债券市场，天哪，我甚至会更宽松。

And, oh, by the way, you're gonna six months from now, you're gonna come and tell them that same bond market that, oh my god, I'm gonna be even more dosh.

对吧？

Right?

这就是为什么三十年期国债收益率会达到6%。

That's how you wind up with six percent thirty year treasury yields.

这就是为什么十年期国债收益率会达到5.5%。

You know, that's how you wind up with five and a half percent ten year treasury yields.

实际上，我们的模型目前认为十年期国债的合理价值是多少？

In fact, what does our model currently say the fair value for the ten years?

根据我们的模型，十年期国债的合理价值是5.8%。

Fair value for the ten year according to our model is 5.8%.

我们不需要做任何复杂的推算就能得出这个结论。

And we don't have to we don't do any mental gymnastics to get there.

我们只是把正常的期限溢价加回到债券市场里。

All we're doing is adding a normal level of term premium back to the bond market.

目前，溢价大概在78个基点左右。

Right now, premium is currently at, you know, right around 78 basis points.

金融危机之前的长期均值是1.88%。

The long run mean prior to the GFC was 1.88 base or sorry, 1.88%.

所以，如果你把时间序列偏离长期均值的部分减掉，那么十年期国债收益率的公允价值就会接近6%，而三十年期的公允价值会远高于6%。

And so if you just, you know, subtract the deviation from the long run mean, you know, to the time series from the time series, then you wind up with a a a ten year treasury yield that's somewhere close to 6% on a fair value basis, thirty year treasury yield somewhere well north of 6% on a fair value basis.

如果美联储不通过收紧货币政策和减少流动性来安抚债券市场的监管者，这就是风险。

That's the risk if the Federal Reserve does not appease the bond vigilantes with tighter monetary policy with tighter money.

对吧？

Right?

紧缩的货币政策会让债券价格上涨。

Tight money makes bonds go up.

宽松的货币政策会让债券价格下跌。

Easy money makes bonds go down in price terms.

所以，最终，我们就是这样通过那次假动作传球来设定这个看涨论点的。

And so, ultimately, that's how we got into that play action pass to set the run, thesis.

但再回到我们开始谈话的地方，财政部长斯科特·贝森，他曾经是世界上最优秀的经济历史学家之一。

But going back again to where we started this conversation, treasury secretary Scott Besson, former one of the best economic historians in the world.

显然，他在索罗斯和Key Square的投资生涯非常成功。

Obviously, he had tremendous investing career with Soros and at Key Square.

你知道，我觉得他对这些东西都很懂。

You know, I think he gets all this stuff.

我觉得他比现在在资本市场上运作的任何人都要懂。

I think he gets it about as well as anybody operating in capital markets right now.

所以，最终，他在自己的位置上尽一切努力，确保美联储有足够的空间从当前状态过渡到开始勾勒鸽派货币政策的时候，而不会把债券市场搞崩，你知道，然后被迫收紧。

And so, ultimately, he's doing everything he can from his seat to make sure that, you know, the Federal Reserve has enough scope to get from now to when they start outlining dovish monetary policy without blowing the bond market up, you know, and and having to tighten.

所以我们可以带你了解一下这些不同的方面，但我先停一下，以防你有任何问题。

So we can kind of walk you through, those different things, but I'll pause here in case you have any questions.

好的。

Yeah.

我觉得这里的关键就是展示当前利率和正常化利率之间的差距。

I mean, I think just the the distillation here of showing the the current, the current rate versus the normalization.

在我看来，这似乎是未来几年最核心的问题，就是如何走好这根钢丝。

I think that is that to me feels like the ultimate question of of the next couple years of how to how to navigate that that tightrope.

有趣的是，沃什面临着一个两难境地：他经常谈论资产负债表正常化，试图退出市场。

And it's interesting because on on one side of that, it's almost as this dichotomy that Warsh has to deal with, which is that, you know, he talks a lot about balance sheet normalization and and, you know, trying to get out of that market.

而在我看来，这反映了对长期利率的某种压制。

And and to me, that's a reflection of this suppression of sorts of the long end.

但另一方面，尽管债券市场在强烈呼吁加息，他却几乎拒绝真正加息。

But then on the other side of things, it's this almost refusal to actually hike rates even though the the bond market is screaming for it.

所以另一面是，你是否看到他不愿承诺可能需要的正常化？

And so the other side of that is, you know, do you do you see this refusal to actually commit to the normalization that might be required?

这感觉像是一种持续的平衡，我觉得这很好地展现了这种两难，也就是当前收益率和正常化水平之间的差距。

And it feels like this this constant balance, and I just feel like it's it's such a great exposition of that dichotomy, which is just the the spread between that that that current yield and the, you know, the normalization level.

是的，我们很想听听你如何看待这种情况的发展，以及可能会动用哪些手段来应对这条非常棘手的钢丝。

And, yeah, we'd just love to hear more about how you think that starts to play out and and what are the levels levers that might be pulled to try to navigate that, you know, really tricky tightrope?

不是。

No.

这是最难走的钢丝。

This is the trickiest tightrope.

我是说，你见过那种二十年代的照片吧，那些人拿着长杆在高楼之间走钢丝。

Mean, again, I it's you know, you've seen those those, like, pictures from folks in, like, the nineteen twenties, and they got the long poles tightropen across the buildings.

我就觉得，对。

I'm like Yeah.

这就是在第四任期当财政部长和美联储主席需要做的事。

That's what it takes to be a treasury secretary in a Fed chair during a fourth term.

就得这样。

That's what it takes.

所以如果你身边没有合适的团队，对经济史没有足够的理解，对驱动货币政策和净融资政策的模型也没有足够的理解，那你就会很吃力。

So if you don't have the appropriate team around you, you don't have the appropriate understanding of economic history, don't have the appropriate understanding of the models that kind of power monetary policy and net financing policy, then you're going to struggle.

但我确实觉得现在岗位上的人是对的。

But I do think we have the right people in the job.

我认识斯科特差不多十年了。

I know Scott for almost a decade.

我不太认识凯文·莫里斯本人，但我认识一些跟他很熟的人。

I don't know Kevin Morris personally, but I know people that know him well.

而且很明显，他师从斯坦·德鲁肯米勒，我觉得他可以说是史上最牛的基本面投资者。

And obviously, he's just studied under Stan Druckenmiller, who I believe is arguably the best fundamental investor of all time.

所以他身边都是对的人，也跟对的人学到了东西，这让他很有机会成功。

So obviously, he's surrounded himself with the right people and have learned from the right people to give himself a great chance to be successful.

下面说说为什么我觉得凯文·沃尔什最终会被选为美联储主席，这跟我们刚才聊的那些都有关系。

Here's why I think Kevin Walsh was ultimately chosen to be Fed chair in the context of everything we're talking about.

黄金的价格，我们的客户从2023年10月起就一直做多，黄金的价格，而且很明显，我们把旗舰的KISS模型组合里原本配置债券的那30%都调出来了，转投到了黄金市场。

The price of gold, which our clients were long since October 2023, the price of gold, and obviously we pivoted our our entire flagship, you know, KISS model portfolio, out of the bond market and into gold market in terms of the the 30% target allocation to bonds.

我们在2024年秋天就把那部分资金转到了黄金上。

We pivoted that into gold back in in the fall of twenty twenty four.

所以，我们在黄金上站对了边。

So, you know, we were on the right side of gold.

而且对我来说，我觉得我们在黄金上站得这么对，这本身就在向斯科特·贝森特那些人，还有他周围圈子里的所有人发出一个信号，就是我们在美元贬值方面有问题。

And and to me, I think we were so on the right side of gold that it was sending a signal to the Scott Bestens of the world and to everyone, you know, kind of in and around his circle that we had problems from a dollar debasement standpoint.

因为说到底，如果美元贬值太厉害，那整个国债收益率曲线的长端就全完了。

Because ultimately, if the dollar gets debased too much, then you're to lose the entire long end of the treasury curve.

你得让投资者对美元作为货币的稳健性有信心，才能有债券市场。

You to have investors to have confidence in the soundness of the dollar as money in order to have a bond market.

如果他们不相信美元作为货币——我显然会这么说，你看我们最近一期宏观侦察报告里的第112页，我们每个月都做这个演示。

If they don't believe in the dollar as money, which obviously I would argue, you know, if you look at slide one twelve in our most recent macro scouting report, we do this presentation every month.

我们看到黄金在全球外汇储备中的占比上升，我们看到美元在全球外汇储备中的占比下降，这很吓人。

This move that we've seen in gold as a share of global FX reserves, this move that we've seen in the dollar as a share of global FX reserves, this is frightening.

这种事情不常发生。

This stuff doesn't happen very often.

对吧？

Right?

我是说，我们已经很久没见过黄金在全球外汇储备中的占比这么飙升了。

Like, I mean, it's been a long time since we've seen gold shoot up as a share of global FX reserves.

那是在上世纪七十年代末。

That was back in the late nineteen seventies.

而且，顺便说一句，那时候我们其实也没什么像样的债券市场。

And so and, obviously, we didn't have a much of a bond market back then, by the way.

所以，我觉得贝森财长在一月份就意识到了这一点，他对特朗普总统说，我知道你想要更低的利率。

And so, you know, I think, the treasury secretary of Besson realized this in January and said, hey, Mister Trump, president Trump, I know you want lower interest rates.

但要想降低利率，关键就在于保持美元的稳定。

The path to getting lower interest rates starts and ends with a stable US dollar.

所以我们不能让凯文·哈西特，虽然我不会说他是疯子，

So we cannot put Kevin Hassett, you know, some I wouldn't call him a kook.

他显然很聪明，但在政治上确实有点偏激。

He's obviously really smart, but, like, he's a political kook in that sense.

你不能让一个政治偏激的人来执掌美联储，因为那会向全球资本配置者发出一个信号，而美国国债市场有30%是由外国人持有的。

You can't put a political kook at the helm of the Fed because you're gonna send a signal to the world's capital allocators, of which 30% of the treasury market is owned by foreigners.

显然，我们的净国际投资头寸赤字非常严重，大约相当于GDP的四分之三。

Obviously, we have a a deeply negative net international investment deficit ratio, roughly about three quarters worth of our GDP.

有史以来，任何国家出现比这更宽的差距，也就是最近几年，差不多占我们GDP的90%。

The only time we've ever seen it wider than that for any country in recorded history is in the most recent few years when it was like 90% of our GDP.

你知道吗？

Know?

哦，你知道，幸好GDP增长强劲。

Oh, you know, thank goodness for booming GDP growth.

但是，你知道，我觉得选择凯文·沃尔什，真的是从那个角度考虑的，因为他是最可信的鸽派，穿着鹰派的外衣。

But, you know, so I think I think the the choice of of Kevin Walsh, was really designed from the perspective because he's the most credible dove in Hawk's clothing.

对吧？

Right?

他在通胀问题上表现得强硬、说话鹰派，有最长的记录。

He's got the longest track record of sounding tough on inflation and talking hawkish.

他在资产负债表上的观点非常明确地鹰派。

He's got very explicitly hawkish views on the balance sheet.

所以最终，让他坐上那个位子，在我看来，是明确承认了财政部长本人——我知道斯科特也这么想——

And so ultimately, putting him in a seat was, in my opinion, was a clear admission that the treasury secretary himself and I know Scott thinks.

我跟他见过无数次了。

I've met with him a million times.

他明白这一点。

He understands this.

他明白这张图表对国债市场意味着什么风险。

He understands the risk that this chart represents to the treasury bond market.

所以最终，他们需要找一个在债券市场和外汇市场都足够有信誉的人来坐这个位置，这样才能减轻一些压力。

And so ultimately, they needed to put somebody in the seat who was credible enough with the bond market and credible enough with the currency market to ultimately, you know, kind of reduce some of this, some of this pressure.

所以回到你的问题，从长远来看，我们为什么一开始要这么做呢？

And so kind of answering your question, you know, taking it, you know, to to longer term, why do we even have to do that in the first place?

我们来看第86页幻灯片。

Let's go to slide, 86.

看这张图表，它显示的是联邦基金利率减去基线泰勒规则估计值。

If you look at, this chart, it shows the Fed funds rate minus the baseline Taylor rule estimate.

这就是阴影区域曲线所展示的内容。

That's what the the shaded area curve, side shows.

可能有些人不太熟悉，这个基准泰勒规则估计值是一个基于模型的信号，用来判断政策利率的合适水平，它依据的是通胀目标偏离度和产出缺口，也就是实际经济中相对于潜在GDP的偏离程度。

So for those who may be unfamiliar, the baseline Taylor rule estimate is model based signal for what the appropriate level of the policy rate is based on the deviation from the inflation target and the output gap, which is basically the deviation from potential GDP in the real economy.

所以当这个利差为正的时候，基本上就是说美联储的政策利率水平比它应该有的水平更紧，基于这种简单的……

And so when the when the spread is positive, it's essentially saying the Federal Reserve has a policy rate level that is tighter than what it otherwise should be based on this kind of, you know, simple.

其实也不简单，但就是那种简单的模型，是约翰·泰勒在胡佛研究所建的。

It's not simple, but it's, you know, simple model by a friend built by a friend John Taylor over at the Hoover Institution.

你可以把它跟过去几十年的美联储主席们做个对比。

If you you know, so you kind of just look at it relative to the Fed chairs over the over the last, you know, kind of several decades.

比如阿瑟·伯恩斯，他被认为是现代最宽松、最通胀倾向的美联储主席，他在任期间平均把政策利率定在比当时泰勒规则建议的水平低大约175个基点，这显然是在助长通胀，给七十年代的通胀火上浇油。

You know, Arthur Burns, who's kind of derided as the kind of the easiest, most inflationary Fed chair in modern times, you know, he kept the the policy rate on on average about, you know, a hun let's call it 175 basis points below what the Taylor rule suggested at the time throughout his tenure, which obviously was inflating, helping helping fan the flames of inflation throughout the nineteen seventies.

然后保罗·沃尔克上任，带来了制度变革。

Then you have Paul Volker come in with regime change.

他在任期间平均把政策利率定在比当时泰勒规则建议的水平高大约362个基点，这让我们进入了……

He kept the policy rate on average about 362 basis points a lot, you know, tighter than the what the federal what the Taylor rule would have suggested at the time, got us to tenure.

然后到了格林斯潘，他比当时泰勒规则建议的水平大约紧65个基点。

And we shift to Greenspan who was about 65 basis points tighter than what the Taylor rule suggested at the time.

不过，你知道，在互联网泡沫破裂之后，泰勒规则一直显示政策利率应该比实际水平低大约50个基点。

Although, you know, post the .com bust, it was, you know, consistently around 50 basis points easier.

但总体来看，他的政策利率比泰勒规则建议的水平高出大约65个基点。

But on an on an aggregate basis, he's about 65 basis points tighter.

伯南克基本上也是这样。

Bernanke, basically the same thing.

他的政策利率平均比泰勒规则建议的水平高出大约31个基点。

He was about 31 basis points too tight on an average basis.

但部分原因是，你知道，在全球金融危机之后，泰勒规则建议联邦基金利率应该是负的。

But part of that reason is that, you know, post the GFC, the tailor will suggest that the federal funds rate should be negative.

但显然，他们不能把利率降到负值，或者他们不想降到负值。

But obviously, they can't take it negative or they didn't wanna take it negative.

所以最终，伯南克的政策利率虽然从水平上看保持在零，但泰勒规则算出来的值还是略微为正。

And so ultimately, you wind up with this kind of modestly positive value for Bernanke, even though he kept the policy rate at zero from a levels perspective.

接下来是耶伦和鲍威尔。

Then you get into Yellen and Powell.

耶伦在任期间，政策利率平均比泰勒规则建议的低256个基点。

Yellen, throughout the duration of her tenure, kept the policy rate about two fifty six basis points easier than what the Taylor would have suggested throughout our tenure.

然后到了鲍威尔，在这项分析中，他是美联储历史上最鸽派的主席，至少从尼克松放弃金本位以来是这样。

And then you get to Powell, the most dovish Fed chair of all time in the context of this analysis, at least in instance was since Nixon abandoned the gold standard.

他在任期间，政策利率平均比泰勒规则建议的低314个基点。

He kept the policy rate about three fourteen basis points on average below what the Taylor would have suggested throughout his tenure.

所以，从沃尔克以来，美联储的政策利率立场越来越宽松，越来越宽松，越来越宽松。

So you've got Federal Reserve policy since Volker has gotten easier and easier and easier and easier from a policy rate standpoint.

与此同时，在危机后的时代，美联储的资产负债表政策也变得越来越宽松。

Meanwhile, you've also had Federal Reserve policy get easier and easier and easier from a balance sheet standpoint in the post crisis era.

所以债券市场知道这一点，现在债券市场有了资金的另一种用途。

So the bond market knows this, and now the bond market has an alternate use for the money.

对吧？

Right?

或者，抱歉。

Or or sorry.