Discord: Jason Citron

说实话，我们一直没想明白怎么靠这个赚钱。

And we never really figured out how to make money off of it, frankly.

所以，你们后来开始融资了？

So, essentially, you started to raise money.

对吧？

Right?

你们吸引的投资者越来越多。

You were getting you were attracting more and more interest from investors.

我记得你们最后融了大约一千二百万美元，但那时候根本没任何收入？

I think you eventually raised, like, $12,000,000, but you had no revenue coming in?

没错。

That's right.

说实话，最初确实有几个人付过钱，但我们当时的思路是，用户增长太快了，先全力做规模，赚钱的事儿以后再说。

I mean, I I think a few people had paid us, you know, with the initial thing, but but this was one of our the our our thought was, like, the growth rate of it was such that, like, we'll focus on growing, and then we'll we'll turn our attention to making money later.

那你后来，随着越来越多游戏公司或者游戏开发者对你们感兴趣，情况怎么样？

And And did you I mean, as you, you know, as you just attracted more and more interest from from gaming companies or people building games.

是投资人主动找上门，还是你们自己去跑沙山路，到处去路演拉投资？

Were investors coming to you, or were you guys going out and and, you know, going up and down Sand Hill Road and pitching people?

对。

Yeah.

是我们主动去路演。

We we were pitching people.

说实话，当时融资真的挺难的。

Like, it was actually very hard to raise money.

那是2009年。

You know, this was 2009.

对。

Yeah.

那时候硅谷正集中力量搞智能手机，虽然圈子很小，但大家觉得机会无穷无尽，这新事物发展得特别快，感觉棒极了。

So it was a very odd time in that in in this very sort of small place of Silicon Valley focusing on smartphones, it felt like opportunity was endless and that it was just this amazing new thing that was growing.

但外面的世界呢，你知道的，金融危机正好在那时候爆发。

But the world around us, like, it was the fin you know, the financial crisis just was happening.

那时候真的很难融到资。

Like, it was it was very difficult to raise money.

我们从几个战略投资者那里拿到了钱，但真没有一家红杉路的风险投资公司投这家公司的。

We raised money from a couple strategic investors, but actually no Sandhill VCs invested in that in that company.

你是怎么找到门路的？我当时还以为你才23岁，经验还很浅呢。

How did you find I mean, you were, I don't know, 23 years old and, you know, still relatively new.

你是怎么适应这种到处去拉投资的过程的？

But how did you find that process of going and pitching for money?

你还记得刚开始的时候吗？你会紧张吗？

Did you do you remember in the early days, did you did you would you get nervous?

你会觉得不自在吗？

Did you feel awkward?

我的意思是，你做这些事的时候觉得自然吗？

I mean or was it were you comfortable doing it?

这对你来说容易吗？

Was it easy?

算是各种情况都有吧。

It was kind of all of the above.

关键是，我非常清楚自己在推销什么，而且我真的相信它。

The thing about it is I I really knew what I was pitching, and I really believed in it.

数据一路向上，所以关键是找到那些认同并理解这一点的人。

The numbers were just up into the right, and so it was just about finding people who who believed in that and who understood it.

我们拿到的第一笔投资，其实来自另一家公司，他们也在做类似的东西，只是面向不同市场，所以他们特别懂。

And, you know, the first the first investment we got was from actually another company that was working on something similar in a different market, and so they really understood it.

后来，英特尔旗下的一家传统风投机构也投了我们。

And then later on, we got a little more traditional venture capital arm of of Intel actually invested.

是的。

Yeah.

我觉得

I think

300万美元。

$3,000,000.

是的。

Yeah.

没错。

That's right.

但那时候，整个市场确实挺难的。

But it was just it was just a a difficult time, I think, generally in the market.

也许没上斯坦福，确实是个劣势。

And maybe this was where, like, not going to Stanford didn't help.

你知道的。

You know?

我也说不准。

I don't know.

因为你没有那个圈子。

You because you didn't because you didn't have the network.

对。

Yeah.

但你有和彼得·雷伦共事的经历，我猜他应该算是带你入门了吧？

But you I mean, you had this experience with Peter Rellen, who kind of I'm assuming maybe he kinda mentored you.

你是从他那里学会怎么评估公司价值、选哪些律师合作的吗？还是通过别的渠道？

Like, is that where you kinda learn the ropes about, you know, how to value your company and and which lawyers to work with and or or was it through some other channel?

是的。

Yeah.

不是。

No.

没错。

That's right.

没错。

That's right.

对。

Yeah.

他真的带我熟悉了硅谷的门道，还介绍了一群优秀的人来支持公司。

He really kinda showed me the ropes for of Silicon Valley, and he had a network of some really good folks that kind of he brought in to support the company.

所以他帮我们牵线搭桥，让我们有机会见到一些投资人，并指导我们如何应对这些情况。

So and he had some connections to help us get in front of some investors and and navigate that

在这方面。

a bit.

你那么年轻的时候，作为领导者表现怎么样？

How did you how did you do as a leader when you were so young?

我的意思是，你一开始只有五个人，但我觉得在一年半的时间里，团队就扩张到了将近一百人。

I mean, you you start out with five people, and I think within a year and a half, it grew to almost a 100 people.

对。

Mhmm.

所以帮我理解一下，你是怎么学会领导一百多人的。

So help me understand how you figured out how to be a leader of a 100 people.

我是说，这对任何人来说都不容易。

I mean, that's for anybody, that's hard.

对于一个25、26岁的人来说，这真的很难，对吧？

For somebody, you know, 25, 26 is really you know, it's a right?

没那么容易。

It's not not so easy.

确实不容易。

No.

真的不容易。

It wasn't easy.

我虽然没把书上所有的错都犯一遍，但该犯的几乎都犯了。

I I made, you know, not every mistake in the book, but I made a lot of the mistakes in the book.

对我来说，这简直就是一场实战商学院的历练。

It it really was like a business school of hard knocks kind of an experience for me.

我记得特别清楚，大概是在第二年的时候。

You know, I have I have a very clear memory of, like, probably around year two.

那时候我们大概有七十个人左右。

I think I think we were maybe 70 people at the time.

安迪，就是我那个至今还在和我一起干的朋友，来找我说：杰森，这儿的工作真够呛。

And, Andy, the you know, my friend who is still working with me, came to me and he said, you know, Jason, it kinda sucks working here.

但我不会走。

But I'm not leaving.

我只是想让你知道。

I'm just letting you know.

我们需要努力改善这里的工作环境，因为现在并不理想。

We need to work on making it better to work here because it's not awesome.

哪些地方不理想？

What was what was not awesome?

主要是因为我们发展得太快了，一切都很新，我们没太关注打造好的企业文化。

Well, we just you know, because we grew so fast and everything was new, I I we we were not focused on building a great culture.

那时候就是一心想着解决问题，只想别被淹没了。

Like, it was very much just like we have to solve the problems, and we just we're just trying to stay, you know, above water.

做软件产品的时候，你必须有意识地去偿还技术债务，认真思考如何规模化地管理开发流程。

You know, when you're building software products, like, you've gotta be really intentional about paying down technical debt and thinking about how you run the process around building software at scale.

如果你不重视工具的建设，不写可复用、易维护的代码，迟早会陷入处处掣肘的境地。

Because if you're not thoughtful about tool development and and building code that is reusable and easily to maintain, you find yourself in situations where, like, everything is really hard to do.

事情一难办，人就容易焦虑。

And when things get hard to do, people get stressed.

我当时更倾向于不断push，再push，再再push。

And I was I kinda leaned more towards the, like, more, more, more.

我对事情的要求一直很高。

Like, I have really high expectations.

我们得把这事赶紧搞定。

Like, we gotta get this done.

对。

Mhmm.

所以我并没有对人发火。

So I wasn't getting mad at people.

我肯定不是那种容易生气的人，但我的要求确实很高。

Like, I'm I'm definitely not the guy who gets angry, but I have really high expectations.

高要求加上大量的技术债和管理债，导致推进起来特别吃力，我就特别着急。

And high expectations combined with lots of technical debt and management debt made it, like, difficult to make progress, and I I would get frustrated.

但你当时对管理一无所知。

But you didn't know anything about management.

你根本没接触过管理，没有。

You had no management No.

培训也好，经验也好，都没有。

Training or experience.

我没有。

I I didn't.

我确实没有。

I didn't.

我觉得，领导力和管理其实是两回事。

And I think, you know, there's there's also a difference between, like, leadership and management.

这两种能力都可以学，但我觉得自己天生有点领导气质。

They're both skills that can be learned, but I think I was a bit of a natural leader.

我处理工作的方式，还有我们为客户解决问题的态度，都让团队里的人受到鼓舞。

Like, something about how I approached my work and approached the problems we were solving for our customers was inspiring to the people we were working with.

但我当时的管理能力简直太稚嫩了，只能 heavily 依赖我们后来招来的那些高管。

But my management ability was just, like, so raw that I really leaned on on some of the executives that we ended up hiring.

彼得确实帮了我不少，教了我很多这方面的知识。

Peter, you know, certainly helped teach me some things about that.

但大部分东西都是靠试错和看书学来的。

But a lot of it was just trial and error and reading books.

我花了很多时间学习，就像当年学编程时那样。

And, you know, I I studied a lot as I did when I was learning programming.

我就下定决心，一定要把这家公司搞起来。

I was like, I'm gonna learn how to build this business.

所以我读了很多管理类的书，也不断向别人请教。

So I read management books and talked to people.

我慢慢把一些基本的东西搭起来了，但说实话，这真的特别难。

And, you know, I I I kinda got a lot some of the basics in place, but, you know, it's it's really hard to to do that.

你懂的。

You know?

他们是怎么说的？

What do they say?

就像你在从天上掉下来的时候，一边掉一边造飞机，而且你以前从来没造过飞机。

Like, you're building the plane as you're falling out of the sky kind of a thing, and you never built a plane before.

是的。

Yeah.

所以。

So

对。

Yeah.

所以我想，OpenFeint大概在2011年初开始有点收入了。

So I I guess OpenFeint started to make a little bit of money by I I think, like, probably by early twenty eleven.

然后到了2011年4月，这家公司被一家叫Gri的日本社交游戏公司以一亿美元收购了，简直难以置信。

And then basically, in April 2011, the company was sold to a Japanese social networking game maker called Gri for, like, a $100,000,000, which is unbelievable.

是的。

Yeah.

我觉得换谁都会这么做的。

And and I think anybody would have done that.

我就是有点好奇，有没有人说过什么？

Was there any I just had a curiosity.

有没有人劝过你别卖？

Was there anybody who said, like, don't do this?

是有人觉得咱们还能做得更大，还是大家都说‘行’？

Like, we can we can we can get bigger, or was everyone like, yep.

咱们就干吧。

Let's do it.

咱们卖了吧。

Let's sell.

当时其实并不清楚该不该卖。

It was not clear that we should sell.

当时的考虑其实是综合了眼前的机会和我们感受到的风险。

The the the thought process was really kind of a combination of the opportunity we have in front of us and how much risk we felt Yeah.

当时的机会，还有团队每个人——包括我自己——能拿到的收益，以及这可能会怎样改变大家的生活。

Was in that opportunity, and then the financials that everyone in the team would get, including myself, and sort of how that might change people's lives.

而且，从我们当时的业务状况来看，用户增长其实很强劲。

And, ultimately, because of where we were with the business, like, had strong user growth.

但我们还没完全找到盈利的方式，而市场又在快速变化。

We hadn't quite figured out how to make money, and the market was changing a lot.

那时候免费游戏开始流行起来，而免费游戏对OpenFeint的需求也相应减少了。

You know, free to play games games were starting to become popular, and free to play games kinda had less of a need for for OpenFeint.

而且，这时候我们还要跟苹果和谷歌直接竞争。

And we were also competing with Apple and now Google at this point.

综合这些因素，我觉得结果可能走向任何一方。

And so given all of this dynamic, I sort of felt like it could go either way.

要么继续做下去，说不定能找到出路，要么就走不通。

Like, could keep doing it, and it could we could figure it out or not.

最终我决定卖掉公司，是因为我们和收购方Gree谈好的条件是：能获得更多资源，继续开发OpenFeint，看看能把它带到多远。

And, ultimately, the reason I chose to sell the company was because, you know, the arrangement we had with with with Gree, the acquirer, was that we would get more resources to go on and continue building the OpenFeyn and and and see where we could take it.

但说实话，我很快就发现我们根本没法达成共识，他们想把公司往左拉。

But, you know, unfortunately, I very quickly realized that we actually didn't see eye to eye, and, you know, they wanted to take the the business to the left.

我想往右走。

I wanted to take it to the right.

所以三四个月后，他们让我退出，说公司要往另一个方向走，我就离开了。

And so after, like, three or four months, you know, they asked me to to step aside and basically, like, we're gonna take the business in this direction, and so I I left.

让我

Let

先稍微退一步说清楚。

me just back up for a sec.

卖公司的时候，通常有个条件是你得留下来为他们工作，因为他们买的是你和你团队的人才。

When you sell a company, oftentimes, part of the deal is you go work for them, and they were buying your talent and the talent of your team.

对。

Mhmm.

而且那时候你们其实还没盈利。

And you you were not you you weren't profitable.

你离盈利还差得远呢。

You were far from profitable.

你没赚多少钱，但用户数量多得惊人。

You were more weren't making much money, but you had tons of users.

我听说你卖给Guri的时候，App Store里差不多有30%的App都在用Open Faint。

I think when you sold to Guri, you were, like, on 30 per I read, like, 30% of the apps in the App Store were using Open Faint.

那时候你在那个市场里的渗透率高得吓人。

So a huge penetration in that market.

对吧？

Right?

但他们肯定得想办法把它变成能赚钱的产品。

But they had to figure out presumably how to make it a revenue generating product.

所以，理念上的冲突就是从这儿开始的？

Is that where the the clash of ideas came from?

不是。

No.

我是说，我完全支持，比如我们怎么围绕这个建立业务？

I mean, I I was all all supportive, like, how can we build a business around this?

对。

Right.

但我认为他们想采取的策略，我觉得会毁掉我们之前建立的东西。

But I think that the the strategy that they wanted to take to do that, I believed, would destroy the stuff that we had.

而且，你知道，卖掉公司就是卖掉了，他们有权做决定。

And, you know, when you sell a business, you're selling it, and they had the right to choose.

你只是个员工。

You're an employee.

他们可以自己选择想做的事。

They could choose what they wanted

所以他们就这么做了。

to do, and so they they did.

不过，这是否也涉及到了性格上的冲突呢？

But did was it was it a was it kind of a clash of personalities too?

我觉得主要是期望值没对齐。

I I think it was it was just expectation setting.

其实不是性格不合，而是我和他们之间确实存在很大的语言障碍。

Like, it wasn't a clash of personalities, but ultimately, there was actually a big language barrier between them and myself.

我觉得这也导致我们在很多问题上没法达成共识。

And I think that contributed to some of not seeing, you know, eye to eye on it.

我当时是打算长期留下来的。

I was fully intending to stick around for a long time.

我是说，我倾注了全部心血创办这家公司，本以为

Like, I didn't build this, you know, pour my heart and soul into this company with the expectation that

自己最终能全身而退。

I was gonna walk away from it.

我的意思是，你做得很出色。

I mean, you did well.

你在财务上彻底实现了自由。

You came out of that set for life financially.

你那时候才26岁。

You were 26.

我的意思是，当然视角不同看法就不一样，但你可以从好几个角度来想，算了。

So, I mean, you could look at it and and, of course, perspective of matters here, but you could look at it from a number of different perspectives and say, okay.

没什么大不了的。

No big deal.

他们让你走，可你已经财务自由了。

So they ask you to leave, but you're set for life.

但我猜你没觉得事情这么简单。

But I'm assuming you didn't quite see it that simply.

不是的。

No.

我确实没这么想。

I I didn't.

说实话，确实如此。

I mean, it's true.

你知道，把公司卖个好价钱，经济上获得这么好的结果，真是太棒了。

You know, like, selling a company and having you know, for for a good economic outcome is phenomenal.

这不仅彻底改变了我的生活，也改变了公司里很多人的命运。

It was life changing for myself and for a lot of the people at the company.

我们都明白，钱确实很重要。

You know, we all recognize that money is important.

我爸爸小时候在纽约市的贫民区长大，穷得不得了。

You know, my my dad grew up super poor in the projects in, you know, in in New York City.

所以我觉得，对他来说，这简直让人难以置信。

And so, you know, I I think for him, he was really like, wow.

能聊到这么深入的话题，真不容易。

This is an incredible conversation to be having.

你说是吧？

You know?

我们该把公司卖了吗？

Should we sell this company?

是的

Yeah.

我没错。

I'm I'm right.

我知道。

I know.

太棒了。

Amazing.

对吧？

Right?

但你知道，我一开始做这个，直到今天，我之所以继续，是因为我喜欢创造东西。

But, you know, I I got into doing this and and even to this day, like, I I do what I do because I love building things.

我喜欢为人们打造能让他们微笑的体验。

I love creating experiences for people that make them smile.

我离开的时候，记得坐在车里哭了，心想自己可能再也没机会做一件有意义的事了。

And at the time when I left, I I remember sitting in my car actually crying because I thought maybe I wasn't ever gonna have the opportunity to build something that mattered again.

稍后回来，我们会讲讲杰森是怎么终于实现了他一直以来的梦想——创办一家电子游戏公司，以及这个想法为何以一种最成功的方式失败了。

When we come back in just a moment, how Jason finally does what he's always wanted to do, start a video game company, and how that idea ultimately fails in the most successful way possible.

请继续关注我们。

Stay with us.

我是盖伊，欢迎收听《我是如何打造这一切的》。

I'm Guy and you're listening to how I built this.

嘿。

Hey.

欢迎回到《我是如何打造这一切的》。

Welcome back to How I Built This.

我是盖伊·拉兹。

I'm Guy Raz.

大约在2011到2012年之间，杰森在卖掉了他的公司Open Faint之后，稍微歇了口气。

So it's around 2011, 2012, and Jason is taking a bit of a breather after selling his company, Open Faint.

那段时间他玩了很多电子游戏，特别喜欢《最终幻想6》，还和女朋友一起出去旅行了一阵。

And during this period, he plays a lot of video games, Final Fantasy six is a special favorite, and he does a little traveling with his girlfriend.

但他也在认真思考接下来该做什么。

But he's also thinking really hard about what he wants to do next.

当时我就坐在那儿琢磨，心想，好吧。

Now I was sitting there thinking like, okay.

我一直想开一家游戏公司，现在正是时候。

I've always wanted to start a video games company, and I could do it now.

所以，我该怎么着手呢？

So, like, how do I wanna do it?

而且，你知道，我这些年观察到一点，每当出现新的分发渠道，就意味着有新公司可以借此起步。

And, you know, one of the things that I'd seen over my life is when there are these new distribution channels that get created, that's opportunities for new businesses to get to get launched.

我之前提过，比如游戏主机和 App Store 就是这样的例子。

You know, I mentioned this earlier with, you know, consoles and the App Store.

所以 2012 年那会儿，我坐在那儿琢磨，心想，好吧。

And so sitting around in 2012, I was like, okay.

到底哪里还有那种前沿的创新，能带来新的分发机会，而且竞争没那么激烈，让初创公司有机会脱颖而出？

Where in the world are is there kind of a leading edge innovation that may have some new distribution opportunities where there's less competition so a startup has an opportunity to stand out?

是的

Yeah.

那时候大概是iPad推出的第二三年左右。

And this was around, I think, year two or three of the iPad.

早期iPad的增长势头简直像坐上了火箭。

And early days, iPad growth was like a hockey stick.

对

Yeah.

我记得当时想，也许iPad最终会改变人们使用台式机的方式。

And so I remember thinking, you know, maybe iPads will end up replacing how people use desktop computers.

人们在这些设备上玩游戏的方式，跟手机上有很大不同。

And the way that people play games on those devices are quite different than mobile devices.

你会坐得更久一些。

You tend to sit for longer amount of time.

能有更深入的体验。

You can have deeper experiences.

我当时的想法是，能不能做一家游戏公司，做类似传统电子游戏那样的产品，但平台是平板电脑，而不是我之前做的那种碎片化、随时能玩的手机游戏。

And the idea I had was what if we built a gaming business that was more like traditional kind of video games but on tablets as opposed to kind of the mobile games, which I had been doing before, which were more kind of bite sized pickup and play ideas.

所以你的想法就是创办一家专注于平板电脑多人游戏的公司？

So that was basically your idea to to start a company where you would do multiplayer games for tablets?

对。

Yeah.

当时的思路是，我研究过娱乐行业，发现那些能长期存活的企业，往往不只是靠某一款作品，而是拥有某种持久的优势。

And the thesis there was I studied entertainment businesses, and I realized that the ones that end up being around for a long time tend to have some kind of durable advantage beyond just a single title.

现在游戏即服务的趋势让情况有点不一样了，但十年前，那些能长久存在的游戏公司，通常都有自己的一套发行渠道，用来缓冲热门作品之间的空档期，毕竟这行业太依赖爆款了。

It's changing a bit now with games as a service, but, you know, a decade ago, video game businesses that were around for a long time tended to have a distribution mechanism of their own that they could use to kind of buffer the time between making hit titles because it's a very hit driven industry.

是的。

Yeah.

比如任天堂、索尼的PlayStation、微软的Xbox，还有Valve的Steam商店，都是这样的例子。

So I'm talking, you know, Nintendo, Sony with their PlayStation, Microsoft Xbox, you know, Valve has their Steam store.

作为一个技术背景的人，我就想，我大概也能搭建出类似的分发平台。

And so as a technologist, I'm like, I probably can build some kind of distribution mechanism or something.

我当时有个想法，就是为游戏玩家开发一个群组通讯应用。

And I had the notion that there's might be an opportunity to build a group communications app for people who play games.

所以想法是做一个团队多人游戏，内置语音和文字聊天功能，有点像Aurora Feint那样。

And so the idea was build a team based multiplayer game that had voice chat and text chat kinda built into it, kinda similar to how Aurora Feint was.

对。

Yeah.

只不过加了语音聊天？

Except it would have voice chat?

对。

Yeah.

是团队实时对战的游戏。

It'd be team based real time gameplay.

没错。

Mhmm.

然后用游戏来带动一个通讯网络，再靠这个网络推出更多新作，最终建立起一个游戏分发平台。

And then use the game to kind of bootstrap a communication network and then use that to launch additional titles and eventually build a distribution business for games.

听起来你的想法是打造一家媒体科技公司，提供类似Aurora Feint的服务，但加上语音聊天功能，同时开发专为这个社交互动平台设计的游戏。

It sounds like the idea was to build, like like, a media technology company where you would offer this service similar to Aurora Faint, but with audio chat component, but also to make games that were designed to be used with this social interactive platform.

对。

Yeah.

没错。

That's right.

但不像OpenFeint那样，主要是个卖给开发者、让他们集成到自己游戏里给用户用的服务。

But instead of, like, OpenFeint where it was primarily a service that we sold to developers who then put it in their games for their users Yep.

这次我想直接面向玩家，和游戏玩家建立直接联系，最后把它做成一个独立的应用。

This time, I was like, I wanna go direct to consumers and have a direct relationship with the game players, and then eventually make it into its own app.

所以你其实是在考虑打造一个社交网络？

So so you were really thinking about building a social network?

是的。

Yes.

那是2012年左右，你最初把公司命名为Phoenix Guild，后来改成了Hammer and Chisel。

This is around 2012, and you I think you originally called the company Phoenix Guild, then you changed to Hammer and Chisel.

是的。

Mhmm.

你们筹集了大约一百万美元的种子资金来启动这个项目。

And you raised a little bit a little over $1,000,000 in seed money to launch it.

当你向人推介时——我猜那时候，很多人愿意投钱给你，因为你之前两年就把一家公司从零做到了一亿美元的估值。

And when you pitched it to I mean, I'm assuming at that time, you'd to lots of people who want to throw money throw money at you because you've taken a, you know, a company from zero to a $100,000,000 in two years.

但当你解释你在做什么的时候，你是怎么描述的？

But when you explained what you were doing, how did you describe it?

你是说我们要做视频游戏，还是说我们要打造社交网络，或者两者都提？

Did you describe it as a we're gonna make video games, or did you describe it as we're gonna create the social network or both?

对。

Yeah.

我描述的是，我们要在下一代计算设备上构建一种全新的游戏生态系统，它会融合多种元素。

I I described it as we're gonna build a new kind of gaming ecosystem on, like, the next generation of computing devices, and it's gonna be a combination of things.

它会包含游戏。

It's gonna be games.

它会是一个通信服务，同时也是一个分发平台。

It's gonna be a communication service, and then it's gonna be a distribution mechanism.

你最初是怎么找到人加入你的团队的？

How did you begin to recruit people to join you?

你是怎么认识这些人的？

Did you who who how did you find people?

是来自OpenFeint的人主动来找你的吗？

Or did people from OpenFeint who came?

你之前就有一批认识的人脉吗？

Was it was there just a network of people you knew?

是的。

Yeah.

你最初是怎么开始的？是的。

Where did you how'd you start Yeah.

是的。

Yeah.

为了组建团队？

To gather the team?

我当时想，我得找个美术设计师。

I mean, the the the initial place that I started was I was like, I need I need an artist.

我是搞软件工程的，对产品和游戏设计也懂一点，但真不是搞美术的。

I was like, I'm a, you know, I'm a software engineer who kinda understands product and game design, but I'm not an artist.

所以没个美术，这事根本推进不了。

So I need an artist to make any progress.

我就联系了几个游戏圈的朋友，问他们有没有人感兴趣。

And so, I, you know, called up some of my friends from the games industry to see, like, you know, is anyone interested?

大家都在忙些什么？

What are people doing?

然后我就上网搜，想找些顶尖的设计师。

And I started looking online to find, like, great talent.

有个网站，好像是叫cghub.com，就是computergraphicshub.com，艺术家们会在那儿放作品集。

And there was this website, I think it was called cghub.com, like computergraphicshub.com, where artists would, like, put up their portfolios.

所以我就开始一个个看这些作品集，给那些作品特别棒的人发消息。

So I just kinda started going down these portfolios and sending messages to people who looked like they had really awesome work.

后来我跟一个家伙特别投缘，他真的特别厉害。

And then ultimately, really hit it off with one guy who was just incredible.

他叫布兰登。

His name is Brandon.

我还专门飞去德克萨斯见了他一面，结果他成了公司第一个加入的人。

I actually flew to Texas to meet with him, and he ended up being the first person to join the company.

他到现在还在我们这儿，挺不容易的。

He's actually still with us today, It's pretty cool.

你当时有没有一个明确的想法，知道游戏会是什么样子？还是只是去找他，说：我也不太确定要做啥，但我想做个游戏，想跟你一起搞？

Did you have an idea, a specific idea of what the game would be, or did you just go to him and say, I'm not really sure what it is, but I wanna make a video game, and I want to do it together?

大概有个方向，但真没成型的想法。

Kinda had a hunch of of the space to explore, but I didn't have idea.

我知道我想做一款实时多人游戏，让朋友们能一起玩，创造些特别有趣的回忆。

You know, I knew that I wanted to build a game that was real time multiplayer, that allowed you to spend time with your friends and have these really fun experiences to, like, create memories together.

这样也为我们后来在游戏基础上搭建通信服务打下了基础。

And then that would also plant the right kind of seeds to be able to build that, you know, communication service that we wanted to build on top of the game.

对。

Right.

那这个想法是怎么来的？

So how did you come up with it?

这个概念后来被命名为《Fates Forever》。

The concept would eventually be called Fates Forever.

这应该是你第一个想到的游戏，没错。

This that was the first game, I think, that you Yep.

想出来的。

Came up with.

是的。

Yeah.

《Fates Forever》是一款三对三的实时多人游戏。

Fates Forever is a three versus three real time multiplayer game.

这种类型叫大规模在线竞技场，简称MOBA。

The genre is called massively online battle arena or MOBA.

你是在和别人对战。

You're fighting other people.

是的。

Yeah.

对。

Yeah.

有点像踢足球，只不过不是把球踢进球门，而是用巨龙、火球这些东西去攻击对方。

It's kind of like playing soccer, but instead of a ball going into a goal, it's like dragons and fireballs and stuff.

你们三个人是一队的，一起对抗对方。

And the three of you are all kind of on the same team fighting fighting them.

没错。

Yeah.

所以就是，嗯，

So it it yeah.

就是你和两个朋友对上另外三个人。

It's like you and two other friends against three other people.

不过我得承认。

But I I have to give credit.

我们并不是这个玩法的原创者。

Like, we didn't invent this.

这个游戏本身早就存在了。

This is this game Yeah.

在PC端，这款游戏早就因为《英雄联盟》而广为人知了。

Was already really popularized on PC by something called League of Legends.

对。

And so Mhmm.

是的。

Yeah.

我们之前在节目里采访过拳头游戏的创始人。

We've done the we we talked to the founders of Riot Games on the show.

太好了。

Oh, great.

很好。

Great.

没错。

Yeah.

他们确实。

They're Yeah.

对。

Yeah.

太出色了。

Phenomenal.

这是一个精彩的故事。

An amazing story.

但你继续说。

But keep keep going.

顺便说一句，我知道问这种问题的时候，我听起来像个十足的傻瓜。

And by the way, I know I sound like a complete bozo when I'm asking these kinds of questions.

因为玩这些游戏的人肯定会想：你在开玩笑吗？

Because people who play these games are like, are you kidding me?

你居然不知道这怎么玩？

You don't know how this works?

答案就是：不知道。

And the answer is no.

我不懂。

I don't.

虽然我看过，也看过我孩子玩，

Even though I've seen this, see my kids play it.

但我还是觉得，好吧。

I'm like, okay.

所以是你们三个人，跟那个人打，火球朝你们飞过来，旁边还有条龙。

So it's three of you, and you're fighting this guy, and the fireball's coming at you, and there's a dragon there.

然后还有这么一个人，你们在打他。

And then there's this guy, and you're fighting.

有时候你们还会互相干掉。

And sometimes you kill each other.

是的。

Yeah.

差不多吧。

Kind of.

明白了。

Okay.

接着说。

Keep going.

对。

Yeah.

要学的东西很多，但这就是这游戏的精髓。

It's there's a lot to learn, but so that's what the game is.

所以我们从《英雄联盟》里拿了一个游戏模式，然后想，怎么把它重新设计成适合一块12英寸屏幕的游戏，就是你玩平板的时候那种体验？

So we basically took one of the the game modes from League of Legends, and we said, how could we reimagine this for, like, a 12 inch piece of glass, you know, when you're paying playing on a tablet?

对，没错。

And Yeah.

于是我们设计了一套全新的触控操作方式。

So we we came up with a new kind of touch mechanics.

你可以画一条曲线，火焰就会跟着你画的路线走。

You could, like, draw you know, you could draw a squiggly line and, like, the fire would, like, follow the line that you drew.

真酷。

Oh, cool.

我们做了很多有意思的交互设计，就是想打造真正适合移动端的体验。

So, like, we had a lot of interesting interaction design that we did to try and really create, like, a mobile native experience Mhmm.

为了提供一些不一样的东西。

To offer something different.

对了，我看到说开发这个游戏的团队有八个人，是吗？

By the way, how long I I read that it was an eight person team that made this game.

因为你之前筹到了钱，我记得大概是250万美元来做这个游戏，后来又追加了800万，或者再多一点。

Because you had because you raised some money, I think, about $2,500,000 to make this game, and then another 8,000,000 or a little bit more after.

但问题是，八个人做一款游戏，到底要花多长时间？

But but, I mean, how long does it take for eight people to make a game?

我想答案应该是一年半左右吧。

I I mean, I guess I guess the answer is a year and a half.

对吧？

Right?

但这个过程是不是特别紧张，节奏快得吓人？

But but it but it's is it just, like, crazy intense schedule?

因为这游戏看起来太复杂了，八个人实在不算多。

Because it seems so complex, and eight people is not a

人手确实不多。

lot of people.

是的。

Yeah.

做游戏这事挺复杂的，但有意思的是，公司头六个月我们一直在试各种原型和点子。

It's complicated making games, but it's interesting because for the first six months of the company, we were kinda noodling around on different prototypes and different ideas.

我们当时搞过几个塔防类的构想，还有其他几个不同的方向。

We we had, like, a tower defense concept, a couple different kind of concepts.

大概六个月后，我们有了一个关键的转折点——我决定重新设计一款MOBA游戏，专门适配平板，因为我真觉得这游戏设计太棒了，而且在手机上肯定能火。

And then after about six months, we kinda had this interesting moment where, you know, I I decided, like, we should reinvent this MOBA concept on tablets because I I I believe that it was a real it's a really great game design, and I thought it would be huge on mobile.

不过当时公司里有几个人并不认同这个想法。

But, like, a couple of the people at the company time didn't agree.

结果有两个人直接辞职了，我还得让一个人走，因为他不愿意参与这个项目。

And so, actually, two people ended up quitting, and I had to let one one person go because they didn't wanna work on it.

他们觉得这主意根本行不通。

They thought it was they thought it was a bad idea.

说实话，他们当时说得也有道理，但这段经历对我们来说特别重要——最后只剩下三个人，一个是Andy，我之前提过好几次的那位，

I mean, they were kinda right, but it was a it was a it was an interesting formative moment for us because there were, like, three of us left, and it was Andy, this fellow that I've mentioned a few times.

他后来加入了我们，还有我最早招来的那个小伙子，Brandon。

He ended up joining up, and then Brandon, that first guy that I hired.

对。

Mhmm.

我们围坐在一起，想着：我们真要继续干下去吗？还是干脆解散，去别处找份工作算了？

And we were sitting around thinking, like, do we even wanna go do this, or should we just kinda close-up shop and go get jobs, you know, somewhere else?

是的。

Yeah.

最后我们决定不另找工作，而是想试试看自己创办一家游戏公司。因为如果我们能打造一个让人真正想待的地方，和那些我们敬重的人一起合作，这本身就已经很有价值了，好事自然会跟着来。

And we ended up deciding that we didn't wanna go get jobs somewhere else, and we wanted to take a shot at building our own games company because if we could make a great place to work and collaborate with people that we, you know, respected, like, would actually be kind of an end in and of itself, and good things would probably happen.

我们都曾在游戏行业经历过不太好的工作环境。

You know, we all had difficult experiences working in the games industry.

所以，就在那时，我们把公司改名为‘锤子与凿子’，就是为了致敬这种精神。

So that was actually the moment we renamed the company to Hammer and Chisel to really honor Right.

用心制作一件东西的工艺。

The craft of making something.

之后，我们陆续招了大约十八个人来开发这款游戏。

And so we ended up then hiring actually up to about 18 people to build the game.

我觉得我们大概花了两年半的时间，因为那时候是早期，或者其实可能

And it took us about two and a half years, I think, because that was early or maybe actually it

是一年半。你说得对，真厉害。

was a year and a You're right Wow.

来开发并上线这款游戏。

To build it and launch it.

我们确实很努力，但并没有怎么加班赶工。

But we worked hard, but we didn't crunch a lot.

我们的工作和生活平衡得还不错。

We had pretty good work life harmony.

做这件事的过程挺有意思的，但我们尽量保持理性，从长远角度来打造一个好的工作环境。

We had a lot of fun doing it, but we just, like, tried to be smart about it and took a long a long view on building a great place to work.

你当时推出了

You you launched the

那款游戏，我记得是2014年4月或者7月正式发行的，但销量并不理想。

game in you know, for wide release in, I think in April or maybe in July of of twenty fourteen, but it didn't do that well.

对吧？

Right?

当时真没火起来。

It didn't really take off.

是的。

Yeah.

这跟《极光微光》的经历挺像的。

It it was kind of a similar similar story to what happened with Aurora Faint.

我们拿到了iPad编辑推荐。

Like, you know, we got iPad Editor's Choice.

第一周就有不少人下载了。

We got a lot of people downloaded it in that first week.

评论家们很喜欢。

Critics liked it.

评论家们很喜欢。

Critics liked it.

拿了不少奖。

Won a lot of awards.

但最终我们意识到，平板上的这种类型根本行不通，平板虽然受欢迎，但不会像我们预期的那样成为主流，也不会成为改变人们与电脑关系的转折点。

But, ultimately, it became clear that the genre on tablets was not really gonna work and that tablets generally, while popular, were not gonna be as big as we thought and not gonna be kind of the inflection point around, like, how people change their relationship with computers.

其实，真正会崛起的一直都是智能手机。

And that, actually, it was gonna be smartphones all along.

所以没错。

So Right.

于是我们开始把游戏移植到智能手机上。

We started porting our game to smartphones.

这有帮助吗？

And did that help?

其实我们一直没机会知道，因为就在我们做移植的时候，公司里有个叫斯坦尼斯拉夫·维什涅夫斯基的工程师来找我，说：嘿，杰森。

Well, we never actually found out because as we were working on that port, you know, one of the engineers at the company, a guy named Stanislav Vishnevsky, came to me and was like, hey, Jason.

我们之前聊过好几次这个游戏沟通的事了。

And we've been talking about this gaming communication thing for a while.

他说，他有个想法，能让我们做一个通讯应用，而且不需要靠游戏来冷启动。

And he was like, I have an idea for how we could build a communications app that doesn't require us to bootstrap it with a game.

他当时跟我提的那个点子，其实就是今天 Discord 的雏形。所以我把 Stan 算作联合创始人，就是因为他那个时刻。

And he actually pitched me the seed of the idea of what Discord is today, and so I call Stan a cofounder because of that moment.

那 Stan 具体给你提了什么想法呢？

But what what what was the exact idea that that Stan brought to you?

他那个洞察到底是什么？

Like, what was the what was that insight that he had?

他真正的洞察在于把几个看似反直觉的点串联起来，我们发现客户在用各种不同应用拼凑出围绕我们游戏的交流方式。

What he the insight that he really had was kind of putting together a couple of dots, which were kinda counterintuitive, which was we're seeing our customers cobble together, you know, communication around our own game with all these different apps.

我们自己玩电脑游戏的时候，其实也常这么做。

And also ourselves, like, we kinda do this when we play, you know, games on PC.

所以，也许我们可以直接解决这个问题，而不是非得先做一个游戏，让人去用某个东西，然后再把精力集中到别处。

And, like, maybe we can just solve that problem directly rather than needing to build a game to get people to use something which we can then focus on.

真正反直觉的地方在于，我们应该先从电脑端开始做。

And the real counterintuitive part was, and we should start by doing it on PC.

你知道吗，2014年的时候，手机市场正疯狂增长。

You know, because in in 2014, like, mobile was exploding.

硅谷里所有人都盯着手机市场。

You know, everyone in Silicon Valley was focused on on mobile.

结果我们反而决定先在PC端推出这款通讯服务。

And we ended up basically talking about launching a communication service on PC first.

董事会觉得我们有点疯，但最后还是同意了。

Our board thought we were kinda nuts, but ultimately Yeah.

值得肯定的是，他们相信我们真正懂用户。

To their credit, they believed that we understood our customers.

作为普通用户，我们自己回家后也经常在PC和游戏主机上打游戏。

And as as individual users, like, we would go home and play games on our PCs and consoles all the time.

因为电脑性能更强。

And so because they're more powerful.

对吧？

Right?

是的

Yeah.

它们性能更强。

They're they're more powerful.

如果你要坐下来和朋友玩上几个小时，确实更舒服。

It's more comfortable if you're gonna sit and play a game for, like Yeah.

四个小时和朋友一起玩。

Four hours with your friends.

你希望有个更大的屏幕，还有键盘和鼠标。

Like, you want a bigger screen, you wanna a keyboard and a mouse.

对我们来说，这再自然不过了。

It just seemed natural to us.

虽然在硅谷当时大家讨论的焦点不是这个，但作为游戏玩家，我们觉得这显而易见。

So so while it wasn't kind of, like, the top of mind conversation of the day in Silicon Valley, as people who play games ourselves, it was it it seemed obvious.

等斯坦一写下来，我们就觉得：

Once Stan, like, put it on paper, we were like,

哦，这个应该能行。

oh, this should probably work.

咱们试试看吧。

Let's let's take a swing at it.

我的意思是，Discord 最初的想法，就是让你在打游戏的时候能聊天，打完之后还能接着聊？

When you I mean, the the idea of Discord initially was a way to communicate while you're playing video games and then to communicate around video games to talk after?

因为玩电子游戏——很多听众可能知道，但请容我稍微解释一下。

Because video games this and and know a lot of people listening know this, but just bear with me for a moment

当然。

Sure.

如果你了解这一点，那是因为很多听众可能并不知道：很多人玩电子游戏，并不是因为他们想赢，或者真的特别在意游戏本身。

If you know this because lots of people listening will not know this, which is a lot of people play video games not because they care about winning the game or they even care that much about the game.

他们只是想和朋友待在一起，顺便玩个游戏而已，其实重点是社交。

It's just a chance to hang out with friends, and you happen to be playing a video game, but you're really hanging out.

这才是关键。

That's the thing.

对吧？

Right?

是的。

Yeah.

所以这个工具就是为这个目的服务的。

And so this tool would just facilitate that.

你当初就是这么想的？

That was your thinking?

对。

Yeah.

完全没错。

That's exactly right.

我小时候，打游戏就是我和朋友一起消磨时间的方式。

You know, growing up, video games were the way that I spent time and hung out with my friends.

我不是那种喜欢跑出去打球的孩子。

You know, I wasn't the kid going outside playing sports.

所以这一辈子，我和最好的朋友、我妻子、我弟弟一起打游戏，留下了太多美好的回忆。

And so through my whole life, I just have so many amazing memories with my best friends, my wife, my brother, playing video games.

你知道吗，像你说的，游戏本身其实并不是重点。

You know, the video games themselves were not the point, like you're saying.

很多时候，我们根本就是在闲聊，聊些乱七八糟的事，聊生活。

And half the time, we'd be just talking about random stuff, talking about life.

Discord 的核心理念，就是为你们和朋友创造一个能聚在一起聊天、放松的空间。

And, fundamentally, what Discord was about was creating a place that you and your group of friends could come together to talk and hang out.

它就像让你在电脑上拥有一个专属的咖啡馆、宿舍或者客厅，只属于你和你的朋友，后来很快，这个空间就进了你的口袋，装进了手机里。

So it really created almost like a the feeling of, like, having your own private cafe or dorm room or living room that's for just for you and your friends, you know, on your computer, and then very quickly, we got we you know, in your pocket on your phone.

是的。

Yeah.

关键是，我想弄明白一件事。

He here's the thing here's what what I'm trying to understand.

我的意思是，这些东西其实早就以各种形式存在了。

I mean, all of these things were available in different formats.

对吧？

Right?

就像，你可以很粗略地想，你和朋友们在打游戏的时候，大家掏出iPhone开个电话会议，开免提，就能这样交流了。

Like, you could just very crudely, like, you were playing video games with your friends, you could all just get your iPhones out and do a conference call and just put on speaker, and you could you could communicate that way.

对吧？

Right?

你们能听到彼此的声音，也能聊天。

You could hear each other's voices and talk.

对。

Mhmm.

当时已经有 Slack 了，而且也有其他沟通方式。

Slack was out there, and and there were other ways to communicate.

所以，你为什么觉得大家会需要它呢？是因为那些工具都太分散，到处都有，所以需要一个简单的一站式平台，让大家在游戏里就能搞定所有沟通吗？

So why did you think that people would was it was it just that all of those were disparate, they were all over the place, and and there just needed to be a simple one stop shop where you could do all of that in the game?

你当时就是这么想的吗？

Was that the way you were thinking about it?

对的。

Yeah.

当时确实存在一些

There were there were a

原因有好几个，不过把所有功能整合在一个平台里确实是很重要的一点，对。

couple parts, but having an all in one experience was a big part of it because Mhmm.

你也知道，要在这么多不同的应用之间来回协调，实在是太麻烦了。

You know, having to coordinate between all these different apps is kind of a pain in the butt.

你知道，如果你想在游戏里跟朋友聊天，大家通常会用一套应用。

You know, like, if you wanna talk to your friends while you're playing a game, you know, people would use one set of apps.

但如果你没在游戏里，却想让他们加入，你可能就得用另一个应用去发短信。

And then if you weren't in the game but wanted you to join, you'd be, like, texting people on a different app.

可问题是，他们正在玩游戏，哪有空看手机呢？

But, like, they're playing the game, so, like, are they checking their phone?

他们哪有空看消息呢？

Are they checking their, you know, their messages?

就好像你置身于另一个世界一样。

It's like you're somewhere else.

游戏结束后，如果有人退出了，但还想继续聊天，用游戏自带的语音功能的话，那人就得一直开着游戏。

And then when the game is over, if someone leaves let's say someone drops out of the game but they wanna keep talking, If you're using the built in voice chat in the game, like, the person has to keep the game on their computer.

他没法去浏览网页或者其他事情。

They can't go, like, browse the web.

所以，有很多这种细微的使用习惯，让整个体验变得挺麻烦的。

So, like, it there's all these little, like, nuanced behaviors that it just made it kinda complicated to use.

但Discord的语音聊天方式不一样，它就像一个永远在线的会议。

Whereas with Discord, the way that voice chat works is it's like an always on conference call.

你把人拉进一个群组，创建一个语音频道，如果你和我在聊天，朋友看到我们在里面，点一下就能直接加入，完全不会打断我们。

Because you invite people into a group space and then create a voice channel, if you and I are talking, you know, our friend can see that we're there and just click the button and hop right in without us having to get interrupted.

整个体验简直太顺滑了。

And and so it's just a magical experience.

你在线上遇到别人的方式，跟用Skype时完全不一样。

You can, like, run into people online in a way that didn't happen in, Skype.

所以这里明显有个机会。

So so there was clearly an opportunity here.

但如果你打算专心做 Discord，那意味着你得放弃公司原本的视频游戏业务。

But, but if you were gonna focus on on building Discord, that presumably, that would mean that you were gonna have to abandon the the video game part of the company.

是的。

Yes.

不过一开始，情况没那么极端。

Well, initially, it was it was a little a little more incremental than that.

最初只有斯坦和一位设计师在做 Discord。

Initially, it was just Stan and a designer who were working on Discord.

2015年1月，我们干脆重新开始，全力投入这个项目。

In January 2015, we kinda went file new and started working on that.

对了，那时候你们已经叫它 Discord 了吗？

And And did you have that name, by the way, Discord?

那时候还没定名 Discord。

We did not have the name Discord at that point.

是的。

Mhmm.

当时它只是《锤子与凿子》项目里的一个附属功能。

It was just a side thing inside of hammer and chisel.

对。

Yeah.

没错。

That's right.

没错。

That's right.

大概几周内，斯坦就搭出了一个基础应用，我当时就觉得这玩意儿挺有意思的。

And within, like, a couple weeks, Stan kinda started to stand up a basic app, and I was like, this is kinda cool.

于是我开始参与开发，又过了几周，陆续又有另一位工程师加入。

So, like, I started coding on it, and then a couple weeks later, like, you know, one other engineer joined, another engineer joined.

两三个月后，我们的情况变成了：所有工程师都在做这个聊天应用，而所有美术和游戏设计师则继续做游戏。

And after, like, two or three months, we were in a situation where we basically had, like, all of our engineers working on this chat app, and then all of our artists and game designers building games.

我那时候就意识到，这太疯狂了。

And I realized, like, this is crazy.

作为一个18人的初创公司，我们没法同时押注这两件事。

Like, as an 18 person startup, we can't be betting on these two things at the same time.

是的。

Yeah.

风险实在太大了。

It's too too much risk.

如果我们专心做那个游戏，本来可以做成一个不错的中小型企业。

And, like, I think we could have had a really good small to mid sized business if we had focused on that game.

但因为我之前做OpenFeint的经历，我知道自己有能力去影响上亿甚至几亿人，我想做一件真正宏大而重要的事。

But from the experience I had building OpenFeint, I knew that, like, we I had these powers that I could use to to have positive impact on, like, tens or hundreds of millions of people, and I wanted to do something that was really big and important.

我知道，那个游戏以当时的形式，根本达不到那个目标。

And I knew that that game in it in that form wasn't gonna get there.

所以，我不满足于只打个一垒安打，而是决定：好吧。

So rather than being okay with hitting a single to first base, I was like, okay.

我们该怎么调整，才能直接来个满垒本垒打，或者类似的大动作呢？

How do we how do we change this up so we can get, you know, a triple home run grand slam or whatever?

那你们是什么时候决定彻底转向后来成为 Discord 的这个项目上的？

So when did you make the decision to, to totally shift your focus to to what would become Discord?

那是四月初的事。

So it was the beginning of April.

我清楚记得，当时我给布兰登打了电话，就是那个负责我们美术团队的艺术家，跟他说：嘿。

I I very distinctly remember, actually, I called Brandon, the the artist that I had you know, that was leading our our art team, and told him, like, hey.

我们要专注做这个应用了。

We're gonna focus on on this app.

所以，我得让你走，也让所有美术同事都离开。

And so, like, I gotta let you go and let, like, all the artists go.

你们都是特别出色的创意人才。

Like, y'all are amazing creatives.

你们的才华在这里太浪费了。

Your talent is wasted here.

所以我们聊了很久，最后也就这么定了。

So, you know, we had a long conversation about it, and ultimately, that's what happened.

整个美术团队都走了，去做了特别棒的游戏。

Like, the entire art team left and went and got jobs making, you know, great amazing games.

五月十三日，我想是那天。

So May 13, I think,

你把这一天看作是Discord非正式上线的日子，因为从那天起，不只是你的朋友，任何人都能注册使用了。

is what you you consider this sort the unofficial launch date of of Discord, because that was the day where you you released it widely, and, you know, people who weren't your friends could sign up for it.

你们是怎么引起别人注意的？

How did you get any attention for it?

你们的推广计划是什么？

What was your plan of attack?

是的。

Yeah.

在头五个月开发期间，我们不断跟朋友聊，给他们看，征求他们的意见，自己也反复用，就为了搞清楚大家喜不喜欢，怎么才能做得更好。

You know, during those first five months as we were building, we would constantly be talking to our friends, showing it to them, getting their input, and trying it ourselves to really try and get a sense for how is it resonating with people, how can we make it better.

通过这么一番折腾，我们最终有几位朋友开始用这个服务了。

And ultimately, from doing that, you know, we ended up getting, you know, a handful of our friends to actually start using the service.

对。

Yeah.

我们能感觉到这东西有潜力，但还远远不够成熟。

And we could tell that it was gonna be something, but it wasn't there yet.

那时候bug特别多。

Like, it it was buggy.

经常无缘无故就崩溃。

It would it would crash sometimes.

你根本没法安心用它来玩游戏。

You couldn't like, you actually really use it quite so much to play.

到了四月份，我们就琢磨着，怎么才能让这东西火起来呢？

And so come come April, you know, we were thinking about, like, how do we get this thing to grow?

我们想到一个办法，让一位熟悉游戏圈的朋友在Reddit上发帖，问问大家对这应用的看法，看看会不会有人来试试。

And we had this idea to ask a friend of ours who who was sort of in the video game community to make a post on Reddit asking people, like, what they thought about the app, and then maybe some folks will try it.