#94 亨利·西蒙森（《局外人》）

现在降到了大约十年。

Now it's down like around ten.

因此，大型企业正变得越来越脆弱。

So of course larger corporations are becoming more fragile.

这就是为什么，如果你听我在这个录制时间点发布的播客，我会提供七个隐藏剧集。

That's why if you if you listen to my podcast that I've done for at this time of recording, I have seven hidden episodes.

如果你留下了评价并发送到 foundersreview@gmail.com，或者你在 Overcast 上通过点击星星推荐了我的播客，并且给我发了邮件。

If you've if you've left a review and sent it to me at foundersreview@gmail.com or if you've recommended my podcast on Overcast by pressing the star, I've and you've emailed it to me.

我会给你回发链接，你可能已经知道这一点，但我读过一本书，我认为它准确地揭示了当前正在发生的事情。

I've sent you back the link and you probably know this, but I read this one book that I think is fundamentally right on what's taking place now.

这本书叫《Unscaled》。

It's called Unscaled.

它探讨了工业时代直到最近的规模经济。

And it talks about, like, the economies of scale in, let's say, the industrial age up until maybe recently.

规模在很大程度上确实是一个巨大的优势。

Size was, for the most part, yeah, it was a huge advantage.

我的意思是，读一读亨利·福特的自传。

I mean, read Henry Ford's autobiography.

他在书中说，你必须做大做强，你必须做大做强。

He's talking about, like, you gotta get big, you gotta get big.

在他那个时代，这很有道理。

It made sense in his time.

这本书讲的是，如今由于技术赋予了个人、小团队或小群体强大的杠杆效应，公司的最优规模正在缩小。

And what that book is talking about is, like, well, now you you we because of the the the leverage that technology gives the individual or small team or small group of people, like, the optimal size of companies is shrinking.

这正是我喜欢的。

And that's what I like.

我希望能看到更多员工人数少、却盈利良好并做出卓越成就的公司。

I would love to see smaller, as far as head count, profitable companies doing great things.

我认为就像自然界通过进化实现多样化一样，自然厌恶垄断。

And I think just like in nature where we have this diversification through evolution, like nature abhors monopolies.

你不会在自然界看到这种情况。

You don't see that.

你会看到各种不同的实验。

You see a bunch of different experiments.

这是一种试错的机制。

It's the mechanism of trial and error.

因此，你会得到许多不可预测的奇怪事物，这些事物实际上对整个生态系统都有好处。

You as a result, you get all these weird things that are unpredictable that, you know, benefit the whole the ecosystem as a whole.

所以，这大概是我想看到的最佳描述方式。

So that's, like, the best way to describe, like, what I would love to see.

我要岔开话题了。

And I something I'm gonna take on a tangent here.

我本来没打算谈这个，但我刚刚听了我非常敬佩的一位企业家的问答。

Wasn't trying to talk about this, but I was listening to this q and a from one of an entrepreneur that I really respect.

他是Shopify的创始人。

It's the founder of Shopify.

他叫托比。

His name's Toby.

我不太确定怎么念他的姓，但我试试看。

Don't I know to pronounce his last name, I'm gonna try.

但他讲了一些有趣的话。

But he said something interesting.

他说，很多人觉得Shopify的股价现在飙升，因为人们认为它可能会成为下一个亚马逊。

They're like, a lot of people, like Shopify's share price right now is is going through the roof because people think it might be the next Amazon.

他说，亚马逊就像一个 conglomerate（企业集团）。

He's like, well, Amazon's like a conglomerate.

他们规模太大了。

Like, they're huge.

他说，我真希望我能看到原话，但他基本上是说，亚马逊试图建立一个帝国。

He's like, I'm not he he used the the I wish I had the quote in front of me, but he basically said Amazon's trying to build like an empire.

他说，而我想要武装那些反抗者。

He's like, I'm trying to arm the rebels.

这几乎让我起了一身鸡皮疙瘩。

And, like, that almost gave me goosebumps.

我当时就想，是的。

I was like, yes.

这正是我们需要的。

That's what we need.

如果你听托比的讲话，可以再翻一下我的笔记。

If you listen to Toby, and you can go again, go through my notes.

只要搜索‘托比’，我就记了他三四场演讲的笔记。

Just type in Toby, and I've taken notes on three or four of his talks.

他经常谈到这一点。

And he talks to this all the time.

他说，Shopify的目标不仅仅是人们以为的那样，只是开发一些用来做在线商店的软件。

He's like, the goal of Shopify is not just to people think, oh, I'm just making, you know, software to make online stories.

不，不是这样的。

Like, no.

我的目标是提高世界上企业家的数量。

I'm trying to increase the rate the the amount of entrepreneurs there are in the world.

我认为，很少有目标能像这样赋予人们责任，让他们掌控自己的收入来源，并给予他们自由去从事自己想做的工作。

And I think there's very few goals, like, you could have as far as, like, empowering people to to to take responsibility for how they make money and and to give them the the freedom to work on what they want.

哇哦。

So, wow.

这跑题了。

That was a tangent.

现在我希望这说得通了。

And now I hope that makes sense.

我本来没打算谈这个。

I wasn't expecting to talk about it.

好的。

Okay.

他说，这意味着整个公司的生存能力永远不会因某一项操作的失败而受到威胁。

So he says, this means the survivability of the entire company will never be jeopardized by failure of one single operation.

另一种理解方式是，这与埃德·索普、沃伦·巴菲特和查理·芒格的思维方式非常相似。

Another way to think about this is very very similar to how Ed Thorpe thinks, how Warren Buff and Charlie Munger think.

事实上，他们不会承担尾部风险，他们的很多思维方式都与凯利准则有关。

The fact is, like, they don't take tail risks and a lot of their thinking is has to do with, the Kelly criterion.

这就是一个例子。

This is an example of that.

他们不会去冒险。

Like, they're not gonna jeopardize.

他们绝不会做任何可能让他们面临破产风险的事情。

They're not gonna ever do anything that's gonna risk that's going to ever give them a chance of risk of ruin.

现在有些人用不同的术语来描述这一点。

Now some people use different terms for that.

沃伦·巴菲特称之为安全边际。

Warren Buffett uses the term margin of safety.

这其实就是说，嘿，我会留出一些缓冲，虽然具体数字有时不同，但他的意思是，比如他希望有一个250亿美元的缓冲，或者40%的缓冲。

It's just saying, hey, I'll have and I've sometimes there's been different numbers, think, but it's to some point, he says, like, you know, he wants like a $25,000,000,000 buffet or a 40 a buffer rather.

巴菲特。

Buffet.

或者400亿美元的缓冲。

Or $40,000,000,000 buff buffer.

他只是说，只要我在，这家公司就不会有倒闭的风险。我认为对于风险承担者、创业者来说，这是你们的第一准则。

He's just saying, hey, as long as I'm here, this company's gonna have no risk of going to And I think for for risk takers, for entrepreneurs, like, that's your rule number one.

如果你想成功，你首先要做的就是确保自己能生存下来。

If you wanna be successful, you have to the first thing you have to do is make sure that you survive.

所以，在我看来，辛格顿和罗伯茨在Teladoc身上采取的策略就是，他们正在提高自己生存的概率。

And so that's to me, what I my reading of what the the the the strategy that Singleton and Roberts are taking with Teladon is like, they're increasing the chance that they're going to survive.

好的。

Okay.

所以关键在于这一点。

So what matters is this.

到1979年为止，所有129家公司都实现了盈利。

So far in 1979, all a 129 are profitable.

过去两年，经营一家小型盈利企业比经营一家大型盈利企业容易得多。

For the last two years, it's a lot easier to make a small profitable business than it is to make a large profitable business.

过去两年里，只有半导体这一项亏损，而且仅仅亏损了几百万美元。

For the last two years, only one, semiconductors, was in the red, and that was just by a few million dollars.

好的。

Alright.

所以这说明，他们不仅不浪费钱，也不浪费时间。

So it talks about, like, they not only do they they not waste money, but they don't waste time.

你知道，这些事情都是相关的。

And, you know, the whole thing is those things are related.

他也不会在机场和豪华轿车上浪费时间和精力。

Nor does he waste time and energy in airports and limousines.

这129家公司的负责人轮流来到洛杉矶现代办公室，向他和辛格顿汇报。

The heads of the 129 companies take turns coming to him and Singleton in their modern office in LA.

所以现在他们谈论的是，别管产品了，罗伯茨开始说。

So now they're talking about forget products, Roberts begins.

开始。

Begins.

关键就在这里。

Here's the key.

我们培养了一种追求高利润率的态度。

We create an attitude toward having high margins.

在我们的体系中，如果一家公司快速增长，而其管理者实现了高利润率，他就会因此获得丰厚的回报。

In our system, a company can grow rapidly and its manager be rewarded richly for that growth if he has high margins.

如果他的利润率低，就很难从我和亨利这里获得资金。

If he has low margins, it's hard to get capital from Henry and me.

所以我们的员工都会关注并理解这一点。

So our people look and, our people look and understand.

高利润率成了大家该做的事。

Having high margins gets to be the thing to do.

没人喜欢在筹措新资金时遇到麻烦。

No one likes to have trouble getting new money.

罗伯茨说的没什么特别的。

Roberts is saying nothing exceptional.

不同寻常的是，Teledyne 践行了它所宣扬的理念。

What is exceptional is the way Teledyne practices what it preaches.

无论规模大小，几乎没有哪家公司能像 Teledyne 这样对资本开支如此节俭，更不用说那些十亿美元级别的企业了。

There are very few companies of any size and certainly none of the billion dollar class that are as tight with a capital dollar as Teledyne.

换句话说，过去的创业者曾经给我们什么建议？

In other words, what have entrepreneurs in the past have have advised us?

留意你的成本。

Watch your costs.

不要过于灵活变通。

Do not be resourceful.

不要浪费钱。

Don't waste money.

随着时间推移。

Over time.

今年，它的资本支出将连续第二年超过一亿美元，但相对于 Teledyne 超过三亿美元的现金流而言，这仍然相当节俭。

This year, its capital spending will exceed a $100,000,000 for the second straight year, but this is rather miserly some in relation to Teledyne's cash flow of more than $300,000,000.

德州仪器是一家规模和技术导向相当的公司，其支出将超过三倍。

Texas Instruments, a company's e of equal size and technological orientation, will spend more than three times as much.

许多公司通常在资本项目上的支出超过其现金收入，但泰利丹并非如此。

Many many companies normally spend more for capital projects than they take in as cash, not so with Teledyne.

这才是泰利丹能够持续增长的真实秘诀。

This is the real secret to Teledyne's ability ability to grow.

关键在于自律。

The key then is discipline.

不要自我膨胀。

No ego trips.

只投资那些能迅速以现金流增长形式回报的项目。

Only new investments that will quickly pay off in the forms of enhanced cash flow.

这又是乔治·罗伯茨的原话。

This is a quote from George Roberts again.

在某些行业中，赚钱的唯一方式就是不进入这些行业。

The only way you can make money in some businesses is not is by not entering them.

现在我们要谈谈风险，我刚才其实已经稍微提到了。

Now we're gonna get into risk, which I was just kind of talking about earlier.

风险也同样被谨慎地控制。

Risk too is carefully rationed.

冷静理性的人辛格尔顿厌恶意外。

A coolly rational man, Singleton despises surprises.

公司政策规定，作为国防承包商的部门必须保持相对较小的规模。

It is a company policy that divisions which are defense contractors remain relatively small.

为什么？

Why?

因为规模大会增加你的脆弱性。

Because large increases your fragility.

我们不希望有任何大型主合同，”罗伯茨说。

We don't want any big prime contracts, says Roberts.

我们更愿意成为重要的、技术导向的分包商，为那些想成为主承包商的人提供服务。

We prefer to be import to be important, technically oriented subcontractors who serve those who want to be prime contractors.

那为什么你要这么做呢？

Now why why would you do that?

比如，为什么你要故意限制任何一个来源的收入？

Like, why would you purposely limit the revenue for any one source?

这样，如果一个大合同被取消了，我们也不会受到伤害。

That way, if a large contract is aborted, we will not be hurt.

这几乎就像是他们公司整体结构的镜像。

It's almost it's like a a mirror image of how their entire company is structured.

对吧？

Right?

它不是一家庞大的公司。

It's not not one big company.

它是129家独立的小公司。

It's a 129 ones.

现在我们来听一些辛格顿的引述。

Now we're gonna get some quotes from Singleton.

西尔万顿说，我们对现金流和资产管理的态度源于我们自己的思考过程。

Our attitude towards cash generation and asset management came out of our own thought process, says Singleton.

这不是抄袭来的。

It is not copied.

在收购了一些企业之后，我们反思了商业的各个方面。

After we acquire a number of businesses, we reflected on aspects of business.

我们的结论是，关键在于现金流。

Our own conclusion was that the key was cash flow.

西尔万顿或许是个科学家和知识分子，但他对现金有着老派的尊重。

Singleton may be a scientist and an intellectual, but he has an old fashioned respect for cash.

你不能用会计利润来支付账单。

You can't pay bills with bookkeeping profits.

他知道，有些公司多年来报告了巨额利润，却依然破产了。

He knows that companies have gone broke after reporting big profits for years.

他还举了一些例子。

And they give some examples.

跳过这一点。

Skip over that.

他希望在公司的报告中看到这些资金的实际体现。

He wants to see the color of some of that money in his company's reports.

他希望每家公司产生的现金都能超过其再投资需求。

He wants each company to throw off cash over and above its reinvestment needs.

现金可以用于公司福利，但我刚才说错了，让我重新说一遍。

Cash can cash that can never be utilized for corporate perk for over I need to start that over again.

现金是可以……等等，我说的是不能。

Cash that can that can be that can be I said cannot be.

对不起，我刚才说错了。

I I'm sorry for the mistake.

现金可以用于整体公司用途。

Cash that can be utilized for overall corporate purposes.

这与芒格的观点非常相似，他说：‘那些每年为股东创造14%回报、并且你还能从中提取现金的业务，我们喜欢。’

So this is very similar to Munger who says, hey, you know that that the business that generates 14% a year for the owners and you can actually deduct the cash out of the business, we like that.

那些地方写着：嘿，你看到那边所有的设备了吗？

The ones where it says, hey, you see that see all that equipment over there?

那就是我的利润。

There's my profit.

我们讨厌这样的企业。

We hate businesses like that.

西格蒙德在这里说的完全是一回事。

Singleton's saying the same exact thing here.

这种实实在在的现金流使西格蒙德能够在公司股票跌至低价时买入其股票。

This kind of real hard cash flow enabled Singleton to buy up his company's stock when it was lying on the bargain counter.

这种现金流使泰莱达因公司得以将债务降低至仅占总资本的约22%，而像ITT、海湾石油和韦斯顿这样的同类 conglomerates 的债务比例则高达52%。

It has enabled Teledyne to reduce debt to the point where it amounts to only about 22% of total capital against as against 3250% 52% for con for fellow conglomerates like ITT and Gulf and Weston.

当然，每个管理层都声称希望获得高资本回报。

Of course, every management wants or says it wants a high return on its capital.

亨利·西格蒙德想要的更多，是现金回报。

Henry Singleton wants something more, a cash return.

西尔弗曼不会向自己的股东支付现金股息。

Singleton won't pay cash dividend to his own shareholders.

他会，我会在后面解释他为什么改变主意。

He'll he'll I'll talk about why he changes his mind on this later.

但他期望他的129位公司总裁在长期内都做到这一点。

But he expects them from his from all of his company presidents, all a 129 of them over the long run.

这是罗伯茨的原话。

This quote from Roberts now.

没有现金的净利润未必是真正的净利润。

Net income without cash is not necessarily net income.

我们把现金生成能力纳入了对经理人的薪酬体系中。

We build cash generation into the system of paying our managers.

奖金可以达到基本工资的100%。

Bonuses can be a 100% of base salary.

一个从科学家起步、后来成为运营专家的人，最终却在金融领域取得了最辉煌的成就，这或许令人惊讶，但西尔弗曼确实做到了。

If it is curious that a man who started as a scientist and became an operating man should finally make his greatest mark of all in finance, Singleton has has nevertheless done just that.

美国企业仍然被对规模的狂热所支配。

American business is still gripped with a mania for bigness.

这不是很有趣吗？

Isn't that funny?

这些话写于1979年。

These these words are written in 1979.

有谁能帮我算一下吗？

Somebody do the math for me.

所以，四十年前？

So what, forty years ago?

我自己就能算出这个。

I can do the math myself on that.

嗯，他确实到现在仍然完全正确。

Well, like, he's that's that's still exactly true today.

美国企业仍然被对规模的狂热所支配。

American business is still gripped with the mania of bigness.

那些股价仅为盈利五倍的公司，却毫不在意地花出十到十五倍盈利的价格去收购一家大型企业，而他们本可以以一半的价格回购自己的股票。

Companies whose stock sell for five times earning will think nothing of going out and paying 10 to 15 times earnings for a nice big acquisition when they could tender for their own stock at half the price.

这听起来像谁？

Who does that sound like?

我希望，呃，快点来吧。

I hope like, this come on.

我们其实早就知道这一点了。

We we already know this.

这些显然是基本原理，如果你看到它们早在五十年前就被辛格尔顿成功运用，甚至在过去二十五年里被巴菲特所采用。

This is they're they're clearly fundamental principles if you see it being deployed successfully fifty years ago by Singleton and then even in the last like twenty five years by Buffett.

好吧。

Okay.

所以它说，与其花十到十五倍盈利的价格去收购一家大型企业，不如……这里有一些理论。

So it says, instead of going out and paying if you're you're instead of going out paying 10 to 15 times earning for a nice big acquisition, and there's some there's some theories.

巴菲特对人们为何这么做有一些理论。

Buffett has some theories on why people do this.

他说，人们就像旅鼠一样，喜欢模仿，即使这对公司的财务状况不利，也会受到媒体的赞誉，他们喜欢这种声望。

He says, like, people are lemming like, they like to copy, They like to get themselves even if it's not good financial result for the company, it'll be celebrated by the press, and they like that kind of prestige.

但那并不是你应该追求的目标。

But that that's not what you're supposed to be optimizing for.

对吧？

Right?

那你为什么要做这种事呢？

So why are you doing that?

因此，你可以选择以一半的价格回购自己的股票。

And so you could instead, you could be tendering for your own stock at half the price.

这样做的结果是什么？

And what is the result of that?

你的股本会减少。

You'd be shrinking.

对吧？

Right?

但他刚刚才告诉你，人们为什么不会缩减规模。

But he just got done telling you, why are people not they're not gonna shrink.

因为所有外部的陈词滥调——我是不是该用‘陈词滥调’这个词？

Because all the the incentives for all the external plat like, is it platitudes is the word word I'm looking for?

都是推崇规模庞大。

Is for bigness.

西尔格顿根本不关心这些。

Singleton didn't care about that.

他不在乎别人怎么想。

He didn't care what other people thought.

我不在乎会不会被报道。

I don't care if I'm gonna be written up.

我不会去参加你们那无聊的会议。

I'm not gonna go to your stupid conference.

我根本就不会去参加你们的采访。

I'm not gonna go and sit down for your interview anyways.

我会把时间集中在为我创立的公司创造最大价值上。

I'm gonna be focused my time on on creating the most value for the company I founded.

就像Teledyne那样收缩，至今仍只有少数精明的创业公司才在做。

Just as shrinking, a la Teledyne, still isn't done except by a handful of shrewd entrepreneurial companies.

好吧。

Alright.

在这篇文章里，我还有几页没看完。

Still in this I still have a few pages to go in this article.

我做了很多标注，都不知道自己标了多少，大概有50%吧。

I highlighted, like, I don't even know how much, maybe 50% of this thing.

最近，辛格尔顿开始涉足股市。

More recently, Singleton has been turning his hand to the stock market.

他完全是偶然地被推上了投资组合经理的位置。

He was stressed into the role of portfolio manager quite by accident.

他说，如果不是Teledyne的Argonaut保险子公司在1974年因承保医疗事故保险而陷入严重困境，这件事可能根本不会发生。

It might never have happened, he says, if Teledyne's r Argonaut insurance subsidiary had not gotten into serious trouble writing medical malpractice insurance in 1974.

辛格顿将他所有的保险投资组合全部转为现金，以备不时之需。

Singleton converted all of his insurance portfolios into liquid cash to be ready for disaster.

那里确实留出了安全边际。

Just got a margin of safety there.

但这场灾难从未发生。

That disaster never came.

因此，他不得不面对重新投资的任务，并决定在这一领域也采取创新而大胆的方式。

So the job of reinvesting faced him, and he decided to be innovative and daring in his approach there too.

他绝不追逐任何投资潮流。

No investing fads for him.

指数化投资这个想法，我不相信，也不会去追随，”他带着轻蔑的语气说。

The idea of indexing isn't something I believe in or would follow, he says, with scorn.

而且，如果你不懂如何评估企业价值，那你当然会想通过指数化来跟从市场。

And again, if you don't know how to value businesses, then of course you wanna index for the market.

对吧？

Right?

那就是他们的意思，你的回报和市场一样。

That's what they're I mean, you're you're getting the same return as the market.

但对于像西尔万这样的、像索普这样的、像巴菲特这样觉得自己有某种天赋的人来说，不，完全不是这样。

But for people like Singleton, people like Thorpe, people that don't really like, people like Buffett that feel they have a some kind of talent, like, no.

我为什么要这么做呢？

Why would I do that?

当我能将回报提高三倍甚至四倍时，我为什么要接受你的回报？

I don't want your your return when I can triple or quadruple that return.

在选股时，他摒弃了华尔街的教条，依靠自己的经验。

In choosing stocks, he rejected Wall Street's dogma and relied on his own experience.

西尔万决定买入那些他认为管理良好且被低估的公司。

Singleton decided to buy those he felt were well run and undervalued.

分析师们回避其他 conglomerates，就像他们回避Teledyne一样，这反而让他更容易以低价购入。

That and that that analysts were shunning other conglomerates as they shunned Teledyne only made it easier for him to get a good price.

西尔万最大的举动是将超过1.3亿美元、占其整个投资组合25%的资产投入Litton公司。

Singleton's biggest move was to put a 100 over 130,000,000, 25% of his equity of his entire portfolio into Litton.

这是利顿工业公司。

This is Litton Industries.

再说一遍，如果你查阅你可访问的笔记，就会发现这一点。

Again, that goes back if you search the notes that you have access to.

记住，作为MiFID会员，你享有终身访问权限。

Remember, you have lifetime access as part of your benefits for being MiFID.

请好好利用它。

Please use it.

我认为这是一个非常好的资源。

It's I think it's a great resource.

如果我不相信这些资料的价值，我不会花数小时、数年的时间去整理它们。

I wouldn't waste, you know, hours and hours and years of my life compiling them if I didn't believe that.

但你可以搜索一下查理·芒格的分散投资、沃伦·巴菲特的分散投资。

But just search Charlie Munger diversification, Warren Buff diversification.

你就会看到这一点。

You'll see that.

他们认为分散投资是无稽之谈。

They think diversification's nonsense.

辛格顿说他并不是这个意思，但他的言辞却如此。

Singleton is say he's not saying that, but he in words.

他的行动才真正表达了这一点。

He's saying that in actions.

我要把1.3亿美元——我全部资产的25%，也就是四分之一——投入一家公司。

I'm gonna put a 130,000,000, 25% of everything I have, one fourth of everything I have into one company.

到目前为止，结果如何？

What's the results at this point?

如今，这些持股的价值已达2.7亿美元。

Now the holdings are worth $270,000,000.

现在，另一家公司的某个人在谈论辛格顿。

Now we have some other guy of another company talking about Singleton.

他说，这是一笔高达1.4亿美元的惊人收益。

He says, that was a fabulous $140,000,000 gain.

但当亨利第一次把所有资金都投入一只股票时，我以为他疯了。

But when Henry first put all that in one stock, I thought he'd gone crazy.

然后西尔万就像说，这其实并不复杂。

And then Singleton's just like, this is not complicated.

我觉得莱顿是一个稳健的投资。

I felt Lytton was a sound investment.

当一家大型公司因为某个问题的担忧而导致股价下跌时，买入拥有优质业务的公司是明智的。

It's good to buy a large company with fine businesses when the price is beaten down over worry about one problem.

所以他指的是，当时他这么做时，莱顿正与美国海军经历一场昂贵而漫长的造船纠纷。

So he's referring to the fact that at the time he's doing this, Lytton was going through a costly and protracted shipbuilding fracas with the US Navy.

那么西尔万是怎么想的？为什么别人都害怕？

So how did Singleton like, why is everybody else scared?

对吧？

Right?

别人都害怕，因为我们从他们的行动中看得出来。

Everybody else scared because we know by their actions.

股价正在下跌，这意味着卖方和买方都在增加。

The stock price is going, which means there's more sellers and buyers.

对吧？

Right?

他说，Lyndon的问题不是普遍性的，而是一个孤立的问题，就像我们对Argonaut保险公司的状况一样。

And he says he adds, Lyndon's problem was not a general one, but an isolated problem as ours was with Argonaut Insurance.

对我来说，这正是我所说的极度理性。

To me, this is what I mean about being supremely rational.

听听他在说什么。

Listen to what he's saying here.

对我来说，很难相信一个价值30亿或40亿美元的企业负责人会处理不了一个业务问题。

To me, it's hard to believe that heads of a 3 or $4,000,000,000 business would not be able to handle one business problem.

目前，Singleton超过50%的股权组合都集中在多元化企业上。

Currently, Singleton has over 50% of his equity portfolio in conglomerates.

所以他仍然是个忠实的支持者。

So he's still a big fan.

现在，其他所有投资者都不喜欢。

Right now, everybody else in the investors like, no.

我们不喜欢这个。

We don't like this.

他说，我觉得它们太棒了。

He's like, oh, I think they're fantastic.

哦，你不喜欢它们？

Oh, you don't like them?

很好。

Good.

我就能以更低的价格买入了。

I'm just gonna be able buy them for cheaper.

谢谢。

Thank you.

辛格顿早已平息了关于他增持股票是为了控制莱顿及其他他买入股票公司的传言。

Singleton has long since put to rest the speculation that he was accumulating shares to go for control of Lytton and the other companies whose stocks he was buying.

现在这一点我可以肯定地说。

Now this is gonna be this is I I do I know for a fact.

哦，我不该说我可以肯定。

Oh, I shouldn't say I know for a fact.

我几乎可以确定，沃伦·巴菲特也读过这篇文章。

I'm almost as sure as anybody could be that Warren Buffett has also read this article.

考虑到他阅读量之大，以及他多次提到多么钦佩亨利·西尔弗曼，说他从未读过我现在念给你的这篇文章，我完全不信。

As much as that guy reads and as much as he talks about how he admires Henry Singleton, the idea that he's never read the article I'm I'm reading to you now is I don't believe that at all.

你会看到的，因为巴菲特后来也采用了大量类似的理念。

And you're gonna see because there's a lot of these ideas like Buffett does years later.

他曾说，阅读让他变得富有。

He tells his readings made him rich.

这是沃伦·巴菲特的原话。

That's a direct quote from Warren Buffett.

他说：‘我什么都读。’

He's like, I read everything.

读书，读10-K报告，阅读让我致富。

Read books, read 10 k's, readings made me rich.

好的。

Okay.

所以他提到，人们说：‘你是在买一个球。’

So he says people saying, hey, you're buying a ball.

你想掌控一切。

You wanna control.

但他会说：听好了，问题就在这里。

And he's like, peep now here's the problem though.

对吧？

Right?

他们说你想掌控，是因为他们用普通人的思维方式在思考。

They're saying you wanna control because they're thinking like conventional people think.

但如果你用常规思维，就无法理解像西尔万这样特立独行的人。

But if you think conventionally, you're not gonna understand a misfit like Singleton.

这对你来说根本无法理解。

It doesn't even compute to you.

以这种方式投机的人是在做常规判断，这正是大多数 conglomerators 的运作方式。

People who speculate that way were making conventional judgments, that's the way most conglomerators work.

但如果你买入足够多的股票，就能充分了解财务报表和整体情况，然后再通过要约收购来获得控制权。

But in buy enough stock to get a good look at the books and a feel for the situation, then go for the control via a tender offer.

但 Singleton 并不像大多数 conglomerators 那样。

But Singleton isn't like most conglomerators.

听听他对要约收购这一话题的推理。

Listen to his reasoning on the subject of tenders.

这是 Singleton 的原话。

This is a quote from Singleton now.

在这个要约收购意味着管理层为追求规模扩张而不惜任何代价的环境下，我更倾向于收购其他公司的部分股权。

In this climate where tender offers mean overpaying by managements, which want to grow at any price, I prefer to buy pieces of other companies.

这正是沃伦在致股东的信中反复提到的内容。

That's direct that Warren talks about that constantly in the shareholder letters.

在公开市场上购买部分股份，比收购整个公司能获得更优的价格。

You can get better prices buying pieces on the open market than you can for acquisitions.

让我讲完，因为西格蒙特的这段话和巴菲特得出的结论是一样的。

Let me finish this because this is this quote from Singleton is is is the same came to the same Buffett comes to same conclusion.

所以他说，我更倾向于购买其他公司的部分股份，或者买我们自己的股票，或者从内部扩张。

So he says, I prefer to buy pieces of other companies or our own stock or expand from within.

为什么价格会这样？

The price why?

这才是我的主要观点。

This is my main point.

或者准确地说，是他的主要观点，也是巴菲特的主要观点。

Or not my main point, his main point and Buffett's main point.

收购一家完整公司的价格太高了，实在太高了。

The price for buying an entire company is too much is too much.

你毫无理由地支付了溢价。

You're paying a premium for no reason.

你为什么要这么做？

Why would you do that?

以今天所需的溢价进行要约收购会损害而非提升我们的股本回报率，所以我们不这么做。

Tendering at the premiums required today would hurt, not help our return on equity, so we don't do it.

许多企业认为，即使以远高于市价的溢价收购，也比自建更便宜，但辛格尔顿却问：为什么要在要约收购中以十倍收益的价格购买一家公司，而我却可以以六倍收益的价格收购公司股份，以五倍收益的价格收购自己的股票呢？

Where many businesses say that it is where many businesses say that it's cheaper, even at big premiums of the market price, to buy rather than to build, Singleton is saying, why pay 10 times earning in a tender for a company when I can buy pieces of companies for six times earnings and my own stock for five times earnings?

这是一种僵化的法律逻辑，但并非流行的观点。

Rigid law logic that but not the fashionable view.

这正是研究这些人的意义所在。

And that's the point of studying these these people.

他们通过经验学到了一些东西，而这些是你在任何学校都学不到的。

These they they've learned things through their experience that you are not gonna learn in any school.

这是不可能的。

It's impossible.

没有人能教你如何创业。

There it's no one can teach you entrepreneurship.

你所能做的，就是把这些我认为是工具的想法，放进你的工具箱里。

All you can hope to do is take these ideas, which I consider tools, put them in a tool belt.

你可能五年后、十年后才会用到这个想法。

You might use that idea five years from now, ten years from now.

你根本不知道什么时候会用到它。

You have no idea when you use it.

但这就是我想说的。

But that's what I'm talking about.

比如，如果你听这个是因为你想在工作上做得更好，对吧？并且希望打造一个更好的企业。

Like, wouldn't you rather be like, as far as if if you wanna you wanna assuming you're listening to this because you wanna, like, do better at work, right, and hopefully build a a better business.

什么才能帮助你打造一个更好的企业？

Like, what's gonna help you build a better business?

是像辛格尔顿那样思考，还是追随潮流观点？

Thinking about in the terms that Singleton is or following Fashionable View.

谁在乎潮流观点？

Who cares about Fashionable View?

西尔维斯特当然没有。

Singleton certainly didn't.

尽管泰莱达因公司资金充裕，为什么亨利·西尔维斯特仍然坚决拒绝向股东派发现金，除非股东用股票交换？

Liquid as Teledyne is, why does Henry Singleton still flatly refuse to disperse cash to his own stockholders except in exchange for their shares?

我特别喜欢这一部分。

I love that part.

这正是我之前提到的：当我们谈到他为什么不派发股息时，我会读给你这段话。

And this is what I meant earlier when I mentioned, like, when when we get to the point why he doesn't pay dividend, I'm gonna read this paragraph from you.

我实在找不出任何逻辑漏洞，真的挑不出毛病。

I I I can't find any, like, any ill any like, I can't pick on any of his logic here.

我真的挑不出来。

I I just can't.

他说，首先，他会问：股东拿到这笔钱会做什么？

He says, to begin with, he asks, what would the stockholder do with the money?

花掉吗？

Spend it?

Teledyne不是一只收益型股票。

Teledyne is not an income stock.

他们会再投资吗？

Would they reinvest it?

由于Teledyne的股本回报率为33%，他认为自己为股东再投资的收益比股东自己投资更好。

Since Teledyne earns 33% on equity, he argues he can reinvest it better for them than they could for themselves.

此外，这些利润已经缴过税了。

Besides, the profits have already been taxed.

如果以股息形式发放，还会被二次征税。

Paid out as dividends, they get taxed a second time.

我为什么要让股东的资金面临双重征税？

Why would I subject my stockholders' money to double taxation?

还有一件事，我先跳过一下。

One thing and I'm skipping ahead.

亨利·西蒙森让外界感到不适的一点，也是导致他在华尔街股价受挫的原因，是他与外界交流时那种神谕般的说话方式。

One thing that puts people off about Henry Singleton that has hurt his stock on Wall Street is his Delphic way of talking with outsiders.

他想表现得有魅力时是可以的，但等等。

He can be charming when he wants to be, but he but but wait.

他想表现得有魅力时是可以的，但说得模棱两可。

He can be charming when he wants to be, so but charmingly vague.

他用笼统的言辞说话，让提问者自己去填补关键细节。

He speaks in general terms, leaving the questioner to fill in the vital details.

例如，我相信最大限度的灵活性，这样我就能保留随时根据外部环境变化而调整任何立场的权利。

For example, I believe in maximum flexibility so I can reserve the right to change my position on any subject when the external environment relating to any topic changes too.

你怎么知道什么是理性的人的标志？

How do you know what's a sign of a rational person?

关键是，他们不会过于执着于某种意识形态。

It's the fact that, like, they don't they're not overly focused on like ideology.

就像芒格告诉我们的，如果你过于偏向意识形态，认为你的想法和你自己无法分离，那你的大脑就会变成搭桥手术。

Like Munger has told us, like too if you lean too heavy into ideology and think that you are there's no separation between your ideas and and the person you are, like it's gonna turn your brain into CABG.

西尔弗曼告诉我们，我就要保持灵活。

Singleton is telling us, like, I'm just gonna be flexible.

当外部环境发生变化时，我会随之调整。

When when the the the environment outside of me changes, then I'm going to adapt to that.

我为什么要固守一种僵化的形式，还觉得世界必须适应我呢？

Why would I just have this rigid form and be and think that the world needs to adapt to me.

世界并不在乎我。

The world doesn't care about me.

所以他说，这实际上回到了那篇文章。

So he says this is actually the the the back to the article.

这是他的原话。

This is an quote from him.

他说，特莱德因公司就像一台强大的复合收入机器。

He says Teledyne Teledyne functions as a powerful compound income machine.

以30%的回报率投资并再投资，资金将在三年内翻倍。

Money invested and reinvested at 30% return doubles itself in less than three years.

而特莱德因公司的收益远超30%。

And Teledyne is earning well over 30%.

我现在快讲完了。

I'm almost at the end now.

他说，没有人能准确预测亨利·西门子明年或下一个十年会做什么，因为没人知道明年或下一个十年的世界会变成什么样。

So he says, nobody nobody knows precisely what Henry Singleton is going to do next year or next decade because nobody knows what the world is going to be like next year or next decade.

这就是西门子所说的。

And this is what Singleton says.

我非常喜欢这句话。

And I love this.

我从不以任何僵化的定义来界定我的工作，而是根据在任何时刻什么最符合公司利益来决定该做什么。

I do not define my job in any rigid terms, but in terms of having the freedom to do whatever seems to me to be in the best interest of the company at any given time.

正如他的履历所显示的，这绝非空话。

As his record shows, this is no empty phrase.

这让我首先想到，我觉得这是最好的方式，所以我根本不用任何日历。

So this this made me first of I think this is the best so I don't keep any kind of, like, calendar at all.

对吧？

Right?

我从马克·安德森身上学到的一个教训是。

And one of the lessons I learned was from Marc Andreessen.

我提到过这个，我想是在《创始人》第50期。

I covered this, I think it's on Founders Number 50.

当时我读了马克所有的博客文章。

When I did, I read all of Marc's blog posts.

那是一本电子书。

It was an e book.

这些博客文章现在网上已经找不到了，但他现在经营的公司Sixteen Z允许你免费下载这本电子书。

Somebody, the blog posts are not on the line anymore, but his company he runs now, a sixteen z, will let you like download the e book for free.

我推荐你去读一读。

I recommend doing it.

非常精彩。

It's fantastic.

其中一篇提到，他所说的最棒的个人效率秘诀就是不设日程表。

And one of these says, he says the greatest personal productivity hack is not having a schedule.

但这并不意味着你每天都不知道该做什么。

And it doesn't mean, like, you don't know what you're doing every day.

但这是辛格尔顿所说的。

But this is what Singleton's saying.

意思是，如果你没有日程安排，如果你的日历不是这样：早上九点必须做这个，十点十五分必须到那里，就像一堆乐高积木一样。

It's like, if you don't have a schedule, if you don't if you're not like if you're if you're if your schedule, like, calendar's not like, you know, 09:00 I have to do it here and at 10:15 I have to be here and, you know, kinda like it's like like a set of Legos.

你的每一段时间都被安排得明明白白。

Like, your time is accounted for.

那你什么时候思考呢？

When are you gonna think?

所以，这是我曾经以为自己拥有的一个东西。

And so so that's one thing I that I thought I had.

但不仅如此，我觉得更好的做法是每天问自己：我现在正在做的最有价值的事情是什么？

But not only that, it's like I think the better schedule is like asking yourself, what is the single most valuable thing I've been working on right now?

如果你每天只问自己这个问题，然后去执行它，长期来看，你创造的价值会远超过提前规划两周后周四的那场会议。

And if you just ask yourself that every day and then do that, you're gonna create more value over the long term than you will sit trying to plan in advance for this meeting to have two two Thursdays from next week.

所以这个，我不确定是否适用于工作，但我的个人生活是这样的。

So this I I don't know it applies to work, but my personal life.

你知道，我和大多数现代人一样，会和朋友或其他人互动。

You know, I'm like most modern people, like, you have you interact with other people, friends or whatever.

我有一些朋友，他们总是这样：哦，对，要一起去吃晚饭吗？

And I have some friends that have this where it's just like, okay, oh, yeah, wanna grab dinner?

下个星期四三周后怎么样？

How does three weeks from Thursday sound?

我从来不会这么做。

It's like, I'm not ever doing that.

不，绝不。

Like, no.

你想出来聚一聚？

You you wanna hang out?

我不会这么做的。

Like, I'm not I'm not doing that.

我不知道自己将来会做什么。

I have no idea what I'm gonna be.

像我无法提前那么久做出承诺。

Like, I can't commit to something that far in advance.

我不知道那是不是我时间的最佳安排，或者我到时候有没有空之类的。

I don't know if that's the best use of my time or if I'm be available or whatever the case is.

然后我会说，你想一起吃晚饭吗？

And I go, you wanna have dinner?

告诉我，早上给我打电话或发消息。

Tell me the the call text me in the morning.

嘿，今晚能一起吃晚饭吗？

Hey, can you have dinner tonight?

或者，嘿，明晚能一起吃晚饭吗？

Or, hey, can you have dinner tomorrow night?

那样的话我就去。

Then I'll do that.

但这种想法——我要用日历跟你来回折腾，不行。

But this idea where I'm gonna play this, like, calendar, like, go back and forth with you, like, no.

我不会这么做的。

I'm not doing that.

我觉得这真是个糟糕透顶的主意。

I think that's that's that's a terrible, terrible idea.

我理解这可能是大多数人安排事情的方式，等等。

And I understand that's, like, how most people schedule and whatever.

如果人们想这样，那我也想这样。

If that's how people wanna be, that's how I wanna be.

我只是对这个问题的回答是明确的：不行。

It's just I don't my answer to that is unequivocally, no.

我不会这么做的。

I'm not doing that.

我觉得西ingleton正在专业领域告诉我们这一点。

And I think Singleton is is telling us that in the professional, like, professional domain.

他说：‘我不以任何僵化的定义来界定我的工作，而是根据在任何时刻做出最符合公司利益的决定来拥有自由。’

He's like, well, I'm not I don't define my my job in any rigid terms, but in terms of having the freedom to do what seems to be the best interest of the company at any given time.

然后这篇文章的最后一句话，我将转向这本书：Singleton 找到了一种以创业和创新的方式运营一家数十亿美元公司的方法，这非常非常罕见。

And then the last sentence from this article, and I'm gonna jump into the book, is Singleton has found a way to run a multi multibillion dollar company in an entrepreneurial and innovative way, which is very, very rare.

好的。

Okay.

那么，让我们回到《门外汉》这本书。

So let's go back to now I'm gonna go back to the outsiders.

我们来看看。

And let's see.

让我感到有趣的是，尽管作者索恩代克 profiling 了八个人，

So what's fascinating to me is even though Thorndyke, the author, is he's profiling eight people.

但前言的标题叫‘Singleton 城’。

The preface is called Singleton Ville.

他虽然 profiling 了八个人，但显然在告诉你，他认为谁是史上最佳CEO。

So he's profiling eight people, but he's clearly telling you who he thinks is the best CEO of all time.

他在这里会使用‘首席执行官’这个词。

And he's gonna use the word CEO here.

这当然适用于首席执行官。

Sure applies to CEOs.

就我们的目的而言，我会使用‘创始人’这个词。

For our point, I'm gonna use founder.

明白吗？

Okay?

所以他说，他会给我们简要概述一下他为什么钦佩西尔万，以及书中他所 profiling 的其他人物——包括沃伦·巴菲特和一大堆其他人——是如何呼应西尔万的运营方式的。

So it says I'm gonna he's gonna give us like a brief overview of why he admires Singleton and then how the other people in the book that he's profiling, which include Warren Buffett and there's a bunch of other people, kinda echo Singleton's, like, how he how he operates.

他说，如今只有少数投资者知道亨利·西尔万，他是一位非凡的人物，其背景对于一位首席执行官来说非同寻常。

He says, known today today only to a small group of investors, Henry Singleton was a remarkable man with an unusual background for a CEO.

想想创始人。

Think founder.

这位世界级的数学家喜欢盲下象棋，曾在攻读电气工程博士学位期间，为麻省理工学院编程了第一台计算机。

A world class mathematician who enjoyed playing chess blindfolded, he had programmed MIT's first computer while earning a doctorate in electrical engineering.

在第二次世界大战期间，他开发了让盟军舰船躲避雷达探测的技术。

During World War two, he developed technology that allowed allied ships to avoid radar detection.

在20世纪50年代，他创造了至今仍被大多数军用和商用飞机所采用的导航系统。

And in the nineteen fifties, he created guidance systems that's still in use with most military and commercial aircrafts.

在20世纪60年代初，他创立了多元化企业泰德奈公司，并成为历史上最伟大的创始人之一。

All that before he founded a conglomerate, Teledyne, in the early nineteen sixties and became one of history's great founders.

conglomerates 是20世纪60年代的互联网股票，当时大量此类公司上市。

Conglomerates were the Internet stock of the nineteen sixties when large numbers of them went public.

然而，西尔万特经营的是一家非常独特的多元化企业。

Singleton, however, ran a very unusual conglomerate.

所以这部分内容可能会有些重复，我会反复提到。

So some of this is gonna be like, it's gonna be me repeating myself.

我并不回避这一点。

I'm not I don't shy away from that.

我之前就跟你们说过，我认为声誉具有说服力，而我制作这个播客的目标，就是让这些理念传播开来。

I've told you before, like, I think reputation is persuasive, and I I my goal here to create this podcast is to get these ideas spread.

而且我认为重复有助于你随着时间推移更好地掌握这些内容。

And it's to to I think repeating things helps you learn them over time.

你会惊讶的，我经常回头翻看自己的标注，然后心想：哦，我居然忘了这一点。

You'd be surprised, like, how much like, I go back and read my highlights all the time and, like, oh, I forgot about that.

我们的记忆并不完美。

Like, our memories are they're not they're imperfect.

所以希望你不要介意这种重复，但这是很重要的。

So I hope you don't mind the repetition, but it's important.

在他成名之前很久，他就积极回购自己的股票，最终购入了超过90%的Teledyne股份。

Long before he became popular, he aggressively repurchased his stocks, eventually buying in over 90% of Teledyne shares.

这太疯狂了。

That's bananas.

他回避分红，重视现金流而非账面收益，管理着一个以高度分权著称的组织，并且从未进行过股票拆分。

He avoided dividends, emphasizing cash flow over reported earnings, ran a famously decentralized organization, and never split the company's stock.

这简直就是巴菲特的风格，在整个七十年代和八十年代，这是股价最高的股票。

That's Buffett right there, which for much of the nineteen seventies and eighties was highest priced stock.

他因不愿与分析师或记者交谈而被称为斯芬克斯，也从未登上过《财富》杂志的封面。

He is known as a sphinx for his reluctance to speak with either analysts or journalists, and he never once appeared on the cover of Fortune magazine.

辛格尔顿是个特立独行的人，他选择的非传统道路在华尔街和商界引起了大量议论和不安。

Singleton was an iconoclast, and the idiosyncratic path he chose to follow caused much comment and consternation on Wall Street and in the business spread.

事实证明，他忽视那些怀疑者是正确的。

It turned out he was right to ignore the skeptics.

他那些更知名的同行，那些参加大会、发表演讲、接受杂志专访的人，长期回报如何呢？

The long term returns of his better known peers, these are the people going to the conferences, giving the speeches, applying the mag being profiled in magazines.

对吧？

Right?

他那些更知名的同行的长期表现普遍平庸，年均回报仅为11%，仅略高于标普500指数。

The long term results of his better known peers were generally mediocre, averaging only 11% per year, a small improvement over the S and P 500.

相比之下，辛格尔顿执掌泰莱丹近三十年，其投资者的年均复合回报达到了惊人的20.4%。

Singleton, in contrast, ran Teledyne for almost thirty years, and the annual compound return for to his investors was an extraordinary 20.4%.

你来看看这个。

Now check this out.

这会让你大吃一惊。

It's gonna blow your mind.

如果你在1963年以一美元投资于西尔万，到1960年他退休时，尽管市场正处于严重的熊市，这笔投资也会增值到180美元。

If you had invested a dollar with Singleton in 1963 by 1960 when he retired as chairman in the teeth of a severe bear market, it would have been worth a $180.

现在你明白为什么克劳德·香农大量投资于Teledyne，获得了如此惊人的回报率了，这一点我在播客《不幸的公式》中提到过。

Now you can see why Claude Shannon, who invested heavily in Telenai, had such a fabulous rate of return, which I covered in the podcast Unfortunate's Formula.

我觉得我当时忘了他的投资组合中Teledyne占了多大比例，大概是30%，也许60%。

I think it was like I forgot how much of his portfolio that Telenai was like 30%, maybe 60%.

记不清确切的数字了。

Don't remember the exact number.

这是克劳德·香农投资组合中的重要组成部分。

It was a large point part part of Claude Shannon's portfolio.

他的成功并非源于Teledyne拥有任何独特且快速增长的业务。

His success did not stem from Teledyne owning any unique rapidly growing businesses.

相反，Teledyne区别于其他公司的关键，在于他对资本配置这一重要但略显神秘的领域的精通。

Rather, much of what distinguished Teledyne from his peers lay in his mastery of the critical but somewhat mysterious field of capital allocation.

决定如何配置公司资源以实现股东回报最大化的过程。

The process of deciding how to deploy the firm's resources to earn the best possible return for shareholders.

继续看前言，其中提到，辛格尔顿的关注点不同。

Continuing in the preface, it says, Singleton had a different focus.

其实，那是我的笔记。

Actually, that's my notes.

那是我的笔记。

That's my note.

创始人要想成功，需要做好两件事。

Founders need to do two two things well to be successful.

高效运营业务，并将业务产生的现金流进行合理配置。

Run their operations efficiently and deploy the cash generated by those operations.

对吧？

Right?

这是两种完全不同的技能，根本不是一回事。

That's those are complete two completely different skills, It's not the same thing.

就像我之前跟你说的，我非常喜欢这篇文章。

Just like I told you before, I love this article.

我觉得他叫摩根·豪塞尔之类的。

I think his name's like Morgan Housel or something.

他写了一篇很棒的文章。

He wrote this great essay.

致富是一种技能，而守富则是完全不同的另一种技能。

It's like, the getting rich is one skill, staying rich is a completely different skill.

所以文章说，管理类书籍中的大多数创始人关注的是运营管理，这无疑非常重要。

So it says most founders in the management books they write or read focus on managing operations, which is undeniably important.

相比之下，辛格顿则把大部分注意力放在了后者上。

Singleton, in contrast, gave most of its attention to the late to the latter task.

和巴菲特一样。

Same thing as Buffett.

对吧？

Right?

现在这是巴菲特关于资本配置的说法。

Now this is Buffett on capital allocation.

我们还在前言部分。

We're still in the preface.

等我讲到关于Singleton的章节时，我会告诉你的。

I'll tell you when I get to the chapter on singleton.

事实上，这个角色可能是任何创始人最重要的职责。

In fact, this role just might be the most important responsibility any founder has.

然而，尽管它如此重要，顶尖商学院却没有任何关于资本配置的课程。

And yet despite its importance, there are no courses on capital allocation at the top business schools.

正如沃伦·巴菲特所观察到的，很少有CEO或创始人能为这项关键任务做好准备。

As Warren Buffett has observed, very few CEOs slash founders come prepared for this critical task.

许多公司的高管并不擅长资本配置。

The heads of many companies are not skilled in capital allocation.

他们在这方面的不足并不令人意外。

Their inaccuracy in inadequacy is not surprising.

大多数老板之所以能升至顶层，是因为他们在市场营销、生产、工程、行政或有时是组织政治等领域表现出色。

Most bosses rise to the top because they have excelled in areas such as marketing, production, engineering, administration, or sometimes institutional politics.

一旦成为CEO，他们就必须做出资本配置决策——这是一个至关重要的职责，但他们可能从未接触过，也很难精通。

Once they become CEO, they now must make capital allocation decisions, a critical job that they may have never tackled and one that is not easily mastered.

为了更进一步说明，这里巴菲特提供了一个绝佳的例证或类比。

To stretch the point, it this is such a great illustration or analogy here from Buffett.

打个比方，这就像一位才华横溢的音乐家，最终的成就不是在卡内基音乐厅演出，而是被任命为美联储主席。

To stretch the point, it is as if the final step for a highly talented musician was not to perform at Carnegie Hall, but instead to be named the chairman of the Federal Reserve.

现在我们来看看辛格顿的方法。

So now this is Singleton's approach.

对吧？

Right?

我们马上就要深入探讨这一点。

We're gonna get into that.

辛格顿是一位资本配置大师，他在各种配置选择之间的决策与同行截然不同，这些决策极大地提升了股东的长期回报。

Singleton was a master capital allocator, and his decisions in navigating among those these various allocation alternatives differed significantly from the decisions his peers were making that had an enormous positive impact on long term returns for his shareholders.

具体来说，西格蒙德将泰莱达因的资本集中在选择性收购和一系列大规模股票回购上。

Specifically, Singleton focused Teledyne's capital on selective acquisitions and a series of large share repurchases.

而且他还根据不同时间采用了不同的策略。

And he also used employed different strategies at different time.

所以当他能用股票作为支付手段时，他就充分利用这一点，收购了大量公司。

So he go winds up going when when he could use stock as currency, He he wound up taking advantage of it by buying up a lot of companies.

然后我认为他后来完全停止了。

And then once he I think he stopped completely.

他再也没有收购更多公司。

He never bought more companies.

我不确定。

I don't know.

我想说，大概持续了十年或十五年。

I I wanna say for, like, ten or fifteen years.

可能是二十年，类似这么长时间。

It might have been twenty years, something like that.

但他会根据环境变化调整策略。

But he switches strategies depending on the the environment.

这家伙最疯狂的地方就在这里。

That's what's what's crazy about this guy.

他能够驾驭如此多不同的环境。

Like, he's able to master so many different environments.

因此，辛格尔顿将资本集中在选择性收购和一系列大规模股票回购上。

So it says, Singleton focused capital on selective acquisitions and a series of large share repurchases.

他在发行股票方面非常克制，频繁使用债务，但并不持有过多现金。

He was restrained in issuing shares, made frequent use of debt, and did not now hold on.

他频繁使用债务，但他真正做的是用债务回购股权。

He made frequent use of debt, but he what he did is he used it to buy back equity.

由于这些业务产生了大量现金流，他积极偿还债务。

And then because the businesses were throwing off so much cash flow, he aggressively paid down the debt.

这一点被忽略了，但在我看来非常重要。

So that was left out, but that's that's important in my opinion.

并且直到二十世纪八十年代末才开始支付股息。

And did not pay a dividend until late nineteen eighties.

相比之下，其他多元化企业采取了完全相反的资源配置策略：积极发行股票来收购公司，支付股息，避免股票回购，并且总体上使用较少的债务。

In contrast, the other conglomerates pursued a mirror image allocation strategy, actively issuing shares to buy companies, paying dividends, avoiding share repurchases, and generally using less debt.

所以请记住，我们正在比较和对比这两种策略。

So just remember this, that the idea that we're comparing and contrasting.

他只是说这是一种镜像关系。

He just says it's a mirror image.

所以我们有了辛格顿的策略，而其他所有人则在另一侧。

So we got Singleton's strategy and then everybody else on the other side.

记住，当这个播客接近尾声时，你会看到他为什么这么说，以及他关于这一点的原话。

Remember when it gets to the end of this podcast because you'll see what he why he said what he what he says about this.

这非常有趣，而且非常简洁。

It's very interesting and very succinct.

简而言之，他们使用了一套不同的工具，取得了截然不同的结果。

In short, they deployed a different set of tools with very different results.

如果你更广泛地将资本配置视为资源配置，并包括人力资源的配置，你会发现西尔万斯特的方法依然非常独特。

If you think of capital allocation more broadly as resource allocation and include the deployment of human resources, you find again that Singleton had a very highly differentiated approach.

具体来说，他主张一种极端的组织分权模式，总部的公司职员极少，而业务单元的运营责任和权力则集中在总经理手中。

Specifically, he believed in an extreme form of organizational decentralization with a wafer thin corporate staff at headquarters and operational responsibility and authority concentrated in the general manager of the business units.

得了吧。

Come on.

那是什么？

What is that?

那是谁？

Who is that?

你把西尔万斯特换成巴菲特，这个说法依然完全正确。

You take out Singleton and put in Buffett, and that is still exactly right.

想想看，在他的股东信中，他有多少次提到这一点。

Think about how many times in his shareholder letters, he talks about this.

他总是说：‘我们总部的人手实在太臃肿了。’

He's like, oh, we're getting real bloated at HQ.