HoP 024 - 著名的遗言 - 柏拉图的《斐多篇》

嗨，我是彼得·亚当森，你正在收听的是《哲学史》播客，由伦敦国王学院和莱弗休姆信托基金支持，在线访问 www.historyofphilosophy.net。

Hi, I'm Peter Adamson, you're listening to the History of Philosophy podcast brought to you with the support of King's College London and the Leverhulme Trust online at www.historyofphilosophy.net.

今天的节目，遗言，柏拉图的《斐多篇》。

Today's episode, famous last words, Plato's Phaedo.

天鹅临死前会唱歌。

When a swan is about to die, it sings.

它唱得比以往任何时候都更动听，因为它属于阿波罗神，拥有预言的天赋。

It sings more beautifully than it ever has before, for it belongs to the god Apollo and has the gift of prophecy.

所以天鹅知道自己要死了，却欢快地歌唱，因为它终于要回到神的主人身边了。

So the swan knows it will die and sings with joy because it is finally about to join its divine master.

至少苏格拉底是这么说的，他也献身于阿波罗，面对死亡时充满希望，而不是抗拒。

Or so at least says Socrates, who likewise dedicated himself to Apollo and met death with hope rather than reluctance.

他在柏拉图的对话《斐多篇》中，对聚集在监狱里的朋友们说了这番话。

He says as much to his friends, who gather around him in prison in Plato's dialogue, The Phaedo.

这出戏演绎了苏格拉底的天鹅之歌，他最后的哲学讨论，以及他愉快地喝下毒芹后死去的情景。

It dramatizes Socrates' swan song, his final philosophical discussion, and his death upon cheerfully drinking down the hemlock.

《斐多》是一部伟大的文学作品，其中对死亡面前勇敢甚至渴望的描绘，从古代到现代一直激励着读者。

The Phaedo is a great work of literature whose portrayal of bravery, even eagerness, in the phase of death has inspired readers from the ancient world down to the present.

从哲学角度看，它也是柏拉图最伟大的对话之一，部分原因在于它是第一部阐述理念论的对话。

From a philosophical point of view, too, it's one of Plato's greatest dialogues, in part because it is the first dialogue to set out the theory of forms.

理念论通常被认为是柏拉图最重要的学说，所以有些听众可能一直在想，我要讲多少集才会提到它。

The theory of forms is usually taken to be Plato's most important doctrine, so some listeners may have been wondering how many episodes I was going to get through without mentioning it.

但事实证明，并非所有甚至大多数柏拉图对话中都明确提到理念。

But as it turns out, forms are not mentioned explicitly in all or even most of Plato's dialogues.

在我们之前看过的对话中，比如《高尔吉亚》、《美诺》和《泰阿泰德》，都没有提到理念，即使在《斐多》中，对话的主题也不是理念，而是灵魂的不朽。

They are absent from the dialogues we've looked at so far, like the Gorgias, Mino, and Thiotitis, and even in the Phaedo, the main topic of the dialogue is not forms, but the immortality of soul.

这对苏格拉底来说是个值得关注的问题，因为对话的每一页都让他离死亡场景更近一步。

This is a matter of some concern to Socrates, since each page of the dialogue is bringing him closer to his death scene.

柏拉图让苏格拉底说，即使是一个喜剧诗人也不会因为他在这个时间、这个地点谈论这个话题而责备他胡说八道，这肯定是对阿里斯托芬的讽刺。

In what must be a swipe at Aristophanes, Plato has Socrates say that even a comic poet wouldn't blame him for irrelevant prattling when he takes up this topic at this time and place.

这是柏拉图处理理念论的典型方式，即使在这里，在少数直接讨论理念的对话之一中，理念也只扮演了辅助角色。

It's typical of the way Plato handles the topic of forms, that even here in one of the handful of dialogues where they are discussed directly, they play only a supporting role.

所以我们不从理念开始，而是从灵魂不朽这个问题入手。

So let's start not from forms, but from this question of the soul's immortality.

有人可能会认为，首先要做的是确认我们确实有灵魂，但苏格拉底和他的朋友们只是把这一点视为理所当然。

One might suppose that the first order of business would be to establish that we do have a soul, but Socrates and his friends simply take this for granted.

事实上，他们似乎预设了某种二元论作为讨论的基础。

Indeed, they seem to presuppose some kind of dualism as a basis for their discussion.

我说的二元论，就是指他们认为灵魂是一回事，身体是另一回事。

By dualism, I mean just that they assume that the soul is one thing and the body another.

但这并不是说他们认为灵魂是非形体或非物质的。

But this is not to say that they assume that the soul is incorporeal or immaterial.

苏格拉底曾一度暗示，他的朋友们可能认为我们的灵魂就像烟，死后就会消散。

Socrates suggests at one point that his friends may think our souls are like smoke that could blow away upon death.

即使灵魂是非物质的，它也可能依赖身体而存在，所以苏格拉底喝下毒药后，他的灵魂就会消失。

And even if the soul is immaterial, it might depend on the body for its existence so that Socrates' soul will vanish when he drinks the hemlock.

正如他的一位朋友所说，灵魂就像调好弦的乐器的和声，它不是身体，但乐器毁坏时，它也会随之消亡。

As one of his friends suggests, soul could be like the harmony of a tuned string instrument, which would not be a body but would be destroyed when the instrument is destroyed.

那么，苏格拉底的任务就是证明灵魂不仅与身体不同，而且能够独立于身体而存活。

Socrates' task, then, is to show that the soul is not just distinct from the body, but is capable of surviving independently from the body.

在这个过程中，他会证明灵魂确实是非物质的、无形的，这些都是我们对柏拉图式二元论者关于灵魂的预期。

Along the way, he will show that it is indeed immaterial, invisible, all the things we expect a Platonic dualist to believe about the soul.

那么，我们该如何证明这一点呢？

So, how should we prove this?

用一个柏拉图自己似乎觉得好笑的冷笑话来说，你们都会记得，在《美诺篇》中，苏格拉底论证过，当我们看似在学习时，实际上是在回忆我们出生前就知道的事情。

To use a rather lame joke that Plato himself seems to find amusing, you will all recollect that in the Mino, Socrates has argued that when we seem to be learning, we are actually recollecting things we knew before we were born.

在角色们互相提醒这个观点之后，他们意识到这暗示着灵魂在身体之前就已经存在了。

After the characters remind each other about this idea they realize that it implies that the soul existed before the body did.

所以很明显，灵魂可以脱离身体存在，因为它以前就是这样存在的。

So obviously, the soul can exist without the body, since it used to do so.

此外，灵魂必定与它出生前所知道的事物相似。

Furthermore, the soul must be akin to the things it knew before birth.

这就是形式（理念）登场的时机。

This is the cue for the forms to make their entrance.

我们出生前知道、现在回忆起来的东西，比如美本身、相等本身，或者我们通常谈论柏拉图时说的，美的形式和相等的形式。

What we knew before birth and now recollect are things like the beautiful itself and the equal itself, or as we would usually put it when talking about Plato, the form of beauty and the form of equal.

这些不是物理对象，而是美或相等的物理对象所分有的本质。

These are not physical objects, but the natures in which beautiful or equal physical objects partake.

所以，我们已经有另一种方式来证明灵魂独立于身体，这就是所谓的亲和论证。

So, we already have another way to show the soul's independence of body, the so called affinity argument.

根据这个论证，灵魂必定与它所知道的这些事物相似，既然这些事物是永恒且非物质的，灵魂也是永恒且非物质的。

According to this argument, the soul must be akin to these things it knows and since these things are eternal and immaterial, the soul too is eternal and immaterial.

注意，这些论证的目的是证明灵魂的不朽，而不是证明形式的存在。

Notice again that these arguments are intended to prove the soul's immortality, not the existence of forms.

事实上，看起来我们只是假设形式存在，来证明灵魂是不朽的。

In fact, it looks like we are just assuming the existence of forms to prove that the soul is immortal.

那么，形式理论是不是柏拉图希望我们理所当然接受的，就像灵魂和身体的区分一样？

So, is the theory of form something Plato wants us to take for granted, like the distinction between soul and body?

他期望我们如何知道这些形式是什么样的呢？

And how does he expect us to know what these forms are like?

如果柏拉图没有给我们任何相信这些形式的理由，也没有解释它们是什么，那会让人非常失望。

It would be pretty disappointing if Plato gave us no reason to believe in them, and no explanation of what they are.

但是，等等，还有更多内容。

But wait, there's more.

柏拉图邀请我们更仔细地思考回忆形式实际上是如何运作的。

Plato invites us to think more carefully about how recollection of forms would actually work.

考虑其他被提醒的情况可能会有所帮助。

It might be helpful to consider other cases of being reminded.

比如，想象一下你被提醒起你最好的朋友。

So, imagine being reminded of your best friend.

正如苏格拉底指出的，你可能被一些与你朋友完全不像的东西提醒，比如他或她的一件衣服。

As Socrates points out, you could be reminded of him or her by something which is nothing like your friend, like a piece of their clothing, say.

或者，你可能被一些像你朋友的东西提醒，比如一幅你朋友的画。

Alternatively, you could be reminded by something which is like the friend, say, a painting of the friend.

在这第二种情况下，很自然地会比较这两样东西。

In this second kind of case, it's natural to compare the two things.

比如说，你会判断这幅画是不是很像你的朋友。

For instance, you will judge whether or not the painting is a good likeness of your friend.

就在这儿，苏格拉底对理型提出了一个非常有意思的观点。

It's here that Socrates makes a really interesting point about forms.

他说，当你看到两根相等的木棍，想起“相等”这个理型时，就像看到一幅不太像你朋友的肖像画。

He suggests that when you see two equal sticks, and are reminded of the form of equal, it is like seeing a portrait which is in an imperfect likeness of your friend.

木棍确实有点像“相等”这个理型，因为它们彼此相等，但又不完全像，因为从某种角度看，它们又是不相等的。

The sticks do resemble the form of equal, because they are equal to one another, but they're also unlike the form because, in some other way, they are unequal.

苏格拉底在这里的意思不太明确，但在我看来，最有说服力的理解是这样的：想象两根一样长的木棍，旁边还有一根更长的。

It's not totally clear what Socrates means here, but to me the most persuasive reading is this: imagine two equally long sticks, and a third longer one next to them.

左边的木棍和中间的木棍相等，反过来也一样，但它们都不等于右边那根更长的木棍。

The stick on the left is equal to the stick in the middle, and vice versa, but both are unequal to the stick on the right, which is longer than them.

所以，第一根和第二根木棍，也就是左边和中间的那两根，既相等又不相等，不像理型那样，只相等。

Thus, sticks number one and two, the one on the left and in the middle, are both equal and unequal, unlike the form, which is only equal.

就像我今年早些时候一个学生跟我说的，理型是相等的，木棍也是相等的，但有些相等的东西比其他东西更相等。

As a student of mine put it to me earlier this year, the form is equal and the sticks are equal, but some equal things are more equal than others.

这种例子在柏拉图的其它对话录里也经常出现。

This sort of example crops up in other Platonic dialogues too.

比如说，海伦。

For instance, Helen.

你还记得《伊利亚特》里的她吧，就是那个美得能引发千帆竞发的人。

You remember her from the Iliad, the one whose face was so good at ship launching.

她跟其他人类女性比是美的，但跟女神比就不美了。

She is beautiful compared to other human women, but not beautiful compared to a goddess.

所以她既美又不美。

She is thus both beautiful and not beautiful.

再比如，还债这个例子。

Or, take the example of repaying a debt.

通常来说，还债是好事。

This is normally good.

比如说，你从朋友那儿借了一把斧头，现在要还给他。

Suppose, for instance, you borrowed an axe from a friend and are going to return it.

听起来不错。

That sounds good.

但假设你的朋友疯了，变成了一个斧头杀手，正想着去哪儿找把斧头。

But suppose your friend has gone insane and is now an axe murderer, wondering where he might be able to find an axe.

顺便说一句，这两个例子分别出现在《克拉底鲁篇》和《理想国》里。

These two examples, by the way, crop up in the Cradolis and Republic, respectively.

我们会在后面的节目里讨论这两篇对话。

We'll be looking at both dialogues in later episodes.

研究柏拉图的人有个很好的术语来描述这些情况：对立属性的共存。

People in the Plato business have a nice bit of terminology to describe these cases: compresence of opposites.

基本意思是，我们周围世界的事物常常具有矛盾的特征，尤其是在我们比较事物时，这些矛盾就会显现出来。

The basic idea is that the things in the world around us often have contradictory features, which especially emerge when we are comparing one thing to another.

事物可能在某方面是相等的，另一方面是不等的；某方面是美的，另一方面不是美的；某方面是好的，另一方面是坏的。

Things may be in one respect equal and another unequal, in one respect beautiful and another not beautiful, in one respect good, in another bad.

柏拉图确信，我们对平等和美这类事物的知识不仅仅指向相等的棍子和美丽的女人，也不仅仅指向美丽的棍子和相等的女人。

Plato is convinced that our knowledge of things like equality and beauty is not just directed towards equal sticks and beautiful women, or for that matter, beautiful sticks and equal women.

相反，平等本身和美本身必须与那些棍子和女人有所区分，我们评判棍子和女人时，必须参照一个绝对的平等和美标准。

Rather, equality itself and beauty itself must be somehow separate from the sticks and the women, and we must be judging the sticks and the women by looking to an absolute standard of equality and beauty.

当我们这样做时，形式就是我们评判的标准。

When we do this, the forms are the standard by which we judge.

所以，这一点加上回忆说，为我们相信形式的存在提供了另一个理由：它们是判断的标准，因此在我们获取知识的过程中起着关键作用。

So this, along with a theory of recollection, introduces a further reason to believe in forms: they are standards of judgment and thus play a crucial role in our knowledge.

但是等等，还有更多！

But wait, there's still more!

因为形式不仅在柏拉图的认知论中起作用，它们还在他的形而上学中起作用，更具体地说，在他对因果关系的理解中起作用。

Because forms do not only play a role in Plato's theory of knowledge, his epistemology, they also play a role in his metaphysics, or to be more specific, his understanding of causation.

他在这里的想法是，平等的形式以某种方式使像斯提克斯这样的平等事物变得平等，而美的形式则使海伦变得美丽。

His idea here is that the form of equal somehow causes equal things like Styx to be equal, while the form of beauty causes Helen to be beautiful.

苏格拉底以一种思想自传的形式提出了这个观点。

Socrates presents this idea in a kind of intellectual autobiography.

我在之前的一集里提到过这段内容，因为在这段中，苏格拉底批评了前苏格拉底哲学家阿那克萨戈拉。

I mentioned this passage in an earlier episode because in it, Socrates criticizes the pre Socratic philosopher Anaxagoras.

你可能还记得，苏格拉底对阿那克萨戈拉感到失望，因为他虽然提到了心灵，好像要表明宇宙遵循某种理性设计，但最后却退回到纯粹物理的解释。

As you might remember, Socrates was disappointed that Anaxagoras invoked mind as if he would show that the universe follows a rational design, but then retreated into merely physical explanations.

苏格拉底说，这就好比他说自己坐在监狱里是因为他的骨头和肌肉在监狱里，而不是因为他有机会逃跑时决定不跑。

As Socrates says, this would be like his saying that he is sitting in jail because his bones and muscles are in jail, instead of saying that he is sitting there because he decided not to run away when he was offered the chance to do so.

这些例子表明，对柏拉图来说，我们在确定任何事物的真正原因时，需要满足非常严格的标准。

The examples show that for Plato, we need to satisfy very strict criteria in identifying the correct cause for anything.

无论我们是要解释宇宙，还是解释苏格拉底为什么坐在监狱里，我们都应该选择一个必然导致我们试图解释的那个结果的原因。

Whether we try to explain the cosmos or why Socrates is sitting in jail, we should select a cause which must give rise to the effect we're trying to explain.

真正的原因的存在不应该与其他可能的结果相容。

The presence of the true cause shouldn't be compatible with other possible outcomes.

比如，阿那克萨戈拉那个著名的漩涡，表面上看，既可能产生一个设计糟糕、混乱的世界，也可能产生我们周围这个美好的世界；而苏格拉底的骨头和肌肉，无论他逃跑还是留下，都会参与其中。

So, for instance, Anaxagoras' famous vortex seems on the face of it to be compatible with a badly designed chaotic world, as well as with the good world we see around us, and Socrates' bones and muscles would be involved in both running away and staying put.

另一个例子：如果说一个人比另一个人高是因为头，那就不对了，因为头也可能让人变矮，所以用头来解释高矮，并不能说明为什么高，也不能说明为什么矮。

Another example: It would be wrong to say that one man is taller than another by a head because it's also possible to be smaller by a head, so invoking the head doesn't explain being taller any more than it would explain being smaller.

顺便说一句，用头来解释身高还有另一个问题：头本身是小的。

And, by the way, there's another problem with invoking the head as a cause of tallness: the head itself is small.

苏格拉底觉得说一个小东西能成为高大的原因，这很荒谬。

And Socrates finds it ridiculous to say that something small could be the cause of tallness.

柏拉图在这里提出了一个非常严格的要求。

Plato is making a very strict demand here.

简单来说，这个要求就是：比如，大的原因不应该小，也不应该能导致小。

To oversimplify a bit, the demand boils down to the following: The cause of, say, largeness should not be small, nor should it be able to cause smallness.

平等的原因不应该是不平等的，也不应该导致不平等，等等。

The cause of equality should not be unequal and should never cause inequality, and so on.

而形式似乎完美地满足了这一要求。

Now, forms seem to satisfy this demand admirably.

如果事物之所以平等，是因为它们相似于平等的形式，那么理所当然，平等的形式本身不会是不平等的，也永远不会导致任何事物不平等。

If things are equal precisely because they resemble the form of equal, it stands to reason both that the form of equal is not going to be unequal, and that the form of equal never causes anything to be unequal.

但如果平等的形式不会导致事物不平等，那什么会导致呢？

But if the form of equal doesn't cause things to be unequal, what does?

嗯，也许也有一个不平等的形式吧。

Well, maybe there's a form of unequal, too.

或者，事物之所以不平等，也许只是因为它们没能完全像“相等”这个理型，就像你朋友的画像并不完全像你朋友本人一样。

Or maybe things are just unequal because they fail to be perfectly like the form of equal, the way your friend's portrait isn't perfectly like your friend.

同样的逻辑也适用于其他理型。

The same kind of logic will work for other forms.

“美”的理型不是丑的，也不会导致丑。

The form of beauty is not ugly, and cannot cause ugliness.

丑要么是由另一个理型——“丑”的理型——引起的，要么就是因为没能完全相似于“美”的理型。

Ugliness must be caused either by another form, the form of ugly, or by a simple failure to resemble the form of beauty.

注意柏拉图在这里所说的话的一个含义。

Notice one implication of what Plato is saying here.

听起来他不仅是在说每个理型都排斥其对立面，而且每个理型也体现其自身——比如，“相等”的理型本身是相等的，“美”的理型本身是美的。

It sounds like he's saying not just that each form excludes its opposite but also that each form exemplifies itself for instance, the form of equal would itself be equal the form of beauty would itself be beautiful.

这听起来可能挺合理，但我们可能会担心，比如“大”的理型本身不可能是大的，因为它是非物质的；而且我们后面会看到，这种“每个理型都体现自身”的假设会在另一篇对话中给柏拉图带来麻烦。

This may sound reasonable enough, but we might worry that the form of large, for instance, can't really be large, since it's immaterial and as we'll see, this assumption that each form exemplifies itself is going to cause trouble for Plato in another dialogue.

这些理型或许满足了柏拉图对恰当因果性的要求，但这是不是有点，嗯，作弊呢？

These forms may satisfy Plato's demands for proper causation, but isn't this, well, cheating?

告诉你海伦之所以美丽是因为美的形式，这真的有信息量吗？

Is it really informative to be told that the cause for Helen's being beautiful is the form of beauty?

柏拉图对这个质疑很敏感，他让苏格拉底承认，当我们引用形式时，我们给出的是一种他称之为安全但头脑简单的解释。

Plato is sensitive to this objection, and has Socrates admit that when we invoke forms, we are giving what he calls safe but simple minded causes.

虽然说是美让海伦美丽，这说法很安全，但似乎并没有让我们走得很远。

Although it's safe to say that beauty makes Helen beautiful, it doesn't really seem to take us very far.

不过，它可能比我们想象的要走得更远。

On the other hand, it may take us further than we might think.

记住，形式不仅仅是原因，也是我们知识的对象。所以，一个知道美的形式的人，就会确切地知道美丽意味着什么。

Remember that the forms are not just causes, but are also the objects of our knowledge, So someone who knew the form of beauty would know exactly what it means to be beautiful.

毕竟，他们会理解美本身的本质。

They would, after all, understand the nature of beauty itself.

因此，他们就能准确解释海伦美丽的原因，也许还能解释为什么海伦与女神相比并不美丽。

So, they would be able to explain exactly what it is for Helen to be beautiful, and perhaps also why Helen is not beautiful compared to a goddess.

苏格拉底也认识到，有时我们可以在安全而简单的解释之外，给出他所谓的巧妙解释。

Socrates also recognizes that sometimes, we can give what he calls a clever cause in addition to a safe and simple minded cause.

比如说，如果我们想知道是什么让东西变冷，我们可以稳妥地说冷的形式，但更聪明的回答是雪。

For instance, if we want to know what has made something cold, we might play safe and say the form of cold, but a more clever answer would be to say snow.

毕竟，雪符合柏拉图提出的要求：它本身是冷的，不是热的，而且它不能让任何东西变热。

After all, snow satisfies the demands Plato has laid down: it is cold without being hot, and it cannot make anything hot.

所以，雪作为冷的原因，和形式一样好。

It is therefore just as good a cause of coldness as a form would be.

不过，这里可能还有一些让人担心的地方。

We might still have some worries here, though.

比如，每当有东西变冷时，冷的形式都会参与其中。

For instance, the form of cold will be involved every time something is cold.

用冷的形式来解释东西变冷，总是稳妥或安全的。

It's always okay or safe to invoke the form of cold as a cause of things being cold.

但并不是每次东西变冷时，雪都参与其中。

But snow is not involved every time things are made cold.

有时候，冷的聪明原因可能是冰、液氮，或者一份不够慷慨的情人节礼物。

Sometimes the clever cause of coldness might be ice, or liquid nitrogen, or an insufficiently generous Valentine's Day present.

所以，虽然形式可能是安全且简单的解释，但因为它们具有普遍适用性，所以至少比某些巧妙的解释要好。

So, although the forms may be safe and simple minded causes, they will be better than at least some clever causes because of their universal application.

现在，我知道你们在想什么。

Now, I know what you're thinking.

我已经喋喋不休地讲了很久关于形式的话题了。

I've been blathering on about forms for quite a while now.

那灵魂不朽呢？我之前一直强调这才是这篇对话录的主题。

What happened to the immortality of the soul, which I was insisting was the main topic of this dialogue?

其实，我们刚才讨论的内容和这个主题直接相关。

Well, it turns out that what we've just been talking about is directly relevant to this topic.

毕竟，灵魂如果不是生命的原因，那它是什么呢？

After all, what is the soul if it is not a cause of being alive?

但如果灵魂是一个符合柏拉图要求的原因，那么它就必须只关乎生命，与死亡无关，就像雪要成为冷的原因，就必须只冷而不热一样。

But if it is a proper cause that satisfies Plato's demands, then the soul will have to be only alive, not dead, just the way that in order for snow to be a cause of cold, it has to be only cold and not hot.

如果这个说法成立，那么灵魂不可能死亡，就像数字三不可能是偶数一样。

If this is right, then the soul can no more be dead than the number three could be even.

灵魂本质上就必须是永远活着的。

The soul will have to be permanently alive by its very nature.

这条论证思路让苏格拉底得以反驳一个一直困扰着他和他朋友们的质疑。

This line of argument allows Socrates to ward off an objection which has been troubling him and his friends.

就算我们说灵魂能在肉体死后继续存在，我们又怎么知道它不会最终耗尽呢？

Even if we say that the soul can survive the body's death, how do we know it won't wear out eventually?

它可能就像一个织工，已经穿坏了很多件斗篷。

It might be like a weaver who's worn out many cloaks.

就像织工在一件又一件斗篷变得破旧、不得不被丢弃时依然活着一样，灵魂也可能存活很长时间，穿坏一个又一个身体。

Just as the weaver survives while one cloak after another becomes threadbare and has to be discarded, so the soul might survive for a long time, wearing out one body after another.

但最终，织工会在穿着最后一件斗篷时死去。

But eventually, the weaver will die wearing his last cloak.

同样，灵魂也可能在离开它众多身体中的最后一个之后死去。

Similarly, the soul may die after it leaves its last of many bodies.

幸运的是，苏格拉底现在能够驳倒这一点了。

Happily, Socrates is now able to refute this.

作为生命的真正原因，灵魂本质上不会死亡。

As a proper cause of life, the soul is by nature immune to death.

注意，苏格拉底再次假设灵魂与身体是分开的，然后问这个分开的灵魂是什么样的。

Notice again how Socrates is assuming that the soul is distinct from the body, and then asking what this distinct soul is like.

他其实没有真正考虑过自己可能会和身体一起死去，因为他就是身体本身，这种可能性如今困扰着我们很多人。

He doesn't really pay any attention to the possibility that he may die with his body because he is nothing other than his body, which is the possibility that worries many of us nowadays.

相反，他担心的是灵魂本身可能是会死的，可能会随着身体的死亡而经历第二次死亡。

Instead, he worries that the soul itself may be a mortal being, which could die a second death along with the death of the body.

不过，经过思考，苏格拉底决定他其实不需要担心。

Upon reflection, though, Socrates decides he does not need to worry after all.

他所有的论证都指向一个结论：他的灵魂会继续存在。

All the arguments at his disposal point towards the conclusion that his soul will live on.

当然，他可能转而担心自己的灵魂会继续存在，但会遭遇某种可怕的命运。

He might, of course, worry instead that his soul will live on but go to some horrible fate.

但在这里，苏格拉底依然是个乐观主义者。

Here again, though, Socrates is an optimist.

他相信自己会加入善良的神圣导师们，如果来世还有其他人类，他们也都会是善良的。

He believes that he will be joining good divine masters, and if there are any other humans in the afterlife, they too will be good.

如果有什么值得害怕的，那就是我们逃离了现在的人类身体之后，可能会回到更糟糕的身体里。

If there is anything to fear, it is that we might come back into worse bodies after escaping from our current human bodies.

但苏格拉底认为，我们很可能得到自己应得的身体。

But Socrates suggests that we are likely to receive the bodies we deserve.

暴力的人会变成狼，守秩序的人会变成蜜蜂这样组织严密的昆虫。

Violent people will get the bodies of wolves, orderly people will come back as well organized insects like bees.

那苏格拉底呢？

And Socrates?

他没有预测，但我愿意相信，他下一次轮回变成了一只天鹅。

He doesn't make a prediction, but I like to think that next time around, he was a swan.

在结束之前，我再多说一点关于理念论和灵魂的内容。

Before I close, let me just say a little bit more about the theory of forms and the soul.

正如我在这一集中解释的，理念帮助柏拉图解决了至少三个相互关联的问题。

As I've explained in this episode, forms help Plato with at least three interconnected problems.

首先，它们为他提供了恰当的知识对象。

First, they give him appropriate objects of knowledge.

当我们回忆时，我们回忆的正是这些形式。

When we recollect, it will be forms we are recollecting.

其次，形式不包含对立面的共存。

Second, forms are free of the compresence of opposites.

我们经验到的相等事物既相等又不相等，但相等本身的形式绝无不相等。

The equal things we experience are both equal and unequal, but the form of equal is not unequal in any way.

第三，形式将是诸如相等和美丽等特征的恰当且普遍的原因。

Third, forms will be proper and universal causes of features like equality and beauty.

这在哲学上带来了很多好处，但形式的作用远不止于此。

That's a lot of philosophical payoff, but it still doesn't exhaust the usefulness of forms.

例如，在其他对话中，柏拉图提出物理世界中的事物是不断变化的。

For instance, in other dialogues, Plato suggests that things in the physical world are constantly changing.

形式使他能够说，至少有些事物是稳定不变的，从而避免了赫拉克利特所主张的万物皆流的学说。

Forms allow him to say that some things at least are stable and unchanging, a way of avoiding the total flux doctrine he ascribes to Heraclitus.

他还用理型来解释词语的含义，我们以后会讲到。

He also invokes forms to explain the meanings of words, as we'll see in a future episode.

人们很容易以为柏拉图是先想出了理型论，然后才设计出这些难题，好让理型成为答案。

It's easy to assume that Plato thought up his theory of forms, and then engineered these puzzles so that the forms could be the solutions.

但如果我们看看他在《斐多》和其他地方实际使用理型的方式，就会发现他通常是反过来的。

But if we look at the way he actually uses forms in the Phaedo and elsewhere, we see that he usually goes in the other direction.

柏拉图被一大堆哲学问题困扰，而他反复发现理型能帮他解决这些问题。

Plato was plagued by a whole range of philosophical problems, and he repeatedly found that forms could help him solve those problems.

他是被解决哲学难题的需求所驱动，而不是为了捍卫某个学说本身。

He was driven by the need to solve philosophical difficulties, not the desire to defend a doctrine for its own sake.

事实上，我们以后还会讲到，没有人比柏拉图自己更严厉地批评过理型论。

Indeed, as we'll see in another episode in the future, no one has attacked the theory of forms more severely than Plato himself.

最后，回到灵魂这个话题。

And finally, back to the soul.

有一个显而易见但很重要的事实：这里命运攸关的灵魂，不仅仅是苏格拉底的一部分，而是苏格拉底本人。

To state an obvious but important fact, the soul whose fate is in question here is supposed to be not just a part of Socrates, but Socrates himself.

在对话的结尾，他的朋友们问该怎么埋葬他，苏格拉底笑着说，他们得先抓住他才行。

At the end of the dialogue, his friends ask how they should bury him, and Socrates laughs, saying that they will do well to catch him.

换句话说，苏格拉底不是他们将要埋葬的那具身体，而是他的灵魂。

In other words, Socrates is not the body they will bury, but rather his soul.

《斐多篇》，尤其是其中的亲和力论证，似乎在暗示灵魂很像一种形式。

Now, the Phaedo, and especially its affinity argument, seem to suggest that the soul is a lot like a form.

所以如果苏格拉底就是他的灵魂，那么他就是非物质的、不可分割的、无形的、不朽的。

So if Socrates is his soul, he will be immaterial, indivisible, incorporeal, immortal.

但我们的经验难道没有表明，我们或我们的灵魂充满了冲突吗？

But doesn't our experience show that we or our souls are riven by conflict?

我们一点也不简单，反而是一堆相互冲突的欲望、经历和想法的集合体？

That we are anything but simple, and are instead a mass of conflicting desires, experiences, and ideas?

《斐多篇》似乎没有认识到这一点，但柏拉图在他通常被认为最伟大的作品《理想国》中弥补了这一遗漏。

Phaedo does not seem to recognize this fact, but Plato will make up for this omission in what is usually regarded as his greatest the Republic.

在那里，柏拉图让苏格拉底论证说，我们的灵魂是复杂的实体，既能产生内部冲突，也能实现内部和谐。

There, Plato has Socrates argue that our souls are complex entities, capable of both internal conflict and internal harmony.

灵魂的和谐就是正义本身，这也是《理想国》全书的主题，也是下周《哲学史无遗漏》节目的内容。

Harmony in the soul would be nothing less than justice, the topic of the republic as a whole, and of next week's episode on the history of philosophy without any gaps.