伊朗战争会引发第三次世界大战吗？

这些天，新闻好像每小时都在变化。

These days, it feels like the news changes every hour.

嗯，NPR 也有一个做这种内容的播客。

Well, NPR has a podcast that does that too.

NPR News Now 每小时为您带来一集全新的五分钟节目，提供最新、最重要的新闻头条，内容清晰、基于事实、易于理解。

NPR News Now brings you a fresh five minute episode every hour of the day with the latest, most important headlines in episodes that are clear, fact based, and easy to digest.

请在 NPR 应用程序或您收听播客的任何平台收听 NPR News Now。

Listen to NPR news now on the NPR app or wherever you get your podcasts.

这是新鲜空气。

This is fresh air.

我是特里·格罗斯。

I'm Terry Gross.

伊朗的新最高领袖穆萨·纳博克·哈梅内伊是前最高领袖阿亚图拉·哈梅内伊的儿子，后者在战争初期的一次以色列袭击中丧生。

Iran's new supreme leader, Moshe Nabok Khamenei, is the son of the former supreme leader, Ayatollah Khamenei, who was killed in an Israeli attack at the start of the war.

穆萨·纳博克与他的父亲相比如何？他可能会成为怎样的领导人？

How does Moshe Nabok compare with his father, and what kind of leader might he be?

战争爆发前，阿亚图拉政权屠杀了数千名抗议者。

Before the war, the Ayatollah's regime massacred thousands of protesters.

特朗普总统向抗议者传递了这条信息。

President Trump sent the protesters this message.

等我们完成时，就接管你们的政府。

When we're finished, take over your government.

它将属于你们去夺取。

It will be yours to take.

但这场战争是否帮助了抗议者？我们是否正濒临第三次世界大战？

But has this war helped the protesters, and are we on the verge of World War three?

我的嘉宾卡里姆·萨贾德普尔将回答这些问题。

Those are some of the questions my guest Karim Sadjadpour will address.

他是美国最顶尖的伊朗问题专家之一。

He's one of America's leading experts on Iran.

他是卡内基国际和平基金会的高级研究员，专注于伊朗及美国对中东的外交政策。

He's a senior fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, where he focuses on Iran and US foreign policy toward The Middle East.

他还是乔治城大学的兼职教授，也是《大西洋月刊》的撰稿人。

He's also an adjunct professor at Georgetown University and a contributing writer at The Atlantic.

他的父母是伊朗人，但他出生并成长于美国。

His parents are Iranian, but he was born and raised in The US.

我们昨天录制了这次访谈。

We recorded our interview yesterday.

今天早上，我们得知一次以色列的袭击杀死了伊朗最高国家安全委员会主席阿里·拉里贾尼。

This morning, we learned that an Israeli attack killed Ali Larajani, the head of Iran's Supreme National Security Council.

他与哈梅内伊关系密切，原本有望成为莫什塔巴的亲密顾问。

He was close with Ayatollah Khamenei and was expected to be a close adviser to Moishtaba.

今天早上，我们向卡里姆·萨贾德普尔询问了拉里贾尼之死的意义。

This morning, we asked Karim Sadjadpour about the significance of Larijani's death.

他说：‘拉里贾尼是伊朗最有权势的人物之一，一个冷酷的实用主义者。’

He says, quote, Larijani was one of Iran's most powerful men, a ruthless pragmatist.

在阿亚图拉去世后，拉里贾尼是掌管国家的几位关键人物之一。

After the Ayatollah's death, Larajani was one of the men running the country.

在政权生存岌岌可危的时刻，拉里贾尼数十年的国内和外交政策经验使他的去世成为重大打击。

At a time when the regime's survival is at stake, Larajani's decades of domestic and foreign policy experience make his loss a significant blow.

对于一个以殉道为政治意识形态核心的革命政权而言，核心问题是：这些暗杀最终会彻底消灭这一意识形态，还是会助其复兴。

For a revolutionary regime whose political ideology is premised on martyrdom, the central question is whether these assassinations will ultimately extinguish the ideology or help revive it, unquote.

这是我们之前的采访。

Here's our interview.

卡里姆·萨贾德普尔，欢迎再次做客《新鲜空气》。

Karim Sadjadpour, welcome back to Fresh Air.

所以，大阿亚图拉的官方继任者是他的儿子马贾达巴。

So the official successor to the Ayatollah is his son, Majdaba.

他一直没有在公众面前露面。

He hasn't been seen by the public.

我们不知道他的伤势如何。

We don't know what his injuries are.

尽管是委员会投票选举他为继任者，但我们是否知道他实际上是否在掌控国家？

Do we know if he's the one who's even running the country even though he was voted by the council who does the official voting to be the successor?

嗯，能和你在一起真好，特里。

Well, it's great to be with you, Terry.

坦白说，目前伊朗政权的内部运作对我们来说是一个黑箱。

And the honest answer is that the inner functionings of the Iranian regime are right now for us a black box.

我们无法接触到它。

It's inaccessible to us.

从纸面上看，莫贾德普尔·哈梅内伊是这个国家最有权力的人。

On paper, Mojadpour Khamenei is the most powerful man in the country.

但事实上，真正掌握权力的是革命卫队和军队。

But I think in practice, really, it's the revolutionary guards and the military who are the power behind his throne.

他继承了一个极其艰难的职位，而且他自己也受伤了。

He's inherited an incredibly difficult position and that he's been injured.

那场杀死他父亲、母亲和妻子的导弹袭击也伤到了他。

The missile strike that killed his father and his mother and his wife injured him.

据报道，他当时在隔壁的房间里。

He was reportedly in an adjacent room.

我从德黑兰内部的消息来源了解到，这些伤势并不致命，但他确实受伤了。

What I've heard from sources inside Tehran is those injuries are not life threatening, but he has been injured.

考虑到他失去了许多家人，他显然承受着巨大的情感痛苦。

He's obviously got to be in enormous emotional distress given that he's lost many members of his family.

以色列人正在积极试图除掉他。

And the Israelis are actively trying to kill him.

所以他很可能藏身于地下的某个地方，而且他从未真正担任过高级领导职务。

So he's probably in hiding underground somewhere, and he's not someone who has really any experience in senior leadership roles.

尽管他长期在幕后活动，一直是他父亲的得力助手，但他从未正式担任过高级职位。

Even though he operated in the shadows, he was his father's right hand for many years, he's never formally held a senior position.

伊朗公众并不认识他。

The Iranian public doesn't know him.

他的形象和声音对人们来说都很陌生。

His image, his voice are not familiar to people.

因此，他继承了这个极其艰难的职位，现在却要统治一个我认为绝大多数人——包括政权内部——都讨厌他的国家。

And so he's inherited this incredibly difficult position and that he's now meant to rule a country, which I would argue overwhelmingly dislikes him in in the regime.

他正在与世界上最强的超级大国——美国，以及中东最强的军事力量——以色列作战。

And he's fighting a war against the greatest superpower in the world, The United States, and against the greatest military power in The Middle East, Israel.

所以你说现在革命卫队和军队在管理国家，对吗？

So you said that the revolutionary guard and the military, right now are running the country.

他们之间意见一致吗？

Are they all on on the same page?

革命卫队大约有十五万人。

So the revolutionary guards are approximately 150,000 men.

他们并不是铁板一块，内部也存在不同观点。

And so they're not a monolith, and you have internal views amongst them.

但革命卫队的高级指挥官都是由执政长达三十七年的哈梅内伊大阿亚图拉亲自挑选的。

But the senior commanders of the revolutionary guards were all handpicked by Ayatollah Khamenei, who ruled Iran for thirty seven years.

因此，他们总体上都是忠于我所说的‘1979年愿景’的人，即1979年革命的核心原则，其中最重要的是对美国和以色列的敌意，以及这种抵抗意识形态。

And so they, by and large, are individuals who are loyal to what I call vision 1979, the the principles of the nineteen seventy nine revolution, chief among them being antipathy toward America and Israel and this ideology of resistance.

在遭到攻击之前，政权决定从根本上分散其军事结构。

And what the regime decided to do before it was attacked was essentially to decentralize their military structure.

他们没有在德黑兰设一个总指挥向所有人下达命令，而是拥有大约31个不同的单位，据我们所见，这些单位彼此之间在一定程度上独立运作。

Instead of having one general in Tehran who's commanding orders to everyone, they have essentially 31 different units that are, as far as we can see, operating somewhat independently from one another.

这就像章鱼的31条触手。

It's like, 31 legs of an octopus.

因此，你看到伊朗的报复策略可谓五花八门。

And for that reason, you've seen an Iranian retaliatory strategy that has really been all over the place.

因为没有中央指挥官。

Because there's no central commander.

但他们是否在维护父辈——哈梅内伊大阿亚图拉所坚持的基本原则上达成一致？

But do they agree on the basic principles of upholding what the father, the Ayatollah Khamenei, stood for?

当然。

Absolutely.

在这一点上，他们显然都团结一致，首要的是，对任何独裁政权而言，政权生存至关重要。

On that point, they all have seemingly closed ranks around obviously, number one, paramount for any dictatorship is is regime survival.

其次，他们坚信不会放弃自己的原则。

And and two is this belief that we're not going to abandon our principles.

我们将坚持我们对抗美国和以色列的立场。

We're going to uphold our principles of defiance against America and Israel.

到目前为止，特里，我认为他们相信自己的策略是有效的，因为他们成功推高了油价，并对美国的公众舆论造成了负面影响。

And up until now, Terry, I think they believe that their strategy has been effective in that they've been able to spike the price of oil, and they've been able to negatively impact popular opinion in The United States.

从民调来看，大约四分之三的美国人反对这场战争，他们希望特朗普总统能受到美国公众舆论的制约，被迫突然结束这场战争。

We see from polling that perhaps three out of four Americans oppose this war, and they're hoping that president Trump is going to be restrained by popular opinion in The United States and and be forced to abruptly end the war.

所以，如果以色列成功暗杀了哈梅内伊大儿子莫贾德普尔，接下来会是谁？

So if Israel succeeds in assassinating Mojadpour, the son of the Ayatollah, who's next in line?

你知道吗？

Do you know?

我首先想说的是，我认为这不是一个靠单一暗杀就能颠覆的政权。

So I'd I'd first start off by saying that I don't think this is a one assassination regime.

即使他们成功刺杀了穆萨·巴赫马尼，这也表明以色列已经深度渗透了伊朗政权的内部运作。

Even if they managed to kill Moshe Bachamani, which Israel has really penetrated the inner workings of the Iranian regime.

因此，他们完全有可能成功除掉他。

And so it is well possible that they they do succeed in in killing him.

我怀疑，如果他们真能做到这一点，将会出现另一位与穆罕默德·沙巴特·哈梅内伊世界观极为相似的高级神职人员。

I suspect if they were able to do that, there will be another senior cleric with a very similar worldview to to Muhammad Shabbat Khamenei.

已经有人提到了几位不同的人选。

There's different individuals who have been mentioned.

有一个人叫阿贾伊。

There's one guy called Ajai.

还有另一个人叫阿德罗菲。

There's another guy called Adrophi.

我认为，他们都会 broadly 支持1979年的理念和愿景。

They, I would say, all kind of will broadly support the the the principles of of 1979, vision 1979.

在我看来，无论谁可能接替莫谢·巴赫马尼，至少在初期都会受到军方的严格控制。

And whoever would potentially succeed Moshe Bachmanin would likewise, in my view, be really controlled by the military, at least early on.

是的。

Yeah.

1979年当然是伊朗革命的年份。

And 1979 was, of course, the year of the Iranian revolution.

没错。

That's right.

所以特朗普说莫贾德普尔可能已经死了。

So Trump has said that Mojadpour might already be dead.

这是猜测，还是他有某种依据？

Is that speculation, or did he have some kind of grounding on that?

嗯，显然，总统所掌握的情报我无从得知。

Well, obviously, the the presidency's intelligence that I'm not privy to.

我从一些身处伊朗内部、其中有些人认识莫舍瓦·哈梅内伊的人那里听说，他还活着。

What what I've been told from people inside the country who some of them know Mosheva Khamenei is that he's alive.

他所受的伤并不致命。

The injuries that he suffered were not life threatening.

但你也知道，这些信息也可能是错误的。

But, you know, that could also be, incorrect information.

我们并不清楚。

We we don't know.

我们之所以不清楚，部分原因是伊朗方面没有提供任何确凿证据证明他还活着。

And part of the reason why we don't know is that the Iranians haven't given any concrete evidence that he's alive.

莫谢·巴哈马尼发表了他作为最高领袖的第一次讲话，但这段讲话是由官方电视台代为宣读的。

Moshe Bachamani gave his first message, his first speech as supreme leader, but it was read on official state television.

他本人并没有亲自发表这段讲话。

He didn't deliver that speech.

有人告诉我，他并不具备公开演讲的能力。

What someone told me is that he's not someone who's capable of public speaking.

他从未真正公开发表过讲话，而他的父亲则是凭借出色的口才逐渐掌权的。

He's never really spoken publicly, whereas his father kind of rose to power because of the power of his his oratory.

这个儿子在很多方面都是一个被宠坏的独裁者之子，有人告诉我，他之所以不公开讲话，是因为他的首次公开演讲不仅会受到九千万伊朗人的关注，全世界也在等待他发声。

The son was, in many ways, kind of a coddled dictator's son, and that was given to me as the explanation for why he didn't speak publicly because his first public speech would not only be watched by 90,000,000 Iranians, but the entire world is is waiting for him to speak.

我怀疑他们也不愿透露他目前的所在地，担心他会成为暗杀的明确目标。

I suspect that they also, don't want to give any information about where he's currently located for fear that, you know, he's he's a strong target of assassination.

那我们继续比较一下父子二人吧。

Well, let's continue the comparison between father and son.

你这么一说，儿子远没有父亲聪明，不善言辞，也不够博学。

The way you describe it, the son is not nearly as smart, as good a speaker, as well read.

他不像他父亲那样会说英语。

He doesn't speak English like his father.

他父亲研究过西方和伊斯兰的经典著作。

His father studied Western and Islamic texts.

他是个出色的演说家。

He was a great speaker.

他很聪明。

He was smart.

他更有魅力。

He was more charismatic.

这让我想起十四世纪北非历史学家伊本·赫勒敦的一个观点。

So I'm reminded of a observation which, the North African historian, Ibn Khaldun, made in the fourteenth century.

他谈到帝国如何在三代人之间兴起与衰落。

He talked about how empires are built and destroyed over three generations.

第一代人内心燃烧着激情。

And the first generation are men who have fire in the belly.

他们是建设者。

They're the builders.

到了第二代，他们是巩固者。

When it reaches the second generation, they're the consolidators.

他们巩固权力。

They consolidate power.

而到了第三代，他们生来就是贵族子弟，并非天生拥有祖辈那样的坚韧和激情。

And when it reaches the third generation, by no fault of their own, the third generation are born as princelings, and they're not born with the grit and the fire in the belly of their grandparents.

伊朗伊斯兰共和国已经进入了第三代领导层。

And the Islamic Republic Of Iran has entered its third generation leadership.

穆萨·巴哈马尼是第三代。

Moshe Bachamani is the third generation.

1979年伊斯兰革命的领袖是霍梅尼大阿亚图拉。

The father of the Islamic revolution in 1979 was Ayatollah Khomeini.

他就是那个有着钢铁般的决心和内心火焰，建立起这个神权政体的人。

He was the guy who, you know, had the steely determination and fire in the belly to create this theocracy.

他之后由哈梅内伊大阿亚图拉继任，统治了三十七年，巩固了伊斯兰共和国的权力。

He was succeeded by Ayatollah Khamenei, who ruled for thirty seven years and consolidated the power of the Islamic Republic.

而当我们来到莫什塔巴·哈梅内伊时，他正如我所说，一生都在幕后活动，而他的父亲却曾多年作为革命政治犯入狱。

And now when we arrive at Mojshtabah Khamenei, he's someone who, as I said, has operated in the shadows all of his life, whereas his father spent many years in prison as a as a revolutionary political prisoner.

他遭受过酷刑。

He suffered torture.

你知道，为了爬上权力巅峰，他做了许多卑劣的事，在他掌权期间，国家很可能在最近去年一月的民众抗议中屠杀了几万名本国公民。

You know, he did a lot of dastardly things to to rise the ranks of power, and he oversaw a state which during his watch probably killed tens of thousands of its own citizens as as recently as last January when there were, popular protests and a massacre which took place.

而莫什·塔巴·哈梅内伊从未担任过这些角色。

And Moshe Taba Khamenei has not served in in any of those roles.

他不是革命领袖。

He wasn't a revolutionary leader.

他不是革命者。

He wasn't a revolutionary.

他继承了权力。

He's inherited power.

因此，基于这一点，特里，我对穆沙瓦·霍尔穆兹是否会成为伊朗未来几十年里像沙特的穆罕默德·本·萨勒曼那样的新强人持怀疑态度。

And so by virtue of that fact, I'm skeptical, Terry, that Mosheva Hormuz is going to be Iran's new powerful leader that who's going to be with us potentially for decades to come like, Mohammed bin Salman in Saudi Arabia.

你认为穆什塔巴可能不会长久掌权，甚至如果他被暗杀后接替他的人也无法持久的原因之一，是因为伊朗为了自身的生存，需要从以‘美国和以色列是大撒旦’为核心的基本组织原则，转向民族主义，转向更积极的方向，比如发展经济、现代化——就像许多海湾国家，包括沙特阿拉伯那样，它们已经摆脱了对石油和天然气的依赖，转向发展旅游业和其他可出口的产业。

You think that one of the reasons why, Mushtaba might not last long or even the person maybe who would replace him if he if Mushtaba is assassinated is that Iran, for its own survival, needs to switch from its basic organizing principle being like The US and Israel are the great Satans to nationalism, to to something more positive like building the economy, modernizing, like a lot of the Gulf nations have, including Saudi Arabia, which have moved away from dependence on oil and gas to, you know, modernize, to create, an economy based more on tourism and, you know, other things that they can export.

你能详细说说吗？

Can you elaborate on that?

这是个非常好的问题，特里，因为如果你看看波斯湾地区那些我认爲与伊朗存在竞争关系的国家，最受关注的三个是阿联酋、沙特阿拉伯和卡塔尔。

So that's a very good question, Terry, because if you look at the countries in the Persian Gulf who, I would argue, have kind of this rivalrous relationship with Iran, the three ones that get the most attention are The United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, and Qatar.

尤其是阿联酋和沙特阿拉伯，它们的国家愿景与伊朗伊斯兰共和国截然不同。

And The UAE and Saudi Arabia, in particular, have very different national visions for the country than the Islamic Republic Of Iran.

正如我提到的，自1979年以来，伊朗伊斯兰共和国的核心原则一直是‘打倒美国’、‘打倒以色列’，以及强制女性戴头巾，霍梅尼曾称这是革命的旗帜。

As I mentioned, Islamic Republic Of Iran's organizing principle since '79 has been death to America, death to Israel, the mandatory veiling of women, which Ayatollah Khomeini once called the flag of revolution.

而这些波斯湾国家的愿景则是面向未来的。

And those Persian Gulf countries, their visions are forward looking visions.

沙特阿拉伯将其愿景称为2030愿景。

Saudi Arabia calls its vision vision 2030.

阿拉伯联合酋长国也有类似愿景，称为2031愿景。

The United Arab Emirates has a version of that, vision 2031.

它们对这一地区的前景有着截然不同的看法。

And they have very different outlooks for the region.

海湾国家的安全建立在与美国和以色列的合作基础上。

The Gulf countries, their security is is premised on partnership with America and Israel.

这些国家正在努力推进社会改革。

Those countries are, really trying to socially reform.

你知道，阿联酋——任何去过那里的人会发现，它在社会上相当开放。

You know, The UAE, for anyone who's been there, is socially a a pretty free place.

沙特阿拉伯的穆罕默德·本·萨勒曼正试图引领一场社会革命，而伊朗伊斯兰共和国则根植于社会压制。

Saudi Arabia, Mohammed bin Salman is trying to lead a social revolution, whereas Islamic Republic Of Iran is anchored in social repression.

在地区背景下，它们的愿景也大相径庭。

In the regional context, they also have very different visions.

伊朗曾主导着五个阿拉伯地区：叙利亚、黎巴嫩、伊拉克、也门和加沙。

Iran is a country which had been dominating five Arab lands, Syria, Lebanon, Iraq, Yemen, and Gaza.

这五个地方有什么共同点？

What did all those five places have in common?

它们本质上都是五个濒临崩溃的国家。

They were all essentially five failing states.

伊朗的意识形态，即伊斯兰共和国的意识形态，在权力真空和国家失败时得以壮大，并能通过其民兵组织（如黎巴嫩真主党）填补这些真空。

And Iran's ideology, the Islamic Republic's ideology thrives when there are power vacuums and state failures, and it can fill those vacuums with its militias like Lebanese Hezbollah.

而海湾国家则需要稳定。

Whereas the Gulf countries, they need stability.

你知道，它们正努力成为国际旅游、交通和技术中心，但如果持续发生战争、不安全，或者机场不断受到威胁，这是不可能实现的。

You know, they they are trying to become international hubs for tourism, for transportation, for technology, and you can't have that if there are constant wars or insecurity or, you know, your airports are being threatened.

因此，这些国家对未来有着截然不同的愿景，而伊朗民众对1979年的愿景早已失去兴趣。

And so these countries have very different visions for their future, and the Iranian public has no interest in vision 1979 anymore.

伊朗人口中绝大多数人出生于1979年革命之后。

It's a population, the vast majority of whom were born after the nineteen seventy nine revolution.

你知道，我对他们的看法是，他们想成为韩国，而不是朝鲜。

You know, my line about them is they wanna be South Korea, not North Korea.

霍尔木兹的愿景大部分是想打造一个什叶派的朝鲜，而我认为他所推销的东西根本没多少人买账。

And most of Hormuz's vision is for a Shiite North Korea, and I just don't think there's many many takers for for what he's selling.

你提到的海湾国家在现代化方面的优势，正是伊朗所攻击的目标——酒店、旅游业，甚至现代性本身，比如机场。

And everything you mentioned about the strengths of the Gulf countries who are modernizing, those are the things that Iran is attacking, the hotels, tourism, modernity itself, like the airports.

所以伊朗的策略看似聪明，虽然残酷 destructive，但对伊朗自身的生存而言，这似乎是一个明智的策略，包括阻止船只进入霍尔木兹海峡，并威胁关闭红海。

So Iran's strategy seems pretty smart, like horrible, destructive, but for Iran itself, its survival, it seems like a smart strategy, including not allowing ships into the Strait Of Hormuz and threatening to shut down the Red Sea.

你知道，特里，二十年前我曾在贝鲁特进行富布赖特奖学金研究，那一年在黎巴嫩的经历让我最深刻的体会是，黎巴嫩这个国家曾饱受内战之苦。

You know, Terry, I did a Fulbright scholarship in Beirut two decades ago, and one of my biggest takeaways from that year in Beirut, a country which, in Lebanon has suffered from terrible civil war.

贝鲁特曾经是中东的迪拜，它告诉我们：建设一个地方需要几十年，而摧毁它却只需几周。

Beirut, which once used to be the Dubai of The Middle East, is that it takes decades to build places, and it takes weeks to destroy places.

这些国家花费了数十年和数万亿美元，努力成为我所说的人工智能、交通、媒体和娱乐中心。

And those countries have spent decades and trillions of dollars trying to become, as I said, hubs for artificial intelligence, transportation, media, entertainment.

他们清楚意识到，伊朗伊斯兰共和国只需用导弹和廉价的无人机，就能摧毁他们辛辛苦苦建设的一切。

And they recognize that the Islamic Republic Of Iran, can come by with its missiles and and pretty cheap drones and destroy what they've sought to build.

而且你也能看到，他们在对全球经济的攻击中也体现了这种经济上的不对称性。

And and you see that that economic asymmetry in their attacks on on the global economy as well.

在霍尔木兹海峡，每天有全球20%的石油通过这条通道。

So in the Strait Of Hormuz, which on any given day, 20% of the world's oil passes through that corridor.

在波斯湾，世界上大量的天然气和化肥也都要经过这里。

In in the Persian Gulf, a lot of the world's natural gas, a lot of the world's fertilizer passes through that.

这些是装载着数亿美元货物、价值一亿美元的油轮，而伊朗却用价值两万美元的无人机封锁海峡并骚扰这些船只。

And these are $100,000,000 tankers filled with hundreds of millions of dollars in cargo, and Iran has been shutting down the strait and harassing these ships with $20,000 drones.

因此，这是一种穷人的策略，到目前为止对伊朗来说是有效的，并且挫败了特朗普总统的野心。

And so it's a poor man strategy, which up until now has worked for Iran and frustrating the ambitions of president Trump.

我认为伊朗的战略，比如封锁霍尔木兹海峡，你或许可以派船护航通过，但美国的盟友们并不愿意真正卷入这场战争。

And I think Iran's strategy, like closing off the Strait Of Hormuz, and, you know, you could try to get through with a ship that accompanies you, but the people who had been America's allies are reluctant to really get involved in this war.

特朗普已经疏远了北约。

Trump has alienated NATO.

他还疏远了中国，而中国曾寻求帮助。

He's alienated China who has asked for help.

因此，伊朗的策略让特朗普显得软弱。

So it's making the Iran strategy is making Trump look weak.

你知道，特里，前美国中东驻军指挥官、前中情局局长戴维·彼得雷乌斯将军曾说过一句非常有洞察力的话。

You know, Terry, general David Petraeus, used to command US troops in the Middle East, also former CIA director, said something that was quite perceptive.

他说，美国在2001年对塔利班看似迅速的胜利，扭曲了我们对两年后伊拉克战争艰巨性的理解。

He said that America's seemingly swift victory over the Taliban in 2001 kind of distorted our understanding of how difficult the Iraq war would be two years later.

这一点与此相关，因为正如我所说，我们已经四十七年没有在伊朗设立大使馆了，因此对伊朗政权的内部运作了解非常有限，与该政权的外交互动也极为有限。

And that's relevant here because Iran is a country in which, as I said, we haven't had an embassy there for forty seven years, so we have very limited understandings of the inner workings of the regime, limited diplomatic context with the with the regime.

我认为当时并没有进行周密的规划。

And I don't think there was a great amount of planning.

当时的希望是，我们只需对伊朗施加巨大的政治和经济压力，希望它要么屈服，要么如果它不屈服，我们就迅速发动攻击，杀死其领导人，然后与继任领导层达成协议。

The hope was that we were simply going to subject Iran to enormous political and economic pressure in the hopes that either it would, capitulate, or if it didn't capitulate, we would quickly attack it, kill its leader, and then do a deal with the successor leadership.

我认为，坦白说，特朗普总统本人并没有真正理解他将要面对的是什么。

I don't think president Trump, in his own words, frankly, understood what he was getting into.

例如，伊朗从一开始就明确表示要将战争扩大到地区范围，而特朗普总统却说，当伊朗开始攻击波斯湾国家或关闭霍尔木兹海峡时，这让他感到意外。

For example, Iran telegraphed from the very beginning that they plan to regionalize the war, and president Trump said that that took him by surprise when Iran started to attack the Persian Gulf countries or close down the Strait Of Hormuz.

我认为，特里，从我的角度来看，这场战争起初是一场选择性的战争。

And I think, Terry, we're now in a situation in which this began, in my view, it was a war of choice.

它并不是一场必要的战争。

It was not a war of necessity.

当时并没有迫在眉睫的威胁表明伊朗即将获得核武器，或对美国或我们的盟友发动导弹袭击。

There was no imminent threat that Iran was about to acquire nuclear weapons or launch missile strikes on The United States or our partners.

但在我看来，起初的选择性战争实际上已经演变为一场必要的战争，这意味着我认为特朗普总统不可能轻易结束战争并宣称胜利，只要伊朗伊斯兰共和国这个被孤立的政权仍然存在，它就挟持了世界经济，并能控制这一至关重要的走廊——不仅是能源通道，还是农业通道，因为霍尔木兹海峡也是化肥运输的重要通道。

But what began as a war of choice, in my view, has actually morphed into a war of necessity, meaning that I don't think that president Trump is going to simply be able to end the war and claim victory so long as you have a pariah government, the Islamic Republic Of Iran, which has the world economy hostage and and can control this critically important, not only energy corridor, but but agricultural corridor given that Strait Of Hormuz is also a major thoroughfare for fertilizer.

好吧，我们需要休息一下。

Well, we need to take another break here.

如果你刚刚加入，我们的嘉宾是卡里姆·萨贾德普尔，卡内基国际和平基金会的高级研究员，他曾是国际危机组织的分析师，当时他常驻德黑兰和华盛顿。

If you're just joining us, my guest is Karim Sadjadpour, senior fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, formerly an analyst with the International Crisis Group, and at that time, he was based in Tehran and Washington.

所以，广告后我们将继续讨论与伊朗的战争。

So we'll talk more about the war with Iran after another break.

我是特里·格罗斯，欢迎收听《新鲜空气》。

I'm Terry Gross, and this is Fresh Air.

如今，新闻似乎每小时都在变化。

These days, it feels like the news changes every hour.

嗯，NPR 也有一个这样的播客。

Well, NPR has a podcast that does that too.

NPR 新闻速递每天每小时为您带来一集全新的五分钟节目，内容是最新、最重要、清晰、基于事实且易于理解的头条新闻。

NPR News Now brings you a fresh five minute episode every hour of the day with the latest, latest, most important headlines in episodes that are clear, fact based, and easy to digest.

请在 NPR 应用程序或您收听播客的任何平台收听 NPR 新闻速递。

Listen to NPR news now on the NPR app or wherever you get your podcasts.

让我和您分享我对这件事将如何影响美国和世界最担忧的两点。

Let me share with you two of my biggest concerns about how this will affect The US and the world.

最大的担忧是第三次世界大战。

And the biggest one is World War three.

我认为目前我们已经处于一场局部世界大战中，大约有13个国家以某种方式卷入其中，但我指的是真正的全面第三次世界大战。

And we're in a partial world war now with, I think, like 13 countries involved in some way, but I'm talking about a real full blown World War three.

如果爆发更广泛的战争，核武器的威胁将取决于谁与伊朗结盟，因为俄罗斯、朝鲜、中国——这些国家都拥有核武器，且与伊朗存在某种联盟关系。

With the threat of nuclear weapons, depending on who allies with Iran if more world war breaks out because Russia, North Korea, China, who all have nuclear weapons, have some kind of alliance with Iran.

那么，你对更大规模的世界大战以及其爆发的可能性有什么看法？

So, what are your thoughts about a larger world war and the likelihood of one breaking out?

幸运的是，特里，我认为这种可能性并不高，我来告诉你为什么

Well, fortunately, Terry, I don't think that is a high likelihood, and I'll I'll tell you why it's

谢谢。

Thank you.

对。

Yes.

让我安心一下。

Reassure me.

你知道，过去几周伊朗攻击最多的国家，正如我所说，是这些波斯湾国家，特别是沙特阿拉伯和阿拉伯联合酋长国。

You know, the countries that Iran has been attacking most over the last few weeks are, as I said, these Persian Gulf countries, Saudi Arabia, The United Arab Emirates in particular.

我认为，正如我提到的，它们已经遭受了超过2000次伊朗导弹和无人机的袭击。

I think as I mentioned, they've been the target of over 2,000 Iranian missile and drone attacks.

当你观察这些国家时，它们实际上与中国和俄罗斯的关系可能比伊朗还要稳固。

And when you look at those countries, they actually have probably more robust relations with China and Russia than Iran does.

因此，伊朗并不是拥有强大盟友全力支持的国家，而这些海湾国家也并非只与美国和以色列结盟。

And so it's not the case that, you know, Iran is this country with very strong allies who have its back, and those Gulf countries are only allied with America and Israel.

事实上，伊朗伊斯兰共和国可能是世界上战略上最孤立的国家之一。

In fact, the Islamic Republic Of Iran is probably the top one or two most strategically lonely countries in the world.

它在世界上真正可靠的盟友非常少。

It really has very few reliable allies in the world.

因此，我认为中国不会为了伊朗而与海湾国家开战，而这些国家与中国的能源关系甚至更紧密。

And so I think that the Chinese are not going to come and fight on Iran's behalf against Gulf countries with whom they have even closer energy relations.

弗拉基米尔·普京实际上与沙特阿拉伯的领导人穆罕默德·本·萨勒曼、阿联酋的领导人穆罕默德·本·扎耶德都有着良好的关系。

And Vladimir Putin actually has strong relations with the leadership in Saudi Arabia, Mohammed bin Salman, with the leadership in The United Arab Emirates, Mohammed bin Zayed.

所以，我不认为这场冲突会升级为第三次世界大战。

So I'm I'm not concerned that this will deteriorate into a World War three.

但你没错，这确实树立了一个非常危险的先例。

But you are correct that this, has just set a very dangerous precedent.

我认为，在可预见的未来，世界、尤其是中东地区，都不会感到安全稳定。

And I don't think that the world or, you know, especially The Middle East is going to feel like a stable place for this foreseeable future.

我最近与阿联酋的一位高级领导人交谈过。

I spoke to a senior leader in The United Arab Emirates recently.

他说，我们国家已经发生了翻天覆地的变化。

He said, we're a country which has been changed forever.

正如我所说，他们意识到自己所建立的一切是多么脆弱。

And they realize, as I said, how how fragile what they've they've built is.

只要当前的伊朗政权掌权，我认为这些国家都难以安枕无忧。

And, I don't think any of those countries are going to sleep well at night so long as this current Iranian regime is in power.

我认为，特朗普最初攻击伊朗的主要目标之一是让伊朗放弃所有核材料。

One of the goals I think the primary goal that Trump initially stated for attacking Iran was to get Iran to give up all of its nuclear material.

他们在谈判中表示愿意妥协，放弃任何拥有核武器的企图，唯一希望保留的是用于医疗目的的低浓缩铀，这种铀无法用于制造核武器。

They said in negotiations they were willing to compromise and give up, you know, any aspiration for a nuclear weapon, and the only thing they really wanted to hold on to was uranium enriched enough for medical purposes, which isn't usable for nuclear weapon.

这并不意味着他们说的是实话，但这是他们所宣称的。

That doesn't mean they were being truthful about it, but it's what they said.

而特朗普想要的是彻底放弃，不行。

And Trump wanted a complete, no.

你连这一点都不行。

You can't even have that.

你必须放弃一切。

You have to give up everything.

现在我们真的与伊朗开战了，他们有多大可能放弃这一切？我们有多大可能发动攻击？

And now that we're really at war with Iran, what's the likelihood that they would give that all up, and what's the likelihood we could attack it?

我们已经袭击了它们埋藏的主要地点。

We've already attacked the main places where it's buried.

我们得深入进去，摧毁核材料，这非常危险且极其复杂。

We'd have to, like, go in and take out the nuclear material, which is, like, really dangerous and really complicated.

那么，我们现在的情况是不是比以前更糟了？

So are we in worse shape now than we were before?

我们陷入了一个困境，我认为在与伊朗的潜在谈判中，有四个主要优先事项。

We're in a predicament, and I think that there really, are are four main priorities when it comes to our potential negotiations with Iran.

首先是核问题，那些高度浓缩的铀，据称在去年六月的轰炸之后已经埋在废墟下了，必须加以清点。

One is obviously nuclear, and that highly enriched uranium, is ostensibly under rubble now, the the the after the bombings of last last June, that needs to be accounted for.

因为如果伊朗掌握了这种高浓缩铀，并试图将其转化为核武器的燃料。

Because if Iran gets its hands on that uranium, highly enriched uranium, and, tries to, you know, can convert that into, fuel for for nuclear weapon.

现在我的感觉是，考虑到他们的系统已被深度渗透，他们很难迅速冲刺制造核武器，但这必须得到解决。

Now my sense is that given how penetrated their system is, it would be very difficult for them to make a mad dash for a nuclear weapon, but it's something which needs to be addressed.

这不能被忽视。

It can't be neglected.

第二点是他们的导弹和无人机。

You know, second point now are their missiles and drones.

而且，与波斯湾地区的官员交谈时，他们说，在这一切发生之前，我们只希望达成核协议，但现在不再如此了。

And, again, speaking to officials in in the Persian Gulf, they they say, you know, before all of this, we would have been happy with just the nuclear deal, but now no longer.

我们需要一项也涵盖他们使用导弹和无人机的协议。

We need a deal which also addresses their use of missiles and drones.

第三个问题是他们的代理人，他们对黎巴嫩真主党、也门胡塞武装和伊拉克什叶派民兵等组织的支持。

A third issue are their proxies, their support for groups like Hezbollah and Lebanon, the Houthis and Yemen, the Iraqi Shiite militias.

这些代理人虽然已被削弱，但仍对地区稳定构成真实威胁。

Now these proxies have been degraded, but they still do pose a real threat to regional stability.

第四个问题是导致我们陷入这种局面的原因，即伊朗对其本国人民的暴行。

And then the fourth issue is the reason why we're we're even in this situation, which is Iran's brutality toward its own population.

如果你还记得的话，特里，去年一月，特朗普九次警告伊朗政府，如果他们杀害抗议者，美国将进行干预。

If you remember, Terry, last January, Trump on nine occasions warned the Iranian government that if they killed protesters, The United States would intervene.

这是他多次提出的红线，正如我所说，他一共提了九次。

And that was his red line he he issued, as I said, on nine occasions.

而伊朗撕毁了这条红线，这正是促使他开始在波斯湾大规模军事部署的原因。

And Iran tore up that red line, and that's what actually motivated for him to to to start this military buildup in the Persian Gulf.

但我们看到的是，当被问及他的目标时，总统的说法一直前后不一。

But what we've seen is that the president has kind of been all over the place when he's asked what his goal is.

有时候他说，目标只是达成一项核协议。

Some days, he says it's just to get a nuclear deal.

有时候他说，他想要一个类似委内瑞拉的协议。

Some days he says he wants a Venezuela deal.

有时候他又想让政权崩溃。

Some days he wants to implode the regime.

在我看来，这种缺乏清晰性造成了严重损害，因为如果你不知道自己究竟想达成什么目标，就会让美国军队和我们的合作伙伴陷入极其困难的境地。

And that lack of clarity, in my view, has been deeply detrimental because, you know, if you don't know what it is that you're trying to achieve, then you're putting both the US military and our partners in very difficult positions.

我的嘉宾是卡里姆·萨贾德普尔，卡内基国际和平基金会的高级研究员。

My guest is Karim Sadjadpour, a senior fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

在此之前，他曾四年担任国际危机组织的分析师，并在那几年里常驻德黑兰和华盛顿。

Before that, he spent four years as an analyst with the International Crisis Group, and he was based in Tehran as well as Washington during those years.

短暂休息后，我们将继续播放这段访谈。

We'll hear more of the interview after a short break.

这是新鲜空气。

This is fresh air.

如今，感觉好像

These days, it feels like

新闻每小时都在变化。

the news changes every hour.

嗯，NPR 也有一个播客是这么做的。

Well, NPR has a podcast that does that too.

NPR新闻快讯每天每小时为您带来五分钟的全新节目，内容涵盖最新、最重要的新闻头条，节目清晰、基于事实且易于理解。

NPR News Now brings you a fresh five minute episode every hour of the day with the latest, most important headlines in episodes that are clear, fact based, and easy to digest.

请在NPR应用程序或您收听播客的任何平台收听NPR新闻快讯。

Listen to NPR news now on the NPR app or wherever you get your podcasts.

当特朗普总统表示支持伊朗抗议者——其中许多人遭到屠杀——随后又决定攻击伊朗时，他曾说：‘当我们完成时，你们就接管你们的政府。’

So when president Trump expressed support for the Iranian protesters, many of whom were massacred, and then decided to attack Iran, he said, when we are finished, take over your government.

那将是属于你们的。

It will be yours to take.

现在恐怕已经不可能再进行抗议了。

It would be impossible now probably to protest.

人们将会遭到彻底的屠杀。

People would be just totally massacred.

我的意思是，你同意这一点吗？

I mean, do you agree with that?

特里，当我听到特朗普总统的言论时，这反映出他可能从未在残酷的独裁政权下生活过。

When I listen to president Trump's language, Terry, it reflects someone who probably hasn't spent any significant amount of time under brutal dictatorship.

因为当你生活在残酷的独裁政权下时，走上街头是非常可怕的，你知道，伊朗人民手无寸铁且缺乏组织。

Because when you're living under brutal dictatorship, it is very scary when you go out in the streets and, you know, the people of Iran are unarmed and unorganized.

而你看到的是，成千上万的围困民兵或革命卫队，他们手持自动武器，手指扣在扳机上，这种氛围令人极度恐惧。

And you see, you know, many thousands of besieged militia or, revolutionary guards who are carrying, automatic weapons and have their fingers on the trigger, that's an incredibly intimidating atmosphere.

我认为人们并不真正理解独裁政权的运作方式，当人们问：这个政权到底有多少支持者？

And I think one thing that people don't really understand about dictatorships when, you know, people ask, well, how much support does this regime have?

对于一个独裁政权来说，支持者的广度其实并不重要。

And it doesn't matter so much what is the breadth of your support if you're a dictatorship.

更重要的是支持者的深度。

It matters much more the depth of your support.

因此，在我看来，这个政权最多可能只有20%，甚至只有15%的民众支持。

So in my view, this is a regime which probably has at best 20, maybe 15% popular support.

但他们的支持者，至少目前而言，是一群冷酷无情的少数派，他们坚信一旦失去权力，自己就会被处死。

But they their supporters, at least for now, are a ruthlessly devoted minority that believes that if they lose power, they're gonna be killed.

对他们来说，一旦失势，必死无疑。

This killer be killed for them.

过去三周，他们更加清楚地看到，不仅本国人民希望推翻他们，美国和以色列也同样如此。

And that has been proven to them even more the last three weeks that not only, you know, does their own population want to unseat them, but, obviously, America and Israel do as well.

因此，他们表现出愿意杀害数万人以维持政权的意愿。

And for that reason, they've shown themselves willing to kill potentially tens of thousands of people to stay in power.

我认为，对他们来说，这一计算并没有改变。

And I don't think that that calculation for them has has changed.

鉴于过去几周的事件，这种计算可能反而被进一步强化了。

It's probably only been amplified, given the events of the last few weeks.

所以我认为，总统仅仅告诉人们‘去接管你们的制度’是不够的，却没有制定一套完整的政府战略，比如：在里根政府时期，美国是如何帮助推翻苏联的？

And so I I think that simply the president telling people, go take your institutions without having any whole of government strategy about, okay, how did The United States during the Reagan administration help to bring down the Soviet Union?

当时使用了哪些制度、政策、语言和战略传播手段？

What were the the institutions, the policies, the languages, the strategic communications used during that period?

这可不是八分钟腹肌训练。

And this isn't eight minute abs.

你不能简单地下个命令，就指望两三周后，伊朗人民就能顺利接管他们的制度，事情哪有这么简单。

You can't simply, you know, order something, and two, three weeks later, it happens as nice as that would be for people in Iran to take over their institutions.

这是一个无情的政权。

This is a is a ruthless regime.

与1979年垮台的君主制相比，伊朗当前政权的一个显著不同之处在于，君主制时期的政治和军事精英中，许多人曾在美洲和欧洲求学。

And one of the things very different about this particular Iranian regime compared to the monarchy, which collapsed in 1979, is that the the political and military elite of Iran's monarchy, many of them had studied in America and Europe.

在某些情况下，他们可能拥有外国护照，并且会说外语。

In some cases, they probably had foreign passports, and they spoke foreign languages.

因此，当局势变得艰难时，他们可以在洛杉矶或伦敦重新开始生活。

And so when things got difficult, they could remake their lives in Los Angeles or London.

但伊斯兰共和国的政治和军事精英往往出身于偏远地区。

But the political and military elite of the Islamic Republic have oftentimes provincial backgrounds.

他们没有在国外接受过教育。

They weren't educated abroad.

他们不会说外语。

They don't speak foreign languages.

他们没有外国护照，也没有其他地方可去。

They don't have foreign passports, and they have nowhere else to go.

因此，对于他们中的许多人来说，这不是你死就是我亡。

And, again, for that reason, for many of them, it's kill or be killed.

与此同时，许多伊朗人正在逃离炸弹。

In the meantime, a lot of Iranians are fleeing bombs.

他们吸入烟雾，成为黑色雨水的受害者，因为大量石油设施遭到轰炸。

They're inhaling smoke and being the victims of black rain because of all the oil that has been bombed.

所以，我的意思是，有毒烟雾和黑色雨水的后果可能会伴随人的一生。

So, I mean and, you know, the consequences of of toxic smoke and black rain, that can last a lifetime.

这可能导致癌症并夺走生命。

That can lead to cancer and kill you.

确实如此。

Absolutely.

而且，战争就是地狱。

And, again, this is, war is hell.

这不仅仅是一句陈词滥调。

It's not just a cliche.

我认为伊朗国内的人们正在亲身体验这一切。

I think people are experiencing that inside Iran.

对许多人来说，他们可能在权衡哪种恶果更轻。

And for many people, they're probably thinking about the lesser of evils.

我听过一些人说，听好了。

I've heard some people say, listen.

我们害怕这场战争。

We we we fear this war.

你知道，我们在轰炸中担心自己的生命，但如果这个政权得以维持并进一步巩固自身，我们更担心孩子们的性命。

You know, we we're we're fearing for our lives under bombardment, but we fear for our children's lives if this regime manages to stay in power and further retrenches itself.

所以我认为，伊朗国内和海外侨民中近九千万人的情绪是复杂多样的。

So I think there are a wide mix of emotions among 90,000,000 Iranians inside the country and within the diaspora.

不幸的是，对于这个可怕的困境，没有快速的解决办法或捷径。

And, unfortunately, there are no quick fixes or quick solutions to this terrible predicament.

你知道抗议运动中有没有可能出现任何领袖人物？

Do you know if there were any leaders in the protest movement that could have emerged?

而且，你知道，如果这个政权真的被推翻了，他可能会成为新伊朗的领导人之一？

And, you know, if the regime truly was toppled, that could have been a leading contender as the leader of a new Iran?

伊朗伊斯兰共和国最擅长的一件事就是镇压。

The one thing that the Islamic Republic Of Iran does effectively is repression.

这是一个为维持权力而建立的政府，他们已经实践了五十年的镇压艺术与科学。

It's a government built to stay in power, and they've been practicing the art and science of repression for five decades.

因此，他们非常擅长镇压抗议活动，也能识别出可能担任领导角色的个人。

And so they are skilled in crushing protests and also identifying individuals who are capable of potentially playing leadership positions.

我记得多年前，一位在德黑兰的欧洲大使曾对我说，伊朗的精英要么死了，要么住在洛杉矶。

I remember a European ambassador in Tehran years ago said to me, the Iranian was left havil is either dead or in Los Angeles.

你知道，他们要么杀人，要么流放人。

You know, they either kill people or exile people.

因此，许多政权的反对者都转移到了伊朗境外。

And for that reason, a lot of the opponents of the regime have turned outside of Iran.

看看雷扎·巴列维，他是伊朗前王储穆罕默德·礼萨·巴列维的儿子，雷扎·巴列维已经在流亡中度过了过去四十七年。

And looking at the person of Reza Pahlavi, the son of the former crown prince of Iran, Muhammad Reza Shah, who Reza Pahlavi has lived in in exile the last forty seven years.

对许多伊朗人来说，虽然并非所有人，但许多反对政权的人将他视为反对派的精神领袖。

And for many Iranians, certainly not all, but for many who who oppose the regime, he's kind of become an inspirational leader for the opposition.

有一位名叫杰克·戈德斯通的人写了一本关于革命的精彩著作，他说每场革命都需要两种领导力：组织性领导和精神性领导。

There's a wonderful book by a guy called Jack Goldstone on revolutions, and he said every revolution needs two kinds of leadership, organizational leadership and inspirational leadership.

组织性领导力有所欠缺，但对许多人而言，他已成为精神领袖。

The organizational leadership is lacking, but for many people, has become the inspirational leader.

是的。

Yeah.

这让我很难理解，因为巴列维国王推动了伊朗的西化，带来了大量教育、西方价值观和现代化。

That's really hard for me to understand because the shah westernized Iran, and, you know, there was a lot of education and western values and modernization.

然而，他的秘密警察手段极其严酷。

However, his secret police, the, they were severe.

他们折磨人。

They tortured people.

他们逮捕并使人失踪。

They rounded up and disappeared people.

你知道吗，特里，如今伊朗国内大约四分之三的人口都是在1979年革命之后出生的。

You know, Terry, this is a population inside Iran now around three quarters of whom were born after the nineteen seventy nine revolution.

因此，当他们回想巴列维时代时，想到的是社会自由——你知道，他们看到那个时代的照片，感受到经济尊严，以及伊朗作为一个国家在世界上享有积极地位的时光。

And so when they think of the era of the shah, what they think about are social freedoms, which, you know, they they see the photos of that era, economic dignity, a time when Iran as a nation had a had a positive place in the world.

当时伊朗护照能带你去很多地方。

The Iranian passport could get you places.

他们将这种生活与伊斯兰共和国时期的经历作比较，而后者不仅比巴列维政府更加残酷，而且在社会和经济上也极为专制。

And they compare that to the life they've experienced under the Islamic Republic that has not only been far more brutal than, the Shah's government, but it's been socially and economically authoritarian as well.

因此，我认为在过去十年左右，尤其是伊朗年轻一代中，出现了一种大量重新评价历史的现象，他们观看纪录片和电影，阅读关于巴列维时代生活状况的资料。

And so I think there's been a lot of revisionism in, the last decade or so among especially the younger generation of Iranians who who see documentary films and movies and and read about what was like life was like under the sham.

而说‘巴列维王朝万岁’，这简直就是对伊斯兰共和国最彻底的反抗。

And it's kind of the ultimate middle finger to the Islamic Republic to to to say, you know, long live Pahlavi.

我们想回到巴列维时代，因为这个政权——伊斯兰共和国——从伊朗孩子很小的时候起，就在不断宣传贬低巴列维政府。

We want to return to Pahlavi because this is a regime, the Islamic Republic, which has spent you know, it's from the time children are small in Iran, propagandizing against the shah's government.

在我看来，这是一种面向未来的怀旧情绪。

And in my view, it's kind of like a a forward looking nostalgia that people have.

他们希望伊朗再次成为一个拥有繁荣经济、社会自由以及在世界上享有崇高地位的国家。

They they they want Iran to once again be a nation with a prosperous economy and social freedoms and an upstanding place in the world.

对许多人来说，最直观的参照就是过去的生活是什么样子。

And the idea or the example which is perhaps most palpable for many people is is how things once were.

好的。

Alright.

所以我们需要再休息一下。

So we need to take another break here.

如果你刚刚加入，我们的嘉宾是卡里姆·萨贾德普尔，卡内基国际和平基金会的高级研究员，他曾任国际危机组织分析师，在德黑兰和华盛顿工作了四年。

If you're just joining us, my guest is Karim Sadjadpour, a senior fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and formerly an analyst with the International Crisis Group during those four years who was based in Tehran as well as Washington.

广告后我们继续对话。

We'll continue the conversation after a break.

这里是新鲜空气。

This is fresh air.

如今，感觉就像

These days, it feels like