HoP 028 - 菲奥娜·利关于柏拉图的《智者篇》

嗨，我是彼得·亚当森，你正在收听的是《哲学史》播客，感谢伦敦国王学院和利伯里姆信托基金的支持，更多信息请访问 www.historyofphilosophy.net。

Hi, I'm Peter Adamson, and you're listening to the History of Philosophy podcast, brought to you with the support of King's College London and the Liberium Trust, online at www.historyofphilosophy.net.

今天的节目是对菲奥娜·利的采访，我们将讨论柏拉图的《智者篇》。菲奥娜是伦敦大学学院的哲学讲师，她对这篇对话录做了很多研究。

Today's episode will be an interview about Plato's Sophist with Fiona Leigh, who is a lecturer in philosophy at University College London, and who's done a lot of work on this dialogue.

嗨，菲奥娜。

Hi, Phi.

嗨，彼得。

Hi, Peter.

谢谢你来做客播客。

Thank you for appearing on the podcast.

不客气。

You're welcome.

在我们深入讨论《智者篇》之前，我想先请你简单谈谈柏拉图的理念论。

Before we get into the Sophist itself, I wanted to start by asking you to say just a little about the theory of forms.

如果让你在其他对话录中总结柏拉图的理论，比如《斐多篇》或《理想国》，如果那算是一个理论的话，你会怎么说？

If you had to summarize Plato's theory, if it is a theory, in dialogues other than the Sophist, So maybe the Fido, the Republic, what would you say?

我的意思是，这有什么意义呢？

I mean, what's the point?

我会说，形式是解释事物为何具有它们所具有的那些属性的东西。

I would say that forms are that which explains things having properties that they have.

所以，如果有很多美的事物，比如一条漂亮的裙子、一个美好的日子、一座美丽的城市，所有这些事物之所以美，柏拉图认为，是因为美的形式使它们成为美的。

So if there are lots of things that are beautiful, a beautiful dress, a beautiful day, a beautiful city, all of those things are beautiful, Plato thinks, because the form of beauty makes them beautiful.

所以，形式是解释所有事物为何如此、为何具有它们所具有的那些属性的原因和解释。

So it's an explanation and a cause for all the things being what they are having properties that they have.

这个回答显然让我们关注到形式在形而上学或因果方面的作用。

That answer obviously focuses us on a metaphysical or causal role of the forms.

但我想它们也应该有认识论上的作用，对吧？

But I guess they're also supposed to have an epistemological role as well, right?

对。

Right.

如果你能发现那个解释所有美的事物在何种意义上为美、并且确实解释它们为美的东西，那么柏拉图认为你就发现了某种看起来像是美的定义的东西。

If you can discover the thing that explains in what sense all beautiful things are beautiful, and indeed explains them being beautiful, then Plato thinks you've discovered something that looks like the definition of beauty.

所以如果你把它表达出来，用语言表达出来，你就发现了美的定义，比如说。

So that if you express it, put it in linguistic terms, you've discovered the definition of beauty, for instance.

这显然就起到了认识论上的作用。

And that obviously plays an epistemological role.

然后你也许可以用它来检验你对事物是否美的看法是否真的正确。

And then you could maybe use that to check whether your opinions about things being beautiful were in fact true or not.

甚至可能进一步认识到哪些事物是美的。

And maybe even come to know which things are beautiful.

对。

Right.

因为如果某物符合这个定义，那它就是美的。

Because if something satisfies the definition, it's beautiful.

好的。

Okay.

所以，如果你愿意的话，知识的首要对象就是美的形式。

So the primary object of knowledge, if you like, would be the form of beauty.

但这样一来，你就能用这个定义去检验你对其他事物是否美的看法，甚至可能获得知识。

But that then allows you to check your beliefs about other things being beautiful and perhaps come to knowledge.

当然，这一点人们是有争议的。

That's debated, of course, by people.

对。

Yes.

不过我觉得奇怪的是，形式（理念）的因果作用似乎和我们用它们来检验事物为何具有某些特征（比如美）这个想法是两回事。

I guess the weird thing about this, though, is that it seems like the causal role of the forms could come apart from that idea that we're checking why things count as having certain characteristics like beauty.

我的意思是，为什么认为导致某物美的东西，就是那个通过定义“美”这个词而得到定义的对象呢？

I mean, why think that the thing that causes something to be beautiful is going to be the object that's defined by defining the word beautiful.

比如说，为什么导致事物美的东西不能是一位美之女神呢？

I mean, why couldn't, for example, why couldn't the thing that causes things to be beautiful be, say, a goddess of beauty?

而这位女神的定义显然不会是“美”这个概念或这个词的定义。

And then the definition of this goddess obviously wouldn't be a definition of the concept or the word beauty.

对。

Right.

所以很明显，你可以把定义，抽象的定义，和原因分开来看。

So it's obvious that you could pull apart a definition, an abstract definition from a cause.

事实上，在当代哲学里，人们就是这么做的。

And indeed, in contemporary philosophy, that's what people do.

但不管出于什么原因，柏拉图似乎认为他的理型就是原因。

But for whatever reason, Plato seemed to think that his forms were causes.

而且，你确实会发现，某种东西之所以是美的原因，是因为它本身就是美的本质。

And certainly, you find something that is the cause of something by the nature itself being the nature of beauty.

如果你认为这起到了原因的作用，那当然就会得出这样的结论。

And if you think that acts as a cause, it's certainly going to follow that.

如果你发现了那个东西，你就会发现所有美的事物共同拥有的东西，因为它们都满足那个定义。

If you discover that thing, you'll discover what it is that all the beautiful things have in common because they satisfy that definition.

所以，如果美的理型就是世界上真实存在的东西，柏拉图认为理型是真实的，如果理型就是那个以某种方式体现美的本质的真实存在，那么它就会起到认识论上的作用。

So if the form of beauty just is whatever is the real thing out there in the world, Plato thinks forms are real, if the form just is that real thing out in the world that embodies somehow the nature of the property beauty, then that's going to serve an epistemological function.

所以，某个东西可以同时起到这两种作用，或者至少对柏拉图来说，认为某个东西可以同时起到这两种作用或扮演这两个角色，是连贯的、合理的。

So something can serve both functions, or at least it's coherent or plausible for Plato to have thought that something can serve both functions or fill both roles.

但同样很明显的是，他其实不必追求那么宏大和激进的东西，他本可以认为因果作用与认识作用是可以分开的。

But it's also the case and very clear that he need not have gone for something so big and bold that he could have thought the cause, the causal role comes apart from

认识作用。

the epistemological role.

这看起来很明显，

It just seems clear

从对话录来看，他并没有分开。

from the dialogues that he didn't.

对。

Right.

所以也许可以公平地说，理念论的核心就是：当你掌握了美或美的定义时，你掌握的就是事物之所以美的原因。

So maybe it would even be fair to say that the point of the theory of forms is just to claim that when you get hold of a definition of beautiful or beauty, that what you've gotten hold of is the cause of things being beautiful.

这样概括这个理论公平吗？

Would that be a fair way to just summarize the theory?

这个理论的重点

The point of the theory

理念论。

of forms.

为什么不行？

Why not?

理念论的重点。

The point of the theory of forms.

也可以这么说。

It could be.

好的。

Okay.

那我先接受这个说法。

I'll take that for now.

我们接着来看《智者篇》。

Let's go along to the Sophist.

这篇对话我还没讨论过。

This is not a dialogue I have discussed yet.

那你大概可以跟我们说说发生了什么，有哪些角色，讨论的重点是什么？

So maybe you could just kind of tell us what happens, who are the characters, what's the point of the discussion?

主角通常被认为是柏拉图在对话中的代言人，但他没有名字。

So the main character, often thought to be Plato's mouthpiece in the dialogue, is unnamed.

所以这是个神秘人物，来自雅典城外一个叫伊利亚的城市。

So it's a mystery guy from a city called Ilia outside Athens.

这个陌生人，大家常这么称呼他，来自伊利亚的陌生人，是主要的发言者。

So the stranger, as he's often referred to, the stranger from Ilia, is the main speaker.

他在跟塞奥提达斯说话。

He's talking to Theotidas.

塞奥提达斯是个年轻人。

He's a young man, Theotidas.

按照对话的设定，他是在跟塞奥提达斯说话，而前一天塞奥提达斯刚跟苏格拉底在《塞奥提达斯》那篇对话里聊过。

And he's talking to Theotidas according to the fiction of the dialogue, the day after Theotidas has been talking to Socrates in the dialogue called Theotidas.

所以这显然发生在第二天。

So this takes place the very next day, apparently.

泰阿泰德在对话开始之前就已经和那位陌生人交谈过了，然后他们遇到了塞奥多洛和苏格拉底。

Theotidas has been talking with the stranger prior to the dialogue's opening, and they run into Theodorus and Socrates.

现场还有其他人，但整个对话大部分时间主要是由埃利亚的陌生人和泰阿泰德在发言。

And there are some other people there, but they're the two people who speak throughout the dialogue for the most part are the Eliatic stranger and Theotidas.

想必重要的是，那位陌生人来自巴门尼德所在的城市。

And presumably it's important that the stranger is from the city where Parmenides is from.

所以埃利亚哲学就是巴门尼德的哲学。

So the Eliatic philosophy is Parmenides' philosophy.

完全正确。

Absolutely.

对话中多次提到并引用了巴门尼德的哲学。

So Parmenides' philosophy is referred to and brought up many times in the dialogue.

这场对话的核心目的就是界定什么是智者。

The main point of the dialogue is to say just what a Sophist is.

我不知道你的听众对智者了解多少。

So I don't know if your listeners know much about Sophist.

对，做吧。

Yeah, do.

我已经做过一期关于右派的节目。

I've done an episode on the Right.

所以他们想试着定义什么是智者，以及智者是否不同于哲学家和政治家。

So they want to try and define what a Sophist is and whether or not a Sophist is different from a philosopher on the one hand and a statesman on the other.

或者这三个名称是指同一个东西，还是各自独立的。

Or if all three names are names for the one thing or if they're separate.

陌生人说他能判断它们是否相同或不同，他认为它们是不同的。

And the stranger says that he can say whether or not they're the same or separate, and he thinks they're separate.

但解释起来是个漫长的过程，他想通过问答的方式，和一个配合的对话者来进行。

But going through the explanation is long process, and he'd like to do it by a question and answer session with a compliant interlocutor.

所以他不想只是自己一个人发表长篇大论。

So he wants he doesn't want to just give a speech where he's the only one talking.

他想通过问答来推进，但他希望对方能在他跟不上时告诉他。

He wants to proceed by questions and answers, but he wants someone who's only going to let him know if he really doesn't follow what he's saying.

他不希望有人一路上处处反驳他。

He doesn't want someone to be challenging him at every point along the way.

嗯，我就是这么理解那段话的。

Well, that's how I read that bit.

他乐于问一些引导性极强的问题，只希望对方一直说“是”。

He's happy to ask extremely leading questions and just have the person say yes all the time.

也许不像苏格拉底那样？

Unlike Socrates, maybe?

对。

Right.

嗯，他不仅仅是在提问。

Well, he doesn't just ask questions.

他自始至终都在提出自己的观点。

He puts forward views the whole way through.

而且他好像希望对话者只在真正不理解所提观点时才打断他。

And it's as if he wants the interlocutor to only interrupt him when he's really not understanding what's being proposed.

对话中呈现了很多正面的学说，我想通常是这样称呼的。

There's a lot of positive doctrine, I guess, it's called often, presented in the dialogue.

我想有些人认为，柏拉图在这里正在偏离戏剧化呈现苏格拉底式讨论的思路。

And I guess some people think that Plato is here moving away from the idea of dramatising Socratic discussions.

尽管他保留了问答的形式，但提问的人不再是苏格拉底，而且提问的方式也大不相同，因为提问者确实有自己的议程和想要推动的理论。

Even though he's holding on to the question and answer format, the questioning is not being done by Socrates, and the questioning seems to be rather different because the person doing the questioning really has an agenda and a theory that he wants to push.

对。

Right.

所以，苏格拉底以不提出自己的信念或陈述学说供人考虑而闻名。

So Socrates famously didn't put forward his own beliefs or state doctrine for consideration.

而《伊利亚特》中的陌生人却提出了各种建议。

Whereas the Iliad Exstranger makes various proposals.

所以他不仅仅是质疑别人持有的观点。

So he's not just questioning the views that somebody else holds.

事实上，在《智者篇》中，我们对塞奥提达斯的观点了解得并不多。

In fact, we don't find out very much about the views that Theotidas has in the Sophist.

他提出自己的观点，问忒埃泰图斯的问题大致就是，是不是这样？

He puts forward his own views, and the question he puts to Theotidas is more or less along the lines of, Isn't that so?

你同意吗？

Don't you agree?

这挺有意思的，对吧？

It's interesting, isn't it?

因为在《泰阿泰德篇》里，忒埃泰图斯实际上被允许提出所有关于知识是什么的理论，然后这些理论被逐一讨论。

Because in the Theatidas, theeatidas is actually allowed to come up with all the theories of what knowledge is, and then these are considered one after another.

对。

Right.

所以，在《泰阿泰德篇》中，忒埃泰图斯确实提出了他们考虑的所有建议，而在《智者篇》中，那位异乡人几乎提出了他们考虑的所有观点。

So whereas in the Theatidas, theeatidas really does submit all the proposals that they consider, the iliac stranger, or the stranger in the Sophist, puts forward practically all the views they consider.

忒埃泰图斯在过程中学习，偶尔他会说，比如，哦，我知道答案

Theotetus learns along the way, and occasionally he says, for instance, oh, I know the answer

那个问题的答案。

to that one.

他会根据之前讨论的内容提出一些观点。

And he draws on what's been said earlier to propose something.

因为他是个聪明的年轻人。

Because he's a bright young man.

班上的聪明孩子。

The clever kid in class.

对，没错。

Right, exactly.

但主要还是陌生人在提出观点。

But mainly it's the stranger's proposals.

这场对话的表面目的是定义什么是诡辩术，什么是诡辩家。

And the purpose of the dialogue ostensibly is to define what sophistry is, what a sophist is.

他们试图按照所谓的“分类与划分”的方法来做这件事，正如陌生人建议的那样。

And they attempt to do this following the so called method of collection and division, as the stranger proposes that they do.

这种方法就是先取一个非常宽泛的类别，然后根据差异来划分它们。

And the method is one whereby you take a very general class of things, and then you divide them according to Differentia.

然后你不断对这些越来越小的类别进行划分，直到找到你要找的那个东西。

And you keep performing these divisions on the ever smaller classes, until you find the very thing that you're looking for.

所以，陌生人举的例子就是为了让这个方法更清楚，就是寻找钓鱼的定义，基本上就是飞钓者是什么。

So the example that the stranger gives to make the method clear is the quest to find out a definition of angling, what a fly fisherman is basically.

他一开始把所有不同类型的狩猎都划分开来，直到最后缩小到钓鱼这个很小的类别。

And he starts off by dividing all the different sorts of hunting until he gets down to the very small group of angling.

而且他总是分成两类，然后选其中一个，再把它细分成两个更小的类别，直到得到一个定义，这个定义基本上就是一系列被接受的划分。

And he always divides into two and picks one or the other and then subdivides that into two more classes until you get to a definition which is basically just a list of the divisions that have been accepted.

对。

Correct.

对。

Correct.

而且并不是每次划分出来的两个类别都有名字。

And it's not always the case that the two divisions, the two classes that are isolated in the divisions are named.

有时候他会说，哦，这个是无名的东西。

Sometimes he says, oh, and this is a nameless thing.

但我们知道它

But we know what it

是什么。

is.

好的。

Okay.

然后他们实际上用智者派做了好几次这个，得出了几个不同的定义。

And then they do this with the Sophist actually several times and they come up with different alternative definitions.

对吧？

Right?

对。

Right.

其中一个定义让我们把智者派看作制造图像的人，这和虚假的概念有关，这就把我们带到了智者派中最重要、最著名的部分，我想我们剩下的时间应该用来讨论这个。

And one of these asks us to consider the Sophist as being a maker of images, which is connected to the idea of falsehood, and that brings us to the most important and famous part of the Sophist, which I guess is what we should probably spend the rest of the time discussing.

对。

Right.

这就引出了那个著名的问题，大约在《智者篇》中间部分提出的，也就是“非存在”的问题。这个问题很贴切，因为正如我们所说，来自爱利亚的陌生人，也就是巴门尼德的城市，似乎和巴门尼德的思想有关，涉及某种巴门尼德式的“非存在”问题。

That brings us to this famous problem, which is raised sort of around the middle of the Sophist, and the problem of non being, which seems very appropriate given that, as we said, the strangers from Eleaia, the city of Parmenides seems to relate to something in Parmenides, some kind of Parmenidian problem of non being.

那你能解释一下这个问题基本上是什么吗？

So can you explain what the problem basically is?

在对话中，这个问题之所以出现，是因为他们想说明虚假是真实存在的。

As it's introduced in the dialogue, the problem of non being comes up because they want to say that falsehood is real.

所以智者被定义为那种为了钱卖虚假东西、卖幻象的人。

So the Sophist has been isolated as somebody who sells falsehoods for money, sells images for money.

这些虚假的东西可能很危险，因为他没有明说它们是虚假的。

And these falsehoods can be dangerous because he's not advertising them as such.

所以在对话的这个点上，陌生人说，等等，智者会否认有虚假这回事。

So at this point in the dialogue, the stranger says, but wait, the Sophist would deny there's any such thing as falsehood.

因为要说明什么是虚假，就必须引入“非存在”这个概念。

Because to say what falsehood is involves introducing the concept of non being.

而巴门尼德，我来自的那个地方的人，说过“非存在”是不存在的。

And Parmenides, where I come from, has said that there's no such thing as non being.

我们无法思考或谈论非存在。

We can't think or talk about non being.

所以，虚假要么是说存在的事物实际上不存在，要么是说不存在的事物实际上存在，就像对话中说的那样。

So falsehood is either saying what is when in fact it is not, or saying what is not when in fact it is, as they say in the dialogue.

虚假涉及非存在。

Falsehood involves not being.

什么是非存在？

What is non being?

陌生人决定他必须解释非存在是存在的，以及非存在在什么意义上是存在的。

And the stranger decides that what he has to do is explain that not being is, and in what sense not being is.

这听起来很矛盾。

Which sounds contradictory.

对。

Right.

听起来确实很矛盾。

It sounds really contradictory.

那说到底，“不存在”到底有什么问题呢？

So what's the problem with not being anyway?

巴门尼德可能对“不存在”有特别的看法。

Parmenides might have had a particular problem with non being.

《智者篇》里对此没有真正的评论，所以我就不多说了。好。

There's no real comment on that in the Sophist, so I'm going to leave that aside Okay.

在回答这个问题的时候。

In answering the question.

但如果你关心的是虚假，就像柏拉图在《智者篇》里那样，你可能会觉得“不存在”的问题涉及那些没有发生的情况。

But if your concern is falsehood, as Plato's concern was in the Sophist, you might think that the problem of non being concerns states for fairs that don't obtain.

你能举个例子吗？

Could you give me an example?

比如你可以说，今天伦敦外面天气很好。

So you might say that it's a lovely day outside today London.

确实是这样，她不是瞎编的。

It actually is, she's not making that up.

难得今天天气真好。

It's really a lovely day for once.

所以你可以说没在下雨。

So you might say it's not raining.

而这是个真实的陈述，对吧，今天。

And that's a true statement, right, today.

这是个真实的陈述。

It's a true statement.

它之所以真实，是因为外面天气很好。

And it's true because outside it's a lovely day.

但你也可以说它真实，是因为外面并没有在下雨。

But you might say it's true because outside it's not the case that it's raining.

所以，一个否定的事态就是“在下雨”这个事态，而这个事态并不成立。

So a negative state of affairs is the state of affairs in which it's raining, which is the state of affairs that isn't true.

它并不存在。

That doesn't obtain.

所以这个想法就是，之所以没有下雨，是因为那个不存在的东西，也就是下雨这件事。

So the idea would be the reason that it's not raining is that the thing that isn't, namely The raining.

下雨这件事，对。

The raining Yeah.

它就在那里，可以说是。

Is out there, as it were.

所以我们有某种不存在的东西，它却存在，这就是那个难题？

And so we have something that isn't, that is, and that's the puzzle?

可能吧。

Possibly.

也许我会试着解释得更清楚一些。

Maybe I'll try and explain it more clearly.

非存在的问题可以看作是一种本质上是否定的事态，比如没有下雨这个事态是真实的。

The problem of non being could be thought of as either a state of affairs which is inherently negative, so the state of affairs in which it's not raining, being real.

这很奇怪，因为实际上当你想到确实存在的事态时，它和雨无关，只有蓝天。

And that's strange because in fact when you think about the state of affairs that does obtain, there's nothing to do with rain, there's just blue skies.

所以那个负面的方面，也许可以说是在以某种方式显现出来，但很难理解怎么会是这样。

So the negative aspect of that is said perhaps to be manifesting itself somehow, but it's hard to understand how that's the case.

或者以虚假陈述为例，如果我说“正在下雨”，那我在我的错误陈述中表达了一个正在下雨的事态，而这个事态并没有成立。

Or it could be in the case of falsehood, if I say, It is raining, that I've expressed a state of affairs in my false statement that it's raining that fails to obtain.

所以你可能会觉得，非存在的问题之所以是个问题，是因为它涉及到这些负面的、没有成立的事态的概念。

So you might think that the problem of non being is a problem because it involves the notion of these states of affairs that are negative somehow that don't obtain.

而实际上，世界上存在的只有那些成立的事态。

And really all there is out in the world is the states of affairs that do obtain.

换句话说，就是事情的真实情况。

In other words, the way things really are.

世界上不存在那些不成立的情况，因为世界就是所有事实的总和，对吧。

There's no way things aren't out there in the world because the world is just everything that is the case Right.

引用维特根斯坦的话。

To quote Wittgenstein.

所以只有正面的、成立的事态。

So there are only positive states of affairs.

对。

Right.

好。

Okay.

所以这就是问题所在。

So that's the problem.

如果这就是问题，至少柏拉图是这么看的，那我直接问你解决方案是什么，会不会太冒昧？

If that's the problem, at least as Plato sees it, is it too nasty if I just ask you what the solution is?

嗯，对柏拉图来说，这个问题也是形而上学层面的。

Well, so for Plato the problem is also a metaphysical one.

如果他认为，就像我所理解的那样，不同的事物因为分有形式而具有属性，那么一切存在的情况之所以存在，是因为各种事物在分有形式。

If he thinks, as I take him to think, that different things have properties in virtue of participating in forms, then everything that is the case is the case because various things are participating in forms.

这就是所有正面事态在形而上学层面上的解释。

That's the explanation on a metaphysical level of all the positive states of affairs.

但他如何解释负面事态，就不清楚了。

And it's not clear how he can explain negative states of affairs.

对吧？

Right?

如果一个人丑而不是美，是不是有一个丑的形式，而他们正在参与其中？

Is it that somebody if somebody is ugly rather than being beautiful, is there a form of ugliness and that they're participating in that?

柏拉图是不是得承认很多很多否定的形式？

Is Plato going to have to countenance lots and lots of negative forms?

而且你可能会有一种属性，它不是有对立面的那种属性。

And you might have something you might have a property that isn't a property which has an opposite.

比如大的概念有对立面小的概念，但你也可能有平等的概念。

So you might have the idea of largeness that has the opposite property, smallness, But you also might have the idea of equality.

所以如果你在考虑度量，柏拉图可能需要假设很多很多形式来解释所有正面的情况，所有事物真实的样子。

So if you're conceiving of measurements, Plato might need to postulate lots and lots of forms to account for all the positive states of affairs, all the ways that things really are.

你也可能觉得他可以说或者想说的是，事物可能没有参与某个形式。

You also might think that he could say or might want to say that things fail to participate in a form.

但是不参与这件事本身就很奇怪，很难解释。

But a failure to participate is strange thing to explain.

他已经面临解释什么是“分有”的困难了。

He's already faced with the difficulty of explaining what participation is.

所以，未能分有这件事本身可能就很难解释。

So a failure to participate could be a difficult thing to explain.

那么，这样说是否公平：他一开始，比如在《斐多》或其他类似对话中，也许在《理想国》里，试图解释某些事物为何为真。

Would it be fair to say then that it's like he started out in, say, the Fido or other dialogues like that, maybe the Republic, by trying to explain how it comes to be that certain things are true.

比如，海伦是美的，或者这根棍子等于那根棍子，诸如此类。

For example, that Helen is beautiful or that the stick is equal to that stick or whatever it is.

他有一个不错的真理理论，即这些真理之所以成立，是因为它们分有了形式。

And he's kind of got a nice theory of truth, namely that these truths come about because of participation in forms.

然后他想，好，下一步就是解释虚假，尤其是因为当时有智者派到处说，不可能说出任何虚假的话。

And then he thinks, okay, next step would be trying to explain falsehood, especially since there were the Sophists running around saying that it was impossible to say anything false.

所以，无论从辩证角度还是哲学角度，这对他来说都是一个紧迫的问题。

So it was a kind of pressing problem for him dialectically as well as philosophically.

对。

Right.

我是这么看的。

That's how I see

对。

it.

好的。

Okay.

所以这也许能更深入地理解为什么这个问题对柏拉图来说是个难题，但这听起来仍然不像一个解决方案。

And so that's maybe a more deep understanding of why the problem is a problem for Plato, but it still doesn't sound like a solution.

不是。

No.

所以他想要解释虚假陈述是如何可能的，以及否定性谓述一般来说如何为真，或者可以为真，通过分析肯定性的事态来实现。

So he wants to explain how falsehoods are possible and how negative predications generally are true, or can be true, by way of analysing positive states of affairs.

泰阿泰德在飞就是对话中的一个例子。

Theotidas is flying is an example from the dialogue.

所以泰阿泰德正坐在那位陌生人对面，那是他们之前谈话时的情况。

So Theotidas is sitting down opposite the stranger from earlier during their conversation.

所以他们考虑这个陈述，这个说法，泰阿泰德在飞。

So they consider the statement, the logos, Theotidas is flying.

这是一个错误的陈述。

And it's a false statement.

所以这个分析，据我理解，虽然这有争议，人们对此有不同的理解，柏拉图提供的分析是，泰阿泰德参与了某些形式，他直接或间接地参与了与其他的差异，所以我们解释泰阿泰德飞是假的，因为实际发生的是他参与了坐。

So the analysis, as I understand it, though this is controversial, people understand this differently, the analysis that Plato offers is that Theotinus is participating in some forms, and he's participating in, directly or indirectly, difference from So other we explain Theotidas' flying being false because what's happening is that he's participating in sitting.

所以泰阿泰德坐着。

So Theotidas sits.

而那个坐，人们说要么坐本身，这个形式，参与了与飞的差异，要么泰阿泰德，除了参与坐之外，或者也许因为他参与坐，从而参与了与所有参与飞的事物的差异。

And that sitting either, people say that either sitting itself, the form, participates in difference in relation to flying, or that Theotidas, as well as participating in sitting, or perhaps because he participates in sitting, thereby participates in difference from all the things that are participating in flying.

所以有两种不同的，我想，还有其他解释，但这是两个相当突出的。

So there are two different, I guess, well there are other interpretations as well, but they're two fairly prominent ones.

不管你怎么切，解决方案都与说所有否定的工作都是由差异形式完成的有关。

And however you cut it, the solution has something to do with saying that all the work of negation is being done by the form of difference.

对。

Right.

而且存在一个“差异”的形式和一个“相同”的形式。

And there's a form of difference and a form of the same.

对。

Right.

对吧？

Right?

所以我想这里的想法是，如果你坐着，我也坐着，事实上我们确实都坐着，嗯。

So I guess that idea there would be that if you're sitting and I'm sitting, which in fact we are Mhmm.

那么我们都参与了“相同”的形式，也参与了“坐”的形式。

Then we both participate in the form of sameness as well as the form of sitting.

这就是为什么我们俩在这方面相似，因为我们都在坐着。

And that's why the two of us resemble each other in this respect, so that we're both sitting.

对吗？

Is that right?

可能是吧。

It could be.

我觉得这真的很难。

I think that's really difficult.

我说难的原因是，对话录里没有这样的例子。

The reason I say it's difficult is that we don't get such cases in the dialogue.

我们看到的参与差异和同一的例子，都是理型参与差异和同一。

Where we do have cases of things participating in difference and sameness are cases of forms participating in difference and sameness.

所以对话录里没有对非理型——比如你和我——参与同一或差异的详细分析，实际上根本没有。

So we don't have a lengthy or complete or detailed analysis in the dialogue of any non forms, so you and I are not forms, any non form subjects participating in sameness or difference in fact.

我觉得这确实是《智者篇》的一个突破，或者说可能的突破：柏拉图开始思考的不只是像我这样的东西参与理型，或者石头、棍子参与理型，而是理型参与理型，这样他就能说一个理型因为不同于另一个理型而参与了差异。

And I guess that's really one of the breakthroughs or possible breakthroughs of the Sophist, that Plato starts to think about not just things like me participating in forms or sticks or stones participating in forms, but forms participating in forms so that he's able to say that one form participates in difference by being different from another form.

没错。

Exactly.

他重点讨论了五个理型。

And there are five forms that he focuses on.

对吧？

Right?

也就是存在、运动、静止、相同和差异。

Namely, being, motion, rest, sameness, difference.

对。

Right.

对。

Right.

最伟大的种类。

The greatest kinds.

最伟大的种类。

The greatest kinds.

听起来这确实可能是个突破，如果我们真的需要考虑形式之间的相互关联的话。

Well, sounds like it might be a breakthrough if we actually need to think about forms sharing in one another.

但我为什么需要考虑形式之间的相互关联或参与呢？

But why do I need to think about forms sharing in or participating in one another?

为什么仅仅考虑木棍、石头和海伦参与形式还不够呢？

Why isn't it enough to think about sticks and stones and Helen participating in forms?

对。

Right.

所以如果你是柏拉图，你可能会想把形式本身当作具有自身属性的事物来分析或考虑。

So you might want to, if you're Plato, you might want to analyse or consider forms as things that have properties on their own.

而且过去的情况可能是，如果你是柏拉图，你会担心形式本身不能拥有属性，或者如果它们本身拥有属性，可能会引发其他问题，比如《巴门尼德篇》中的“第三人”问题。

And it could be the case that in the past, if you were Plato, you worried that forms couldn't have properties in their own right, or if they had properties in their own right, that other problems, such as the Third Man Problem might arise from the Parmenides.

我上次看过那个，是的。

I looked at that last time, yeah.

所以可能的情况是，柏拉图想要弄清楚，形式是属性的体现，是我们发现某个属性定义的那类东西，是属性的本质。

So it could just be the case that Plato wants to get clear, right, about whether or not forms, which are the embodiment of properties, the sorts of things that we've discovered a definition of some property, the very nature of a property.

他想弄清楚属性是否能够拥有属性，即二阶属性是否可能。

That he wants to get clear on whether or not properties can have properties, whether second order properties are possible.

而且

And

这是看待这篇对话的一种方式，有些人

that's one way of looking at the dialogue, and some

有人认为他就是在做这件事。

people have thought that that's what he's doing.

所以，如果你认为运动的形式在数字上不同于静止的形式，而且事实上爱利亚的陌生人也是这样论证的，那么你可能会认为，由此可以推出，运动的形式必须具有不同于静止的形式这一属性。

So if you think that the form of motion might be a numerically distinct form from the form of rest, and indeed the Iliadic stranger argues that it is, you might think that it follows from that that it's got to have the property of being different from the form of rest.

但这样一来，运动的形式就必须相对于静止的形式而分有差异的形式，就像其他任何事物一样，就像你因为不同于椅子或不同于我而分有差异的形式一样。

But then it follows that the form of motion would have to participate in the form of difference in relation to the form of rest, just like anything else, just as you participate in the form of difference from being different from the chair or from me.

柏拉图可能认为这是一个难以说清或可能有问题的主张，因为那样的话，形式就会以完全普通的方式拥有属性，就像其他事物拥有属性一样。

And Plato might have thought that that was a potentially difficult thing to say or potentially problematic thing to say, because then forms would have properties in a perfectly ordinary way, just as other things have properties.

但不管出于什么原因，到了《智者篇》的时候，他已经准备好说形式之间相互分有，或者说可以相互分有。

But for whatever reason, by the time he gets to the Sophist, he is prepared to say that forms participate in one another or can participate in one another.

并非所有形式都相互分有。

Not all forms participate in one another.

所以，似乎是逻辑形式被形式所分有。

So it seems to be the logical forms that forms participate in.

因此，至少在《智者篇》中，这五个最伟大的种类都分有相同的形式。

So the five greatest kinds, in the Sophist anyway, all share in the form of sameness.

所以它们本身就是同一性。

So they're all the sameness themselves.

它们都是自身同一的。

They're all self identical.

它们都与其他形式不同，

They're all different from other forms,

具体来说。

specifically.

对。

Right.

所以它们都分有差异性。

So they all share in difference.

有一个暗示，有些段落表明所有形式都分有存在。

There's an implication, there are passages which suggest that all forms share in being.

当然，运动和静止明确地分有存在。

Certainly motion and rest share in being explicitly.

但言下之意是，所有形式都分有存在。

But the implication is that all forms share in being.

但在对话中，没有说任何形式分有运动或静止。

But no forms are said to share in motion or in rest, in fact, in the dialogue.

我们快没时间了，但让我再问你最后一个问题，这个问题有点推测性。

We're almost out of time, but let me ask you just one last question, which is a little bit speculative.

你觉得柏拉图在这里是不是想给哲学找点事做？

Do you think that part of what Plato is after here is to give philosophy something to do?

因为如果你只是说，好吧，有这些美的事物，它们分有美，所以它们才美。

Because if you just say, well, okay, so there's these beautiful objects, they participate in beauty, That's why they're beautiful.

对。

Right.

但那其实算不上哲学。

But that's not really a philosophy.

对吧？

Right?

我的意思是，哲学不只是观察美的事物因为美而美，因为在《斐多》里那被说成是一种安全又简单的答案。

I mean, philosophy is not just observing that beauty makes beautiful things beautiful because that's said to be a safe and simple minded solution in the Fido.

对吧？

Right?

但这里可能有个真正棘手的问题。

But here's maybe a really tough question.

想想理解世界所需的所有那些重要概念。

Think of all of the kind of important concepts that you need in order to understand the world.

然后去弄清楚它们之间是如何相互关联的。

Now go figure out how they relate to one another.

换句话说，弄清楚形式之间是如何相互参与的。

So in other words, figure out how the forms participate in one another.

有没有可能他是在说，那就是他特殊哲学意义上的辩证法，或者说那就是哲学家会做的事？

Is there some possibility that he's saying that that's what dialectic is in his sort of special philosophical sense, or that that's what the philosopher would do?

还是你觉得这有点疯狂？

Or do you think that's just kind of crazy?

嗯，不，实际上对话中有一段话，他说理清最伟大的种类之间的相互关系就是辩证法，而这正是哲学家所做的。

Well, no, there's actually a passage in the dialogue where he says that working out the interrelations between the greatest kinds is dialectic, and that that's precisely what the philosopher does.

所以，无论是理清概念之间的逻辑关系，还是理清在我们面前的世界中，对象之间的关系所蕴含的后果，都是一个有趣的问题。

So whether it's working out the logical relations between the concepts, or whether it's working out what follows the entailments of the relations between the objects given the world that we have in front of us is an interesting question.

我想这可能引发一个问题，即哲学家是否对我们周围的物理世界不太感兴趣。

And I guess maybe poses a problem as to whether philosopher is not very interested in the physical world around us.

因为现在他会把所有时间花在思考形式如何相互关联上，或者思考形式如何相互关联只是思考我们周围事物的一种方式。

Because now he's going to be spending all of his time thinking about how forms relate to each other, or is thinking about how forms relate to each other just a way of thinking about the things around us.

所以我认为你之前提到的关于真理和谬误的观点在这里很相关。

So I think what you said earlier about truth and falsehood is relevant here.

所以，如果过去柏拉图关心的是对我们陈述为真的状态进行形而上学分析，那么他当然也会关心对我们陈述为假或否定陈述为真的状态进行类似或同样令人满意的分析。

So if in the past Plato was concerned to give a metaphysical analysis of the states of affairs that make our statements true, then of course he's going to be concerned with giving a parallel analysis or an equally satisfactory analysis of the kinds of states of affairs that make statements false or make negative statements true.

那么，如果形式之间的关系是其中的必要组成部分，他肯定关心世界。

Then if the relations between forms are a necessary component of that, then he's definitely concerned with the world.

因为他关心的是陈述如何关于世界为真或为假。

Because he's concerned with how statements can be true and false about the world.

他关心的是从形而上学的角度来理解“塞奥提图斯坐着”是真的，而“塞奥提达斯飞”是假的这一观点。

He's concerned with making sense of the idea that Thiotitis sits is true and Theotidas flies is false from a metaphysical point of view.

所以他想要提供一个形而上学的解释，既能说明这些现象，又能让我们的陈述解释清楚我们关于这些现象的陈述如何为真。

So he wants to provide a metaphysical account that can explain the phenomenon and make our statements explain how our statements about the phenomena can be true.

说到关于现象的陈述为真，下次我实际上会研读柏拉图的一篇关于语言以及语言如何指称世界的完整对话，即《克拉底鲁篇》。

And speaking of statements about phenomena being true, next time I'll actually be looking at a whole dialogue of Plato about language and how language refers to the world, namely the Cradolis.

所以下次请务必加入我。

So please join me for that next time.

但现在，我要非常感谢菲奥娜今天来到节目中。

But for now, I'll just thank Fiona very much for appearing on the show.

不客气。

And You're

下次请继续收听《无间断的哲学史》。

please join me next time for the history of philosophy without any gaps.