Shopify：托比亚斯·吕特克。一名滑雪板爱好者如何打造价值 1500 亿美元的商业帝国（2019）

那到底是什么？为什么这么重要？

What was that and why was that so significant?

我突然意识到，我可能是唯一一个会在这个项目上写代码的人。

So I had this realization that I probably got to be the only programmer that will ever work on this.

所以我根本不需要选一个大家都懂的语言。

So I don't actually have to choose something that lots of people know.

我完全可以挑最适合这个任务的工具。

I can actually choose just the best tool for the job.

我一直都很喜欢一门叫 Ruby 的编程语言，简直爱不释手。

And so I've always there's been this programming language called Ruby which I just absolutely loved.

人们通常不会这样谈论编程语言，但我特别享受在脑子里构思想法、一点点把它构建出来的过程。

It was you know, people don't usually talk about programming languages like this but I find like I I I really really love the process of constructing something in your brain, having this idea.

这感觉有点像画画。

It's it's a little bit also like painting.

是的。

Yeah.

你脑子里有个想法，而编程语言就是把脑海里那个完美的构想实现到屏幕上的工具。

You have an idea for for something, and then the programming language ends up being the mechanism for translating this perfect picture you have in your head onto a canvas.

没错。

Right.

如果你眼前有一幅壮丽的风景，却只能用蜡笔来画，虽然也能画出杰作，但终究还是蜡笔画。

And so, you know, if you have like an amazing landscape and they give you crayons, it's possible to make a masterpiece with crayons, but it will be it will always be a crayons painting.

Java 这些语言，跟我脑子里构建软件关系的方式完全对不上号。

So this is sort of in the way Java and others, they just didn't match the way my brain ended up constructing the relationships that make up software.

所以 Ruby 是我偶尔会玩一玩的语言。

And so Ruby was this thing I sometimes played with.

开源的。

Open source.

那时候它是日本开发的开源项目，只有日文文档。

And it opensource Japanese, there's only Japanese documentation around this time for it.

我是靠读源代码学会这门语言的。

I learned the language by looking at the source code.

而且

And

但源代码用的是拉丁字母。

But the source code is in Latin characters.

至少是拉丁字母。

Latin characters at least.

对。

Right.

但使用手册是日文的。

But the instruction manual was in Japanese.

没错。

But exactly.

所有表单和这些东西也都是日文的。

So and all the forms were in Japanese and all these kind of things.

我记得那时候想到，等等。

And, like, I remembered that, hey.

我有权利选择工具，那为什么不直接用 Ruby 呢？那样有趣多了。

I have the power to choose the tool, and so why don't I go and use Ruby because that would be way more fun.

用这种编程语言来搭建基础设施，你实际花多久建好了店铺界面？

Using this coding language, this programming language to build the infrastructure that would allow you how long did it take you to actually build the shop front?

是的。

I yeah.

我们大概两个半月后上线了 Snowdevil。

We launched Snowdevil about two and a half months later.

所以速度很快。

So It's fast.

那真是不错的技术。

It was really good technology.

而且说实话，我那时候每天大概要干十六个小时。

And and I mean, I also admit I probably spent sixteen hours a day doing that.

那会儿喝很多可乐，吃很多披萨，生活特别不健康。

So a lot of Coca Cola and pizza and very unhealthy lifestyle.

但我根本不觉得我是在拼命加班，这种生活方式我绝对不会推荐给别人。

But I it didn't feel like I was doing crazy hours or anything like this, and I would never recommend anyone to do this.

但那时候，世界上根本没什么比这更让我着迷的事了。

But, like, there was literally nothing more interesting in the world for toward this time.

所以从你上线网站到收到第一笔订单，中间花了多久？

So was it pretty quick from the time you launched the website to the time you got your first orders?

让我仔细说说这个，因为当时我是在咖啡馆里工作的，然后我就收到了第一笔订单。

It took let me let me just double click on this because, you know, I was working from coffee shops at this I I I had my first order.

那天的每一个细节，我到现在都记得清清楚楚。

I actually remember almost like everything about that day.

这其实成了一个特别有意义的时刻，因为我写的正是这套软件。

This is actually ended up being a really profound experience because I wrote the software.

在写代码的过程中，我不得不亲手写下那封软件会自动发给我的邮件。

At some point, doing writing the software, I actually had to type the email that the software would send to me.

是的。

Yeah.

我就去了家咖啡馆，打开笔记本，结果真收到一笔订单，是个来自宾夕法尼亚的陌生人，我从来没见过他。

Like and so, you know, I I went to a coffee shop, I opened my laptop, and it was a real order from gentleman in Pennsylvania, no one I ever met.

那种感觉真的很特别，我想这就是让你成为企业家的关键时刻。

And it really felt like I think that's what makes you an entrepreneur.

就是你第一次卖出东西，或者第一次有人打电话找你办事，那种感觉。

Like the first time you sell something or first time someone hires you for when the phone rings or something like this.

因为在那之前，你只是个做了点东西的人，没错。

Because until then, you're just someone who built something which is Yeah.

这已经很了不起了。

Already great.

但说实话，确实如此。

But like Yeah.

每当遇到 Shopify 的客户，我常会问他们：你接到第一笔订单的时候，人在哪儿？

It's that moment and it's something when I meet Shopify customers, I often ask them, like, hey, where where were you when you got that first order?

每个人都能清楚记得那个时刻。

And everyone can remember it.

你看到第一笔订单的时候，心里简直不敢相信，居然有个来自宾夕法尼亚的陌生人向你下单。

And you see your first order, and you're thinking, oh my god, some guy in Pennsylvania is ordering from me.

是的。

Yeah.

对。

Yeah.

我当时得走回家打电话给斯科特，因为我还没手机。

I actually had to walk home to call Scott because I didn't have a cell phone.

我跟他说我们接到订单了，那天特别有意思。

Tells about that we had an order, and was a cool day.

那人们是怎么知道Snowdevil这个品牌的呢？

And and how are people finding out about about Snowdevil?

我们当时试过一些基础的推广方式。

I mean, we tried to do basic promotions.

也发过传单之类的。

We tried flyers and stuff like this.

但2004年的测试版完全不一样。

But beta of 2004 was so different.

对吧？

Right?

那时候谷歌广告关键词刚推出不久。

Like, there was Google AdWords was a new product.

没错。

Right.

那两天，点击广告的最低出价是20美分，我们几乎每个搜索都出最低价，结果竟然卖出去了一块500美元的滑雪板。

Both days, it turns out that the minimum bid for an ad for click is 20¢, and we paid minimum bid for almost every search, which ended up converting on a $500 snowboard.

所以你就能通过谷歌广告把消息传出去。

So so you cut you could get the word out

是的。

Yeah.

那时候网上卖滑雪板的店本来就不多。

Through Google ad ads, and there were not that many online snowboard shops, presumably.

那Snowdevil这个生意做得怎么样？

So how did Snowdevil do as a business?

做得非常好。

It did really well.

滑雪板的利润率一直很高。

Snowboards have really good or had really good profit margins on them.

我们最大的问题就是补货跟不上，几乎一整年都断货。

And our biggest problem was keeping inventory getting inventory back and we were just basically out of stock the entire time.

真的吗。

Wow.

但我们那季的业绩特别棒。

But we we had an excellent season.

你们很快就回本了吧？

I mean you guys recouped your investment pretty quickly?

回本特别快，之后还攒下了一笔钱，用来支持下一阶段的计划。

Very quickly and then we had some a good amount of savings from from that for the next phase.

就你们俩自己干吗？

And it was just you and Scott?

还是很快就得招人帮忙处理库存、发货和配送？

Or did you quickly have to grow and bring in other people to help you with inventory and shipping and fulfillment?

不用。

No.

就我们两个人，所有事都自己做。

It was just the two of us, and we we did everything.

主要是Scott把滑雪板送到邮局，然后

Mostly, Scott and brought snowboards to the post office and

他真是亲自开车送去邮局的。

He was literally driving them to the post Yep.

是啊。

Yeah.

或者骑自行车送去。

Or biking them.

我们想出了一个办法来

We figured out a way to

我想象得到，他肩上扛着个用牛皮纸包着的滑雪板。

I'm imagining, like, a a brown paper wrapped snowboard on his shoulder.

是的。

Yeah.

对。

Yeah.

没错。

Exactly.

就是这个画面。

That's exactly the picture.

那段时间挺有意思的。

It was fun.

真的特别有意思。

It was really fun.

是的。

Mhmm.

好的。

Okay.

所以你和Scott一起经营滑雪板生意，听起来进展不错啊。

So so you're running the snowboard business with Scott, and it sounds like it's going pretty well.

你们赚钱了，那接下来发生了什么？

You guys are making money and I mean, what happened next?

事情是这样的。

Here's what happened.

到了春天，销量明显下滑了，我们就开始讨论，要想把这生意做成全年可持续的，要么卖滑板、冲浪板、风筝板，要么做点别的。

The sales slowed obviously in spring and we we we sort of had began the conversations around, you know, to make this a really sustainable year around business, we need to, you know, either sell skateboards, surfboards, kiteboards, or do something else.

所以你们当时在考虑，春天到了，要不要试试风筝板、滑板之类的，对吧。

So you were considering, hey, it's a spring, maybe we should do kiteboards and skateboards and Yeah.

其他的东西。

Other things.

是的。

Yeah.

我的意思是，这确实是顺理成章的做法，没错。

I mean, that would have been the natural thing Sure.

去做到全年运营，确实。

To do Yeah.

继续做下去，实现全年运营。

To to go year round.

再次，我和斯科特决定在镇上开个新店。

Again, Scott and I said we wanted to start a location in town.

但我真正投入的是开发工作，那时候我整天都在捣鼓软件。

But I really doing the development of it, I was now spending all this time like I was tweaking the software.

我从来没停下写代码。

I did not stop programming.

我就想，好吧，现在试试看别的方法。

I was just, okay, now let me try things.

让我把它提速。

Let me make it faster.

让我试试别的方法。

Let me use different approaches.

于是越来越多的人给我发邮件，问我能不能把 Snowdevil 授权给他们，因为他们也想搞个类似的项目。

And so increasingly, I got people sending me emails asking me if I would license Snowdevil to them because they wanted to start something similar.

有人跟我说：嘿，你这东西能授权给我们用吗？

People were saying, hey, can you just license you you built this Yes.

我们能拿它来做自己的电商网站吗？

This can we use it for our ecommerce shop?

没错。

Right.

而且正是因为它的设计完全不一样。

And exactly because it was it was just different.

它根本不是那种常规的网格结构。

It wasn't it wasn't a normal grid.

它讲的是故事。

It was it told stories.

它明显很有现代感。

It was clearly modern.

它有点像Web 2.0的样子。

It it was sort of web two o e.

所以很多人都说，真想用这个基础来打造自己的业务。

And so people were saying, would love to just build my business based on that foundation.

这让我想起Squarespace的故事。

I mean, It's it reminds me so much of the story of Squarespace.

Squarespace的创始人当初是因为找不到一个能同时做博客和网站的好工具，才开始做这个的。

And Squarespace was essentially started because the founder, he couldn't find a good way to do a blog and a website all in one.

于是他自己开发了一套建站的方式。

And so he basically created his own way to build a website.

对吧？

Right?

他自己做的。

He did it himself.

这里的情况也差不多。

It's similar story here.

确实类似。

Similar story.

对。

Yeah.

我需要的是一个能帮我从零开始创业的工具。

What what I needed was something that helps me in the journey of entrepreneurship from this from scratch.

我和其他人其实没什么不同。

And I'm not that different from other people.

如果我当时需要这个，那肯定也有成千上万的人同样需要。

Like, if I needed this at some point, there's gonna be at least couple thousand people who also need

这个。

this.

没错。

Right.

那是2005年春天的事。

So this was like spring two thousand five.

后来有一天，斯科特和我干脆说：滑板还是软件？

At some point, Scott and I just said, okay, skateboards or software?

很明显，我们该选软件。

It was pretty obvious that we should go with software.

稍后回来，Shopify开始慢慢上轨道了，但还是缺钱。

When we come back in just a moment, Shopify starts to gain traction but still needs money.

于是托比去了湾区，在Craigslist上买了一辆二手自行车，骑着去了桑迪胡克路。

So Tobi heads to the Bay Area, buys a used bicycle on Craigslist, and pedals over to Sandhill Road.

敬请继续关注。

Stay with us.

我是盖伊·拉兹，欢迎收听《我是如何打造的》。

I'm Guy Raz, and you're listening to How I Built This.

嘿。

Hey.

欢迎回到《我是如何打造这个的》。

Welcome back to How I Built This.

我是盖伊·拉兹。

I'm Guy Raz.

2005年，托比和他的联合创始人斯科特刚刚做出一个重大决定：把他们的滑雪板公司转型为软件公司。

So it's 2005, and Tobi and his cofounder Scott just made a huge decision to pivot their snowboarding company to a software company.

为了推进这件事，托比给他的朋友丹尼尔打了电话。

And to help them do it, Tobi calls up his friend, Daniel.

是的。

Yeah.

我们决定转做软件，于是我给丹尼尔打了电话，他是我特别要好的朋友，当时人在德国。我跟他说：‘我想做这么一件事，可能还需要半年时间来搭建，你愿不愿意来加拿大过个夏天，咱们一起干？挺有意思的。’

So we decided it's gonna be software, and I called Daniel who's a really good friend, my best friend really from who was in Germany and said, hey, here's what I would like to do and I think I need another half year to build this.

我们可以一起工作，那会很有趣。

Do you want to spend a summer in Canada and we do this together and like, we could work together, and that would be fun.

所以你和丹尼尔那年夏天，也就是2005年夏天，一起待在一起对吧？

So you you and Daniel spent that summer, I guess, summer of two thousand five.

那段时间其实拖了一年半，不过没错。

That summer became, like, a year and a half, but yes.

明白了。

Okay.

你们花了整整一年半的时间一起开发这个软件。

Year and a half trying to build this software together.

没错。

Exactly.

你们是什么时候彻底停止卖滑雪板的？

At what point do you stop selling snowboards?

大概就是那时候。

Around that time.

那年夏天之后，资金就耗尽了，我们也没再开门营业。

Cash was it was basically the summer, and we didn't reopen afterwards.

你就没再开门营业了。

You just didn't reopen.

你们是怎么想到给这个软件取名 Shopify 的？

How did you come up with the name Shopify for this software?

这是斯科特的主意。

It was Scott's idea.

我们讨论过想要什么样的名字，把 'shop' 和 'simplify' 合在一起很自然，后来我们就在 Codaddy 上注册了 registerthe.com。

It was we we talked about what what we wanted it, and putting shop and simplify together was pretty straightforward and and we went, I think, on codaddy and registerthe.com.

就这样定了。

And there you go.

那时候人们一听到，都会说：哦，对，是这么回事。

That take people back and saying, oh, Yeah.

那时候情况不一样。

Times were different.

好吧。

Alright.

所以你们有了Shopify，开始打造这个产品，从那一刻起，你们就已经在想，这就要成为我们的事业了。

So you've got Shopify, you're building this thing, And really, it sounds like from that moment, from the beginning, you're thinking, this is gonna be our business.

我们要开发一款软件，让任何人都能轻松简单地开设自己的电商网站。

We're gonna build the software that will enable people to open ecommerce sites easily and simply.

没错。

Exactly.

你知道的，创业要做的事情太多了。

It's, you know, all there's so much to building business.

有太多复杂的环节了，比如你收到一个订单，钱怎么才能到你手里？

There's so much complexity and like, if you get an order, how how does this money make it to you?

货运标签从哪儿来？

How do you get where do you get shipping labels from?

怎么让卡车准时来取货，把东西发出去？

How do you make a truck show up to actually send it anywhere?

Shopify把这些全都帮你解决了。

Like Shopify just does all these things for you.

那就是我们的目标，因为就像我刚才说的，我第一次卖出产品的时候，我们终于有了第一笔订单。

That was the goal because you know that moment that that I described there, I got my first sale, we got our first sale.

是的。

Yeah.

从那以后，那种感觉再也找不回来了，但那个时刻真的特别深刻。

From that point on, I can never get that again, but that was such a profound moment.

我当时就想，我真正想花时间去做的，是让别人也能拥有这样的体验。

Like, what I wanna spend my time on is, like, I can't I just have other people have that experience?

这后来成了我们打造公司的一个核心理念。

That became sort of a guiding principle of how we build a company.

我猜你们一定在某个时候得融资，来支付服务器费用、

And I have to imagine that you gotta, at some point, raise some money to pay for server space, pay for

对。

Yeah.

还有开发这项技术以及推广它所产生的各种开销，你们是什么时候开始考虑引入资金的？

You know, the kind of the the costs associated with building this technology and then marketing it, when did you first start to think about bringing in some money?

那时候，我们向亲朋好友筹了些钱。

So around that time, we asked friends and family for money.

大概是2006年、2007年左右。

This is, like, 2,006, 2,007.

大概是2005年左右。

2,000 around 5.

我们差不多凑了。

We Okay.

我们大概弄了。

We did around.

比如菲奥娜的父母，任何手里有点闲钱的人。

Like Fiona's parents, anyone who knew with any cash.

没错。

Exactly.

我家人那边的人。

People from my family.

说实话，真没想到大家这么信任我们。

I mean, know, amazing that people trusted us so much.

那时候你们觉得自己需要多少钱？

And how much money did you think you needed at that time?

需要二十万美元。

It was $200,000.

这可不是小数目。

Which is a lot of money.

当别人问托比，你为什么要二十万美元？

And and when people said, Tobi, what do you need $200,000 for?

你怎么回答的？

What would you say?

到目前为止，我的经历是这样的。

Here's my experience up to this point.

这很有价值。

This is valuable.

我知道这很有价值，因为我自己就需要，而且还有很多像我这样的人。

I know it's valuable because I would have needed it and there were more people like me.

但与此同时，这么多人还在问你要这个，你当时是怎么回应他们的？

But meantime, all these sort of like people were still asking you for this, and what were you saying to them?

你是不是跟他们说，别急，我们正在搞，再等等，马上就能给你们？

Were you saying, hang on, we're working on something, just hold tight, we'll get it to you?

是的。

Yeah.

我一直在写一个博客，记录我开发这个过程中的经历。

I I kept a web log where I sort of talked about my experience building it.

我还设了一个着陆页来收集邮箱，现在这个页面已经变成了

I also had a landing page collecting emails, which is now of

当然，那个着陆页就是 shopify.com，还是

course And the landing page was shopify.com or

是的。

Yeah.

我们还做了一个演示，引导大家去Snowdevil，解释我们为什么要做这件事。到2006年正式上线时，我觉得我们已经收集了四五千封邮件。

And here's like a demo which we pointed people to Snowdevil to explain why we were doing this and by the time we launched in 2006, I think we had four or 5,000 emails.

所以，这个数字看起来也不算多。

So it's not that that seemed like a lot.

哇哦。

Wow.

对啊。

Yeah.

明白了。

Alright.

你已经有启动资金了。

You've got the seed money.

你也有

You've got

一个小办公室。

A small office.

我们最后租了一个特别小的办公室。

We ended up taking a very small office space.

我们其实搬到了那家咖啡店楼上，那地方是我当时看中的。

We actually moved above the coffee shop I got that for sale.

好的。

Okay.

我们根本没申请网络专线。

Actually we never got Internet line.

一直用的是他们店里的WiFi。

We always used their WiFi.

没错。

Right.

搭了几张桌子，我们就从那儿开始干了。

Built some desks and that's from where we worked.

该正式上线了。

And it's time to launch.

你从落地页收到了大约四千封邮件。

You've got 4,000 emails or so from the landing page.

你们是不是直接发了一封群发邮件，说‘我们上线了’？

And did you just send like a blast of emails saying, okay, we're live.

我们在这儿了。

We're here.

随时可以开始了。

We're ready to go.

是这么操作的吗？

Is that how

你们就这样把产品推出来的？

you launched what we did.

就是发了一封群发邮件。

So just a blast email.

反响怎么样？

And what was the response?

所以人们注册只是为了试一试，这真的非常令人兴奋。

So people signed up to just try it out, which was really, really exciting.

说实话，到现在还有商家在用Shopify，而他们就是从那天开始的，简直不可思议。

And frankly, there are still business running on Shopify that that actually started on that day, which is Wow.

太了不起了。

Remarkable.

但那段时间真的忙得不得了。

But it wasn't it was a lot.

我的意思是，你想一想，在线商店意味着什么。

I mean, you know, think about what an online store is.

对大多数客户来说，这可是他们的饭碗。

It's to most of our customers, this is their livelihood.

没错。

Right.

如果店铺突然打不开，或者出了什么问题，生意就完了，这责任太重大了，而他们居然把信任交给了加拿大这边的一群普通人。

If that thing is not there suddenly or something goes wrong, the business is defunct, which is a huge responsibility, and people were trusting free guys in Canada.

那一开始是免费的吗？

And was it free initially?

刚开始确实是免费的。

It started out free.

第一年，我们决定不搞多档月费订阅，对吧？

The first year, we decided against the multiple tier monthly Subscription, right?

对。

Okay.

因为我们觉得，要让人信任我们已经很难了，价格低一点，大家才更愿意试试看。

Because we figured that this it's gonna be so hard to get people to trust us that making it cheaper would be more likely for people to give it a try.

我们的模式是，我记得每笔交易收3.5%或者3.75%的费用。

And the model was, I think we charged like 3.5 or 3.75% per sale.

这根本是个失败的商业模式——那些本来就没指望能卖出去东西的人觉得太棒了，可真打算大卖的人觉得这费用高得离谱。

It was a complete failure of a business model because basically everyone who didn't expect to have sales thought it was amazing and people who expected to sell a lot would that was way too much money.

所以我们在上线一年后就改了，其实是在我婚礼前一晚改的，到现在我都想不通我为啥选那天。

So we ended up switching it a year after launch, actually the night before my wedding for a reason I will never figure out why I did that.

你结婚前一晚，对吧？

The night before your wedding Yeah.

你们改成了订阅制？

You switched to a subscription model?

对。

Yeah.

我们把所有老用户都保留了下来，但突然之间大家全都打电话来问，说之前答应过别人可以免费用，现在怎么又要收费了。结果我婚礼期间电话都快被打爆了。

And we we grandfathered everyone, but suddenly everyone called us and said, hey, I promised my so and so that they can use this for free, and suddenly it costs money, and so I got all these phone calls, like, during my wedding.

所以这事儿多少有点让人压力山大。

So it's it's sort of a bit stressful.

所以你们是在2007年改的模式，对吧？对。

So you so you changed the model in 2007 Yeah.

那时候你还跟公婆住在一起呢。

Still living with your in laws.

是的。

Yes.

现在你和岳父母住在一起了。

Now but but now married with your in laws.

是的。

Yeah.

对。

Yeah.

你还记得刚开始那一年，大概有多少人注册了这个服务吗？

How many people do you remember, like, in those early days, like, first year or so, actually signed up for the service?

当时有几千个账户，但活跃用户大概就一百来个。

I mean, there's a couple of thousand accounts, and I would say, like, maybe a 100 active.

到了第二年，我们遇到一件挺有意思的事。

And in in the year two, we had a interesting event.

我记得那时候印第安纳波利斯队赢得了超级碗，当地一家报纸在超级碗前两天临时建了一个Shopify商店。

I I mean, this is I think the Indianapolis team won the Super Bowl around that time and they actually had a or or a local newspaper actually had a Shopify store created, which they started like two days before the Super Bowl.

他们卖的T恤上面印着‘我们赢了超级碗’的头版新闻。

And it just was selling T shirts with the front page saying, we won the Super Bowl.

哦，天哪。

Oh, wow.

T恤上印的是封面图片。

Like a front like a picture of On the T shirt.

就是他们万一赢了会是什么样子。

What the would look like if they actually happen to win.

是的。

Yeah.

结果他们真的赢了，当天就卖出了数万件，我觉得有几十万美元的T恤。

And then they ended up winning, and they sold tens of thousands, think hundreds of thousands of dollars worth of these T shirts on on that day.

这对我们来说简直太震撼了，因为有人只是在办公室里有个好点子，就真地把它变成了现实。

And that was like a stunning experience for us because that was that was so like someone just had a really good idea in an office and turned it into like a real Yeah.

一场真正的经济事件。

Economic event.

你知道，这类事情开始越来越多了。

You know, these events started accumulating.

那时候，人们开始更多地尝试在线零售。

People were kind of experimenting more with online retail.

新企业纷纷自己冒出来，而不是来找我们说：嘿。

The the the new businesses were starting instead of people coming to us saying, hey.

我们想降低成本，转用你们的服务。

We want to reduce costs and switch to you.

不过听起来，这像是个缓慢积累的过程。

It sounds like it was a slow burn, though.

并不是一下子爆发式的增长。

It wasn't like an overwhelming rush.

而是一点一点地推进，比如2006年、2007年那会儿。

It was like incremental, you know, 2006, 2007.

但那时候，你们还是靠当初融到的种子资金和产生的收入在维持运营吗？

But you're still at this point, you're still operating off of the seed money you raised and any revenue you were generating?

是的。

Yeah.

当时资金状况怎么样？

How was the money situation?

是靠自己慢慢赚出来的吗？

Were you were was it just self generating?

你们当时是吗？

Were you?

不是。

No.

根本不是。

Like, no.

我们是有付费客户，但现金流正迅速枯竭。

It was we had paying customers, but we were going trending towards zero fast.

对。

Yep.

说白了，差不多就是这时候钱彻底花光了。

Like we eventually were if we I mean, we did basically run out of money around this time.

幸运的是，我们认识了一位天使投资人，他在2007年左右投了大约40万美元，救了我们一命。

We luckily met an angel investor who ended up putting I think $400,000 around 2,007 and that saved us.

有个人叫约翰·菲利普斯。

There's an individual by the name of John Phillips.

我觉得他投资的部分原因是他父母住在渥太华，他可能想在城里找点事做，而不是光去探望父母，但他确实也很看好这个生意。

I think part of the reason why I invested is because his parents were in Ottawa and I think he wanted something else to do in town rather than just visit his parents, but he also really liked the business.

于是他最终成了我们的投资人，也成了公司的导师。

So he ended up becoming our investor and and and basically mentor to the company.

这是一笔非常有远见的投资，因为当时公司估值已经到了300万美元。

It was a very prescient investment because I think at that time, the company was valued at $3,000,000.

对。

Mhmm.

大概这个时候，2008年，斯科特离开了。

Around this time, 2008, Scott leaves.

他决定，想换个方向了。

He decides, I wanna move on.

你对那个决定有什么印象？

What do you what do you remember about that decision?

他是首席执行官，负责那方面的工作。

I mean, it was he he had the job of CEO.

我觉得他后来意识到，软件行业的发展趋势是，大多数首席执行官都是创始团队里技术背景很强的人。

I think he just realized at some point that where the software industry was going is most of the people who were CEOs were actually highly technical parts of the founding teams.

他也明白，从长远来看，最关心这家公司的人会是我。

I think he also realized that I will end up being the person who will care most about this company in the long run.

所以，那也就没什么问题了。

So, you you know, that was okay.

我们决定分开走。

We decided to part ways

你担心过吗？毕竟他是个首席执行官？

worried about it because he was a CEO?

我确实很担心，因为我自己也没觉得我适合当首席执行官。

I was hugely worried about it because, like, I I was I was not convinced that I should have a CEO job.

但有人告诉我，如果一家顶尖的风投机构投资了你的公司，他们就能帮你找到

But someone gave me told me that if a great VC invests in your company, they would have a network to find

一位CEO。

A CEO.

合适的CEO。

The right kind of CEO.

对。

Yep.

所以我心想，好吧，也许我真的该去跟风险投资人聊聊。

And so I was like, okay, well, maybe I really should talk to venture capitalists.

那时候，我去了硅谷，专门去见了一些风投。

And that was the time I I traveled to Silicon Valley to talk with VCs.

所以明确一下，这是2008年。

So just to be clear, this is 2008.

你决定，还是去一趟硅谷，找一位风投，让他们帮你物色一位CEO。

You decide, I better go to Silicon Valley, find a venture investor who then can help me find a CEO.

是的。

Yeah.

所以你飞过去，2008年。

So you fly out there, 2008

对。

Yeah.

就约了几个会吗？

With a couple of appointments?

对。

Yeah.

几个会面，再加上和在硅谷认识的朋友、熟人喝点东西。

A couple of appointments and and and just drinks with friends and people I knew in Silicon Valley.

那是我第一次去硅谷。

That's the first time I was I came to Silicon Valley.

你带了商业计划书吗？

Did you have a deck?

绝对不是。

Absolutely not.

我的初衷是创办一家20人的公司。

My intention was to build a 20 people company.

我就想做这么一件事。

That's what I wanted to do.

20人的公司，是啊。

A 20 person company Yeah.

高效运作，给人们提供软件，不是搞个庞然大物。

Super efficient, providing the software to people, not a massive company.

对。

Yeah.

因为你就是想要一种稳定又舒服的生活。

You because you you wanted to have you just want a sustainable nice life.

是的。

Yeah.

我不需要钱，因为我根本没觉得这是在创业。

I I didn't need the money because I didn't think this was a venture I was building.

所以我去做这件事的时候，并不怎么在意结果。

And so I went not really being too worried about the results.

我更担心的是飞去湾区的机票和住宿开销。

Was more worried about the amount of money it would cost me to fly To fly to Bay Area.

还有其他相关费用。

And accommodations and so on.

你住在哪里？

Where did you stay?

我住在一个小旅社。

I stayed at little hostel.

青年旅舍？

At a youth hostel?

对。

Yeah.

对。

Yeah.

是的。

Yeah.

就是那种上下铺的房间吗？

Like in a bunk bedroom?

对。

Yeah.

我有个室友。

I had a I had a roommate.

顺便说一下，他也是个程序员，其实特别棒。

Like, incidentally, it was also a computer programmer, it was actually great.

我还在Craigslist上买了一辆自行车。

I actually bought a bicycle on Craigslist.

你待了一周还是两周？

And did you go for a week or two weeks

或者我原本计划只待一周。

or I was scheduled to be there for a week.

结果我待了大概两到两个半月，因为事情发生得很快——我是骑着自行车去的，第一次见面时，他们可能心里都在想：这人是谁？

I ended up staying I think two of two and a half maybe because what happened pretty quickly is, you know, I would have my first meeting and again, this is me biking.

是从青少年医院那边吗？

From the youth hospital?

从青少年医院骑到市中心，一到场，他们大概已经在心里嘀咕了：这人是谁？

From the youth hospital to down center of road, and, showing up and they probably already thought, who is this?

第一次见面时，我带着笔记本，一开始我还在介绍业务，但他们很快就问起用户使用情况、市场规模这类问题。

And so I I would have my the first meeting and I had my notepad and they would ask me it started out, I I was sort of explaining the business and but then they would ask me some questions about, you know, usage and market size and these kind of things.

有些问题我能答上来，他们一听就特别感兴趣。

And some of those I could answer and and they would would get really interested.

但问题是，他们很快问了一些我答不上来的问题。

But the problem was that very quickly they asked me questions I couldn't answer.

比如关于获客成本比率、用户生命周期价值这些概念。

Like there was questions around CAC ratios and and and lifetime value and all these kind of things.

我会把那些术语记下来。

I would write down the terms.

然后去查它们的意思。

I would then look up what meant.

是的。

Yeah.

通常会查到一个公式，因为这些都是需要套用到商业分析里的计算方法。

Usually, would get an equation back because it's some equation that you're supposed to apply to a business.

接着我会去公司的数据库里找相关数据，代入公式算出结果，这样下次见面时我就又能答上一个问题了。

I would then go to our database and get all the relevant data, plug them in the equation, I would get the numbers so I had one more question I could answer the next meeting.

所以，我就是这么一步步应付这些会面的。

And so basically this is how I went through these meetings.

我记得最后拿到的投资条款，简直是别人梦寐以求的类型，说实话，我那时候主要就是拿到了一些行业基准的报价，然后……

I remember that I I mean, I ended up getting the kinds of term sheets people actually, frankly, dream about, which I can I was mostly like, I got I got benchmark offers and

是那次访问之后的事吗？

From that from that visit?

是的

Yeah.

到后来我慢慢摸清门道了，我们居然能免费参会了

We actually got meeting free by the time I I I I kind of figured out

所以其实很多人根本没兴趣

So so people actually really weren't.

不过确实有几个人表现出兴趣

There were some people who were interested.

有几个人是感兴趣的，但所有报价都附带一个条件：必须把公司搬到硅谷

Some people were interested, but all the offers were always conditional on moving a company to Silicon Valley.

他们都这么说：我们会全力支持你

They all said, we'll we'll support you.

但你得把公司搬过来

You gotta move it here.

对

Yes.

所以我收到了那些报价。

So I got the offers.

我拿到了条款清单，有些人还给我介绍了潜在的首席执行官人选。

I got term sheets, and some of them referred me to potential CEOs.

我跟一些可能接任CEO的人开了很多场深夜会议。

I had a bunch of late night meetings with people who could take over as CEO

因为你并不想当CEO。

because you did not wanna be CEO.

因为我喜欢摆弄技术，那才是我擅长的事。

Because I wanted to play with technology, that was what I was good at.

是的。

Yeah.

那就是我的身份认同。

That was my identity.

所以我跟他们说，好吧，如果现在就想推进，而且我能做出漂亮的数据，你们迟早会把这位置给我。

So I said, okay, clearly, if you wanna be do this now and if I get good numbers, you're gonna give me this latest Eventually.

所以你意思是，我不需要

So you you figured I don't need to

慢点说。

Slow this down.

对。

Yeah.

我回去之后

I go back.

会和团队聊聊。

I talk with my team.

我好好想想这件事。

I I think about this.

这时候你的团队有多少人？

And how many people are on your team at this point?

大概只有五个人。

There's about just five people.

我之前请了一个人负责客户服务。

I I had someone for customer support.

一开始所有客户服务都是我亲自做，后来团队其他人告诉我，我的英语水平不够好。

I was doing all the customer support initially, and then eventually, the rest of my team told me my English wasn't good enough.

所以。

So

顺便问一下，你平时怎么给员工发工资？

By the way, how are you paying people?

那时候我们已经拿到了天使投资。

This was now after we got angel investment.

但我自己还是没拿薪水。

I was still wasn't taking salary.

你的资金撑不了太久。

But your runway was not very long.

对。

No.

但那时候已经有收入了。

It's but there was income now.

我们还在烧钱，不过速度越来越慢了。

It was it was we were still burning, but it was it it got slower and slower.

因为订阅者开始付费了。

Because there was income coming in from subscribers.

明白了。

Okay.

没错。

Exactly.

我回头想想，那已经是2008年了。

I go back, and then we're talking 2,008.

那时候雷曼兄弟出事了。

So Lehman Brothers at some point.

整个世界都开始崩塌了。

Now the world was falling apart.

雷曼兄弟倒闭了，市场崩盘，2008年，你之前拒绝的一些条款书，现在突然全都变得至关重要，而你正面临一场全球金融危机。

Lehman Brothers collapsed, markets collapsed, 2008, you've got term sheets that you've kind of rejected, and now you're about to face a global financial crisis.

所以大概就是那时候，我收到通知，说那些条款书再也不会被认定了，真是没想到。

So basically, I got this, around this time, notice that term sheets will no longer be honored because Wow.

大家都得赶紧收紧开支，诸如此类。

Everyone needs to tighten bells and so on.

一开始，我以为我们彻底完了。

Basically, initially, I thought we were toast.

广告回来后，我们会讲讲这场全球衰退怎么反而成了Shopify的巨大机遇，以及Tobi Lutke是怎么被迫接手CEO这个他根本不想做的职位的。

When we come back after the break, how the global recession actually turned out to be a huge opportunity for Shopify, and how Tobi Lutke learned to do the job of CEO, a job he never wanted in the first place.

请继续关注。

Stay with us.

我是盖伊·拉兹，欢迎收听《我是如何打造这家公司的》。

I'm Guy Raz, and you're listening to how I built this.

欢迎回到《我是如何打造这家公司的》。

Welcome back to How I Built This.

我是盖伊·拉兹。

I'm Guy Raz.

那是2008年，全球金融危机爆发了。

So it's 2008, and the global financial crisis hits.

这时候，托比·卢特克已经是Shopify的CEO了。

At this point, Tobi Lutke is the CEO of Shopify.

原本对投资感兴趣的风险投资人，态度突然冷淡下来，Shopify的资金也所剩无几。

The VCs who had been interested in investing weren't quite so interested anymore, and Shopify didn't have that much runway.

钱快用光了。

The money was running out.

但接下来，发生了一件出人意料的事。

But then something surprising happened.

很多刚被裁员的人，反而萌生了自己开网店的想法。

It turned out that lots of people who were newly laid off had lots of ideas about starting their own online stores.

那些失去工作的人，借助Shopify实现了自主创业，重获独立。

People who lost their jobs could reach for their own independence and engage in entrepreneurship using Shopify.

于是他们想，要不我干脆试试看？

And they said, why don't I give this a go?

就是那种，我要去做我一直想做却没做的事。

Like, I'm gonna try this thing I always wanted to try.

对吧？

Right?

我就想着，干脆

I'm I'm going like

你有没有注意到，用户和订阅人数开始慢慢增加了？

I mean, did you see start to see users and and subscribers start to tick up?

有。

Yes.

2008年到2009年，你确实看到了明显的转变？

You saw you saw a measurable change in 2008, 2009?

我们原以为数据会断崖式下跌，结果反而一路攀升，越涨越快。

We thought the numbers would fall off a cliff, and what they actually did is they started climbing and accelerating.

所以你原本完全预料不到会是这样的结果。

So you had you you just anticipated a completely different outcome.

对。

Yes.

我当时都准备好要告诉别人，迟早发不出工资了。

I I was ready to think about how to

别急，听我说。

Shut up, tell

但到了2009年，公司居然第一次实现了现金流平衡。

people that I can't meet payroll at some point and instead basically in 2009, the company now hit first time sort of cash flow neutral.

我们终于能挺过这次低迷，重新开始考虑长期投入，比如基础设施建设之类的。

Like we can write out whatever downturn this is and start thinking about long term investment, like infrastructure projects and so on again.

与此同时，你可是公司的CEO。

Meantime, you are the CEO.

作为CEO，你自己感觉怎么样？

How are you doing as the CEO of the company?

我做得不好。

I'm not good.

我的团队对我特别有耐心。

I mean, my team was very, very patient with me.

需要学的东西太多了。

There was a lot to learn.

这工作很难，非常微妙。

It's a tough it's a it's a very subtle job.

计算机的好处是，你让它做什么，它就会一直做下去，直到你叫停为止。

And, you know, wonderful things about computers is when you tell them what to do, they'll keep doing it, and they'll do it forever until you stop.

没错。

Right.

但人可不是这样的。

Like, out humans are not like that.

人是不一样的。

Humans are different.

是的。

Yes.

所以，我当时的成长曲线非常陡峭。

So so there was a very large learning curve.

从2009年到2010年，我真的拖了公司的后腿，本来我本可以做得更好，公司也本该发展得更快。

And I would say 2009 to 2010, I truly held the company back from what I could have and should have probably become.

你拖了公司的后腿？

You held it back?

对。

Yeah.

什么意思？

What do you mean?

如果你有工程背景，就会明白，总有个瓶颈，你解决了一个，另一个又冒出来，公司也是一样。

Like, if if you come from engineering, you know, something is always a bottleneck and and the moment you remove that, something else becomes a bottleneck and it's same goes for companies.

那时候，我故意放慢了公司的发展速度，因为我需要让它变得我能掌控得住。

At this point, I intentionally slowed down the growth of a company a little bit just because I needed it to be manageable for me.

我当时一直在纠结一个最关键的问题：这到底是个生活方式型生意，还是真打算做一家风险投资型公司？

And I was wavering on the most important decision which was, is this a lifestyle business or is is this actually a venture?

到那时候，你的年收入已经突破一百万美元了。

And by this point, your revenue is over $1,000,000 a year.

是的。

Yeah.

对吧？

Right?

听起来是不少，但你显然有巨大的开销，员工也在不断增长。

But which sounds like a lot, but obviously, you've got huge expenses, you've got a growing staff.

没错。

Yeah.

你有没有过那种感觉：天啊，这么多程序员和员工现在都靠我养活，全指望这个项目，可我根本不确定它能不能撑下去？

Did you ever get the feeling like, oh my god, all these programmers and people are now, like, working for me, and they're depending on this thing, and I I don't know if this is gonna work.

老兄，那种压力真的压得人喘不过气。

Guy, it's it's crushing.

这责任太重了。

It's a crushing responsibility.

对吧？

Right?

你得为所有在那里工作的人负责。

Like, it's you're responsible for everyone who is there.

对吧？

Right?

人都有家庭吧？

People have families?

人都有家庭。

People have families.

人都有孩子。

People have kids.

我家并不富裕。

My family, like, it's not a wealthy family.

我的意思是，人们给我钱，可他们自己根本没多少余钱。

Like, it's it's I mean, people gave me money they didn't really have.

到目前为止，钱主要来自约翰·菲利普斯，还有我家人，最近一年则是我岳父出的钱，专门用来发工资。

Like, up till this point, it was really just money from John Phillips, from my family, and then for the last year, from my father-in-law who gave me money for for to meet payroll.

他给你钱发工资？

He was giving you money to meet payroll?

我们住在一起，还一起吃晚饭。

And we were living together and had dinner together.

真没想到这事儿居然成了。

It's amazing that this worked.

我简直不敢相信他愿意这么做。

I mean, I just couldn't believe he was doing that.

因为他是个公务员。

Because he was a bureaucrat.

那是他省吃俭用攒下来的钱。

This was his savings.

他几乎是把毕生积蓄扔进了这场火海，却依然无比支持，因为他们真的相信这个想法。

Basically, he was putting his life savings into this money bonfire, was just unbelievably supportive because they somehow believed in this idea.

你晚上睡不着觉吗？

Did you have trouble sleeping at night?

经常睡不着。

Pretty often, yeah.

你知道吗，我发现创业这条路——至少对我而言——本质上就是活在两种截然不同的状态里。

You know, like, so one thing I found about entrepreneurial journey, or at least mine, is you basically exist in two different states.

一种是觉得一切正在成形，只要我们这么做，就没人能超越我们；另一种是彻底绝望，觉得完了完了，今晚就完了。

There's the state of things are coming together and I think if we do this we are unbeatable And the state of complete dread and we are dead, we are dead, we are dead tonight.

我觉得这种状态从来就没真正消失过。

And I don't think that actually ever went away.

直到今天，我依然这样。

I still to this day have this.

变化的是，以前可能一个月在一种状态，再一个月切换到另一种，后来变成一周，现在是一天，有时候甚至一天里来回切换。

The thing that changed is it used to be like a month in one state and then a month in another, and then eventually became a week and now a day and now it this can happen.

我早上吃早餐前能抽三根烟，但说到底，那种低谷真的特别深，失败意味着太多东西了。

I can smoke a tree three times before breakfast, you know, like, but at the bottoms, like the bottoms are deep and the implications of what failure means is it just means so much.

这会彻底改变每个人的人生轨迹，对吧？

It changes everyone's life story to a significant degree, right?

你是怎么熬过来的？

How did you manage that?

你去长跑吗？

Did you go for long runs?

你吃百忧解了吗？

Did you take Prozac?

你到底做了些什么？

What did you do?

我没有。

I, no.

我就是埋头写代码，其实那往往并不是我最该做的事。

I basically just programmed, which actually often wasn't the best use of my time.