HoP 023 - MM 麦凯布谈柏拉图的知识

嗨，我是彼得·亚当森，你正在收听的是《哲学史》播客，感谢伦敦国王学院和勒沃胡姆信托基金的支持，在线访问 www.historyofphilosophy.net。

Hi, I'm Peter Adamson and you're listening to the History of Philosophy podcast brought to you with the support of King's College London and the Leverhulme Trust online at www.historyofphilosophy.net.

今天的节目将是我在国王学院的同事麦凯布教授的又一次访谈。

Today's episode will be another interview with my colleague here at King's, Professor McCabe.

嗨

Hi

嗨，彼得！

Hi Peter!

今天我们讨论的是柏拉图关于知识的观点，这个话题我在最近几期节目中一直在探讨。

Today we're going to be talking about Plato's views on knowledge, which is a topic I've been looking at in several recent episodes.

我想知道，比如，柏拉图是否认为我能知道我现在正坐在椅子上和你说话这个事实。

I was wondering whether you could tell me, for example, whether Plato thinks that I could know the fact that I'm sitting in a chair right now talking to you.

他觉得我能知道这类事情吗？

Is that the kind of thing he thinks I could know?

我想很多人会说，他认为你无法知道那样的事情，因为很多人相信，在柏拉图看来，知识是由其对象决定的，所以只有当对象是特定类型时，你才能拥有知识。

I think a lot of people would say that he thinks you can't know something like that, because a lot of people believe that on Plato's account, knowledge is determined by what it's of, so that you can only know when you have objects of a particular specified kind.

我不确定这样理解是不是对的。

I'm not sure that that tells the right story.

我不确定这样能解释清楚为什么知识值得我们这么重视，特别是为什么要把知识和美德联系起来，如果知识不能以像坐在椅子上这种日常琐事为对象的话。

I'm not sure that it tells the story about why knowledge should be anything much that we care about, in particular why we should associate knowledge with virtue, if we can't think of knowledge as having as its objects the sort of ordinary mundane things like sitting in a chair.

但我觉得对他来说，知识可以单独指向某件事，比如“我正坐在椅子上”这种想法，是有问题的。

But I think there is a problem for him with the idea that knowledge could be of something on its own, like, Here I am sitting in my chair.

所以在我看来，这里有两个不同的问题。

So there are two separate questions here, it seems to me.

一个是我们是否像当代哲学那样，用严格限定的方式来理解知识，比如知道某个命题是真的，而且因为我有理由相信它，所以我知道它，诸如此类；还是说，知识其实比这更宽泛、更宏大。

One of them is whether one thinks about knowledge in these strictly delimited ways that contemporary philosophy thinks about it so that you might think of knowledge in terms of I know that some true proposition, and I know it because I'm justified in believing it and so on and so forth, or whether, in fact, knowledge is something broader and wider than that.

那是不是说，如果我知道任何一件事，就意味着我也知道其他一些事情？

And would that mean that if I know anything, then it means that I know some other things as well?

所以我不能只单独知道一件事，比如我坐在椅子上。

So I couldn't just know one thing at a time, for example, that I'm sitting in a chair.

我觉得柏拉图是这么想的。

I think Plato thinks that.

我觉得他不是认为知识只能直接触及那些高深的对象。

I think it's not that he thinks that knowledge is only direct access to some rarified objects, for example.

我觉得他认为知识必须是有系统性的。

I think that he thinks that knowledge has to be somehow or other systematic.

这有两个很明显的理由。

There are two outstanding reasons for that.

其中一个是他认为知识和解释是联系在一起的。

One of them is that he thinks that knowledge is connected with explanation.

如果你不知道某件事为什么是真的，那你就不能算知道它是真的。

You don't know that something is true unless you know why it's true.

所以至少要知道一件事，你就得知道另一件事。

So at least to know one thing, you've got to know one other thing.

也就是说，为什么第一件事

Namely, why the first thing

就是为什么第一件事是真的。

is why the first thing's true.

所以，你一旦知道某件事，你就得知道两件事。

So you've gotta know as soon as you know something, you know two things.

而且，这还会扩散到……

And in fact, then that that spreads out to

有没有某件事是我一定会知道的，比如我知道这件事这个事实？

Is there a certain thing I would know, namely that the fact that I know it?

没错。

Exactly.

所以，我觉得有两个条件。

So there are two conditions, I think.

一个是对我们所知道的东西的结构的要求。

One of them is a condition on how what we know is structured.

另一个是我们如何知道自己知道，也就是我们如何思考自己的认知状态的内在条件。

The other is an internal condition on how we know that we know, how it is that we think about our own epistemic condition.

至少在我看来，对他来说，这两个关于知识的条件决定了我们如何理解他所认为的知识是什么。

And it seems to me, at any rate, that those twin conditions on knowledge for him determine how we understand what he thinks knowledge is.

这样一来，他关于知识与美德之间的其他很多联系也就说得通了。

And they make sense then of a lot of the other connections that he makes between knowledge and virtue.

对。

Right.

这个我们一会儿再谈。

Which we'll get on to in a second.

是的。

Yeah.

不过我想先再仔细想想这一点。

But I first just wanna think about that a little bit more.

根据你刚才说的，我猜一个结果就是，我不可能知道某件事却不知道自己知道它。

One result of what you just said, I guess, is that I couldn't ever know something without knowing that I know it.

正是如此。

Exactly.

对。

Right.

所以这意味着，如果我不知道自己知道，就不能算知道，那么我想如果我问柏拉图，告诉我知道某件事是什么感觉，他会说，如果你非得问我，那你就已经……

And so what that would mean is if I can't know something without knowing that I know it, then I guess if I asked him, Well, Plato, tell me what it's like to know something, he would say, If you have to ask me, then There you've already

不过，你刚才问我的问题其实有两种理解方式，对吧？

are two ways of understanding what you just asked me, though, aren't there?

一种是，我能不能给你描述一下知道某件事是什么感觉，这是一个问题，也许你那个回答正好对应这个。

One of them is whether I can give you an account of what it feels like to know something, which is one question, which maybe your response would be the right one to that.

嗯，你知道，如果你不知道，如果你非得问，那……

Well, you know, if you don't know, you if you've gotta ask will.

如果你非得问，那你永远都不会知道。

If you've gotta ask, you ain't never gonna know.

但我觉得还有另一种思考方式，那就是对话录里那些大量以困惑或僵局结尾的论证，其实都是在探讨知道是什么。

But think there's another way of thinking about it, which is that huge amounts, huge swathes of the arguments in the dialogues that seem to end in Aporia, in impasse, are actually about what it is to know.

它们探讨的是，什么样的条件才能让我们解释某件事，或者让我们理解知道某件事意味着什么。

They're about what the conditions are that would allow us to explain something or that would allow us to understand what it is for us to know something.

这又回到了那两个反复出现的孪生条件。

And that happens in two again, these twin conditions keep turning up.

所以，比如说，尤西弗罗篇不仅告诉我们理解虔诚的条件，或者解释虔诚是什么的条件，而且我们可以把它推广到解释勇气是什么，以及其他各种事物是什么。

So if you think about the for example, the euthyphro doesn't only tell us about the conditions for understanding piety or the conditions for explaining what piety is, but they allow us to generalize it to explaining what courage is, what all sorts of other things are.

所以，对话本身的一部分努力，即使对话没有解决手头的问题，大量的工作是在角色之间关于他们试图做什么的讨论中完成的。

So part of the endeavor in the dialogues themselves, even although the dialogues come to no resolution of the question in hand, a great deal of the work gets done in the discussion between the characters about what it is they're trying to do.

而那个讨论部分是关于知识解释的这个条件，即我们需要能够说出为什么某事物如此，某事物是什么，比如虔诚或勇敢或其他什么。

And that discussion is partly about this condition on knowledge of explanation, condition that we need to be able to say why something is so, what it is for something, to be pious or brave or whatever.

同时，还有一系列其他主题，特别是在苏格拉底对话中，但反复出现，关于知识的内部条件是什么，知道你知道意味着什么。

At the same time, there's a whole series of other themes, particularly in the Socratic dialogues, but they turn up over and over again about what the internal conditions of knowledge are, what it is to know that you know.

有人可能会说，那只是琐碎的。

And somebody might say, Well, that's just trivial.

知道是什么，当然，当你知道时，你知道你知道。

What it is to know Of course, when you know, you know that you know.

你得到

You get

那是免费的。

that for free.

对。

Right.

而苏格拉底对这个不感兴趣。

And Socrates is not interested in that.

苏格拉底更感兴趣的是思考知识如何影响我们的心理构成。

Socrates is much more interested in thinking about how knowledge makes a difference to our psychological constituency.

我说的心理是在一个相当严格的意义上。

And I mean psychological in a quite strict sense.

我指的不是那种可能与知识论述分离的心理，而是对知识应该是什么样的一种内在条件。

I don't mean psychological in anything that might be separable from accounts of knowledge, but it's an internal condition on what knowledge should be like.

那这是不是就是美德和知识如此紧密相关的原因？

And is this why virtue and knowledge are so closely related?

因为，我的意思是，你刚才说的似乎暗示，我拥有知识就意味着我的灵魂变成某种状态。

Because, I mean, what you just said seems to imply that for me to have knowledge would be for my soul to become a certain way.

而我的灵魂处于某种状态听起来就像是拥有美德。

And my soul as being a certain way sounds like being virtuous.

是这样吗？

Is that right?

我觉得这就是两者联系起来的地方。

I think that's where the connection gets forged.

不清楚是哪个方向来的，是他先想到美德，然后想到知识，还是反过来。

It's not clear which direction it comes from, that if he starts out by thinking about virtue, ends up thinking about knowledge or the other way around.

只是……

It's It only

看起来他确实来回摇摆。

certainly seems like he goes back and forth.

嗯，我觉得很可能是这样，你理解美德和知识之间的联系，因为美德就像知识一样，是灵魂的一种状态。

Well, I think that's probably right, And that you understand the connection between virtue and knowledge because virtue, like knowledge, is a state of soul.

你觉得他在多大程度上只是在推演苏格拉底似乎已经想到的东西，也就是美德即知识？

To what extent do you think that he's just working out the implications of something Socrates seems to have thought, which is that virtue is knowledge.

比如说，如果我勇敢，那意味着我知道在战斗中该怎么做，或者也许意味着我知道什么是勇气，比如我能给出勇气的定义。

For example, if I'm courageous, that means that I know what to do in battles, or I maybe it means that I know what courage is, for example, I can give a definition of courage.

你觉得柏拉图只是在探讨苏格拉底的那个观点，还是说这里有什么特别属于柏拉图的东西，而不是苏格拉底的？

Do you think that Plato is just exploring that Socratic idea, or is there something, as it were, distinctively platonic here which isn't Socratic?

我觉得是前者。柏拉图对知识的探讨，很大程度上一直受苏格拉底影响，一直到《泰阿泰德篇》甚至更晚。

I think the former, a large amount of Plato's investigation into knowledge is dominated by Socrates all the way through to the Theietetus and perhaps beyond.

所以我认为这确实是苏格拉底式的。

So I think it is Socratic.

而且我觉得把它看作一种探索也是对的，因为并不清楚他背后有一个贯穿所有言论的观点，而是在努力弄清楚如何在美德和知识之间建立恰当的联系，同时又不让任何一方变得肤浅。

And I think it's also right to think of it as an exploration because it's not clear that he's got, as it were, a view that's lurking behind everything he says, but rather that he's trying to work out how to make the proper connections between virtue and knowledge in such a way as not to trivialize either.

我觉得是这样，但有一个首要的条件，就是无论如何，这最终要解释清楚。

I think that's but there's an overriding condition that somehow or other this is going to explain.

不管我们对美德和知识的关系怎么说，都要能解释他在《欧绪德谟篇》里提出的主张，即唯一的好就是智慧。

Whatever we say about the relation between virtue and knowledge is going to explain the claim that he makes, for example, in The Euthodemus that the one thing that's good is wisdom.

那是一个非常非常高的要求。其实在当时的论证语境里，他真正想说的是，唯一本身就好、独立自足的好就是智慧。

Now that's a very, very high clear the what he actually means is the one thing that's good itself by itself, actually, in the context of the argument there.

但那是一个非常强的论断。

But that's an enormously strong claim.

所以我们需要它，它就像一种挑战。

So we need the it it works as a kind of challenge.

它说，好吧。

It says, well, alright.

所以如果你认为这是理解美德与知识关系的一种方式，那你最好能对美德是什么、知识是什么，以及两者之间的联系，说出一些相当有见地的话。

So if that's what you think is one way of understanding the relation between virtue and knowledge, you better be able to say something pretty interesting both about what virtue is and about what knowledge is, let alone about the connection between the two.

所以当我们开始讨论这个话题时，我举了一个很简单的例子。

So when we started off talking about this, I gave a kind of trivial example.

我知道我正坐在这把椅子上跟你说话，而显然柏拉图认为知识比这要高级得多。

I know that I'm sitting in this chair talking to you, and clearly Plato thinks that knowledge is something more advanced than that.

是的。

Yes.

现在听起来知识变得极其高深，所以我必须得对。

Now it's starting to sound like knowledge is incredibly advanced, so I have to be Right.

也许得像一个完美的哲学圣人那样，才能知道任何东西。

A kind of perfect philosophical sage maybe in order to know anything.

这是一个原因吗？嗯，也许这里有两个问题。

Is this one reason well, guess maybe there's two questions here.

一个是，柏拉图是不是这么想的？

One is, does Plato think that?

另一个问题是，这是不是柏拉图对如何起步这个问题如此担忧的原因？

And the other question is, is that why Plato is so worried about this problem of how you get started?

比如说，在美诺悖论中，问题似乎是，如果我一开始完全无知，我怎么才能获得知识？

So for example, in Mino's paradox, the problem seems to be, if I start out in a position of complete ignorance, how will I get to knowledge?

你可能会觉得这应该很容易，对吧？

You might think it should be very easy, right?

如果我坐在这里，那么我很容易就知道我坐在这里。

If I'm sitting here, then it's easy for me to come to know that I'm sitting here.

但如果他认为知识是这种极高的成就，意味着要有德行，那你就能明白，我很难从普通人变成圣人。

But if he thinks that knowledge is this incredibly high level attainment, it means being virtuous, then you can see how it'd be pretty hard for me to get from being this ordinary schmo to being this sage.

对。

Right.

而且很难知道我怎么才能开始。

And it's hard to know how I would even get started.

我觉得从那个想法出发，可能有三个方向可以走。

I think maybe there are three things that one can three directions one can go from that thought.

其中一个就是，他为什么那么担心开始的问题？

One of them is, why is he so worried about starting?

对开始的担忧和对完成的担忧有什么联系？

How does the worry about starting connect with the worry about finishing?

因为你可能会觉得，开始的问题涉及的是完全不同的知识概念，而不是那个关于我是否必须成为一个完全成熟的人才能成为认识者的问题。

Because you might think that the starting question is about a completely different conception of knowledge than the question about whether I have to be a fully fledged stage in order ever to be a knower at all.

第三个问题又回到你问我的第一个问题，就是关于范围的问题。

The third question goes back to your first question to me, which is about scope.

如果知识有一个很高的门槛，比如要成为圣人，那这和坐在椅子上有什么关系呢？

If there's a very high condition on knowledge, so it might be like being a sage, what's it got to do with sitting in a chair?

是不是说，我只有真正能知道那些圣人才知道的事情？

Is it that I can only really know sagy sorts of things?

我是不是非得知道那些宏大的事情，还是说我也能知道一些无聊的事情？

Do I have to have grand things or can I know boring things?

在我看来，这里又有一个很重要的联系，就是美德和知识之间的关系，因为我们需要弄清楚美德是在什么情境下存在的，知识又是在什么情境下存在的。

And it seems to me that there, again, the connection between virtue is very important because we need to be able to figure out what context virtue is in as well as what context knowledge is in.

所以，如果美德是关于如何生活的，并且和知识有关，那么与之相关的知识就不仅仅是关于那些高深的事情，还包括那些普通的事情，比如日常的道德问题和实际的日常问题。

So if virtue is about living a life and it's connected with knowledge, then the knowledge that it's connected with will have to be about not just sagey things, but boring things like ordinary moral questions and ordinary practical questions as well.

比如说，我怎么去拉里萨，那个提到的另一个希腊城市？

For example, how do I get to Larissa, this other Greek city that's mentioned

在那个地区？

in the area?

我是说，在柏拉图的著作里，有很多这样的例子，就是一些简单的事实。

Mean, there are examples in Plato of these currently just facts of the matter.

所以

So

比如在《泰阿泰德篇》里，我怎么去拉里萨，还有比如我作为陪审团成员，要判断这个人是否真的有罪。

there's how do I get to Larissa in the Thietetus, there's whether this man is actually guilty of the crime and I'm on the jury.

对。

Right.

所以问题在于，对于这类说法，是否存在一些较低的要求，假设关于拉里萨的位置，或者那个家伙是否做了他可能做的那些可怕的事情，确实有一个事实真相。

So the question there is whether whether there are low conditions on those kinds of claims, supposing there's a supposing there is a fact of the matter about where Lurice is or where or whether the bloke did whatever dreadful thing he's supposed to have done.

要加上多少才足以把它变成知识呢？

How much is it enough to add to make that into knowledge?

这个问题反复出现。

And the question arises over and over again.

有时候看起来他好像认为我们可以加上一些相对简单的东西，但其他时候，看起来他又觉得如果不加上所有东西，任何添加都不够。

And there are times when it looks as if he supposes that we can add something moderately low key, but at other times, it looks as though he thinks that no addition is enough without having all the additions.

看起来他认为，要对我们所相信的事情为什么是真的给出一个恰当的解释，就需要我们能够解释为什么一切都是真的。

It looks as though he thinks that coming up with a with a proper account of why the thing that we believe is true is true engages us with being able to say why everything is true.

所以一旦你这样想，就有点误导了，因为当代关于知识的讨论都是围绕个别命题展开的，以及你是否能解释它们为什么是真的。

So once you start to think about it like that, it's slightly misleading because contemporary discussions about knowledge turn on questions about individual propositions and whether you can account for them as being true.

所以如果它们是信念，而且它们是真的，那么什么样的理由才能让你认为它们是知识呢？

So if they're beliefs and they're true, what kinds of justification would allow you to think they're knowledge?

我觉得柏拉图不是从那个角度来讨论的。

I don't think Plato's dealing with it in those terms.

我觉得他想得更全面，与其说是关于证明，不如说是关于解释。

I think he is thinking much more comprehensively, not so much about justification as about explanation.

而且他认为解释比我们可能认为的证明要更全局化。

And he supposes that explanation is much more global than anything that we might think looks like justification.

所以按照那个说法，知识会是整体性的。

So knowledge will be holistic on that account.

那么，著名的理念论是不是就派上用场了？

And is that where the forms, the famous theory of forms, will come in?

我在播客里还没怎么聊过这个。

I haven't really talked about that in the podcast yet.

但如果你刚才说的对，他认为要知道任何东西都会让你开始思考解释，而思考解释在某种程度上会改变你的灵魂，让你变得有德性，而且解释都是相互关联的。

But if if this if what you just said is right, that he thinks that to know anything gets you off on this process of thinking about explanation, that thinking about explanation in some way would change your soul so that you'd become virtuous, and that explanations kind of all hang together.

你可能会认为解释都是相互关联的，并且认为你最终知道的东西是有结构、和谐的，就像你有德性的灵魂一样。一个理由可能是，你所知道的是这些其他的对象，也就是理念。对。

One reason you might think that the explanations all hang together and think that the things that you wind up knowing are structured and harmonious in just the way that your virtuous soul is structured and harmonious, One reason to think that would be if what you're knowing is these other objects, which are the forms Right.

这些形式本身也都是有结构、相互关联的。

Which are themselves all structured and interrelated.

对。

Right.

但是，我能不能——我在播客里其实还没怎么深入讲形式理论，但我觉得还是值得想一想，我们能不能在不引入形式理论的情况下说这些，还是说这是一种你可以接受、但不必同时接受形式理论的认识论？

But can I mean, I haven't really gotten into the forms in the podcast yet, but I think it still might be worth wondering whether we can say all these things without wheeling the forms on or whether it's, as it were, an epistemology which you can embrace without also embracing the theory of forms?

我觉得很可能可以。

I think you probably could.

我是说，我觉得你也许可以——我想先回到你刚才说的关于美德和灵魂状态的那一点，先把它放一边。

I mean, I think you might I want to come back to the thing you just said about virtue and the state of soul, leave that on one side for a second.

在我看来，你完全可以这样描述知识：只有当你知道了所有该知道的东西，你才算真正知道，而不必承诺存在某种超越性的实体，这些实体构成了你所知道的事物的解释——这是对形式理论的一种理解方式。

It seems to me that you could perfectly easily say something about knowledge such that you only know when you know all there is to know without being committed to something about transcendent entities that constitute the explanations of the things that you know, which is one way of thinking about the theory of forms.

另一方面，我觉得重要的是要记住，柏拉图似乎对所有关于知识的描述都加了一个条件，那就是知识所关乎的必须是真实的东西，无论他认为什么是真实的。

On the other hand, I think it's important to remember that one of the conditions that Plato seems to put on all of these accounts of knowledge is that what knowledge is about is something that's real, whatever it is he thinks counts as real.

所以你不必相信

So you don't have to believe

在某个

in a

理念论上，但你必须是实在论者。

theory of forms, but you have to be a realist.

我觉得你必须是实在论者。

I think you have to be a realist.

不管对象是什么。

Whatever the object is.

我觉得你必须是实在论者。

Think you have to be a realist.

但这又回到了关于美德的问题，在我看来。

But then that that comes back to the question about virtue, seems to me.

这么说吧。

So put it like this.

有人可能会想，嗯，在这种条件下，知识不过是一种巨大的专业技能。

One might think that, well, knowledge under those conditions is is just a huge expertise.

它只是最庞大的科学，包含了你能想到的任何可能的科学。

It's just the most enormous kind of science that includes any possible science that you might care to think of.

而且每当出现一门新科学，因为你是知者，你也知道那门科学。

And whenever there's a new science, because you're a knower, you know that science as well.

关于这一点有一些开玩笑的论证。

And there are some jokey arguments about that.

不，你提到过《欧绪德谟篇》，里面就有一些关于这个的玩笑式论证。

No, you've talked about the Euthydemus, and there are some jokey arguments about this in the Euthydemus.

如果人们这样想，把知识看作一种包罗万象的超级技能，而且这种超级技能是针对现实的，那么你可能会认为，有德性是什么样的事情会有点令人沮丧，因为知识能让你做的，就是某种计算。

If that's how one thinks about it, if one thinks about knowledge as this just overarching super skill, and an overarching super skill that's directed at reality, you might then think that what it would be to be virtuous is something rather kind of dismal because what knowledge will then allow you to do is sort of calculate.

所以如果知识看起来像那样，它就像一种计算技能，你就能在任何特定场合判断出该做什么正确的事。

So if knowledge looks like that, it looks like a calculating skill, and you'll be able to tell what's the right thing to do on any given occasion.

当然，这忽略了一点，就是你也能在任何特定场合判断出什么是错误的事。

Of course, what that leaves out of account is that you'll also be able to tell what the wrong thing is to do on any given occasion.

而且，在那个超级技能的知识观内部，没有任何解释能说明你为什么会有某种特定的行为方式。

And there's nothing there's no account internal to that super skill account of knowledge that gives you an account of why you would behave in any particular way.

所以，如果知识与美德之间的联系是这样的话，那看起来美德和知识是相连的，因为知识让你能弄清楚生活中什么是好的，但这已经预设了你关心好东西的原因，或者说它有限制，因为它假设你关心的只有对你有好处的东西。

So if the connection between knowledge and virtue looks like that, so there's it makes it look as though virtue and knowledge are connected because knowledge allows you to figure out what the good things are in life, It's already tendentious about what makes you care about the good things, or it's limited because it supposes that the only things you care about are good for you.

所以你可以看到，它会给你一个如何最大化你的快乐的解释，比如说。

So you can see that it would give you an account of how you maximize your pleasures, for example.

他在《普罗泰戈拉篇》里有一个论证，给出了这种机制如何运作的解释。

And he's got an argument in The Protagoras that offers that offers an account of how that would work.

但这是一种非常令人沮丧的道德观。

But it's a very dismal account of morality.

这也是一种非常令人沮丧的知识观，因为它实际上没有捕捉到我们之前讨论的那个点。

It's also a very dismal account of knowledge because actually it fails to register the thing we were talking about earlier on.

它给你的知识很大程度上是由其对象决定的，但完全没有涉及灵魂的状态，而看起来他认为知识就是那种状态。

It gives you a knowledge that's determined very much by its object, but nothing about the state of soul that knowledge it looks as though he thinks knowledge is.

所以我们回到美诺悖论。

So we go back to Meno's paradox.

美诺悖论要求知道包括知道自己知道，这看起来是一个很强的条件。

Meno's paradox requires that knowing involves knowing that you know, That and it looks as though that's a strong condition.

苏格拉底说自己知道自己一无所知，这其实是对自我认知提出了很高的要求。

Socrates' account of how he knows that he knows nothing is, again, a strong condition on self knowledge.

那么，自我认知和美德之间到底有什么联系呢？

So what's the connection then between self knowledge and virtue?

什么才算是有美德呢？

What would it be to be virtuous?

为什么不能反过来，就是恶呢？

Why wouldn't that be just vicious?

为什么不能是它的反面呢？

Why couldn't it be, as it were, the the obverse?

我非常擅长得到我想要的东西，

I'm really good at getting what I want,

而我想要的是坏的东西。没错。

and what I want is bad Exactly.

比如说。

For example.

没错。

Exactly.

所以他需要证明的，首先就是知识本身是灵魂的一种良好状态。

So what he needs to be able to show is that is first of all that knowledge is itself a good state of soul.

其次，这种良好的灵魂状态就是我们所说的美德。

And second of all, that that good state of soul counts as what we would think of as virtue.

我觉得你刚才说的，好像暗示了在灵魂这一方面，善良和你所知道的一切之间是有联系的。

It seems to me like what you just said implies that on the side of the soul, as it were, there's this connection between being good and all the things that you know.

所以，你知道你所知道的，而且你知道你知道你所知道的，

So the fact that you know what you know and that you know you know what you know

对。

Right.

对柏拉图来说，这基本上就是有德行的含义。

Is basically what it is to be virtuous for Plato.

所以，没办法把知识的内容和知识的善性分开来看。

And so there's no way of sort of pulling apart the contents of knowledge and the goodness of knowledge.

对吧？

Right?

它们其实是一回事。

They really amount to the same thing.

而且事实上，在理念论里，他好像也有类似的观点。

And in fact, in the theory of forms, looks like he has something like the same view.

所以你有所有这些理念，但正如我们会在《理想国》里看到的，他有一个“善的理念”，可以说是解释了所有理念的善。

So you've got all these forms, but then as we'll see in the republic, he has the form of the good, as it were, explaining the goodness of all the forms.

所以即使你之前说得对，认识论可以独立于理念论，也就是说你可以有一种非常强的原子式知识理论，而不必接受理念论。

And so even if you were right earlier to say that, as it were, the epistemology floats free of the theory of form so that you could have this very strong atomic theory of knowledge without embracing the theory of forms.

那么，整个系统的善和系统各元素之间的关系，是否仍然会在灵魂的知识层面和理念的对象层面分别对应起来呢？

Is is it still gonna be true that this relationship between the goodness of the whole system and the elements of the system is kind of paralleled both in the soul, on the knowledge side and in the forms on the object side.

你觉得这样说公平吗？

Do think that's fair?

嗯，我觉得这确实是回答那个悬而未决的问题的一种方式，即知识给你带来的、或者说知识构成的，为什么是美德，而不是恶习或仅仅是精明的审慎。

Well, I think it's it's certainly one way of answering the hanging question about what makes it virtue that knowledge gives you or that knowledge constitutes rather than vice or just jolly prudence.

对。

Right.

而且就是很擅长获得快乐。

And just good at getting pleasure.

真的，非常擅长获得快乐。

Really, really good at getting pleasure.

就是那种东西。

I mean, that kind of thing.

而且看起来，所以我同意有一个范式，那就是知识所认识的东西是由善来维系的，所以知识本身也必须由善来维系。

And it looks as though so I agree that there's one paradigm of that would be that what knowledge is of is held together by the good, so the knowledge itself must be held together by the good.

这看起来有点牵强，你可能会这么想。

It that looks a bit gerrymandered, you might think.

哎呀，糟糕。

Oh, crap.

我还没把关于善的内容讲够，所以我最好还是弄一个善的形式吧。

I haven't fitted in enough stuff about goodness, so I better I better sort of have a form of the good.

所以我觉得这不仅仅是表面上的那些东西，我觉得也许有一种理解方式就是稍微想想美德本身。

And so I think there's more to it than that, and I think that maybe one of the ways of coming at this is to think a little bit about virtue itself.

如果你想想当代的美德理论，这其实并不像听起来那么跑题。

So if you think about contemporary virtue theory, this isn't as much of a red herring as it sounds.

当代美德理论家感兴趣的一个问题就是价值的所在之处。

One of the things that interests contemporary virtue theorists is the location of value.

而柏拉图在把美德和知识联系起来，并且把知识描绘成这种自我认知的整体系统时，我想他想要强调的是，价值存在于认知者身上，存在于行动者身上。

And what Plato wants to insist on, I think, in connecting virtue and knowledge and in having knowledge look like this self knowing holistic system is that the value resides in the knower, in the agent.

不是说从这儿那儿的一点快乐中就能捡到价值。

It's not that it's not that it you pick it up from bits of pleasure here, there, and everywhere.

价值是由那个认知的人、那个行动者来维系的。

Something about value is held together by the person who by the agent, by the person who's doing the knowing.

这听起来有点天马行空、不太严谨。

Now that sounds a bit kind of wild and woolly.

但这和“智慧本身就是唯一的好”这种说法是一致的。

It fits with the claim that wisdom is the only good itself by itself.

这与理念论的关系有点不太协调。

It's a little bit more uneasy in its fit with the theory of forms.

对。

Mhmm.

说到理念论，这正是我下一集以及之后几集要讲的内容。

And speaking of the theory of forms, that's what I'll be talking about next episode and for a few episodes after that.

下一集我会讲柏拉图的《斐多》，请大家到时收听。不过现在，我要再次感谢麦凯布来到播客做客。

Next episode, I'll be talking about Plato's Fido, so please tune in for that, but for now I'll just thank McCabe for appearing again on the podcast.

非常感谢。

Thank you very much.