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尼克·斯利普写得最有意思的一点,是理解一家公司底层真实情况的重要性。
One of the most interesting things that Nick Sleep writes about is the importance of understanding the underlying reality of a company.
他把这称为企业成功的引擎。
He calls this the engine of its success.
这些信件里最让我着迷的,是尼克对好市多、亚马逊和沃尔玛成功引擎的分析,以及三位创始人——吉姆·西尼格尔、杰夫·贝佐斯和山姆·沃尔顿——如何设计商业模式,确保企业能长期存活下来。
What I actually found most interesting in these letters is Nick's analysis of the engine of success of Costco, Amazon, and Walmart, and how those three founders, Jim Sinegal, Jeff Bezos, and Sam Walton, designed their business in a way that ensured that they would survive over the long term.
他们三人都被尼克·斯利普称为诚实经营的复利机器。
All three of them were what Nick Sleep calls honestly run compounding machines.
这三位创始人对长期成功的执着,让他们从未犯过一个致命错误:打断复利的进程。
This emphasis that all three founders placed on the long term success of their business allowed them to never make the fatal mistake of interrupting the compounding.
为了做到这一点,贝佐斯、西尼格尔和沃尔顿都养成了一种关键特质。
And to do so, Bezos, Sinegal, and Walton all adopted a key trait.
用沃伦·巴菲特的话说,他们都是成本控制的狂魔。
They were in the words of Warren Buffet, a demon on costs.
相比竞争对手,他们长期保持更低的成本结构,这种优势在几十年间不断累积。尼克多次提到这一点,甚至在2006年就意识到,亚马逊的成本已经低到极致、效率高到可怕,游戏其实早就结束了。
Having a lower cost structure than any of their competitors was a competitive advantage compounded over the decades, and Nick is going to mention that several times, including one time when he realizes back in 2006 that Amazon's costs are so low and they're so efficient that the game was already over.
别人都还没意识到这一点。
Everybody else just didn't know it yet.
我之前跟我的朋友埃里克聊过这个,他是Ramp的联合创始人兼CEO。
This is something that I was talking about with my friend Eric, who's the co founder and CEO of Ramp.
现在Ramp已经是这个播客的合作伙伴了。
Ramp is now a partner of this podcast.
过去一两年里,我跟Ramp的几位联合创始人都熟络起来了,他们也都听这个播客。
I've gotten to know all the co founders of Ramp and spent a bunch of time with them over the last year or two, and they all listen to the podcast.
所以他们也注意到了,播客里反复强调的一个核心主题就是控制成本、管好开支。
So they've picked up on the fact that the main theme from the podcast, one that recurs over and over again, is the importance of watching your costs and controlling your spend.
能做到这一点的管理者,就能建立起巨大的竞争优势,这正是Ramp存在的原因。
The managers that are able to do so develop a massive competitive advantage, and that is the reason that Ramp exists.
Ramp就是为了帮你全面掌控开支、盯紧成本而打造的。
Ramp exists to give your business everything you need to control your spend and watch your cost.
历史上所有伟大的创业者,都把成本控制当成一种执念。
All of history's greatest entrepreneurs made cost control an obsession.
Ramp 在一个平台上帮你全面控制成本。
Ramp helps you control costs all on a single platform.
Ramp 为你整个团队提供易用的公司信用卡、自动报销功能和成本管控工具。
Ramp gives you easy to use corporate cards for your entire team, automated expense reporting, and cost control.
山姆·沃尔顿在他的自传里说:我们的利润来自对开支的严格控制。
In his autobiography, Sam Walton said, Our money was made by controlling expenses.
如果你运营高效,就算犯不少错也能翻身;但如果你效率低下,再聪明也照样倒闭。
You can make a lot of different mistakes and still recover if you run an efficient operation, or you can be brilliant and still go out of business if you're too inefficient.
Ramp 帮你打造高效组织,大幅提升企业的成功引擎。
Ramp helps you run an efficient organization and greatly enhances your company's engine of success.
Ramp 的网站做得非常出色。
Ramp's website is incredible.
去 ramp.com 了解他们如何帮你控制成本,向历史上最伟大的企业家看齐。
Make history's greatest entrepreneurs proud by going to ramp.com to learn how they can help your business control costs today.
网址是 ramp.com。
That is ramp.com.
尊敬的巴菲特先生,
Dear Mr.
在经营诺马德投资合伙基金十三年之后,扎克和我决定关闭这只基金。
Buffet, after thirteen happy years of running the Nomad Investment Partnership, Zak and I have decided to close the fund.
这一过程要求我们向投资者返还资金,因此在多年持有伯克希尔股票后,我们最近卖掉了所有股份。
The process requires us to return cash to our investors, and so after many years as shareholders in Berkshire, we have recently sold our shares.
在外界看来,诺马德这些年来取得的业绩似乎全靠扎克和我。
It appears to all the world that the performance that Nomad has enjoyed over the years was created by Zak and me.
但事实并非如此。
That is not the case.
随着时间推移,我们的客户所获得的回报,实际上是来自我们所投资企业的成功所带来的资本增值。
As time goes by, the performance that our clients have received is the capitalization of the success of the firms in which we have invested.
换句话说,真正做出贡献的是您和伯克希尔的优秀团队。
In other words, the real work is done by you and the good people at Berkshire.
写这封信的目的,就是想向您表达由衷的感谢,并告诉您,您真的产生了深远的影响。
The purpose of this letter is to say a very big thank you and let you know that you have made a real difference.
Nomad基金规模并不算大,但这些年为客户创造了大约二十亿美元的收益,客户主要是慈善机构和教育基金会。
Nomad was not a particularly large fund, but over the years, it did make around $2,000,000,000 for its clients, which were predominantly charities and educational endowments.
伯克希尔在其中发挥了重要作用。
Berkshire was a big part of that.
这让我们看到,资本主义其实可以运行得非常好。
That strikes us as capitalism working well.
对我们来说,扎克和我都想退出这个行业,把时间花在更有意义的事情上。
For our part, Zak and I are keen to leave the professional industry behind and spend our time in more caring pursuits.
扎克有自己的慈善项目,而我打算创办一个提供喘息照护的中心。
Zak has his various charitable causes, and I have in my mind to set up a center to provide respite care.
这两件事都需要长期资金支持,所以虽然你们失去了我们作为专业投资者,但我们仍会以个人和我们所运营的慈善机构名义回购股票。
Both of these activities will require long term funding, and so while you'll lose us as professional investors, we will be able to repurchase our shares both privately and for the charities that we run.
你们可没那么容易摆脱我们!
You don't get rid of us that easily!
我们会保留办公室,门口那扇有点破旧的门上会挂上一块新招牌。
We will be keeping the office and a new sign will be hung above our somewhat shabby front door.
期待在下一次股东大会上见到你们,也诚邀你们来伯恩斯维尔街拜访我们。
We look forward to seeing you at the next AGM and extend an invitation to visit us at Burnsville Street.
顺致最诚挚的问候,尼克·斯利普。
With the warmest regards, Nick Sleep.
接着,巴菲特回信说:亲爱的尼克,谢谢你的更新信息。
And then Buffett writes back, Dear Nick, thanks for sending along the update.
你和扎克做出了正确的决定。
You and Zak have made the right choice.
我相信,你们的人生才刚刚开始。
I predict you will find life is just beginning.
此致问候,沃伦·E。
Best regards, Warren E.
巴菲特。
Buffet.
这些信件被我放在了另一本自己制作的书的最前面。
And so those letters appear at the very front of another homemade book that I have created.
我读完了全部十一万字。
I read all 110,000 words.
这是Nomad投资合伙人的全部信件合集,由Nick Sleep在2001到2014年间写给合伙人的信。
This is the full collection of the Nomad Investment Partnership letters that were written to partners between the years 2001 and 2014, and they're written by Nick Sleep.
我把Nick的信全都打印出来,整整二百一十九页,装进了一个活页夹里。
I printed Nick's letters out and put all two nineteen pages in a binder.
我想先从Nick反复提到的一句话说起,这句话他经常放在每封合伙信的结尾。
And so I want to begin with something that Nick repeats and something that he leaves at the end of a lot of his partnership letters.
他写道:关于耐心的重要性,最后再说几句。
And so he writes, A final word on the need for patience.
我们知道有些投资者是刚加入基金的,所以有必要再重申一些基本准则,让大家清楚我们的立场。
We are aware that several investors are new to the fund, and so it may be worth reiterating some ground rules so that you know where we stand.
Nomad的一大优势,就在于投资人群体整体的耐心。
One of Nomad's key advantages will be the aggregate patience of its investor base.
我们确实是抱着长期投资的心态在操作。
We are genuinely investing for the long term.
没几个有。
Few are.
如果诺马德要超越同行,优势将来自你管理人的资本配置能力,以及我们投资人的耐心。
If Nomad is to have a competitive advantage over our peers, this will come from the capital allocation skills of your manager, if any, and the patience of our investor base.
只有比那些短视的人看得更远,我们才有可能胜出。
Only by looking further out than the short term crowd can we expect to beat them.
正因如此,我们才称诺马德为‘投资合伙制’,而不是‘基金’。
It is for this reason we named Nomad an investment partnership and not a fund.
我们追求的关系截然不同。
The relationship we seek is quite different.
所以我在这页上给自己留的笔记,其实包含两个想法:一是为什么我花了两周时间,做了一期节目,全面介绍尼克和扎克是如何建立他们的投资合伙制的;二是为什么我又花了一周时间,读完了尼克·斯利普那十一万字的投资合伙信件。
And so the note I left myself on this page is really two ideas or why I spent two weeks, why I did an episode last week that gives an overview of how Nick and Zak built their investment partnership, and then why I would spend another week reading, you know, 110,000 words of Nick Sleep's Investment Partnership letters.
从上周读完那本书,到本周读尼克·斯利普的信件,很明显,他们并没有模仿同行。
And so it's obvious from reading the book last week and then reading Nick Sleep's letters this week, they didn't copy their peers.
尼克和扎克完全是根据自己的思考来经营业务,然后他们投资那些也这么做的创始人。
Nick and Zak ran their business based on the outcome of their own thinking, and then they invest in founders that do too.
我认为,正是他们愿意付出努力去信任自己的判断,才让他们发现了极其宝贵的经验之谈,进而愿意调整自己的行为,把整个合伙关系围绕这个经验建立起来。
Then I would argue that it's their willingness to do the work necessary to trust their own judgment that allowed them to arrive at a very valuable earned secret, and then the willingness to change their behavior to build their entire partnership around that earned secret.
所以,今天我想重点和你们聊的就是这一点。
So that's really what I'm going to focus on and I want to talk to you about today.
我在这些合伙信件里发现的很多有意思的内容,其实跟投资本身没什么关系。
A lot of what I found interesting in the partnership letters has nothing to do with investing.
而是他们对吉姆·西尼格尔如何经营好市多的分析。
It's their analysis of how Jim Sinegal ran Costco.
还有他们对杰夫·贝佐斯如何经营亚马逊的分析。
It's their analysis of how Jeff Bezos ran Amazon.
他们还提到,等等,这有点奇怪。
It's their analysis of, Wait, this is kind of strange.
这种商业模式在历史上反复出现,而有天赋的创业者总能把它用在截然不同的行业里,持续取得惊人的成功。
This business model keeps reappearing throughout history, and gifted founders are able to use it and apply it to vastly different industries and keep having wild success.
所以尼克谈到了查理·芒格做癌症手术时的那套方法。
And so Nick writes about Charlie Munger's cancer surgery approach.
他正在分析他们投资的这家企业。
He's analyzing this business that they made an investment in.
我上周提到过。
I talked about it last week.
这家公司叫Stagecoach。
It's called Stagecoach.
创始人退休后,新管理层把它搞得一团糟,于是创始人又回来接手。
The founder retires, new management kind of runs it into the ground, so the founder comes back out.
当你发现底下其实藏着一家很棒的公司,只是上面堆了一堆乱七八糟的东西。
And when you realize, like, there's this beautiful business under here, you kind of layered all this crap on top of it.
所以穆格意识到,商业史上经常出现这种情况——你得来一场‘癌症手术’。
And so what Munger realizes there's many times in business history where, well, you just need to do the cancer surgery approach.
他说,这招常常有效,因为大多数公司核心都藏着一颗宝石,通常被用来支持新项目。
He says, This often works because there's normally a jewel at the heart of most companies that has often been used to fund new ventures.
这颗宝石往往被缺乏耐心的管理层忽视了。
That jewel has been taken for granted by inpatient management.
随着这个核心资产被越来越多不成功的项目稀释,整体表现就开始下滑。
As the jewel becomes diluted by less successful projects, aggregate performance declines.
尼克提到,芒格和巴菲特在上世纪80年代中期就看出了可口可乐的问题——那时候可口可乐已经变成一个模糊的 conglomerate,什么虾场、酒庄、电影公司都掺和在一起。
And so Nick talks about the fact that Munger and Buffett saw this in Coca Cola in the mid-1980s because at that time Coca Cola had become a poorly defined conglomerate, including a shrimp farm, winery, and a film studio.
当那些不好的业务被剥离,露出真正核心的糖浆生产和营销业务后,可口可乐的股价在接下来的十年里涨了十倍以上。
As the poorer businesses were cut away to reveal the jewel that is syrup manufacturing and marketing operation, the shares of Coca Cola rose over tenfold in the succeeding decade.
我想到一个特别有意思的故事:耐克前CEO马克·帕克曾经问乔布斯,有没有什么建议给他。
There's a hilarious story that comes to mind when the Mark Parker, who's the former CEO of Nike, asked Steve Jobs if he had any advice for him.
乔布斯说,耐克做的产品是世界上最好的,让人一看就想要。
And Steve said Nike makes some of the best products in the world, products that you lust after.
那些产品确实美得惊人,但你们也生产了太多烂东西。
They're absolutely beautiful, stunning products, but you also make a lot of crap.
把那些糟糕的全扔了,专心做好东西。
Just get rid of the crappy stuff and focus on the good stuff.
把那些糟糕的全扔了,专心做好东西。
Just get rid of the crappy stuff and focus on the good stuff.
这个观点是说,当一些不那么成功的项目稀释了核心价值时,整体表现就会下滑。
This idea that a jewel can become diluted by less successful projects as aggregate performance declines.
我之所以从这里开始,是因为读这些信件特别有意思——而且我会按时间顺序一一梳理,这样就能看到尼克·斯利普思维的演变过程。
The reason I started here is because what's fascinating about reading these letters, but also, and I'm going go through these in chronological order, so we can see the evolution of Nick Sleep's thinking.
这跟我们读传记时看到的景象其实是一样的,顺着时间线看一个人的一生。
It's also the same phenomenon that you and I see when you go through a biography and you go through somebody's life chronologically.
你会看到他慢慢想明白了。
You see them slowly figure it out.
他曾经挣扎过,努力寻找生命中最核心的那个理念和方向。
They struggle and they're trying to really get to the idea, the main idea and the main focus of their life.
而读到这部分特别有意思,因为这还只是开头。
And what's fascinating about reading this part, this is at the very beginning.
那时候尼克其实还不懂。
Nick doesn't understand.
他只是在描述一种像切除肿瘤一样的做法。
He's describing the cancer surgery approach.
他是在描述可口可乐。
He's describing Coca Cola.
他是在描述驿站马车。
He's describing stagecoach.
那时的他还不知道,将来自己也会用这个原则来打造自己的生意。
At this point in his life, he doesn't understand he's going to also use this principle in building his business.
他会采纳史蒂夫·乔布斯的建议,哪怕他从来没听过这句话。
He is going to take the advice of Steve Jobs, even if he never heard it.
他会甩掉那些没用的东西——也就是其他那些投资,只专注在真正好的项目上。
He's going to get rid of the crap, which is these other investments, and just focus on the good stuff.
他其实已经无意中发现了一个非常棒的生意,这正是他理解的起点。
And he's already stumbled onto a really great business, and this is the beginning of his understanding.
他还不知道自己会在好市多这件事上走得多深。
He doesn't know how deep he's going to go on Costco.
所以这是2002年。
So this is 2,002.
他说,哎,我们就是买了这只股票。
And he's like, Well, you know, we just bought the stock.
这生意本身已经做得不错了,根本没必要去改。
There's really no need to fix this business because it's performing well already.
后面尼克会提到这一点。
And so there's something that Nick will mention later on.
他说,我们想分析那些现在还像老鼠、将来可能变成大象的公司,反过来推演它们是怎么成长起来的。
He's like, Well, you know, we're trying to analyze businesses that are a mouse now but may turn into an elephant, and try to reverse engineer how that happens.
当你刚开始听他谈好市多的时候,就能看到这种思路了。
And so you start to see this at the very beginning when he starts talking about Costco.
他说,他们一直坚持每日低价策略,往后他会把这个叫作EDLP。
He's like, well, they operate on this everyday low pricing strategy, which he'll refer to moving forward as EDLP.
我要是说清楚点,如果你还没听过第36集,听完这一集之后一定要去补一下。
The way I would describe that is if you have not listened to episode three sixty, listen to episode three sixty after you listen to this episode.
想办法找找那本书。
Try to find that book.
这本书是鲍勃·基林写的,他是Fastenal的创始人。
It is written by Bob Keerlin, who's the founder of Fastenal.
这本书,还有鲍勃经营Fastenal的方式,核心都围绕着一个理念:公司领导者必须让整个团队始终朝着同一个目标努力。
That book, and the way Bob ran Fastenal, all centers around this one idea: that the leader of a company has to keep the entire organization committed to a common goal.
Costco的共同目标就是坚持这种每日低价策略。
Costco's common goal is that we are going to commit to this everyday low pricing strategy.
他们每一分每一秒、每一天都坚定不移地执行这一策略,接下来我们会听到吉姆·西内加尔的一个精彩故事,正好说明这一点。
And they commit to it every single minute of every single hour of every single day, as we're about to hear with this great Jim Sinegal story in a minute.
但在离开这一页之前,我得提一下,这是2002年。
But I gotta before I leave this page, this is 2002.
他刚开始谈到规模经济共享,才刚刚开始去思考和理解这个概念。
And he's just started talking about the scale economy shared, and he's just starting to try to think about and understand.
要真正明白这个理念有多强大,需要很长时间,但他已经开始谈论‘规模经济共享’这个新想法——这将成为他们独有的秘密,也是他们最了不起的洞见,从此主导他们的一切决策。
It's going to take a long time to understand how powerful this idea is, but he starts talking about this new idea of scale economy shared, which is going to be their earned secret, the single best thought that they ever had, the one that they're going to let dominate everything that they do.
所以尼克说,好吧,Costco坚定地推行这种每日低价策略。
And so Nick is like, Okay, so Costco is committed to this strategy of EDLP.
他们坚持统一的加价标准,这样公司因规模带来的所有好处,都会以更低价格的形式回馈给顾客,从而推动销售增长,进一步扩大规模优势。
And by them sticking to the standard markup is a way that they all the benefits that they get from scale as a company are returned to the customer in the form of lower prices, which in turn encourages growth and then extends scale advantages.
为了说明创始人对这一理念的坚定程度,他是这么说的:要理解EDLP对吉姆·西内加尔——Costco的创始人——有多重要,不妨听个故事。
And to illustrate the level of commitment that the founder has to this idea, this is what he says: To understand how important EDLP is to Jim Sinegal, Costco's founder, considered the following story.
Costco有一次拿到了一个超棒的采购价,比平时便宜得多,200万条设计师牛仔裤的进货价低到了每条22美元,比他们过去卖的价格还低了10美元。
So Costco gets this incredible deal, a better deal than they normally get, when they buy 2,000,000 pairs of designer jeans.
他们本来可以大幅加价,但即便再加50%的利润,价格依然只有其他零售商的一半。
They wind up getting them for $22 so $10 less than Costco has sold the jeans for in the past.
所以他们本可以给这批货定个更高的售价。
So they offer this huge markup.
你完全可以再加五成的利润,价格还是比大多数零售商便宜一半。
You could essentially mark it up another 50% and you'd still be half the cost of most other retailers.
有个Costco的采购员建议,趁没人知道,把利润率提高一点,超过平时14%的加价幅度。
So one of Costco's buyers recommends taking a higher gross margin than usual, more than the normal 14% markup, since no one would know.
他把这想法告诉了吉姆·西内加尔,但西内加尔坚决反对,说:‘如果这次我答应你,下次你还会再来。’
So he says that to Jim Sinegal, Sinegal insists on the standard markup, arguing that if I let you do it this one time, you'll do it again.
与顾客之间的约定——那就是低价,绝对不能打破。
The contract with the customer, which is very low prices, must not be broken.
这一点非常关键,值得认真思考。
This is a really important point to consider.
你好好想想。
Think about this.
这位采购员的想法是,做对公司更有利的事,至少在他看来,短期来看对公司更有好处。
What the buyer is trying to do is do what's better for the company, what he thought was better for the company, at least what was better for the company in the short term.
吉姆·西内加尔和其他优秀的创始人,总是优先考虑顾客的利益,因为从长远来看,对顾客好的事,最终也一定对公司的成长有利。
What Jim Sinegal and other great founders do is they always do what's better for the customer because if you do that over the long term, that is then what is better for the company.
我读到这一段、整个这段话的时候,就盯着页面发呆,心想:这场景我好像在哪见过。
And so when I read this section, this entire paragraph, I just stared at the page, was like, I've seen this before.
这让我想起了沃尔特·迪士尼。
This reminds me of Walt Disney.
于是我打开《创始人笔记》,搜了关键词‘迪士尼 皮带’。
So then I go to Founders Notes, I type in the keyword search, Disney Leather Straps.
值得注意的是,沃尔特·迪士尼在建造迪士尼乐园时,也上演了类似的故事。
And what is remarkable is we see a very similar story play out when Walt Disney is building Disneyland.
他们超支了,时间也不够。
They are over budget, They don't have enough time.
他们必须在某个特定日期前开业。
They have a specific date that they have to open by.
于是你就看到沃尔特·迪士尼和他一名员工之间的对话。
And so you see this conversation that Walt Disney is having with one of his employees.
这位员工也做了同样的事。
And his employee does the same thing.
咱们在这儿省点事吧。
Let's cut a corner here.
咱们妥协一下原则吧,反正短期来看,对公司更有利——至少他们是这么以为的。
Let's compromise a principle because short term, it's better for the company, at least in their misunderstanding.
他们正在最后敲定一项游乐设施,挺有意思的是,那是个马车,由马拉动的那种。
And so they are finalizing a ride and funny it's stagecoaches because they're horse drawn stagecoaches.
这个名字和前一页尼克的投资是一样的。
Same name as Nick's investments on the previous page.
让我从这本书《迪士尼的土地》里念一段。
And so let me read from this book called Disney's Land.
这些是乐园里最早完工的项目之一,但时间压力已经让所有人都喘不过气了。
They were among the first of the park's attractions to be finished, but the pressure of time was already weighing on everyone.
有一天,约翰·亨奇过来检查马车的进度,突然有了个主意,就去跟沃尔特提了。
One day John Hench stopped by to check the progress on the coaches and had an idea, which he brought up to Walt.
沃尔特,咱们干脆别装皮带了,怎么样?
Why don't we just leave the leather straps off, Walt?
游客根本注意不到这些细节。
The people are never going to appreciate all the close-up detail.
迪士尼给亨奇上了一堂尖锐的小课。
Disney treated Hench to a tart little lecture.
你这沟通方式太差了。
You're being a poor communicator.
人们其实都懂。
People are okay.
你可别忘了这一点。
Don't you ever forget that.
他们会感受到的。
They will respond to it.
他们会喜欢的。
They will appreciate it.
亨奇没再争辩。
Hench didn't argue.
他说:我们给那辆马车装上了你见过最棒的皮带。
He said, We put the best damn leather straps on that stagecoach you've ever seen.
我觉得华特明白的是吉姆·西内加尔说过的话:这次我让你这么干,下次你还会再来一次。
I think what Walt understood is what Jim Sinegal said: If I let you do it this time, you'll do it again.
整个公司都要一心一意地实现同一个目标:天天低价。
This entire organization is going to be committed to this one common goal: Everyday Low Prices.
或者像吉姆·西内加尔的导师索尔·普莱斯说的那样——我们后面会讲到他——始终要把最低的价格带给顾客。
Or as Jim Sinegal's mentor, Sol Price, who we'll talk about later, says: Focus on getting the lowest possible price to the customer always.
回到尼克的信件:很多零售商根本不是这样经营的。
So back to Nick's letters: Many retailers do not operate in such a way.
好市多的管理层把这种策略形容为:道理简单,执行起来却很难。
Costco's management describes this strategy as easy to understand and hard to operate.
几年后到了2004年,你看到这种情况,这可是我最喜欢的部分之一,因为当你读的传记越来越多,研究的创业者和企业越来越深入,这种事本来就应该发生。
Now, a few years later in 2004, you see this, this is one of my favorite parts because this is, this happening, this should be happening as you know, you're reading more biographies, you're studying more entrepreneurs, studying more companies.
你开始意识到,他们的那些想法其实很有价值。
You start to see that their ideas, right?
你开始把这些想法用到自己的生意里。
You're applying them to your own business.
他们研究了这么多案例,就是希望从中提炼出能成长为伟大企业的模式。
And so they're studying all these, what they want to, you know, hopefully think and will turn into like large, wonderful businesses.
你知道,好市多的未来只会变得更大。
You know, Costco is going to only get a lot bigger from here.
然后他们会把从好市多身上学到的洞察,大规模地用在亚马逊的投资上。
And then they're going to use the insights that they derive from Costco to make a massive investment in Amazon.
但读到这一段,你难免会注意到,他们真的在把这套方法用在自己创业的公司和时间分配上。
But with this paragraph, you can't help but notice that they're, Oh, they're applying it to the businesses they're building and how they're spending their time.
对你经理来说,投资回报率就是头等大事、第二要务、第三优先。
So this is job one, two, and three for your manager is investment performance.
真正践行这种做法的人寥寥无几。
Few practice this approach.
我们默认一个前提:只要业绩够稳,大家对我们的做法就会越来越感兴趣,合作关系也会慢慢扩大。
We work under the assumption that if performance is reasonable, then the level of interest in what we're doing will increase, and the partnership will grow in time.
他们说的这个理念,跟吉姆·西内加尔经营好市多时所坚持的原则如出一辙。
The principle behind what they're saying is very similar to the same principle that they identified with the way Jim Sinegal ran Costco.
说白了,只要把给顾客最低价格当成头等大事、第二要务、第三优先,顾客自然会用忠诚来回应。
It's like, well, if we just focus on getting the lowest possible price to the customer, if that is job one, two, and three, then the customers will respond with loyalty.
这种忠诚会逐年累积,好市多就会越做越大,就像他们说的,诺曼德这个合伙关系也会随着时间慢慢壮大。
That will compound over the years and Costco will get bigger just like they said Nomad, the partnership will grow in time.
所以我写的笔记其实比这段话还要长。
And so the note I have is actually longer than the paragraph.
首先,要抓住重点,始终聚焦在最重要的事情上。
So the first thing is keep the thing, the importance of keeping the main thing, main thing, the importance of focusing concentrating.
这跟第二点有关,也是我最欣赏的一个观点。
And that is related to part two, which is one of my favorite ideas.
当他们意识到自己发现了一个深刻的真理时,尼克说:‘如果你这辈子有过最棒的一个想法,那就必须让它主导一切,因为这种级别的洞见你一生都遇不上几次。’
When they knew that they had uncovered a deep truth, and Nick says, If it's the single best thought you have ever had in your life, it needs to dominate everything because you're not going to get many insights like that.
如果你真有一个前所未有的绝佳想法,那显然就该把所有时间都花在它上面。
And if it's your single best insight, your single best idea, then obviously it's what you should be spending all your time on.
有一篇由Palantir联合创始人写的文章。
There is a post written by one of the co founders of Palantir.
文章讲的是他跟彼得·蒂尔共事时学到的东西。
It talks about what he learned from working with Peter Thiel.
我手机里存着这篇文章里的这段话,觉得它完美契合了我们现在讨论的情况:别分散你的注意力。
And this part of the post I have saved on my phone, and I think it applies to exactly what's taking place here: Do not divide your attention.
专注做一件事,每多花一份力气,回报都会越来越大。
Focusing on one thing yields increasing returns for each unit of effort.
从微观上看,多花一小时专注手头的项目,收益远高于去碰新东西,更别说把五分钟分给十二个新任务了。
At a micro level, an extra hour of focus on the current project has a much higher return than an hour on something new or worse, five minutes each on 12 new things.
在开始任何新事情之前,你都该想清楚,这跟当前正在做的事相比,机会成本是多少。
Before you ever do something new, you should understand the opportunity cost versus existing things.
别找借口说你想做的事是互补的,其实根本不是。
Don't rationalize that something you want to do is complementary when it's not.
从宏观角度看,明白投入的精力会产生非线性回报,这对评估新市场方向特别有帮助。
At a macro level, understanding that applied effort has a convex output curve is a very useful discipline when considering new market areas.
这种非线性意味着,把资源从现有项目挪到新项目上去,代价非常高。
This convexity means that the opportunity cost of transferring resources from existing projects to new ones is high.
除非新领域真的极其有价值,否则任何能让你现有成果继续放大做的事,都远比新开一个项目划算。
Unless the new area is incredibly valuable, anything we can do to extend an existing convex curve is worth so much more.
所以到了合作后期,他们以极度专注在三件事上而闻名。
And so towards the end of the partnership, they are known for their heavy concentration in just three things.
就像我们上周聊的,有个例子,他们70%的净资产——我觉得这是扎克的净资产——都集中在亚马逊一只股票上。
And like you and I talked about last week, in one case, 70% of their net worth, I think this was Zak's net worth, 70% of Zak's net worth was in Amazon, just one stock.
但我们现在看的是2004年的信件,那时候他们还没真正意识到重仓押注的重要性。
But we're in the 2,004 letters and they haven't yet learned the importance of betting heavy yet.
读这些信最让人惊叹的地方,就是能看到他们思维的持续演变。
This is what's so remarkable about reading them is you see this constant evolution of thinking.
那时候他们的持仓从最高的7%到最低的0.3%不等。
So at this point, they have holdings ranging anywhere from at most their highest one is 7% of their entire portfolio down to 0.3%.
你能看出尼克在认真思考这个问题。
And you see that Nick is thinking about this.
他在想,这不就跟查理·芒格说的一样吗?
He's like, well, this is just like Charlie Munger.
查理·芒格说得对。
Charlie Munger is right.
他说,只买一点点确实让人憋屈,但这个问题真不好回答。
When he says it's aggravating to buy just a little bit, but this is a hard question to answer.
他说,现实中,我们有把握投入资本的机会非常少,而最有信心的那一个更是少之又少。
So he says, In reality, opportunities in which we are comfortable to deploy capital are rare, and the highest conviction idea is the rarest of them all.
问题就在于,每个机会该投多少。
The issue then is how much to invest in each idea.
这是尼克在思考凯利公式后得出的结论。
And this is Nick s takeaway from thinking about the Kelly Criterion.
这个公式的直觉结果是:如果你百分百确定某个判断是对的,那就该把全部资金押上去。
The common sense outcome of that equation is that if one is certain of being right, one should invest the entire portfolio in that idea.
但真有人这么做吗?
But does anyone do that?
于是他回头去看历史。
So he goes back to history.
据我们所知,只有早期巴菲特合伙基金的组合接近这种集中度,而且主要集中在巴菲特拥有控制权的公司上。
As far as we are aware, only the early Buffett Partnership portfolios had anyone near this level of concentration, and then mainly in companies in which Buffett was a controlling shareholder.
但这难道不是正确的思考方式吗?
But is this not the right way to think?
从这个思路延伸下去,Nomad的投资集中度有时候其实偏低了。
The logical extension of this line of thought is that Nomad's portfolio concentration has been at times too low.
所以我在这本自己做的笔记边上写了:嗯,他们开始转变想法了。
And so in the margin of this homemade book I have, I was like, alright, it's starting to change their mind.
那他们的行动什么时候能体现出来呢?
When do their actions reflect that?
就在下一页,他专门列了一个章节,叫《合伙投资的可能演变》。
And on the very next page he has a section called The Likely Evolution of the Partnership Investments.
我特别喜欢这一段。
I love this part.
我几乎把整段都划了线。
I underlined almost the entire part.
在办公室里,我们保留了一份名单,标题是‘超级高质量思考者’公司。
In the office, we keep a list of companies assembled under the title Super High Quality Thinkers.
要进这个名单可不容易,目前一共有15家公司。
This is not an easy club to join and the list currently runs to 15 businesses.
只有那些思维诚实、经济理性的人才有资格入选,但光有这两点还不够。
Entry is reserved for the intellectually honest and economically rational, but that alone is not enough.
很多公司在被逼到墙角时也会做正确的事。
There are many companies that do the right thing when their backs are against the wall.
真正被选中的少数企业,是因为它们多年来始终如一地超越竞争对手,理性配置资本,从而巩固自身的竞争优势。
The anointed few are there because they have chosen to outthink their competition and allocate capital over many years with discipline to reinforce their firm's competitive advantage.
良好的资本配置方式多种多样,并不一定要求企业必须扩张。
Good capital allocation takes many forms and does not necessarily require a firm to grow.
这又回到了查理·芒格那种‘癌症手术式’的思路。
This goes back to the Charlie Munger's cancer surgery approach.
他说:合伙企业对Stagecoach的成功投资,靠的是这家公司的收缩策略,而不是扩张。
Okay, so he says: The partnership's successful investment in Stagecoach has been due to the firm's shrinking strategy, not its growth.
在伯克希尔旗下的国家赔偿公司,只有在定价合理时才承保业务,定价不佳时就果断退出——即使收入下滑也毫不动摇,这正是资本纪律和高效配置的绝佳范例。
At National Indemnity, which is an insurance subsidiary of Berkshire, the firm's ability to write insurance only when pricing is good and stand back when pricing is poor, even if revenues decline, is a wonderful example of capital discipline and good capital allocation.
毕竟,如果回报率低,为什么要盲目扩张呢?
After all, why grow if returns are going to be poor?
令人惊讶的是,很少有公司有底气选择按兵不动。
Surprisingly, few companies have the strength to just sit it out.
这段话让我笑出声了。
This part made me laugh out loud.
我们问那些经营状况糟糕的公司:你们为什么非要扩张?管理层往往用一副‘你是不是疯了’的眼神看着我们。
We ask companies with poor economics why they want to grow, And senior management look back at us incredulous at our line of questioning.
我想他们的回答大概是:我们想扩张,这样就能亏得更多。
I guess their answer is we'd like to grow so we can lose even more money.
那些顶尖的思考者,我们推测就是那些股东愿意放弃股票交易权的公司——也就是说,你是在主张由管理层自己来配置资本,对吧?
The super high quality thinkers are our best guess as those firms whose shareholders could abdicate their right to trade stock, which means you're advocating the right to allocate capital themselves, right?
尼克把这件事交给了巴菲特、贝佐斯、西内加尔这样的人。
Nick is outsourcing that to the Buffets, the Bezos, the Sinegal.
所以,那些顶尖的思考者,就是那些股东完全有信心:无论多久,公司内部的资本都会被妥善配置的公司。
So the super high quality thinkers are the best guess of those firms whose shareholders could abdicate their right to trade stock, sure in the knowledge that their capital will be well allocated for years to come within the business.
这份名单上的一群公司,都是经营得极其诚实、持续创造复利的典范。
This list is a group of wonderful, honestly run compounding machines.
他找的就是这种诚实经营、能持续创造复利的公司。
That is what he's looking for, honestly run compounding machines.
我们管这个叫终极投资组合。
We call this the terminal portfolio.
这才是我们真正想去的地方。
This is where we want to go.
问题是,为什么这份名单和现在的诺马德投资组合不一样?
The question is, why is this list not the same as the current Nomad portfolio?
我在那儿写的,其实是在回应前一页的问题,我直接写了:‘太对了!’
And what I write there is answering the question on the previous page and I wrote fucking bingo.
前一页已经开始转变他们的想法了。
On the previous page, starting to change their mind.
那他们的行动什么时候才会跟上呢?
When will their actions reflect that?
他正在进行一场非常坦诚的对话。
He's having a very honest conversation.
他说,这是我们自己思考后得出的结果。
He's like, this is the outcome of our own thinking.
我们有这么一个群体。
We have this group.
我们已经挑出了少数几家真正认真经营的复利型公司。
We've identified a handful of potential, honestly run compounding machines.
这就是我们的终极投资组合。
This is our terminal portfolio.
我们想达到这个目标,但一对照当前的投资组合,发现根本对不上。
This is where we want to go, but then we compare that list to our portfolio, they don't match.
接着尼克进一步解释了‘认真经营’这部分的意思。
And so then Nick elaborates on the honestly run part of this.
他要的不只是复利型公司,而是真正认真经营的复利型公司。
Now he doesn't want just a compounding machine, he wants an honestly run compounding machine.
这到底意味着什么?
What does that mean?
公司行为端正只有两个原因:一是他们想这么做,二是他们不得不这么做。
There are only two reasons companies behave well: because they want to and because they have to.
我们更倾向于投资那些主动想做对的事的公司。
Our preference is to invest in those that want to.
如果我们能找到足够多这样的绝佳机会,它们最终会让我们无事可做。
If we can find enough of these heavenly opportunities, they will in fact put us out of a job.
如果能这样,我们会很高兴,哪怕有点无聊。
We will be pleased if a little bored.
他得出这个结论是因为,如果我们能早早投资这些公司,就能像早年投资好市多和亚马逊那样。
And he arrives at that conclusion because he's like, Well, if we can invest in them early, we can invest in Costco and Amazon early.
我们根本不需要做别的,因为时间会站在好企业的这边。
We don't have do anything else because time is a friend of a good business.
事实上,我觉得巴菲特在致股东的信里说得更好。
In fact, I like the way Buffett put this in his shareholder letters better.
他说:时间是卓越企业的朋友,却是平庸企业的敌人。
He says, Time is a friend of the wonderful business and the enemy of the mediocre.
所以尼克说,到了2004年,我们已经投资了两家出色的复利机器,但目前只有其中一家在我们的投资组合里占了比较重要的位置。
And so Nick says, Today, in 2004, we have made two investments in wonderful compounding machines, and only one of those is meaningfully represented in our portfolio.
那就是好市多。
That's Costco.
你觉得在未来十年里,这些顶尖的优秀企业,会不会有相当一部分股价跌到五毛钱左右,出现明显的回调?
What is the probability that, say, over the next ten years, a good portion of these super high quality thinkers will be priced at 50¢, So there's some kind of pullback in the stock.
对吧?
Right?
我们相信,这种可能性是相当存在的。
Our betting is that odds are reasonable.
关键在于,今天就得把功课做足,做好准备。
The trick is to do the work today so that we are ready.
如果你回看李路在哥伦比亚商学院那场讲座,他一直在强调这一点。
If you go back to the Lee Lu's lecture with the Columbia Business School students, that's what he kept telling them.
你必须成为一个持续学习的机器。
You have to be a learning machine.
你现在就得开始做功课。
You have to be doing the work now.
他多次提到,现在花的时间很长,但以后反而能走得更快。
He he referenced many times that it takes a long time now, but it makes you go faster later on.
你会去研究某个东西。
But that you'll study something.
他会花上十五年,专门研究一家美国公司。
He would study like an American company for, like, fifteen years.
他要花十五年才能找到亚洲的对应企业。
It would take him fifteen years to find the Asian counterpart.
尼克在这里说的,其实也差不多。
Nick is telling us something very similar here.
我们要好好想清楚这件事。
We're going to think this through.
我们要分析这个商业模式。
We're going analyze this business model.
我们要去找那些顶尖的思考者,那些能持续创造价值的人。
We're going try to find these super high quality thinkers, these compounding machines.
然后我们要有耐心。
And then we are going to be patient.
我们会等下去,因为机会出现的概率很高。
We are going to wait because the probabilities are high.
这样才能等到一个理想的买入价格。
To be able to get a good price to buy in.
关键在于今天就把功夫做到位,好让自己随时准备好。
The trick is to do the work today so that we are ready.
除了花时间分析公司和行业、寻找这些能持续增长的企业之外,他们还经常谈起——尤其是尼克,会详细讲同行和其他人犯过的各种错误。
And so in addition to spending time analyzing companies and industries and trying to find these compounding machines, they also talk a lot about, or Nick talks a lot about all the mistakes that his peers and other people in the industry make.
他说,成功的投资其实是个小众运动。
He says successful investing is a minority sport.
我跟查理·芒格吃晚饭的时候,手机里存着一整份我记下的对话要点。
When I had dinner with Charlie Munger, I have a list on my phone of all the notes I took from the conversation.
晚餐快结束时,芒格跟我说,擅长投资是一种非常罕见的能力。
One of the last things that Munger said to me at dinner was that being good at investing is a very rare skill.
这种能力分布极窄,而且永远都不会普及。
It is not distributed widely and will never be.
这跟人的行为模式息息相关。
And that has to do with behavior.
所以尼克·斯利普说,关于投资最精彩的一次演讲,其实根本没谈投资。
So Nick Sleep says the best talk on investing wasn't about investing.
那场演讲就是查理·芒格的《人类误判心理学》。
And it was Charlie Munger's talk, The Psychology of Human Misjudgment.
尼克现在想的是,如果我们的判断是对的,那会怎样?
And so what Nick is doing here, he's thinking through, he's like, Well, the problem is, what if we're right?
如果这些真是绝佳的企业呢?
What if these are wonderful businesses?
如果好市多未来还能再翻好几倍呢?
What if Costco is going to get much bigger from here?
为什么纵观投资历史,这么少的人能看见成功呢?
Why is it that when you look at the history of investing, that so few people cannot see success?
他意思是,这些人卖得太早了。
And what he means by that is they sell way too early.
他说:我们不能因为‘看错时机’是投资中常犯的错误就感到安心。
So he says: We take no comfort from the fact that not seeing success is a perennial investment mistake.
上世纪五十年代,一家总部在巴尔的摩的大基金公司把客户持有的IBM股票卖了,结果后来这些股票涨到价值超过了整个基金公司的资产。
In the 1950s, a large Baltimore based fund management company sold their client shares in IBM only for the shares to appreciate to the point that the value of the shares sold would become bigger than the whole fund management company itself.
我们今天要避免的,就是这家巴尔的摩公司后来在七十年代犯的另一个错误——把沃尔玛的股票也卖了。
What we are trying to do today is to avoid the Baltimore company's second mistake, which was to sell an equally big stake in Walmart in the 1970s.
他明显想说的是:只要一直拿着IBM和沃尔玛的股票,别的什么都不用做。
The point he's obviously making is, Hey, just hold on to IBM and Walmart and you didn't have to do anything else.
那怎么才能避开这些错误呢?
So how does one avoid these mistakes?
答案在于,别只看企业的表面成果,而要深入挖掘公司真正的本质,找到它成功的底层逻辑。
The answer lies in analyzing not the effects and outputs of a business, but digging down to the underlying reality of the company, the engine of its success.
你得把投资看作一个不断增长的动态系统,而不是一张静态的资产负债表。
One must see an investment not as a static balance sheet, but as an evolving compounding machine.
如果你真这么看,就不会在七十年代把沃尔玛的股票卖掉了。
And if you did that, you would not have sold Walmart in the 1970s.
于是尼克开始分析好市多成功的核心动力,看看它做了哪些事,能让客户长期保持忠诚和信赖。
And so Nick starts sharing his thinking about what is the engine of Costco's success and is there some actions that it's taking that would cause their customers to maintain this loyalty and this commitment to Costco over a long period of time.
我上周跟你说过,我老婆一家在好市多购物已经快三十年了。
I told you last week, you know, my wife's family has been shopping there for almost thirty years.
他们对好市多的忠诚度非常高。
They are extremely committed to Costco.
尼克说,第一,运营成本很低,低得惊人。
So Nick says, number one: Operating costs are low, indeed very low.
公司对成本的控制近乎偏执,连开支都精确到基点。
It is indicative of the paranoia with which the company is run that costs are measured in basis points.
第二。
Two.
批发价已经做到了极致的有竞争力。
The wholesale price is as competitive as it can be.
谈判的关键在于门店商品数量固定为四千种,每个货架位置都通过竞标决定,谁能为顾客提供最佳价值,谁就能赢得上架资格。
The key to negotiating terms is that the number of items in a store, so the SKUs, are fixed at 4,000 and the right to fill one of those spaces is auctioned with the supplier that provides the best value proposition to the customer, winning space on the shop floor.
他还提到,他们对供应商有多苛刻,官网甚至明文列出了成为 Costco 供应商的条件。
So he talks about how ruthless they can be with their suppliers that on their website, it lists the criteria required to become a Costco supplier.
尼克特别指出了其中一条。
And Nick highlights this one section.
我们要求所有供应商必须主动、持续地提供所有商品的最低采购价。
We expect all vendors to consistently and voluntarily quote the lowest possible acquisition price available on all items.
如果供应商不主动、持续地给出最低价格,将永久失去为 Costco 供货的资格。
A vendor who does not consistently and voluntarily quote its lowest price to our buyers will be permanently discontinued as a purchasing source for Costco.
这是尼克对这条规定的反应。
This is Nick's response to that.
天哪,一次失误就直接出局。
Good grief, one strike and you're out.
第三点:收入必须非常高。
Three: Revenues need to be very high.
如果其他两个因素有利,运营成本低,价格也做到极致有竞争力,收入自然就会很高。
Revenues will be high if the other factors, one and two, are favorable if operating costs are low and prices are as competitive as they can be.
关键在于,公司之后如何利用这种收入优势。
The issue is what the company then does with the revenue advantage.
以好市多为例,它把规模带来的效率提升,直接回馈给消费者,以此推动收入持续增长。
In the case of Costco, scale efficiency gains are passed back to the consumer in order to drive further revenue growth.
这样一来,即使在西雅图以外最早开设的好市多门店,也能从品牌扩展到俄亥俄州这样的新市场中受益,同时还能享受到供应商降价的好处。
That way customers at one of the first Costco stores outside of Seattle benefit from the fern's expansion into, say, Ohio, as they also gain from the decline in supplier prices.
这样连老店也能持续增长。
This keeps the old stores growing too.
核心是,既然公司把成本节省的好处分享给了顾客,顾客就会反过来支持它。
The point is that having shared the cost savings, the customer reciprocates.
在办公室里,我们有一块白板,上面列出了我们真正理解且认为有效的少数几种投资模式。
In the office we have a whiteboard on which we have listed the very few investment models that work and that we can understand.
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Costco 是我们能找到的最典型的例子——把规模效率带来的好处分享出去。
Costco is the best example we can find of one of them: scale efficiencies shared.
大多数公司追求规模效率,但很少有人愿意分享。
Most companies pursue scale efficiencies few share them.
真正让这个模式如此强大的,正是这种分享。
It's the sharing that makes the model so powerful.
这家公司通过回馈客户实现增长。
The company grows by giving back.
这就是为什么很难跟 Costco 竞争的原因。
That is why competing with Costco is so hard to do.
这家公司并不只盯着眼前的成绩和表现。
The firm is not interested in today's static assessment and performance.
它是在为长期成功提升可能性而经营业务。
It is managing the business as to raise the probability of long term success.
当 Costco 不断把成本节约的好处回馈给消费者时,它其实是在降低失败的概率。
When Costco continues to recycle cost savings to the consumer, it is lowering the probability of failure.
在我念下一句话之前,你要记住,他写这段话的时候是2004年。
And before I read this next sentence to you, remember it is 2004 when he is writing this.
亚马逊可能也在走同样的路。
Amazon.com may be following this path as well.
于是他开始试着解释清楚。
And so then he tries to reconcile.
这个商业模式对我们来说是说得通的。
Like, this business model makes sense to us.
对顾客来说这简直太棒了,可为什么股价会被低估呢?
This is phenomenal if you're a customer, but why are the shares mispriced?
为什么这么便宜?
Why is this so cheap?
所以他列出了当时人们对好市多的一些批评意见。
And so he lists what some criticisms that Costco gets at the time.
这家公司的利润率很低。
The company has low margins.
有意思的是,他这时候同时提到了好市多和亚马逊,别忘了杰夫·贝佐斯有一句特别有名的话:你的利润率就是我的机会。
And it's funny that he's mentioning both Costco and Amazon at this time, because remember, one of Jeff Bezos' most famous quotes is that your margin is my opportunity.
所以人们会说,我们不想买这只股票,因为好市多的利润率太低了。
So people are like, well, we don't want to buy the stock because Costco has low margins.
尼克·斯利普说,没错,但这正是关键所在。
And Nick Sleep says true, but that's the point.
这家公司现在选择推迟盈利,为的是延长品牌的生命期。
The firm is deferring profits today in order to extend the life of the franchise.
当他继续分析好市多时,他提出了一个有趣的问题。
And so as he continues to analyze Costco, he says there s an interesting question.
什么样的公司特质,能让它成为全世界最有价值的企业?
What characteristics could one bestow on a company that would make it the most valuable in the world?
它应该是什么样子的?
What would it look like?
他说,这样的企业会拥有一个规模庞大的市场,带来巨大的体量。
And he says such a firm would have a huge marketplace that would offer size.
它们会拥有很高的进入壁垒,带来持久性,同时资本投入极低,从而产生充沛的自由现金流。
They would have high barriers to entry, which would offer longevity, and very low levels of capital employed, which would offer free cash flow.
Costco 拥有其中一些特质。
Costco has some of these attributes.
它比同行更轻资产,但还不是最轻的。
It is also more asset light than its peers, but it's not the lightest of them all.
要找最轻的,还得看互联网公司。
For that, one must turn to the Internet.
在读下一句之前,我先停一下,因为我敢保证,你绝对猜不到下一句是什么。
I'm going to pause here before I read the next sentence because I promise you, you're not gonna be able to guess what the next sentence is.
我们刚讲完 Costco 的优势。
We just got going through the benefits of Costco.
他们提到了亚马逊。
They mentioned Amazon.
他们说能理解的商业模式没几个,而这个就是其中之一。
They mentioned they can only understand a few business models, and this is one of them.
Costco确实不错,但你想想,要是把Costco搬到网上会怎么样?
Costco is great, but imagine if you had Costco on the internet.
考虑到这些因素,我们接下来要转向一个有点意外的方向。
And given all that, we take this strange turn right here.
因为他们说,要找那种模式,你就得看互联网。
Because they said, well, for that one, you gotta turn to the Internet.
所以,在我们看来,像eBay这样的公司可能是世界上最有价值的公司。
So, and in our opinion, a business such as eBay could be the most valuable in the world.
当然,Costco也不是完美的。
So no, Costco is not perfect.
也许我们也该考虑持有eBay。
Perhaps we should own eBay as well.
不。
No.
我刚才写的是下一页的内容。
I I wrote on the this is the next page.
所以这些内容你可以免费在线阅读。
So you can read these for free online.
如果你像我一样喜欢看纸质材料,也可以打印出来。
And I'd if you like reading physical things like I do, you can print them out.
我现在看到第52页了。
So I'm on page 52.
在第51页,他们谈到了好市多的好处。
On 51, on page 51, they're talking about, you know, the benefits of Costco.
他们提到,迈克尔·戴尔也采用了这种模式,通过控制成本,把规模优势回馈给购买他电脑的顾客,而亚马逊可能也在走同样的路。
They talk that the fact that Michael Dell is also using this model by keeping costs low and passing back scale benefits to the buyer of his PCs, and that amazon.com might be following this path as well.
到了第52页,他们说,这听起来不错,但如果这一切发生在互联网上呢?
On page 52, it's like, well, would be great, but what if it was on the internet?
所以,也许答案就是eBay。
So maybe it's eBay.
我在页边用巨大的字写着:答案在上一页。
And I wrote in giant letters in the margin, the answer was on the previous page.
答案就是亚马逊。
The answer is Amazon.
他们自己还没意识到而已。
They just don't know it yet.
现在他们终于要明白了。
Now they will arrive at that.
我觉得他们赚的那两百亿里,大部分应该都是亚马逊贡献的,如果我没记错的话。
I think that the majority of that $2,000,000,000 that they made, I think the single company that contributed most of that, if I'm not mistaken, is Amazon.
想想这些话写出来的时候,世界是什么样子,总是很有帮助的。
And it is always helpful to think about what was going on when these words were written.
所以我特意去查了当年的情况,毕竟你读早期亚马逊的故事,也不可能把每本书都翻遍。
So if you go, I went and looked up like what it'd be, because you read about early days of Amazon, you never read every single book I can find.
很长一段时间里,我都觉得贝佐斯根本斗不过eBay。
And for the longest time, thought that Bezos has no chance against eBay.
想想看,到2004年底,当尼克·斯利普发现这个秘密时,亚马逊的市值已经高达180亿美元。
And think about this, in the end of two thousand and four, the market cap of Amazon, when Nick Sleep is discovering this earned secret was $18,000,000,000.18000000000.
同一时期,eBay的市值是770亿美元。
The market cap in that same time for eBay was 77,000,000,000.
在今天这个年代,听起来很荒谬,但回到2000年初,那时候到处都在说亚马逊根本不可能赢过eBay。
In today's world we're living in, that sounds silly, but if you go back to the early 2000s, there was a ton of stuff written on the fact that Amazon stands no chance against eBay.
接下来的一页,他总结了自己对好市多的看法。
And so on the next page, he gives us his summary of thoughts on Costco.
我们认为,好市多是一家成本控制严格、思维诚实、产品品质卓越、持续运转的公司,而且当前价格还低于其真实价值。
In our judgment, Costco is a cost disciplined, intellectually honest, high product integrity, perpetual motion machine trading at a discount to value.
我觉得我们肯定会做得不错。
I think we will do quite well.
你的经理在投资好市多时,第一个错误就是买得太少了。
Your manager has already made his first mistake in investing in Costco from not buying enough.
在他合伙信的末尾,尼克·斯利普写了一段非常精彩的话。
Towards the end of his partnership letters, Nick Sleep writes something that's excellent.
那些今天有效的投资理念,过去也有效,未来也必将成就新的商业帝国。
The fact that, you know, these ideas that work today, they worked in the past, and they will build empires in the future too.
所以我才读了这十一万字。
That is why I read 110,000 of these words.
这就是我在和你们交流时,特意选择聚焦的内容。
This is what I'm choosing to focus on as I speak to you.
让我真正对尼克·斯利普产生兴趣的,不是他的投资业绩,而是他在下面这段话里提出的观察。
The one, the first thing that got me really interested in Nick Sleep is not his investment performance, it's his observation that he lays out in the following quote.
他说,最优秀的投资者根本算不上投资者。
He says, The best investors aren't investors at all.
他们其实是从未套现的创业者。
They're entrepreneurs who never sold.
既然尼克是个投资者,他就在琢磨:为什么这些创业者选择不卖?
And since Nick is an investor, he's trying to learn from that, from learning that why these entrepreneurs not sell.
他认为,投资者能犯的最大错误,就是卖掉一只后来涨了十倍的股票,而不是持有了破产的公司。
He says the biggest mistake an investor can make is to sell a stock that goes on to rise tenfold, not from owning something into bankruptcy.
但大家普遍都这么想,至少从客户常问的问题来看就是这样。
But that's what everyone thinks, at least judging by the questions that we get from our clients.
我们收到的提问更多是关于持有西北航空的股票,而不是今年早些时候卖掉了苹果。
We got questions about our holding in Northwest Airlines rather than the sale of Apple earlier this year.
但其实,卖掉苹果给我们造成的损失更大。
But selling Apple has cost us more.
所以,这再次印证了尼克所说的——这件事有多难。
So again, that speaks to Nick's own point about how difficult this was.
当他提到上世纪五十年代卖掉IBM、七十年代卖掉沃尔玛的公司时,并不是在说:‘瞧这些傻子。’
When he's talking about that firm that sells IBM in the 50s and Walmart in the 70s, he's not like, Hey, look at these idiots.
他们太蠢了。
They're so stupid.
他的意思是,纵观历史,这种错误一再重复发生。
He's making the point that that mistake is repeated over and over and over again when you look through history.
觉得自己不会犯同样的错,这种想法未免太自大了。
It's arrogant to think that you're not capable of making the same mistake.
那我们该怎么避免呢?
So how do we avoid that?
我觉得我们稍后会聊这个,但万一我忘了,有个观点是,最优秀的投资者其实根本不是投资者。
And I think we'll talk about this later, but just in case I forget, the idea that the best investors aren't investors at all.
他们是那些从未套现的创业者。
They're entrepreneurs who never sold.
这跟创业者对自己所创造的事业那份深厚的感情有关。
That has to do with the love that an entrepreneur feels for the business that they're making, that they're creating.
山姆·沃尔顿从不会盯着沃尔玛的股票,想着怎么让银行账户里的钱最大化。
Sam Walton is not looking at his stock in Walmart and maximizing for the best return on the most dollars in his bank account.
他一心一意要打造一个能长期服务他人的伟大企业。
He was focusing on building something great that served other people over a very long period of time.
换句话说,有时候,最明智的财务决策,根本就不是一个财务决策。
In other words, sometimes it turns out that the best financial decision is not a financial decision at all.
到了2006年,他们终于意识到,天啊,这根本不是eBay。
Now we get to 2006 and they start to realize, Oh my god, it's not eBay.
他并没有直接这么说。
He doesn't say that.
这不是eBay,这是亚马逊。
It's not eBay, it's Amazon.
不过在他深入分析亚马逊之前,我觉得他提到了一个非常有趣、相关的观点。
Before he gets into analyzing Amazon though, I think he hits on something that's very fascinating that is related.
这个观点出现在他谈亚马逊之前的那一页,但我认为它和他对亚马逊的思考方式密切相关。
It's on the page before he gets into Amazon, but I think it's related to how he thinks about Amazon.
他说,我们在教经济学时,有个特别奇怪的地方。
And he's like, you know, this is a really weird thing in how we teach economics.
他指出,经济学研究的主流方法有一个盲点:总是基于短期观察,仿佛因果关系是叠加在一起的。
He says there's a blind spot as the overwhelming methodology for research and economics has been to take observations over a short period of time, as if cause and effect sit on top of each other.
记住这句话,等我们看到杰夫·贝佐斯的股东信时,你会发现尼克·斯利普的合伙信里大量引用了它。
Remember that line for when we get to Jeff Bezos' own shareholder letters, are quoted heavily in Nick Sleep's partnership letters.
明白吗?
Okay?
这真是个很特别的现象。
It's this really weird thing.
我们默认观察都是在短时间内完成的,好像因果关系是叠在一起的。
We're assuming that, you know, observations happen over a short period of time as if cause and effect sit on top of each other.
而这其实都指向他核心的观点:拥有更长远的视角,能带来巨大的优势。
And really this all ties to his main point of why having a longer a longer term view can be just a massive advantage.
他指出,当时好市多和亚马逊都因为把规模带来的效率红利大量让利给消费者,而被资本市场惩罚。
And he makes the point that both Costco and Amazon at this time, they're penalized by the public markets because they're giving so much of their scale efficiencies back to the consumer.
于是他问:那我们该怎么看待这个问题呢?
And so he goes, Okay, well how should we think about this?
他把这种做法叫做‘让利定价’。
He calls them price givebacks.
杰夫·贝佐斯在去年的年报里说过:我们决定,只要效率和规模允许,就持续大幅降低顾客的价格。
Here's what Jeff Bezos had to say in his last year's annual report: We have made a decision to continuously and significantly lower prices customers year after year as our efficiency and scale make it possible.
这是一个非常重要的决策,无法用数学模型来推导。
This is an example of a very important decision that cannot be made in a math based way.
当我们降价时,其实是在违背常理——因为数学模型总是说,聪明的做法是提价。
When we lower prices we go against the math, which always says that the smart move is to raise prices.
我们有大量的数据关于价格弹性。
We have significant data related to price elasticity.
我们可以比较准确地预测,价格降低一定百分比,会带来销量相应比例的上升。
With fair accuracy, we can predict that a price reduction of a certain percentage will result in an increase in units sold of a certain percentage.
在短期内,销量的增长几乎从来都不足以弥补价格的下降。
With rare exceptions, the volume increase in the short term is never enough to pay for the price decrease.
不过,我们对价格弹性的量化理解只限于短期。
However, our quantitative understanding of elasticity is short term.
我们可以估算这次降价在本周或本季度会带来什么影响,但没法预测持续降价五年、十年后对公司整体会产生什么后果。
We can estimate what a price reduction will do this week in this quarter, but we cannot estimate the effect that consistently lowering prices will have on our business over five or ten years.
这正是尼克之前说的,学者和经济学家常犯的错误:他们以为因果关系是瞬间叠加的。
It's exactly what Nick was saying on the other the mistake that academics and economics make: they act like cause and effect sit on top of each other.
杰夫的意思是,没错,你确实能算出这次降价本周或本季度会怎样,但你没法说它五年、十年后会对业务产生什么影响。
Jeff is saying, Yeah, okay, you can quantitatively understanding what this price reduction will do this week or this quarter, But you can't say what effect it'll have on the business for five or ten years.
这就是为什么我特别喜欢这句话,来描述创始人的真正角色:创始人是公司灵魂的守护者。
This is why one of my favorite lines about what the role of the founder actually is: The founder is the guardian of the company's soul.
这就是一个例子:我们相信,持续把效率提升和规模经济的好处以更低价格的形式让给客户,能形成一个良性循环,长期来看会带来远超以往的自由现金流,也让亚马逊变得更有价值。
This is an example of that: Our judgment is that relentlessly returning efficiency improvements and scale economies to customers in the form of lower prices create a virtuous cycle that leads over the long term to a much larger dollar amount of free cash flow, and thereby to a much more valuable Amazon.
我们在免费超级省运和亚马逊Prime上也做过类似的判断——这两项服务短期成本很高,但我们认为,从长远看它们至关重要且价值巨大。
We have made similar judgments around free Super Saver Shipping and Amazon Prime, both of which are expensive in the short term and, we believe, important and valuable in the long term.
杰夫写这段话的时间,以及尼克评论这段话的时间,非常关键。
The timing in which Jeff is writing this, and which Nick is commenting on it, is really important.
那时候,几乎没人看好亚马逊。
This is a time when few people are buying Amazon.
尼克和扎克拥有了他们共同的洞察。
Nick and Zak have their earned secret.
他们已经合作了五年多。
They are half a decade into their partnership.
所以尼克写道:这其实就是我们多年前在分析好市多时详细讨论过的规模与效率共享模式,如今已被好市多、戴尔、亚马逊和伯克希尔这些公司广泛应用,而好市多正是他的重仓股。
And so Nick writes, This is a summary of the scale efficiency shared model that we dealt with in detail in our analysis of Costco years before, and is deployed by companies which have now come to dominate Nomad, which is his holding in Costco, Dell, Amazon, and Berkshire.
如果股价只由那些盯着下一个数据点的人决定,那他们就不可能同时关注长期价值。
If the share price is being set by those with an eye on the next data point, then they can't also be looking out for the long term value.
很少有交易员会反对贝佐斯创造价值的方式,但他们觉得这些成效还不会马上体现在数字上。
There are few traders that disagree with Bezos' value creation process, but they don't think it'll show up in the numbers just yet.
交易员们有很多小点子,而我们只有一个大主意。
The traders have many small ideas, and we have one big idea.
祝他们好运。
Good luck to them.
这并不是一个纯粹靠数学推导的公式,投资支出也未必总能见效。
It is not strictly a math based equation and there's no guarantee that investment spending will always work.
他还再次引用贝佐斯的话:基于数学的决策容易达成共识,而基于判断的决策则必然引发争议,至少在付诸实践并得到验证之前是这样。
And he quotes Bezos again: Math based decisions command wide agreement, whereas judgment based decisions are rightly debated and often controversial, at least until put into practice and demonstrated.
任何不愿承受争议的机构,都只能局限于做第一类决策。
Any institution unwilling to endure controversy must limit itself to decisions of the first type.
在我们看来,这么做不仅会减少争议,更会严重限制创新和长期价值的创造。
In our view, doing so would not only limit controversy, it would also significantly limit innovation and long term value creation.
贝佐斯的这段话就说到这里。
That is the end of Bezos' quote.
这是尼克的简短回应:没错。
This is Nick's one word response: Amen.
接下来他说:我觉得贝索斯会是个出色的基金经理,而这正是关键所在。
And the next sentence he says: I think Bezos would run a good investment fund, but that is the point.
好的投资和好的商业决策本质上是一回事。
Good investing and good business decisions are synonymous.
在2007年的一封致合伙人的信中,他谈到了亚马逊如何能变得更好。
And so in one of the 2,007 partnership letters, he talks about how and why Amazon can get even better.
请注意,第二年他还不知道,但就在那一年,你就能以35美元的价格买到亚马逊股票。
Now keep in mind, the following year he doesn't know this yet the following year, you're going be able to buy Amazon stock for $35 Okay?
所以他提出一个问题:我们怎么知道一家公司能从小小的老鼠成长为庞大的大象?
So he's asking the question, how do we know that a business will actually grow from a mouse to an elephant?
他指出了与好市多在现实中具备的相同特质,而这些特质还能通过互联网得到极大增强。
And he identifies the same traits that in the physical world that Costco has, and then it can be super powered by the internet.
所以,有几件事非常重要。
So, you know, several things are important.
一家公司应该能够靠自身盈利来支持增长。
A business ought to be able to self fund its own growth.
其次,进入门槛应该随着规模扩大而提高。
Second, barriers to entry should increase with size.
这样,公司随着发展,护城河也会越来越宽。
That way the company's moat is widened as the firm grows.
亚马逊相比好市多最大的优势在于,互联网世界里的幂律效应非常显著。
And then the giant advantage that Amazon has over Costco is that on the internet, power law is very high.
这意味着像亚马逊这样的企业,有机会比实体行业的同类公司成长得更快、规模更大、利润更高,更何况它还是由一位以客户为中心的创始人领导的。
And this implies that businesses like Amazon have a shot at being far bigger, quicker, and more profitable than their physical world equivalents, and the fact that it's led by a customer centric founder.
这种组合让我们觉得,我们可能正面对一只能长成大象的老鼠。
This combination makes us think that we may have a mouse that can turn into an elephant.
对于那些说亚马逊已经够大的人,我们想问两个问题:你觉得电子商务在未来会占到美国零售总额的多少?
To those who argue that Amazon is large already, we ask you two questions: What do you think e commerce will be as a proportion of U.
美国零售总额的多少?
S.
十年后的零售业会是什么样子?
Retailing in ten years time?
那去年的情况你觉得如何?
And what do you think it was last year?
所以第二个问题的答案是:2006年,所有零售额中有3.1%是在线完成的。
So the answer to that second question is: 3.1% of all retail sales happened online in the year 2006.
于是他又回到了这个尚未解决的问题上。
And so then he goes back to this unresolved problem.
别人都在分散投资,这在我们看来没什么道理。
It's like everybody else is diversified, that doesn't make a lot of sense to us.
我们该怎么看待这个问题?
How should we be thinking about this?
这真的很难搞。
This is very difficult.
自从他们买了亚马逊之后,股价就涨了两倍。
And so since they had bought Amazon, it went up twice.
所以股价翻倍之后,扎克和我很容易就会觉得赢了,击个掌,然后把亚马逊的股票卖了。
So it said after the doubling of the share price, it'd be easy for Zak and me to claim victory, high five, and sell our shares in Amazon.
在之前的《游牧者》信件里,我们一直认为,投资者最大的错误就是在沃尔玛或微软早期成长阶段就把股票卖了。
In previous Nomad letters, we have argued that the biggest error an investor can make is the sale of Walmart or Microsoft in the early stages of the company's growth.
我们不禁想,今天卖掉亚马逊,是不是就像1980年卖掉沃尔玛那样犯了同样的错误?
We wonder, would selling Amazon today be the equivalent mistake of selling Walmart in 1980?
于是他提到,不如反过来想。
And so he talks about, let's invert.
让我们倒过来构建投资组合。
Let's invert the way to construct a portfolio.
另一种和别人不一样的构建方式,就是从100%观望开始,再逐步减少。
The other way to construct a portfolio that's different from how other people do it is to invert and start at 100% waiting and work down.
这正是创业者的做法。
This is what founders do.
他其实没明说,但意思很清楚:如果你像创业者那样投资,会怎么样?
He's really saying, without saying, what if you invested like founders invest?
对吧?
Right?
完全是百分之百。
It's a 100%.
山姆·沃尔顿把全部身家都投在了自己的公司里。
Sam Walton, a 100% of his net worth was in his company.
他说,我们并不是建议把所有资金都押在亚马逊上。
And he says, now we are not advocating all the fund in Amazon.
至少现在还不行。
Well, just not yet, at least.
最疯狂的是这一点。
And here's the crazy thing.
如果你已经把钱投进去了,那么这反而是他们最明智的决定。
That would have been their best performing decision, assuming you're gonna put all your money into what you've already invested in.
他们当时当然不知道,但最成功的做法,其实就是这么干。
They didn't know it then, obviously, but they the best performing decision would have to do just that.
把全部资金都投到亚马逊。
Allocate the entire fund to Amazon.
他讲了一个特别精彩的故事,解释为什么这事儿这么难,简直太逗了。
And he tells a wonderful story why this is so difficult, and this is hilarious.
他提到,最近有报道称,石油不是在地球偏远角落发现的,而是在埃克森公司位于德克萨斯州欧文的总部地下发现的,而且还不是埃克森自己发现的。
He says, It was recently reported that oil had been found not in the far flung reaches of the globe, but under the headquarters of Exxon in Irving, Texas, and not by Exxon.
有时候,你找的东西其实就在你眼前。
Sometimes what you are looking for is right in front of you.
连埃克森都会犯这种错,我们谁都可能。
If Exxon can make that mistake, we all can.
现在我们来到了2008年那场巨大的金融危机。
So now we're in the great financial crisis of two thousand and eight.
记得吗?尼克说过,历史上最伟大的投资演讲,根本不是讲投资的。
Remember, Nick said that the greatest speech on investment wasn't about investment.
讲的是人类判断失误的心理学。
It was about the psychology of human misjudgment.
他在说,大家都慌了神。
And he's talking about, you know, everybody's panicking.
觉得今年年底股价可能跌到百分之四十,甚至四十五?
Think they're going to wind up being down like 40% this year, 45% the at the end of the year?
但他早在事情发生前的信里就提到,这次他最多只跌了百分之二十。
And he says in the letters before this even happens, I think he's only down to 20% this time.
他说,虽然看起来不像,但我向你保证,现在正是当投资者最好的时机。
Goes, I know it doesn't seem like it, but I promise you this is the best possible time to be an investor.
他在关注亚马逊的基本面。
And he's looking at the underlying strength of Amazon.
这和股价完全没关系,他简直不敢相信。
It's completely uncorrelated to stock price, and he cannot believe it.
接下来这一部分写了好几十页。
This next section goes over many, many pages.
这是我读过他所有信件里最喜爱的部分之一。
It's one of my favorite parts of his entire letters.
所以他要用亚马逊作为例子说明,顾客和所有人一样,会对激励做出反应,而亚马逊将规模带来的好处分享给客户,会让它的增长空间远超预期。
And so he's about to make the point using Amazon as an example that, hey, customers respond to incentives, like all people do, and Amazon's sharing of these benefits of its scale will make them grow much farther from here.
你甚至能在2008年这场金融危机最严重的时候,看到亚马逊的实际表现有多强。
And you can see it with how they're actually performing in the middle of this great financial crisis that's happening in 2008.
他把亚马逊的韧性,和普通零售商的疲软做了对比。
And so he's comparing Amazon's strength with the lack of strength that normal retailers have.
他管那些零售商叫‘高低价’模式。
So he calls them high low.
就是那种靠大幅打折吸引顾客进店,拿亏本商品当诱饵,指望你进店后买点利润更高的东西的策略。
Know, people that say, Hey, you know, they get you in the door by essentially heavily discounting, having like a loss leader in the hopes that once you're in the store, you're going to buy something that they have a higher margin on.
所以他把这类公司称为‘主街同行’。
So he's going to call them high street peers.
明白吗?
Okay?
亚马逊的这些主街同行,就算把产品定价压到刚好保本,也根本没法在价格或利润上跟亚马逊竞争。
Amazon's high street peers could price their products at net income breakeven and still not undercut Amazon's prices or profitability.
对这些传统零售商来说,游戏已经结束了。
For these high street competitors, the game is over.
他写这篇文章的时候是2008年,人人都在恐慌。
He's writing this in 2008 when everybody's panicking.
尼克非常理性,看得异常透彻。
Nick is thinking very rationally and seeing things unbelievably clearly.
顾客会被持续低价和便利的吸引力吸引,转而支持更高效的竞争对手,导致这些传统零售商收入流失。
They will leak revenues to more efficient rivals as customers respond to the incentives of consistently low prices and convenience.
规模经济在经济低迷时同样有效,甚至更明显。
Scale economics works well in bad economic times as well as good.
今年圣诞节前最繁忙的一天,亚马逊的订单量比去年高出16%,而整个零售行业却下降了10%。
On the busiest day in the run up to Christmas this year in 2,008, order volumes at Amazon were 16% higher than the previous year compared to the overall retail industry, which are down 10%.
过去几个月,市场一直把它的股价压得低低的,仿佛它未来不会再增长,尽管它的增长前景堪称绝佳。
In the last few months, has been priced in the market as if it would not grow in the future, despite some of the best growth prospects we can imagine.
这种组合非常罕见。
That is a very rare combination.
这时候有个特别搞笑的例证,说明尼克说得对。
There's a hilarious illustration at this point that Nick's right.
规模经济在经济低迷时和繁荣时同样有效。
Scale economics works well in bad economic times as well as good.
这事发生在2008年。
This happened in 2008.
上世纪90年代初经济衰退时,沃尔顿被问到如何看待这场衰退,他说:我考虑过了,决定不参与。
Back when there was a recession in the early 1990s, Walton was asked about the recession that was happening, and he said, I've thought about it, and I've decided not to participate.
当亚马逊的订单量在半个世纪以来最严重的金融危机期间仍同比增长16%时,这其实就是杰夫·贝佐斯在说:我考虑过了,我不参与。
When you have order volumes at Amazon growing 16% year over year in one of the worst financial crises in half a century or whatever the timeframe was, that's Jeff Bezos saying, Yeah, I thought about it, I'm not going to participate.
在我们看来,人生中真正值得尊敬的事情寥寥无几。
In our opinion, just a few things in life are noble.
正因如此,诺马德的投资组合也只聚焦于少数几项。
And it is because just a few things are noble that Nomad has just a few investments.
多元化被当成一种保险,以防某个想法出错。
The Church of Diversification is seen as an insurance against any one idea being wrong.
我们认为,如果知识能创造价值,而真正能确定的事情又少之又少,那么逻辑上讲,持股越多,风险反而越大。
We would propose that if knowledge is a source of value add, and few things can be known for sure, then it logically follows that owning more stocks does not lower risk but raises it.
山姆·沃尔顿不是靠分散投资赚到钱的,比尔·盖茨、安德鲁·卡内基和约翰·D·洛克菲勒也不是。
Sam Walton did not make his money through diversifying his holdings, nor did Bill Gates, Andrew Carnegie, or John D.
洛克菲勒。
Rockefeller.
伟大的企业从来都不是这样建起来的。
Great businesses are not built that way.
这些人的投资组合几乎全部集中在一家公司,但他们自己也清楚这很冒险。
The portfolios of these men were more or less 100% in one company, and they did consider it risky.
再回头看看那句话。
Go back to that quote.
有史以来最出色的投资者,根本算不上投资者。
The best investors of all time are not investors at all.
他们是从未套现的创业者。
They're entrepreneurs who never sold.
所以他问了一个问题:为什么只有沃尔顿家族的创始成员,一路持有沃尔玛的股票?
And so he's asking the question, why is it that no one but the founding Walton family owned Walmart all the way through?
扎克和我听过一个故事,特别有意思,或许能帮我们说明这一点。
Zak and I were told a story which we enjoyed enormously, and might help illustrate this point.
上世纪70年代初,一家规模很大的成功基金管理公司复盘自己的投资组合,发现三十年前卖掉IBM股票是个重大疏漏。
In the early 1970s, a large successful fund management company analyzed its portfolio and discovered that their sale of IBM thirty years earlier had been a huge error of omission.
如果当年他们没卖,而是一直持有IBM的股票,光这一笔投资,现在价值就超过公司当时管理的全部资产。
If they had instead kept their IBM shares for the last thirty years, that stake alone would have been larger than the total funds under management.
他们一致同意要从这个错误中吸取教训,但和往常一样,回到办公桌后,又照常过日子,好像什么都没发生过。
They all agreed to learn from that particular mistake, and as so often happens, went back to their desks and got on with life before as if nothing had happened.
就在他们意识到这个错误的同时,他们还决定卖掉沃尔玛的股份——而三十年后,这笔股份的价值将超过他们当时管理的全部资产。
Around the same time that they realized their mistake, they also made the decision to sell their stake in Walmart, which thirty years later would be worth more than their then to be funds under management.
从错失的收益金额来看,这很可能是这家公司历史上最大的一次投资失误。
In terms of dollars of opportunity loss, it is likely to be the biggest single error that firm will make.
所以他在几页之后又强调了一点:你不能只盯着结果看。
And so then he makes a point a few pages later: You cannot just focus on the outputs.
如果你这么想,迟早会卖掉的。
If you do, you're going to sell.
你必须真正理解成功的根本动力。
You have to really understand the central engine of success.
你得深入理解这家企业的运作方式。
You have to understand that business deeply.
这就是为什么他说,真正能确定的事情其实少之又少。
This is why he says so few things can actually be known.
如果你只能搞懂几件事,那自然就得集中火力,下重注。
And if you can only know a few things well, then of course you need to be heavily concentrated and bet heavily.
有人可能会说,沃尔玛能连续四十年增长,得有太多条件刚好凑在一起。
It could be argued that lots of things had to go right for Walmart to grow for forty years.
这当然没错,但归根结底,真正关键的就那么几件简单的事。
That is certainly true, but at its heart, a very few simple things really mattered.
在我们看来,沃尔玛成功的根本动力,就在于一种极致的节俭文化——低成本、零浪费,把省下来的钱直接让利给顾客。
In our opinion, the central engine of success at Walmart was a thrift orientation so low cost, low waste, fueling growth with the savings shared with the customer.
这才是商业的深层真相。
That is the deep reality of the business.
如果你对投资感兴趣,不妨在这里停一停。
And so you could pause there if you're interested in investing.
想想看,现在谁在做这件事?
Say, Okay, so who's doing this now?
今天谁才是当年的沃尔玛?
Who today is the Walmart of the 1970s?
或者你可以问问自己:我该怎么把这用到自己的生意上,让现在的生意也能持续增长几十年?
Or you can ask yourself, Okay, how do I apply this to my own business so my business, the one I'm running today, can compound for decades?
他最后总结得特别精彩,因为他们研究沃尔玛、花大力气分析好市多,归根结底就是想问:亚马逊和沃尔玛,到底谁更像?
And he wraps this up beautifully because they're asking essentially the reason they're studying the Walmart and the reason they did all the work on Costco is they're like, is Amazon or Walmart?
我特别喜欢这一段,因为它直接点出了我们过去几周一直在聊的核心问题。
And I absolutely love this section because it really comes to what you and I've been talking about the past few weeks.
努力和机会成本。
Effort and opportunity costs.
芒格说,聪明人做决定,靠的是机会成本和投入精力。
Munger says that all wise people, the way wise people make decisions is through opportunity costs and then effort.
所以他说:过去十八个月,我和扎克翻遍了股市,读了一千份年报,走访并访谈了三百家公司。
So it says: When Zak and I trawled through the stock market these last eighteen months, we read 1,000 annual reports and visited and interviewed 300 companies.
我们当时有四个主要选择:第一,
We had four main choices: one.
可以在现有持仓基础上加码;第二,
We can add to our existing holdings two.
投资新企业;第三,投资成长型公司;
We can invest in new businesses Three, we can invest in growth businesses.
或者第四,买一些廉价的烟蒂股。
Or four, we can invest in cigar butts.
我们绝大多数时候,都更倾向于继续持有现有的企业,而不是考虑其他选项。
Overwhelmingly, we have preferred our existing businesses to the alternatives.
我们并不是在说亚马逊会成为下一个沃尔玛。
We are not saying that Amazon is the next Walmart.
这方面还得时间来证明。
Time will tell on this front.
但我们还是得问一句:万一真是这样呢?
But we are asking the question, what if it is?
如果答案是肯定的,那答案就在下一页。
And if the answer is yes, then the answer is on the next page.
书中提到了投资者塞思·克拉曼,他写过《安全边际》,有人曾质疑巴菲特的投资纪录是否具有统计意义,毕竟他交易次数那么少,克拉曼回应说,巴菲特每天选择什么都不做,其实也是一种决策。
It talks about the investor Seth Klarman, who wrote Margin of Safety, was once challenged on whether Buffett s track record was statistically significant since he traded so little, to which Klarman answered that each day Buffett chose not to do anything was a decision taken too.
我读到这儿的时候,就觉得尼克一定在自己身上看到了影子。
When I read that, I assume that Nick is seeing himself in that story.
2008年那时候,他心想:我有好市多。
Right now in 2008, he's like, I got Costco.
我有伯克希尔。
I got Berkshire.
我有亚马逊。
I got Amazon.
关键是别把这事搞砸了。
The key is to not mess that up.
关键就是别打断这些真正能持续复利的机器,而这种不作为本身也是一种决定——每天都要做出的不作为的决定。
He the key is to not interrupt this these honest compounding machines, Which in itself is a decision, a daily decision not to do anything.
这 arguably 比采取行动更难,因为我觉得我们天生就倾向于做点什么,总想动手干点啥。
And arguably more difficult than to do something because I think we're naturally wired to do something, to take action.
正是这个想法让我想花时间去研究尼克·斯利普、扎克、露露和贝佐斯,还有其他所有人。
And what made me want to spend time studying Nick Sleep and Zak and Lulu and Bezos and everybody else because of this idea.
还记得露露被人问到的时候是怎么说的吗?
Remember what Lulu said when he was asked?
人家就问:‘你的投资方式跟那些没你成功的投资者有什么不同?’
He's just like, Well, how is your approach different than other investors that are less successful than you?
他回答说:‘我从不花时间去操心别的投资者在干嘛。’
He's like, I don't spend any time worrying about what other investors do.
我所有的时间都用来研究优秀的企业和优秀的行业。
I spend all my time studying great companies and studying great industries.
如果尼克和扎克当时还在担心其他投资者在做什么,他们就不会有今天的成绩。
If Nick and Zak were worried about what other investors were doing at this time, they wouldn't be doing what they're doing.
他们根本不会去投资亚马逊。
They wouldn't have been buying Amazon.
也不会整天谈论好市多。
They wouldn't have been talking about Costco.
有一位匿名创始人,管理着诺马德旗下的一家被投公司,在一次私下会议中说了这么一段话。
And so there's this unnamed founder that is running one of Nomad's investments that said this in a private meeting.
我猜,这肯定说的是贝佐斯。
I'm I this has got to be Bezos.
他们没明说是贝佐斯,但你听这句话。
They don't say it's Bezos, but listen to this.
我觉得,咱们就假设这人真是贝佐斯吧。
And I think, again, let's let's just assume this is Bezos.
贝佐斯就是这样经营他的公司的。
Bezos is running his business this way.
我认为李录就是这样经营企业的,尼克和扎克也是这么做的。
I would argue that Li Lu ran his business this way, and that Nick and Zak were running their business this way.
如果你想成功——我们确实想——那就得准备好被人误解。
If you want to be successful, and we do, then you have to be willing to be misunderstood.
这可是过去一个月里反复提到的核心观点。
Come on, this has been a main theme in the last month.
去做那些大多数人觉得不靠谱的事。
And do things that do not seem sensible to most people.
比如,如果你作为员工每天早上进办公室,想的都是怎么超越行业里前三名,那这家公司根本不适合你。
For example, if you, the employees, come into the office in the morning thinking how are you going to beat one, two, and three in the industry, then our business is the wrong place for you.
我们从客户出发,倒推一切决策。
We start with the customer and work backwards.
他还说,与其拿别人的做法当标准,不如对现状保持一种近乎本能的不满,这种不满让我们不敢松懈,推动企业不断进步,不管竞争对手在做什么。
He continued that rather than set your standards by what others do, the business benefited from a divine discontent with the status quo, which kept us on our toes and the business improving irrespective of what the competition was doing.
换句话说,他的公司有自己的内在指南针,真正的方向始终指向对客户最有利的选择。
In other words, his company had an internal compass with True North pointing to what was right for the customer.
这听起来跟吉姆·西内加尔早期的做法很像。
Sounds a lot like what Jim Sinegal did at the beginning.
他说:‘我们这批设计师牛仔裤进价太划算了。’
Was like, Hey, we got such a good deal on these designer jeans.
多加十美元没人会发现的。
We can mark them up another $10 no one will notice.
但他却说:‘我不干,这违背了我的内心准则——永远为客户做对的事。’
And he's like, no, I'm not gonna do that because that violates my internal compass, which which points to always doing what's right for the customer.
吉姆·西内加尔的这种想法,深受他导师索尔·普赖斯的影响。
And Jim Sinegal's thinking on this was heavily, heavily influenced by his mentor, Soul Price.
我做过两期关于索尔·普赖斯的节目。
I've done two episodes on Soul Price.
如果你还没听,那是第304期。
If you haven't listened to them yet, it's episode three zero four.
索尔·普赖斯,这位培养了吉姆·西内加尔、山姆·沃尔顿、杰夫·贝佐斯和伯尼·马库斯的导师。
Soul Price, the founder who taught Jim Sinegal, Sam Walton, Jeff Bezos, Bernie Marcus.
这本书是根据他儿子写的传记改编的。
It's based on a biography written by his son.
他儿子听了那期节目后,给我发了一封非常暖心的邮件。
His son listened to that episode and sent me a very, very kind email.
所以,扎克和吉姆——不对,应该是尼克和扎克——去见吉姆时,他突然在说话中途停了下来。
So, Zak and Jim or Nick and Zak, rather, are meeting with Jim, and he says, Jim suddenly stopped in mid sentence.
他脸上一下子亮了起来。
His face lit up.
我得给你看看这个,他说。
I must show you this, he said.
他转身走进了文件柜里。
He disappeared into a filing cabinet.
他拿着一份索尔·普赖斯在1967年写的备忘录走了出来,还送了对方一份副本。
He emerged with a memo from 1967 written by Sol Price, and he gave him a copy.
他们把这份备忘录装裱起来,挂在了办公室的墙上。
They framed it and hung it on the office wall.
备忘录上写着:
The memo says this.
这是索尔·普赖斯说的话。
This is Sol Price.
吉姆觉得特别重要的一点是:虽然我们都关心利润,但绝不能以牺牲我们的理念为代价。
This is what Jim thought was super important: Although we are all interested in margin, it must never be done at the expense of our philosophy.
利润应该通过更聪明的采购、专注于销售我们想卖的好商品、提升运营效率、减少降价和加快周转来实现。
Margin must be obtained by better buying, emphasis on selling the right kinds of goods we want to sell, operating efficiencies, lower markdowns, greater turnover.
单纯提高零售价,还说自己依然有竞争力,这种做法很危险,很多公司都已经吃过亏了。
Increasing the retail prices and justifying it on the basis that we are still competitive could lead to a rude awakening as it has with so many.
我们该多想想怎么把东西便宜地送到顾客手上,而不是盯着顾客能承受多少价格。
Let us concentrate on how cheap we can bring things to the people, rather than how traffic how much the traffic will bear.
等比赛结束的时候,联邦百货依然会在那里。
And when the race is over, FedMart will be there.
这是尼克的点评。
This is Nick's commentary.
这是我们见过的对规模经济商业逻辑最精辟的总结。
That is the best summary of the business case for scale economics shared that we have come across.
四十三年后,好市多成了全球最有价值的同类零售商。
Forty three years later, Costco is the most valuable retailer of its type in the world.
那种时刻关注细节的文化很难建立,杰夫·贝佐斯认为,如果不在公司初创时就奠定基础,几乎不可能做到。
Cultures that care about the little things all the time are very hard to create, and in the opinion of Jeff Bezos, almost impossible to create if not put in place at the firm's genesis.
最后,我想点出这一集的核心观点:这些理念历久弥新,完全可以应用到我们的工作中。
And then I want to end on what I think is the main point and the main idea behind this episode that these ideas are timeless and are transferable to our work.
当我们研究真正优秀的企业时,往往会发现,它们的成功往往源于一些简单却关键的人性特质。
When we study truly great businesses, we find that very often it has been simple human attributes that have led to their success.
喝可乐和喝无名可乐的感觉不一样,你对总是低价打压对手的商家,或者主动上门取回退货的快递服务,感受也会不同。
You feel differently drinking a Coke than a no brand cola, or you may feel differently towards a business that consistently undercuts the competition and price, or a delivery service that literally goes the extra mile and picks up returned items.
你产生这些感受的原因,以及触发它们的刺激因素,几千年来几乎没变过。
And the reason you have these feelings and the stimuli that produce them have hardly changed in millennia.
有意思的是,一百年前造就福特帝国的商业模式,和七十年代山姆·沃尔顿、九十年代赫布·凯莱赫,以及今天杰夫·贝佐斯所用的,本质上是一样的。
It is interesting to note that the business model that built the Ford empire one hundred years ago is the same that built Sam Walton's in the 1970s, Herb Kelleher's in the 1990s, or Jeff Bezos' today.
未来,它还会继续造就新的商业帝国。
And it will build empires in the future, too.
关于这个完整的故事,我就先说到这里。
And that is where I'll leave it for the full story.
我强烈建议你读一读所有的股东信。
Highly recommend reading the shareholder letters, all of them.
这些信件都可以在尼克的慈善网站上免费获取。
They're available for free on Nick's charity website.
我会在下方附上链接。
I will leave a link down below.
如果你不想读完全部两百一十八到两百一十九页的股东信,我特别推荐你买威廉·格林的那本书,就是我上周讲过、专门写尼克和扎克那一章的那本。
And then if you don't want to read all two eighteen, two nineteen pages of the shareholder letters, I would heavily recommend buying William Green's book, the one I covered that did the chapter last week on Nick and Zak.
这本书叫《更富有、更睿智、更快乐:世界顶尖投资者如何在市场与生活中取胜》。
The book is called Richer, Wiser, Happier: How the World's Greatest Investors Win in Markets and Life.
作者威廉·格林听了这期节目,非常喜欢。
The author William Green listened to the episode and he loved it.
这周有不少朋友买了这本书。
A bunch of my friends have bought that book this week.
我会在下方放个链接。
I will leave a link down below.
如果你通过这个链接买书,也是在支持这个播客。
If you buy the book using that link, you'll be supporting the podcast at the same time.
目前已经卖出了3.65本书,还差1000本,我再跟你们聊。
That is $3.65 books down, 1,000 to go, and I'll talk to you again soon.
我读这些信的时候很清楚,吉姆·西尼格尔和好市多的核心执着,就是始终坚持每日低价策略。
When I was reading these letters and it was very clear that Jim Sinegal and Costco's obsession was this total commitment to this everyday low price strategy that they had.
他们所有的行动,都是为了实现这一个目标。
Everything they were doing was serving that one goal.
当你读到或听到这些时,就会开始想:我所在组织的目标是什么?
And when you read that or when you listen to that, you start to think, okay, what is my organization's goal?
我的目标,我唯一的目标,也是我整个事业的核心原则,就是帮助别人从历史上最伟大的企业家身上学习。
So my goal, my one goal, the central organizing principle of my entire life's work is that I want to help other people learn from history's greatest entrepreneurs.
我想比世界上任何人都做得更好。
And I want to do that better than anybody else in the world.
为了制作这个播客,我必须收集并提炼历史上最伟大企业家们的集体智慧,这成了副产品。
And so as a byproduct of making this podcast to, in order to make the podcast, I have to collect and distill the knowledge, the collective knowledge of history's greatest entrepreneurs.
然后我通过播客把这些知识广泛传播,因为我真的相信,这些传记、致股东的信、自传,都能让别人受益于他人长达四五年甚至六十年的创业经验。
And then I use the podcast to spread that knowledge far and wide because I really do think these biographies, these shareholder letters, these autobiographies, I really do think it is an act of service that other people can benefit from a, you know, four, five, six decade long career.
这种执着最终体现为一个播客,但现在我开发了一个工具,确保我永远不会忘记这些教训,需要时随时能调出来。
And so this obsession takes form of a podcast, but now I've made a tool to make sure that I never forget the lessons and that I can pull them up on demand when I need them.
这个工具叫‘创始人笔记’,现在你也能使用它了。
And that tool is Founders Notes, which you can now get access to that tool as well.
‘创始人笔记’让你能随时获取历史上最伟大企业家们的集体智慧,方式非常简单——过去六年,我把为播客读过的所有内容的笔记和重点都存进了一个庞大的可搜索数据库,现在你可以直接使用。
Founders Notes lets you tap into the collective knowledge of history's greatest entrepreneurs on demand, and it's a very simple way because for the last six years, I've been putting all of my notes and highlights for everything that I read for the podcast into a giant searchable database that you can now tap into.
即使你之前没听说过这个工具,你也会在播客里不断听到它被使用——每次我提到过去的想法、过去的节目或书籍,比如讲杰夫·贝佐斯,或者这期提到的沃尔特·迪士尼、山姆·沃尔顿、芒格、巴菲特,这些内容都是我从‘创始人笔记’里查出来的。
And even if you didn't know about this tool, you hear me use it over and over again because every time you listen to the podcast and I'm referencing past ideas from past episodes from past books, like when I brought up Jeff Bezos, when I was talking about Walt Disney in this episode, or Sam Walton or Munger or Buffett or all of this, that is me searching through Founders Notes and pulling up those ideas.
这一点非常重要,你一定要明白。
And that is a really important point to get across what you see.
如果你订阅了Founders Notes,用的就是我本人一直在用的同一个工具。
If you subscribe to Founders Notes, that is the same tool that I use.
你看到的,完全是我每天在用的界面和内容。
You see the exact same thing that I use.
这个工具最初是我为自己做的,早在考虑让别人用之前,我已经用了好几年了。
It is a tool that I made for myself and I had for years before I even thought about making it a tool that other people can get access to.
现有的Founders Notes用户,已经用它来解决公司里的各种问题,比如招聘、营销、领导力,甚至准备董事会会议和销售演示。
Existing subscribers to Founders Notes have been using it to help them think through issues they're having from anything in their company from hiring to recruiting to marketing to leadership to preparing for board meetings to preparing sales presentations.
如果你已经在经营一家成功的公司,那投资这个工具根本不用犹豫。
If you are already running a successful company, think it's a no brainer to invest in this tool.
你可以随时访问历代创业者的集体智慧,去foundersnotes.com就行。
You can tap into the collective knowledge of history based founders on demand by going to foundersnotes.com.
网址是foundersnotes.com,和播客名字一样,记得是Founders加s,现在就订阅吧。
That is Founders with an s, just like the podcast, foundersnotes.com, and subscribing today.
感谢你的支持。
Thanks for the extra support.
谢谢收听,我很快再和你聊。
Thanks for listening, and I'll talk to you again soon.
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