欧洲为何必须准备独自前行 | 卡洛·马萨拉

大家最近怎么样？

What's up everybody?

我叫德米特里·科菲纳斯，你们正在收听《隐藏的力量》播客，这档节目旨在激励投资者、企业家和普通民众挑战主流叙事，学会批判性地思考塑造我们世界的权力体系。

My name is Demetri Kofinas and you're listening to Hidden Forces, a podcast that inspires investors, entrepreneurs, and everyday citizens to challenge consensus narratives narratives and learn how to think critically about the systems of power shaping our world.

本期《隐藏的力量》的嘉宾是卡洛·马扎拉，他是政治学家，也是慕尼黑联邦国防军大学的国际政治学教授，著有《如果俄罗斯获胜》一书，书中迫切呼吁欧洲各国重新武装，以遏制俄罗斯近期对北约成员国的入侵威胁，并保护欧洲政府和国家免受俄罗斯的政治操控。

My guest in this episode of Hidden Forces is Carlo Mazzala, a political scientist, a professor of international politics at the Bundeswehr University Munich, The author of the book, If Russia Wins, which makes the urgent case for European national rearmament and the need to deter near term threats of Russian incursions into NATO member countries and protect European governments and nations from Russian political domination.

卡洛和我在本对话的前一个小时详细探讨了他在书中提出的场景：俄罗斯对爱沙尼亚城市纳尔瓦发动有限入侵。

Carlo and I spend the first hour of this conversation detailing the scenario that he puts forward in his book, that of a limited Russian incursion into the Estonian city of Narva.

我们探讨了卡洛认为俄罗斯可能发动此类行动的原因，以及该行动与2014年俄罗斯在乌克兰采取的策略的异同，北约第五条集体防御承诺在这种情况下是否有效，以及无论普京还是其继任者执政，俄罗斯联邦的终极目标是否就是逐步削弱并最终摧毁北约联盟。

We explore why Carlo thinks that Russia might attempt such an operation, the similarities to and differences from the approach Russia took in Ukraine in 2014, whether NATO's Article five commitment would hold in such a scenario, and whether the gradual erosion and eventual destruction of the NATO alliance is the ultimate goal of the Russian Federation, irrespective who is in office, be that Putin or his successor.

第二个小时我们聚焦于欧洲在面对美国对北约承诺减弱的背景下所面临的国防挑战，探讨了在缺乏美国支持的情况下，欧洲国家在增强威慑能力时所遭遇的物质与财政限制，俄罗斯常规与非传统军事力量的优劣，以及西方民主国家正在经历的身份与目标深层危机。

The second hour is devoted to a conversation about Europe's defense challenges in the face of declining American commitments to NATO, the material and financial constraints European nations face in strengthening their deterrent capabilities in the absence of such a commitment, the advantages and disadvantages of Russia's conventional and unconventional forces, and the deeper crisis of identity and purpose afflicting Western democracies.

我们讨论了欧洲政治中的移民辩论、文化战争和领导力失效问题，以及普通公民如何在应对外部威胁和内部侵蚀时捍卫民主制度。

We discussed the immigration debate, culture wars, and the failure of leadership in the context of European politics, and what ordinary citizens can do to defend democratic systems in the face of threats, both external and those emanating from within.

如果你想收听全部对话内容，请访问 hiddenforces.io/subscribe，加入我们的高级订阅频道，你可以在手机上使用任何你喜欢的播客应用收听，就像你现在收听这一集一样。

If you want access to all of this conversation, go to hiddenforces.iosubscribe and join our premium feed, which you can listen to on your mobile device using your favorite podcast app, just like you're listening to this episode right now.

如果你想要

If you want

加入讨论并成为Hidden Forces天才社区的成员，

to join in on the

该社区包括与嘉宾的问答通话、第三方研究分析的折扣访问权限，以及如私人晚餐和周末静修会等线下活动。

conversation and become a member of the Hidden Forces Genius community, which includes Q and A calls with guests, discounted access to third party research analysis, and in person events like our intimate dinners and weekend retreats.

你也可以在我们的订阅页面完成这一操作。

You can also do that on our subscriber page.

如果你还有疑问，欢迎发送邮件至info@hiddenforces.com。

If you still have questions, feel free to send an email to infohiddenforces.

我或我团队的成员会立即回复你。

Io and I or someone from our team will get right back to you.

好了，接下来请欣赏我嘉宾卡洛·马扎拉关于北约和欧洲未来这一及时而重要的对话。

With that, please enjoy this timely and important conversation about NATO and the future of Europe with my guest, Carlo Mazala.

卡洛·马扎拉，欢迎

Carlo Mazala, welcome

欢迎来到Hidden Forces。

to Hidden Forces.

谢谢您邀请我参加您的节目。

Thanks for having me on your program.

很高兴您能来。

I'm excited to have you on.

您的书在圈子里广为流传，很多人都向我推荐过。

Your book has been making the rounds and it was recommended to me by a number of people.

我上周末刚读完，今天非常期待能和您讨论这本书。

I finished reading it over the weekend and I'm very excited to speak with you about it today.

这本书名为《如果俄罗斯赢了》，开篇描绘了一个发生在未来2028年3月27日的具体场景：俄罗斯军队入侵了爱沙尼亚人口5.7万的最大城市，并占领了一座人口稀少的爱沙尼亚岛屿。

The book is titled If Russia Wins, and it opens with a very specific scenario that takes place in the future on 03/27/2028, where Russian forces invade Estonia's largest city with a population of 57,000 and also take control of a sparsely populated Estonian island.

请为我们详细介绍一下书中描述的这个情景。

Walk us through the scenario that you lay out in the book.

您为什么选择写这本书？

Why did you choose to write it?

你为什么选择这个国家以及这一系列事件作为你的思想实验？

And what made you choose this particular country and this sequence of events as your thought experiment?

好的。

Okay.

我必须先说明我为什么写下这个场景。

I have to start with the reason why I wrote this scenario.

这要追溯到2024年夏天。

And this goes back to summer twenty twenty four.

在2024年夏天，欧洲几乎所有的军事情报机构都发布了评估报告，认为俄罗斯到2029年可能拥有足够强大、足以攻击北约成员国的军队。

In summer twenty twenty four, almost every military intelligence service in Europe published their assessment that Russia might have an army by 2029, which is big enough and strong enough to attack a NATO member state.

随后，欧洲——部分也在美国，但主要是在欧洲——展开了一场辩论，批评者提出了两点意见。

And then of course, a debate started here in Europe, partly also in The US, but mostly here in Europe, where critics made two points.

第一点是：为什么俄罗斯会如此愚蠢，去攻击北约？因为北约的军事实力远超俄罗斯。

The first one was, why should Russia be so stupid to attack NATO because NATO is far superior in its military capabilities than the Russians are?

第二点是：看看俄罗斯在乌克兰的军队，他们面临这么多困难。

And the second argument was, look at the Russian forces in Ukraine, they have so many difficulties.

你怎么会认为，就连俄罗斯的政治和军事精英也可能觉得他们有真正击败北约的机会？

How can you think that, you know, even the Russian political and military elite might think that they have a real chance in fighting NATO?

这就是我们在2024年夏天所进行的辩论。

So this was the debate we had in summer twenty twenty four.

当时我在想，也许这种思考俄罗斯如何攻击北约国家的方式并不正确。

And at that time, I was thinking, you know, maybe this is not the right way to think about how Russia might attack a NATO country.

那么，俄罗斯的目标究竟是什么？

Because what is Russia's goal?

俄罗斯的目标实际上是摧毁北约，确保美军撤离欧洲，因为俄罗斯的政治和军事精英认为，只有这样，他们才能再次在政治和经济上主导欧洲的部分领土。

Russia's goal is actually to destroy NATO and to make sure that US forces are out of Europe, because then, this is what the Russian political and military elite thinks, they are able to dominate parts of the European landmass again, politically and economically.

因此，我开始思考：要实现这一目标，真的有必要全面进攻一个北约国家吗？也就是说，比如出动六个坦克师，穿越白俄罗斯-波兰边境，目标是占领华沙。

So this led me to the thought, to achieve this goal, is it really necessary to attack a NATO country full fledgedly, meaning, you know, six tank divisions breaking through the Belarus Polish border with the aim to conquer Warsaw.

我想，其实并不必要。

And I thought, no, it's not necessary.

我的意思是，俄罗斯只需要给北约来一次考验，看看北约是否愿意启动第五条；而他们能做的最好的事，就是对北约领土进行一些小规模的入侵。

I mean, the Russians just have to put NATO on a test and to see whether NATO is willing to invoke Article five, and the best thing they can do is, they can do some, let's say, minor incursion into a NATO territory.

然后我在思考，北约的软肋究竟在哪里？

And then I was looking, where are basically NATO's soft underbellies?

这要追溯到二战时期，丘吉尔当时在寻找纳粹的软肋，最终在西西里找到了，因此他们通过西西里进军，以解放欧洲其他地区。

And this goes back to, you know, the Second World War, where Churchill was looking for the soft underbellies of the Nazis and he found the soft underbelly in Sicily, so that's the reason why they drove in through Sicily to basically liberate the rest of Europe.

如果你看一下地图和各个北约国家，会发现有几个软肋。

And if you look basically at the map and in various NATO countries, you have a couple of soft underbellies.

比如挪威有一个岛屿叫斯瓦尔巴，那里有小型的俄罗斯聚居区；还有瑞典的哥特兰岛；此外，还有四个城市——挪威两个、爱沙尼亚一个、立陶宛一个——靠近俄罗斯边境，当地有俄语少数民族，甚至一些人仍是俄罗斯公民。

You have an island which belongs to Norway, Svalbard for instance, where there are small Russian settlements, you have Gotland, which is a Swedish island, but you have also a couple, four cities actually, two in Norway, one in Estonia and one in Lithuania, which are close to the Russian border, which have a Russian speaking minority and even some people who are still Russian citizens.

这些拥有俄语少数民族、俄罗斯公民或双重国籍人士的城市，通常为俄罗斯提供了完美的入侵借口。

And these kind of cities with a Russian speaking minority or even Russian citizens or people who have a dual citizenship, one of them is Russian, and usually provide the Russians with a perfect narrative to invade.

2014年在顿巴斯我们就是这样看到的，因为那时俄罗斯可以声称，其少数民族在相关国家的权利受到压迫，因此必须采取行动保护海外的同胞。

This is what we saw in the Donbas in 2014, because then the Russians can make the argument that the rights of their minorities are oppressed in the respective countries and that they have to do something in order to protect their minorities abroad.

比如爱沙尼亚的纳尔瓦，立陶宛的另一个城市，我以纳尔瓦为例。

And so, you have Narva in Estonia, you have another city in Lithuania, and I choose Narva as an example.

有些人认为这个情景是一种预测，以为我在说俄罗斯一定会进攻纳尔瓦，但那不是我的本意。

So sometimes people think that, you know, this scenario is a prognosis and that I say they will go into Narva, But that's not the point.

纳尔瓦只是一个例子，用来说明我们从俄罗斯人那里了解到的情况，同样也可能发生在那两个有俄语少数民族的挪威城市，或是在立陶宛，但我只是选择纳尔瓦作为例子，来说明俄罗斯人可能如何考虑将北约置于考验之中。

Narva is just to illustrate something we know from the Russians, could have taken place also in these two Norwegian cities, where there is a Russian speaking minority or in Lithuania, but I just choose Narva basically as an example for how the Russians might look at the possibility to put NATO on the test.

这是基本的情景。

This is the basic scenario.

然后，当然，俄罗斯人会制造这种情景——我不想透露太多细节，因为我还是希望人们去读这本书——他们会绕着北约国家，尤其是美国，质问：你们真的愿意为了解放爱沙尼亚这个小地方而冒上一场重大常规冲突的风险吗？而这种冲突总是伴随着核威胁。

And then, of course, I mean, the Russians would make the scenario, I don't want to reveal too many things because still I want people to read the book, and then the Russians would basically go around NATO countries and especially to The United States and would say, are you really willing to risk a major conventional confrontation, which always includes a nuclear dimension, for the liberation of this tiny place in Estonia.

这将考验北约的立场，因为北约必须决定是否援引第五条，不惜一切代价去解放这个被俄罗斯占领的城市，还是有些北约国家认为不值得，让我们用一个来自第一次世界大战的短语来说：为纳尔瓦而死并不值得。

And this will put NATO on a test, because NATO then has to decide whether they invoke Article five and they try to liberate, by all means necessary, this Russian occupied city, or whether some NATO countries think it's not worse, let's use a phrase which we know from the First World War, that it's not worse to die for Narva.

这基本上是一个政治情景，而非军事情景。

This is basically the So it's a political scenario rather than a military scenario.

所以我确实鼓励大家去读这本书。

So I certainly encourage people to read the book.

这是一本很短的书。

It's a very short book.

如果你认真阅读，几个小时就能读完。

You can read this book in a few hours really if you're committed.

所以，我非常希望至少能让他们对你们提出的这个情景有所了解，因为我也想向你提出一些反事实假设，事实上，这个地区是存在争议的。

So I would love to at least give them some sense of what the scenario is that you put forward, because I also want to run some counterfactuals by you because in fact, this is a contested area.

‘争议’这个词不太准确，但纳尔瓦河渡口确实曾多次发生俄罗斯军队的入侵。

Contested is the wrong word, but the Narva River Crossing is an area that has seen incursions by Russian forces before.

因此，爱沙尼亚人平时就处于高度戒备状态，爱沙尼亚军队也一直在研究如何应对这种情况。

So Estonians are on high alert on a regular basis, the Estonian army, in how to deal with this.

所以，尽管这个情景本身是虚构的，但绝非不可能发生。

So this is not actually While the scenario itself is fictitious, it is by no means implausible.

所以请你帮个忙，跟我们分享一下你在书中提出的细节，这样大家不仅能对即将阅读的内容有个基本了解，更重要的是，为接下来深入探讨这个话题奠定基础。

So just do me a favor and share with us what details you can about what you've put forward in the book so that both people can get a sense of what they're about to read, and also more importantly for this discussion, to lay the foundation for a further series of questions that delve into this topic.

是的。

Yeah.

所以，这本书从俄乌战争结束时讲起，你知道的。

So basically the book starts with the end of the war against Ukraine, you know.

我称之为《日内瓦和约》，因为俄罗斯和乌克兰在日内瓦签署了一项条约，由美国和一些欧洲国家斡旋，基本上满足了俄罗斯所声称的所有要求。

There is, I call it the Peace of Geneva because there is a treaty signed in Geneva between the Russians and the Ukrainians, mediated by The US and some Europeans, which basically gives Russia whatever they claim they want to have.

俄罗斯获得其占领的领土，乌克兰其余地区要么被大幅非军事化，要么得不到欧洲或美国的任何安全保障。

So Russia gets the territory it is occupying, Russia gets or mostly demilitarize Ukraine, rest of Ukraine, which will have no hard security guarantees, neither by the Europeans nor by The US.

现任政府或总统必须辞职，进入新一轮选举阶段，而俄罗斯试图干预这类选举；更重要的是，乌克兰其余地区没有任何经济前景，导致民众开始离开国家。

The current government or the president has to resign, they go into a phase of new elections and the Russians are trying to meddle into these kinds of elections, but mainly also there is no economic perspective for the rest of Ukraine, so people are starting to leave the country.

关键是，俄罗斯会将此视为一场胜利，并因此受到鼓舞，进一步采取行动。

And the point is that this will be perceived by the Russians as a victory and this encouraged them to go even further.

在我的设想中，普京作为俄罗斯总统辞职，一位来自金融界、此前从未从政的年轻聪明人士接任，他开始对欧洲和美国展开魅力攻势，明确表示他无意就乌克兰被占领土进行任何谈判，但希望与西方恢复正常关系，并不断提出一系列建议，这导致欧洲领导人和公众舆论都难以确定，这位新领导人究竟是一个更英俊的普京，还是真的代表了一种新的政策方向。

So in my scenario, Putin, as a Russian president resigns and a new guy comes in, which is someone who comes from the financial sector, wasn't in politics before, young, smart guy, and he starts a charm offensive vis a vis, let's say Europe and The US, making clear that he's not ready to negotiate anything about, you know, the occupied territories in Ukraine, but he wants to normalize relations with the West and he puts forward proposal after proposal, which basically leads in Europe to a situation where European leaders, as well as public opinion, is not quite sure whether this guy is just a better looking Putin or really represent a kind of new approach policy.

其后果是，过去两三年来我们看到的所有重新武装欧洲、建立对俄威慑的努力都被搁置，因为欧洲政治领导人希望观察和验证：这个人究竟是代表了俄罗斯外交政策的新方向，还是只是表面文章。

And the consequence is that all these attempts we've seen over the past couple of years, two years, to rearm Europe, to establish some kind of deterrence with regard to Russia, is put on hold, because European political leaders want to test and want to see basically who is this guy, is he really a new approach in Russian foreign policy or not.

这是理想主义幻想与迎合公众情绪的结合，因为公众更加疲惫，也渴望获得与俄罗斯更紧密经济一体化的好处。

Some combination of wishful thinking and also appealing to a public that is more weary and also wants the benefit of closer economic integration with Russia.

是的。

Yeah.

在所有欧洲社会中，一场辩论随之展开：如果这个人代表了俄罗斯的新变化，那我们为何还要继续投入资源重新武装？

And definitely in all of the European societies, then a debate starts, you know, that if this guy represents something new in Russia, then why should we continue with all the efforts to rearm?

那么，我们应当寻求与俄罗斯更紧密的合作。

Then basically we should, you know, look for closer cooperation with Russia.

而在俄罗斯，这一点非常明确：这位新总统实际上希望延续俄罗斯近年来所展现的这种新帝国主义政策。

While in Russia, it is very clear that actually this president, this new president wants to continue this kind of neo imperial policy we see from Russia since a couple of years.

于是，他把最亲近的顾问和最高军事将领召集在一起，说：给我找一个方法，让我们能继续推行我前任的政策。

So he gets all his closest advisors and top military guys together and says, find me a way where we can basically continue with the policy of my predecessor.

接着，他们开始讨论各种可能的选项。

And then they started discussing about various options.

他们非常确定，全面入侵一个北约国家不会带来预期的结果。

They are very sure that, you know, invading a NATO country full fledgedly would not lead to the desired results.

随后，俄罗斯陆军总长提出了一个历史类比——即莱茵兰的再军事化。

And then the chief of the Russian army comes up with a historical analogy and historical analogy is the so called remilitarization of the Rhineland.

对于不熟悉这一历史的人，这是指1936年的情况：《凡尔赛条约》——也就是第一次世界大战结束后签署的条约——明确禁止德国在莱茵兰地区驻扎常备军队，因为法国坚决反对，而英国也支持这一立场。

And for those who are not familiar with that is, this is a situation in 1936, the Versailles treaty, I mean, the treaty which was signed basically after the end of the first world war, did forbid Germany to have a permanent military presence in the Rhineland, which is part of Germany, because the French were adamantly against this and supported by Great Britain in that.

因此，这一点被写入了《凡尔赛条约》。

So it was written into the Versailles treaty.

当纳粹上台后，他们与德军展开了一场辩论，探讨如何测试法国和英国对抗纳粹德国的决心。

When the Nazis came into power, they started a debate with the dealership of the Wehrmacht, how to basically test the French and the British resolve in confronting Nazi Germany.

他们想到的主意是派遣德军进入莱茵兰，完全清楚如果法国——这是他们的判断——以及英国做出反应，他们就会立即从莱茵兰撤出；但最终，法国和英国都没有任何反应，因此德军留在了莱茵兰。

And they came up with the idea of sending the Wehrmacht into the Rhineland, fully knowing that if France, and this was the decision, that if France and Great Britain would react, they would basically immediately withdraw from the Rhineland, but at the end it turned out that neither France nor Great Britain did react in any way, so the Wehrmacht stayed in the Rhineland.

于是，他们为自己的政治野心设计了这一方案：你只需进入北约区域的一小部分，驻扎下来，并质问北约是否真愿意为解放这样的城市，与俄罗斯武装力量展开大规模常规冲突，甚至涉及核威慑。

And this basically is the scenario they developed then for their political ambitions, which is, you basically go into a small part of a NATO area, you stay there, you ask NATO actually if they're really willing to have a major conventional escalation with Russian armed forces and the nuclear dimension included to that for the liberation of such a city.

如果北约做出反应，他们就会自行撤回本国领土；但如果北约不反应，他们就会留下，而北约将就此垮台。

If NATO would react, if NATO were to react, they would immediately withdraw on their own territory, but if NATO doesn't react, then they would stay and NATO would be dead.

这基本上就是他们的方案。

That's basically the scenario.

这本书中重要的一点是，对纳尔瓦的进攻并非始于纳尔瓦。

What is important for the book is that the attack on Narva doesn't start in Narva.

实际上，它始于俄罗斯的准军事单位在非洲推动非洲人前往地中海沿岸，并将他们送上前往欧洲的船只。

Actually, it starts with Russian paramilitary units in Africa in pushing basically people from Africa to the Mediterranean Coast, putting them on boats to be sent to Europe.

因为如果你生活在欧洲，你就知道，目前一个主要问题就是来自非洲的非法移民涌入欧盟。

Because if you live in Europe, you know that one of the major issues at the moment is irregular migration into the European Union, especially from Africa.

所以，如果你面临一波试图进入欧盟的移民，欧洲将完全专注于阻止这些移民进入欧盟。

So, if you have such a wave of migrants trying to get into the European Union, then Europe would be completely focused on preventing these migrants from entering the European Union.

因此，欧洲将被分散注意力，无法关注所谓的东翼。

So Europe is going to be distracted from, let's say, the Eastern flank.

在我的设想中，同样的情况也会发生，只是中国稍微帮了点忙，他们开始与越南就南海一个小群岛的争端闹起来。

The same thing happens in my scenario with a little bit of help from the Chinese who start basically some kind of quarrel with the Vietnamese of a small archipelago in the South China Sea.

因为你们美国人知道，每当南海发生什么事，每一届美国政府的反应至少是派遣航母编队前往，以威慑侵略者进一步行动。

Because you, as Americans, you know that whenever something happens in the South China Sea, the reaction of every US administration is at least to send a carrier group over to deter the aggressor from doing even more.

所以，即使美国也在一定程度上被分散了注意力，转而关注南海，而非北约的东翼。

So even The US, to a certain extent, is distracted from the eastern flank of NATO and focus on the South China Sea.

而这为俄罗斯进军纳尔瓦提供了空间。

And this basically provides the space for the Russians to move into Narva.

这正是我的设想中他们所做的事情。

This is what they do in my scenario.

然后整个政治进程就开始了，对吧？

And then basically the whole political process starts, yeah?

接着你会看到几个场景，描述美国国内如何争论，探讨有哪些可能的手段能把俄罗斯人赶出纳尔瓦。

Then you have a couple of scenes where basically, you know, how The US is debating internally what kind of possibilities they have in order basically to get the Russians out of Narva.

欧洲也会发生同样的情况，而俄罗斯则通过派遣外交官来应对，尤其是书中一个非常关键的场景是：俄罗斯驻联合国大使被派往白宫，与美国国家安全顾问会面，讨论纳尔瓦问题。

The same thing happens in Europe and the Russians are countering this by sending out their diplomats and especially one scene is, I think, very crucial in my book, is a meeting between the Russian ambassador to the United Nations, who is sent to the White House to meet The US National Security Advisor to have a talk about, you know, Narva.

在这次会谈中，美国国家安全顾问不断向俄罗斯大使施压，询问俄罗斯究竟愿意为保卫纳尔瓦做到什么地步，因为俄罗斯明确表示，这仅仅关乎这座城市，关乎保护其少数族群，他们根本没有进一步扩张的意图。

And in this talk, The US National Security Advisor basically is pressing the Russian ambassador on the issue what Russia is willing to do in order to defend Narva, because the Russians make it very clear, it's about this city, it's about the protection of their minority, they have no intention even to go further.

在这场对话中，俄罗斯大使明确表示，俄罗斯愿意不惜一切代价保卫纳尔瓦，这甚至包括使用核武器，对吧？

And in this conversation, in this chat, the ambassador, the Russian ambassador and The US National Security Advisor, they have, the Russian ambassador makes it very clear that Russia is willing to protect Narva by all means necessary, which also means the use of nuclear weapons, yeah?

接着在第三步，你会看到北约会议，这是整个场景的核心——在那里，北约成员国之间出现了分裂。

And then actually in the third step you have the NATO meeting, which is the center of my scenario, where actually you see a split in NATO member states.

一些成员国认为这是对北约领土的攻击，主张必须反击、采取行动；而另一些国家则非常不愿意为保卫纳尔瓦而卷入冲突。

There are some member states who see this as, you know, an attack on NATO's territory and they want to push back, they want to basically react, and you have a couple of countries who are very reluctant to engage in order to defend Narva.

因此，在这次北约会议结束时，北约并未援引第五条，这意味着北约作为一个整体不会对此作出回应，对吧？

So at the end of this NATO meeting, NATO doesn't invoke Article five, which basically means NATO will not react to that, yeah, as a whole.

然后我想简单提一下这本书的最后一章。

And then I think I just say something about the last chapter of the book.

在书的最后一章，讲述了新任俄罗斯总统与中国总统之间的一通电话。

In the last chapter of the book, there is a call between the new Russian president and the Chinese president.

这是一个非常短的章节。

And it's a very small chapter.

我的意思是，只有半页左右的样子。

I mean, it's half of a page or something like that.

对话大致如下。

And the dialogue basically is as follows.

俄罗斯总统对中国总统说，你知道，事情的发展速度比过去一个世纪都要快。

The Russian president says to the Chinese president, you know, things are moving faster than they did over the past century.

中国总统回应说，是的，我们正掌握着主动权，或者说我们在主导这一切。

And the Chinese president answers by saying, yes, and we are in the driving seat or we are driving that.

我看似虚构的这段对话，实际上正是普京和习近平一年半前在索契举行双边会晤时的真实对话。

And what sounds like a made up dialogue by me is exactly the dialogue Putin and Xi had a year and a half ago at Sochi when they basically had a bilateral meeting.

在某个时刻，他们休息了一下，和各自的代表团走到阳台上，当时有一个话筒未关闭，恰好录下了这段对话。

So at a certain point they had a break, they went out on the balcony with their delegations and there was a kind of hot mic, which recorded exactly this kind of conversation.

普京对习近平说，历史的进程比过去一百年要快得多，习近平回答说，是的，我们掌握着主动权。

Putin said to Xi, history is moving faster than the past one hundred years, and answer to Putin, yes, and we are in the driving seat.

所以这基本上就是我这个情景的结尾。

So that's basically the end of my scenario.

好的，我有很多问题。

Okay, I have a lot of questions.

非常感谢你。

Thank you so much.

首先，我们知道当时那段对话是被谁的麦克风录下的吗？

First of all, do we know whose mic it was that was turned on during that conversation?

嗯，我得回去翻一下我的文件。

Well, I would have to go back into my files.

我不知道。

I don't know.

我可能是出于俄罗斯人的好奇，因为我也持怀疑态度。

Probably I'm Russian just curious because I'm also skeptical.

如果这是中国代表团的人，我会认为这是个失误，但如果俄罗斯一方故意保持麦克风开启，我也不感到意外。

If it was someone from the Chinese delegation, I would expect that it had done an error, but I wouldn't have been surprised if someone on the Russian side kept it hot on purpose.

那么，我们来逐一讨论我的几个问题。

So let's go through a number of my questions.

首先，谈谈你选择并决定用这位更年轻、更有魅力的领导人取代普京的原因。

First of all, let's talk a little bit about your choice and your decision to replace Putin by this younger charismatic leader.

你为什么决定在这次入侵之前进行领导层更替？

Why did you decide to engage in a leadership transition ahead of this incursion?

这对你们来说为什么重要？

Why was that important for you?

是为了表明俄罗斯的威胁超越了普京本人吗？

Was it to demonstrate that the Russian threat extends beyond Putin?

我的理由有三个，这就是我更换俄罗斯总统的基本原因。

I mean, are three arguments why I changed basically a Russian president.

第一，很简单，为了让这本书更易读，并给读者带来一些惊喜元素。

One is, it's very simple, to make the book more readable and to have some kind of surprise element for the reader.

第二点是，你们已经提到了这一点：如果看看俄罗斯，我们往往称这场战争为‘普京的战争’，却忽视了这实际上是俄罗斯的战争，因为是这个政权怀有这种新帝国主义野心。

The second thing is, and you alluded already to that, that if you look at Russia, we tend to call this war Putin's war, and we tend to overlook that this is basically Russia's war, because it's the regime who has this kind of neo imperial ambition.

所以，如果普京明天就去世了，他会被另一个人取代，而这个人很可能继续推行同样的政策，因为我们知道，是这个政权拥有这种新帝国主义野心。

So if Putin, I mean, if Putin will be dead by tomorrow, he will be replaced by someone else who probably would continue the same kind of policy, because we know from the regime, it's the regime who has this kind of neo imperial ambition.

第三点是，像我这样年纪较大的读者，看到这位新的俄罗斯总统让欧洲和美国感到困惑，这恰恰让我们想起了上世纪八十年代中期的情景。

And the third thing is, I want to basically, older readers like I am, you know, having this kind of new Russian president who basically confuses Europe and The US is exactly what we had in the mid eighties.

上世纪八十年代中期，当戈尔巴乔夫上台时，欧洲和美国——也就是里根政府和我们的政府——对戈尔巴乔夫究竟是一个外表更体面的勃列日涅夫（他的前任），还是真正代表了苏联外交政策的新变化，存在着分歧。

In the mid eighties when Gorbachev came into power, actually Europe and The US, I mean, the Reagan administration and our administrations, they were split on whether Gorbachev is something like a better looking Brezhnev, I mean his predecessor, or whether he represents really something new in Soviet foreign policy.

我需要这一点来引出我真正担忧的核心问题：一旦战争结束，我们遏制俄罗斯的努力就会放缓，因为社会和政治层面都会出现一种情绪，认为‘俄罗斯已经在乌克兰得到了他们想要的，事情到此为止了’。

And I needed that to basically get to the point, which is something I'm really concerned of, that if the war is over, basically we will slow down in our efforts to deter Russia, because we will have this kind of mood in the societies as well as in politics to say now the Russians got what they wanted in Ukraine and that's it.

他们不会再对欧洲的稳定与安全构成进一步威胁。

They won't pose any further threat to European stability and security.

因此，我确实认为，为了最好地准备自己并有效遏制潜在的俄罗斯侵略，采取最坏的假设是一种明智的策略。

So I definitely think it's a good strategy to assume the worst in order to prepare yourself as best as possible in this case to deter potential Russian aggression.

但我还想更深入地探讨一下你对俄罗斯目标所作的一些假设。

But I do want to dig a bit deeper into some of these assumptions that you make about Russia's goal.

你说他们的目标是摧毁北约。

You said its goal is to destroy NATO.

是的。

Yeah.

而且你还提到，除了普京之外，俄罗斯的统治阶层有着帝国野心。

And also that the regime beyond Putin, that the Russian, I suppose the ruling consensus within Russia has imperial ambitions.

你为什么坚持这些假设？

Why do you proceed with these assumptions?

首先，俄罗斯想要摧毁北约这一假设，是俄罗斯人自己明确告诉我们的。

I mean, first of all, the first assumption that Russia wants to destroy NATO is something the Russians are clearly telling us.

如果你回溯一下，比如那份由拉夫罗夫撰写、但实际上是普京授意的信件，写于2021年12月17日，发往华盛顿，第二天又发了一封类似的信给北约总部布鲁塞尔，信中列出了他们不入侵乌克兰的条件。

If you go back, for instance, to the letter, I mean, the letter was written by Lavrov, but of course it was Putin's letter, on the 12/17/2021 to Washington and a similar letter was sent the day after to Brussels, NATO headquarters, where they laid out their demands in order not to invade into Ukraine.

其中一项最重要的是，他们希望与美国就欧洲安全架构展开谈判，也就是说，他们要求美军撤出中东欧和巴尔干的大部分地区。

One demand and the most important was that they wanted to talk to The US about actually the European security architecture, meaning they wanted US forces out of large parts of Middle And Eastern Europe, as well as the Balkans.

有些人甚至说他们希望美军撤出科索沃，但我对此不太确定。

Some even say they want US forces out of Kosovo, but I'm not quite sure about that.

是的，但这些内容基本上都是他们写在信里的。

Yeah, but this is basically which they've wrote in a letter.

从那以后，每当普京、拉夫罗夫、佩斯科夫等人谈到结束这场战争时，都明确表示他们想与美国讨论欧洲安全架构。

And since then, when Putin or someone else, Lavrov, Peskov, whoever, talks about, you know, ending this war, they make very clear that they want to talk to The US about its European security architecture.

因此，俄罗斯通常会向美国表明，他们不太愿意讨论乌克兰问题，因为他们有这些极端要求，希望得到满足，但他们希望就逆转欧洲安全架构展开对话。

So usually the Russians let The US know that they're not that much willing to talk about Ukraine, because they have this maximalist demands, which they want to see fulfilled, but they want to engage in a dialogue about, you know, reversing the European security architecture.

而2021年这封信中所写的内容，是要求恢复到1997年的状态。

And what is written in this letter of 2021 is to the status of 1997.

1997年时，距离北约第一次东扩还有两年。

So in 1997 was two years before the first enlargement of NATO.

第一次东扩是波兰、匈牙利和捷克共和国加入。

The first enlargement was Poland, Hungary and The Czech Republic.

俄罗斯人很清楚，北约不可能把这些国家逐出北约。

And the Russians know that, you know, I mean, NATO will not kick out these countries out of NATO.

但俄罗斯人真正意思是，不允许美国在1997年之后加入北约的那些成员国部署军队和军事设施。

But what the Russians do mean is no American troops and installations, you know, in those member countries who came after 1997 into NATO.

如果你问自己，为什么会这样？

And if you ask yourself, why is this the case?

我的意思是，为什么他们要把美军撤出中欧和东欧？

I mean, why do they American troops out of Middle And Eastern Europe?

这是他们再次在政治和经济上控制这片陆地的先决条件。

That's a precondition for them to dominate parts of this landmass again, politically and economically.

我个人不认为俄罗斯的野心是重建苏联，尤其是在领土方面。

I don't think personally, I do not believe that Russia's ambition is to recreate the Soviet Union, especially not when it comes to territory.

我的意思是，我不认为俄罗斯希望将波罗的海国家和其他国家并入其领土，建立一个新的苏联。

I mean, it's not that I think that the Russians want to integrate the Baltic countries and the other countries into their territory and have this kind of new Soviet Union.

但你可以回溯到叶利钦时代，我的意思是，1991年苏联解体后，俄罗斯出现了第一个民主政府，就连叶利钦也想控制这些地区。

But, and you can go back to the Yeltsin area, I mean after 1991 when the Soviet Union collapsed and there was the first democratic government in Russia, even Yeltsin wanted to have the control over these areas.

我们知道，1993年克林顿和叶利钦曾会面，叶利钦基本上表示，把波罗的海国家和中欧、东欧地区让给我们吧。

I mean, we know that there was a meeting between Clinton and Yeltsin in 1993, where Yeltsin basically said give us, you know, the Baltics and Central And Eastern Europe.

我们有俄罗斯联邦的第一份国家安全战略，我不太记得具体年份了，但应该是1993年，当时他们把整个这一地区称为‘近邻’，并声称在那里拥有特殊利益。

We had the first national security strategy of the Russian Federation, I don't remember, 1993, I think was it too, where basically they called this whole area, they're near abroad, where they have special interests.

所以，这并不是普京及其政权意识形态的一部分，这种想法甚至可以追溯到叶利钦时代。

So this is something which is not, you know, part of Putin's and the regime's ideology, this goes even back to the Yeltsin area.

你甚至可以将这一观点延伸到苏联时期，因为1958年，当时的波兰外交部长拉帕基首次提出，呼吁西欧国家开展某种外交努力，建立一种从符拉迪沃斯托克到里斯本的欧洲安全架构。

And you can even extend this to the Soviet Union, because the first proposal in '58 by the Polish, then Polish Foreign Minister, Rapaki, calling on the Western Europeans to engage in some kind of diplomatic effort to create a kind of European security architecture ranging from Vladivostok to Lisbon.

这一提议中没有包括旧金山和温哥华。

San Francisco and Vancouver were missing in this proposal.

因此，就连苏联也明白，要主导欧洲，就必须排除美国在欧洲的影响力。

So because even the Soviet Union knew that dominating Europe is only possible if you don't have any American influence in Europe.

这就是我的观点。

So that's my point.

俄罗斯骨子里有一种帝国主义乃至新帝国主义的野心，即使在当前政府时期，他们也在向我们明确传达这一点，我甚至可以提供更多细节。

There is this inherent imperial, neo imperial aim in Russia and even with the current government, they're telling us this, and I could even give you more nitty gritty details.

有一位立陶宛政治家，曾因被指控为俄罗斯间谍而被立陶宛驱逐，如今居住在俄罗斯某地。

There is a Lithuanian politician who basically was expelled from Lithuania because he was accused of being a Russian spy, who lives now somewhere in Russia.

他最近写了一本书，其主要论点是：根本不存在立陶宛这个国家，立陶宛语甚至根本不存在。

He recently wrote a book and his main argument is, actually there is no state Lithuania and the Lithuanian language doesn't even exist.

令人惊讶的是，这本书的序言是由拉夫罗夫撰写的，是的，这为这种修正主义政策提供了一种官方背书。

And surprisingly, who wrote the foreword for this book, it was Lavrov, yeah, so which gives you some kind of official label, you know, for this kind of revisionist policies.

是的。

Yeah.

其次，取代普京。

So, secondly, replacing Putin.

我不是俄罗斯问题专家，因此对俄罗斯内部的争论缺乏深入了解，但我经常与我认识的许多俄罗斯专家交流，甚至在我自己的专业领域——安全、国防和安全政策以及军事事务方面——如果你观察这场战争，俄罗斯内部其实只有一场分歧，而这场分歧并不是发生在那些认为这场战争愚蠢、对我们毫无益处的人之间。

I'm not a Russian expert, so I lack a lot of insights in Russian inner debates, but I talk to a lot of Russian experts I know, and I would even say in my field of expertise, which is more security, defense and security policy and military stuff, If you look at the war, there was only one clash in Russia with regard to this war and this was not among people who said this war is stupid, you know, and doesn't bring anything to us.

分歧发生在普京身边和强硬派内部，他们指责普京在对乌克兰的战争中过于软弱。

These were among the people around Putin and the hardliners, accusing Putin being too soft in the way he was waging the war against Ukraine.

因此，我们所了解到的唯一反对声音，其实比当前政权更加民族主义。

So actually, the only opposition we became aware of was an even more nationalistic opposition than the current regime is.

所以，我的假设是，如果俄罗斯的政治领导层发生更替，我们可能会迎来比现任领导层更极端的人，他们在俄罗斯的外交和安全政策目标上更加激进。

So therefore, you know, my assumption is, if there is a change of politicians in Russia, we might even get people who are more hardcore with regard to Russia's goals and, you know, what the Russians wanted to achieve in foreign and security policy than the current leadership is.

这其实是个很好的观点，因为许多美国评论员在谈论俄罗斯时，或者在谈论土耳其时（因为这一点也适用于土耳其，那里有一群强硬派推动埃尔多安向右转），都预期如果领导人离开、或出现崩溃、政变等情况，对美国来说会是好事。

That's actually a great point because a lot of commentators in The United States, whether we're talking about Russia, whether we're talking about Turkey, because this also applies to Turkey as well, where you have a significant contingent of hardliners who push Erdogan to the right, there's an expectation that if a leader leaves or if there's a collapse or a coup or something that somehow this is good for The United States.

撇开其他所有类似情况可能带来的负面影响，认识到你所提出的观点也很重要。

Putting aside all the other ways in which something like that would be bad, it's also important to recognize the points that you made.

所以我认为，随着讨论的深入，我们还有机会进一步挑战这些假设。

So I think there'll be opportunities to challenge some of these assumptions even further as we move along.

但我想澄清一下你提出的其他一些假设。

But I want to clarify a few other assumptions that you put forward.

其中一个前提条件是，美国对北约的支持撤回。

One of them, one of the preconditions for this scenario is a withdrawal of American support for NATO.

是的。

Yeah.

这种情景在多大程度上依赖于美国退出北约，或减少其承诺——即使这种减少并非明确表达，而是对美国领导力的信心丧失？

How much does a scenario depend on this, on a US withdrawal from NATO or a reduction of its commitments, even if they aren't necessarily explicit, but a loss of confidence in American leadership?

这至关重要。

It's crucial.

我的意思是，目前以及可预见的未来，一个无法依赖美国在欧洲参与的欧洲——指的是军事参与——将无法抵御任何俄罗斯的侵略，因为双方在能力上存在巨大差距，而许多应对大规模侵略（无论是来自俄罗斯还是其他势力，但目前俄罗斯显然是最可能的威胁）所必需的关键要素，若没有美国支持，将极其难以实现。

I mean, right now and in the foreseeable future, a Europe which can't rely on a US engagement in Europe, I mean a military engagement, won't be able to defend itself against any Russian aggression, because there is a huge capability gap and a lot of things which are crucial for defending against a large scale aggression, beat by Russia or by someone else, but Russia is the obvious candidate for this right now at the moment, would be extremely difficult without US support.

是的。

Yeah.

因此，美国在常规和核领域对北约的承诺，是欧洲能够自卫、北约能够威慑俄罗斯的前提条件。

So, US being committed to NATO in both areas, conventionally and nuclear, is the precondition for Europe being able to defend itself and for NATO being able to deter the Russians.

如果莫斯科方面认为美国不再承诺支持北约，特别是不再愿意与欧洲共同积极防御，那么俄罗斯趁机行动的可能性就会增加，对吧？

If there is the perception in Moscow that The US is no longer committed to NATO, and especially not committed to defend actively together with Europe, then the chances will increase that Russia might seize the opportunity, yeah?

我给你举一个我觉得非常引人注目的例子。

And I give you one example, which I found very striking.

我之前告诉过你，到2024年夏天，所有这些军事情报机构都得出结论：到2029年，俄罗斯军队如果得到政治授权，就具备攻击北约国家的能力。

I told you that by summer, you know, 2024, all these military intelligence services came up and said, you know, by 2029, the Russians will have an army, which if politically wanted, is able to attack a NATO country.

所有这些评估当然都是基于他们掌握的情报来源，比如俄罗斯生产多少坦克、多少弹道导弹和巡航导弹等等。

And all these assessments were, of course, based on, I mean, what they had as sources in terms of how many tanks do the Russians produce, how many ballistic missiles and cruise missiles and so on and so forth.

今年年初，德国政府更迭了，是的，随着政府更迭，我们的对外情报机构领导层也发生了变动。

At the beginning of this year, we had a change of government in Germany, yeah, and with this change of government came also a change in the leadership of our external intelligence service.

那位离任的负责人并没有被解雇，因为他现在被任命为驻梵蒂冈大使，所以你知道，他不是因为表现不佳被撤换，只是因为他已经担任对外安全部门负责人六年了，大家觉得该换人了。

And the outgoing guy who was not sacked because he's now ambassador to the Vatican, so, you know, he wasn't sacked because, you know, they didn't like him, it was just because he was already for six years head of the external security service and they thought change might be good.

但这位官员在离任前的采访中表示，我们有迹象表明，莫斯科内部有一些势力不再相信第五条，他们甚至想测试一下。

But this guy, in interviews he did before he left this position, said, we have indications, which is far more than, you know, we know how many tanks they produce and how many ballistic missiles, we have indications that there are circles in Moscow who do not believe in Article five any longer Moscow and they would like to test it.

那么，什么是威胁呢？

So, you know, what is a threat?

你需要了解行动者是否具备能力和意图。

You need to know the actor that he has the capabilities and the intentions.

我们了解这个行动者，也知道他的能力，现在我们还获得了一些迹象，表明某些势力——他没有具体说明是哪些势力——但甚至认为，如果他们对北约发动攻击，不是全面进攻，而是像我在我设想的场景中描述的那样，北约不会援引第五条。

And we know the actor, we know his capabilities and now we have some indications that some circles, he wasn't very specific which kind of circles, but they even, you know, have the perception that if they would attack NATO, not full fledgedly, but in the way I wrote it in the scenario, that NATO is not going to invoke Article five.

当然，如果

And this, of course, I mean, if

你有了这种认知，这就为行动打开了机会之窗。

you have this kind of perception, this opens a window of opportunity to do it.

那么，你之前提到的多域战略有多重要？即除了俄罗斯对爱沙尼亚等邻国进行渗透外，中国也在参与分散美国注意力的行动，比如迫使美国将航母调往南海，或在争议领土问题上挑起危机——比如在第二汤加礁问题上与菲律宾制造紧张？

So how important is this multi domain strategy that you talked about earlier, where in addition to the Russians conducting incursions into neighboring territories like Estonia, the Chinese are also participating in trying to distract the Americans by getting them to send carriers into the South China Sea, by instigating a crisis over some disputed territory, in this case with The Philippines over the second Thomas Shoal?

换句话说，你多大程度上认同这种观点：莫斯科和北京愿意合作并协调其军事行动，共同削弱美国在欧洲的威慑力，更广泛地说，以加速美国实力的衰退和削弱为最终目标？

In other words, how much do you buy into this idea that there is a willingness between Moscow and Beijing to collaborate and coordinate their military engagements in a joint effort to degrade America's deterrent in Europe, and more generally speaking, with the overarching goal of hastening the decline and diminishment of American power?

如果你谈论的是削弱美国在欧洲的能力，俄罗斯和中国的目标是不同的，因为俄罗斯希望美国退出欧洲。

If you talk about degrading American capabilities in Europe, the Russians and the Chinese do have different goals, because the Russians would like the Americans out of Europe.

中国并不太支持这一点，因为如果美国退出欧洲，他们就能完全专注于亚太地区，而这对中国来说可不是什么好消息。

The Chinese are not that much in favor of that, because if the Americans are out of Europe, they can focus entirely on Asia Pacific, which of course for the Chinese is no good news.

所以从中国的角度来看，这场持续的战争对他们来说是最好的情况，因为这在一定程度上牵制了美国在欧洲的军事能力。

So from a Chinese perspective, this ongoing war is the best thing that can happen to them because, you know, it ties down The US partly with their capabilities in Europe.

你认为中东的情况也是如此吗？

Do think that's also true for what's going on in The Middle East?

嗯，当然了。

Well, yeah, definitely.

无论美国在哪里被分散了对印太地区或亚洲的注意力，中国都会积极支持这种分散，因为它们担心——当然，如果你看看美国的国家安全战略，就会发现其重点是印太地区，是亚洲。

Wherever, you know, The US is distracted from the Indo Pacific or Asia, this is something the Chinese do support actively, yeah, the distraction, because they're afraid that, and of course, I mean, if you look at the national security strategy of The US, you know, the focus is Indo Pacific, is Asia.

我的意思是，西半球，但接下来，就是阻止中国在亚洲成为区域霸主。

I mean, Western Hemisphere, but then next, you know, preventing China from becoming a regional hegemon in Asia.

你说得很有意思，虽然我们不要离题太远，但有趣的是，这实际上在美国内部一直是一个争论的焦点。

It's interesting you say that, and not to take us too far afield, but it's interesting because this has actually been a source of debate in The US.

事实上，关于国家安全战略的大部分公众评论都暗示，美国正在加大对西半球的投入，本质上将亚洲让给中国，但事实上，这份文件的表述完全不是这样。

And in fact, most of the public commentary around the national security strategy has suggested that this is The United States doubling down on the Western Hemisphere and essentially ceding Asia to China, where in fact the document doesn't read like that at all.

不，绝对如此。我认为唯一合理的批评是，这份文件毫无意义，因为特朗普可以随心所欲地表态，它可能并不真正反映政府的意图。

No, absolutely So I think the only legitimate criticism that I can think of is that the document doesn't mean anything because Trump can say whatever he wants and maybe it doesn't actually reflect the intentions of the administration.

然而，我认为这份文件在你的观点上非常明确。

However, the document I think is pretty clear to your point.

他们说的是，我们要牢牢掌控西半球，然后阻止中国在亚洲称霸。

What they're saying is we're going to lock down the Western Hemisphere and then we're going to deny China hegemony over Asia.

完全正确。

Absolutely.

我也是这样解读这份国家安全战略的。

This is how I read the National Security Strategy too.

我的意思是，这一点明确写出来了。

I mean, it's explicitly stated.

文件中提到，比如台湾的独立至关重要，这无非意味着中国不能把我们视为自己的后院。

It's stated something like, you know, the independence of Taiwan is very crucial, which means nothing else than, you know, China doesn't get what we claim for us, an own backyard.

但与此同时，我想让你回到之前的话题，不过我想先提一下这个，也许我们稍后可以探讨。

And at the same time though, again, and I want you to go back to where you were before, but just to throw this out and maybe we can explore it later.

这一届政府在处理外交政策时，最令人困惑的一点就是它对待盟友的方式。

The one just major curiosity in terms of how this administration has approached its foreign policy is the way it has dealt with its allies.

因此，如果你正在推行一项针对中国的遏制战略，那么很多做法都显得不合逻辑。

And so this idea, if you're running a containment strategy on China, there is so much that doesn't make sense.

许多人会试图用‘这是特朗普表达严厉之爱的方式’来解释这一点。

And many people will try and explain this by saying, Well, this is Trump's way of showing tough love.

这是他迫使欧洲人增加集体防务开支，从而使美国的联盟体系——北约以及美国在北约中的参与——更具可持续性的手段。

This is his way of forcing the Europeans to spend more on collective defense in order to make the American alliance structure, NATO and America's participation in NATO more sustainable.

如果真是这样，那当然再好不过。

That would be great if that's true.

但我仍然觉得有些地方说不通，不过也许我们可以稍后深入探讨。

I still think that there are things that don't make sense, but maybe that's something we can explore.

但请回到你之前的话题。

But please go back to where you were.

我最初问过你关于这个多域战略的问题，你当时在解释你认为什么才是符合中国最佳利益的，以及这种伙伴关系在多大程度上是一种主动合作，旨在削弱美国投射力量的能力和美国帝国的边界。

I had originally asked you a question about this multi domain strategy and you were explaining how you feel What exactly is in China's best interest and the extent to which this partnership is an active collaboration to degrade America's ability to project power and the boundaries of American empire?

我的意思是，这种合作是主动的，因为双方都认同，美国的实力是他们实现自身外交与安全目标的最大障碍。

I mean, it's an active collaboration in that sense that both do agree that US strength is the biggest impediment for them to achieve their own foreign and security goals.

如果你阅读过去三年中中国和俄罗斯发布的每一份文件，或者阅读金砖国家的宣言——这是一个松散的组织，主要由中国主导，但俄罗斯也扮演着重要角色。

If you read every document, the Chinese and the Russians basically had or agreed over the past three years, if you read the declarations of the BRICS countries, I mean, this is an organization, loose organization, which is dominated mainly by China, but also the Russians have a big role in there.

美国在政治、经济和军事上对全球的主导地位，被他们视为对自身外交政策目标的最大威胁。

The US, what they perceive as The US dominance politically, economically and militarily over the globe is the biggest threat to their own foreign policy goals.

因此，双方都认同，削弱美国或促成美国作为全球行为体的衰落，是他们共同的目标。

And thereby they both do agree that, you know, degrading The US or basically contributing to the demise of US as a global actor is what they both have in common.

所以我认为，我们已经看到了这种合作。

So I think, I mean, we see already the collaboration.

中国是俄罗斯在战争问题上最大的支持者。

I mean, China is the biggest supporter of Russia when it comes to the war.

这种合作甚至到了这样的地步：他们向俄罗斯提供技术，用于其无人机生产。

This goes even so far that, you know, they deliver technology the Russians do use in their drone production.

中国基本上在购买俄罗斯的石油，这帮助俄罗斯经济维持生存，甚至还能有钱资助战争。

Chinese are basically buying Russian oil, which helps the Russian economy surviving and even, you know, having money for financing the war.

因此，中国是俄罗斯最大的盟友。

So, China is Russia's biggest ally.

中国过去在贸易方面与乌克兰关系良好。

China had also good relations with Ukraine in terms of trade.

但如果你问自己，为什么中国要支持俄罗斯进行这场战争？

But if you ask yourself, why is China supporting Russia in their attempts, you know, to waging this war?

这是因为这场战争有助于中国阻止美国将注意力集中在亚洲。

This is because this war helps China to prevent that The US is focusing on Asia.

只要战争持续，美国就会——我指的是，可能不会在特朗普政府时期，但我们将在未来几周和几个月内看到——到目前为止，只要战争还在继续，美国就部分被牵制在欧洲，无法完全专注于印太地区和亚洲。

As long as the war goes on, The US will, I mean, probably not with the Trump administration, we will see in the upcoming weeks and months, but so far, as long as the war was going on, The US was partly tied down, bogged down in Europe, not being able to focus entirely on the Indo Pacific and Asia.

好的。

All right.

那么我们来谈谈低强度战争。

So let's talk a little bit about low threshold warfare.

实际上，我想推荐我几年前做过的一期节目。

And actually I want to suggest an episode that I did several years ago.

事实上，我记得我们录制这期节目时，正是2020年初新冠疫情开始在美国显现的时候。

In fact, was right I think we recorded it right as the pandemic was beginning to show up in The United States in early twenty twenty.

那是我和大卫·基尔库伦的对话，当时讨论的是他的书《龙与蛇》。

It was with David Kilcullen and the book was The Dragons and the Snakes.

书中有一部分讲中国，但也有一段非常有用的内容是关于俄罗斯的，他称之为‘边缘战争’，其实就是低门槛战争。

And there's a section there on China, but there's also a really useful section on Russia and what he calls liminal warfare, which is essentially low threshold warfare.

而今天我们确实看到了俄罗斯在欧洲各地的破坏行动。

And we've actually seen Russian sabotage operations across Europe today.

我们看到了波罗的海电缆被切断。

We've seen the Baltic cable cuts.

我们看到了仓库火灾和暗杀企图。

We've seen warehouse fires, assassination attempts.

大卫在那本书中提到的俄罗斯低门槛战争或边缘战争的现实，与你描述的情景相比如何？

How does the reality of Russia's low threshold warfare or liminal warfare, as David referred to in that book that I mentioned, compare to what you describe in your scenario?

这个情景中的这一方面，究竟有多少不是推测或假设，而是我们今天实际看到的现实？

And how much is this aspect of the scenario not really conjecture or hypothetical, but actually what we're seeing today?

我的意思是，首先，

I mean, first of all,

我认为俄罗斯目前正在打两场战争。

I would say the Russians are waging right now two wars.

一场是用动能手段在乌克兰进行的战争，另一场则是用非动能手段针对大多数欧洲社会，是的，这种许多人称之为混合战争的方式，你称之为低门槛战争，主要是为了恐吓政府，阻止政治家以及公众舆论支持乌克兰。

The one is with kinetic means in Ukraine, and the other one is with non kinetic means against most of the European societies, yeah, and this kind, what many people call hybrid warfare, you call it low threshold warfare, mainly is also to intimidate governments and to deter politicians, as well as, you know, public opinion from, in this case, supporting Ukraine.

因为，正如你提到的，我们已经看到，那些与向乌克兰提供物资生产有关的公司被烧毁了。

Because, as you mentioned, I mean, we've seen, you know, that companies which are connected to the production of material, which goes to Ukraine went up in flames.

是的。

Yeah.

我们曾发现一起针对德国一家军工企业高管的暗杀企图，幸运的是，这起企图被很早就发现了。

We had an assassination attempt, which luckily was discovered very early against, in Germany, against one of our leading managers or CEOs of one of the armaments companies.

我们在波罗的海的电缆、无人机入侵波兰、战斗机侵入爱沙尼亚领空长达十七分钟等事件中都看到了这种情况。

We see this with the cables in the Baltic Sea, drone incursion into Poland, fighter jets who are violating the Estonian airspace, for instance, for seventeen minutes.

这些行为本质上都是为了阻止各国政府做俄罗斯不希望它们做的事，向公众展示其政府的无能为力。

So these are all things which basically aim at deterring governments from doing certain things the Russians don't want them to do, from basically showing the public how defenseless their governments are.

我的意思是，看看目前在许多欧洲国家发生的无人机事件。

I mean, look at the whole drone thing which is going on in a lot of European countries.

哥本哈根机场出现了无人机，导致机场被迫关闭。

Drones in Copenhagen at the airport where the airport had to be shut down.

德国也出现了无人机，导致机场被迫关闭。

Drones in Germany where the airport had to be shut down.

无人机飞越军事设施以进行侦察。

Drones over military installations to spy on them.

到目前为止，没有任何政府能够有效保护这些设施免受无人机入侵，因为我们长期以来忽视了无人机作战和反无人机作战，这使民众产生了一种国家无法保护他们的感觉。

And so far, no government was able to protect these kind of installations against, you know, the drone incursion because we neglected this whole drone warfare and anti drone warfare for a long time, which gives the population the feeling that the state can't protect you.

我认为，我们现在离我所描述的场景比一年半前我写这本书时所预想的还要接近。

I think we are moving even closer to the scenario that I described than I would have thought a year and a half ago when I wrote this book.

因为当前发生的情况——这正是我的设想与现实之间的区别——我现在不禁自问：俄罗斯是否真的还需要测试北约？还是说，当前的发展，尤其是格陵兰的问题，已经严重损害了北约，以至于欧洲北约国家不再相信第五条条款了？毕竟，当最大的盟友威胁要用武力夺取其他伙伴的领土时，谁还会相信这条条款？

Because what is happening now, and this is the difference between, you know, my scenario and the reality, that right now I'm asking myself whether Russia really needs to put NATO on a test or whether, you know, the current development, especially with Greenland, has damaged NATO already to such an extent that, you know, Article five is no longer anything European NATO countries do believe in, if they have the biggest alliance partner who is threatening other partners with the use of force to basically take some part of the territory.

所以，你知道，我原本以为俄罗斯是在测试北约，看看美国人和欧洲人会如何反应。

So, you know, I mean, what I was anticipating that the Russians are putting NATO on a test to see how do the Americans react, how do the Europeans react.

现在，俄罗斯人可能在观察北约，还有我跟你说过的我们的外部安全负责人，莫斯科的一些圈子认为北约已经死了。

Right now, maybe the Russians look at NATO and what I told you about our external security chief, you know, and that circles in Moscow are thinking NATO is already dead.

因此，我们可以毫无顾忌地进入纳尔瓦，根本不用担心北约会启动第五条，因为这根本不会发生。

So we can move into Narva without even thinking about the risk that NATO will invoke Article five, because this is not going to happen anyway.

那我们来更详细地讨论一下这个情景。

So let's talk about that scenario a bit more.

你再次提到的类比，就是希特勒在1936年对莱茵兰的入侵。

The analogy again that you brought up, which was the invasion by Hitler in 1936 Or invasion, the reacquisition of the Rhineland in 1936.

这通常被称为莱茵兰的再军事化，因为这是欧洲的工业心脏地带，纳粹如果想重建军队并具备对欧洲国家发动战争的能力，就必须控制这里。

That's otherwise known as the remilitarization of the Rhineland, specifically because this was the industrial heartland of Europe and the Nazis needed it if they wanted to rebuild their military and their capacity to conduct war against European states.

纳尔瓦河谷并没有同样的重要性。

The Narva River Valley doesn't have the same significance.

所以，其意义仅仅在于摧毁北约这个防御性联盟。

So the significance would be simply destroy NATO as a defensive alliance.

但问题是，考虑到回报有限，俄罗斯人冒这些风险能获得多少好处呢？

But then the question is, how much is there to be gained by the Russians for taking these types of risks given the limited reward?

我认为，从俄罗斯的角度来看，如果北约因这个问题而崩溃，那将是一个巨大的胜利。

I think from a Russian perspective, it would be a huge reward if NATO would collapse over this question.

是的，正如我所说，俄罗斯人知道，他们要想渗透并主导其势力范围，唯一的机会就是美国不在那里。

Yeah, as I said, you know, the Russians know that the only chance they have to basically penetrate, dominate their four field is if The US is not there.

只要美国仍然是德国东部与白俄罗斯或俄罗斯西部之间这些国家的保护者，他们就很难主导所谓的近邻地区；但如果没有美国，那就容易多了。

As long as The US is the protector of most of these countries in between, you know, let's say, the eastern border of Germany and the western border of Belarus or Russia, they have a hard time in dominating this near abroad, as they called it, but without The US, it's much easier.

因此，摧毁北约对俄罗斯来说收益巨大。

So the gains of destroying NATO would be huge for Russia.

这一直是一个持续的争论，而在这个问题上持不同立场的人，往往在政治上具有明显的动机或立场。

So this has been an ongoing debate, and it's the people that fall along one side or another over the debate are predictably politically oftentimes motivated or politically situated.

关于这个问题，人们的言论存在政治偏见。

There's a political bias in terms of what people say on this matter.

我所讨论的问题是：美国是否激化了俄罗斯对乌克兰的入侵，以及俄罗斯对北约扩张是否真的有合理的不满。

The matter that I'm speaking of is whether or not The United States provoked Russia's invasion of Ukraine and whether the Russians have a legitimate beef with the Americans and the Europeans for NATO enlargement.

因此，我想向你提出的真实问题是：我们如何调和俄罗斯所认为的其对北约的合法国家安全关切，与欧洲面对一个具有修正主义倾向的俄罗斯时所持有的合法国家安全关切之间的矛盾？

So the real question that I want to pose to you is, how do we mediate between what Russia perceives to be its legitimate national security concerns vis a vis NATO and the legitimate national security concerns that the Europeans have when faced with the potential of revisionist Russia.

当每一方声称自己所采取的行动都是出于自卫，而这些行动却又恰恰引发另一方的担忧和升级行为时，我们该如何找到中间地带？

How do we find a middle ground when the very things that each side claims it's doing in its own defense are the things that incite the concerns and the escalatory behavior of the other side.

我会首先质疑一些同事——我也非常了解美国的辩论——所提出的假设，即这场乌克兰战争在某种程度上是由美国或北约的扩张政策所引发的。

Well, I would start by questioning the assumption some of my colleagues, and I know The US debate also quite well, are putting forward that this Ukraine war has been in one way or the other, being provoked by The US or NATO's policy of enlargement.

是的。

Yeah.

原因有两个。

For two reasons.

第一个是，幸运的是，几周前公布了一份文件，记录了弗拉基米尔·普京与两位领导人会谈的两份协议，一位是乔治·布什，我是说儿子，不是父亲，另一位是

The one is, and this luckily was published a couple of weeks ago, where two protocols of talks Vladimir Putin had, one was George Bush, I mean the son, not the father the other

乔治·W。

George W.

布什。

Bush.

是的，正是乔治·W.

Yeah, exactly, George W.

布什，另一个是克林顿，我想。

Bush, and the other one was Clinton, I think.

在这两种情况下，普京都强调北约不应扩大到乌克兰。

When both cases, Putin made the point that NATO should not enlarge to Ukraine.

而乔治·W.

And George W.

布什问普京为什么，是的，但普京并没有用安全理由来回答。

Bush asked Putin why, yeah, and Putin answered not with security arguments.

普京的回答是：因为乌克兰不是一个国家。

Putin answered by saying because Ukraine is not a state.

所以重点是，这场战争的动机正是普京在2021年左右的那篇期刊文章中所写的。

So the point is this whole war was motivated, and this is what Putin wrote in 2021, I think, this journal.

嗯，这也

Well, it's also

坦白说，他所提出的观点确实如此。

quite frankly what he suggested really.

他所有这些言论，尤其是那场给塔克·卡尔森的著名采访，都明确表达了同样的意思。

The totality of all his statements to that famous interview with Tucker Carlson that he gave suggested the exact same thing.

他从未真正提出过这是由于

At no point did he really make the The argument that it was

俄罗斯发动这场战争的理由，并不是因为北约即将逼近俄罗斯边境。

reason for Russia to wage this war is not because NATO was about to get close to the Russian borders.

我的意思是，我曾在北约工作了五年。

I mean, I worked for NATO for five years.

从2003年到2007年。

From 2003 to 2007.

我见证了整个布加勒斯特峰会前的全过程。在2000年那一届政府时期，没有人希望乌克兰加入北约，这正是为什么德国和法国当时反对美国推动在2008年就将乌克兰和格鲁吉亚纳入北约成员的压力。

I saw the whole run up to the Bucharest summit in 2000 administration, no one wanted the Ukrainians becoming a member of NATO, and that was the reason why, you know, the Germans and the French basically objected The US pressure of including in 2008 already including Ukraine and Georgia as members of NATO.

那不是吗？我们当时给出的信号是最终会让乌克兰加入北约，而在所有可能的选择中，这似乎是我们做过最愚蠢的事——暗示乌克兰正走在加入北约的道路上，但实际上它并未成为北约成员，因此也不受第五条集体防御条款的保护。

Wasn't that I mean, the guidance that we were going to eventually bring Ukraine into NATO, of all the things that one could point to, that seems to have been the single stupidest thing that we could have done, Suggest that Ukraine was on the path of becoming part of NATO, but in fact was not part of NATO and therefore not covered by Article five.

是的，没错。

Yeah, exactly.

没错。

Exactly.

从2008年到2024年，乌克兰与北约的关系没有任何进展。

And since 2008 up to 2024, there was no progress in bringing Ukraine closer to NATO.

是的，他们在北约-乌克兰伙伴关系框架内做了很多事，但说普京发动某种‘预防性战争’是因为乌克兰即将加入北约，这完全是捏造的。

Yeah, they did a lot of things within the framework of the NATO Ukrainian partnership, but the argument that actually Putin did some kind of, yeah, let's say preemptive war because Ukraine was about to become a NATO member is completely made up.

对此没有任何实证依据。

There is no empirical evidence for this.

对此没有任何实证依据。

No empirical evidence for this.

普京本人，他曾经对克林顿、对小布什说过，

And Putin himself, I mean, he told Clinton, he told George W.

在2021年写过，此后又反复重申：对他而言，乌克兰根本不是一个独立国家，那些认为乌克兰人是独立民族的人，都被彻底误导了。

Bush, he wrote it in 2021 and since then he repeated it, you know, for him, the Ukrainians are no, this is no state in its own right, and the people who think are Ukrainians are completely misled.

他称他们为带有奇怪口音的俄罗斯人。

He calls themselves Russians with a funny accent or a strange accent.

在他看来，这些人都是俄罗斯人，应该被带回祖国。

From his perspective, these are Russians and they should be brought back into the motherland.

真相会不会介于两者之间？即并非北约这一军事联盟威胁到了普京，而是乌克兰的西方化构成了威胁。

Is it possible that the truth lies somewhere in between, that it wasn't NATO, the alliance structure that militarily threatened Putin, but the westernization of Ukraine that represented the threat.

因此，谈论乌克兰最终会加入北约，以及暗示它可能最终成为欧盟成员的对话，本身就被视为一种威胁。

So talking about how Ukraine was going to eventually become part of NATO and conversations that suggested that it may eventually become part of the European Union were themselves the threat.

更明智的外交政策本应是避免谈论乌克兰最终加入北约的可能性，因为这实际上是在没有第五条集体防御保障的情况下，激化了俄罗斯的潜在侵略行为。

And what would have been a more intelligent foreign policy would have been not to talk about the eventual entry of Ukraine into NATO because that was essentially inciting potential Russian aggression without the deterrence of Article five.

嗯，但2008年已经发表了那样的声明，而北约的有趣之处就在于，一旦达成共识，他们就会永远坚持下去，你知道吗？

Well, yeah, but once you had the statement in 2008, and that's the funny thing about NATO, you know, once they agree on something, they carry this on forever, you know?

我的意思是，每次的联合声明里都会提到，乌克兰和格鲁吉亚终有一天会成为北约成员，但我觉得，真正的愚蠢和错误政策在于，2014年克里米亚被吞并、顿巴斯战争爆发后，没有对俄罗斯采取强硬立场，这向普京传递了一个信号：他可以逍遥法外。

Mean, then in every communique, of course, I mean, '48 was that Ukraine and Georgia one day will become member of NATO, so, but I think, you know, the stupidity was and the wrong policy was actually, and now we're going back to history and, you know, lessons you learn from history, by not playing tough on Russia after 2014, after the annexation of Crimea and after they started the war in the Donbas, showed to Putin that he can get away with those things.

因为克里米亚被吞并之后，虽然实施了制裁，但与此同时，北溪二号管道协议却签署了。

Because what happened after the annexation of Crimea, of course, there were sanctions, but at the same time, you know, Nord Stream two was signed.