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亨利·辛格尔顿是个了不起的人，作为CEO，他的背景很不寻常。
Henry Singleton was a remarkable man with an unusual background for a CEO.
他是一位世界级的数学家，喜欢蒙眼下棋，还在攻读电气工程博士学位时，为麻省理工学院编写了第一台计算机的程序。
A world class mathematician who enjoyed playing chess blindfolded, he had programmed MIT's first computer while earning a doctorate in electrical engineering.
二战期间，他开发了让盟军船只避开雷达探测的技术。
During World War two, he developed technology that allowed allied ships to avoid radar detection.
到了五十年代，他发明了一种导航系统，至今仍被大多数军用和民用飞机使用。
And in the nineteen fifties, he created a guidance system that is still in use in most military and commercial aircraft.
所有这些成就，都发生在他六十年代初创立泰利达因集团、成为历史上最伟大的CEO之一之前。
All of that before he founded the conglomerate Teledyne in the early nineteen sixties and became one of history's greatest CEOs.
那时候，集团企业就像现在的互联网股票一样热门。
Conglomerates were the Internet stocks of the nineteen sixties.
很多这样的公司都上市了。
A large number of them went public.
不过，辛格尔顿经营的集团企业却非常特别。
Singleton, however, ran a very unusual conglomerate.
早在回购股票流行起来之前，他就大举回购自家股票，最终买下了Teledyne超过90%的股份。
Long before it became popular, he aggressively repurchased his stock, eventually buying over 90% of Teledyne shares.
这太疯狂了。
That's nuts.
他不发股息，更看重现金流而不是账面利润，管理上出了名的分散放权，而且从不拆股。
He avoided dividends, emphasized cash flow over reported earnings, ran a famously decentralized organization, and never split the company's stock.
他被称为“斯芬克斯”，因为他不爱跟分析师和记者打交道。
He was known as the Sphinx for his reluctance to speak with either analysts or journalists.
事实证明，他无视那些质疑者是对的。
It turned out he was right to ignore the skeptics.
他那些更出名的同行们，长期回报普遍平平。
The long term returns of his better known peers were generally mediocre.
相比之下，辛格尔顿经营Teledyne近三十年，给投资者的年化复合回报率高达惊人的20.4%。
Singleton, in contrast, ran Teledyne for almost thirty years, and the annual compound return to his investors was an extraordinary 20.4%.
如果你在1963年投了1美元给辛格尔顿，到1990年他卸任时，这笔钱会变成180美元。
If you had invested a dollar Singleton in 1963, by 1990, when he stepped down, it would have been worth a 180.
其实，查理·芒格说过，辛格尔顿的财务回报比任何人都高出不止一截，简直离谱。
Actually, Charlie Munger said that Singleton's financial returns were a mile higher than anyone else's, that they were utterly ridiculous.
这是芒格的原话。
That's a direct quote from Munger.
CEO要想成功，需要做好两件事：高效运营，以及合理配置运营产生的现金。
CEOs need to do two things well to be successful, run their operations efficiently and deploy the cash generated by those operations.
大多数CEO都专注于管理运营。
Most CEOs focus on managing operations.
而辛格尔顿则把大部分精力放在后一件事上。
Singleton, in contrast, gave most of his attention to the later task.
正如沃伦·巴菲特所说，很少有CEO对资本配置这项关键任务有所准备。
As Warren Buffett observed, very few CEOs come prepared for this critical task of capital allocation.
很多公司的负责人——这是巴菲特的原话——
The heads of many companies this is a direct quote from Buffett.
很多公司的负责人并不擅长资本配置。
The heads of many companies are not skilled in capital allocation.
他们的不足并不令人意外。
Their inadequacy is not surprising.
大多数老板之所以能升到高层，是因为他们在市场营销、生产、工程、管理，有时甚至是办公室政治方面表现出色。
Most bosses rise to the top because they've excelled in areas such as marketing, production, engineering, administration, or sometimes institutional politics.
一旦他们成为CEO，就必须做出资本配置决策，这是一项关键工作，他们可能从未接触过，而且不容易掌握。
Once they become CEOs, they must now make capital allocation decisions, a critical job that they may have never tackled and one that is not easily mastered.
打个比方，这就好比一位才华横溢的音乐家，最后一步不是去卡内基音乐厅演出，而是被任命为美联储主席。
To stretch this point, it's as if the final step for a highly talented musician was not to perform at Carnegie Hall, but instead to be named chairman of the Federal Reserve.
所以这就是巴菲特引言的结尾。
So that's the end of Buffett's quote.
辛格尔顿是一位资本配置大师，他在各种配置方案之间做出的决策，与同行们的决策大相径庭，并对股东长期回报产生了巨大的积极影响。
Singleton was a master capital allocator, and his decisions in navigating among these various allocation alternatives differed significantly from the decisions his peers were making and had an enormous positive impact on the long term return for his shareholders.
辛格尔顿的方法非常与众不同。
Singleton had a highly differentiated approach.
具体来说，他信奉一种极端形式的组织分权，总部只有精简的企业员工，运营责任和权力集中在各个业务部门的总经理手中。
Specifically, he believed in an extreme form of organizational decentralization with a thin corporate staff at headquarters and operational responsibility and authority concentrated in the general managers of the individual business units.
然后这本书继续列出了辛格尔顿的一系列信念。
So then the book goes on to list a bunch of beliefs that Singleton had.
辛格尔顿认为，资本配置是CEO最重要的职责。
So Singleton believed that capital allocation is a CEO's most important job.
他认为，从长远来看，重要的是每股价值的增长，而不是整体增长或规模。
He believed that what counts in the long run is the increase in per share value, not overall growth or size.
他认为，决定长期价值的是现金流，而不是报告的盈利。
He believed that cash flow, not reported earnings, is what determines long term value.
他认为，分权化的组织能释放创业精神，同时降低成本和内部矛盾。
He believed that decentralized organizations release entrepreneurial energy and keep both costs and rancor down.
他还认为，独立思考对长期成功至关重要，而与外界的互动可能会分散注意力、耗费时间。
He also believed that independent thinking is essential to long term success and interactions with the outside world can be distracting and time consuming.
他认为，有时候最好的投资机会就是自家公司的股票。
He believed that sometimes the best investment opportunity is your own stock.
他还认为，在收购方面，耐心是一种美德，偶尔的果断也同样重要。
He also believed that with acquisitions, patience is a virtue, as is occasional boldness.
辛格尔顿非常节俭，节俭得都出了名。
Singleton was frugal, often legendary so.
他善于分析，为人低调。
He was analytical and understated.
辛格尔顿和其他高调的CEO很不一样，比如史蒂夫·乔布斯、山姆·沃尔顿、赫布·凯莱赫或马克·扎克伯格。
Singleton was very different from other high profile CEOs such as Steve Jobs or Sam Walton or Herb Kelleher or Mark Zuckerberg.
这些天才都拥有极其强大的想法，然后以近乎疯狂的专注和决心去执行。
These geniuses were struck by enormously powerful ideas that they proceeded to execute with maniacal focus and determination.
辛格尔顿则务实，专注于现金流。
Singleton had a pragmatic focus on cash.
在1979年一次罕见的采访中，辛格尔顿说，在我们收购了一些其他企业之后，我们反思了自己的业务。
In a rare interview in 1979, Singleton said, after we acquired a number of other businesses, we reflected on our business.
我们得出的结论是，关键在于现金流。
Our conclusion was that the key was cash flow.
我们对现金生成和资产管理的态度，源于我们自己的思考。
Our attitude towards cash generation and asset management came out of our own thinking.
这不是抄来的。
It is not copied.
辛格尔顿的引述到此结束。
That is the end of the Singleton quote.
这里有一段沃伦·巴菲特的引述。
Here's a quote from Warren Buffett.
巴菲特说，亨利·辛格尔顿在美国商业界拥有最佳的运营和资本配置记录。
And Buffett said, Henry Singleton has the best operating and capital deployment record in American business.
如果把100名顶尖商学院毕业生的成就综合起来，他们的记录也比不上辛格尔顿。
If one took the 100 top business school graduates and made a composite of their triumphs, their record would not be as good as Singleton's.
在将近三十年的时间里，宏观经济环境剧烈变化，辛格尔顿却以非凡的速度实现了价值增长。
Singleton managed to grow values at an extraordinary rate across almost thirty years of wildly varying macroeconomic conditions.
他通过不断适应变化的市场环境，并始终专注于资本配置，做到了这一点。
He did this by continually adapting to changing market conditions and by maintaining a dogged focus on capital allocation.
接着，书中简要介绍了他早年的生活。
And then the book gives this quick bio of his early life.
他1916年出生在得克萨斯州的一个小镇上。
He was born in 1916 in a tiny town in Texas.
辛格尔顿是一位非常出色的数学家和科学家，但他从未读过MBA。
Singleton was a highly accomplished mathematician and scientist who never earned an MBA.
相反，他去了麻省理工学院，在那里获得了电气工程的学士、硕士和博士学位。
Instead, he attended MIT where he earned a bachelor's, master's, and Ph degrees in electrical engineering.
辛格尔顿在麻省理工学院编程了第一台学生计算机，这是他博士论文的一部分。
Singleton programmed the first student computer at MIT as part of his doctoral thesis.
1939年，他赢得了普特南奖章，成为全国最优秀的数学学生。
And in 1939, he won the Putnam medal as the top mathematics student in the country.
他还是一个狂热的国际象棋爱好者，能蒙眼下棋。
He was also an avid chess player who could play blindfolded.
这两本书里有很多关于他下棋的精彩轶事。
There's a great a lot of bunch of great anecdotes about his chess playing in both of these books.
1950年从麻省理工学院毕业后，他在北美航空公司和后来的休斯飞机公司担任研究工程师。
After graduation from MIT in 1950, he worked as a research engineer at North American Aviation and then Hughes Aircraft.
后来，他被传奇的“神童”泰克斯·索恩代克招募，加入了利顿工业。
He was then recruited by the legendary former whiz kid, Tex Thorndike, to come to Lytton Industries.
1960年，辛格尔顿离开了利顿，因为他意识到自己不会接替索恩代克成为CEO。
Singleton left Lytton in 1960 after it became clear to him that he would not succeed Thorndike as CEO.
那时他43岁。
He was 43 years old.
这一点非常重要。
This is really important.
现在我要说的是，这是有史以来最成功的公司之一。
So now let's tell that I'm one of most successful companies ever created.
亨利·辛格尔顿在43岁时创立了这家公司，而在此之前他从未创立过任何公司。
Henry Henry Singleton founded it when he was 43 and had never founded a company before.
这太厉害了。
This is awesome.
所以他就这么做了。
So he does this.
他和同事乔治·科兹梅茨基一起创办了一家公司。
He founds a company with his colleague, George Kozmetzky.
1960年7月，他们创立了Teledyne。
And in July 1960, they founded Teledyne.
他们先收购了三家小型电子公司，并以此为基础，成功竞标了一份大型海军合同。
They started by acquiring three small electronic companies and using this base, they successfully bid for a large naval contract.
随后，Teledyne在1961年上市，正值企业集团时代兴起之初。
Teledyne then became a public company in 1961 at the dawn of the conglomerate era.
在20世纪60年代的大部分时间里，企业集团享有很高的市盈率，并利用其高价股票作为货币，进行了一连串疯狂的收购。
For most of the 1960s, conglomerates enjoyed lofty PE ratios and used that currency of their high priced stock to engage in a prolonged frenzy of acquisitions.
在那个繁荣时期，收购的竞争远没有今天激烈。
During this heady period, there was significantly less competition for acquisitions than today.
当时私募股权公司还不存在。
Private equity firms do not yet exist.
而且，以市盈率衡量，收购一家运营公司的控制权价格往往远低于收购方在股市上的交易倍数，这为收购提供了强有力的理由。
And the price to buy control of an operating company measured by its PE ratio was often materially less than the multiple the acquirer traded for in the stock market, providing compelling logic for acquisitions.
辛格尔顿充分利用了这个长期的套利机会，打造了一个多元化的业务组合。
Singleton took full advantage of this extended arbitrage opportunity to develop a diversified portfolio of businesses.
在1961年到1969年间，他收购了130家公司，涉及从航空电子到特种金属和保险等多个行业。
And between 1961 and 1969, he purchased a 130 companies in industries ranging from aviation electronics to specialty metals and insurance.
这些公司中，除了两家之外，其余都是用泰利达因高价的股票收购的。
All but two of these companies were acquired using Teledyne's pricey stock.
然而，辛格尔顿的收购方式与其他CEO不同。
Singleton's approach to acquisitions, however, differ from that of other CEOs.
他并不是盲目收购，而是避开扭亏为盈的情况，专注于那些盈利增长、市场领先的公司，通常是在非常小众的市场中。
He did not buy indiscriminately, avoided turnaround situations and focused instead on profitable growing companies with leading market positions, often in very niche markets.
正如负责泰利达因特种金属部门的杰克·汉密尔顿向我总结的那样，我们专注于高利润率的产品，这些产品是按盎司卖的，而不是按吨卖的。
As Jack Hamilton, who ran Teledyne's Specialty Metals division, summarized his business to me, we specialized in high margin products that were sold by the ounce, not the ton.
1967年，在他迄今为止最大的一次收购中，辛格尔顿收购了瓦斯科金属公司，并将其总裁乔治·罗伯茨提升为泰利达因的总裁，自己则保留了CEO和董事长的头衔。
In 1967, in his largest acquisition to date, Singleton acquired Vasco Metals and elevated its president, George Roberts, to the role of president of Teledyne, taking the titles of CEO and chairman for himself.
罗伯茨加入公司后，辛格尔顿开始从运营中抽身，把大部分时间用于战略和资本配置。
Once Roberts joined the company, Singleton began to remove himself from operations, freeing up the majority of his time to focus on strategy and capital allocation.
不久之后，Singleton停止了收购其他公司。
Shortly after, Singleton became the first to stop acquiring other companies.
1969年年中，随着他公司股票估值倍数下降、收购成本上升，他突然解散了并购团队。
In mid nineteen sixty nine, with the multiples on his stock falling and acquisition prices rising, he abruptly dismissed his acquisition team.
Singleton意识到，市盈率降低后，其股票作为收购货币的吸引力已大不如前。
Singleton realized that with a lower PE ratio, the currency of his stock was no longer attractive for acquisitions.
从那时起，公司再未进行过重大收购，也再未发行过任何新股。
From this point on, the company never made another material purchase and never issued another share of stock.
所以这一点会反复出现。
So this is gonna something that's gonna come up over and over again.
他愿意根据实际发生的情况调整策略，而且他说过，他希望每天上班时都能像掌舵一样，把稳方向。
The fact that he was willing to switch strategies depending on what was actually happening on the ground and that he never he wanted to he said repeated that he wanted to come to work every day and just steer the boat each day.
这是他用的一个比喻。
That's the metaphor that he used.
他在描述自己的工作时也提到这一点，他认为自己每天要做的，就是为公司争取最大利益。
He reserved he said that when he described what his job was, what he how he viewed his job, which is just to act in the company's best interest every single day.
辛格尔顿摒弃了当时流行的整合与协同概念，转而强调极度分权，把公司拆分成最小的组成部分，并尽可能将责任和管理职责下放到组织的最基层。
Singleton eschewed the then trendy concepts of integration and synergy and instead emphasized extreme decentralization, breaking the company into its smallest component parts and driving accountability and managerial responsibility as far down into the organization as possible.
总部只有不到50人，而公司总员工超过4万人，并且没有人力资源或投资者关系部门。
At headquarters, there were fewer than 50 people in a company with over 40,000 total employees and no human resource or investor relations departments.
讽刺的是，那个时代最成功的综合企业集团，其运营方式却最不像综合企业。
Ironically, the most successful conglomerate of that era was actually the least conglomerate like in its operations.
收购引擎放缓后，辛格尔顿将注意力转向了公司现有的业务。
Once the acquisition engine had slowed, Singleton then turned his attention to the company's existing operations.
又一次背离传统智慧，辛格尔顿不再关注报告的盈利——这在当时是华尔街的关键指标——而是转而优化自由现金流。
In another departure from conventional wisdom, Singleton issued reported earnings, which at the time was a key metric on Wall Street, running his company instead to optimize free cash flow.
他们设计了一个独特的指标，称为“Teledyne回报”，通过平均每个业务单元的现金流和净利润，强调现金生成能力，并成为所有业务单元总经理奖金的基础。
They devised a unique metric that they called the Teledyne return, which by averaging cash flow and net income for each business unit emphasized cash generation and became the basis for bonus compensation for all business unit general managers.
辛格尔顿说，如果有人想追随Teledyne，他们应该习惯我们季度盈利会波动的事实。
Singleton said, if anyone wants to follow Teledyne, they should get used to the fact that our quarterly earnings will jiggle.
我们的会计设置是为了最大化现金流，而不是报告的盈利。
Our accounting is set to maximize cash flow, not reported earnings.
这些举措的最终结果是，从1970年开始，公司在各种市场条件下都保持了非常稳定的盈利能力。
The net result of these initiatives was that starting in 1970, the company generated remarkably consistent profitability across a wide variety of market conditions.
我记得有一次，我在读一篇很难找到的文章。
I think at one point, I was reading this this article that was really hard to find.
你得在缩微胶片上才能找到它。
You had a chance to find it on microfilm.
我记得那好像是1979年发表的。
I think it came out like, 1979.
文章叫《斯芬克斯说话了》。
It's called The Sphinx Speaks.
我记得在那之前一年，他大概有130个不同的业务部门，其中大约129个都是盈利的。
And I think at that point, the previous year, he had, I think, a 130 different business units, and I think a 129 of them were profitable.
这些现金源源不断地汇到总部，由辛格尔顿来分配。
This influx of cash was sent to headquarters to be allocated by Singleton.
他在使用这些资金时所做的决定，毫不意外地，既非常独特又非常有效。
The decisions he made in employing this capital were, not surprisingly, highly unusual and effective.
辛格尔顿说，我一直在考虑这件事，我们的股票实在太便宜了。
Singleton said, I've been thinking about it, and our stock is simply too cheap.
我觉得在这个价位买回我们的股票，比做其他任何事都能获得更好的回报。
I think we can earn a better return buying our shares at these levels than by doing almost anything else.
我打算宣布一项收购要约。
I'm going to announce a tender.
从1972年的那次要约开始，接下来的十二年里，辛格尔顿进行了一场前所未有的股票回购行动。
Starting with that 1972 tender and continuing for the next twelve years, Singleton went on an unprecedented share repurchasing spree.
说真的，这句话太精彩了。
It is accurate this is a great line.
把他称为回购界的贝比·鲁斯，一点也不为过。
It is accurate to describe him as the Babe Ruth of repurchases.
在七十年代初之前，股票回购并不常见，而且备受争议。
Prior to the early nineteen seventies, stock buybacks were uncommon and controversial.
传统观点认为，回购意味着公司内部缺乏投资机会，因此华尔街将其视为软弱的信号。
The conventional wisdom was that repurchases signaled a lack of internal investment opportunity and thus were regarded by Wall Street as a sign of weakness.
这太搞笑了。
That's hilarious.
所以，这明明是他当时能做的最好的事情，他们却说他这么做是软弱的表现。
So the literally the best thing he could have possibly done at the time, and they're saying he's weak for doing it.
辛格尔顿在1972年到1984年间无视了这种传统观念。
Singleton ignored this orthodoxy between 1972 and 1984.
在八次独立的要约收购中，他回购了泰里达因公司高达90%的流通股。
In eight separate tender offers, he bought back an astonishing 90% of Teledyne's outstanding shares.
正如芒格所说，这是芒格的一句名言，从来没有人像他那样激进地回购自己的股票。
As Munger says, this is a great line from Munger, no one had ever bought his shares as aggressively.
辛格尔顿认为，以有吸引力的价格回购股票具有自我催化作用，就像压缩弹簧一样，未来某个时刻会强力反弹，实现全部价值，并在此过程中产生非凡的回报。
Singleton believed buying stock at attractive prices was self catalyzing, analogous to coiling a spring that at some future point would surge forward to realize full value, generating exceptional returns in the process.
辛格尔顿非常擅长回购自己的股票，在历次要约收购中，为泰里达因的股东带来了惊人的42%的年复合回报率。
Singleton bought his own stock extremely well and generated an incredible 42% compound annual return for Teledyne's shareholders across the tenders.
在我们继续深入这个话题之前，我想向你介绍一下本期播客的赞助商，Ramp。
Before we get back into this, I wanna tell you about the presenting sponsor of this podcast, Ramp.
我最近读了很多关于SpaceX的东西。
I have been reading a lot about SpaceX lately.
SpaceX是世界上最有价值的企业之一，而SpaceX历史中的一个核心主题就是不断挑战和质疑你的成本。
SpaceX is one of the most valuable businesses in the world, and one of the main themes in the history of SpaceX is constantly attacking and questioning your cost.
Ramp帮助世界上许多最具创新性的企业做到这一点，他们通过第一性原理思维来实现。
Ramp helps many of the most innovative businesses in the world do exactly that, and they do this by using first principles thinking.
使用Ramp的公司中位数能削减5%的开支。
The median company running on ramp cuts their expenses by 5%.
SpaceX已经证明，对控制成本的执着追求有助于增加收入，因为你可以追求原本无法实现的机会，我们在Ramp的数据中也看到了这一点。
And one thing that SpaceX has demonstrated is that a religious dedication to controlling your costs helps increase revenue because you can pursue opportunities you couldn't otherwise, and we see that in the ramp data too.
使用Ramp的公司中位数收入也能增长16%。
The median company running on Ramp also grows their revenue by 16%.
所以，当你的企业使用Ramp而竞争对手没有时，你就拥有了一个随时间不断累积的巨大竞争优势。
So when you're running your business on Ramp and your competitors are not, you have a massive competitive advantage that compounds over time.
Ramp是唯一一个旨在让你的财务团队更高效、更快乐的平台。
Ramp is the only platform designed to make your finance team faster and happier.
我认识的很多顶尖创始人和CEO都用Ramp来运营他们的公司。
Many of the top founders and CEOs that I know run their business on Ramp.
我自己也用Ramp，你也应该试试。
I run my business on Ramp, you should too.
今天就去ramp.com看看，了解它如何帮你节省时间、省钱，还能增加收入。
Go to ramp.com today to learn how to can help your business save time, save money, and grow revenue.
网址就是ramp.com。
That is ramp.com.
辛格尔顿从十几岁起就对股市着迷。
Singleton had been fascinated by the stock market since he was a teenager.
到了七十年代中期，辛格尔顿终于有机会实现他毕生的兴趣，当时他直接负责Teledyne保险子公司的股票投资组合，而那正是股市低迷的时期。
And in the mid nineteen seventies, Singleton finally had an opportunity to act on his lifelong fascination when he assumed direct responsibility for investing the stock portfolios at Teledyne's insurance subsidiaries during a severe bear market.
到现在，我想你也不会感到意外，就连他投资股票的方式也与众不同，有自己的一套。
And by now, I don't think you'll be surprised that even the way he invests stocks is going to be unusual and done in his own manner.
辛格尔顿采用了一种独特的投资方法，结果非常出色。
Singleton developed an idiosyncratic approach with excellent results.
他把超过70%的股票投资组合集中在仅仅五家公司上，其中令人难以置信的25%投在了一家公司，那就是他以前的雇主——利顿工业。
He invested over 70% of combined equity portfolios in just five companies, with an incredible 25 of his portfolio allocated to a single company, which was his former employer, Lytton Industries.
这种极端的投资集中度在华尔街引起了轩然大波，许多观察者认为辛格尔顿是在为新一轮的收购做准备。
This extraordinary portfolio concentration calls consternation on Wall Street, where many observers thought Singleton was preparing for a new round of acquisitions.
他重仓的公司都是他非常了解的，而且在他投资的时候，这些公司的市盈率都处于或接近历史最低点。
His top holdings were companies that he knew well whose PE ratios were at or near record lows at the time of his investment.
正如查理·芒格评价辛格尔顿的投资方法时所说，他和沃伦以及我一样，乐于集中投资，只买那些自己真正懂的东西。
As Charlie Munger said of Singleton's investment approach, like Warren and me, he was comfortable with concentration and bought only a few things that he understood well.
对于任何首席执行官来说，最重要的决策之一就是如何分配自己的时间。
One of the most important decisions any CO makes is how he spends his time.
而亨利·辛格尔顿管理时间的方式，毫不意外地，与他的同行们截然不同。
And Henry Singleton's approach to time management was, not surprisingly, very different from his peers.
他是这么说的。
This is what he said.
我不给自己安排任何日常事务，这样我就不会陷入某种固定的模式。
I don't reserve any day to day responsibilities for myself, so I don't get into any particular rut.
我不会把自己的工作定义得很死板，而是拥有自由，随时去做对公司最有利的事情。
I do not define my job in any rigid terms, but in terms of having the freedom to do whatever seems to be in the best interest of the company at any time.
辛格尔顿不相信详细的战略计划，他更愿意保持灵活性，保留选择余地。
Singleton did not believe in detailed strategic plans, preferring instead to retain flexibility and keep his options open.
正如他曾经解释的，我知道很多人都有非常明确和坚定的计划，他们针对各种事情都做了规划，但这些计划会受到大量外部因素的影响，而且其中绝大多数是无法预测的。
As he once explained, I know a lot of people have very strong and definitive plans that they worked out on all kinds of things, but were subject to a tremendous number of outside influences, and the vast majority of them cannot be predicted.
所以我的想法就是保持灵活。
So my idea is to stay flexible.
我唯一的计划就是继续来上班。
My only plan is to keep coming to work.
我喜欢每天掌舵，而不是提前规划太远的未来。
I like to steer the boat each day rather than plan ahead way into the future.
辛格尔顿强烈的独立思考精神一直是他晚年最突出的特质。
Singleton's fierce independence of mind remained a prominent trait until the end of his life.
1997年，也就是他因脑癌去世前两年，当时他82岁，他和一位长期投资Teledyne的投资者坐下来交谈。
In 1997, two years before his death from brain cancer at age 82, he sat down with a longtime Teledyne investor.
当时，很多财富500强的公司最近都宣布了大规模的股票回购。
At the time, a number of Fortune 500 companies had recently announced large share repurchases.
当被问及这些回购时，辛格尔顿回应说，如果大家都在做，那肯定有问题。
When asked about them, Singleton responded, if everyone's doing them, there must be something wrong with them.
好的。
Okay.
所以，这就是我今天要跟你们聊的两本书中的一本的节选。
So that is an excerpt from one of the two books I'm going talk to you about today.
那本书是威廉·桑代克写的《局外人》。
That book is The Outsiders written by William Thorndike.
另一本书叫《远方力量》，是特尔达因公司的回忆录，以及创造它的那个人，作者是乔治·罗伯茨。
And then the other book is called Distant Force, a memoir of the Teledyne Corporation and the man who created it, and that was written by George Roberts.
我想回到《局外人》中比较沃伦·巴菲特和亨利·辛格尔顿的那部分。
I wanna go back to this section in The Outsiders where it actually compares Warren Buffett and Henry Singleton.
很多年前我就发现了辛格尔顿，因为我当时读了所有能找到的关于沃伦·巴菲特和查理·芒格的书，他们不断提到这个他们都十分钦佩的人。
I found out about Singleton many, many years ago cause I was reading everything I could get my hands on about Warren Buffett and then Charlie Munger, and they kept bringing up this guy that they both greatly admired.
他们说他的回报率高得离谱。
They said his returns were utterly ridiculous.
查理·芒格说他是他见过的最聪明的人。
Charlie Munger said he was the smartest person he ever met.
而且因为我之前研究过芒格和巴菲特，我以为他们用的很多想法都是他们自己的。
And I since I studied Munger and Buffett before, I thought a lot of the ideas that they were using, like, were their ideas.
我没意识到其实很多都是辛格尔顿先做的。
And I didn't realize many of them were actually done by Singleton first.
所以《局外人》里有一段很棒的内容，比较了——其实不算是比较，就是展示了沃伦·巴菲特和辛格尔顿之间的相似之处，那些惊人的相似之处。
And so The Outsiders says this is a great section comparing and really, not even comparing, just showing the similarities, the remarkable similarities between Warren Buffett and Singleton.
书中说，沃伦·巴菲特管理伯克希尔·哈撒韦的独特方法中，很多标志性的原则其实都是辛格尔顿在特利丹公司率先采用的。
So it says many of the distinctive tenets of Warren Buffett's unique approach to managing Berkshire Hathaway were first employed by Singleton at Teledyne.
实际上，辛格尔顿可以被看作是巴菲特的先驱，两人之间有着不可思议的相似之处。
In fact, Singleton be can can be seen as a proto Buffett, and there are uncanny similarities between the two.
所以我觉得威廉·桑代克在这里给了我们一个很好的概述。
And so I think William Thorndike gives us a great overview here.
书中说，巴菲特和辛格尔顿都设计了让他们专注于资本配置而非运营的组织结构。
It says both Buffett and Singleton designed organizations that allowed them to focus on capital allocation and not operations.
两人都把自己主要视为投资者，而不是管理者。
Both viewed themselves primarily as investors, not managers.
两人都运营着高度分权的组织，总部员工很少，运营公司与高层管理之间几乎没有层级。
Both ran highly decentralized organizations with very few employees at corporate and few, if any, layers between operating companies and top management.
两人都为自己的公司做出了所有重大资本配置决策。
Both made all major capital allocation decisions for their companies.
巴菲特和辛格尔顿都将投资集中在他们熟悉的行业，并且对集中持有公开证券的组合感到舒适。
Both Buffett and Singleton focused their investments in industries they knew well and were comfortable with concentrated portfolios of public securities.
两人都不向分析师提供季度业绩指引。
Neither offered quarterly guidance to analysts.
两人都提供信息丰富的年度报告，包含详细的业务部门信息。
Both provided informative annual reports with detailed business unit information.
辛格尔顿和巴菲特都认识到利用保险公司浮存金来创造股东价值的潜力。
Both Singleton and Buffett recognized the potential to invest insurance company float to create shareholder value.
而且对这两家公司来说，保险都是最大、最重要的业务。
And for both companies, insurance was the largest and most important business.
巴菲特和辛格尔顿有意经营着非常不寻常的企业，随着时间推移，吸引了志同道合、注重长期发展的股东。
Buffett and Singleton intentionally ran highly unusual businesses that over time attracted like minded, long term oriented shareholders.
然后，在我讲《远方力量》这本书之前，我想从《斯芬克斯开口》那次采访中摘几句话出来。
And then before I move on to the book Distant Force, I just wanna pull out a few sentences from that interview The Sphinx Speaks.
里面说，亨利·辛格尔顿有个习惯，就是先看看大部队往哪儿走，然后自己朝另一个方向跑。
It says Henry Singleton has a tendency to watch the thundering herd then trot off in his own direction.
他是个典型的个人主义者，二十世纪末的风格。
He is a rugged individualist, late twentieth century style.
他的管理哲学非常独特。
He has a highly individualistic management philosophy.
好。
Okay.
所以接下来我做的，因为你知道，这期节目的标题才是我真正感兴趣的，就是，好，亨利·辛格尔顿到底是怎么工作的？
So then what I did, because it really, you know, the title of this episode is really what I was interested in, is like, okay, how did Henry Singleton work?
我把两本书都翻了一遍，然后把所有重点都摘出来，把其他跟他的工作方式和公司建设无关的内容都去掉了。
And I went through both books and then pull out all the highlights, kind of removing anything else that's not about how he approached his work and how he built his company.
希望这里面有些想法，你和我都能用得上。
And hopefully, you know, there's some ideas in in here that you and I can use.
所以，在《远方力量》这本书快结尾的地方，有一段重点内容，我想把它提到最前面来讲，因为我觉得它是对Teledyne的一个很好的描述。
So there's a highlight that actually comes towards the end of the book Distant Force that I want to bring to the very beginning because I think it's a great description of Teledyne.
辛格尔顿创建Teledyne，是为了抓住即将到来的数字技术革命，这场革命将用数字技术取代模拟设备和系统，以及我们所能触及和想象的一切。
Singleton formed Teledyne to capitalize on the coming revolution in which digital technology would replace analog devices and systems and everything that we could touch and imagine.
辛格尔顿想把半导体和数字技术应用到商业的各个领域。
Singleton wanted to apply semiconductors and digital technology to many fields of commerce.
关于他，我特别喜欢的一点是，他像巴菲特、像芒格、也像你我一样，是商业历史的学生。
And so one thing that I loved about him is the fact that he is a student of business history just like Buffett, just like Munger, just like you and I.
亨利远不止是一位销售员、数学家、工程师、发明家和国际象棋冠军。
Henry was much more than a salesman, mathematician, engineer, inventor, and chess champion.
他是一位学生，一位制造业历史的观察者，他观察从亨利·福特时代以来企业的进步和成长，通用汽车的崛起，以及成功企业通过收购实现扩张的方式。
He was a student, an observer of the history of manufacturing, of the progress and growth of corporations from the days of Henry Ford, the growth of General Motors, and the manner of successful corporations in growing by acquisitions.
所以这是对辛格尔顿的一个很好的描述，来自一个和他共事很久的人。
So this is a great description of Singleton from somebody who worked with him for a very long time.
辛格尔顿在他所从事的企业创建和发展中展现了非凡的才华。
Singleton brought exceptional brilliance to the creation and development of the enterprises he undertook.
很少有商业领袖能同时具备数学天才和工程才能，再加上金融分析师的洞察力和国际象棋选手的管理创造力。
Few business leaders have possessed the combination of mathematical genius and engineering talent with the insights of a financial analyst and the management creativity of a tournament chess player.
辛格尔顿用来建立公司的最重要的理念之一，他称之为他成功的关键。
And one of the most important ideas that Singleton used to build his company is that and he called this his key to his success.
他只是想把最有才华的人留在身边。
He just wanted to keep the the most talented people around him.
辛格尔顿也相信并常说，他成功的关键是人，有才华的人，他们有创造力，是好的管理者，也是实干家。
Singleton also believed and often said that the key to his success were people, talented people who were creative, good managers, and doers.
从一开始，他就让自己身边围绕着这样的人。
From the start, he surrounded himself with that kind of person.
他们不仅描述了他的联合创始人，还有他的一个朋友，也是Teledyne董事会的成员，我想大概有二十六年，就是克劳德·香农，我几周前刚做过关于他的另一期节目。
And so they described not only his cofounder, but then one of his friends and who was on the board of Teledyne, I think, for, like, twenty six years, Claude Shannon, who I just did another episode on a few weeks ago.
克劳德·香农是他在麻省理工的朋友和同学。
Claude Shannon was a friend and fellow student at MIT.
他带来了自己的专业技术，并因创立信息技术科学而闻名于世，现代数字计算机技术正是基于这一科学。
He brought his own technical expertise, and he became world renowned as a creator of the science of information technology in which modern digital computer technology is based.
现在，我们也在讨论他有很多好主意，但你读了两本书后，会觉得，这家伙简直像外星人。
Now, we're also dealing he's got a lot of great ideas, but you you read both books, you're like, okay, this guy's like an alien.
你想想看。
You think about it.
查理·芒格说过，这是我这辈子见过的最聪明的人。
Charlie Munger said that this is the smartest person I've ever met.
想想查理·芒格一生中见过的那些世界级人物。
Think about all the the world class people Charlie Munger met in his life.
所以，亨利在820人的班级中数学排名第一。
So Henry, who's actually ranked first in his class of 820 people in mathematics.
他赢得了普特南奖，这是世界上最负盛名、也出了名难搞的数学竞赛之一。
He won the Putnam Award, which is one of the most prestigious and notoriously difficult mathematics competitions in the world.
所以每本书里都散布着这样的小句子，让你感觉到我们面对的是非常非常不寻常的东西。
So there's all these, like, little sentences spread through each book that just give you an indication that we're dealing with something very, very unusual.
我觉得有一件事特别有意思，我喜欢这些小故事，讲的是其他航天领域的企业家，在早年间如何相遇、如何擦肩而过。在辛格尔顿创办特利丹之前，他其实为霍华德·休斯工作过，他讲过那段经历。
One thing that I thought was very interesting, and I love these little anecdotes where some of other history space entrepreneurs, like, interact with and wind up crossing paths earlier in their lives, before Singleton started Teledyne, he actually works for Howard Hughes, and he talked about what that was like.
他说，有一天我有幸给霍华德·休斯演示了一个飞行员训练用的火控模拟器。
He says, I had the pleasure of demonstrating a pilot training fire control simulator to Howard Hughes one day.
亨利后来告诉我，他和霍华德·休斯在晚上加班时见面的故事。
Henry later told me stories of meetings he had with Howard Hughes in evenings when they worked late.
霍华德总是晚上来看我们，而且从不提前打招呼。
Howard only come by to see us at night and always unannounced.
他会问我们在做什么，我们解释的时候，他总能完全理解。
He would ask what we were doing, and he always understood everything when we explained to him.
他是个非常好的人。
He was a very fine man.
抱歉。
Sorry.
我之前提到过，他在创办Teledyne之前几十年就对金融市场很感兴趣。
Mentioned this earlier, but he was interested in financial markets decades before starting Teledyne.
亨利告诉我，在四十年代初和五十年代初，他会在经纪公司的办公室里待上好几天，盯着股票行情机，思考怎么让资本高效流动，以及股票是如何估值和交易的。
Henry told me that how in the early nineteen forties and in early nineteen fifties, he spent days in the offices of brokerage houses watching the stock ticker, thinking about how to get capital rolling efficiently and how shares are valued and traded.
他思考过，那些稳定增长的公司是如何获得越来越高的市盈率的。
He thought about how companies with a steady growth rate were rewarded with an ever increasing PE multiple.
亨利确信，数字技术将成为控制系统以及几乎所有其他电子领域未来发展的主导力量，而半导体技术对这些领域的未来发展至关重要。
Henry had become convinced that digital technology would be the dominant force in future developments in control systems and virtually every other electronic field and that semiconductor technology would be critical to future development in those fields.
他觉得利顿公司进入半导体领域很重要，这样才能控制这些控制系统中使用的元件的设计。
He felt it was important that Litton should enter the semiconductor field in order to control the design of the components used in these control systems.
所以这就是他当时工作的地方。
So this is where he's working at the time.
这是他创办自己公司之前的最后一份工作。
This is his last job before he starts his own company.
于是他把这个想法带给了利顿公司的总裁，但总裁不同意。
And so he takes that idea to the president of Lytton, and the president of Lytton disagreed.
他告诉亨利，半导体元件行业竞争太激烈了，已经人满为患。
And he told Henry that the semiconductor component business was too crowded and competitive.
但亨利对自己的判断很有信心。
But Henry had faith in his convictions.
就在那时，亨利43岁，他和乔治决定投入自己的积蓄，创办一家新的电子公司。
So it's at that point when Henry was 43 that him and George decided to invest their personal resources in starting a new electronics company.
他们最初投入了45万美元的资本。
They started with an original capital of $450,000.
在继续讲这个之前，我想跟你聊聊Applovin。
And before we get back into this, I wanna tell you about Applovin.
我一直很喜欢《从零到一》这本书里的一句话。
One of my all time favorite quotes is from the book Zero to One.
那本书里，彼得·蒂尔写道。
In that book, Peter Thiel writes.
他说，我注意到的最强大的一个规律是，成功的人总能在意想不到的地方发现价值，而他们这样做，靠的是从基本原理出发思考商业，而不是套用公式。
He says, the single most powerful pattern I have noticed is that successful people find value in unexpected places, and they do this by thinking about business from first principles instead of formulas.
这正是Applovin在广告平台上做到的。
And that is exactly what Applovin has done with their advertising platform.
Applovin能让你接触到移动游戏中超过十亿的潜在新客户。
Applovin connects you with over a billion potential new customers in mobile games.
Applovin能帮你吸引用户的全部注意力。
Applovin allows you to capture undivided attention.
Applovin的广告是全屏视频，平均观看时长达到三十五秒。
Applovin ads are full screen videos that are watched for an average of thirty five seconds.
这种用户留存效果远超其他广告平台，而且你几分钟内就能在Applovin上开始投放。
That is retention that blows other ad platforms out of the water, and you can launch on Applovin in minutes.
你设定目标，Applovin帮你实现。
You set the goal, and Applovin achieves it.
无需复杂设置，无需专业知识，Applovin能快速扩展。
No complex setup, no expertise needed and Applovin scales quickly.
他们能把你的广告展示给超过十亿的潜在客户。
They can put your ads in front of over a billion potential customers.
其他企业已经看到了立竿见影的效果，日投放额迅速增长到数十万美元，收入也增加了数百万。
Other businesses have seen immediate results scale to hundreds of thousands of dollars of spend per day and increase their revenue by millions.
所以，趁你的竞争对手还没都上Applovin，赶紧开始吧。
So you want to get started quickly before all of your competitors are on Applovin.
你可以访问applovin.com来开始。
And you can do that by going to applovin.com.
就是applovin.com。
That's applovin.com.
接下来我想跟你聊聊Vanta。
And then I want to tell you about Vanta.
Vanta。
Vanta.
Vanta。
Vanta.
Vanta能帮你的公司证明你是安全的，这样更多客户就会使用你的产品或服务。
Vanta helps your company prove you're secure so more customers will use your product or service.
Vanta 是一个人工智能驱动的安全专家，能随着你的业务扩展而扩展。
Vanta is an AI powered security expert that scales with you.
你的业务增长越快，安全需求就越复杂，而这种复杂性会变成混乱。
The more your business grows, the more complex your security needs get, and that complexity turns into chaos.
Vanta 帮你搞定这种混乱。
Vanta tames that chaos for you.
Vanta 自动化合规流程，持续监控你的控制措施，并为你提供合规和风险的单一信息源。
Vanta automates compliance, continuously monitors your controls, and gives you a single source of truth for compliance and risk.
所以无论你是快速成长的初创公司还是大型企业，Vanta 都能轻松融入你现有的工作流程。
So whether you're a fast growing startup or an enterprise company, Vanta fits easily into your existing workflows.
很多公司不认证就不签合同，这让你错失销售机会。
Many companies won't sign contracts unless you're certified, and this is causing you to lose out on sales.
这就是为什么 Vanta 客户平均报告在成为 Vanta 客户后获得了 526% 的投资回报率。
That is why the average Vanta customer reports a 526% return on investment after becoming a Vanta customer.
用 Vanta 自动化你的合规、安全和信任。
Automate your compliance, security, and trust with Vanta.
Vanta会帮你赢得信任、达成交易，并且更快、更省力地保持安全。
Vanta will help you win trust, close deals, and stay secure faster and with less effort.
访问vanta.com/founders，你将获得一千美元的优惠。
Go to vanta.com/founders, and you'll get a thousand dollars off.
网址是vanta.com/founders。
That is vanta.com/founders.
所以辛格尔顿谈到了他当时的那份信念。
And so Singleton talks about this conviction that he had.
我们在1960年进入了半导体行业，尽管当时我们正处于商业危机之中。
We went into the semiconductor business in 1960 even though we were in the midst of a business crisis at the time.
我们这么做，是因为我们坚信这对我们未来的长期增长是必要的，而不是因为我们确信能立刻赚大钱。
We did it because of our conviction that it was necessary for our long term future growth and not because of any conviction that we would immediately make huge amounts of money.
接着他在下一段继续写道，在我看来，你真的能在这里看到他的思维方式。
And then he continues in this next paragraph, and I in my opinion, you really see how his brain works here.
我们决定，如果我们要制造、开发和销售电子控制系统，我们就应该在元器件领域具备能力，这样能增强我们设计系统的能力，因为我们对能用的新元器件了解得更多。
We decided that if we were going to manufacture, develop, and sell electronic control systems, we ought to have a capability in the component area That would enhance our ability to design systems because we know more about new components we could use.
另一方面，我们在系统方面的专长能让我们更好地判断该开发什么样的组件。
On the other hand, our expertise in systems would enable us to better judge what kind of components to develop.
然后书中讲到，亨利有三个伟大的想法。
And then it breaks the book breaks down the fact that Henry had three great ideas.
这三个主要想法是他建立公司的基础。
These are the three main ideas that he built his company on.
我想在这里强调的是，亨利在创建和发展特利丹公司时，有三个伟大的想法。
What I would like to emphasize here is that Henry had three great ideas in creating and growing Teledyne.
第一个想法是，在数字半导体电子技术还处于萌芽阶段时，他就认识到它未来的重要性，并通过有选择性的收购，在这个不断发展的领域建立起强大的基础，以便在此基础上实现公司的多元化。
His first was to recognize the future importance of digital semiconductor electronics when this technology was in its infancy and by selective acquisitions create a strong base in this growing field on which to diversify his company.
第二个想法是，在他的公司内部收购并组织一批金融公司，以提供强大的财务基础。
The second idea was to acquire and organize a selection of financial companies within his company to provide a strong financial base.
第三个想法是他在股票回购方面的创新运用。
The third was his innovative use of stock buybacks.
在回顾和继续讲述亨利·辛格尔顿的成就时，这三件事同样值得铭记。
These three things are equally important to remember considering and continuing the story of Henry Singleton's accomplishments.
亨利从公司运营的第一年就开始实施他通过收购来实现增长的计划。
Henry initiated his plan of growth through acquisition from the very first year of operation.
我之前提到过，当你读这两本书的时候，你会看到一些随机的句子，然后你会意识到，好吧。
And then I mentioned earlier how when you're reading both books, they'll just get these lines and these random lines in the books that you realize, okay.
我们面对的是一个非常与众不同的人。
We're this we're dealing with a very different kind of person.
书中说亨利练就了一种能力，可以不用看棋盘就能下棋。
Says Henry had developed the talent of being able to play chess without seeing the board.
有一个故事讲的是，亨利背对着棋盘和泰克下棋，泰克告诉他每一步怎么走的。
One story relates that Henry was playing chess with Tech with his back turned to the board, and Tech was telling him what move he made.
突然在比赛中，亨利说，泰克，你三步之前告诉我的走法错了。
Suddenly during the match, Henry said, Tech, you told me the wrong move three moves back.
然后在一次谈话中，辛格尔顿描述了他创建特利丹公司的目标。
And then in this one conversation, Singleton describes what his goal for creating Teledyne is.
书中说，杰伊·拉斯特在第一次见到亨利时问他，你是想再创建一个利顿公司吗？
Says at his first meeting with Henry, Jay Last recalls asking him, are you trying to create another Litten?
亨利回答说：“当然不是。”
Hell no, Henry replied.
我要打造的是另一个通用电气，这也解释了为什么亨利收购的公司选择越来越多样化。
I'm trying to create another GE, which explains why Henry's choices of companies to acquire gradually became more and more diverse.
后来，他开始放眼那些与最初电子、政府和军工市场关联越来越小的公司，但这些公司能带来多元化，并提升公司的盈利能力。
Later, he would look afield to companies that were less and less related to his original electronics, government, and military markets, but would diversify and contribute to the profitability of his company.
多年后，亨利说：“Teledyne就像一棵活生生的植物，我们的各个公司就是不同的枝干，每根枝干又长出新的枝干，不断生长，这样没有哪一项业务会过于重要。”
Many years later, Henry said, Teledyne is like a living plant, with our companies as the different branches and each putting out new branches and growing so that no one business is too significant.
辛格尔顿的策略形成了这种飞轮效应，他们在这里也描述了这一点。
And Singleton's strategy created this kind of flywheel, and they describe it here.
有趣的是，Teledyne的技术确实像一棵分枝的树一样扩展，每项新技术都开辟了通往其他相关技术的道路，而这些技术又通向更多的技术。
It is quite interesting how Teledyne's technologies actually did expand like a branching tree, with each new technology opening the way into other related technologies and these into still others.
很多时候，当各个公司的经理看到相关领域的机会时，他们自己也会向我们推荐收购其他合适的公司。
In many cases, when managers of the individual companies saw opportunities in related fields, they themselves recommended acquisitions to us of other suitable companies.
所以他们举了一个例子，说明随着树的生长，你会像树枝一样分叉，进入这些相关的行业。
So they give an example of how this can kind of as the tree grows, you kind of branch yourself and grow into these other related industries.
这就是描述。
And this is the description.
我们的地球物理能力和地震产品让我们进入了海洋学和近海石油勘探领域，在那里我们用地震技术来描绘海底的地质层，找出可能适合钻油井的地方。
Our geophysical capabilities and seismic products led us into the field of oceanography and offshore petroleum exploration, where seismic techniques are used to profile the geological strata of the bottom of the sea to uncover likely places to which we can drill oil wells.
这进一步扩大了Teledyne在石油行业的业务。
This led to further expansion of Teledyne's activities in the petroleum industry.
这就是我之前提到的。
And this is what I mentioned earlier.
Teledyne把业务分成了130个利润中心，去年只有其中一个亏损。
Teledyne divides its business into a 130 profit centers, and only one of the 130 lost money last year.
如果你能弄到这本书，它已经绝版了，很难买到，但里面有很多信息。
And if you can get your hands on the book, it's out of print, it's really hard to buy, but there's a bunch of information.
这几乎就像他们参与的每家公司的迷你传记。
It's almost like like miniature biographies of each company that they're involved in.
他们没有涵盖全部130家，但比这里显然要详细得多。
They don't cover all 130 of them, but they go into a lot more detail than obviously go into here.
所以如果你感兴趣的话，试着找找这本书。
So in case you're interested, try try to find a copy of this book.
我非常推荐。
I highly recommend it.
然后亨利反复提到的另一件事就是人才管理，你知道，我觉得播客里已经提过好几次了，他说这是成功的关键。
So then another thing that Henry talks about over and over again, talks about talent management, started, you know, I think it's already mentioned a few times in the podcast where he said, you know, it was like the key to success.
他在这方面也有一些很有意思的想法。
He's got some very interesting ideas here too.
他对他收购的那些企业的老板和管理者的管理才能也非常感兴趣。
He was also very interested in the managerial talents of the owners and managers of the businesses that he acquired.
只要有可能，亨利都希望这些人留在Teledyne，继续管理他们自己的业务，因为他们最了解自己的领域、市场和生产技术。
Whenever possible, Henry wanted these people to stay on with Teledyne as managers of their own operations since they were the most knowledgeable about their fields, their markets, and their production technologies.
下面是他说的。
And this is what he says.
我们有所谓的管理人才库。
We have what is called a management inventory.
我们拼命努力，提升自己发掘和提拔合适人才的能力。
We work our heads off to increase our own capability at collecting and promoting the right people.
我们越成功，整个公司就越成功。
To the extent that we succeed, the whole company will succeed.
这句话他反复说了很多遍。
That's something he repeats over and over again.
我们对那些看起来有业绩的人加大投入。
We increase our bets on the men who seem to be performers.
所以还有一点就是，只要你完成了指标，你就可以自己经营你的业务。
So that's another thing where as long as you're hitting your numbers, you're running your business.
你就不用，你不需要去跟他汇报。
You like, you didn't you didn't have to talk to him.
他就不会来打扰你。
He would just leave you alone.
我觉得他这句话说了好几次。
He would I think he says that a couple times.
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就像，哦，他们在做自己的本职工作。
Like, oh, they're doing their job.
为什么不让他们自己待着呢？
Why don't you just let them be?
我们努力让所有员工，而不是内部竞争——这里还是辛格尔顿在说话。
We try to get all of our people instead of competing among this is still Singleton speaking here.
我们努力让所有员工，而不是在泰莱达内部互相竞争，去放眼外部，看到真正的竞争对手是美国其他所有大公司。
We try to get all our people instead of competing amongst each other with Teledyne to look outside and see that the real competitors are all the other large corporations in The US.
我们的目标是让我们的盈利增长速度比他们更快。
Our objective is to increase our rate of earnings faster than they do.
这非常有趣，因此我们把它看作一场竞争游戏。
It is a lot of fun, and as a result, we visualize it as a competitive game.
所以他们又回去了。
So they go back again.
所有这些亮点，这些都会出现在单独的页面上。
All these highlights, these these will appear on separate pages.
他们只是反复强调同样的观点，就是我们想留住那些已经证明了自己才华和专业技能的人。
They just repeat the same ideas over and over again that we want to keep demonstrated talent and expertise.
我们总是希望这些公司的老板或经理能留下来继续管理他们的业务，而大多数人也确实这么做了。
We always hope that the owners or managers of these companies would stay on and continue to manage their operations, and most did.
他们中的很多人是在二三十年前创办了自己的公司，并且把它们经营成了成功且稳健的企业，这才引起了我们的注意。
Many of them had started their companies twenty or thirty years earlier and had managed them into the successful and viable businesses that had attracted our attention in the first place.
有些人已经准备好退休了。
Some of them were ready to retire.
在这种情况下，我们会问是否有熟悉业务的亲戚可以接手管理。
In those cases, we asked if there was a relative who knew the business and who could take over and manage it.
有时候，其他高管或一些顶尖的技术人员会接受这个职位。
Sometimes another top executive or some of the best technical people accepted the job.
这些人比我们更了解他们各自的业务，我们想保留他们的专业知识。
These men knew more about their specific businesses than we did, and we wanted to keep their expertise.
我们根本没打算在公司层面去管理这些业务。
We had no intention of managing the businesses at the corporate level.
他们确实做到了。
Now, they did.
他们就是这样从那些企业获取信息的。
This is the way they got information from those businesses.
我们确实建立了自己独特的财务和运营报告系统，这让我们能够每月密切监控他们的表现，并在问题变得严重之前发现任何隐患。
We did establish our own unique financial and operations reporting system, which enabled us to monitor their performance closely on a monthly basis and see any trouble spots before they became serious.
亨利·辛格尔顿工作方式的另一个原则是，尤其是当他有坚定信念时，他会迅速行动。
Another principle of the way that Henry Singleton worked, especially when he has conviction, he moves fast.
所以在仅仅三年的时间里，从1966年到1969年，他们又收购了90家公司。
So just during a three year period, from 1966 through 1969, they acquired 90 more companies.
亨利反复强调的另一件事是，他不喜欢浪费时间。
Another thing that Henry repeated over and over again, did not like to waste time.
我觉得这两句话很棒，能让你了解与亨利·辛格尔顿会面是什么样的。
I think this great this, like, two sentences gives you an idea of this describing describing what a meeting with Henry Singleton was like.
我们的第一次会面很简短，但正是在那次会面中，我们双方都坦诚相待，这成为了我们长久关系的基础。
Our first meeting was brief, but it was the one in which each of us spoke with complete candor, and that became the basis of our lasting relationship.
我们所有的会议都很简短，但非常高效。
All of our meetings were short, but they were very effective.
所以他不喜欢浪费时间。
So he didn't like to waste time.
他也不喜欢浪费钱。
He also did not like to waste money.
早期有个有趣的小故事。
One humorous story of those early days.
亨利会打电话给我，邀请我一起吃午饭。
Henry would call me and invite me to have lunch with him.
我们总是去一家扑克厅，因为那里的午餐便宜。
We always went to a poker parlor because the lunches were inexpensive.
到了付账的时候，亨利总是让我来买单。
When it came time to pay for our lunches, Henry would always have me pick up the check.
他通过不请我去高档餐厅，一直在教我节俭的价值。
He was continually teaching me the value of frugality by not inviting me to an expensive restaurant.
他有一次还说了些疯狂的话，就是说他们需要公司配车。
He said some crazy shit too one time where it's just like, they need they need company cars.
他就说，好吧。
He's like, okay.
那咱们给每个人都配一辆福特平托吧。
Well, let's get everybody, a Ford Pinto.
我记得有些员工觉得，平托车太小了，而且名声不太好，因为如果被追尾，可能会爆炸。
And I think some of the guys on staff were like, the Pinto's a tiny car, wind up having a bad bad, like, reputation because it would I think if you run it ran into it behind it, like, blow up.
而且不光这样，车太小了，大多数成年男性都坐不进去。
But not only that, like, it's so small that most of the adult men couldn't fit in it.
所以如果你身高六英尺或六英尺二，根本挤不进去。
So if you were, like, six foot or six two, it's like, couldn't squeeze in there.
他就说，那有什么问题？
He's like, well, what's wrong with that?
所以那个故事也挺好笑的。
And so that that story was funny too.
所以，除了不喜欢浪费时间、不喜欢浪费钱之外，他还期望你对你的业务了如指掌。
And so in addition to not liking to waste time, not liking to waste money, he expected you to know your business from a to z.
在创业史上，我最喜欢的一句格言来自一个叫萨姆·萨穆赖的家伙。
One of my favorite maxims in history of entrepreneurship comes from this guy named Sam Samurai.
有一本关于他的精彩传记，叫《吃掉鲸鱼的鱼》。
There's this fantastic biography of him called The Fish That Ate The Whale.
他说过一句话：如果你对自己的业务了如指掌，就没有解决不了的问题。
This is a line for that he said that if you know your business from a to z, there's no problem you can't solve.
所以他跟这本书的作者说，嘿。
And so he's telling the author of the book, he goes, hey.
我想让你去见一个叫拉斯的人。
I want you to go meet this guy named Russ.
他是个很特别的人。
He's a unique fellow.
然后他说，好的。
And so he goes, okay.
那他有什么特别的？
Well, what's unique about him?
然后，然后，那个团队就回应了。
And and and single team responds.
他特别的地方在于，我问他关于我让他监督的某家公司的问题时，他总能给出准确的数字答案。
What's unique about him is that I'll ask him a question about one of these companies that I've asked him to supervise, and he always knows the exact numerical answer.
如果我问他上个月的销售额，他马上就能答上来，不用打电话问别人。这就是那种能管理好公司的人。
If I ask him what they did in sales last month, he knows right away without calling someone to find That's the kind of fellow that you pick who runs a company and does it well.
这就是我们需要的那种团队领导。
That is the kind of group leader we need.
然后这又回到了他们反复强调的另一个原则，就是他们相信要把公司拆分成尽可能小的单位。
Then it goes back to another one of their principles that they repeat over and over again, that you should be breaking they believed in breaking your companies down to the smallest units possible.
我们认为，较小的单位能让管理层更好地控制，让本地经理对自己的运营成功负全责，并激励他们表现好。
Our contention was that smaller units gave management better control and made the local manager fully responsible for the success of their own operations and motivated them to perform well.
我们保持运营单位小规模、各自负责自身成功的政策，在公司历史上一直贯彻始终。
Our policy of keeping our operating units small, each responsible for its own success, is something we followed throughout the history of the corporation.
辛格尔顿还有一个做法，就是及时止损，然后继续前进。
Another thing that Singleton would do, he would cut his losses and move on.
他说，我们用1650万美元的普通股收购了帕卡德·贝尔公司，并承担了他们5500万美元的债务。
He says, acquired Packard Bell for 16,500,000 in common stock, and we assumed $55,000,000 of their debt.
多年来，这家公司一直是我们公司盈利的一部分，但最终来自日本电视制造商的竞争变得过于激烈。
It was a profitable addition to our company for many years, but eventually competition from Japanese television manufacturers became too severe.
亨利从不犹豫止损，我们干脆退出了那个行业，关闭了电视业务。
Henry was never shy about cutting his losses, and we simply got out of that business and closed the television operation.
然后说到，你知道，头十年里，泰里达因公司的历史几乎是一年一个样。
Then it goes into the fact that, you know, for the first decade, there's all these like it's almost like the the history of Teledyne changed decade by decade.
所以在六十年代的头十年里，他们就是不停地收购。
So for the first decade in the nineteen sixties, they were just acquiring.
他们买了，你知道，超过130家公司。
They bought, you know, 100 over a 130 companies.
然后到了1969年，他们完全停止了收购。
And then in 1969, they stopped acquiring companies completely.
所以他们解释了为什么做出那个决定。
And so they described why they made that decision.
到了1969年，亨利觉得我们可能感兴趣的其他公司价格都太高了。
By 1969, Henry decided the prices for other companies we might be interested in were getting too high.
这在一定程度上是因为其他跟我们一样在扩张的企业集团也在争抢这些公司，竞争越来越激烈。
This was partly due to increasing competition for these companies by other conglomerates who were growing the same way that we were.
很多好公司已经被收购了，真正对我们有吸引力的公司越来越少了。
Many of the better companies had already been acquired and there were fewer companies that were really attractive to us.
公司开始要价，比我们认为合理的价格还要高。
Companies began asking more than we thought was reasonable.
另外，当时经济正在衰退，每股收益增长放缓，股市也不景气，这些因素也促使我们做了这个决定。
Contributing to our decision was the fact that a business recession was occurring at the time, and growth in earnings per share was declining and the stock market was depressed.
既然我们已经收购了150家公司，亨利觉得是时候整理和整合我们已有的资产了。
And since we had already acquired a 150 companies, Henry decided it was time to organize and consolidate what we had.
然后他们谈到了战略转变，从收购整个公司变成了只在股市上买一部分股份。
And then they talk about their shift in strategy where they went from buying entire companies to just buying pieces of them in the stock market.
所以到了1970年，我们进入第二个十年的时候，已经停止了直接收购公司。
So by 1970, as we began our second decade, we had stopped our direct acquisition of companies.
我们觉得，与其花高价买下整个公司，不如在市场行情好的时候，通过我们的保险公司买下它们相当一部分的股份。
We decided there was no point in paying inflated prices for complete ownership of companies when we could buy a substantial interest in them through our insurance companies when the market prices were favorable.
你接下来会看到，亨利在讲这个的时候，听起来很像巴菲特在股东信里说的话。
And you're gonna see here when Henry talks about this, he sounds a lot like Buffett does in his shareholder letters.
然后这里说，亨利在谈到这个的时候，引用了他的理念。
And so it says, Henry was quoted about his philosophy in regards to this.
股票市场里有巨大的价值，但那是买股票，不是买整个公司。
There are tremendous values in the stock market, but in buying stocks, not entire companies.
买公司往往会把收购价格抬得太高。
Buying companies tends to raise the purchase price too high.
别被少数几只市盈率只有六倍七倍的股票给骗了。
Don't be misled by the few shares trading at a low multiple of six or seven.
你要是真想去收购那些公司，市盈率就变成十二倍十四倍了。
If you try to acquire those companies, the multiple is more like 12 or 14.
他们的经理会说，如果你不付钱，别人会付。
And their manager will say, if you don't pay it, someone else will.
他们说得对。
And they're right.
确实有人会付。
Someone else does pay it.
所以在他们价格过高的时候，我们不会进行收购。
So it's no acquisitions for us while they're overpriced.
我不会支付15倍的市盈率。
I won't pay 15 times earnings.
那意味着我只能获得6%或7%的回报。
That would mean I'd only be making return of six or 7%.
我买国债也能做到。
I can do that in T bills.
我们不必进行任何重大收购。
We don't have to make any major acquisitions.
至于我们挑选投资股票的目的，就是尽可能获得最好的回报。
As for the stocks we pick to invest in, the purpose is to make as good as a return as we can.
我们没有其他意图。
We do not have any other intentions.
我们不把它们视为未来的收购对象。
We do not view them as future acquisitions.
所以让我打断一下辛格尔顿的这段话。
So let me interrupt this quote from Singleton.
因为当时人们觉得，哦，这家伙是个连环收购者。
Because at the time, they thought, oh, this guy's a serial acquirer.
他收购了大概一百五十多家公司，具体数字记不清了。
He bought, you know, 150 something companies, whatever the number is.
他这么做只是为了寻找更多收购机会。
He's just doing this as a way to find more acquisitions.
只是这些公司可能规模更大。
They just may be bigger.
然后他说，其实我们并没有把它们当作未来的收购对象。
And he's like, well, we're not actually viewing them as future acquisitions.
他说买卖公司不是我们的专长。
He says buying and selling companies is not our bag.
不相信我的人尽管不信，但他们在未来会像过去对Teledyne其他事情一样错得离谱。
Those who don't believe me are free to do so, but they will be as wrong in the future as they have been about other things concerning Teledyne in the past.
所以这就是引用的结尾。
And so that is the end of the quote.
这又是书里一个很棒的故事，讲的是他当时就说，嘿，去认识一下这个人。
It's another great quote or story rather in the book about how, again, he just said, hey, go meet this guy.
他对这门生意了如指掌。
He knows the business from A to Z.
你问他任何一个部门的销售情况。
You ask him how the sales of any division is.
他马上就能答上来。
He knows it right off the bat.
辛格尔顿对细节非常执着。
Singleton was obsessed with details.
所以我很喜欢沃尔特·迪士尼的一句名言，他说，失去细节，就失去一切。
And so there's this great quote from Walt Disney I love, where he says, we lose the details, we lose everything.
这里有个故事可以说明这一点。
And here's a story that kinda illustrates that.
亨利非常在意特利丹公司的形象。
Henry was very concerned about Teledyne's image.
杰伊告诉我，有一天他碰巧走过公关部门敞开的门，看到亨利·辛格尔顿趴在地上，旁边摊着一些大图纸，正在讨论构成特利丹标志的确切设计、形状和比例。
Jay told me that one day he happened to walk past the open door of the PR department and looked in to see Henry Singleton sprawled on the floor with some large drawings, debating the exact design, shape, and proportions that make up the Teledyne logotype.
他用行动告诉你，他关注每一个微小的细节。
He is telling you with his actions that he's paying attention to every single little detail.
他又回到之前的话题，谈到他偏爱自主权，反复强调这一点。
Goes back again, talks about his preference for autonomy, says this over and over again.
我们确实希望旗下公司拥有相当大的自主权，这给各个公司的总裁带来了巨大的压力。
We really wanted our companies to operate with considerable autonomy, and this place a tremendous burden on our individual company presidents.
亨利说，我们依赖他们。
Henry said, we depend on them.
我们必须信任他们。
We have to trust them.
我们的成败取决于他们的表现。
We succeed or fail according to what they do.
这完全符合亨利坚信人是最重要因素的信念。
This was completely in accord with Henry's strong conviction that people were the most important factor in a business.
他重复了多少次？
How many times has he repeated this?
再说一遍，这贯穿始终。
Again, this is going across.
这本书，大概三百多页吧？
This book is, what, three hundred three hundred and something pages?
而这个观点被反复强调，一遍又一遍。
And that that idea is repeated over and over and over again.
事实上，人才是企业中最重要的因素，必须给他们机会去做好自己的工作。
The fact is people are the most important factor in a business, and they had to be given a chance to do their job.
这是辛格尔顿的原话。
Direct quote from Singleton.
如果他们干得好，何必去打扰他们呢？
Why bother them if they are doing their job?
这又回到了他不在乎你怎么看他的策略这个观点上。
Goes back to this idea of he doesn't give a shit what you think of his strategy.
媒体总是把一切都搞错。
The press gets everything wrong all the time.
你看，他从收购那么多公司，到现在只是买股票，但这只是他个人的做法。
The fact that, oh, he went from acquiring all these companies, now he's just buying stocks, but this this is just a guy's.
他实际上已经转向，你知道，他要进行敌意收购，要收购那些公司。
He's gone to actually, you know, he's gonna do hostile takeovers, gonna acquire them.
他不仅没有收购或进行敌意收购，到1977年，Teledyne已经是《财富》500强中九家公司的最大股东。
Not only is he not going to acquire them or do hostile takeover, by 1977, Teledyne was the largest shareholder in nine of the Fortune 500 companies.
他连董事会席位都不想要，更别说控制了。
He didn't even want a board seat, much less control.
他说，我们实际上在六家公司持有足够的股份，足以有效控制它们，但亨利从未行使过这种能力。
He says, we actually held enough shares in six of these corporations to effectively have control over them, but Henry never exercised that capability.
他甚至从未试图在这些公司的董事会中谋求职位。
He never even attempted to seek a position on the boards of those companies.
很长一段时间里，外界有很多猜测，认为他打算接管这些公司，这可能让一些管理者感到不安。
For a long time, there was considerable speculation that he was planning to take over these corporations, and this may have caused unease in some of the managers.
事实上，亨利特意向那些管理者保证，他没有这样的意图。
In fact, Henry went out of his way to assure those managers that he had no such intentions.
所以，他是这家叫柯蒂斯·赖特公司的最大股东。
And so he was the largest shareholder of this company called Curtis Wright.
即使他是最大股东，柯蒂斯·赖特的发言人是这样评价辛格尔顿的。
And even when he was the largest shareholder, this is what a spokesman of Curtis Wright said about Singleton.
他一直非常谨慎，从不干涉我们的事务。
He's been absolutely scrupulous in staying out of our affairs.
很多人不相信他，这恰恰说明他们对亨利的正直和他坚持走自己路的决心了解得太少了。
That many didn't believe him was an indication of how little they knew of Henry's integrity and determination to follow his own course.
他坚持走自己路的一个方式，就是他提出了一个叫“特利丹回报”的概念。
One way he followed his own course, he comes up with this thing called the Teledyne return.
我们制定了一个衡量标准，叫做“特利丹回报”，就是你的现金回报和利润的平均值。
We developed a measure that we called the Teledyne return, which is the average of your cash return and your profit.
比如，我们会告诉某个业务部门，你报告了100万美元的利润，但你只有50万美元的现金。
We would tell an individual business unit, for example, you reported a profit of a million dollars, but you only had $500,000 of cash.
所以实际上你只赚了75万美元。
So you only made $750,000.
这就是特利丹回报。
That's a Teledyne return.
所以实际上你只赚了75万美元。
So you only made $750,000.
所以，等你拿到剩下的利润时，再告诉我们吧。
So tell us about the rest of the profit when you get it.
我确实读到过一段很好的描述，因为我觉得这对一些人来说挺让人困惑的。
And I actually read a great description of this because I think this is confusing to some people.
所以让我再补充一些关于Teledyne回报率的说明。
So let me just give you some additional notes on the Teledyne return.
这个指标就是净利润加上现金流再除以二。
So it was a net income plus cash flow divided by two.
关键的一点是，辛格尔顿不希望经理们只盯着会计利润来优化。
The important insight was that Singleton didn't want managers optimizing purely for accounting earnings.
一个部门可能报告一百万美元的利润，但如果只产生了五十万美元的现金流，辛格尔顿认为实际的经济结果比利润表显示的差得多。
A division could report a million dollars in profit, but if it only produced $500,000 of cash, Singleton considered the economic results substantially worse than the income statement suggested.
这就是辛格尔顿发明Teledyne回报率的原因。
So this is why Singleton invented the Teledyne return.
Teledyne由几十个分散的业务部门组成。
Teledyne consisted of dozens of decentralized businesses.
辛格尔顿希望给经理们极大的运营自主权，同时总部只需要看一个数字，就能知道他们是否真正创造了经济价值。
Singleton wanted to give the managers enormous operational autonomy while still having one number at headquarters that told him whether they were actually creating economic value.
这个指标成了评估和奖励Teledyne业务部门经理的关键依据。
This metric became a key basis for evaluating and compensating Teledyne's business unit managers.
它还阻止了一种典型的管理手段，就是通过消耗营运资金来虚增报告利润。
It also discouraged a classic managerial trick, boosting reported earnings by consuming working capital.
经理可以通过堆积库存或给客户提供宽松的信用条件来增加销售和利润，但现金流会恶化。
A manager could increase sales and earnings by piling up inventory or extending generous credit to customers, but cash flow would deteriorate.
Teledyne回报率会暴露这一点。
The Teledyne return would expose that.
这完全符合辛格尔顿的整体理念。
This fits Singleton's larger philosophy perfectly.
子公司存在的目的就是产生现金，而辛格尔顿的工作就是分配这些现金。
The subsidiaries existed to generate cash, and Singleton's job was to allocate that cash.
关于辛格尔顿，还有一点，我很喜欢这个，这可能是我的最爱之一，这段话出现在两段里，我觉得挺有意思的。
So another thing about Singleton, and I love this is what this is probably one of my favorite quotes in the So, this happens in two paragraphs, which I think is interesting.
第一段，反复说，一些最好的创始人和经理，其实就是老师。
One, say over and over again, like, some of the best founders, best managers, they're just teachers.
他们有一套独特的理念，我们俩已经聊了挺长时间了。
They have this unique philosophy, which we've you and I have been talking about, you know, for quite some time now.
然后他们就把时间花在教导整个组织上，告诉他们希望业务怎么运作，为什么要这么做，各个业务部门的经理的行为如何影响整个公司的结果，等等等等。
And then they just spend their time teaching their entire organization the way they want the business run, why they're doing what they're doing, how the actions that these individual business unit managers are affecting the outcome of the entire company, and so on and so forth.
所以实际上，很多人不会有一对一的交流，但书里有很多例子，辛格尔顿就是把人们拉到一边一对一地交流，基本上就是教学式的对话，不管是在喝咖啡的时候，还是在午餐时，在扑克室，或者在他的办公室，甚至他躺在地板上的时候。
And so he would actually, a lot of people don't have one on ones here, but there's a lot of examples of just in the books where Singleton is just pulling people aside one on one and just essentially having teaching sessions, like whether it's over coffee, whether it's at the lunch at the poker parlor, whether it's in his office, whether he's laying on the floor.
所以书上说，亨利经常坐在他角落的办公室里，每天独自用他的苹果电脑工作，谈论他经营公司的理念以及他想出的各种财务策略。
So it says quite often, Henry simply talked about his philosophy of running a corporation and the various financial strategies he came up with as he sat in his corner office each day, often working alone at his Apple computer.
他是个杰出的商业战略家，想出了很多有创意的点子，有些想法在当时与主流的大公司管理方法相悖。
He was a brilliant business strategist, and he came up with many creative ideas, ideas that were sometimes contrary to the currently accepted methods of managing a large corporation that prevailed in those days.
然后你有一句很棒的话。
And then you have a great line.
这是这段里我第二喜欢的部分，克劳德·香农在告诉你，坏小子们悄无声息地行动。
This is my second favorite part of this, this paragraph where Claude Shannon is telling you, you know, bad boys move in silence.
这是香农直接引用的话，克劳德·香农评价亨利·辛格尔顿。
This is a direct quote from Shannon, Claude Shannon on Henry Singleton.
他总是想找出最好的走法，也许他不喜欢说太多，因为当你玩游戏的时候，你不会告诉别人你的策略是什么。
He always tries to work out the best moves, and maybe he doesn't like to talk too much because when you're playing a game, you don't tell anyone else what your strategy is.
然后我非常喜欢辛格尔顿的这句话。
And then I just love this quote from Singleton.
这就像打高尔夫球。
It's like playing golf.
谁都能挥杆，但有些人确实挥得比别人好。
Anyone can swing a club, but some of us do swing it better than others.
辛格尔顿还会重复另一件事，他觉得短期思维令人反感。
And then another thing that Singleton would repeat is that he found short term thinking repulsive.
他说，我们并不特别被快速的暂时收益所说服。
He said, we are not particularly persuaded by quick temporary gains.
我们宁愿得到一些永久的东西，而这需要时间。
We'd rather get something permanent, and that takes time.
如果有人希望我们快速做出什么惊人的业绩增长之类的事情，我不知道该如何满足这种愿望。
If there's anybody who wants us to do something real fast that's going to be astonishing in terms of increased earnings or something, I don't know how to satisfy such desires.
当被问及分拆是否是提升股东价值的好方法时，他回答说，你这是在考虑短期利益。
When pressed about spin offs being a good way to boost shareholder value, he replied, you're thinking in the short term.
我看的是长期，所以我不会为了股价的暂时上涨而做那样的事。
I'm in the long term, so I wouldn't do anything like that for a temporary rise in the price of the stock.
你知道，有些公司会卖掉一个部门，再买另一个部门，因为卖掉的部门市盈率通常较低，而买进的部门市盈率较高。
You know, there are companies that will sell one division and buy another because this division generally sports a low multiple and the one they're buying has a high multiple.
他们觉得这样可能会带动整个公司的估值。
And they think this may rub off on the whole company.
这让我非常反感。
That absolutely turns me off.
整个想法都让人厌恶。
The whole concept is repulsive.
我们不会做那样的事。
We don't do things like that.
我们关注的是长期的经济潜力。
We look at the economic long term possibilities.
还有一件关于亨利·辛格尔顿的趣事是，他去世的时候，我记得他当时是美国第三大地主。
And then something also interesting about about Henry Singleton is, like, when he dies, I think he's the third largest landowner in The United States at the time.
他对房地产也有同样的热爱。
He had this also, another love of real estate.
实际上，书里说他一辈子都没卖过一块房地产，不管是房子、牧场还是空地。
In fact, the book says that he never sold a single piece of real estate, whether it's a house or his ranch or just empty land in his entire life.
他就是不停地买。
He just kept acquiring them.
所以，他从特利丹退休后，把生命最后大概十年时间都花在经营他的牧场上。
And so, after he retires from Teledyne, he spends the remaining, I think, ten years of his life, maybe something like that, just working on his ranch.
有趣的是，他女儿后来写了一本书，讲她父亲怎么经营牧场，你会发现那和他在特利丹的做法有很多相似之处。
And one of the interesting parts is his daughter writes a book later on in life where how her father ran the ranch, and you see there's a lot of similarities between what he did with Teledyne.
他坚持亲自签每一张支票，每一笔开销都要过目。
And he would insist on writing every check that, you know, every single expense.
牧场开支的支票都是他亲自签的，他管这叫一种纪律。
He wrote the check for the ranch, and he called it a form of discipline.
他还谈到了关注每一分钱的重要性。
And he talks about the importance of watching every dollar.
他支付牧场所有的账单，并签署所有支票，称之为一种纪律。
He pays all the ranch bills and signs all the checks, calling it a form of discipline.
通过签署这些支票，你会惊讶地发现你对业务的了解有多少。
Through doing the signing, it's amazing how much you learn about the business.
每张支票背后都提醒着每一件事或每一个行动。
There's a reminder of each event or action behind every check.
读完这两本书后，我又整理了一个部分，专门讲芒格和巴菲特对辛格尔顿的看法，里面有一些有趣的观点。
And then what I did after finishing both books is I organized another section where it's actually Munger and Buffett on Singleton, and there's just some interesting ideas in here.
书中提到，巴菲特非常钦佩亨利·辛格尔顿，查理也好奇，我想这是在伯克希尔的某次会议上。
So it says, sharing Buffett's admiration for Henry Singleton, Charlie wondered I think this is at, well, one of the Berkshire Meetings.
鉴于这个人的才华和业绩，我们从他身上学到足够多的东西了吗？
Given the man's talent and record, have we learned enough from him?
巴菲特说，辛格尔顿拥有“美国商业界最佳的运营和资本配置记录”。
Buffett said that Singleton had, quote, the best operating and capital deployment record in American business.
他甚至更进一步说，如果把排名前一百的商学院毕业生的成就加在一起，他们的总成绩也比不上辛格尔顿。
He went even further saying that if you combine the achievements of the top 100 business school graduates, their collective record would not match Singleton's.
巴菲特还说，商学院不研究辛格尔顿简直是一种罪过。
Buffett also called it a crime that business schools did not study Singleton.
查理·芒格说亨利·辛格尔顿非常有意思。
Charlie Munger said Henry Singleton was very interesting.
他比沃伦和我都聪明得多。
He was a lot smarter than Warren or I.
芒格还说，我们尊重亨利·辛格尔顿的原因很简单。
Munger also said we respect Henry Singleton for a very simple reason.
他是个天才。
He was a genius.
芒格称辛格尔顿的智慧令人惊叹，并估计他的原始智力处于顶尖的千分之一中的千分之一。
Munger called Singleton an awesome intellect and estimated his raw intelligence as being in the top one one thousandth of 1%.
芒格说，亨利·辛格尔顿是我这辈子认识的最聪明的人。
Munger said Henry Singleton was the smartest single human being I've ever known in my entire life.
但这真的很有意思。
But this is very fascinating.
这就是我想把这段加进来的原因。
This is why I wanted to include this section.
因为芒格区分了天生的智力和积累的经验。
Because there was a distinction that Munger drew between raw intelligence and accumulated experience.
他近距离观察过巴菲特和辛格尔顿，所以他得出结论：亨利更聪明，但沃伦思考投资的时间要长得多。
And so he since he had an up close view of both Buffett and Singleton, he concluded, Henry was a lot smarter, but Warren had thought about investments a lot longer.
所以想想看。
So think about it.
辛格尔顿直到大约43岁才开始创办公司，真正开始投资所有现金的时候更晚。
Singleton doesn't start his company until he's, like, 43, doesn't really start investing all the cash.
可以说他五十多岁才开始，然后持续了二十年，大概从50岁到70岁，而巴菲特9岁就开始，到现在九十多岁了还在做。
Let's say he's in his fifties, and he does that for another twenty years, so maybe from, like, the age of 50 to 70, where Buffett started at nine and is still doing it in his nineties.
我很喜欢芒格对天生智力和时间之间做的这种区分。
I love the way that Munger drew that distinction between raw intelligence and time.
所以最后我想以一篇优美的悼词作为结尾，这篇悼词印在《遥远的势力》这本书的末尾，它让我们从一位熟悉亨利·辛格尔顿的人那里，深入了解了他这个人。
And so then I want to end with this beautiful eulogy that is printed at the end of Distant Force that gives a deep insight to Henry Singleton, the man from somebody who knew him well.
你很少会遇到一个完全陌生的人，却立刻知道自己会敬佩他。
Rarely do you meet a total stranger and instantly know that you will come to admire that person.
我第一次和亨利·辛格尔顿握手时，就有这种感觉。
That happened to me when I first shook hands with Henry Singleton.
那是半个世纪前，在麻省理工学院，我去那里招聘工程学博士毕业生。
It was half a century ago at MIT where I came to recruit doctorate degree graduates in engineering.
麻省理工学院的院长给了我所有毕业生的档案和每个人的照片。
The dean at MIT gave me the records of all the graduates and a photo of each.
那些毕业生看起来都像通常的工程师那样，除了一个人。
The graduates all looked the way the engineers usually do, except one.
他长得真的很帅。
He was really good looking.
还有一点，他的成绩单上密密麻麻的，特别充实。
And something else, his grade chart was particularly crowded.
其他毕业生的成绩都是80或90分。
All the other graduates' grades were like 80 or 90.
都是两位数。
They were two digits.
亨利·辛格尔顿的成绩全是100分。
Henry Singleton's grades everywhere were 100.
三位数挤在只够写两位数的空格里。
Three digits squeezed into the space for only two.
他修的每一门课，每一次期末考试，都是100分，满分。
For every course he took, every final exam, 100, perfect.
其他毕业生都想展示准备好的成就介绍，而亨利却在问我问题。
While the other graduates wanted to deliver prepared recitals of their accomplishments, Henry asked me questions.
我们在南加州做什么？
What were we up to in Southern California?
为什么？
Why?
而且你们为什么要在那里做？
And why are you doing it there?
还有你的项目是怎么来的？
And how did your projects come about?
亨利接受了我们的邀请，来到西部，开始了他的工程师生涯。
Henry accepted our offer, came West, and began an engineering career.
如果他当初选择留在工程领域，他的职业生涯肯定是非常出色的。
Had he chosen to remain in engineering, his career most certainly would have been a distinguished one.
但一个意外的机会出现了，这激发并揭示了亨利性格中令人惊讶的一面，促使他创建了一家新公司，专门寻找、收购、合并和管理其他公司。
But an unexpected opportunity turned up that triggered and uncovered a surprising dimension of Henry's makeup, to create a new company that would find, acquire, merge, and manage other companies.
在这里，他展现出了非凡的才能，甚至他自己都未必完全了解自己拥有这些才能。
Here he exhibited extraordinary talents even he could not have fully known he possessed.
作为首席执行官，他现在以新颖的方式运用他强大的分析能力，来研究和评估公司的真实价值、股价、竞争情况以及利润和增长潜力。
As CEO, he now applied his powerful analytical strengths in novel ways to research and assess the true values of companies, their stock prices, their competition, their profit and growth potential.
他站在办公桌前，对着电脑，就像一棵充满公司和市场智慧的树。
With his stand up desk and his computer, he became a tree full of wisdom of corporations and markets.
亨利可不是一般的CEO。
Henry was not your ordinary CEO.
他总是不理华尔街和商业媒体，让他们很头疼。
He constantly frustrated the world of Wall Street and business media by ignoring them.
他在商业上取得了惊人的成功，却偏偏喜欢保持低调，这让那些人摸不着头脑。
By accompanying his phenomenal business success with a preference for anonymity, he mystified them.
毫不奇怪，随着他的才能和精准的商业决策逐渐为人所知，很多人都以为他是个纯粹的数字专家，对投资中的人的因素不感兴趣。
Not surprisingly, as his talents and analytical business decisions became known, many assumed he was a pure numbers guru, not interested in the people factor in investments.
其实不是这样，我可以举个例子。
That's not true, and I can cite an example.
多年前，技术的进步突然让低价高性能的电脑成为可能，数百万人都能买得起。
Years ago, technology advanced suddenly made possible low priced, high powered computers that millions could buy.
于是涌现了很多公司来生产这些电脑。
Numerous companies were started to produce them.
大多数都失败了，但亨利资助的那家没有。
Most failed, not the one Henry helped to finance.
他投资了苹果公司。
He invested in Apple.
我问他，在那么多看起来差不多的新电脑创业公司里，你是怎么选中苹果的？
I asked him how, with all these new computer startups looking alike, did you pick Apple?
他回答说，嗯，我想这些数百万潜在的电脑客户一开始大多会被电脑吓到。
He replied, well, I figured most of these millions of expected potential computer customers would at first be intimidated by computers.
但谁会害怕一个叫苹果的电脑呢？
But how could anybody be intimidated by a computer named Apple?
再说，除了苹果，其他公司如果失败了，就会直接放弃。
Besides, all the others, except Apple, if they failed, would just walk away.
而苹果的创始人必须成功。
Apple's founders just had to make good.
所有熟悉亨利的人都能感受到他外表冷漠下那份温暖的友谊和真诚的关怀。
All of us who knew Henry well felt the warmth of friendship and sincere consideration underneath his mane of reserve.
如果他的离世让我们感到悲伤，这或许是我们为认识他所带来的生活充实而付出的应有代价。
If in his passing, we now feel a sadness, this is perhaps a proper price that we must pay to compensate for the enrichment of our lives that knowing him has yielded us.
我就说到这里吧。
And that is where I'll leave it.
已经读了431本书，还剩1000本，我们很快再聊。
That is 431 books down, 1,000 go, and I'll talk to you again soon.
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